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Table of Contents
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 3
Customary International Law ................................................................................................. 3
International Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................3
Scope of CIL in the Use of Weapons ....................................................................................... 4
Nuclear proliferation ............................................................................................................. 5
Syria ..............................................................................................................................................5
Libya ..............................................................................................................................................6
Israel..............................................................................................................................................6
Analysis ................................................................................................................................. 7
Work Cited .......................................................................................................................... 10
 Introduction
The paper discusses customary international law as the key principle of international law
that is violated globally. An analysis is carried out that helps to identify the countries that are
found violating the law. Customary International Law (CIL) being the humanitarian law focuses
on the practices that are consistently followed by the states to carry out their legal duties1. One of
the situations that are discussed under CIL is the use of nuclear weapons by the countries of the
world. The law fosters some obligations on the countries on developing a nuclear weapon and
using them. However, in the global economy countries are found to violate the law by involving
in the practices unacceptable under the standards of CIL. In later sections of the paper, these
points are discussed in detail.

Customary International Law

International obligations which are derived from already established international
practices contrary to the written form of formal conventions or treaties are termed as Customary
International Law (CIL). International law has various components, and CIL is one of them. CIL
is a result of those practices which states generally follow with consistency and consider them as
their legal duties1. Two examples can be quoted here to explain the CIL which are” immunity
provided to the state heads on their visits and the doctrine of non-refoulement. Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice stated the most authentic and referred definition of
the CIL” One of the sources of international law is international custom, an indication of a
general practice recognized as law”1. Another definition of similar nature has been provided by
USA law of foreign relations, Restatement Law (3rd), which states that CIL is “result (ing) from
generally consistent practices of the countries which they follow as a legal obligation1.
International Jurisdiction
The judicial organ of the United Nations (UN) is International Court of Justice (ICJ), and
its major function is to resolve the conflicts between/among the UN’s member countries.
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Chapter II, general
practices and customs of the states shall be considered as ICJ’s sources of CIL2. There are two

1 Talmon, Stefan. "Determining customary international law: the ICJ's methodology between induction, deduction,
and assertion." European Journal of International Law 26, no. 2 (2015): 417-443.
2 Paust, Jordan J. "Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United

States’(1991)." Michigan Journal of International Law 12 (2015): 59-76.

main elements from which CIL can be derived” one is "state practice," and the other is "opinio
juris." Sufficient state practice refers to the objective element of the ICL (according to ICJ
definition, it is "general practice," and under restatement, it is "consistent practice"). On the other
hand, opinio juris refers to the subjective element of the ICL which demands that the practice
must be followed as a legal obligation or recognized as law3.

The scope of CIL in the Use of Weapons

There is a dynamic body of conventional and customary international law which deals
with the threat of and actual use of nuclear arms4. Such laws are accepted by almost all the states
of the world including the major nuclear states like the USA. Principles for such laws are
exclusively expressed by the ICJ. Some conventions, an example of which is the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are available which specifically deals with nuclear arms. According
to NPT, Article IV, all the nuclear-armed states which are a signatory of this treaty including the
USA will negotiate in good faith, the issue of nuclear disarmament4.
On a broad level, this law does not only put limits on the threat of use or actual use of
arms, which includes nuclear arms as well, but it also defines a crime against the peace, war
crimes and crimes against the humanity5. All these are international crimes for which a person
can be punished with sanctions or with a death penalty.
There are some legal obligations which were quite surprising for even extended nuclear
arms and public policy experts. The law, which deals with the threat of actual use of nuclear
arms, is mostly ignored. It is apparent from the fact that the major and deeper analysis of the
nuclear arms-related issues by the political experts does not generally include law5. They don’t
even mention the law in their analysis, keeping aside its consideration. A recent example of this
is the extensive efforts of the president Obama to address the issue of nuclear arms, which were
based on security concerns and policy matters and not on the legal obligations due under the
international law5.

3 Paust, Jordan J. "Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United
States’(1991)." Michigan Journal of International Law 12 (2015): 59-76.
4 Campbell, Bill. "Treaty law: Identification of customary international law." Australian Year Book of International

Law34 (2016): 464

5
Arend, Anthony Clark, and Robert J. Beck. International law and the use of force: beyond the UN Charter
paradigm. Routledge, 2014.
 During the 2010 review conference, states have confirmed the NPT in the section of
“Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions”6. When it comes to nuclear
disarmament, all the states should fulfill their responsibility under international law, and they
should also give due consideration to international humanitarian law. This explicit commitment
should be continued in the coming era as well where international humanitarian law will explain
the production, deployment threat of actual use of nuclear arms. It is argued that this law has
made the threat of actual use of nuclear arms illegal and insists on immediate efforts to achieve
complete nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear proliferation
The spread of nuclear arms, nuclear technology (for weapons purposes) or fissile material to the
states that do not have it already, is called nuclear proliferation. It is also referred to the
possibility of acquisition of nuclear arms by the terrorist or other violent groups7. The states that
are highlighted internationally for nuclear proliferation are discussed below:
Syria
A graphite-moderated gas-cooled nuclear reactor was established by Syria from the year
2001 to 2007. It was found to be very similar to the reactor of plutonium production in North
Korea. Syria produces uranium from its indigenous resources of phosphate. It is a by-product,
generated from the treatment conducted on Homs7.
Israel has destroyed this facility through an air attack in the year 2007, even before the
reactor has started its operations. The remains of the reactor are then eliminated and buried after
some time. The facility, which was established secretly with the purpose of producing weapons,
was the violation of the Syria legal obligations under NPT. Some evidence was found which
showed the contributions of North Korea in the supply of nuclear devices7. Although Syria
argued that the reactor was for non-nuclear purposes but remained failed to provide any evidence
to the IAEA. Furthermore, Syria has denied the access of IAEA to this site for inspection
purposes.

6 Arend, Anthony Clark, and Robert J. Beck. International law and the use of force: beyond the UN Charter
paradigm. Routledge, 2014
7
Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "A dynamic theory of nuclear proliferation and preventive
war." International Organization 70, no. 4 (2016): 655-685.
 In the year 2010, IAEA has reported that Syria denies the access of agency to this site and
various other sites about which the agency has serious concerns thus there are some outstanding
issues and queries. The IAEA demands from Syria to become a signatory of an Additional
Protocol and implement it fully. The agency also demands that Syria should fulfill its obligation
under the NPT safeguards agreement. In the year 2011, the IAEA has reported the issue of Syria
in front of UN General Assembly and Security Council due to its violations of the obligations
under NPT and its failure to disclose the establishment of nuclear reactor8.
Libya
Libya has been involved in the establishment of its capability to enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons purposes, for more than ten years. According to Libya's Safeguard Agreement
of 1980 with the UN, it should inform IAEA about some of these activities, but Libya remained
failed to do so. After negotiations of various months, in Dec 2003, Libya had agreed to terminate
its nuclear arms development9.
Libya's nuclear program was at its initial stages thus no enriched uranium was produced.
A non-signatory country of NPT, Pakistan, has provided illegal nuclear technology to Libya in
the later years of 1990s9.
Although Libya did not have a nuclear power program, it has a Russian 10MW research
reactor that uses 80% enriched fuel, but it remains under the protection program of IAEA. Libya
requested from IAEA that it should publicly confirm that from now onwards, all of its nuclear
activities will remain for peaceful purposes9. To achieve this, Libya agreed to sign an Additional
protocol of NPT which was executed in the year 2006. The protocol will allow the IAEA to
conduct extensive inspection and demands from Libya to ensure a high level of cooperation and
transparency8.
Israel

8
Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "A dynamic theory of nuclear proliferation and preventive
war." International Organization 70, no. 4 (2016): 655-685.
9
Khan, Saira. Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia
and the Middle East. Routledge, 2017.
 Israel has no nuclear program at the municipal level, and thus it is not a signatory of
NPT. But it has made a limited safeguard agreement with IAEA, in the year 197510. Since its
establishment in 1948, Israel and France were in close collaboration regarding nuclear research.
The Atomic Energy Commission of Israel was created in 1952, and in the year 1955, USA
agreed on the supply of 5 MWt pool-type reactor10.
An agreement was signed in 1957 with France to construct a big heavy water research
reactor (24 MW thermal). In this regard, France has supplied for the reactor, almost 4 tons of
heavy water and also facilitated the establishment of the reprocessing plant at the same location.
France advised Israel, in 1960, to bring the plant under IAEA safeguards but it was not followed
by Israel. Then under USA pressure, Israel agreed for the cursory inspection (twice in a year) of
the reactor only10.
Initially, Israel relied on the indigenous resource for uranium purposes, but it is reported
that South Africa also helped it in this regard. CIA has reported in the year 1960 that Israel has
started production of nuclear arms. In 1974, it was claimed that Israel has 20 nuclear weapons
and in the 1990s the number increases up to 75-130Error! Bookmark not defined.. No nuclear
weapon has been tested on mainland Israel, but it is mostly believed that Israel has made a
collaboration with South Africa for this purpose. Officially, Israel has never denied or accepted
the possession of nuclear arms10.

Analysis
Every element of the modern security environment needs to have a substantial deterrence,
and together the requirement of deterrence become even higher. In realistic terms, the USA and
other states of the world cannot ensure their safety against such dangers because a fundamental
change occurs like the security11. There is no comparison between the power of conventional and
nuclear weapons, and alarmingly even the less developed countries possess some military
nuclear devices.
This point is very important because many states including the superpower USA believed
that the end of the cold war had changed the world security environment by making it more
peaceful where there would be no need of nuclear arms11. The main issue lies in the fact that

10
Falk, Richard A. "Nuclear weapons, international law, and the world court: a historic encounter." American
Journal of International Law 91, no. 1 (1997): 64-75.
11 Mozley, Robert F. The politics and technology of nuclear proliferation. University of Washington Press, 2011.
although the danger of USSR and its nuclear arms' collection is ended the progress achieved in
the field of nuclear arms and the chaos of the anarchic system still exists.
Threats are present even in today's world with its new forms and dimensions and are
becoming worse than the cold war period. Now states do not only face threats from other states.
In the 21st century, with the rise of terrorism, non-state actors became a significant component of
international security12. The danger becomes deeper by the fact that extremist actors are
supported by the states that use them as their proxies. Examples of such actors include
Hezbollah, backed by Syria and Iran.
NPT has many flaws, as it is not capable of achieving its own goals. Its major weakness
is insufficient international cooperation that is a prerequisite for its success. These weaknesses
allow the states, even those who are a signatory of NPT, to violate the treaty. It also includes the
USA, a significant advocate and member of the treaty12. The reason behind is that the treaty does
not collectively recognize the most immediate threat of nuclear war. It is essential that the true
recognition of this danger is implanted in the framework of the treaty to stop the constant
hostility and violations of the treaty. Although the world is willing to get rid of the moral burden
of having nuclear armaments at the same time no such efforts are made which could make the
distant dream of complete nuclear disarmament true.
A bitter reality is that the international system allows the commerce of nuclear
proliferation, without this it could never happen. The anarchy of the international system dictates
the major requirements of the states that are power and security. Ultimately, a constant need to
fulfill these requirements flourish the business of arms trade and thus it helps the countries to get
the nuclear capability for military purposes13. It is a vicious circle because states always want to
upgrade their security and by achieving this goal, they make others insecure, who then follow the
same strategy. All this created a security dilemma, and thus nobody remains secure13.
All the states; great powers, superpowers or small states, need to collaborate actively to
limit the impact of the nuclear arms race in the world, which is a home of billions of human

12Mozley, Robert F. The politics and technology of nuclear proliferation. University of Washington Press, 2011.
13
Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. "Deterrence in the age of nuclear
proliferation." Wall Street Journal 7 (2011).
beings. Controlled production and distribution of armaments and collaboration of all the states
are necessary so that the threat of aggression and destruction could be mitigated.
 Work Cited
Arend, Anthony Clark, and Robert J. Beck. International law and the use of force: beyond the
UN Charter paradigm. Routledge, 2014.
Bas, Muhammet A., and Andrew J. Coe. "A dynamic theory of nuclear proliferation and
preventive war." International Organization 70, no. 4 (2016): 655-685.
Campbell, Bill. "Treaty law: Identification of customary international law." Australian Year
Book of International Law34 (2016): 464.
Falk, Richard A. "Nuclear weapons, international law, and the world court: a historic encounter."
American Journal of International Law 91, no. 1 (1997): 64-75.
Khan, Saira. Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions: A Comparative
Study of South Asia and the Middle East. Routledge, 2017.
Mozley, Robert F. The politics and technology of nuclear proliferation. University of
Washington Press, 2011.
Paust, Jordan J. "Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources, and Status as Law of the
United States’(1991)." Michigan Journal of International Law 12 (2015): 59-76.
Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. "Deterrence in the age
of nuclear proliferation." Wall Street Journal 7 (2011).
Talmon, Stefan. "Determining customary international law: the ICJ's methodology between
induction, deduction, and assertion." European Journal of International Law 26, no. 2 (2015):
417-443.