2nd BATCH CRIM REV CASE POOL UPDATED

2nd Batch: CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW – Atty.
Roland Atienza
46. Joseph Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
TOPIC: Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080, as amended by RA 7659) – Plunder, mala in se
Facts: Former President of the Republic of the Philippines, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and a.k.a. 'Jose
Velarde', was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080 (An
Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by R.A. No. 7659, for having amassed, accumulated and acquired ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, described as follows:
(a) by receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling in connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, in
consideration of protection of illegal gambling;
(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing public funds representing a portion of tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of stocks of the Belle Corporation; and,
(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks and depositing the same under his
bank account name 'Jose Velarde' at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
Section 2 of the said law provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder.
The Sandiganbayan found that "a probable cause for the offense of Plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused". Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is malum prohibitum.
Ruling: Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes
are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.
2nd Batch: CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW – Atty. Roland Atienza
47. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division),
Respondents G.R. No. 220598; July 19, 2016; BERSAMIN, J.:
TOPIC: CONSPIRACY IN PLUNDER
FACTS: The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C.
Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors, namely: Manuel L.
Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman Reynaldo A.
Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The accused et al. acquired
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00 more or less. Several of the
accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail. The Sandiganbayan granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and
Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not strong. In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the
Sandiganbayan, denied their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. The motions for
reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Atty. Aleta Tolentino, the prosecution’s main witness testified that e former management of the PCSO was commingling the
charity fund, the prize fund and the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one main
account. This violates Section 6 of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting principles. The Audit
Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). There was
excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10 million in 2002. The allocation in excess of P10 million was
in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. They were working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter
allows only 15% of the revenue as operating fund, which was already exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were
operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009. In the COA report, it was found out that the audit committee also asked Aguas why
there were disbursements in excess of P10 million. He explained that there were board resolutions confirming additional CIF which
were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary.
The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those resolutions. In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it
appears that Uriarte would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo approves it by affixing her signature on that same
letter-request. There were seven letters or memoranda to then President Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."
After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and Villar separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The Sandiganbayan
denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had
conspired to commit plunder.
ISSUE: Whether the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte.
HELD: No, to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in
pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and
each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having
affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of
plunder because it had no immediate and necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular.
It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly
unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby
acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as
an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying
approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a
crime only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if
it does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two
nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit
plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is
notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy. This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or
accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for
plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons.
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth
aggregating P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the
main plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of
the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder. The corpus
delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than P50,000,000.00. The
failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution. The Court inevitably concludes that the
Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the
petitioners; and ignored the lack of evidence establishing the corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00 through any or all of the predicate crimes.
48. Republic rep. by Anti-Money Laundering Council v. Cabrini Green & Ross, Inc.,
GR 154522, 5 May 2006
TOPIC: Jurisdiction of CA to AMLA/freeze order
Facts: The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) issued freeze orders against various banks of the herein respondents. The said
frozen accounts were prima facie found to be related to unlawful activities of the herein respondents. Such issuances were issued
based on section 10 of RA 9160 “Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001”. Under RA 9160, a freeze order issued by the AMLC is effective
for a period not exceeding 15 days unless extended "upon order of the court." Accordingly, before the lapse of the period of
effectivity of its freeze orders, the AMLC filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) various petitions for extension of effectivity of its freeze
orders. The AMLC interpreted the phrase "upon order of the court" to refer to the Court of Appeals. They belive that the Court of
Appeals is given power given to the CA to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of injunction against any freeze order
issued by the AMLC carried with it the power to extend the effectivity of a freeze order.
However, the CA disagreed with the AMLC and dismissed the petitions. It uniformly ruled that it was not vested by RA 9160 with the
power to extend a freeze order issued by the AMLC.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the power to extend the period of effectivity of the freeze order and
issue a temporary restraining order.
Ruling: Yes. The Court of Appeals has the power to extend the period of effectivity of the freeze order and issue a temporary
restraining order. RA 9194 amended RA 9610 that clarifies the power of the Court of Appeals to extend the freeze order issued by
the AMLC as stated: SEC. 7. Section 10 of [RA 9160] is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. - The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and after
determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an unlawful activity as
defined in Sec. 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of
twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.
Section 12 of RA 9194 further provides:
SEC 12. Transitory Provision. - Existing freeze orders issued by the AMLC shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) days after
the effectivity of this Act, unless extended by the Court of Appeals.
49. PNB vs. Gancayco 15 SCRA 91
TOPIC: Exception to bank secrecy – Sec 8, RA 3019
Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional
exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
Facts: Emilio Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the Philippine National
Bank to produce at a hearing the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth.
PNB refused to disclose his bank deposits, invoking Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405. On the other hand, the prosecutors cited the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly Section 8 therewith, to wit:
“Section 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. – If in accordance with the provisions of RA 1379, a public official has been found to
have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal.
Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official, may be taken into consideration, when their
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the
enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.” PNB then filed an action for declaratory judgment
in the CFI of Manila which ruled that Section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act clearly intended to provide an additional
ground for the examination of bank deposits. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is under
investigation for unexplained wealth
Held : Yes. While Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are “absolutely confidential … and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into,” , the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits shall be taken into consideration
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
While No reconciliation is possible between Republic Act No. 1405 and Republic Act No. 3019 as the two laws are so repugnant to
each other. Thus, while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are “absolutely confidential … and, therefore,
may not be examined, inquired or looked into,” except in those cases enumerated therein, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-
graft law) directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits “shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.” The only conclusion possible is that Section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended
to amend Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out
that while Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential,” it nevertheless allows such
disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject of
the litigation.
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of
cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy
as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge
does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
50. Estrada vs sandiganbayan
TOPIC: Plunder – exemption to RA 1405
Facts: In lieu of the Criminal Case “People v. Estrada” for plunder, the Special Prosecution Panel filed before the Sandiganbayan a
request for issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum directing the President of Export and Industry Bank or his/her authorized
representative to produce documents namely, Trust Account and Savings Account belonging to petitioner and statement of accounts
of one named “Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon during the hearings. Sandiganbayan granted both requests and subpoenas were
accordingly issued. Sandiganbayan also granted and issued subpoenas prayed for by the Prosecution Panel in another later date.
Petitioner now assisted by his counsel filed two separate motions to quash the two subpoenas issued. Sandiganbayan denied both
motions and the consequent motions for reconsideration of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty not exempted from protection of R.A. No. 1405
Ruling: NO. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two
classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from
the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public officers, and in either case the noble
idea that “a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life,
so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny” applies with equal force. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the
exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.
51. SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995; KAPUNAN, J.:
TOPIC: Prohibited wiretapping, consent is required
FACTS: A civil case for damages was filed by Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latter's office on February 22, 1988, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript
of the emotionally-charged exchange.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, Garcia
filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200. The trial court granted the
Motion to Quash filed by Ramirez on the ground that the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by
a person other than a participant to the communication.
ISSUE: Whether or not a violation of RA 4200 may only be committed by a third party in a conversation.
RULING: No. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to
penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Even a person privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
52. Gaanan v. IAC
GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986; Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

TOPIC: RA 4200; Wiretapping – phone extension
FACTS: On October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault. The prosecutor called the appellant to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the case. Then, complainant made a telephone call to the prosecutor. When
complainant called up, the prosecutor requested Appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and the prosecutor with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act. The
lower court found them both guilty of violating Section 1 of the Act. Petitioner appealed to the IAC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two
parties using a telephone line
RULING: No
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be
connected by wire to the main telephone but can be used from place to place within the radius of a kilometer or more. A person
should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the
risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
The Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would in no way differ if instead of repeating the message he held out
his handset so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider
to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of
doubt as in the case at bar, the telephone extension telephone is to be construed as not in the phrase “device or arrangement”.
54. DIGITEL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., JOHNSON ROBERT L. GO and ERIC J. SEVERINO vs
MARIQUIT SORIANO
G.R. No. 166039, June 26, 2006; CARPIO MORALES, J.:
TOPIC: RA 7877 – Proper Conduct of Victim
FACTS: Mariquit Soriano was employed as Director for Market and Communications by Digitel. She resigned about 2 years later due
to an altercation with Severino, submitting a resignation letter and a duly signed quitclaim. About 1 year after her resignation, she
filed criminal charges for sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness against her 2 superiors, Johnson Robert Go and Eric Severino.
And 6 months thereafter, Soriano also filed an illegal dismissal case against Digitel, Go and Severino on the ground of professional
and sexual harassment leading to her constructive dismissal,.
The City prosecutor initially dismissed Soriano’s criminal complaints, but on motion for reconsideration, Go was indicted but
only for acts of lasciviousness. On appeal to the Department of Justice however, the resolution of the City Prosecutor was reversed
and all criminal complaints against Go and Severino were dismissed for lack of p[robable cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of sexual harassment.
RULING: NO. Soariano did not immediately file a sexual harassment case. Nor did she advance any reason for her delay. It took
her around 1 year to file criminal case, and 1 and a half year to file her labor charges. The Supreme Court also held that at all
events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or circumstance is worthy of credence is the common experience,
knowledge and observation of ordinary men and Soriuano’s narration of facts did not pass the test of credibility. Soriano was a
highly-paid company executive, well-educated and a product of prestigious schools, assertive and already in her forties. Thus, the
Supreme Court couldn’t understand why, if her allegations were true, she failed to raise an issue about it at the soonest possible
opportunity considering of the gravity of some of her charges (e.i. she alleged that, while seated at a sofa, Go sat beside her, crept
his hand under a throw pillow ands “poked” her vagina several times during a party attended by at least 60 guests).
Moreover, Soriano’s resignation letter, which was addressed to Severino, was cordial, and she even thanked him for the
opportunity of working with him. Such cordiality is deemed inconsistent with the narration of facts. Soriano even admitted that she
attempted to withdraw his resignation letter, and thus in effect, offered to continue working with Go and Severino, her alleged sexual
harassers. Such desire to be re-employed is likewise deemed inconsistent with her narration of facts.
55. DOMINGO vs. RAYALA. GR 155831. February 18, 2008
TOPIC: ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT – Employment related sexual harassment
FACTS: On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint
for sexual harassment against then NLRC Chairman Rayala before the DOLE.
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment complained of, thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang Lot, gumaganda ka yata?
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay
nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. xxx Natatakot na baka mangyari sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na
nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
(In one occasion, Domingo was given money by Rayala. She related this incident to her officemate and was told to return the
money, which Domingo did)
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa
aking palagay at tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
xxx
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon
niya para kay ELA Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na bisita x x x. Pinalabas muna ako
ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran ko si
Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya
sa aking kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang
hanggang kanang tenga at saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At
saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
xxx
Thereafter, Domingo filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the DOLE.
A Committee on Decorum and Investigation was then created. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended his
suspension. The recommendation was then submitted to the Office of the President (OP). OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora,
issued AO 119, finding Rayala guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and thereby dismissed him from
service.
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution.
The CA affirmed the dismissal. Rayala timely filed a MR. Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the earlier Decision.
However, Justice Reyes dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day. Thus later, the CA modified its earlier Decision and deleted the penalty of dismissal and instead the penalty of suspension
from service for the maximum period of one (1) year was imposed.
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta, Rayala posits that for sexual harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or (c) the
denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual
harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same
purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting
or offensive to the victim.
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as
contemplated by the law.
ISSUE: Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
RULING: YES. There appears no valid ground for SC to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating
Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some
of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there
was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a
higher position.
Respondent’s insistence is unconvincing.
The law penalizing sexual harassment is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another
in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting,
segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
It is true that this provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not necessary that the demand,
request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal
certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling
her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the
unspoken request for a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is
clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter
to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
56. People of the Philippines vs Casio
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014
TOPIC: RA 9208 – Recruitment and Trafficking prostitutes; No double jeopardy
Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to
entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1
Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives, Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys,
pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded
in the police blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the
transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district where the accused noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation occured
and upon the signal, the accused was arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.
Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.
Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled to the police who acted as
decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a prostitute because she needed money. AAA
also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as proven by the
testimonies of the witnesses.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the
adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
1. When the trafficked person is a child;
2. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”
and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale
if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
4. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked person
or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement
agencies;
6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
The information filed in this case is as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ignacio Carlos of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the 13th day of February, 1909, and the 3d day of March, 1910, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Ignacio Carlos, with intent of gain and without violence or intimidation against the person or force against the thing,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, take, steal , and carry away two thousand two hundred and seventy-three
(2,273) kilowatts of electric current, of the value of nine hundred and nine (909) pesos and twenty (20) cents Philippine currency,
the property of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation doing business in the Philippine Islands, without the
consent of the owner thereof; to the damage and prejudice of the said Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company in the said sum of
nine hundred and nine (909) pesos and twenty (20) cents Philippine currency, equal to and equivalent of 4,546 pesetas Philippine
currency. All contrary to law.
57. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL
JAMAD y BUKIN (AL) a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain "TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused, BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng
Awid," Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 194255; June 13, 2012; SERENO, J.:
TOPIC: RA 9208; Syndicated
FACTS: Accused Hashim and Bernadette Pansacala were found guilty by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of the crime of ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b), RA 8042 as principals by direct participation, committed by a
syndicate, against BBB and AAA. On different occasions, accused Bernadette approached AAA, a waitress, to encourage AAA to work
in Malaysia, as he knew certain persons who would soon be leaving for that country. Also, accused invited BBB to work as a saleslady
in Brunei. After being assured that the prospective employment was above board and that she would be well compensated, BBB
accepted the invitation. On the next day, BBB together with accused Bernadette and the other 2 co-accused Macky and Jun who will
escort the group in going to Malaysia met with AAA, a certain CCC (allegedly another recruit), Arlene (allegedly AAA’s employer) and
a certain Cristy. When the group arrived in Malaysia, they met Tash who was allegedly their financier. The group stayed at the
Classic Hotel for 3 nights. Accused Hashim instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear "sexy clothes" because they were going to
meet their supposed boss named Bunso. As there was a failure to reach an agreement on the purported compensation of the four
girls, Macky and Jun brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon where the latter were introduced to a certain person named
Mommy Cindy, the alleged owner of the salon, and their purported manager Hako who was called Mommy Susan.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their employment at the Golden Lotus. It
was only after they agreed to stay there for employment that they were forced to become sex workers to earn money and pay off
the debts they incurred from their travel from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia. Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003,
AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women. The girls were told that they would be made to pay a fine if they refused to have sexual
intercourse with the customers. On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She
sought his help for her return to the Philippines, and he agreed. The following day, the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration
Officers of Malaysia, and the prostituted Filipino women, including AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police
Department) in Labuan until all the women were deported to the Philippines. Thus, an information was filed against the accused.
Only Bernadette and Hashim were arrested. The trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the
defense had entered into a stipulation that neither Bernadette nor Franz had a license or an authority to recruit or deploy workers for
overseas employment. Moreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspiracy by the accused and other persons.
ISSUE: WON the convictions of the accused were proper.
RULING: The Court ruled in the affirmative.
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following elements must occur: 1. The
accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; 2. The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and
transporting; and 3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and confederating with one another.
As to the first element, accused Bernadette admitted that she did not have a valid license to recruit persons for overseas
employment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for employment. Anent the second
element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an employment
opportunity, and how they were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they eventually worked as
prostituted women. On the third element, accused Bernadette posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than
two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused liable for the crime.
The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. In the recent case People v. Lalli, we affirmed the trial court’s findings in which 2 of the 3 accused
were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took
note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused.
We held thus:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or
detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a
general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight
of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged. It is clear that
through the concerted efforts of the other accused that victim Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a
prostitute. Such conspiracy among the accused could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated —
each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest x x x.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the
only ones who had conspired to bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the credible
testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was their
financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the
victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these
persons resulted in the oppression of the victims. Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant,
together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felony and decided to commit it. It is not necessary
to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying down the details of how
an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.
The petition was dismissed.
59. People of the Philippines vs. Jeffrey Hirang
G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017
TOPIC: Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA No. 9208) – Qualified Trafficking; Minor
Facts: Appellant Hirang recruited and transported four (4) minor girls: AAA, 17 years old, BBB, 17 years old, CCC, 14 years old and
DDD, 17 years old, for the purpose of prostitution. Hirang told the girls that they would receive P5,000.00 after a "gimik" with them
and instructed them to tell their Korean customers that they were 16 years of age, as this was their preference. They proceeded to
meet with the Koreans at Chowking restaurant, C-5 in Taguig City and upon their arrival, Hirang talked to a Korean and then
introduced the girls to him. The Korean handed money to Hirang and as the latter was counting it, NBI agents arrived at the scene
and announced a raid. NBI agents arrested Hirang, while a social worker approached the girls and brought them to the NBI for their
statements.
Hirang was charged before the RTC of Pasig City with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons, as defined and penalized R.A. No.
9208. The RTC of Pasig City convicted him of the crime of human trafficking, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not appellant Hirang is guilty of the crime of qualified trafficking in persons.
Ruling: The Court affirms Hirang's conviction. In People v. Casio, the Court defined the elements of trafficking in persons, as derived
in Section 3(a), to wit:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders";
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another"; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."
The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor victims for sexual activities
and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and
financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed
in a large scale and his four victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial. The young victims
themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by Hirang to participate in the latter's illicit sex trade. Hirang
recruited the girls to become victims of sexual abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed
and, thus, joined him in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police authorities personally, witnessed
Hirang's unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment operations and arrested him after Hirang transacted with the supposed
customers and received payment therefor.
60. SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168852; September 30, 2008; AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
TOPIC: OFFENDER IN VAWC, application of conspiracy under RPC
FACTS: Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were
born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents)
before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of RA 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order contending that the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No.
9262.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy"
under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family
home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
RTC: issued a resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED
IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9262.
HELD: Yes, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''violence against women and their children as "any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it
does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory
Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.
The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature,
are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However,
conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a
petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. Considering
the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on
whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
62. KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO v. RTC
TOPIC: RA 9262 – Violence against women through harassment

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information
which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and
left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Republic Act 9262.[4]
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against
petitioner on November 19, 2009. The latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged
incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the subject incident. She
narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then
inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private respondent
slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
Issue: Whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor the accused
Held: Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262; Elements. The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts
to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her
child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he
has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and,
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to
be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the
courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is
sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed.
63. Garcia vs Hon. Drilon
TOPIC: RA 9262; Grant of TPO ex parte
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a
victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent
filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the
RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted
product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality
in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issue: WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative
of the equal protection clause.
Ruling: RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
64. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. PATRICIO RAYON, SR., Appellant.
G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013; BRION, J.: (In blue is for rape, for recitation purposes)
TOPIC: RA 7610 – Other sexual abuse
FACTS: The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 and with qualified rape in
two separate informations filed before the RTC.
XYZ and accused got married on March 3, 1990; they begot five (5) children, namely: AAA, XXX, YYY, Jr., BBB, and ZZZ. She stated
that AAA is "mentally deficient," but could play musical instruments.
One time, when XYZ arrived at their house after buying rice, she saw the appellant embracing AAA and spreading her legs, the
accused then put his hand on AAA’s breast, inserted his other hand inside her underwear, and touched her vagina. When the accused
noticed XYZ’s presence, he immediately stood up and instructed her to prepare food. XYZ felt "bad and afraid," but did not confront
the accused. She instead went to the kitchen to do her chores.
On December 16, 2005, BBB revealed to XYZ that the accused had raped her. BBB recalled that while she was in her room in
December 2005, the accused grabbed her and removed her short pants and panty, the accused then removed his short pants,
mounted her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain, but could not shout because the accused covered her mouth with
his hands. Afterwards, the accused inserted his penis into her anus. BBB disclosed the incident to XYZ who, in turn, accompanied her
to the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was a violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 or Section 5(b) of the same
law.
Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified rape.
RULING: The Information charged the accused with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. The body of the
Information, however, alleged those described acts punishable under Section 5(b) of the same law.
Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610 provides that “(a)ny person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
This provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e.,
(a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development.
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to
other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period. [italics ours]
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements:
(1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child is below 18 years old.
In the present case, all the elements of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 have been established. First, the
appellant embraced AAA, parted her legs, touched her breasts, inserted his hand inside the victim’s underwear, and touched her
vagina. Second, the appellant used his moral ascendancy over her daughter in order to perpetrate his lascivious conduct. Finally,
AAA was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, based on her birth certificate and on her mother’s testimony.
For a charge of rape to prosper under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented.
Carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years of age is statutory rape. In the present case, the prosecution established that
the appellant had carnal knowledge of his eight-year old daughter, BBB, in December 2005. Article 266-B, paragraph 6(1), however,
qualifies the rape by a father of his daughter who is below 18 years of age. The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship raises the crime of statutory rape to qualified rape. Simply put, under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
qualified rape is statutory rape in its qualified form.
65. People v. Dulay
GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012; Peralta, J.:

TOPIC: RA 7610; Child Prostitution for profit; Sec. 5(a); elements
FACTS: Appellant Dina Dulay was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation. It was because of her act of bringing the victim
to a room where a man known as “Speed” was waiting and where he raped the victim. Appellant did not do anything despite the
victim’s plea for help. The victim was 12 years old when the incident happened. An information was filed against “speed” and herein
appellant.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty of rape as a co-principal by indispensable cooperation
RULING: No
The Court respects the findings of the trial court that AAA was indeed raped by considering the credibility of the testimony
of AAA. The rule is that factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, the review of a criminal case opens up the case in its
entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus avoiding general conclusions
based on isolated pieces of evidence.
While the Court does not find appellant to have committed the crime of rape as a principal by indispensable cooperation,
she is still guilty of violation of Section 5(a) of RA 7610. The act of appellant falls under the mentioned paragraph, appellant acting
as a procurer of a child and inducing the latter into prostitution.
67. GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 169533. March 20, 2013.
TOPIC: Sec. 10, RA 7610 req. intent
FACTS: The Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the RTC with child abuse, an act in violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act No. 7610, committed against the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old, for acts of physical abuse and/or
maltreatment by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his
left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito
ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here).
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the
evening procession for the Santo Niño; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary
Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called
them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the
face.
Petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary
Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s
burning Cherrylyn’s hair.
RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged. CA affirmed the conviction.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty under RA 7610?
RULING: NO. Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with
his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of
the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the
spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal
safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that
was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
Under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo, every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused.
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical
injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
68. JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, et. al vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, et. al
G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014; ABAD, J.:
TOPIC: RA 9775 – Porn-online; No Double Jeopardy
FACTS: The Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 or the cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and
use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet a system that links him to other computers
and enable him to access information, interact thru social networking, conduct business thru e-commerce and so on.
Petitioners seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, unconstitutional and void. But petitioners claim that the
means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography.
ISSUE: Whether or not charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act (ACPA) of 2009 constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy
RULING: YES. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace (child
pornography committed online). ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
1. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IGNACIO CARLOS, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 6295; September 1, 1911
Facts: The information filed in this case is as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ignacio Carlos of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the 13th day of February, 1909, and the 3d day of March, 1910, in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the said Ignacio Carlos, with intent of gain and without violence or intimidation against the person or
force against the thing, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, take, steal , and carry away two thousand
two hundred and seventy-three (2,273) kilowatts of electric current, of the value of nine hundred and nine (909) pesos and
twenty (20) cents Philippine currency, the property of the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, a corporation doing
business in the Philippine Islands, without the consent of the owner thereof; to the damage and prejudice of the said Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company in the said sum of nine hundred and nine (909) pesos and twenty (20) cents Philippine
currency, equal to and equivalent of 4,546 pesetas Philippine currency. All contrary to law.
Counsel for the appellant insists that the only corporeal property can be the subject of the crime of larceny, and in the support of this
proposition cites several authorities for the purpose of showing that the only subjects of larceny are tangible, movable, chattels,
something which could be taken in possession and carried away, and which had some, although trifling, intrinsic value, and also to
show that electricity is an unknown force and can not be a subject of larceny.
Issue: Is an electricity which is an incorporeal property be subject of the crime of larceny?
Held: YES. Even without them (ordinances), the right of ownership of electric current is secured by articles 517 and 518 of the Penal
Code; the application of these articles in case of subtraction of gas, a fluid used for lighting, and in some respects resembling
electricity, is confirmed by the rule laid down in the decisions of the supreme court of Spain January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897,
construing and enforcing the provisions of articles 530 and 531 of the penal code of that country, articles identical with articles 517
and 518 of the code in force in these Islands.
Article 517 of the Penal Code above referred to reads as follows:
The following are guilty of larceny:
(1) Those who with intent of gain and without violence or intimidation against the person, or force against things, shall take
another's personal property without the owner's consent.
And article 518 fixes the penalty for larceny in proportion to the value of the personal property stolen.
It is true that electricity is no longer, as formerly, regarded by electricians as a fluid, but its manifestation and effects, like those of
gas, may be seen and felt. The true test of what is a proper subject of larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal, but
whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.
It is well-settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of larceny, even in the absence of a statute so providing. (Decisions of
supreme court of Spain, January 20, 1887, and April 1, 1897, supra; also (England) Queen vs. Firth, L. R. 1 C. C., 172, 11 Cox C. C.,
234; Queen vs. White, 3 C. & K., 363, 6 Cox C. C., 213; Woods vs.People, 222 III., 293, 7 L. R. A., 520; Commonwealth vs. Shaw, 4
Allen (Mass), 308; State vs. Wellman, 34 Minn., 221, N. W. Rep., 385, and 25 Cyc., p. 12, note 10.)
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Shaw, supra, the court, speaking through Chief Justice Bigelow, said:
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken
and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being
severed from a mass or larger quantity, and of being transported from place to place. In the present case it appears that it
was the property of the Boston Gas Light Company; that it was in their possession by being confined in conduits and tubes
which belonged to them, and that the defendant severed a portion of that which was in the pipes of the company by taking
it into her house and there consuming it. All this being proved to have been done by her secretly and with intent to deprive
the company of their property and to appropriate it to her own use, clearly constitutes the crime of larceny.
Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property and is capable of
appropriation by another. So no error was committed by the trial court in holding that electricity is a subject of larceny.
2. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SULPICIO and PATRICIA RAMOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195145; February 10, 2016; BRION, J.:
TOPIC: RA 7832 – Anti Electricity and Electric Transmission Materials Pilferage Act
FACTS: MERALCO entered into a contract of service with the respondents, a registered costumers of the former, agreeing to supply
the latter with electric power in their residence in Tondo, Manila. To measure the respondents’ electric consumption, it installed an
electric meter outside the front wall of the property occupied by Patricia’s brother, Isidoro Sales, and his wife, Nieves Sales, located
beside the respondents’ house. In 1999, MERALCO’s service inspector inspected the respondents’ electrical facilities and found an
outside connection attached to their electric meter. The service inspector traced the connection, an illegal one, to the residence and
appliances of Nieves. Nieves was the only one present during the inspection and she was the one who signed the Metering Facilities
Inspection Report.
Due to the discovery of the illegal connection, the service inspector disconnected the respondents’ electric services on the
same day. The inspection and disconnection were done without the knowledge of the respondents as they were not at home and
their house was closed at the time. The respondents denied that they had been using an illegal electrical connection and they
requested MERALCO to immediately reconnect their electric services. Despite the respondents’ request, MERALCO instead demanded
from them the payment of P179,231.70 as differential billing. Thus, respondents filed a complaint for breach of contract with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against MERALCO before the RTC, praying, among others, for the immediate
reconnection of their electric service. The RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect the respondents’ electric service. MERALCO elevated
the case before the CA but its petition was dismissed as MERALCO failed to comply not only with its own contract of service, but also
with the requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 when it resorted to the immediate disconnection of the
respondents’ electric service without due notice. It also ruled that the respondents were not liable for the differential billing as it had
not been established that they knew or consented to the illegal connection or even benefited from it.
ISSUE: 1. WON MERALCO had the right to immediately disconnect the electric service of the respondents upon
discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter.
2. WON respondents should be liable for the differential billing on the illegally consumed unbilled electricity
through the illegal connection.
RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative.

Section 4(a), RA 7832 provides that the discovery of an outside connection attached on the electric meter shall constitute as
prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from the illegal use if the discovery is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). With
the presence of such prima facie evidence, the electric service provider is within its rights to immediately disconnect the electric
service of the consumer after due notice.
R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its customer’s electric service on
the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an authorized ERB representative must be present during the
inspection of the electric facilities; and second, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is
caught in flagrante delicto committing the acts under Section 4(a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the
disconnection. In the case at bar, we find no proof that MERALCO complied with these two requirements under R.A. 7832. MERALCO
never even alleged in its submissions that an ERB representative or an officer of the law was present during the inspection of the
respondents’ electric meter. Also, it did not claim that the respondents were ever notified beforehand of the impending disconnection
of their electric service.
2. The Court ruled in the negative.
Section 6 of R.A. 7832 defines differential billing as "the amount to be charged to the person concerned for the unbilled
electricity illegally consumed by him." Clearly, the law provides that the person who actually consumed the electricity illegally shall
be liable for the differential billing. It does not ipso facto make liable for payment of the differential billing the registered customer
whose electrical facilities had been tampered with and utilized for the illegal use of electricity. In this case, as the prima
facie presumption afforded by Section 4 of R.A. 7832 does not apply, it falls upon MERALCO to first prove that the respondents had
actually installed the outside connection attached on their electric meter and that they had benefited from the electricity consumed
through the outside connection before it could hold them liable for the differential billing. The records show that MERALCO presented
no proof that it ever caught the respondents, or anyone acting in the respondents’ behalf, in the act of tampering with their electric
meter.
As the CA correctly held, the respondents could not have been caught in flagrante delicto committing the tampering since
they were not present during the inspection of the electric meter, nor were any of their representatives at hand. Moreover, the
presence of an outside connection attached to the electric meter operates only as a prima facie evidence of electricity pilferage under
R.A. 7832; it is not enough to declare the respondents in flagrante delicto tampering with the electric meter. In fact, MERALCO itself
admitted in its submissions that Nieves was the illegal user of the outside connection attached to the respondents’ electric meter. On
this point, MERALCO argues that Nieves was an authorized representative of the respondents. However, the records are bereft of any
sufficient proof to support this claim. The fact that she is an occupant of the premises where the electric meter was installed does not
make her the respondents’ representative considering that the unit occupied by the respondents is separate and distinct from the
one occupied by Nieves and her family. Similarly, the fact that Nieves was able to show the respondents’ latest electric bill does not
make her the latter’s authorized representative.
The petition was dismissed.

2nd BATCH CRIM REV CASE POOL UPDATED

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2nd Batch: CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW – Atty.

G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995; KAPUNAN, J.:

TOPIC: Prohibited wiretapping, consent is required

GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986; Gutierrez, Jr., J.:

TOPIC: RA 9262 – Violence against women through harassment

TOPIC: RA 7610 – Other sexual abuse

Whether or not the accused is guilty of qualified rape.

Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012; Peralta, J.:

Facts: The information filed in this case is as follows:

1. The Court ruled in the negative.

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