Van Dorn vs.

Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in
1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and
had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that
petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner

and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He

would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation
before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her
marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality
laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if
the end of justice is to be served.
 G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes
Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15,
1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case,
and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order,
respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after
the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines;
that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada,
United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property
of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he
and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned
case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is
interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of
an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave
abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court
acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case,
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with
the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within
the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim
on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court
that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop
was not established through conjugal funds, and that
respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by
the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is
contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between petitioner and private
respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the
Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he
executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of
Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent
me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground
of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be
adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce
in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding
on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being
contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs.
Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty
party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in
the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la

Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs.

People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439

(1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties

or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras,

Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private
International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs. FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO
BAUTISTA, defendants-appellees
October 28, 1966
Facts:
Lot No. 221 was originally owned by the spouses Severino Salak
and Petra Garcia, their title being evidence by
original Certificate of Title No. 41453 of the register’s office of
Tarlac; on December 20, 1939, said spouses mortgaged said lot
for the sum of P1,200 to spouses Pedro Magat and Filomena
Silva, the mortgage having been registered in accordance with
law; on May 22, 1943, Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva assigned
their mortgaged rights to Honaria Salak for the sum of P1,632
with the consent of the surviving debtor Severino Salak, his wife
having already died; on August 16, 1943, Severino Salak
transferred his ½ interest in the property to Honaria Salak for
the sum of P612, representing ½ of the consideration paid by her
to the mortgagees Pedro Magat and Filomena Silva; this
transaction, as well as the assignment of the mortgage credit,
were never registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds,
nor annotated on the certificate of title No. 41453; Severino Salak
died on December 5, 1944, while Honaria Salak died on January
13, 1945; intestate proceedings were instituted for the settlement
and distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino Salak and
Petra Garcia, including lot No. 221, and after proper proceedings,
said lot was adjudicated to Ernesto Bautista, Aurea Sahagun,
Rita Sahagun and Francisca Salak in the proportion of ¼
interested each; Francisca Salak acquired later the shares of the
other heirs in said lot by virtue of which transfer certificate of title
No. 970 was issued in her name; Honoria Salak died single living
as sole heir Agustina de Guzman, plaintiff herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue of survivorship can be applied in this
case.
Ruling:
Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the
new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which state:
“The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquitted by operation of law for
the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came.”
The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the
Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 —
when Agustina acquired by operation of law all the properties of
her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo’s mother).
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservista, as it then becomes a right of full
ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
revindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised
within the time for recovering real properties, can be lost by
prescription.
Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to
claim the property — 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 – from Francisca
Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an
owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court
of Appeals’ decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal,
promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless
that such right had accrued in their favor from the
time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of
action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on
April 24, 1950.
 G.R. No. L-22601 October 28, 1966
PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and
appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO
BAUTISTA, defendants and appellees.
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac dismissing a suit to recover ownership and possession of
2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac.
Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221
of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334 square meters. Petra
Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943,
Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his ½ portion
of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944, Severino Salak
died.
Sometime in January 1945, Honoria Salak and other members of
her family died — massacred by the Japanese.
As a result, two settlement proceedings were instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac: (1) Special Proceeding No. 3, to
settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra Garcia and (2)
Special Proceeding No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak
family (parents Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo; and children
Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya).
On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in
Special Proceeding No. 3, which the court approved on
November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No.
221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4
of it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or
exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and
Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak
has possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On the other hand, in Special Proceeding No. 23, on February
26, 1948, the court a quo held that the heirs entitled to the estates
of the Salak family were Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carillo (3/4
share) and Ernesto Bautista (1/4 share), applying the
survivorship presumption [Rule 123, Sec. 69(ii), now Rule 131,
Sec. 5(jj) of the Rules of Court], thus: (1) Simeon Salak died first
— his properties went to the children Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo
and Ligaya (1/4 each); (2) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died
next — Honoria's and Consuelo's properties went to their mother,
Isabel; those of Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto Bautista; 1 (3)
Isabel died next — her properties went to her son Adolfo; and (4)
Adolfo died last — his properties went to his maternal
grandmother, Agustina. Agustina thereby succeeded to the
properties that came by intes-state succession from Honoria
Salak and Isabel Carrillo, including ½ of Lot No. 221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed
an action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein
as Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3
to recover ½ of Lot No. 221 which as aforementioned has been
possessed by Francisca Salak de Paz.
On April 24, 1950, Agustina died.
On June 8, 1950 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac in Special Proceeding No. 23,
and further decreed that the properties inherited by Agustina de
Guzman Vda. de Carrillo were subject to reserva troncal.
On November 6, 1950, Ernesto Bautista filed a petition in Special
Proceeding No. 23 for the execution of the judgment therein. Said
petition was heard on November 10, 1959, after a copy was
served on the lawyer of Prima Carrillo, the latter being a party
thereto as administratix of the estate of her deceased mother
Agustina. Acting on said petition, the lower court issued its order
of November 14, 1950, which reads in part:
. . . the Court, in view of the death of the reservista, Doña
Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo, declares all the
 interest of the said reservista Doña Agustina de Guzman
Vda. de Carrillo as well as that of her heirs in the three-
fourths share adjudged to the reservista, definitely
terminated, and that the reservee, the minor Ernesto
Bautista, is entitled to the immediate delivery to him of the
said three-fourths share declared reserved to him in the
decision of the Court of Appeals of June 8, 1950. . . .
(Record on Appeals, pp. 213-214)
On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No.
351. The order of dismissal reads in part:
By virtue of the existence of third-degree relatives of
Adolfo Salak, the portion of Lot No. 221, inherited by
Agustina de Guzman was never released from the
reserva, so as to convert the ownership of Agustina de
Guzman into an absolute one. Upon her death on April 24,
1950, therefore, the property did not pass by inheritance
to her legal heirs, but rather reverted to the family trunk of
the Isabel-Adolfo line. Such being the case, the estate of
Agustina de Guzman, the Present plaintiff in this case, has
no cause of action against the defendants.
In resume, the adjudication in Special Proceeding No. 23,
Intestate Estate of the late Simeon Salak and Isabel
Carrillo, which included Lot No. 221, has become res
judicata which cannot be disturbed in this case. (Record
on Appeal, p. 209)
On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup filed the
present suit for recovery of 2/3 of 1/2 of No. 221 against Francisca
Salak de Paz and Ernesto Bautista.2
On June 20, 1963, defendants Francisco Salak de Paz and
Ernesto Bautita filed a motion to dismiss upon the grounds that
the cause of action is barred by prior judgement and by the
statute of limitations.
On November 19, 1963, the court a quo dismissed the complaint
on the ground of res judicata, finding the suit barred by the order
of delivery dated November 14, 1950 in Special Proceeding No.
23.
Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed
to Us upon questions of law.
Several grounds were advanced to support the motion to dismiss:
that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the
statute of limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the
lower court expressly upon the ground of res judicata, it did not
totally disregard the defense of prescription. Thus, said court
pointed out that:
Prima Carrillo being then the administratrix of the estate of
her mother, she is also deemed to have been notified of
the petition for execution of judgment in Special
Proceeding No. 23, and of the order of November 14,
1950. As of then, therefore, Prima Carrillo (even though as
administratrix) personally knew that Ernesto Bautista
claimed to be the sole reservee of all the properties
inherited by Da. Agustina from the Salak Family, among
which was Lot No. 221 in question, but she did not file any
opposition thereto. It was her opportunity to assert her
right as reservee by opposing the petition or, failing in this,
to contest or to ask to be relieved from the order of
November 14, 1950. Instead, she allowed about thirteen
(13) years before she commenced the present action.
(Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 214-215; emphasis
supplied)
At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of
prescription. As ruled in the cases of Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana
Tuazon, 40 Phil. 943 and Relativo v. Castro, 76 Phil. 563, when
the trial judge decides a case in favor of a party on a certain
ground, the appellate court may uphold the decision below upon
some other point which was ignored or erroneously decided in
favor of the appellant by the trial court.
Reserva troncal in this jurisdiction is treated in Article 891 of the
new Civil Code and Article 811 of the old Civil Code, which states:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came.
The reserva troncal arose — as had been finally decided by the
Court of Appeals in Special Proceeding No. 23 — when Agustina
acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant
Adolfo (grandson), who acquired them by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfo's mother).
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the
death of the reservista, as it then becomes a right of full
ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a
reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not
exercised within the time for recovering real properties, can be
lost by prescription:
Pero extinguida la reserva por la muerte del reservista,
cambian por completo las relaciones y condiciones
juridicas de las personas y de las cosas, como ya se ha
indicado. La obligacion de reservar se convierte en la de
entregar los bienes a quien correspondan, obligacion que
pasa a la herencia del reservista fallecido y deben complir
sus herederos. Y el derecho a la reserva se convierte en
el derecho al dominio pleno de esos bienes. Si a la muerte
del reservista se comple la condicion resolutoria de existir
parientes dentro del tercer grado que pertenezcan a la
linea de donde los bienes proceden, a estos parientes
pasa desde aquel momento por ministerio de la ley el
dominio absoluto de aquellos bienes, y, por consiguiente,
el derecho para reclamarlos, pudiendo disponer
libremente de aquellos o de este, y transmitirlos a sus
herederos, puesto que la ley no lo prohibe. Y si no
sobrevive al reservista ninguno de dichos parientes,
queda extinguida la obligacion de reservar, por no
haberse complido aquella condicion resolutoria impuesta
por la ley, y en su virtud vuelven los bienes al pleno
dominio del ascendiente, y pertenecen a su herencia
conforme al art. 651. Y como nada ordena la ley en sentido
contrario, tenemos por indudable que no tiene el caracter
de personalisimo ninguno de esos derechos, que nacen
con la extincion de la reserva, pertenecen a la herencia y
se transmiten a los herederos, aunque el causante no los
hubiere ejercitado por si mismo, salvo cases de renuncia,
incapacidad o prescripcion.
xxx xxx xxx
C) Extincion de la reserva.—Las mismas condiciones
exigidas para el nacimiento de la reserva son necesarias
para su existencia. Al faltar una de ellas, la reserva
muerte. Tres son, por tanto, las principales causas de
extincion:
1.a. Muerte del ascendiente.—Sea el que quiera el
destino definitivo de los bienes, en virtud de la naturaleza
condicional de los derechos que crea el art. 811, es lo
cierto que la reserva, como tal, una vez necida a compaña
al ascendiente obligado a ella hasta su muerte. Muerto el
ascendiente, cesa toda obligacion de reservar; falta el
sujeto pasivo de la reserva.
xxx xxx xxx
Ademas de las tres causas expresadas, pueden señalarse
otras que expondremos a continuacion.
xxx xxx xxx
Y 5.a La prescripcion, si se disfrutan como libres los
bienes por los herederos del ascendiente durante el
 tiempo y con las condiciones marcadas por la ley.
(Manresa, Comentarios Al Codigo Civil Español, Vol. 6,
1911 Ed., pp. 288-289, 316-318).
Scaevola also states the view that prescription can apply against
the reservatarios to cut off their right to the reservable property:
f) Prescipcion.—Este modo extintivo de los derechos tiene
solo applicacion a los parientes del tercer grado del
descendiente, porque no habiendo reserva si no acepta el
ascendiente, no hay que hablar de prescripcion extintiva
respecto de el.
Tocante a los parientes con derecho a la reserva, es
aplicable la doctrina, porque pueden no ejercer su
derecho por ignorar la muerte del descendiente opor otra
causa.
Dada esta posibilidad, entendemos que, tratandose de un
derecho real sobre bienes inmuebles, prescribira a los
treinta años (art. 1.693) (1), contados desde la aceptacion
de la herencia por el ascendiente, momento determinante
del derecho al ejercicio de la reserva (art. 1.969) ;
transcurridos, pues, treinta años desde la aceptacion sin
que los parientes favorecidos por la ley hayan solicitado la
constitucion de la reserva, se extenguira esta, y el
ascendiente o sus derecho-habientes adquiriran el pleno
dominio de los bienes reservables por su naturaleza, pero
que no fueron objeto de reserva. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil
Comentado, Vol. 14, 1944 Ed., p. 360).
Plaintiffs-appellants herein, as reservatarios, had the right to
claim the property 2/3 of 1/2 of Lot No. 221 — from Francisca
Salak de Paz, who has been possessing it in the concept of an
owner, from April 24, 1950 when Agustina died. And the Court of
Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal,
promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless
that such right had accrued in their favor from the time Agustina
died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action accrued
in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the
period of prescription for actions to recover real property, counted
from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the applicable
law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that
"Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code
[August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws previously in force."
Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April
22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has
prescribed.
And having reached such conclusion, We deem it unnecessary
to pass upon the question of whether the suit is also barred on
the ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby
affirmed on the ground of prescription, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1Thus, Ernesto Bautista was an heir in both Special
Proceeding No. 3 and Special Proceeding No. 23.
2 Plaintiff Prima Carrillo claims to be a reservatario (as
sister of Isabel Carrillo and aunt of propositus Adolfo),
while plaintiff Lorenzo Licup is the surviving husband of
Luz Carillo (likewise a sister of Isabel Carrillo and aunt of
prepositus Adolfo). Prima and Lorenzo claim to be heirs of
Luz.