How Mental Systems Believe
Daniel T. Gilbert University of Texas at Austin
Is there a difference between believing and merely under-
standing an idea?Descartes thought so. He considered the
acceptance and rejection of an idea to be alternative out-
comes of an effortful assessment process that occurs sub-
sequent to the automatic comprehension of that idea. This
article examined Spinoza's alternative suggestion that (a)
the acceptance of an idea is part of the automatic com-
prehension of that idea and (b) the rejection of an idea
occurs subsequent to, and more effortfully than, its accep-
tance. In this view, the mental representation of abstract
ideas is quite similar to the mental representation of phys-
ical objects: People believe in the ideas they comprehend,
as quickly and automatically as they believe in the objects
they see. Research in social and cognitive psychology sug-
gests that Spinoza's model may be a more accurate ac-
count of human belief than is that of Descartes.
Though Truth and Falsehood bee Neare twins, yet Truth a little
elder is.
- - J o h n Donne, 1635/1930, p. 129
Everyone knows that understanding is one thing and be-
lieving is another, that people can consider ideas without
considering t h e m so, and that one must have an idea be-
fore one can determine its merit. "Everyone knows the
d i f f e r e n c e . . , between supposing a proposition and ac-
quiescing in its truth" (James, 1890, p. 283). Nonetheless,
this article suggests that what everyone knows m a y be, at
least in part, wrong. It will be argued that the compre-
hension and acceptance o f ideas are not clearly separable
psychological acts, but rather that comprehension in-
cludes acceptance o f that which is comprehended.
The Process of Belief
Components of Believing
"Believing," wrote Bertrand Russell (1921), "seems the
most mental thing we do." (p. 231) Indeed, the problem
o f belief---what it is, how it happens, and what it d o e s - -
constitutes "the central p r o b l e m in the analysis o f m i n d "
(Russell, p. 231). Exactly what does it m e a n to say that
we believe something? W h a t do we m e a n when we say
we believe that bald m e n are especially licentious, that
sharks can swim backwards, or that love is blind and
justice is not? The answers to these questions are so com-
plex and varied that no brief discussion can treat t h e m
fairly. Nonetheless, in all the epistemological talk that
philosophers and psychologists have p r o d u c e d over the
years, one point o f consensus seems to emerge: Beliefs,
February 1991 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist
Copyright 1991 by the American PsychologicalAssociation, Inc. 0003-066X/91/$2.00
Vol. 46, No. 2, 107-119
in the broad and colloquial sense, involve both the mental
representation and the positive assessment o f meaningful
information (for a review, see Bogdan, 1986).
A proposition is believed when the proposition's
meaning is represented, coded, or symbolized in a mental
system and when that symbolic representation is treated
as if it was true. It makes little sense to say that we believe
something o f which we have absolutely no knowledge or
which we, through our words and actions, acknowledge
to be false. Thus, to believe that armadillos have four
legs, for example, requires that one have the information
armadillos have four legs coded and stored in one's mental
system and that one behave as though the information
correctly characterizes some real zoological state of affairs.
Whereas the representation c o m p o n e n t o f believing refers
merely to the existence o f meaningful information within
a mental system, the assessment c o m p o n e n t refers to the
relation between that information and other information
that already exists within the system.1
The Cartesian Procedure
W h e n we think about how the h u m a n m i n d believes, it
is only natural that we should immediately think about
how it ought to believe. Because we c a n n o t actually ob-
serve the processes by which comprehension and assess-
m e n t occur, we tend to ask the next best question: H o w
should they occur? W h a t is the most logical way for these
things to happen? H o w would we design a device to ac-
complish them? One piece o f the answer to such questions
is obvious and has been obvious for so m a n y centuries
t Such a "coherence theory" of truth is obviously inadequate: One
may not define the veracity of a proposition exclusively in terms of its
fit with other propositions (see Tarski, 1969). Nonetheless, propositions
do (somehow) get assessed, and because the actual mechanics of the
assessment procedure are not crucial to the present discussion, no at-
tempt to define its necessary and sufficient conditions will be made.
The writing of this article was supported by National ScienceFoundation
Grants BNS-8605443 and BNS-8819836 to Daniel T. Gilbert.
So many people have provided kind and insightful comments on
versions of this article that I will surely fail to thank them all. Among
them, then, are John Bargh, Roy Baumeister, Mark Bickhard, David
Cohen, Fred Dretske, Russ Fazio, Susan Fiske, Don Foss, Windflower
Gilbert, Nancy Hazen-Swann, Marcia Johnson, Ned Jones, Stan Klein,
Doug Krull, Mark Lopper, James Liu, Charlie Lord, Pat Malone, Brett
Pelham, Mike Ross, Johnathan Schooler, Dave Schneider, Jim Sherman,
Janet Spence, Bill Swann, Romin Tafarodi, Elizabeth Tighe, Yaacov
Trope, Barbara Tversky,Dan Wegner, Rich Wenzlaff,Tim Wilson, Jason
Young, the students in Susan Fiske's and Shelley Taylor's seminars on
social cognition, and several anonymous reviewers.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Daniel Gilbert, Department of Psychology,330 Mezes Hall, University
of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712. Electronic mail may be sent to
PSHU666@UTXVM.BITNET.
107
 that very few thinkers have challenged it: Obviously, one
must comprehend an idea before one can assess it. Put
another way, before one can consider an idea true, one
must consider it truly.
This simple notion--that comprehension precedes
and is separate from assessment~seems more than
merely agreeable and innocent: It seems to have the force
of logical necessity. Borrowing liberally from the Stoic
philosophers, Ren6 Descartes was the first modem thinker
to formalize this notion by partitioning the mind into
relatively active (controlled) and passive (automatic) do-
mains. Comprehension, he claimed, was passive: Ideas
impressed themselves upon the mind as physical objects
might upon soft wax, and just as wax did nothing to re-
ceive the object's impression, so the mind did nothing to
comprehend the world around it.
Although having ideas was effortless and automatic,
accepting or rejecting those ideas was not. Descartes con-
sidered the assessment of an idea's veracity to be the op-
eration of the voluntas--the active, conscious, willful force
of the psyche. This principle reigned axiomatic in Des-
cartes's philosophy: "That we have p o w e r . . , to give or
withhold our assent at will, is so evident that it must be
counted among the first and most common notions that
are innate in us" (1644/1984, p. 205), and "All that the
intellect does is to enable me to perceive, without affirm-
ing or denying anything, the ideas which are subjects for
possible judgments" (1641/1984, p. 39; see also Bennett,
1984, pp. 159-167; Lehrer, 1983; Nuchelmans, 1983,
p. 45; Price, 1969, pp. 221-240; Russell, 1921, pp.
247-249).
Although his fellow philosophers often took excep-
tion with Descartes's epistemology, they generally ac-
cepted the basic distinction between comprehension and
assessment on which it was based. And indeed, that dis-
tinction continues to pervade contemporary views of how
mental systems should and do operate. Computers, for
example, employ languages and architectures that enable
us to distinguish clearly between the mere representation
and the subsequent assessment of information. A machine
may represent the proposition armadillos deplore raisin
cookies before or even without assessing the veracity of
that proposition. Information can exist inside a machine
in an unassessed form, and it can do so because the ma-
chine's human designers have generally considered this
the most logical and efficient way for machines to think.
Computers, then, are good examples of what one might
call Cartesian belief systems~devices in which the op-
erations of comprehension and assessment are as separate
and sequential as everybody knows they should be.
The Spinozan Procedure
That is, almost everybody. Baruch Spinoza was a part-
time lens grinder who never saw a digital computer, but
it is clear that he did not think the human mind worked
like one. In the 49th proposition of Part 2 of his Ethics
(1677/1982), Spinoza put forth a thesis that, on the face
of it, seems simply preposterous: He dismissed Descartes's
distinction between comprehension and assessment and
108
insisted instead that comprehending and accepting were,
in fact, the same operation. Spinoza argued that to com-
prehend a proposition, a person had implicitly to accept
that proposition; only later, if the person realized that this
proposition conflicted with some other, might he or she
change his or her mind. As William James (1890) would
later characterize Spinoza's position, "All propositions,
whether attributive or existential, are believed through
the very fact of being conceived" (p. 290). Indeed, Spinoza
argued that one need not even distinguish between mere
ideas and beliefsmbecause all ideas are beliefs (see Ben-
nett, 1984).
It is critical to note that this claim does not mean
that persons are incapable of representing falsehoods and
are thus doomed to believe forever that which they com-
prehend: Upon hearing that armadillos make excellent
appetizers, few of us feel compelled to pack our cutlery
and head for Texas. Indeed, having comprehended and
accepted an idea, Spinoza considered persons entirely free
either to unaccept or to certify it. Spinoza's thesis simply
implies that unacceptance is a secondary psychological
act in which the initial accepting that invariably accom-
panies comprehension is subsequently undone. Disbelief
is by no means an impossibility in Spinoza's scheme;
rather, it is merely a deliberate revision of belief.
The Mechanics of Belief
Virtually all current and classical theories of mental rep-
resentation presume that once the truth value of a prop-
osition is assessed, the mental representation of that
proposition must somehow be altered or "tagged" to in-
dicate that truth valuemotherwise we would have to
reassess the validity of our knowledge each time we de-
ployed it. The differences between the Spinozan and
Cartesian procedures may be framed as a disagreement
not about the nature of mental representation itself, but
about the nature of this tagging system. A familiar met-
aphor may serve to illustrate the key elements of this
division.
Spinozan and Cartesian Tagging Systems
Imagine a library of a few million volumes, of which only
a small number are fiction. There are (at least) two rea-
sonable methods by which one could tag the spines of
books so that fiction could be distinguished from nonfic-
tion at a glance. One method would be to paste a red tag
on each volume of fiction and a blue tag on each volume
of nonfiction. Another method would be to tag the fiction
and leave the nonfiction untagged. Either of these systems
would accomplish the goal of allowing a librarian to dis-
tinguish fiction from nonfiction without necessitating that
he or she actually reread the book each time such a dis-
crimination needed to be made.
It is only a mild oversimplification to say that Des-
cartes considered the mind to be a library of ideas that
used something akin to the red-blue tag system. A new
book (new information) appeared in the library (was rep-
resented in the mind), its contents were read (assessed),
and the book was then tagged (recoded or rerepresented)
February 1991 • American Psychologist
as either fiction (false) or nonfiction (true). New books
(unassessed ideas) lacked a tag, of course, and thus were
not identifiable as either fiction or nonfiction until they
had been read. Such new and unread books were
"merely" represented in the library.
Spinoza, however, argued that the mind was more
like a library that used a tagged-untagged system. In Spi-
noza's view, books were represented before they were as-
sessed; but because of the particular tagging system that
was used to denote the outcome of that assessment, a new
book that appeared without a tag looked exactly like a
work of nonfiction. In a Spinozan library, a book's spine
always announced its contents; no book could be
"merely" represented in the library, because the absence
of a tag was itself informative (or misinformative) about
the content of the book. Analogously, ideas whose truth
had been ascertained through a rational assessment pro-
cess were represented in the mind in precisely the same
way as were ideas that had simply been comprehended;
only ideas that were judged to be false were unaccepted,
or given a special tag (cf. Wegner, Coulton, & Wenzlaff,
1985; see also Clark & Chase, 1972).
Perhaps the most striking feature of these different
systems is how similar they are. Despite the fact that the
two libraries use somewhat different tagging systems, both
ultimately accomplish the same end. If, for example, the
Cartesian and Spinozan procedures (shown in Figure 1)
were implemented on a pair of hypothetical machines
that had unlimited processing resources (i.e., time, energy,
and data) then the two machines should end up believing
precisely the same things, and the particular method by
which each achieved its beliefs would be largely incon-
sequential.
The rub is that no mental system, whether natural
or artificial, has unlimited processing resources. On the
contrary, real mental systems must often operate under
imperfect conditions in which multiple tasks vie for access
to a finite pool of resources (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974;
Kahneman, 1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1975), and when
this happens, the procedures these systems execute tend
to break down in predictable ways. As it turns out, Spi-
nozan and Cartesian procedures break down quite dif-
ferently, and thus have very different consequences for
the mental systems that employ them. In reality, any pair
of machines that implemented the Spinozan and Carte-
sian belief procedures would, after some time, come to
have very different beliefs. But before examining the par-
ticular ways in which these systems react to stress, it is
necessary to discuss briefly a more general principle of
systems breakdown.
The Principle of Premature Output
Perhaps the most fundamental feature of mental systems
is that they are modular: Several different subsystems or
modules work in a serial sequence to accomplish the in-
formation-processing tasks that presumably underlie hu-
man actions as diverse as raising an eyebrow, watching a
wrestling match, and composing a sonata (e.g., Fodor,
1983; Garfield, 1987; Gazzaniga, 1985; Minsky, 1985).
February 1991 ° American Psychologist
Even connectionist or parallel distributed processing
models incorporate these serial components (Rumelhart,
Smolensky, McCleUand, & Hinton, 1986, p. 38). Modular
systems, then, pass information from one module to an-
other, and each module modifies the information in some
way before passing it along to the next. Virtually all in-
formation-processing schemesmfrom those that describe
language comprehension (Just & Carpenter, 1977) and
visual pattern recognition (Marr, 1982) to those that
model more general problem-solving procedures (Newell
& Simon, 1972)--contain this information-passing fea-
ture. Surely, a flowchart with one box and no arrows
would be a singularly useless sort of map.
All of this information-passing is not without begin-
ning or end. Processing is initiated by the introduction
of information into a modular system, that information
is passed between and modified by various modules, and
finally an informational product is outputted. In some
systems, outputting can occur only after the last module
has received some information as input. By way of illus-
tration, imagine a very simple, boxlike machine whose
input is a fuzzy, white tennis ball. The ball rolls into the
machine, is shaved, dyed lime green, tattooed with a
trademark, and then rolled out of the machine and into
its retail canister. Such a machine is an example of a
single exit system: The tennis ball can only emerge after
it has been modified by, and passed to, each of the shaving,
dying, and tattooing modules in sequence. Until the tennis
ball is received by the tattooing module, it cannot exit
the machine.
In general, however, sophisticated systems allow in-
formational products to exit at a variety of stages (see
Norman & Bobrow's, 1975, principle of continually
available output). Imagine a different contraption: A
pancake-making machine whose input is an irregular-
shaped pancake. This irregular pancake is modified by
the first module, a square-cutting device, which cuts a
square out of the irregular pancake's center. This square
Figure 1
Two Conceptual Stages of the Spinozan and
Cartesian Belief Procedures
SPINOZAN CARTESIAN
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
REPRESENTATION Comprehension Comprehension
STAGE & Acceptance
ASSESSMENT
1
Certification
1
Acceptance
STAGE OR OR
Unacceptance Rejection
109
pancake can either exit into a blue box or it can be passed
along to a second module, a circle-cutting device, which
cuts a circle from the square pancake and then drops a
circular pancake into a red box. Such a multiple exit
system would be capable of producing output at either
of its two processing stages, and would thus be capable
of producing a variety of different products.
One interesting feature of a multiple exit system is
this: Because resources are required to send the infor-
mation (or, in the preceding case, a pancake) from one
module to the next, any sort of resource depletion will
cause premature output (see Norman & Bobrow's, 1975,
principle of graceful degradation; Tversky & Kahne-
man's, 1974, anchor-adjust heuristic). In other words,
when multiple exit systems break down they generally do
so by outputting the product of an early module. The
pancake-making machine is a good example. A resource
shortage can cause the machine to produce a square pan-
cake (a product of the first module) but not a circular
pancake (a product of the second module), because cir-
cular pancakes depend on the prior manufacture of square
pancakes but not vice versa. It is worth noting that this
tendency toward premature output will occur when the
two modules perform equally complex tasks (i.e., when
they require equal resources); to the extent that the second
module performs a more complex task than the first, this
tendency will be even further pronounced.
This tendency can be codified as a general principle
of systems breakdown: When stressed, modular infor-
mation-passing systems with multiple exit capabilities will
often show a bias toward prematurely outputting the
products of early modules. This principle enables very
clear predictions about the unique ways in which Spi-
nozan and Cartesian systems should break down and,
therefore, about what these systems should ultimately
come to believe. A stressed or resource-depleted system
should represent propositions (a product of the first mod-
ule) but should occasionally be unable to assess those
representations (a product of the second module). This
means that resource depletion should prevent a Cartesian
system from either accepting or rejecting the propositions
that it merely comprehends, whereas it should prevent a
Spinozan system from unaccepting or certifying the
propositions that it both comprehends and accepts.
The Breakdown of Belief
The principle of premature output suggests that the way
a mental system behaves under stressful conditions may
be a good clue to the sort of belief procedure it employs.
In the language of the library metaphor, one can imagine
placing a book on the library's shelves and stressing the
librarian so that he or she is unable to assess the book's
contents and tag its spine. If this were done, then the
librarian's response to a subsequent inquiry about the
book would reveal a great deal about the library's tagging
system. If the library used the red-blue (Cartesian) sys-
tem, then the librarian would claim not to know the
book's contents; but if the library used the tagged-un-
tagged (Spinozan) system, then the librarian would show
110
a profound tendency to mistake such new and unassessed
books for nonfiction. The translation of this metaphor
should be clear: When a multiple-exit Spinozan system
is unable to assess the veracity of information, it should
consider the information true. In short, the two proce-
dures shown in Figure 1 will produce identical products
when run to completion, but very different products when
truncated. With this fact in mind, it is possible to begin
asking the question toward which this discussion has been
driving: Are human beings Cartesian or Spinozan sys-
tems? A preliminary answer to this question may be found
by examining systems in which the belief process has not
yet grown up and by examining systems in which the
belief process has been broken down.
The Construction of Doubt
In The Analysis of Mind(1921), Bertrand Russell spe-
cifically denied Spinoza's position, but he did so with
more than a hint of reluctance: "There is a great deal to
be said in favour of this view," wrote Russell, "and I have
some hesitation in regarding it as inadequate" (p. 249).
Indeed, after denouncing the Spinozan hypothesis, Russell
proceeded to marshal evidence in its support. In partic-
ular, he noted that the hypothesis "is recommended by
the way in which it accords with mental development.
Doubt, suspense of judgment and disbelief all seem later
and more complex than a wholly unreflecting assent"
(p. 249).
Indeed, thinkers of all stripe have suggested that
doubt is less quickly and easily acquired than belief (see
Flavell, 1985; Lundholm, 1936; Piaget, 1962). As early
as 1859, Bain contrasted the "primitive credulity" of hu-
man beings with their "acquired skepticism" and noted
that "we begin by believing everything; whatever is, is
true" (p. 511). Similar sentiments were expressed by such
eminent contemporaries as William James (1890, p. 318),
G. F. Stout (1909a, pp. 11 l-114; 1909b, pp. 258-260),
and William McDougall (1923), who noted, "It is only
gradually that we learn to suspend judgment, to doubt"
(p. 375). But it was the Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid
(1764/1895), who made this point most explicitly:
If credulity were the effect of reasoning and experience,
it must grow up and gather strength, in the same pro-
portion as reason and experience do. But if it is the
gift of Nature, it will be strongest in childhood, and
limited and restrained by experience; and the most
superficial view of human life shews, that the last is
really the case, and not the first. (p. 197)
Two observations provide some empirical support
for these contentions. First, the ability to deny proposi-
tions (i.e., truth-functional negation) is, in fact, one of
the last linguistic abilities to emerge in childhood (Bloom,
1970; Pea, 1980). Although very young children may use
the word no to indicate rejection or nonexistence, the
denial function of the word is not mastered until quite a
bit later. To the extent that linguistic competences reflect
underlying cognitive capabilities, this suggests that dis-
believing propositions may be more demanding than be-
February 1991 • American Psychologist
lieving them. Second, young children (who lack truth-
functional negation) are particularly suggestible--that is,
they are generally prone to accept propositions uncriti-
cally (see Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; cf. Loftus & Davies,
1984). Although such hypersuggestibility is surely exac-
erbated by the child's inexperience and powerlessness
(Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980; Messerschmidt, 1933), young
children are more suggestible than older children even
when such factors are controlled (Ceci et al., 1987).
Frankly, the ingenuousness of children may seem
too self-evident to warrant extended remark. Yet, a mo-
ment's reflection reveals that this self-evident fact does
not fit well with Descartes's hypothesis. If acceptance and
rejection are merely two sides of the same psychological
coin, as the Cartesian perspective asserts, then we should
expect children to learn to believe and disbelieve at about
the same time and with equal ease. Yet, even a "most
superficial view" reveals that this simply isn't so. Children
are especially credulous, especially gullible, especially
prone toward acceptance and belief--as if they accepted
as effortlessly as they comprehended but had yet to master
the intricacies of doubt. In short, human children do pre-
cisely what one would expect of immature Spinozan (but
not Cartesian) systems.
The Destruction of Doubt
The ontogeny of belief is at least consistent with the idea
that unacceptance is a more difficult operation than is
acceptance. Not only does doubt seem to be the last op-
eration to emerge, but it also seems to be the first to
disappear. Investigations of the experimentally induced
breakdown of belief offer clear and convincing evidence
in favor of this view.
Persuasive propositions. Throughout the course of
history, governments have routinely practiced the art of
changing minds. Many of the techniques they have de-
veloped trade on the assumption that beliefs are most
easily instilled when the believer's cognitive resources have
been depleted. Political prisoners, for example, are com-
monly deprived of sleep because it is thought that mental
fatigue will facilitate their rapid indoctrination. As one
victim of the Maoist thought-reform programs recalled
of his own "reeducation" in China, "You are annihilated,
exhausted, you can't control yourself, or remember what
you said two minutes before. You feel that all is lost.
From that moment the judge is the real master of you.
You accept anything he says [italics added]" (Lifton, 1961,
p. 23).
The prisoner's acceptance is not, of course, limited
to those propositions put forth by interrogators or judges.
Indeed, a ubiquitous feature of belief-induction programs
is the forced confession, a remarkably effective technique
that requires resource-depleted prisoners to tell them-
selves the propositions that their captors wish them to
embrace. Prisoners are coerced to write and recite the
appropriate political doctrines and, eventually, even the
most intransigent prisoner begins to experience some dif-
ficulty doubting his or her own words (Lifton, 1961, pp.
38-64; see also Bem, 1966).
February 1991 • American Psychologist
The facilitating effects of resource depletion on per-
suasion are, of course, more than anecdotal. One common
method of depleting processing resources in the labora-
tory requires subjects to perform several tasks simulta-
neously. Logic dictates that when a person performs two
or more resource-consuming tasks at the same time, then
he or she must devote a smaller portion of his or her total
processing capacity to each of the tasks. In this vein, Fes-
tinger and Maccoby (1964) demonstrated that subjects
who listened to a counterattitudinal communication while
attending to an irrelevant stimulus were particularly likely
to accept the propositions they comprehended (see Baron,
Baron, & Miller, 1973, for a review of such studies). More
exacting research has replicated this phenomenon and
specified its mediators: When resource-depleted persons
are exposed to doubtful propositions (i.e., propositions
that they normally would disbelieve), their ability to reject
those propositions is markedly reduced (see Petty & Ca-
cioppo, 1986, for a review).
Once again, an obvious fact of psychological life de-
serves close scrutiny. Why should resource depletion fa-
cilitate believing? Why does the fatigued or distracted
individual seem especially susceptible to persuasion?
Current models of persuasion (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986) have suggested that resource depletion
specifically disables cognitive elaboration--the tendency
for persons to attempt logical rejections of the doubtful
propositions they comprehend. But why should impair-
ment of such a mechanism necessarily engender accep-
tance? Indeed, if rejection efforts were to follow on the
heels of "mere" comprehension (i.e., representation of
meaning without acceptance), then the disabling of these
efforts should leave the person without a belief of any
sort. Such a person should understand what he or she has
heard, but should not be particularly inclined toward or
against it. In short, resource-depleted Cartesians should
be uncertain, uncommitted, but not persuaded.
It would seem, then, that for models of persuasion
to make sense, they must implicitly assume that accep-
tance occurs prior to or more easily than rejection, or
both, and that as a result, this initial acceptance remains
even when subsequent attempts at rejection are experi-
mentally impaired. This assumption is, of course, the very
heart of the Spinozan hypothesis: When one disables the
assessment mechanism that follows Spinozan compre-
hension, one should, in fact, find a person with a belief
in the comprehended proposition. One should find a per-
son who has been artificially reduced to a state of primitive
credulity, a state of judgmental innocence in which ev-
erything that is, is true. And this is what one finds. 2
2I avoid a discussion of how resource-depletedpersons react to
true propositions. As Figure 1 shows, the Spinozan procedurecertifies
(or further accepts) true propositionsthat are initiallyacceptedat the
comprehensionstage.This suggeststhat resource-depletedpersonsshould
believea true propositionless than should normal persons. In fact,just
such an effecthas been documentedby Petty,Wells,and Brock(1976).
It is important to note that in these studies, resourcedepletiondid not
decrease beliefin true propositions;rather, it preventedbelieffrom in-
creasing as much as it otherwisewould have. I thank Richard Petty for
making the raw data from these studies availableto me for reanalysis.
111
 Autobiographical propositions. When an acquain-
tance says that all Democrats are atheists or that squash
is the sport of kings, one may determine not only whether
these contentions are true, but also whether the acquain-
tance believes them to be true. It may be, for example,
that the acquaintance is merely trying to get a rise out of
a nearby liberal or a raise out of a squash-playing superior,
and that he or she does not really believe either of these
claims. In effect, when a speaker asserts that "This is so,"
he or she also asserts (quite independently) that "I believe
that this is so." Such autobiographical assertions are not
limited to verbal declarations of belief; virtually any hu-
man action can be construed as inherently containing a
propositional description of the actor (e.g., a smile says
"I am happy," a vote says "I am liberal," and so on).
How do people react to others' verbal and behavioral
self-descriptions? After decades of research activity, both
the lie-detection and attribution literatures have inde-
pendently concluded that people are particularly prone
to accept the autobiographical propositions implicit (or
explicit) in others' words and deeds (for reviews of these
literatures see, respectively, Zuckerman, Depaulo, & Ro-
senthal, 1981, and Jones, 1979). What makes this phe-
nomenon so intriguing is that people accept these asser-
tions even when they know full well that the assertions
stand an excellent chance of being wrong. So, for example,
when subjects listen to a person read aloud a position
statement (e.g., "I am in favor of the federal protection
of armadillos"), they generally assume that the reader's
autobiographical claim is truemdespite the fact that it
was delivered at the behest of a powerful authority. This
robust tendency--variously known as the fundamental
attribution error (Ross, 1977), the correspondence bias
(Gilbert & Jones, 1986), or the truthfulness bias (Zuck-
erman et al.)nis precisely the sort that a resource-de-
pleted Spinozan system should display. A Spinozan sys-
tem should accept another's implicit self-description as
part of the comprehension of the other's action and should
subsequently unaccept that self-description only if the
system has both the time and energy necessary to do so.
Gilbert, Pelham, and KruU (1988) have shown that this
tendency is, in fact, exacerbated by the experimentally
induced depletion of resources (see also Gilbert, 1989;
Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; Gilbert & Osborne,
1989).
The Language of Doubt
Despite their considerable differences, both the Cartesian
and Spinozan positions contend that belief begins with
the comprehension of propositions. How people compre-
hend propositions is, of course, a primary province of
psycholinguistic research, and several of the phenomena
in this area speak to the present concerns.
Components of propositions. A fundamental as-
sumption of psycholinguistic research is that "complexity
in thought tends to be reflected in complexity of expres-
sion" (Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 523) and, conversely, that
"simplicity in cognition is reflected in simplicity of (lin-
guistic) form" (Lakoff, 1987, p. 60; cf. Geach, 1980). The
112
markedness of a word is usually considered the clearest
index of such linguistic complexity, and it can be deter-
mined by two simple criteria (Greenberg, 1966). First,
unmarked words (such as happy) tend to have fewer mor-
phemes than do their marked counterparts (such as un-
happy). Second, whereas unmarked words may be used
neutrally, marked words generally cannot. For example,
the neutral inquiry "How happy are you?" presupposes
no particular degree of happiness on the part of the lis-
tener, whereas the inquiry "How unhappy are you?"
clearly reveals the speaker's prior belief that the listener
is, in fact, sad. This is because happy (unmarked) and
unhappy (marked) are thought of as degrees of happiness
rather than degrees of unhappiness, just as long (un-
marked) and short (marked) are considered degrees of
length rather than of shortness. Both marked and un-
marked words describe a particular point on a dimension,
but in addition, unmarked words may be used neutrally
to describe the dimension itself.
Unmarked terms are thought to describe operations
that are more conceptually basic than their marked
counterparts. The Spinozan hypothesis states that un-
acceptance is a more complex operation than is accep-
tance and, interestingly enough, the English words that
indicate the acceptance of ideas are generally unmarked
with respect to their antonyms. Thus, people speak of
propositions as acceptable and unacceptable, but (unless
one is a neologizing psychologist) not as rejectable and
unrejectable. One's statements may be true or untrue, but
they may not be false and unfalse. People hope their ideas
are correct, accurate, and credible rather than incorrect,
inaccurate, and incredible, but they cannot grammatically
wish to be unwrong. Indeed, people even speak of belief
and disbelief more naturally than they speak of doubt
and undoubt. To the extent that one's words for mental
processes do reveal something about the processes them-
selves, the structure of the English lexicon suggests (as
did Spinoza, who wrote in Latin) that the rejection of
false ideas is more complex than the acceptance of true
ones.
Verification of propositions. These observations
about the structure of words are complemented by studies
of how words are understood. Research on sentence ver-
ification (i.e., how people decide if a sentence correctly
characterizes its referents) has shown that people are gen-
erally quicker to assess the veridicality of true than false
affirmative sentences (Gough, 1965). Clark and Chase
(1972) have explained this finding with a "paramorphic"
model (i.e., a model that produces the same output as a
human being, but does not necessarily mimic the methods
by which the human being generated that output. See
also Carpenter & Just, 1975; Trabasso, Rollins, &
Shaughnessey, 1971). According to Clark and Chase's
model, when people process assertions (a) they mentally
represent both the assertion (e.g., the sentence an ar-
madillo's eyes are above its nose) and the state-of-affairs
it purports to describe (e.g., a picture of an armadillo),
and (b) they then compare the two representations and
compute a "truth index." This simple model makes very
February 1991 • American Psychologist
clear predictions about how long it should take a person
to verify a variety of logically identical but syntactically
different sentences, and research has shown that these
predictions are excellent approximations of empirical
data. Yet, what enables this model to work so well is the
asymmetrical fashion in which the comparison stage is
assumed to be executed:
First, people start with the truth index set to t r u e . . .
(and) second, they compare the two representations.
If the two match in every respect, the truth index is
left alone. If the two do not m a t c h . . . (then) the truth
index is changed to its opposite, false. (Clark & Clark,
1977, p. 103)
In other words, all sentences are initially coded as true,
and the comparison stage leads to further mental work
only when the sentence turns out to be false. This feature
of the Clark and Chase model is what enables it to predict
listeners' reaction times so well. Spinoza would simply
have added that this model is not paramorphic; it is per-
fectly descriptive.
Self-assessingpropositions. There is something un-
usual about linguistic denials. Homer's armadillo is not
male differs from Homer's armadillo is female in more
than superficial structure; indeed, the word not seems to
be of a different "logical type" than the other words in
the sentence (Russell, 1919, pp. 131-143; Tarski, 1969)
and is probably best thought of as a metalinguistic in-
struction to the listener to reject the affirmative propo-
sition that the remainder of the sentence puts forth. Horn
(1989) neatly characterized this view: "Every negative
statement presupposes a corresponding a f f i r m a t i v e . . .
but not vice versa. Negation is consequently a second-
order affirmation: Negative statements are about positive
statements, while affirmatives are directly about the
world" (p. 3). Indeed, a linguistic denial is "like an affir-
mative supposition and its cancellation all rolled into one"
(Clark & Clark, 1977, p. 98).
All of this means that to comprehend a denial (ar-
madillos are not herbivorous), a listener must first com-
prehend the core assertion (armadillos are herbivorous)
and then reject it. As Russell (1948, p. 122) noted, "When
I say truly 'This is not blue' there is, on the subjective
side, consideration of'This is blue,' followed by rejection"
(p. 122). Tesniere (1959) made the same point: "Before
denying the contents of a sentence, the mind must first
affirm it" (p. 225). 3 A number of experimental studies
have substantiated the psychological reality of such phil-
osophical contentions (see chap. 3 of Horn, 1989, for a
review).
If denials are self-assessing propositions in that they
offer both a core assertion and an instruction to reject
that assertion once it is comprehended, then the Spinozan
hypothesis makes a unique prediction about them. Be-
cause denials require the initial comprehension of that
31 thank Benne Willerman for translating this passage from the
French.
February 1991 • American Psychologist
which is being denied and because Spinozan comprehen-
sion always entails acceptance of that which is compre-
hended, then a Spinozan listener who comprehends a de-
nial should momentarily believe the very state of affairs
that he or she is being instructed not to believe--more
so than should someone who is hearing nothing at all.
So, for example, upon learning that Homer's armadillo
is not aroused, a Spinozan listener should comprehend
(and thus accept) the core assertion Homer's armadillo
is aroused, and should only then be able to finish the
processing of this self-assessing proposition by rejecting
the core assertion. This means that Spinozan listeners
should occasionally end up believing the very assertions
they hear denied!
In a series of investigations, Wegner, Wenzlaff, Ker-
ker, and Beattie (1981) showed that subjects who read
denials such as Bob Talbert not linked to Mafia were in
fact left with more negative impressions of the fictitious
Talbert than were subjects who read a neutral assertion
such as Bob Talbert celebrates birthday. If this tendency
for people to believe denied information is, in fact, a result
of their use of the Spinozan procedure, then it should be
exacerbated by resource depletion. Gilbert, Krull, and
Malone (1990) asked subjects to learn a fictitious vocab-
ulary by reading assertions (e.g., a monishna is an ar-
madillo) whose veracity was either affirmed or denied by
the subsequent presentation of an assessment word. On
some trials, subjects' resources were momentarily de-
pleted by having them quickly identify a musical tone
that followed the assessment word. Whereas a Cartesian
learner should have been able to comprehend each as-
sertion and then wait for the assessment word to deter-
mine whether to accept or reject that assertion, a Spinozan
learner should not have had that prerogative. A Spinozan
learner should have accepted the assertion as it was com-
prehended and then, if that assertion was denied, unac-
cepted it. Indeed, a unique pattern of errors emerged:
Resource depletion did not cause subjects to believe that
affirmed propositions were false, but it did cause them
to believe that denied propositions were true. This is pre-
cisely what one would expect to happen if unacceptance
was disrupted by the musical tone task. The Cartesian
model predicts no such asymmetry in response to re-
source depletion during assessment.
The C o n t r o l o f B e l i e f
Up to this point, evidence for the Spinozan procedure
has consisted largely of evidence for the precedence of
acceptance over rejection. Clearly, acceptance is not
merely the flip side of rejection. However, the Spinozan
hypothesis is really composed of two separable claims--
the first concerning the temporal precedence of accep-
tance over rejection (the asymmetry hypothesis), and the
second concerning the unity of comprehension and ac-
ceptance (the unity hypothesis). These hypotheses are
conceivably independent. It is possible, for example, to
imagine a system in which acceptance occurs prior to
rejection (as it does in the Spinozan system) and yet re-
113

Figure 2
Comparison of Cartozan, Spinozan, and Cartesian
Belief Procedures
CARTOZAN SPINOZAN CARTESIAN
PROCEDURE PROCEDURE PROCEDURE
Comprehension Comprehension Comprehension
& Acceptance
1
Acceptance
1
Unacceptance
1
Rejection
Unacceptance
mains distinct and separate from comprehension (as it
does in the Cartesian system).
A hybrid "Cartozan" processor of this sort is illus-
trated in Figure 2. Such a system would display virtually
all of the effects documented hitherto. Specifically, the
principle of premature output would cause such a system
to show a bias toward accepting whatever propositions it
assessed; however, the Cartozan system would not nec-
essarily assess those propositions it comprehended! In
short, the fact that assessment is asymmetric does not
mean that acceptance is an automatic consequence of
comprehension. As such, the research discussed thus far
may impugn the Cartesian model, but by and large it
supports the Cartozan and Spinozan models equally well.
The question then remains: Can mere comprehension
occur? That is, can one understand a proposition without
representing it as true?
According to some theorists, the answer is by defi-
nition no. Comprehension is the process by which the
meaning of a proposition is mentally represented, and
many theorists have found it difficult to define this process
without reference to the veracity of the proposition. Thus,
Johnson-Laird (I 988) noted that to comprehend a prop-
osition one must "imagine how the world should be
granted its truth" (p. 110), and Dowty, Wall, and Peters
(198 l) argued that "to give the meaning of a sentence is
to specify its truth conditions" (p. 4). Rips and Marcus
(1977) were even more explicit in claiming that the com-
prehension of a sentence involves "creating a temporary
context in which the sentence is true" (p. 192). Indeed,
many of us feel that the meaning of an aphorism such as
oppression is the mother of liberty is not clear until we
have represented the aphorism in a way that renders it
true ("Ah yes--the yearning for freedom becomes acute
when freedom is denied"). In some sense, to generate a
proposition's meaning is to consider it so.
Nonetheless, other theorists have offered definitions
that preserve the possibility of mere comprehension. For
114
example, Bransford and Johnson (1973) argued that
comprehension "may involve options such as whether or
not to judge the truth value of a statement or presuppose
its truth value" (p. 433). Such statements suggest that
comprehension without acceptance is, at the very least,
a viable cognitive option. If this is so, then one would
expect people who are faced with erroneous, suspect, un-
substantiated, or otherwise invalid information to exercise
such options; specifically, they should be able to compre-
hend the invalid information without accepting it.
How do people deal with invalid information? Re-
search shows that people often use information that they
clearly recognize as invalid. Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard
(1975) gave subjects feedback about their performance
on an ability-linked task (namely, the discrimination of
actual from bogus suicide notes) and later confessed that
the feedback had been unrelated to the subject's actual
performance. Despite the experimenter's confession,
subjects persisted in believing the invalid feedback. Sim-
ilar results have been documented with many different
kinds of invalid information (e.g., Anderson, Lepper, &
Ross, 1980; Valins, 1972; Walster, Berscheid, Abrahams,
& Aronson, 1967). Interestingly, one of the few effective
methods for ameliorating belief in such false propositions
is to ask subjects to comprehend the false proposition's
logical opposite (Anderson, 1982).
These findings fit with a larger body of research that
suggests that people are particularly poor at ignoring, for-
getting, rejecting, or otherwise failing to believe that which
they have comprehended (Bjork, 1972; Schul & Burn-
stein, 1985; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987; Wyer & Unverzagt,
1985). Yet, in virtually all such investigations, subjects
have used information whose invalidity was revealed only
after it was comprehended. Cartozan, Spinozan, and even
Cartesian systems are all capable of displaying such ef-
fects. Spinozan systems are unique, however, in that they
should occasionally believe and use information even
when they have prior knowledge of the information's in-
validity.
Wegner et al.'s (1985) extension of the Ross et al.
(1975) study suggested that being forewarned in this way
is not necessarily to be forearmed. Rather than confessing
to subjects after giving them phony feedback on a suicide-
note detection task, Wegner et al. (1985) told subjects
about the invalidity of the feedback before the subjects
received it. Despite this clear forewarning, subjects be-
lieved the arbitrary feedback they were given (cf. Fleming
& Arrowood, 1979; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1964). Similarly,
Gilbert et al. (1990) showed subjects a series of smiling
faces (i.e., icons of the proposition I am happy) and told
subjects that each face was expressing either true or false
happiness. On some trials subjects received these assess-
ments before seeing the face, and on other trials they
received the assessment only after seeing the face. As the
Spinozan hypothesis predicted, resource depletion caused
subjects to misidentify false faces as true, but not vice
versa. Moreover, the timing of the assessment made ab-
solutely no difference whatsoever. Resource-depleted
subjects mistook false faces for true ones, and they were
February 1991 • American Psychologist
just as likely to do so when informed of the face's falseness
before seeing it as when informed only after seeing it. In
both of these experiments, then, subjects were apparently
unable to merely comprehend; rather, they seemed to
accept invalid information whose invalidity was known
prior to its comprehension. A Spinozan, but not a Carte-
sian or Cartozan, system should behave in just this way.
It is important to note that in each of the afore-
mentioned studies, subjects were notified that they were
to receive invalid information, and this presumably mo-
tivated them to exercise their cognitive option and with-
hold acceptance if they could. Gilbert et al. (1990) took
a more direct approach to this problem. Subjects first
learned about an imaginary animal called a glark, and
then tried to decide if some new propositions about #arks
were true or false. As they did this, subjects were occa-
sionally asked to quickly read a statement about glarks,
but not to assess it. Thus, rather than motivating subjects
to withhold acceptance by presenting them with invalid
information, subjects in this experiment were asked to
merely read a few statements--and a premium was put
on the speed with which they could do so. Reaction-time
data indicated that subjects responded to this premium
and did not assess the propositions that they were in-
structed merely to read. Yet, when later asked about the
veracity of the statements they had merely read, subjects
tended to regard them as true (cf. Tousignant, Hall, &
Loftus, 1986). These data suggest that subjects were un-
able to represent the statements in a truth-neutral fashion,
even when directly motivated to do so.
The Suspension of Belief
The unity hypothesis is clearly the more difficult of the
two Spinozan postulates. The hypothesis states that ac-
ceptance is part of comprehension, and therefore when
one represents the meaning of a proposition, that prop-
osition is immediately believed. But how can one dem-
onstrate this hypothesis? There are, in general, two strat-
egies. First, one can show that when people comprehend
information that they are motivated not to believe (either
because they know the information is false or because
they have been given reason not to linger), they act as
though the information was true anyway. This would
suggest that people are unable to decouple acceptance
and comprehension, even when it would be propitious to
do so. Evidence of this sort was just discussed, and al-
though it is not voluminous, what evidence there is tends
to support the Spinozan hypothesis.
A second strategy is to show that when people com-
prehend information whose truth value cannot be deter-
mined via assessment, they act as though they believe the
information to be true. For example, upon hearing that
armadillos relish imported cheese, most people will find
in memory neither evidence for nor evidence against this
proposition and thus may simply wish to reserve judgment
about the matter. If assessment revealed no evidentiary
basis for the acceptance or rejection of a proposition, then
both Cartesian and Cartozan systems should be able to
hold that proposition in abeyance--to suspend both ac-
February 1991 ° American Psychologist
ceptance and rejection--until decisive evidence can be
acquired. A Spinozan system, of course, cannot enjoy
this particular convenience. As Spinoza (1677/1982)
himself argued:
Experience seems to tell us most indisputably that we are able
to suspend judgment so as not to assent to things that we perceive
(and) that the will, that is, the faculty of assenting, is free,
• . .
and different from the faculty of understanding... (but) I reply
by denying that we have free power to suspend judgment• (pp.
97 and 99)
The unity hypothesis, then, suggests that a mental
system must believe that which it comprehends, and that
it may not abstain. If people are Cartesian or Cartozan
systems, then they should be able to avoid both accepting
and rejecting when an "internal audit" provides incon-
clusive evidence. If, on the other hand, people are Spi-
nozan systems, then they should retain their original ac-
ceptance of a proposition when the results of a subsequent
assessment do not provide information with which to un-
accept the proposition. So what happens when people
comprehend propositions whose veracity they cannot
evaluate?
Researchers who have investigated the ways in which
human beings entertain "mere possibilities" have docu-
mented a robust tendency for people to seek information
that confirms those possibilities (Snyder &Swann, 1978;
see Klayman & Ha, 1987, for a review). Although this is
not an optimal strategy under most circumstances, there
is an exception: A confirmatory search is reasonable when
one already believes the hypothesis to be tested because,
under such circumstances, confirmatory searches usually
prove more informative than do other kinds of searches
(Trope & Bassock, 1982). For example, it is quite rea-
sonable to ask questions about a person's extroversion if
one already has reason to suspect that the person is an
extrovert because (a) such questions can help one deter-
mine just how extroverted the person is, and (b) inter-
rogating an extrovert about the details of his or her shyness
is generally a poor way to gain information. In short,
confirmatory information is subjectively more informa-
tive than neutral information. It is interesting to note in
this regard that when Swann and Giuliano (1987) asked
people to entertain a hypothesis and then to rate the di-
agnosticity of relevant information, they found "direct
support for the notion that simply entertaining a belief
elevates the perceived informativeness of evidence that
may confirm that belief" (p. 522). This suggests that in
the process of entertaining a hypothesis, subjects may
actually embrace it--thus raising the perceived diagnos-
ticity of confirmatory evidence.
If people seek confirmatory evidence because they
embrace the hypotheses they are testing (and not because
they are simply inept at testing them), then this tendency
should be annulled when people are led to entertain both
a hypothesis and its contrary. If, for example, a person is
asked merely to comprehend the proposition John's ar-
madillo is an introvert before testing the proposition
John's armadillo is an extrovert, then the person should
115
not conduct a confirmatory search. Lord, Lepper, and
Preston (1984) have demonstrated just such a phenom-
enon. When subjects were led to think about another
person as an introvert before testing the possibility that
the person was an extrovert, they showed no tendency to
conduct a confirmatory search. In fact, this simple ma-
nipulation was far more effective than was a straightfor-
ward appeal to hypothesis testers to be fair and accurate.
Conclusions
The foregoing review of research on human belief attests
to the truth of Bain's (1859) dictum: "The great master
fallacy of the human mind is believing too much" (p.
513). People are especially prone to accept as true the
things they hear and seembut why is this so? The expla-
nation examined here is that people are Spinozan systems
that, when faced with shortages of time, energy, or con-
clusive evidence, may fail to unaccept the ideas that they
involuntarily accept during comprehension. Evidence for
the asymmetry hypothesis (which distinguishes the Spi-
nozan and Cartozan models from the Cartesian model)
is quite strong: Acceptance and rejection are not merely
alternative outcomes of a single assessment process, but
rather, acceptance is psychologically prior. Evidence for
the unity hypothesis (which distinguishes the Spinozan
from the Cartozan model) is somewhat harder to come
by, but at least it is consistent: It is not unreasonable to
suggest that the temporary acceptance of a proposition
is part of the nonvoluntary process of comprehension
itself.
Yet, even if one endorses the Spinozan hypothesis,
there is no denying that this method of accepting and
then unaccepting false ideas is a somewhat awkward one,
in terms of both its procedural redundancy and its sus-
ceptibility to errors. Why do human beings use this un-
gainly belief procedure rather than its esthetically superior
alternatives?
The Origin o f Belief
"My thinking," wrote William James (1890), "is first and
last and always for the sake of my doing" (p. 333). What
James said of cognition is even truer of perception. Or-
ganisms are immersed in a world of activity, and the per-
ceptual system enables them to play their parts quickly
and well. One of the ways in which the system accom-
plishes this end is by using the outputs of early stages of
processing to guide urgent action. Organisms immediately
believe what they see and only question their percepts
subsequently and occasionally (see Bargh, 1989). Percep-
tion can afford to work this way because the correlation
between a perceptual representation (i.e., one's mental
image of an object) and the presence of that object is
nearly perfect. Organisms need not question percepts,
because percepts are for the most part faithful represen-
tations of reality.
Perception, then, is quintessentially Spinozan, and
it would probably be fair to say that this article has been
a meditation on one simple suggestion: As perception
116
construes objects, so cognition construes ideas. In both
cases, the representation of a stimulus (an object or idea)
is believed that is, empowered to guide behavior as if it
were true--prior to a rational analysis of the represen-
tation's accuracy. But perception is not merely a conve-
nient metaphor for cognition; indeed, the two processes
may be similar because one (namely, the propositional
system of representation that underlies cognition) is an
evolutionarily outgrowth of the other (namely, the imag-
inal system of representation that underlies perception).
If this were so, then the cognitive system (which represents
ideas about reality) could be expected to retain vestiges
of the perceptual system (which represents features of
reality), for example, the tendency initially to treat all
representations as if they were true. In other words, a
newly evolved cognitive system might treat socially com-
municated propositions as if they were visually trans-
mitted images, believing what it comprehends (Life is a
bowl of cherries) just as immediately and thoroughly as
it believes what it sees (This is a bowl of cherries). Perhaps
it is not entirely absurd to think of human understanding
as a sensory system that uses the propositional assertions
of others as data--a kind of"vicarious observation" that
is "the first and greatest human device for stepping up
the observational intake" (Quine & Ullian, 1978, p. 51).
Of course, a system that believes its representations
prior to assessing them (e.g., the perceptual system) can
only work if those representations are largely accurate. It
is certainly true that human societies impose a moral
onus on lying (Bok, 1978), which results in a strong ten-
dency for persons to communicate information that they
believe to be accurate (Clark, 1984; Grice, 1975) and for
persons to assume that others will do the same (Swann,
Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982). As Dennett (1981) noted:
"The faculty of communication would not gain ground
in evolution unless it was by and large the faculty of
transmitting true beliefs" (p. 18). Thus, just as perceptual
systems enable timely action by capitalizing on the fact
that most percepts are faithful, cognitive systems may
achieve similar efficiency by capitalizing on the fact that
most propositions are true. One might even argue that
the savings of time and energy outweighs the intellectual
deficits of inaccurate beliefs (Swann, 1984).
In the scheme of things, however, the laws of light
reflectance should prove a great deal more reliable than
the convention of truth telling, and thus a cognitive system
(unlike a perceptual system) would have to develop some
extra machinery for rejecting the representations it has
accepted. If one were designing a cognitive system from
scratch, then a perfectly rational Cartesian assessor might
well be the optimal sort of machinery to build. But nature
does not start from scratch; rather, she is an inveterate
jury rigger who rarely invents a new mechanism to do
splendidly what an old mechanism can be modified to
do tolerably well. The Spinozan belief procedure may be
just such a jury-rigged mechanismma cognitive proce-
dure that retains some features of the perceptual proce-
dures from which it emerged (acceptance upon compre-
hension) and adds some new features of its own (subse-
February 1991 • American Psychologist
quent unacceptance). Is the cognitive system Spinozan
because it arose f r o m the perceptual system? N o one can
say. But the commonalities are certainly suggestive. It may
not be merely coincidental that the language o f visual
perception is so easily used to describe the comprehension
o f ideas, if y o u see the point (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980,
p. 48).
Summary and Reflection
R e n t Descartes did not think that G o d should be re-
sponsible for h u m a n folly, and so he reasoned that people
must exercise free will when they choose to accept an
erroneous idea. Baruch Spinoza, a Jewish scholar who
was excommunicated for his trouble, was not so charitable
toward the designer o f the h u m a n mind. Spinoza argued
that comprehending an idea did entail accepting that idea,
however briefly. "Will and intellect are one and the same
thing," he wrote, and thus, "I deny that a m a n makes no
affirmation in so far as he has a perception" (1677/1982,
pp. 97 and 99). Although Descartes's assumptions about
the s y m m e t r y o f acceptance and rejection and the disunity
o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n and belief have silently dominated sci-
entific thinking about these issues, psychological evidence
suggests that Spinoza's hypotheses m a y have been closer
to the truth. Findings from a multitude o f research lit-
eratures converge on a single point: People are credulous
creatures who find it very easy to believe and very difficult
to doubt. In fact, believing is so easy, and perhaps so
inevitable, that it m a y be m o r e like involuntary compre-
hension than it is like rational assessment. As Reid (1764/
1895) wrote:
W h e n I perceive a tree before me, m y faculty o f seeing
gives m e not only a notion or simple apprehension o f
the tree, but a belief o f its existence, and o f its figure,
distance, and magnitude; and this j u d g m e n t or belief
is not got by c o m p a r i n g ideas, it is included in the
very nature o f the perception. (p. 209)
Such m a n d a t o r y and immediate affirmation may
make evolutionary sense when the mental representation
concerns only the physical presence and properties o f a
stone, an animal, or a tree. The h u m a n eye is an excep-
tionally reliable i n s t r u m e n t and it would be expensive,
even foolhardy, to regularly question what it tells us.
Nonetheless, the tendency to accept our mental repre-
sentations o f things before we assess t h e m may spill over
into the process by which we c o m p r e h e n d ideas as well.
Just as we are compelled to believe immediately that
which we see, so too m a y we be compelled to believe that
which we hear and say. In either case, our belief may last
for only a m o m e n t before it is unraveled by reason: Is
that really water in the road ahead, or is it just a mirage?
Does she really love me, or did she merely say so? If we
c o m p r e h e n d words o f love as we see the gloss o f dark
water, then we m a y thinkingly reject the reality o f either.
But only after we have first accepted them as so.
February 1991 • A m e r i c a n Psychologist
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