Carlo2014 Jaskin

doi: 10.1111/isj.
12039
Info Systems J (2014) 24, 537–569 537
Early vs. late adoption of radical information

technology innovations across software
development organizations: an extension of
the disruptive information technology
innovation model¶
Jessica Luo Carlo* James Gaskin,†,** Kalle Lyytinen ‡ & Gregory M. Rose§
*Department of Advertising, Public Relations, & Retailing, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, Michigan 48824, USA, email: carloj@msu.edu,†Marriott School of Management,
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 785 TNRB, USA, email: james.eric.gaskin@gmail.
com,‡Department of Information Systems, Weatherhead School of Management, Case
Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106, USA, email: kalle@case.edu and
§
College of Business, Washington State University, 14204 NE Salmon Creek Ave.,
Vancouver, Washington 98686, USA, email: grose@vancouver.wsu.edu
Abstract. This paper extends the disruptive information technology innovation

model (DITIM) by exploring the impact of adoption timing on innovation outcomes
within software development organizations during a disruptive innovation cycle.
The DITIM suggests that radical changes in computing platforms result in
pervasive and radical innovations in software development organizations across
three innovation types: base technologies adopted, services produced and
processes adopted. Upstream attributes (amount and radicalness) of the base
innovations impact effects in-kind downstream (a.k.a., strong order effects) on
services and processes. Extending these tenets of the DITIM, we posit that during
disruptive information technology (IT) innovation, the temporal stage of innovation
activity (early vs. late) by software development organizations will significantly
impact four innovation characteristics: (1) adoption rate of radical IT innovations,
(2) strong order effects on downstream innovations related to the amount of
innovation, (3) perceived radicalness of innovations and (4) strong order effects
on downstream innovations related to the amount of perceived radicalness of
innovation. We examine these impacts by reanalysing a cross-sectional study of
121 software development organizations that adopted internet computing as
reported in the original data analysis of the DITIM. By splitting the data into early
and late adopter groups, our moderation analysis shows significant differences
** Assistant Professor of Information Systems.

¶ All authors contributed equally to this paper. This paper is dedicated in memory of our friend and colleague
Jessica Luo Carlo and is her final manuscript.
© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd

538 J. L. Carlo et al.
between early and late adopting groups in each of the four hypothesized impacts.
Specifically, the adoption rate of radical IT innovations, strong order effects on the
amount of innovation, perceived radicalness of innovations and strong order effects
on perceived radicalness were each found to differ between early and late adopters.
However, it is also important to consider innovation type as three significant effects
were in the opposite direction for process innovations. These findings suggest that
IT-innovation scholars and practitioners should carefully consider innovation timing
and type when studying or managing radical IT innovation.
Keywords: internet computing, radical innovation, disruptive innovation, early

adoption, strong order effects, software development
INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT) innovation moves through time. The technologies that underpin
these processes also change over time and shape the innovation process. Temporal concepts
like stages, sequences or lags are thus important intellectual devices for explaining IT
innovation (Ancona et al., 2001). In IT-innovation research, the concept of a temporal stage
has been applied for some time in explaining the dynamics of innovation (Kwon & Zmud,
1987; Newman & Robey, 1992; Newman & Sabherwal, 1996), and IT investments (Nolan,
1973); for a criticism, see King & Kraemer (1984). Temporal concepts have also been applied
to explain IT-innovation sequences (Dong-Gil & Dennis, 2011; Carlo et al., 2012), innovation
speed and its antecedents (Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996) and measures of innovativeness
(Subramanian & Nilakanta, 1996; Wilson et al., 1999). While prior research has made
significant progress towards understanding temporal facets of IT innovation in general, such
a lens has not been widely applied in the study of radical IT innovation. In this study, we address
this gap by investigating the impact of adoption timing during a disruptive technological cycle on
the adoption rates, perceived radicalness and the transformative impacts (strong order effects)
among IT-innovation types as specified by the disruptive information technology innovation
model (DITIM) (Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a; Carlo et al., 2011).1,2
The DITIM essentially explains innovation patterns over time and articulates their sequence
across three types of IT innovations: (1) bases, (2) processes and (3) services. The data for
validating the initial DITIM were retrospective data collected across the software development
industry (in 2005) a decade after the internet disruptive cycle started (Carlo et al., 2011). As
1
We refrained from using the term ‘longitudinal’ because a longitudinal study implies repeated observa-
tions of the same variables over long periods as in a panel study. Owing to its path-breaking and
unpredictable nature, the study of disruptive innovations is retrospective (Dahlin and Behrens 2005).
We know an innovation is disruptive only after its impacts have trickled down, and it is difficult to identify
and track a cohort of organizations from the birth of a disruptive innovation.
2
Here, we use the term ‘disruptive’ differently from Christensen who defines disruptive innovations as
those that ‘challenge industry incumbents by offering simpler, good-enough alternatives to an
underserved group of customers’ (Bower and Christensen 1995; Christensen and Baumann 2006). In
this paper, we define ‘disruptive innovation’ based on its transformative impact on IT-innovation ecology.
© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Radical information technology innovations 539
demonstrated by Lyytinen et al. (2010), the first 10 years of innovation during the internet
computing era across the software development industry can be bifurcated into two periods:
(1) 1995–1999, an early period of rapid, broad and deep industry-wide innovation to all three
innovation types (bases, processes and services); and (2) 2000 onward, a period in which
industry-wide innovation slowed, became dramatically standardized and posed lower learning
requirements for new entrants relative to the earlier stage. With the call for more time-sequence
innovation research in the information systems (IS) literature (Fichman, 2004) and the
recognition that there were two distinct industry-level innovation periods during the internet
computing era, we feel that the DITIM needs to be further refined to account for differences
between the early and late adopters. We suggest that such refinements can improve decisions
about innovation timing, scope and radicalness within software organizations.
In particular, by reanalysing the dataset originating from the initial DITIM study, we developed
hypotheses and tested whether earlier adopters of radical platform innovations perceive
connected IT innovations to be more radical and whether they subsequently adopt these
innovations at a slower rate than late adopters. We also sought to understand whether the
impacts of antecedent radical IT innovations on the downstream technological or administrative
innovations (strong order effects) vary across time – in terms of both the amount and the level of
perceived radicalness of the innovations. In doing so, we investigated outcomes of time (early
vs. late) for differentiation on IT-innovation types. The study therefore recognizes the
importance of differentiating between types of innovation within an ecology (Carlo et al.,
2012; Adomavicius et al., 2007) and adds to the limited set of studies that has empirically tested
the impact of IT-innovation types (Grover et al., 1997; Adomavicius et al., 2007; Carlo et al.,
2011; Carlo et al., 2012). Thus, when studying disruptive innovation, the primary goals of this
study are (1) demonstrating the importance of considering temporal factors while studying dis-
ruptive innovation and (2) illustrating that innovation types matter when theorizing about IT-inno-
vation creation and adoption.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first briefly review the original DITIM,
in particular its constructs of IT-innovation types, radicalness and strong order effects (Lyytinen
& Rose, 2003a; Lyytinen & Rose, 2003b; Carlo et al., 2011). We then present new hypotheses
concerning temporal impacts within the DITIM that focus on the timing of innovation adoption.
Following our theorizing, we then present our reanalysis of the survey study of 121 software de-
velopment organizations reported by Carlo et al. (2011) to validate the hypotheses and detect
how adoption time influences a firm’s engagement with disruptive IT innovation. We conclude
by discussing the main findings and limitations, reviewing implications for practitioners and av-
enues for future research.
T H E D I S R U P T I V E I N F O R M AT I O N T E C H N O L O G Y I N N OVAT I O N M O D E L
This study draws upon the Carlo et al. (2011) extended DITIM model (Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a;
Lyytinen & Rose, 2003b). The model adopts Swanson’s (1994) concept of ‘strong order effects’
to analyse the interaction effects between IT-innovation types. As shown in Figure 1, the
extended model accordingly distinguishes IT innovations by their types and level of radicalness

Figure 1. Three IT-innovation types and strong order effects (DITIM).
and articulates directional interactions between specific types of IT innovations (strong order
effects). For more detailed description of the DITIM, please refer to Carlo et al. (2011) and
Lyytinen & Rose (2003a, 2003b). We will next outline the key concepts of the current study.
Types of IT innovation
Generally, an IT innovation is an innovation in digital and communications technologies and

their applications (Swanson, 1994) resulting from the exponential growth in computing and data
transmission speed, and storage and display capability (Messerschmitt & Szyperski, 2003).
The DITIM distinguishes between three types of IT innovation. Base innovations (type 0)
include changes in IT platforms (i.e. general-purpose digital technologies that enable or support
a family of IS services or development processes) (Fichman, 2004) that embed new scientific or
engineering principles in delivering or developing IS services that depart from those found in
existing platforms (Evans et al., 2006; Sood & Tellis, 2005). Process innovations (type I) are
changes in development tools, methods or teams and their organization. Service innovations
(type II) involve new uses of IT to support an organization’s technical or administrative cores
or business processes. Historical examples of IT innovations in each of the three types are
noted in Table 1. IT innovations exclusive to the internet disruptive cycle within each of the three
types are listed in the instrument in Appendix A.
Radicalness of innovation
IT innovations are also expected to vary on a continuum from incremental to radical

(Christensen et al., 2007). In the following, we focus on radical innovations that form the key
focus of the DITIM. Radical IT innovations have two key characteristics that distinguish them
from incremental innovations. First, radical innovations are unique in that they depart from other
existing alternatives at the time of invention (Zaltman et al., 1973). Such innovations utilize new
architectural principles and components (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Henderson & Clark, 1990;
Utterback, 1996) and erect heightened learning barriers (Attewell, 1992). Second, radical

Table 1. Examples of IT innovation by type (adopted from Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a)
IT innovation sets Description Examples
IT base (type 0) Base technology innovation DBMS, client/server computing;

OODB
Development capability Software patterns; software
innovation component brokering, quality assurance
Service capability innovation Point-and-click GUI, multimedia, QoS
System development (type I) Administrative process Maintenance departmentalization,
innovation CIO, open source development
Technological process Systems programming, data administration,
innovation prototyping
Systems and services (type II) Administrative process Accounting systems, EIS
innovation
Technological process MRP, computer-integrated manufacturing
innovation
Technological product Remote customer order entry and follow-on
innovation customer service systems
Technological integration Inter-organizational information systems, EDI
innovation
innovations are novel in that their use significantly departs from previous technologies and is
frame breaking at the time of adoption (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Bijker, 1994) as they destroy
existing highly invested competencies (Dosi, 1982). Owing to these characteristics, radical
innovations are risky (Dewar & Dutton, 1986), fragile and unclear (Attewell, 1992) and require
provisioning of significant complementary assets (Teece et al., 1997).
It is important to note that, according to the DITIM, both radical and incremental innovations
are assumed to coexist in a marketplace and with regard to a unit that adopts any IT innovation.
Moreover, the level of radicalness tends to diminish over time owing to spillovers, learning
effects and standardization. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, we utilize the Zaltman
et al. (1973) perspective of radicalness as a cognitive ‘impression’ or ‘burden’ perceived by a
single adopting unit. This distinction is important because the disruptive cycle of computing
can manifest itself as having, early on, predominantly radical innovations across all three
innovation types (for internet computing, see the example from Lyytinen et al., 2010) and thus
will influence software development organizations (the adopting unit) to perceive them as
pervasive radical innovations. Later, other adopting units in the population may see the same
IT-based innovations across all innovation types as becoming increasingly incremental
(Lyytinen et al., 2010). Yet, per the Zaltman et al. (1973) definition, individual adopters adopting
later may still be susceptible to perceiving the innovations to be radical owing to their prior
knowledge investments and competencies.
Prior research on the temporal aspects of radical innovation has primarily focused on how
innovators at different time points adopt the same innovation differently and how related innovator
attributes change (Foster, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Anderson & Tushman, 1990;
Swanson, 1994; Lambe & Spekman, 1997; Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1999). Typically, temporal
variables are entered as predictors or moderators to account for changes in adoption
amounts, propensity or adopter profiles. However, these studies generally do not account for (1)

whether the same innovation is perceived differently at different time points and (2) whether adopted
innovations may have differential transformative impacts3 across time ( Abernathy & Clark, 1985; cf.
Lambe & Spekman, 1997).
The concept of strong order effects and adoption timing within the DITIM
The DITIM also suggests that a radical base innovation has transformative effects within the
surrounding innovation ecology (Bijker, 1994; Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). When such effects
cover all three IT-innovation types and the three IT-innovation types share the property of being
radical, a transformative innovation cycle is created. Lyytinen & Rose (2003a, 2003b) call such
an innovation ensemble disruptive. As shown in Figure 1, according to extended DITIM, radical
innovation activities during the disruptive cycle will also show temporal order for both individual
adopters (Carlo et al., 2011) and the adopter population (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; cf. Lambe &
Spekman, 1997). This temporal order arises in part because of the presence of strong order
effects, in that some innovations provide ‘seed(s) for innovation’s subsequent origination in a
compelling way’, generating interactions called ‘strong order effects’ (Swanson, 1994, p.1077).
Such strong order effects predict that radical (base) innovations can have transformative effects
downstream upon service and process innovations. In addition, DITIM suggests that these strong
order effects manifest across two dimensions: (1) the amount of IT innovations a firm adopts and
(2) the perceived radicalness of their innovations (Carlo et al., 2011; Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a;
Lyytinen & Rose, 2003b).
Ostensibly, a radical base innovation generates new design spaces, which involve new and
different design trade-offs for designing services (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Therefore, the
amount of service and process innovation is likely to be positively influenced by cumulative
increases in the amount of the adopted base innovations (Funk, 2006a; Adomavicius et al.,
2007). Likewise, the increased amount of service innovations will positively affect the amount
of process innovations (Lambe & Spekman, 1997). Finally, the amount of service innovation
partially ‘transmits’ the impact of the amount of base innovation on the amount of process
innovation. This is because, although occasionally adopting units can translate radical base
innovations directly into process changes, they often have to first apply these innovations in
services before they can learn how the processes need to be changed.
The DITIM also suggests that innovation radicalness matters because it changes the design
space: base innovation radicalness also positively influences service and process innovation
radicalness. In other words, as base innovations propagate and re-scope design spaces,
subsequent service and process innovation become increasingly fragile, unpackaged and
dynamic and, therefore, likely more original and unique (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Bijker,
1994; Funk, 2006b; Adomavicius et al., 2007). Thus, base adopters are more likely to consider
their service and process innovations to be more radical (e.g. Ihlsoon & Young-Gul, 2001). New
3
While disruptive innovation literature uses the term ‘transformative’ to represent many facets of radical
innovation, our investigation herein limits the scope to the investigation of radical innovative changes to
the base, service and process aspects owing to a disruptive IT innovation and not to the performance
efficiency of the firms as a result of adopting such radical measures.

cognitive frames (Bijker, 1994) endowed with radical base innovations invite adopters to
imagine unique services and processes that depart significantly from contemporary ones
(Lyytinen & Rose, 2003b; Pries-Heje et al., 2004). As a result, the increased perceived
radicalness of the base is likely to heighten the perceived radicalness of service and process
innovations (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Bijker, 1994; Funk, 2006b; Adomavicius et al., 2007).
Likewise, the increased perceived radicalness of service innovations positively impacts the
perceived radicalness of process innovations (consistent with Lambe & Spekman, 1997).
Finally, the model suggests a partial mediation: increases in the radicalness of service
innovations may be required before adopters can determine how changes in base radicalness
truly impact the radicalness of their process innovations.
The formulation of this extended DITIM, however, overlooks the effect of timing in adopting
base innovations during the disruptive innovation cycle. These temporal effects are likely to
emerge, because adopters learn and garner different knowledge about the types of IT
innovations during the diffusion cycle as the technology matures. They also learn to garner
complementary assets to deploy such innovations more effectively (e.g. tools, training and
models), which influences adoption rates and scope. We assume that such effects are likely
to be significant as shown by studies of radical innovation in several industry contexts
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; cf. Lambe & Spekman, 1997). Hence, this omission is problematic.
Indeed, a key characteristic of any disruptive cycle is that it unfolds over time within the
adopter population. During this time, the computing platform becomes cumulatively
reconfigured while its innovation potential gets ‘exhausted’ (Lambe & Spekman, 1997). Most
importantly, over the course of this, owing to investments and learning effects, the
predominance of each innovation type and its relative radicalness can change substantially
(Lambe & Spekman, 1997). Thus, the innovation characteristics and dynamics faced by early
and late adopters within the adopter population are most likely different. This issue of the
effects of timing raises two salient questions. First, do the innovation rates and radicalness of
IT-innovation types differ between early and late adopters? Second, do these adopter cohorts
experience different downstream adoption and radicalness patterns (i.e. do the strong order
effects during the disruptive innovation cycle vary over time)? To address these questions, a
temporal modification to the original DITIM model is proposed and validated next.
A M O D E L O F T E M P O R A L I M PAC T S D U R I N G A D I S R U P T I V E I T- I N N OVAT I O N C Y C L E
A temporal extension to the DITIM posits that the timing of adoption of the base innovations
influences the adoption rates and perceived radicalness of IT-innovation types within the overall
disruptive innovation cycle. IT innovations deemed original and unique at the time of their
creation and adoption will likely be viewed as less original later. Decreases in perceived
radicalness are likely to occur as the marketplace grows to understand these innovations better
via learning by doing, vicarious learning and the continuous refinement of related competencies
(Attewell, 1992; Teece et al., 1997; Sommer & Loch, 2004). We also propose that the timing
of radical base innovation adoption will influence the transformative impacts – strong order
effects – emanating from radical base innovations on downstream innovations. Given these

propositions, we will next present hypotheses to explain why innovation rates and perceptions
of IT-innovation radicalness are likely to vary during a disruptive IT-innovation cycle. We will then
hypothesize why the strong order effects vary over time in terms of both (1) the amount of
subsequent innovation and (2) the perceived radicalness of the innovation.
Adoption rate
As radical innovation matures, its knowledge base becomes more explicit, and it is easier to use
(Christensen, 1997). This lowers learning barriers for later innovators (Abernathy & Clark, 1985;
Attewell, 1992; Lambe & Spekman, 1997) who can build up their absorptive capacity more
readily as the new innovation knowledge aligns better with their current knowledge base
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Ihlsoon & Young-Gul, 2001). Accordingly, late adopters will adopt
base, service and process innovations at a greater rate than early adopters.
H1a: During a disruptive IT-innovation cycle, late adopters adopt radical base
innovations at a greater rate than early adopters.
H1b: During a disruptive IT-innovation cycle, late adopters adopt radical service
H1c: During a disruptive IT-innovation cycle, late adopters adopt radical process
Amount of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects
The dynamics of ‘bundles’ of radical innovations change between later and early adopting units
(Clark, 1985; Attewell, 1992). Accordingly, the adoption timing of base innovations will
determine the strength of the strong order effects, i.e. how strongly the preceding amount of
innovation influences the amount of later innovation. During early phases of the disruptive
cycle, the design space becomes highly fluid because the organizing vision underlying the
technological change is contested (Swanson & Ramiller, 1997). As a result, early adopters
need to experiment frequently and will create a greater variety of services than late adopters.
To put it differently, the same amount of base innovation adoption will result in a larger amount
of service innovation for early adopters than for late adopters as the innovation remains fragile
and no dominant design has emerged. Likewise, because the market gets more stable later
while the space of acceptable design choices is narrowed, late adopters will generate fewer
service innovations as they can ‘get it right the first time’ more easily.
H2a: The same number of radical base innovations adopted will lead to a larger number
of service innovations for early adopters than for late adopters.
We also posit that less-structured process engagements during radical service innovations
compel early adopters to invent more process innovations. In other words, among early
adopters, the same amount of base innovations more strongly impacts the amount of
subsequent process innovations. This is because late adopters benefit from the advantage of
learning more ‘crystallized’ solutions from the marketplace, which has already shaken out
ineffective process innovations (Christensen, 1997). In a sense, late adopters can avoid excess
experimentation owing to the availability of codified learning manifested in more mature tools
and methods and the resulting ‘sedimentation’ of process innovations into other technological
capabilities (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
H2b: The same number of radical base innovations adopted will lead to a greater
number of process innovations for early adopters than for late adopters.
During a disruptive IT-innovation cycle, the amount of process innovations adopted as a

result of the amount of radical service innovations adopted should differ over time. Namely, late
(radical) service innovation adopters face the need for fewer redevelopments in their processes
(Kessler & Chakrabarti, 1996). Again, late movers gain the advantage by waiting until the
market weeds out ineffective processes.
H2c: The same number of service innovations adopted will lead to a greater number of
process innovations for early adopters than for late adopters.
Finally, we expect that the amount of service innovations will partially mediate the impact of
the amount of base innovations on the amount of process innovations. Adopting units often
apply new base innovations to generate services before they can truly determine how their
processes need to be changed. Owing to codified learning and technology ‘sedimentation’
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986), late adopters are more likely to avoid excess experimentation
with services in order to settle on new viable development processes.
H2d: The number of radical base innovations adopted will lead indirectly, through the
number of service innovations adopted, to a greater number of process innovations for
early adopters than for late adopters.
Radicalness of innovation: varying perceptions across time
One reason why early adopters adopt at lower rates is that over time, perceptions of radicalness
among would-be adopters of any radical innovation whittle downward when associated
technological and application knowledge is cultivated into more codified, explicit and formal
forms (Clark, 1985; Attewell, 1992). Accordingly, at early stages, radical base, service and
process innovations will be perceived as more original and unique as their use and benefits
remain highly contested and ambiguous. Therefore, early adopters of radical base innovations
will regard concomitant base, service and process innovations to be more radical. Thus, we
propose the following:

H3a: Early adopters will perceive the base innovations adopted to be more radical than
late adopters will.
H3b: Early adopters will perceive the service innovations adopted to be more radical
than late adopters will.
H3c: Early adopters will perceive the process innovations adopted to be more radical
than late adopters will.
Radicalness of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects
We also posit that the impact of the level of perceived radicalness of the base innovations on
the perceived radicalness of service and process innovations will differ between early and late
adopters. Perceptions of radicalness presume that the adopter assesses innovation
radicalness in the context of its current operations. In the early phases, uses of the radical base
innovations are highly tentative and less packaged owing to lack of use. Therefore, the adopters
cannot easily create good predictive models of the scope and nature of their effects
(Christensen, 1997). Consequently, adopters are more likely to either overestimate their radical
nature or blur the radical nature of the base innovations with the likely radical nature of the
service and process innovations (Christensen & Bower, 1996). Thus, early adopters are more
likely to build upon highly intuitive connections between radical base and process innovations,
or radical base and service innovation, and, as a result, their perceptions of base radicalness
will also strongly move their perceptions of process and service radicalness in the same
direction. By contrast, for late adopters, because base innovations have become more distinct
and causally less ambiguous, they have become more clearly identifiable with specific effects
on services (i.e. the same level of base radicalness does not compel the same level of process
and service radicalness). Consequently, late adopters are more likely to perceive the process
and service innovations adopted to be less radical for the same level of radicalness perceived
in the base innovations. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H4a: The perceived radicalness of base innovations will lead to a higher level of
perceived radicalness of service innovations for early adopters than for late
adopters.
H4b: The perceived radicalness of base innovations will lead to a higher level of
perceived radicalness of process innovations for early adopters than for late
adopters.
H4c: The perceived radicalness of service innovations will lead to a higher level of
perceived radicalness of process innovations for early adopters than for late
adopters.
Finally, the DITIM suggests that service innovation radicalness partially mediates the impact
of the radicalness of base innovations on the radicalness of process innovations. As noted
before, adopting units often have to experiment with radical services before they can transform
radical base innovations into radical process innovations. Owing to the codified learning and
technology ‘sedimentation’ (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), late adopters are more likely to jump
over experimenting with radical services in order to determine how radical their development
process change will be. Therefore, their perception of radical service innovation will influence
how the radicalness of base innovation impacts the radicalness of process innovation. In other
words, for early adopters, the radicalness of service innovation more strongly mediates the
impact of the radicalness of base innovation on radicalness of process innovation.
H4d: The perceived radicalness of base innovations will lead indirectly, through the
perceived radicalness of service innovations, to a higher level of perceived radicalness
of process innovations for early adopters than for late adopters.
E M P I R I C A L S T U DY O F T E M P O R A L I M PAC T S D U R I N G I N T E R N E T C O M P U T I N G
To test these temporal hypotheses, we reanalysed the data analysed and reported by
Carlo et al. (2011). Their study is based on a cross-sectional survey of top executives from
710 small software development organizations that had adopted internet computing during
the period between 1995 and 2005. The original study generated 121 valid responses for our
analysis (see Table 2 for sample characteristics and Table 3 for measurement model, basic
statistics and correlation matrix). We refer to Carlo et al. (2011) for the detailed procedures
for sampling, data collection, measurement development and validation; however, a summary
of instrument-development procedures used by Carlo et al. (2011) is included in Appendix A.
Table 2. Sample characteristics (N = 121)
Obs. %
No. of employees
1–20 95 78.5
20–40 15 12.4
40–60 8 6.6
60–80 2 1.7
80–100 1 0.8
Total 121
Respondent title
President, CEO, Partner, Principle, owner, Managing Director, Executive VP 86 71.1
CIO/CTO/VP of IS, VP of Product Development 9 7.4
IS Manager, Technology Manager, Software Development Manager, Director 7 5.8
Other Managers in IS Department 2 1.7
Business Operations Manager, COO 3 2.5
Other VP (Marketing, Finance, etc.), CFO 7 5.8
Others 7 5.8

Table 3. Measurement model, basic statistics and correlation matrix
548
Correlation matrix
Std. Standard
Construct Ind. Indicator descriptions Est.† Reliability Mean deviation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Base Base The number of internet-related NA NA 5.06 2.44 NA

base innovations a firm
had adopted.
(2) Process Process The number of internet-related NA NA 4.31 2.42 0.61*** NA
J. L. Carlo et al.
process innovations a firm

had adopted.
(3) Service Service The number of internet-related NA NA 4.87 3.82 0.47*** 0.55*** NA
service innovations a firm
had adopted.
(4) Base bRAD1 These technologies were 0.81 0.90 3.64 0.83 0.20** 0.29*** 0.09 0.87
radicalness major improvements over
previous technologies.
bRAD2 These technologies were 0.88
based on revolutionary
changes in technology.
bRAD3 These technologies were 0.92
breakthrough innovations.
pRAD1 These techniques/methods/ 0.83 0.89 3.73 0.77 0.10 0.30*** 0.01 0.24*** 0.85
approaches were major
improvements over previous
development practices.
(5) Process pRAD4 These techniques/methods/ 0.88
radicalness approaches have led to
development outcomes that
were difficult to replace or
substitute using older
methods/techniques/approaches.
pRAD5 These techniques/methods/ 0.85
approaches represented major
methodological advance(s)
within the local contexts in
which they were applied.

Continues
Table 3. Continued
Correlation matrix
Std. Standard
Construct Ind. Indicator descriptions Est.† Reliability Mean deviation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
sRAD1 These applications were 0.84 0.92 3.70 0.80 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.20** 0.63*** 0.32*** 0.86
major improvements over
previous technologies.
(6) Service sRAD2 These applications were 0.90
radicalness based on revolutionary
changes in technology.
sRAD3 These applications were 0.89
breakthrough innovations.
sRAD4 These applications have 0.81
led to products that were
difficult to replace or substitute
using older technologies.
(7) Base year The year your organization NA NA 1999 3.03 0.16* 0.20** 0.32*** 0.13 0.03 0.19* NA
first began to adopt any of

these base technologies?
(8) Base extent b_P The percentage of development NA NA 2.63 0.62 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.32*** NA
projects that use the adopted
base innovations.
(9) Process p_P The percentage of development NA NA 2.61 0.69 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.02 0.22** 0.11 0.1 0.59*** NA
extent projects that use the adopted
process innovations.
(10) Service s_P The percentage of development NA NA 2.44 0.70 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.47*** 0.14 0.03 0.22** 0.22** 0.46*** 0.53*** NA
extent projects that develop the adopted
service innovations.
(11) Size Size Log (number of employees) NA NA 0.89 0.51 0.09 0.20** 0.20** 0.18* 0.01 0.23** 0.15 0.03 0.13 0.32*** NA
Radical information technology innovations
†
All standardized factor loadings are significant at p < 0.01 level. Root square of AVE (diagonal elements). *p ≤ 0.1; **p ≤ 0.5; ***p ≤ 0.01.
549
For our study, we chose the year 2000 for adopting base innovations and used it as a condition to
split the sample into early and late adopters. Our choice of where to differentiate between early and
late was based on the Lyytinen et al. (2010) study that bifurcates the internet innovation wave by
the relative depth, breadth and speed of radical innovation in the software development industry.
Specifically, across all three innovation types in the DITIM, the period of 1995 to 2000 was one
of drastic industry-wide disruption. The period of 2000 onward in the Lyytinen et al. (2010) study
was found to no longer have these characteristics and reverted back to a traditional, non-disruptive
era of innovation across the industry. As such, we applied the findings of Lyytinen et al. (2010) and
bifurcated the DITIM data into pre-2000 and 2000–2005. Thus, we argue that, beginning in 2000,
the universe of internet technologies had become more widely spread and adopting units adopted
late when they faced more stable and less diverse sets of technologies (Lyytinen et al., 2010). Next,
we briefly describe the variables used in the study and the procedures for multigroup analysis using
the year 2000 as a cut-off to test the timing effects across early and late adopters.
Dependent and independent variables
Carlo et al. (2011) measured the amount of innovation by the number of internet-related innovations
a firm had adopted in base technologies, processes and services during the period of the study from
1995 to 2005. For perceived radicalness, Carlo et al. (2011) customized the Gatignon et al. (2002)
five-item instrument of perceived radicalness to tap into overall perceptions of the uniqueness and
novelty of each type of IT innovation. Adoption rate is measured by the number of innovations of a
particular type divided by the innovation period in years; in other words, it is defined as innovations
per year during the period of adoption. Innovation period is calculated by subtracting the year the
innovation type was first adopted from the year the next innovation type was first adopted (and then
adding 1 in order to account for January to December and to avoid values of zero). In the case of the
last innovation type adopted, the year is subtracted from 2006 (2005 + 1). In the case of no innova-
tions of that type being adopted, no value is calculated for that period. For those who reported
adopting all innovation types in the same year, we subtract from 2006. For those who reported
adopting two innovation types in the same year, we subtract both from the year of the third innovation
type (if it was after the two) or from 2006 (if the two were the last thing adopted). Again, if the firm
adopted nothing, then the value is blank. Overall, this measure reflects a firm’s innovation intensity,
or how frequently it innovates during a disruptive IT-innovation cycle.4,5
4
We found no similar measures used in the past. The term ‘innovation rate’ has been used differently
across studies. For instance, Falck (2009) defined the innovation rate as ‘the number of firms in a spe-
cific industry and size class that have introduced a product innovations or a process innovation in the
year preceding over the number of all surveyed firms in the specific industry and size class’ (p. 500).
Şener and Zhao (Şener & Zhao, 2009) defined the aggregated innovation rate as ‘the sum of local-
sourcing and outsourcing-targeted R&D intensities’, where R&D activity is broadly defined as activity
‘that involves not only scientists and engineers working on innovations but also a sophisticated manage-
ment team that globally coordinates the innovation and technology transfer efforts of a multinational firm’
(p. 102). Parello (2008) defined the long-run rate of innovation as proportional to the rate of population
growth and inversely proportional to the R&D difficulty parameter. Our study differs from the prior studies
by emphasizing the temporal dimension of innovation rate.
5
We recognize that this is a fairly rough measure that does not take into account the possibility of
overlapping periods. With better primary data, we could have prevented this limitation, but the second-
ary data we are using did not capture the date of adoption for each innovation adopted, and collecting
such data afterward is impossible.

Control variables
The number of innovations a firm adopts and the extent to which they perceive those adoptions
to be ‘radical’ may be attributed to a host of causes. In an effort to isolate (as best as possible)
the moderation and mediation of strong order effects that we hypothesized in H2a–d and
H4a–d, we controlled for organizational size (number of employees), annual sales (USD),
knowledge depth (perceived expertise), experimentation (tendency towards experimenting
behaviours with technology), environmental pressure (customer and client pressure to
innovate) and knowledge networks (extent of relationships with knowledge-based institutions,
like universities). Controlling for these potential confounds was crucial to estimating valid strong
order effects and minimizing the threat of confounds.
Multigroup analysis
In order to test the differences between the early and late adopter groups, we had to establish
the equivalence of the measurement model between the two adopter groups (Byrne, 2004):
early and late adopters. Because adopting a base innovation early does not necessarily mean
a firm also adopts services early, we created an ‘early on base’ grouping variable to use when
base innovations were the predictor and ‘early on service’ grouping variable to use when
service innovations were the predictor. The sample sizes for each of these groups were as
follows: early on base (n = 55), late on base (n = 61), early on service (n = 44) and late on
service (n = 56).
Following the multigroup invariance analysis procedure outlined by Byrne (2004) for Amos
version 21 (SPSS Inc, West Yorkshire, UK), we used the measurement model to identify
separate base models for each group (model A in Table 4). Then we created a model in which
all factor loadings, factor variances and factor covariances were constrained equally across the
two groups (model B). This omnibus test suggests that there was some variance across the two
groups. We then created nested models in which a single path was successively constrained to
be equal across groups to locate the variances in the model (model C-S). The non-significant
changes in chi squares indicate that allowing the specific loading, variance or covariance in
question to differ did not significantly improve the fit of the model. Thus, the radicalness
measures are equivalent across the two groups.
In particular, the service radicalness construct remained invariant across the two groups
(model J): the four indicators measure the underlying latent variable equivalently in cross-group
data, and the latent variable itself had the same variance across groups (Figure 2). Although its
variance remained the same (model N), the make-up of the latent variable (process
radicalness) varied slightly. When compared with early adopters, late adopters’ perceptions of
the radicalness of process innovations were more driven by whether they considered those
innovations to represent major methodological advances within their local context (item pRAD5,
model I). This makes sense, as many of the early process innovations typically bring together
innovations from several divergent areas. Therefore, their advantages within local contexts
manifest more vividly with late adopters. Moreover, when compared with early adopters, late
adopters’ perceptions of the radicalness of base innovations were more driven by whether they

Table 4. Goodness-of-fit statistics for testing invariance in the measurement model across the groups
2 2
Model Model description χ d.f. χ d.f. Sig.
A Combined baseline models (early and late) – unconstrained 98.98 64 — — —

B Factor loadings, variances, and covariances constrained to 132.14 78 33.17 14 p < 0.01
be equal (Omnibus test)
C Factor loadings constrained to be equal 120.73 71 21.75 7 p < 0.01
D Factor loadings on Base constrained to be equal 108.34 66 9.37 2 p < 0.01
E Factor loading (bRAD2 ➔ Base) constrained to be equal 105.10 65 6.13 1 p < 0.05
F Factor loading (bRAD3 ➔ Base) constrained to be equal 100.37 65 1.39 1 ns
G Factor loadings on Process constrained to be equal 106.67 67 6.30 2 p < 0.05
H Factor loading (pRAD4 ➔ Process) constrained to be equal 100.42 66 0.05 1 ns
I Factor loadings (pRAD4 ➔ Process) and (pRAD5 ➔ Process) 106.67 67 6.30 2 p < 0.05
constrained to be equal
J Factor loadings on Service constrained to be equal 106.03 69 5.66 4 ns
K All variances constrained to be equal 113.95 72 14.98 8 p < 0.1
L Variance B constrained 111.31 70 12.34 6 p < 0.1
M Variance P constrained 109.11 70 10.13 6 ns
N Variance P and S constrained 109.86 71 10.89 7 ns
O All covariances constrained to be equal 121.65 74 22.67 10 p < 0.05
P Covariance between Base/Process constrained to be equal 119.50 72 20.52 8 p < 0.01
Q Covariance between Process/Service constrained to be equal 111.00 72 12.02 8 ns
R Covariance between Process/Service, and Base/Service 116.47 73 17.49 9 p < 0.05
constrained to be equal
S Final 111.00 72 12.02 8 ns
Figure 2. Measurement invariance across two adopter groups: Unstd. Est.

considered these technologies to be based on revolutionary changes in technology (item

bRAD2, model E). This is also intuitive, as the revolutionary impact of a radical innovation
becomes clear after a significant duration of time. The significantly smaller variance (0.19 vs.
0.43, model 1) also indicates that late adopters have a stronger consensus in their judgments
about the nature of base innovation.6
Nevertheless, the same items load equivalently on their hypothesized factors, with high and
significant loadings across the two groups. Thus, we concluded that the overall measurement
model remains stable by demonstrating sufficient configural invariance. The fit indices also
suggest that the final cross-group measurement model fits the data reasonably well.7 The
differentiated covariance among the three factors bodes well for our hypotheses that strong
order effects among the three innovation types vary across groups.
Hypothesis testing
We used general linear modelling (GLM) in SPSS version 21 to determine whether early and
late adopters adopt innovations at different rates and whether they perceive innovation
radicalness differently (H1, H3). GLM is particularly useful for modelling the effects of
dichotomous antecedents on ordinal dependent variables. In our case, early vs. late was our
dichotomous predictor of either rate or radicalness (our ordinal dependent variables). For H1,
we complemented the GLM with a simple count of innovation adoptions across each innovation
type for each year in which the innovation type was first adopted. We compared these counts
between early and late adopters to identify if the rate of first adoption differs. To analyse the
temporal impacts on strong order effects for the amount of innovation and radicalness of
innovation (H2, H4), we followed the multigroup analysis procedures outlined by Chin (2000)
and Gaskin (2013). This approach calculates the t-statistic for the differences between path
coefficients across multiple groups by comparing the group sample sizes, path estimates and
standard errors. Using SmartPLS version 2.0 M3, we conducted a bootstrap (500 resamples)
analysis to calculate the total (direct + indirect) effects in order to analyse group differences
in the mediation effects of the path: Base ➔ Service ➔ Process (hypotheses H2d and H4d).
We used the same formula for differences in total effects as for direct effects (Chin, 2000;
Gaskin, 2013).
The cross-group model for the rate of innovation adoption had adequate predictive power.
The percent of observed variance explained (R-square) in the dependent variables was as
follows: early for base (service: 33%; process: 59%), late for base (service: 39%; process:
40%), early for service (service: 42%; process: 48%) and late for service (service: 32%;
process: 54%). The final cross-group model for perceived radicalness of innovation also had
adequate predictive power. The percent of observed variance explained in the dependent
6
Although the error covariance between e1 and e11 is significant for late adopters, this does not indicate
a significant variance across groups. It is widely accepted that testing for the equality of error covari-
ances represents an overly restrictive test of the data (Byrne, 2004).
2
7
The fit statistics are X = 111.01, degrees of freedom (d.f.) = 72; comparative fit index = 0.93; normed fit
index = 0.82; and root mean square error of approximation = 0.076 (90% confidence interval: from 0.046
to 0.103).

variables was as follows: early for base (service: 54%; process: 37%), late for base (service:
44%; process: 48%), early for service (service: 46%; process: 33%) and late for service
(service: 53%; process: 54%).
FINDINGS
Adoption rate (H1)

While none of the H1 tests were significant at the 0.05 level, GLM comparing early and late
adopters indicates greater adoption rates for early adopters than for late adopters in the number
of innovations adopted per year of the relevant adoption period in the base, processes and
services. H1a found intermediate support as the test approached statistical significance
(p = 0.060). H1b and H1c were directionally consistent with their predicted relationships;
however, their p-values were not significant (p = 0.170 and 0.279, respectively). Owing to low
sample sizes, we did not have sufficient statistical power to determine with confidence whether
the differences for H1a, H1b or H1c were statistically non-significant. Further analysis was
performed with a tally of innovation adoptions. The distribution pattern in adoptions across all
three types provides some added, tentative evidence that for each innovation type, the rate of
adoption for late adopters is compressed and front loaded. This pattern exhibits a greater rate
of adoption for late adopters than for early adopters. The results of the GLM and power analysis
are shown in Table 5. The patterns of innovation rates are shown in Table 6. The intensity of the
colour correlates with the intensity of adoption rates. Notice the gradual increasing rate of
adoption for early adopters compared with the front-loaded accelerated adoption rate for late
adopters. The patterns are nearly mirror images. The pattern resembles a normal distribution
of adoptions where the distribution is somewhat skewed, indicating a higher rate for later
adopters. In total, there is tentative support for H1a, H1b and H1c.
Table 5. GLM tests of between-subjects effects for H1a–c

Table 6. Pattern of adoption rate between early and late for each innovation type
Amount of innovation: temporal impact on strong order effects (H2)

Tables 7 and 8 report the group differences test for H2a–d. The right-tailed p-value indicates
whether the estimate for the path is significantly different between early and late adopters.
Thus, adoption of radical service innovations is significantly greater for early than for late
adopters, supporting H2a (p = 0.012). The effect of base adoptions on process adoptions was
not significantly greater for early adopters than late adopters (p = 0.943). Contrary to the
hypothesized direction, it approaches significance for being greater for late adopters (p = 0.057),
rejecting H2b. We found no significant difference between early and late adopters in terms of
the effect adopting services had on adopting process innovations (p = 0.203), although the effect
was slightly stronger for early adopters, rejecting H2c. Finally, the bootstrapped total effects test
suggests a significant mediated effect of Base ➔ Service ➔ Process for both early and late
adopters. However, the effect was non-significant in the tested direction (p = 0.996). Instead, it
Table 7. PLS tests of group differences for H2a–d
Base ➔ Service Base ➔ Process Service ➔ Process Base ➔ Service ➔

(H2a) (H2b) (H2c) Process (H2d)
Group Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late

Size 55 61 55 61 44 56 55 61
Effect 0.385 0.240 0.289 0.403 0.408 0.362 0.289 0.468
Standard 0.044 0.047 0.039 0.059 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.053
error
T-statistic 2.282 1.590 0.833 2.729
One-tailed 0.012** 0.943 ns 0.203 ns 0.996 ns
probability
Conclusion Supported: Rejected but Rejected: no Rejected but
stronger supported for significant supported for
for early opposite: stronger difference opposite: stronger
for late (0.057*) (stronger for late (0.004***)
for early)
ns, not significant.

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

Table 8. Amount of innovations: effects of control variables
Early base Late base Early service Late service
IV DV Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est.
emp Service 0.037 0.016 0.030 0.014

ext_press Service 0.556 0.255 0.187 0.532
KnNet Service 0.605 0.031 0.600 0.189
KnDep Service 0.204 0.538 0.038 0.706
Experiment Service 2.005 1.363 0.357 0.721
Sales Service 0.412 0.092 1.184* 0.253
emp Process 0.012 0.020 0.020 0.022
ext_press Process 0.850** 0.545 0.144 0.396
KnNet Process 0.098 0.153 0.348 0.324
KnDep Process 0.728 0.615 0.683 1.125**
Experiment Process 1.057 1.825*** 0.640 2.324***
Sales Process 0.200 0.075 0.189 0.001

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
was significantly stronger for late adopters (p = 0.004), rejecting H2d. We found no consistent ef-
fects from controls across groups. Most effects were found to be non-significant (Table 8), and
no hypothesized relationships were substantially changed by including these controls.
Radicalness of innovation: varying perceptions across time (H3)

The GLM reveals that the radicalness of base innovations is significantly greater for early com-
pared with late adopters, supporting H3a (p = 0.002). Overall, early adopters regarded base in-
novations to be significantly more radical than did late adopters. This indicates that early
adopters saw their base innovations to be significantly more frame breaking than did late
adopters. We found similar results that supported H3b (p = 0.010), with early adopters perceiv-
ing service innovations to be significantly more radical than did late adopters. Contrary to H3c,
the perceptions of radicalness of process innovations remain invariant between late and early
adopters (although still slightly higher for the early adopters), rejecting H3c. The results of the
GLM and power analysis are shown in Table 9.
Radicalness of innovation: temporal impact on strong order effects (H4)

H4a–d were tested with the same approach as for H2a–d. The results for H4a–d are shown in
Table 10. The effect of perceived base radicalness on perceived service radicalness was
significantly stronger for early adopters than for late adopters, supporting H4a (p = 0.004).
There was no difference between early and late adopters in terms of the effect of perceived
base radicalness on perceived process radicalness (H4b), rejecting H4b. The hypothesized
effect of perceived service radicalness on perceived process radicalness was non-significant
(p = 0.982). Instead, the effect was significantly stronger for late adopters (p = 0.018),
rejecting H4c. Finally, the bootstrapped total effects test suggests a significant mediated effect

Table 9. GLM tests of between-subjects effects for H3a–c
of Base ➔ Service ➔ Process for both early and late adopters (H4d). The effect was larger for
the early adopters, but the difference was non-significant, rejecting H4d. The effects from
controls were fairly different between early and late adopters, although the effects were fairly
consistent regardless of base or service groupings (Table 11), and no hypothesized relation-
ships were substantially changed by including these controls.
We summarize our key findings in Table 12. Four of 14 hypothesized relationships between
temporal effects and innovation were supported. An additional three had tentative support.
We next discuss the insights gained from this study.
Table 10. PLS tests of group differences for H4a–d
Base ➔ Service Base ➔ Process Service ➔ Process Base ➔ Service ➔

(H4a) (H4b) (H4c) Process (H4d)
Group Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late

Size 55 61 55 61 44 56 55 61
Effect 0.618 0.494 0.302 0.304 0.225 0.380 0.319 0.237
Standard 0.037 0.030 0.041 0.037 0.055 0.049 0.049 0.047
error
T-statistic 2.663 0.045 2.116 1.225
One-tailed 0.004*** 0.482 ns 0.982 ns 0.112 ns
probability
Conclusion Supported: Rejected: Rejected but Rejected:
stronger for no significant supported for no significant
early difference opposite: difference
(stronger Stronger for (stronger
for late) late (0.018**) for early)

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05.

Table 11. Radicalness of innovations: effects of control variables
Early base Late base Early service Late service
IV DV Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est.
emp s_rad 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006

ext_press s_rad 0.084 0.234** 0.172* 0.174
KnNet s_rad 0.356*** 0.020 0.331** 0.021
KnDep s_rad 0.025 0.052 0.051 0.049
Experiment s_rad 0.369** 0.180 0.402* 0.236
Sales s_rad 0.066 0.068 0.167 0.065
emp p_rad 0.000 0.006* 0.002 0.007*
ext_press p_rad 0.180 0.271*** 0.028 0.244**
KnNet p_rad 0.192 0.174* 0.032 0.188*
KnDep p_rad 0.350** 0.210* 0.450*** 0.225*
Experiment p_rad 0.560*** 0.196 0.541** 0.339*
Sales p_rad 0.072 0.029 0.049 0.018

***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has investigated the impact of adoption timing on the adoption rate, perceived
radicalness and transformative effects among IT-innovation types as specified by the extended
DITIM (Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a, Carlo et al., 2011). The results are summarized in Table 12. At
the highest level, the study, indeed, achieved its primary goals of (1) demonstrating the
importance of considering temporal factors in the study of disruptive innovation and (2) illustrating
that innovation types matter when theorizing about IT-innovation creation and adoption.
With regard to demonstrating the value of viewing disruptive innovation with a temporal lens,
by splitting the data into early and late adopter groups, our analysis shows statistically
significant differences between early and late adopters in each of the four hypothesized areas.
Specifically, the adoption rate of radical IT innovations, the strong order effects on the amount of
innovation, the perceived radicalness of innovations and the strong order effects on perceived
radicalness were each found to differ between early and late adopters. In short, we found strong
support that scholars and managers must consider the temporal dimension within disruptive IT
innovation in order to manage that innovation.
Related to advancing innovation theory that distinguishes more accurately between
innovation types, we could see clear patterns emerge. One pattern is that all four primary
base-centric hypotheses were found to be significant (H2a, H3a and H4a) or approach
significance (H1a) as predicted. Likewise, the predicted hypothesis for the adoption rate of
service innovations (H1b) had tentative support, and order effects on the perceived radicalness
of service innovations (H3b) were supported as predicted. While the predicted hypothesis for
the adoption rate of process innovations had tentative supported as predicted (H1c), in
contrast, each of the strong order effects hypotheses for process innovations (process
innovation amounts and perceived radicalness of process innovations) was rejected (H2b,
H2d and H4c). Most importantly, those three relationships were found to be significant or

Table 12. Summary of evidence for hypotheses
Hyp. Path (variable) tested Results Hypothesis support
Adoption rate
H1a Adoption Rate of Base Greater for Tentative support
Innovations (Late > Early) late adopters
H1b Adoption Rate of Service Greater for Tentative support
H1c Adoption Rate of Process Greater for Tentative support
Amount of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects
H2a Base Innovations ➔ Service Greater for Support
Innovations (Early > Late) early adopters
H2b Base Innovations ➔ Process Greater for Rejected (opposite effect
Innovations (Early > Late) late adopters with tentative support found)
H2c Service Innovations ➔ Process No significant Reject
Innovations (Early > Late) differences
H2d Indirect Effect of Base ➔ Service ➔ Greater for late Rejected (opposite effect found)
Process (Early > Late) adopters
Perceived radicalness of innovation – varying perceptions across time
H3a Radicalness of Base Greater for Support
H3b Radicalness of Service Greater for Support
H3c Radicalness of Process No significant Reject
Innovations (Early > Late) differences
Perceived radicalness of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects
H4a Base Radicalness ➔ Service Greater for Support
Radicalness (Early > Late) early adopters
H4b Base Radicalness ➔ Process No significant Reject
Radicalness (Early > Late) differences
H4c Service Radicalness ➔ Process Greater for Rejected (opposite effect found)
Radicalness (Early > Late) late adopters
H4d Indirect effect of Base No significant differences Reject
Radicalness ➔ Service Radicalness ➔
Process Radicalness (Early > Late)
Data in bold indicate where hypothesis results were not simply rejected and where some interesting finding has been found. Data in bold and
italics indicate where the found effect was opposite of the hypothesized direction.
approaching significance in the opposite direction. Thus, the type of innovation appears to
impact the direction of strong order effects (greater for late adopters for process innovations
and greater for early adopters for service innovations).
It is important to recognize that research into innovation-type differentiated models is still in its
early stages and is largely exploratory. As such, it is expected and important to find relationships
in unexpected directions. For example, the seminal Grover et al. (1997) multitype IT-innovation
study found 42% and 58% of hypothesized relationships in the expected direction and 9% and
26% in the unexpected direction (the study focused only on service and process innovations).
Likewise, Carlo et al. (2012) found that 23% of hypotheses were supported in the expected
direction and 53% of predicted relationships were significant in the unexpected direction.
With regard to specific outcomes in the study, the following results can be noted. There was
tentative evidence that the adoption rate of base innovations was slower for early adopters than
for later adopters. If true, it would appear to be easier to wait until the market matures when adopting
new base (H1a), service (H1b) and process innovations (H1c). Clearly, when innovations mature
and grow, they enable a larger number of innovations to be adopted – even when their perceived

radicalness does not significantly decrease over time. At later stages, there is also a larger number
of innovations and higher mimetic and normative pressure to adopt such innovations.
As predicted, early adopters are subject to ‘stronger’ order effects for service innovations (H2a). In
contrast, transformative impacts were not observed in the path [Service_Amount ➔
Process_Amount] (H2c), which remained equivalent between early and late adopters. Thus,
adopting the same amount of radical service innovations generated similar transformative impacts
(independent of time) on an adopter’s process spaces. This suggests that service innovation
remains the primary engine of process innovation during the entire disruptive IT-innovation cycle,
and its effect does not change over time. Unexpectedly, late adopters have some evidence of
‘stronger’ order effects for base-driven process innovations (both directly H2b and indirectly H2d).
This suggests that in the end process, innovations are less influenced by the initially radical nature
of base technologies and services. In contrast, as base technologies ‘mature’ and become more
standardized and powerful, they have more significant effects. Thus, adoption of ready-made
specialists, methods, outsourcers and component libraries would just be simpler in later stages than
in earlier stages of the disruption cycle. Significant process innovations also take more time to
mature and evolve (Lambe & Spekman, 1997), and there were a greater number of established
processes in later stages available owing to the rise of Agile movement in the early 2000s (Erickson
et al., 2005). Process innovations may also have early substitutive effects when the causal links
between the base technologies and their effects are poorly understood and are later replaced with
complementary effects. Finally, owing to these effects, a larger pool of experienced employees
who had experiences with new processes were available in later stages of the innovation cycle.
We found strong support for our hypotheses concerning changes in perceived radicalness
that are consistent with earlier radical innovation research. Prior work suggests that as
technological knowledge matures, it becomes codified, explicit, formal and therefore more
tractable for late adopters (Clark, 1985; Attewell, 1992). We found that perceived radicalness
declines with time for both base (H3a) and service innovations (H3b). This could be an outcome
of two factors. First, over time, base technologies become more familiar and commonplace,
allowing related knowledge to be more easily transferred. Second, late adopters may be more
risk averse and thus only adopt base and service innovations when little risk is at stake
(Bower & Christensen, 1995; Christensen et al., 2006; Christensen et al., 2007).
In contrast, the perceived radicalness of process innovation (H3b) remained equal throughout
the disruptive innovation cycle. This may be due to the cognitive challenges associated with
enacting process changes or related political challenges. This may also signal the fact that process
innovations can be more difficult to ‘package’ in ways that do not create significant learning
barriers. Thus, radical process innovations appear to remain truly frame breaking in that they
radically change work practices independent of the stage of the disruptive cycle. Invariant high
levels of perceived radicalness of process innovations also reflect the deeply embedded nature
of routines associated with software development (Nelson & Winter, 1982).8 Consequently, late
8
The invariant perceptions of base and process radicalness across early and late adopters can also be
an artefact of our sample of small firms. Large firms can better afford to take advantage of changes in
the environment owing to economies of scale and slack. They can more readily absorb turnover and jet-
tison employees fixed in the older technologies. In contrast, smaller firms are more likely to find such
knowledge transfer costs more prohibitive.

adopters continue to face major cognitive inertia when they need to enact process changes
triggered by radical base and service innovations.
With regard to strong order effects, we found that the impact of perceived base radicalness
on service radicalness (H4a) was greater for early adopters, suggesting that perceptions of
service radicalness are less driven by base radicalness perceptions. At the same time, early
adopters are not significantly different from late adopters in the paths related to base and
process perceived radicalness (base radicalness ➔ process radicalness [H4b] and base
radicalness ➔ service radicalness ➔ process radicalness [H4d]). This finding suggests that
adopters’ perceptions of process innovation radicalness are highly driven by the perceptions of
the base innovation radicalness. Essentially, throughout the disruptive cycle, the perceptions of
the base functionality remain ambiguous ‘enough’ to the adopting units, and, therefore, related
process spaces also remain highly fluid. Perceived base radicalness thereby continues to
significantly influence process radicalness no matter the adoption time during the disruptive cycle.
The impact of service radicalness ➔ process radicalness was surprisingly greater for late
adopters (H4c). Late adopters’ perceptions of process radicalness appeared to be driven by
two counterbalancing order effects: (1) a positive transformative impact on the new applica-
tions/services being developed and (2) a negative transformative impact on the base technolo-
gies they adopted. The more radical they perceived the base innovations to be, the less radical
they perceived the process innovations associated with such base technologies to be.
Beyond the specific findings, two overarching observations should be noted. First,
perceptions of radicalness between late and early adopters across all innovation types are far
more complex than earlier theorized. Second, among early adopters, perceptions of service
radicalness are highly driven by technological change and base innovation radicalness. In
contrast, late adopters’ perceptions of process radicalness are driven by both base and service
radicalness. Clearly, the dynamic shifts in these perceptions during a disruptive cycle invite
richer theory development and empirical scrutiny. Likewise, future studies of radical innovation
should either control for or account for time in order to avoid confounded results.
Managerial implications
Managers can learn a few lessons from this study. First, firms can benefit from apparent second-
mover advantages if they want to innovate disruptively and quickly. Second, it is possible to catch
up more easily than assumed in the past because the rate of adopting base technologies increases
with time. Likewise, unexpected strong order effects were found, which suggests that there is a sort
of multiplier effect during adoption races: for late adopters, the amount of innovation in the base has
a stronger impact on the amount of process innovation adopted relative to early adopters. This may
be because late adopters are, in general, more resistant to change and will focus on ‘exploitation’.
Also, the perceived radicalness of base innovations decreased over time, as did the order effects
of perceived base radicalness on perceived service radicalness for late adopters.
Nevertheless, there are also some first-mover advantages. These were observed in the
amount of service innovations created based on the relative number of base innovations
adopted (greater strong order effects). Early adopters of base innovations can generate a more
diverse portfolio of services to market and may in some situations benefit from such

explorations. However, to what extent this was truly realized with the studied firms is not known.
Unexpectedly, early adopters also had less perceived radicalness in new processes adopted as
a downstream effect of perceived service radicalness. Perhaps this had more to do with firms’
focus on exploration when processes are less important. However, indications are that creating
radical services earlier makes the perceived radicalness of the processes seem less daunting.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, our study covered small organizations with fewer than
100 employees. It may therefore not be appropriate to generalize our findings to larger firms,
although even in this study, organizational size influenced the amount of innovation (less with
radicalness). We recognize that small firms with limited resources and capability often face
tremendous constraints when trying to undertake transformative changes when a disruptive
IT innovation presents itself. That said, we should also recognize that small firms are more
adaptive because they are less affected by excess formalization, complexity and structural
inertia (Damanpour, 1992; Grover et al., 2007). Therefore, it is important to study how small
software organizations innovate because many significant IT innovations were created by small
entrepreneurs (e.g. Google, Amazon or eBay). The fact that 121 firms in our study did adopt
innovations across all three areas indicates that small software development organizations
were able to undergo transformative changes.
Second, owing to the unique features of internet computing, our findings may not be fully
generalizable to other types of radical IT innovations without additional empirical scrutiny.
Third, the study relied on a retrospective mode of data collection and used a single respondent
per organization who offered perceptual responses for our measures. As a result, the study has
many of the feedback problems and method biases that characterize the bulk of IT-innovation
research. The retrospective approach was necessary because we know that an innovation is
radical only after the adopters have observed the magnitude of its transformative impact. In our
case, foresight bias is a more severe threat than hindsight bias (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). The
threat of inaccurate recall was also alleviated by the significance of these innovations. During
the talk-aloud protocols and interviews, the participants often commented that these technologies
were so significant that they could easily recall the time of their adoption.
Fourth, unlike a longitudinal field study, our study did not observe events unfolding over time.
Our study did shed light on how adopting times influence firms and their perceptions and
behaviours. Most recent IS research also suggests that the temporal effects are more pronounced
in the beginning of an innovation’s life cycle. For instance, Dong-Gil & Dennis (2011) found that
the performance benefits from codification-based knowledge management systems converge
between inexperienced and experienced users. Instead of focusing on how a single user
changes over time, our study highlights the temporal impacts between early and late adopters
by comparing adopters’ perceptions at the time of adoption across the population.
Fifth, because we were using secondary data collected originally for other purposes, we
had no control over the research design and data collected. We have therefore been required
to use innovative proxies for measures that would have been better tapped into during the
data-collection process with alternative methods. For example, we do not have the exact order

or timing of innovation adoptions – just the rough year of first adoption for a class of innovations.
This implies that the used measure for adoption rate is fairly rough. If possible, it would have
been ideal to be able to measure the ‘velocity’ of innovating – i.e. the exact time differences
between each innovation adopted for each type of innovation. Instead, we are left to assume
that the period of, e.g. base innovations ends roughly around the time that the firm begins
adopting process innovations. While this is surely a rough estimate, it is the best we could come
up with using the secondary data.
Additional issues arise with the perceived radicalness measures as used by Carlo et al.
(2011). Namely, in their study, perceived radicalness was used as a dependent variable and
did not include innovation perceptions at the time adopters actually made the adoption decision.
As a result, there is no way to control for potential biases in perceptions during the time passed
while testing H3a–d and H4a–d. In the past,9 most studies have asked for perceived innovation
characteristics to predict or explain actual adoption behaviour. In such studies, keeping in mind
that perceptions (whichever way formed) drive behaviour, it does not particularly matter why an
adopter perceives a particular innovation to be more radical when compared with other
respondents. When data are being captured longitudinally, as in this study, and the scholar is
polling certain respondents early in the innovation cycle, then this higher-than-average
perception of radicalness could be a reflection of the fact that most instances of the focal
innovation are actually more radical at that time point, as we assume in our study. However, it
could also be that respondents had a more radical-than-average instance in mind when
answering the survey question regardless of when it is asked. Or, it could be that the
respondent’s firm had a particularly tough time getting the innovation to work in early trials,
colouring his or her perceptions. Or, it could be that the adopter does not possess much related
knowledge and experience, meaning for him or her that the innovation is effectively always more
radical. In any case, in the end, which of these mechanisms are in play in our study analysis does
not matter significantly because the level of influence of these perceptions on adoption behaviour
may not be particularly sensitive to how exactly these perceptions are formed.
Finally, the small sample size limits the power of our analysis. For instance, the power for the
radicalness sub-model is 0.77 for the early adopters and 0.70 for the late adopters. To mitigate
this, we bootstrapped 500 sample points for our analysis. According to Qureshi & Compeau
(2009), the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) we used is a relatively powerful tool for
analysing differences between groups when the model is not overly complex. Qureshi &
Compeau (2009) also suggested that sample size ‘does not affect those cases where signifi-
cant differences have been observed . . . and we can thus have confidence that effects which
have been detected are, in fact, truly present’ (p. 206).
Future research
Our study opens several new avenues for innovation research. The survey methodology does
not allow for inferring causal impacts of temporal factors. In the future, we need to go beyond
analyses of single variances to use longitudinal data sets in order to unravel how the disruptive
9
We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for these observations.

innovation ecology emerges over time. Additional benefits may come from conducting
qualitative, case-based or action research, which has the ability to capture more fine-grained
adoption patterns regarding the timing and type of innovation. Further research needs to
investigate how technological, organizational, process and environmental factors interact with
temporal factors. Although we articulated directions for the hypotheses, this remains an
exploratory study as seen by some surprising findings (notably H2b, H2d and H4c). In this
regard, more theorizing is needed to clarify complex interactions of time on adoption rate and
radicalness perceptions (H1, H3) and strong order effects on the amount of innovation (H2)
and on radicalness perceptions (H4). Future radical innovation studies need to recognize
innovation age and control for the interconnectedness of innovations. Finally, there are very
few studies of population-level perceptions of innovations over an adoption cycle such as those
undertaken by Rogers (1995) and Christensen et al. (2007). We attempted to move the IS
literature forward by doing a cross-industry study with retrospective data. However, MIS
research must also look at changes longitudinally within firms, and not just temporally across
a population. The saga of radical IT innovation is not yet over.
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Byrne, B. M. (2004). Testing for multigroup invariance using Brigham Young University, Utah. He received his PhD in
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Available: http://disc-nt.cba.uh.edu/chin/plsfaq.htm. innovation in project-based design work, and research
Gaskin, J. (2013). SmartPLS: multigroup moderation and and teaching methodologies. James advises scholars
moderated mediation. In: Gaskination’s Statistics. and practitioners worldwide through correspondence
Erickson, J., Lyytinen, K. & Siau, K. (2005). Agile modeling, stemming from his SEM YouTube videos and StatWiki.
agile software development, and extreme programming: Kalle Lyytinen (PhD, Computer Science, University of
the state of research. Journal of Database Management Jyvaskyla; Dr h.c. from Umeå University) is Iris S. Wolstein
(JDM), 16, 88–100. professor at Case Western Reserve University and a
Bower, J. L. & Christensen, C. M. (1995). Disruptive technol- visiting CIIR professor at University of Umeå, Sweden,
ogies: catching the wave. Harvard Business Review, 73, and at London School of Economics, UK. Between 1992
43–53. and 2012, he was the third most productive scholar in the
Christensen, C. M., Baumann, H., Ruggles, R. & Sadtler, T. IS field when measured by the AIS basket of eight journals;
M. (2006). Disruptive innovation for social change. he is currently among the five most cited scholars in the IS
Harvard Business Review, 84, 94–101. field based on his adjusted h-index (65). He is an LEO
Nelson, R. R. & Winter, S. G. (1982). An Evolutionary The- Award recipient (2013), AIS fellow (2004), and the former
ory of Economic Change, Belknap Press of Harvard Uni- chairperson of IFIP WG 8.2. He has published approxi-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass. mately 300 refereed articles and edited or written nearly
Damanpour, F. (1992). Organizational size and innovation. 20 books or special issues on the nature of IS discipline,
Organization Studies, 13, 375–402. system design, method engineering, computer-supported
Grover, V., Segars, A. H. & Purvis, R. (2007). Exploring am- cooperative work, standardization, ubiquitous computing,
bidextrous innovation tendencies in the adoption of tele- social networks. He is currently involved in research
communications technologies. IEEE Transactions on that explores IT-induced radical innovation in software
Engineering Management, 54, 268–285 development, digitalization of complex design processes,
Qureshi, I. & Compeau, D. (2009). Assessing between- requirements discovery and modeling for large scale systems,
group differences in information systems research: a and digital infrastructures underlying mobile services.
comparison of covariance- and component-based Gregory M. Rose is Associate Professor in the College
SEM. MIS Quarterly, 33, 197–214. of Business at Washington State University. He received his
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of Innovations. The Free PhD from the Computer Information Systems Department
Press, New York, NY, USA. at Georgia State University, his MBA from Binghamton
Bolton, R. N. (1993). Pretesting questionnaires: content University, and his BS in Business Administration from the
analyses of respondents’ concurrent verbal protocols. University of Vermont. Gregory has more than 20 journal
Marketing Science, 12, 280–303. publications including those in MIS Quarterly; Information
Systems Journal; MIS Quarterly Executive; IEEE Transac-
tions on Engineering Management; Accounting, Management
Biographies
and Information Technologies; European Journal of Infor-
Jessica Luo Carlo was an Assistant Professor in the mation System; Psychology and Marketing; Journal of
College of Communication Arts and Sciences at Michigan Global Information Management; and Communications of
State University. She received her PhD from the Weatherhead the AIS. He is currently working on research projects involving
School of Management at Case Western Reserve University. radical innovation theory, organizational learning, and IT
Her research interests include systemic risk in complex project management. He is an Associate Editor at Informa-
sociotechnical systems and IT-based innovation and the role tion & Management and serves on the editorial board of the
of IT in mitigating systemic risks across organizational Journal of Global Information Management.

A P P E N D I X : S U M M A RY O F M E T H O D O L O G Y P R O C E D U R E S
USED BY CARLO ET AL. (2011)
Instrument development: Multiple techniques were followed to create measurement items.

First, based on an extensive literature review, a large pool of IT innovations deemed to
have occurred since the widespread use of internet computing (1995–2005) were docu-
mented. IS development professionals were interviewed to eliminate any innovations that
they felt would likely have occurred without internet computing (e.g. client/server-based
Enterprise Resource Planning). The list was validated for face and content validity with a
pilot study. Nineteen tape-recorded interviews were conducted with top development
experts in seven software development organizations with a combined experience of over
100 years in developing software and with four PhD students with extensive IT-industry
background. Three additional IS faculty members with industry background were also
consulted. These experts were excluded from the final survey sample to eliminate possible
contamination of findings.
Talk-aloud protocols (Lyytinen & Rose, 2003a) were used during the validation interviews.
Participants talked aloud when filling out the questionnaire, and their reactions to the ques-
tions were observed and notes were taken. Participants were also probed for additional
comments when they experienced information-processing difficulties identified in Bolton
(Bolton, 1993), such as difficulty understanding a question or difficulty forming answers.
Items were continuously revised until participants made no additional requests for revisions
and exhibited minimal information-processing difficulties. To render the list complete, new
types of innovations were added when interviewees mentioned innovations that we had
not included in the original list. Some innovations were deleted from the list, if the inter-
viewees indicated that they were not associated with the range of base technologies being
studied (e.g. all service and process innovations that had been adopted before 1995 and
could not necessarily be connected with adopting internet computing). The cut-off point
for inclusion was whether more than 50% of the interviewees said they had started to
use the innovation after adopting internet computing. By setting the cut-off point so high,
we were able to apply a conservative criterion in compiling the final list, which guaranteed
that interactions examined ranged from widely adopted to commonly known innovations.
The final list, as shown later, consists of 10 base innovations, 9 process innovations and
14 service innovations. For level of perceived radicalness and timing of adoption, partici-
pants in the pilot were asked for feedback as to what level of granularity they were
confident they could accurately recall. As a result of these interviews, the timing metric
implemented was the first year of adoption of the first given innovation type. Also, the
perceived radicalness measure chosen was the relative perceived radicalness for the sum of inter-
net innovations adopted/implemented/created within a given type within that firm.
Amount of Innovation:
Base: Has your organization adopted the following internet-based technologies? Check all
that apply.

□ Uniform and ubiquitous clients (e.g. HTML browser) with multimedia capability that are platform independent
□ Use of three-tier or higher level architecture
□ Web services based on interoperability standards (e.g. XML, SOAP, UDDI or WSDL)
□ Peer-to-peer applications and protocols (e.g. groupware or content ware)
□ Application server middleware (e.g. Java Beans, CORBA, .Net and Java J2EE)
□ Middleware protocols (e.g. CGI, ASP and JSP)
□ Software patterns (e.g. broker and observer patterns)
□ Ubiquitous services available at any terminal, anytime and anywhere across a multitude of often ‘unknown’ client types
(e.g. mobile or multi-channel Web applications, and WAP)
□ Media-oriented services (e.g. video and graphics in Web applications, or voice recognition and generation, and VOIP)
□ Open telecommunication services (e.g. wireless broadband services, 802.11.x or TCP/IP v6)
Process: Has your organization…. Check all that apply.
□ Hired specialists in graphic design, or required existing staff to acquire such competencies
□ Hired specialists in site branding, or required existing staff to acquire such competencies
□ Hired specialists in telecommunications design, or required existing staff to acquire such competencies
□ Used open source development
□ Incorporated clients and other stakeholders into the development process (e.g. JAD sessions)
□ Used external sources for developing solutions or carrying out development tasks (e.g. outsourcing/offshoring)
□ Used new specification models and techniques (e.g. agile development, extreme programming, UML variants for Web
services and RUP)
□ Bought software component libraries or frameworks in the market, instead of developing them in-house
Service: Has your organization developed the following e-business applications for your
clients (either internal or external clients)? Check all that apply.
□ Intranet □ Web-based R&D related knowledge management

□ Web-based transaction-based data delivery □ Business intelligence using internet
□ Web-based periodic information delivery □ Extranet with business partners
□ Web-based enterprise-wide document □ Electronic marketplace and exchange applications
management and sharing (e.g. Internet 2 or Manugistics)
□ Public Web (e.g. external Web presence) □ Electronic auctions
□ One-to-one marketing (e.g. rule-based □ Web-based Supply Chain Management
and collaborative filtering, CRM) (e.g. eCollaboration)
□ B2C order entry and customer management □ Web-based logistic management systems
(e.g. ERP)
Level of Perceived Radicalness: (* indicates dropped items)

Base: (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree; NA)
1. These technologies were major improvements over previous technologies.

2. These technologies were based on revolutionary changes in technology.
3. These technologies were breakthrough innovations.
4. These technologies have led to products that were difficult to replace or substitute using
older technologies.*
5. These technologies represented major technological advance(s) within the local contexts in
which they were applied.*
Process: (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree; NA)
1 These techniques/methods/approaches were major improvements over previous development

practices.

2 These techniques/methods/approaches were based on revolutionary changes.*

3 These techniques/methods/approaches were breakthrough innovations.*
4 These techniques/methods/approaches have led to development outcomes that were
difficult to replace or substitute using older methods/techniques/approaches.
5 These techniques/methods/approaches represented major methodological advance(s)
within the local contexts in which they were applied.
Services: (1 – strongly disagree, 5 – strongly agree; NA)
1 These applications were major improvements over previous technologies.

2 These applications were based on revolutionary changes in technology.
3 These applications were breakthrough innovations.
4 These applications have led to products that were difficult to replace or substitute using older
technologies.
5 These applications represented major technological advance(s) within the local contexts in
which they were applied.*
Timing of Adoption:
Base: What is the year your organization first began to adopt any of these technologies?
Process: What year did your organization first began to adopt any of these techniques/
methods/approaches?
Services: What year did your organization first began to develop any of these applications?

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Carlo2014 Jaskin

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doi: 10.1111/isj.

Info Systems J (2014) 24, 537–569 537

Early vs. late adoption of radical information

Abstract. This paper extends the disruptive information technology innovation

** Assistant Professor of Information Systems.

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd

Keywords: internet computing, radical innovation, disruptive innovation, early

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Figure 1. Three IT-innovation types and strong order effects (DITIM).

Generally, an IT innovation is an innovation in digital and communications technologies and

IT innovations are also expected to vary on a continuum from incremental to radical

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

IT innovation sets Description Examples

IT base (type 0) Base technology innovation DBMS, client/server computing;

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Amount of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects

During a disruptive IT-innovation cycle, the amount of process innovations adopted as a

Radicalness of innovation: varying perceptions across time

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Radicalness of innovation: temporal impacts on strong order effects

Table 2. Sample characteristics (N = 121)

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

(1) Base Base The number of internet-related NA NA 5.06 2.44 NA

process innovations a ﬁrm

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Dependent and independent variables

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

A Combined baseline models (early and late) – unconstrained 98.98 64 — — —

Figure 2. Measurement invariance across two adopter groups: Unstd. Est.

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

considered these technologies to be based on revolutionary changes in technology (item

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Adoption rate (H1)

Table 5. GLM tests of between-subjects effects for H1a–c

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Amount of innovation: temporal impact on strong order effects (H2)

Table 7. PLS tests of group differences for H2a–d

Base ➔ Service Base ➔ Process Service ➔ Process Base ➔ Service ➔

Group Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late

ns, not signiﬁcant.

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Table 8. Amount of innovations: effects of control variables

Early base Late base Early service Late service

IV DV Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est.

emp Service 0.037 0.016 0.030 0.014

ns, not signiﬁcant.

Radicalness of innovation: varying perceptions across time (H3)

Radicalness of innovation: temporal impact on strong order effects (H4)

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Table 9. GLM tests of between-subjects effects for H3a–c

Table 10. PLS tests of group differences for H4a–d

Base ➔ Service Base ➔ Process Service ➔ Process Base ➔ Service ➔

Group Early Late Early Late Early Late Early Late

ns, not signiﬁcant.

© 2014 Wiley Publishing Ltd, Information Systems Journal 24, 537–569

Table 11. Radicalness of innovations: effects of control variables

Early base Late base Early service Late service

IV DV Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est. Unstd. Est.