Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice G.R. No.
132601, January 19, 1999 The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public
respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing
that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case becomes final
and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case
Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its
powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the SC loses is
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final, the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and
enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential
aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one
SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent
and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
comform to law and justice.
the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an accused
who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a
death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be
executed while in a state of insanity. The suspension of such a death
sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the
same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of
commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of
the President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of
the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life. To contend that only the Executive can
protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the
government.
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-
April 5, 2011] Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the
03 Republic of the Philippines.
SEP
FACTS: ISSUES:

Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government

under Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners’ lands on Political Law (Constitutional Law)
December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the properties atP165,484.47 per
hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount. Consequently,
on instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank
deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, (1) Whether or not the “transcendental importance” does not apply to
respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the the present case.
expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made additional
deposits, placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (2) Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance”
(P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five times. Both cannot justify the negation of the doctrine of immutability of a final
petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate complaints judgment and the abrogation of a vested right in favor of the
for just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where Government that respondent LBP represents.
it was dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners
filed a case with the RTC for the proper determination of just (3) Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the
compensation. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation 1986 Constitutional Commission showing that just compensation for
of petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus expropriated agricultural property must be viewed in the context of
attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the social justice.
Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of interest and Civil Law:
attorney’s fees and entry of judgment was issued. The just
compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners
filed a second motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of
award of legal interest and attorney’s fees and a motion to refer the Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration of respondent
second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly, deleting interest and attorney’s fees amount to unjust enrichment in its
restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed their second favor.
motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral arguments with
Remedial Law
(1) Whether or not the rules on second motion for reconsideration by
the Supreme Court should be strictly complied with by a vote of two-
thirds of its actual membership.
(2) Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still serve its
purpose.
(3) Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for
Reconsideration in-Intervention from the Office of the Solicitor General
may still be granted.
RULINGS:
Political Law (Constitutional Law)
(1) No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it
involves a matter of public interest – the proper application of a basic
constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to
receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional
rule on eminent domain – “Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.” While confirming the State’s inherent
power and right to take private property for public use, this provision at
the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power.
When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the
State has the corresponding obligation to pay the owner just
compensation for the property taken. For compensation to be
considered “just,” it must not only be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.
(2) No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to the
assertion it is applicable only to legal standing questions, is justified in
negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It will be a very
myopic reading of the ruling as the context clearly shows that the
phrase “transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize the
overriding public interest involved in this case. The Supreme Court said
in their resolution:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is
not hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation,
guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake
in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain case be “just”
when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has
been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does,
that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an
expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets,
too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards
apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these
standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private
interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should
not leave uncorrected.
xxxx
More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of
transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter
involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government
has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests
of justice are duly served.
(3) Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give a lower market price per
square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission never intended to
give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in the
expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.
[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land
reform and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for the
expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are
corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken
against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends
its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law.
Civil Law
Yes. In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took the
petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full
payment of the just compensation due on May 9, 2008. This
circumstance, by itself, already confirms the unconscionable delay in the
payment of just compensation.
An added dimension is the impact of the delay. One impact – as pointed
out above – is the loss of income the landowners suffered. Another
impact that the LBP now glosses over is the income that the LBP earned
from the sizeable sum it withheld for twelve long years. From this
perspective, the unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust enrichment in its
favor and an inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what
the Court essentially addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12%
interest.
Remedial Law
(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration by a vote of 12 Members (8 for the grant of the motion
and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of the petitioners’ motion.
This ruling complied in all respects with the Constitution requirement for
the votes that should support a ruling of the Court. Admittedly, the
Court did not make any express prior ruling accepting or disallowing the
petitioners’ motion as required by Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal
Rules. The Court, however, did not thereby contravene its own rule on
2nd motions for reconsideration; since 12 Members of the Court opted
to entertain the motion by voting for and against it, the Court simply did
not register an express vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance
with the rule through the participation by no less than 12 of its 15
Members. Viewed in this light, the Court cannot even be claimed to have
suspended the effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions for
reconsideration; it simply complied with this rule in a form other than by
express and separate voting.
(2) No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the
case, have already provided this Court with enough arguments and
particulars to rule on the issues involved. Oral arguments at this point
would be superfluous and would serve no useful purpose.

(3) No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has
been amply protected through the direct action of petitioner LBP – the
government instrumentality created by law to provide timely and
adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution of
needed agrarian reform. The OSG had every opportunity to intervene
through the long years that this case had been pending but it chose to
show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence can only
serve to delay the final disposition of this case. The arguments the OSG
presents, furthermore, are issues that this Court has considered in the
course of resolving this case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the
intervention prayed for.