ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs.

MANGALINAO, G.R. No. 174089. JANUARY 25, 2012

FACTS:
This a case of multiple-vehicle collision in North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) resulting in
the death of all the passengers in one vehicle, including the Mangalinao spouses and a sibling of the
surviving orphaned minor heirs.
An action for damages based on quasi delict was filed by the minor children of the Mangalinao
spouses through their legal guardian against the registered owners and drivers of the two 10-wheeler
trucks that collided with their parents’ Nissan Pathfinder. The children imputed recklessness,
negligence, and imprudence on the truck drivers for the deaths of their sister and parents; while they
hold Sonny and Orix equally liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their respective drivers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.

RULING:
The finding of negligence of petitioners as found by the lower courts is binding. Negligence
and proximate cause are factual issues. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, and
the concurrence of the findings of fact of the courts below are conclusive.
Orix as the operator on record of the Fuso Truck is liable to the heirs of the victims of the
mishap. Orix cannot point fingers at the alleged real owner to exculpate itself from vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Regardless of whoever Orix claims to be the actual owner of
the Fuso by reason of a contract of sale, it is nevertheless primarily liable for the damages or injury
the truck registered under it have caused. Besides, the registered owners have a right to be
indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that they may be required to pay as damage
for the injury caused to the plaintiff, which Orix rightfully acknowledged by filing a third-party
complaint against the owner of the Fuso, Manuel. Moral damages, it must be stressed, are not
intended to enrich plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he/she had undergone due to the other party’s culpable action and must, perforce, be proportional
to the suffering inflicted.

SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 119092. DECEMBER 10, 1998

FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner Sanitary
Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several
others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. The
passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc.
(PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenga. Driving the vehicle was Rolando
Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner’s panel
truck which was traveling in the opposite direction. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the
jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the
opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane. The
driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely, Jason Bernabe and
Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and taken to
various hospitals.

ISSUE:
Whether the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore, the
liability of the petitioner should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished.

RULING:
No. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to
the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must
show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like
any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.
Petitioner says that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during
nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one headlight,
there was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded “decreased [its] maneuverability.” However, mere allegations such as these are not
sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing
cause of the injury.
AMADOR CORPUZ AND ROMEO GONZALES vs. EDISON LUGUE AND
CATHERINE BALUYOT, G.R. No. 137772. JULY 29, 2005

FACTS:
On 14 September 1984, at around 7:15 in the morning, while an Isuzu KC-20 passenger
jeep (KC-20), then being driven by Jimmy Basilio, was traversing the right side of the Roman
Highway in Barangay Pias, Orion, Bataan, it collided with a tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim,
which was then moving from the right shoulder of the highway. As a consequence of the
accident, passengers of the KC-20, including respondent Lugue, suffered physical injuries.
Respondent Lugue then filed an action for damages arising from the vehicular incident before
the Balanga, Bataan RTC, Branch 2, against herein petitioners Amador Corpuz and Romeo
Gonzales, owner and driver of the minibus, respectively, and Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim,
owner and driver of the tanker truck, respectively. Therein defendants filed a third-party
complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio, owner/operator and driver of the KC-20,
respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for damages based on
the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.
 RULING:
It is clear that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondent Lugue was the
collision between the KC-20 and the tanker truck. As correctly pointed out by the lower court,
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Certainly, even assuming that petitioner
Gonzales had a few seconds before actual collision, he no longer had any opportunity to avoid it.
Petitioner Gonzales cannot be deemed negligent for failing to prevent the collision even after
applying all means available to him within the few instants when he had discovered the
impending peril.

WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT

CASE.
Ruling:
the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to be amply
justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be... considered a
common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public,[8] whether to the public in
general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.[9] The true
test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those
who opt to avail themselves of... its transportation service for a fee.[10] Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.[11] The law, recognizing
the obligatory force of contracts,[12] will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any
kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof.[13] A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promisee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest
in... having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have
been in had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a
position as... he would have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution
interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party.[14] Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers... or for
society, unless they are made the basis for action.[15] The effect of every infraction is to
create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the
failure of another to observe his contractual obligation[16] unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a
good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of
common carriers, that of extraordinary... diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event,
to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between
it and petitioner's assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been
lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of...
compliance with, the obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the
place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability
on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS...
has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his negligence or fault, may
not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver, not being a party to the contract of
carriage between petitioner's principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the...
agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors
who have assumed their personality or their juridical position.[17] Consonantly with the
axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest,... such contract can neither favor nor
prejudice a third person. Petitioner's civil action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the claimant for damages to
prove negligence or fault on the part of the... defendant.[18]
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner, holds a
defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the latter's management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of
things,... cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management or control use
proper care. It affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of care.[19] It is not a rule of substantive law and,... as
such, it does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode
of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves
the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply...
places on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.[20] Resort to the
doctrine, however, may be allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes,... including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and (c)
the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.[21] Thus,
it is not applicable when an unexplained accident... may be attributable to one of several
causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.[22]
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the
circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of... the
parties.[23] Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than those due to
defendant's conduct must first be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be understood
as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since... obviously the
presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately
attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor. In the case of the truck driver, whose
liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana,... while he admittedly can be said
to have been in control and management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is
not equally shown, however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa... loquitur to work against him.
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the
movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.[24] Thus,
respondent corporation may no longer offer proof to establish that it has exercised... due
care in transporting the cargoes of the assured so as to still warrant a remand of the case to
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of
Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Court of Appeals, are
AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said
assailed order... of the trial court and decision of the appellate court are REVERSED as
regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay
FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged