From a transcendental-semiotic point of view KARL-OTTO APEL edited by MARIANNA PAPASTEPHANOU MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY PRESS. Manchester and New YorkCopy © Kar-Oue Ape and Marines Papen 1998 “Tel of ka Ote Agel 0 Be ented the author of this ork and he "oh ot Marana Ppaephanos to ened sheer ths work hve been seed by then ecrdace wth the Cop, Desay aod abies ty Manche Unversy Pres (tld Road, Mansheer MID ON UR ‘Roary 40.175 Fh avenue New York, RY 16010, SA Der rey UA by rae ey in Canad by ‘Dic ress Univer a ri Columb, 6548 Meron oad anoruver Be Canada Vt 22 it ay Ct Pits te [toe tcl for hs books vale ea the BA rary say of Coges Casing Pion Dat ape or 171903398 5 pr Typeset by Rest Tyee i. Hoe Kong pedo Boks Howbdne CONTENTS Author’ acknowledgements EEltor’s acknowledgements Editor's introduction 1 The impact of analyte philosophy on my intellectual biography 2 Transcendental semlotls and the paradigms of Fst Philosophy ‘Transcendental semis and tr: the relevance of & Peirean consensus theory oftuth In the present debate about uth theories 4 Can an ultimate foundation of knowledge be non- ‘metaphysical? “Meaning constitution and justification of validity: has Heidegger overcome transcendent by history of being? ‘Wingensten and Heldegger language games and fe forms 7 Regulaive ies or sense events? An attempt t0 determine the feos of hermeneutics | Rogulative ideas or truth happening? An attempt 10 anmer the question ofthe conditions of the possibilty of valid understanding Hisory of science as 2 problem of hermencutis: an argument with Karl Popper’ thint-world hermeneutics 10 The selt-recuperative principle ofa crital-hermenevic reconstruction of history Index page vi an 6s 103 60 183 26 a ayAUTHOR'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1 old Uke to thank all those who made the present cllecon ‘of evsys pone expel the translators Benjamin Greg, Chrstopher| ‘Macann, Dale Snow and Roll Sommermeter, as well as those who oniited in many ays and alsa improved my on werting spe 0 English, here and i oer caves, ‘In parcular rome a debt of pratude to Manchester Universty Press and Dr Marianna Papsstepbanou, who fist together with mem ‘ber ofthe Depornient of Phsophy t The University of Wales, Cot, suggested the projec ofthe present collection and then undertook the ‘dion work Kar-ono ApelEDITOR'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. “The editor wishes to expreshee rattude ro PeessrKat-Ono Apel fr hisgoklnce, his kind co-operation and the mater he supplied me with forthiscollection aswell 9s for my own writings on the Apel Habeas at stellt Profesor Christopher Nort for his editorial advice and hie nexhaostbe patience. I would abo keto thank the sal and Students of the Philosophy Section 2 The University of Wales. Cari Dr Evy Vasamopouiow in panicuar. my fends and colleagues a the University of Cyprus, Manchester University Pess and all those who contbuted in various ways 0 ths volume. A mumber ofthese chapters have Been publshed blore and therefore its my pleasure to acknowl ‘ge the permision ofthe publishers ozepit them. Ospina sources sregiven at theends ofthe choptes. chapes 12.9 and 1Oare new and previously unpublished. Unless otherwite speci the chapters have been translated by Karl-Otto Ape. Smal changes have een made tO Some of the previously published material for sisi reasons t0 {chieveterminologal consistency, Any errors tht remain are entirely ‘aly, many thanks tomy fends and family for thei ustsining. encouragement, Marianna Papatephanow EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION Contemporary philosophy is by and large characterized by a shit fom the subject-abjeet model of thinking to a more linguistically informed paradigm. From Marin Heidegger criique of meta physics, and Marin Buber's questioning of the T-it relation, 10 ‘Wintgenstein’s arguments against the possibility of a pivate lan _avge, downto Lacan's account of the unconscious as structured ike language, the idea of a pre-linguisic origin of reflection has fallen | upon hard mes However, the etique ofthe notion ofa world-consutive ra seendenta ego does not necessarily point the way toward a concep tion of language as trth-yeldng in » manner that would favour 2 correspondence theory of uth ora posivstleprorization of the feferent and the objective world, Current interpretations of the constellation ‘subject, abject concept” st up a complex and highly Giferentiated nexus with far-reaching implications that serve t0 ‘discourage mere reversals of elder binary oppositions like subject ‘versus objec. mind versus body, private versus public. Thus the Iiguidation ofthe subjet often goes along with are)ection of objec tivism and scientism but sometimes only turns out tobe the flipside ‘ofthe dated and culture-pecfc metaphysis It appears to challenge. eis not acidentl that many theorists trace residues of positivism in the work of the most prominent detractors of the metaphysics of presence “This feeling of walking a tightrope one gets when contemplating the giddy talk of paradigm shits, Blanket critique of tradition and ‘eformulations of older concepts shoul not prevent vs fom under taking the tak ofrevistng, redefining and a times discarding pre vious workviews. But itshovld make us cautious and vigilant a5 to what we offen polemically or prematurely brand as obsolete logocentric and trapped within the discourse of ‘enlightened’ ot speculative reason Ir should also heighten our awareness ofthe fact that often what we regard as trendy” and path-bresking and what ‘we dismiss as outmoded and even tyeannical can very well be secret accomplices. It might aso be that alternative inerpetations and fsessmente of past theories that appear to be at odds do in fact Converge in respect of some of thelr deep-seated assumptions. I consider Apel’ tansfommation of Kansan themes to be such ana brror’s intRoDUCTION. + of eason, mor kemauive to some postmodem approaches 10 lity and language ‘At frst sight, KasLOtto Apet's interes in epistemology and {postjanalyie philosophy and is commitment to ranscendentalsm ‘would justify usin classying his work within one major trend of| four times ~ the so-called “hard-line” philosophy of a return 10 {oundationatimn ~ and in opposition to the ether main theoretical tendency ~the postmodernist or ironic subversion of time-honoured philosophical eal. But this oreshortened perspective would not do Justice this endeavour to ind a thid way between traditional metaphysics and relativism that gives his theory an almost hye ‘haracer i would also present us once again with a dase choice betmeen ses a choice that not onl illusory bu also conforms to the bipolar reasoning that postmodernism has been at great pains 10 sondern ‘The complex and multi-dimensiona framework whlch informs pels teanscendental semiotics and renders it iluminating and Useful even for those who would strongly disagree with many of Ins arguments wil become apparent va 2 bret account of is {evelopment The reconstruction os ocation' will show indirectly what was indicated above, namely that Apel’ philosophy. lke Habermas's, shares some objectives with is postmodernist counter- par, thos leaving space for innovative mediations between French nd German schonis of thought, but also draws from the analytic talon, and inthis way encounters Anglo-Ameeican philosophy. The hermeneutic tur in phenomenology provides one vital ‘component ofthe architetonis of Apel projet of transformation fof Kantian reason, Heidegger showed thatthe cognitive aspect of| four relation tothe world resides always already in the ‘ontextval Snacture of beingln-the-world as understanding the coherent sg nifeance ofthe word’. Combined withthe cultural anthropology of Exch Rothacker(Apel's mentor) and the Humboltian conception of language 25 Breegung, tis Heideggerian conjecture inspired Apel 10 _sccomimodate in his theory an a por dimension of world disclosure through language. The prioritization of relational omology over suljec-centred rational entails a departure from Cartesian slip sism and ftom Husserian transcendentalsm ~ tothe extent tha the lave remains commited to he idea ofa pre-lingustic philosophical origin, However, this rapprochement with Heidegger does not lead ‘Apel to the philosophical dogmas, now well-worn, which trap philosophers of «Heideggevian leaning from both sides ofthe Atlan tc. He endorses neither the Lyoardin or Foucaldianindctent of reason and socal order nor the Rortyan suspicion of realism and of ‘concomitant leas of truth, objective knowledge and emancipation In the present volume his renegotiation of Meidegerian Ideas appears in his Meaning constitution and justication of valiy: has Heidegger overcome wanscendental philosophy by history of being?” (chapter 9), ‘On the contrary she shift of imerest from consciousness to language and inter-ubjectvity brings Apel cose to philosophies of| Tanguage inthe analytic mul, He has been one of he fis thinkers to consider senously and consistently the encounter of two appar- fly oppostional trends, the continental and the Anglo-American, His presecupation withthe early Witgenstln has resulted in an astute interpretation which acknowledges, in agreement with Eric Stenus, the linguistic transcendental of Witigensteiy’s Trac ‘and its alfinites with Kant's Copernican revolution without losing Sight ofthe laters residual Cartesian dualism of the rex oitanes tions dichotomy and the former's proneness to ellace the subject fd resort to behaviourism, His assessment ofthe Philp Ive ‘iaton has led him to make a crtical-hermeneusic intervention in the Erlliren/Verschn controversy and to adopt a position equi tant from Geong von Wrights dualism and Peter Winch’ cultural relativism? By taking issue withthe reladvstic conclusions drawn from igensteln's concept of life forms Apel seeks is reconstrucive Import in order to provide = meaningful explanation of inter subjectivity and communicably. Then again, once feed of relat isi leanings, at interpretation of Wittgenstein aspiring t peer the above task has to part company with the taditional gh segre- tation between incommensurable hermeneutic and nomologial Tanguage games. Hence Ape’: overcoming of the divide betieen aditonal hermeneutics and the postemprcst epistemology of| ‘neo-Kantians and Popperans and his partial appropriation of ele- ments from the two thinkers work, Alon the lites of the former school of thought, he emphases the pecullar character of commu: nicative or hermeneutic expenence: with regard to the later he fels attacted to ‘the normative orientation of the Popperian conception df the hetmeneutc reconstruction ofthe history of Science, 35 twas especially developed by mee Lakatos!‘ prror’s itRopucTiON. ‘Wirgenstein’s refutation of the Mea of a private language 3s ‘nadequate to expan rule-following: the phenomenoiogically In- sited critique of logical atomism and formal meta-languages: Mor res turn to pragmatics: Plrce’s triadic structure of semiosis: and “Austin’s and Seales ascertions about the double siactre of speech 1s ~ that they involve a performative and a propositional dimen: ‘ion ~ all these comprise between them the chief developments that mark ‘the impact ofthe broadly analytic or Anglo-American plllorophy on Ape’ intellectual biography” (to paraphrase the ti fone of his essays). Reaching understanding with co-speakers in ‘scours (Vestndigung uber eta) the types of valaty dais im- Pilly o explicitly raised in dislogue and the normative presuppo- Siions of argumentation for example equality and co-responsibilty Of interloetors forthe outcome oftheir deliberation, ae sme ofthe premises om which transcendental pragmatics (oe semiotics, a5 Apel ‘so term it) relies and which mifzor the boundary crossing that ‘underpins the theoretal configurations of so-called second genera ton Franksurt School philosophy” ‘The ending legacy of linguistic analysts would be of limited value for 4 project that aspires to undo the oppositions beeen formal logic and grammar, abstract reason and empltcal content, nature and culture if not supplemented witha socio-theoretcally informed account of communicative competence (context-specific conscual of meaning and stated role behaviour) which in usm quires the retrieval of prox chiefly underaken by thinker in the continental’ in of descent. Apel has identified three paradigmatic trends of pos-Hegean philosophy concerning the binary opposton “theory vers pron: Marxism, existentialism, and American pra: satis In Marx revolutionary praxis dons a histrica-dalectic| mantle leading toa proces of redemption: in Kierkegaard existential rats voices the subject’ resistance fo 11a: and, in keeping with ‘American pragmatsn, experimental pra i interowined with the vision ofa democratic human if. Aihough Apel has never lst ight fof those thee philosophical tendencies and their significance. his tvident indebtedness to Kantanism and bis critical retrieval of Pecean themes render his intervention nique and orginal. It presents 3 medistory approach not only 0 the problem of praxis Sd sheoie but also to questions of truth, consensus and critique, as becomes obvious from his ‘Transcendental semiotics and truth the relevance of 4 Pelzcean consensus theory of truth in the present rorroR's TRoDUcTiON 5 eae about truth theories (Chapter 3) His asses to these ques tions revolve around the idea of certain normative presuppositions of Gialogue, necesrly employed by the tuth-sccking ideal comme flation communiy ofall afected by the outcome of a pantcular discourse "Now for Apel the presuppositions of argumentation ierent in all ascourse (andthe fac that by wtering a sentence we automat Cally ras, iplicily or explily, caims to some type of validity) are non-cecumventible (uokinergchar) ~ which in turn means that ‘we cannot sidestep them without performative sel-contradicion. To {deny that we employ them when taking part in a dialogue amounts to denying that we ae arguing or tha we aze conveying meaning, but the denial itself seventy an argument with impliccpresup- postions and valdty aims. Hs pointing out ofthe self-disabling potas produced by discounting or ignoring these impli vaiity ‘ims presents a challenge to those sceptics or relatvsts who do not recognize their language game as discursive and who cast doubk on ‘the primacy ofa postive conception of language tha the commu lcative aspect of signification In ths way the idea ofa performative sellcontradiction = which, owing to the linguistic framework of its derivation, fers from previous notions of contradiction ~ 6 not ‘easly deconstracible and deserves serious consideration by etc theorists ofa post structural persuasion. However, the Idea of the ineuctabiity of Snvoking valcty sims in our utterances and the priority of communicative over ategic ation require, according t© Apel. 2 solid philosophical {round which we aiain only if we regard the linguistic pragmatic Justin of aniculated speech a4 an Archimedean point. The Implication here is twofold fest in place of the traditional prima Philosophie 4 new grounding has to emerge: second, old foundationaisms have to be unmasked as false or inoperative and Feplaced with a more plausible claim. As concerns the fst point. Apt’ essay with the tile “Transcenden‘al semiotics and the para ‘gms of Fst Philosophy’ (Chapter 2) displays how he wckles the ss of paradigm shifs through a cical overcoming ofthe specific rctaphysical baggage of modern First Philosophy. Regarding the second point, in 'Can an ullimate foundation of knowledge ‘be non-metaphysical” (Chapter 4) Apel discusses the so-called ‘Mlinehhausen telemma’ — the proposition that-exta-linguistc Blllsophical foundations reduce ether to Infinite cepress or peitioprincipio dogmatism ~ and malntalns that ir does not apply 0 fronscendental-emiotic ultimate justifications 1H should be noted that all theories of regulative Meals (the Fabermasian communicative ethics notwithstanding) presuppose tension between the validity (Gttigkei) and the social currency {Geltag) of scenic, soca-normative and subjective statements, ‘thus implicily affirming 2 surplus of ruth or justice unacainable by existing account of reat or morality. This introduces alibi fn 2 compeling way. All claims are fllbe,se-recuperating and subject to revision, But it would be se-defeating for a wel founded” philosophy, if consistent, to endorse an unrestricted {alibiism. For, as Apel argues in "Transcendental semiotics and the paradigms of First Philosophy’. the idea of a language game of being that doe ot presppes some paradigmatic cere i ‘Before ending this ble overview of Ape’ philosophy it would bbe perinent to make some bret reference to the Apel-Habermas| technological presctions (Thi may be considered as 3 confirmation as well asa correction of Karl Popper’ criticism of the prediction ‘sims of ‘historic’ for i affects Karl Marx but not Hegel. who {Galmed only ex ot explanations of historical necessity.) “he second focus ofthe recent discussion in analytic pllosophy that brings together hermeneutic and Witigensteinian motives of ‘thoughts epresented by the so-called “post-empiriist philosophy of Science’. found that interesting. especially in connection to Thomas Kuhn's The Srcure of Sdentie Reourons (1962) and the debates followings publication. What struck rom the beginning with regard to Kuhn's book was the convergence of, Witgenstein’s notions of language-game paradigms and Heieggerian (and Gadamerlan} notions about epochal (or epoch-making) groundings fof our pre-understanding of the world by world disclosures (uncovering) of meaning and tru. (But also themes from Ameri ‘an pragimatam, 10 which T shall come back later, seemed t0 be {influential inthe background) ‘Now, a8 concerns the convergence of hermeneutic and Witgensteinan ideas, was well prepared to accept, and even wel ome, many insights that helped t0 surmount zhe methodological Solipssm and the overlooking of the « priai of hnguistialy and soxio-hstorcall impregnated world interpretation which character: laed the traditional ~ postvisic and mentalisiciranscendental ~ epistemology and philosophy of science. Yet. on the other hand there were also tendencies that I had already ented inthe later Wirtgenstein (and Winch, as mentioned above) and in Heideage's and Gadame’s philosophies. which [now lexnd especially tating inthe context ofa philosophy of scence. Alter what I have already insimated, my eesstance ro certain tendencies of Kuhnian (an post Kunnian pllosophy of science may here perhaps be signalled pro visionally by noticing that my opposition to scents inthe ight of hermeneutics didnot mean to my mind a questioning ofthe raiton- aly of science and its progress and my opposition to transcendental ‘mentalsm and methodological solipsm did not commit me to a fejecion ofthe universalism of transcendental philosophy aiogether fn favour ofa relativistic historic, From this general point of view 1 wed 10 defend ~ 35 already In the ease of Gadamers Truth and Method ~ the nonmative-methodologial implications ofa diferent ated philosophy of scence (according to diferent cognitive interests ‘which themselves have a normative underpinning) against the ten dency to replace the idea of a possible scientific progress toward ‘the truth in different normative mensions) by the concepion of 2 history of tut happenings or mere paradigm changes. ‘The post-Kuhnian philosophy of scence Here [shall mention only tw points of my encounter wit the poste Kuhnian philosophy of scence. A minor point of challenge was presented to1me by the tendency (or rather fashion) ~to be found especially in the Anglo-American scene ~to propagate a novel ve lon, ait were, ofthe ideal fa wified science, but this ie inthe name of pan-hermeneutis, All the subtle eerlologial achieve ‘ments of thee or mote phases of the explantion-versus understanding controversy were swept aside by the strange arg ment (advanced by people who probably did not even know the ‘older history of hermeneutics) that the natural sciences have a Ihermeneutle character too because thet history has indeed shown | that they are always dependent on a historically impregnated pre~ understanding ofthe Ifewold. against this conclusion at least the following arguments should be put forward, rst, the soci-historical pre-understaning of the worlds pt marily thematzed not by natural science iself but by history of| Sclence, which, of course, always was and stil a hermeneutic Geitersetcha (ever more so than the quast-nomological sciences of social behaviout Second, the natural scences most try to separate methodol gical over and again thei subject matter ~ nature objeciied 38 epitome of nomic structures ~ from the (llrent) pre- “understandings of the Ieworld trom Which they indeed have 10 ‘depart. For they must ty to establish ~ also Lnguisically - 2 newpre-understanding of thelr objet pre-undertanding to be shared ‘with all members of the sienific community but not ~ asa least, ‘tally i the case of the hermeneutic socialsciences = with the very objets of their cognition. This leads to the thed and most Important argument. ‘Thie,the specifi object ofthe natural sciences does not co for imply any understanding of the world, or hence any meaning intentions hat could express themselves through symbols but only signs of the character af indies ot symptoms. Hence it could be rightly sid that af dhe natura sciences are considered hermeneutic because oftheir own presupposed presunderstanding ofthe worl then the sodal sciences presuppose a double hermeneutis.* But [would prefer to say that the methodological point of the hermeneutic sciences is constituted precisely by the need of meat ‘ng theough communication between their own pre-understanding ofthe world and that oftheir sibyect-objects” ‘A second, more important reason for raking isue with post ‘empiricist philosophy of scence was the grounds of the debate be ‘ween Thomas Kuhn and Kar! Popper and his followers. One of the ost striking results ofthis confrontation was the fact that she Popperians ~ who previously had defended i loose alance with the neo-positivss) a rather sclentse-reductionlst view af the socal sciences ~ came to discover al of sudden, the genuine problems of hermeneutics and the Geiseisencsfon, a8 they ate indeed mie rored inthe topics of history of science. Confronted with these topic. they not only tried to develop their own conception of ‘thint-workd hermeneutics which is not so very different fom that ofthe neo: Kantans, especially that of Hcnsich Rickert, but in fat even devel ‘oped a conception of the hermeneutic reconstruction of istry” that amounted 1 establishing a non-vale-tre typeof critical socal science (in contradstincion to Max Weber's stance on this question which ha always been defended by the Popperian). Now. tying 10 find my ground with regatd 1 the debate between Kut and the Popperian, was in a pecullar and somewhat ambivalent poston (n the one hand, I et obliged to defend traditional hermeneutics and parly also Gadamer and Kuhn, against the neo-Kantian an Popperian ‘thtd-world hermeneutic. On the ether hand, however. elt strongly atracted also by the normative orientation of the Popperian conception of the hermeneutic reconstruction of the his tory of scence. a it was especially developed by Imre Lakatos. ‘With regard tomy frst concer, 1 led to elucidate ~ along with Dilhey, bat also with the aid of a Peecean semiotics ~ the peculiar aracer of hermeneutle or communicative experience, aleady on the basic level of the meaning-expressive sense-data, and to play of, this tunction against Popper's approach. which ~ similarly to Rickert In his polemics against Dithey ~ relied only upon the conceptual: ation ofthe possible meanings sits represented through the qua Platonic ‘third word” of “objective knowledge’, ineluding on Popper's account even problems and problem situations. Thus, t0| take an example of Popper's itis possible that Popper is righ in supposing that Galle had good reasons (according #0 3 Popperian methodology) to stick 10 his theory of the tides against Kepler's better theory because histheory a simpler and not ye refuted. But the gven textual evidence of hermeneutic experience which Popper does not take into account 2 all, might ater all provide testimonies to the fact that, contary to Popper's hypothesis, those interpreters are right who suppose that Gaieo refs Kepler's proposals out of Jealousy of similar mosves. This point 1 think, may be generalized into the tenet that not only empathetic understanding, as Popper supposes ail along with ‘Hempel ~ bu third-wodd projections of objective sutures of prob lems and sotions as well can have 2 heuristic function only within the whole methodological pracedire of hermeneutic understanding, ‘which Is rather regulated through the pricpe ofthe “hermeneutic sdide’* Nevertheless, with regard tothe problem of a hermeneutic re ‘onstruction of the whole process of the history of scence, it may ‘very well be derived from the Popperian conception thatthe hypo- thecal construction tagain and again to be renewed) of an ideal history of progeesve scence (Le. a history of creative moves af thought tobe undersood and evalated as having been motivated by good reasons) mast be given pracy over al attempts ~ not at learning fom te given texts bythe nermeneutic experience but ~at explaining the particular decisions of scientists by pposing causally tflectve “external motives a for example interest or passions. Tie was, roughly put, Lakator's proposal for the reconstrution of the history of scence in his discon between “internal and external story“ Without this dsincton and the pertinent methodological ‘maxim of maximizing as much a posible the scope of the ‘intemal history’ t would indeed be posible neither to identity selectively» FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW {he relevant ats abou persons and events ofthe history of sence from the whole of human history nor to lean from the history of science something relevant for the actual progress of science ‘Now, in my reeepion of Lakatos's understanding ofthe history ‘of science, I came to ask the following question, obviously inspired by my interest in generalizing thls approach: what about the transi- ton ftom understanding facts ofthe internal history to explaining facis of the external history? Ii allowed, the ease of motives that have to be considered as had reasons in the light of even the maxi- ‘mized construction ofthe internal history of good science. to switch ‘over immediately to looking to exteral motives that canbe consi ‘ered only as causally ellecive factors, such a5 hidden imterests or passions? ‘The answer to this question ms abwousl be no: forthe history ‘of what can be understood and evaluated as done for good reasons is wider than only the most comprehensive interal history of scence 1, for instance, Newton's motive for introducing the concept of| _sbsolue space’ into his philosophical theory (namely the suppos- ton that space isthe sesorum de) cannot be evaluated tobe a good reason within a maximized intemal history of physic, i may never= theless be understood and even evaluated as 8 good reason within the frame of maximized internal history of religious ideas (which indeed has tobe supposed by someone who want to understand the bulk of Newton’ life work hermeneutical). Stating out from this consideration I led to generalize Lakatos's conception ino that of 2 maximized internal history of human cultural evelution. The ieal limit ofthis conception would be marked by those facts of human behaviour that cannot be hermeneutially understood from good reasons at all but can merely be causally explained (and possibly “understood ~ by deep psychology or citique of ideology = from ‘reasons that have to be evaluated asbad rom all normative perspec tives of a hermeneutic reconstruction of human history or. on the other hand, cultuel evolution). However it should have become cleat from these last remarks thatthe generalization of Lakatos conception f possible only He ‘an uilze an expanded conception ofthe normative yardticks that ‘an be presupposed in the process of evaluative reconstruction. That Js tosay, the normative foundation of cultural hermeneutics had 10 {0 beyond the normativism of the late Popper and Lakatos which iways remained limited by the ideas of, respectively, truth or progress towards truth in science. Now. the conception of those formative conditions of the possibilty of arguing that we cannot deny without commiting 2 performative self-contredcion may. 1 sugges, provide the bridge to the enlarged conception of normative yardstcks of evaluation and thus to a foundation of the hesme- ‘uti of historical reconstruction.” ‘On account of my reeption of the post-empiricist philosophy of (che history of scence. my narrative reconstruction of the impact of analytic philosophy’ on my intelectual biography could be consi ‘red to have been concluded. But Ihave already mentioned that 1 consider my study of American pragmatism ~ especially of Charles. Peirce’s work ~ as almost an integral part of my taking issue with analytic philosophy, Thector, in what follows, Tl argue, through brief reconstrucion of my own experience, thatthe intertwining of ‘he problematic of pragmatism with that of analyticphilsophy isnot ‘only an interesting topic seen fom the perspective of my intellectual biography bur probably also for objective reasons that have 10 do vith the character of pragmatic philosophy and its function in the Intellectual history ofthis entry 1 historical interpretation of the intertwining of analyte phi- Josophy and pragmatism inthis century from my own point of view, in so far as t might be representative, may start out from a leas three problem perspectives. First it may take up that part of the history of semlods that through the co-operation of Mortis with (Camnap was integrated inthe history of linguistic philosophy, 25 well 45 of neo:postvistic lg of science. Second may conceive ofthe ‘whole development of ordinary language philosophy and of post empiricist philosophy of science as part ofthat ‘pragmatic turn’ of| analytic philosophy that already announced iself In the days of “Morris and Caenap. Third may concentrate on single persons and specific movements of thought that make up the impact of prog ‘matism or neo-pragmatism in the present scene of philosophical discussion ‘think that Ihave already, at east implicitly giver an account ofthe fist two stages or aspect ofthe impact pragmatism rom my perspective. Theretore I will ow proceed according to the third poss. But I wil concentrate on my reception of the work of Peirce and on my ellor to show why Belre’s direction of pragma tism (bis ‘pragmaticsm) is more relevant than many other direc- tions of pragmatism, nd neo-pragmatia, within the context of 3» OM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW. crteal assessment and selective reepton of analyte philosophy in the broadest sense Peirce and pragmatism {In my firs study of American pragmatism in the 19605 my interest twas not yet focused on the links between pragmatism and analytic Philosophy but on the ~ very general ~pos-Hegelan problem of 2 foure-dreced philosophy ofthe mediation of theory and praxis From this point of view tame to distinguish between three para ‘matic ends of post-Hegelian pillosophy: Marxism, existentialism fst represented by Kierkegaard) and American pragmatism. Each of these tends, 1 suggested, has given an answer 10 the above- ‘mentioned problem. Marks answer to Hegel was directed towards ‘the praxis of socal revolution within the fame ofa dialectical con- capon af the necessary course of sory. Kierkegaard’ answer 10 Hegel was directed toward the existential prausof the incommensu- rable decision of the single person on the basis of belie. Finally “American pragmatism was a~ somewhat delayed - answer 1 Hegel ‘that was oriented towards the experimental coping with the pravs of Ihuman life, But with regard to this third answer, one could state furthermore that it again allowed fr an ideal typical diferentation into three main directions, two of which, namely that of James and that of Dewey, could be co-ordinate, ina sense, with Kierkegaard and Marx, respectively: although the experimentalist ~ and that means also the undogmatic- character of pragmatism united James and Dewey 35 against Kierkegaard and Marx. The third dtetion of ‘Amevican pragmatism, however, that of C5. Feige, could not be related primarily, to a subjectve-psychological (or existentialist) or 4 socio-historcal (or pola) perspective of ilepraxs, but rather to the perspective of logic (in @ nareow and in a wide sense of a transcendental-semiotial, epistemologically relevant, logic of sc- ence) and its function forthe evolaion of rationality through bu ‘man praxis Thus far Plice’s pragmatism (‘pragmatics’) was an answer not primarily to Hegel but rather to Kant, and to that extent, fan early rival, so 10 speak, of analytic plilosophy, one that com prised all its topics (logic of science as well as language analysand ‘meaning cig) within a much broader horizon of experimentalist speculation APEL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ” It was for these last-mentioned reasons that I concentrated my ‘sudy on American pragmatism and Peuce’s philosophy, and that 1 studied it over an again by drawing comparisons with the dilrent phases and stands of linguistic philosophy. tn what fllows twill deal only with those aspects of Peirce suds that led me to discover novel altemative answers tothe main problems of analytic philoso Dy. some of them appearing to me even superior to those of analc| piilosophy. As in the case of my Wittgenstein studies. so inthe case of my Peirce studies lemployed the heuists of inquiring on is relation: Ship to Kans ‘transcendental og In the st case this was justified by Wigensten himself nthe Tradatur and in the Phisophia ‘vestigations; in Peizce's case there i similar authorization to be found, from is early work on a ‘New List of Categories’ (1864) ‘through the Logie of Inquiry’ (1870) down to the ‘Normative, Sem fotle Logic’ in 1902, But there isnot only an analogy but alo 3 remarkable ilference between Witgenstein’s linguistic transforma tion of Kans transcendental logic and Peice’s tansformaton of -Kant’s approach into that ofa ‘semiotic lgle of inguly’. From the ex ps perspective of my study of both thinkers T would characterize the alfnties and the diferences inthe folowing overview. In both cases there sa shift from mental 1 a philosophy of language, an that means alo from transcendental methodical solip- sism of Cartesian provenance towards a recognition of the quasi tuanscendental function ofthe community of ign interpretation qua worl interpretation. This parallel goes along in both cases ~ wih 2 ritique of (metaphysical) meaning as well and with the later ‘Wingenstein we find even a strong ‘pragmatic tur’ and 2 eenain| ‘auivalent to Peirce’ ‘pragmatic maxim of meaning explication, To {hat extent ane could talk about two versions of language-oiented pragmatism. But 10 these analogies the following differences may be ‘opposed: whereas Wittgenstein’ Tingusic turn’ focused fst on fone ideal system of world depiction, and later ~ more eeaistcally~ fon language games as pans of if forms. Peirce’s philosophy of language is from the beginning a par of semiotics. Ths means tha, corresponding to the three Peircean fundamental categories ~ ‘ists "secondness and thitdness’ = there are, even within lan nage. three main types signs functioning, namely cons indies and symbols. From these dee types of signs ony the conventional‘symbol’ (of concep) are peculiar functions of language, whereas ‘leone and “indice” ate functions of natural signs as well as co functions ast wer. of linguistic symbols, as for example “indexial signs" ike “this, "there, now’ ete. Already this base diference [between the linguistic’ and the ‘semiotic turn’ opens up epistemo- logical possibities for Peirce’ semiotic loge that are missing in the twenteth century's analytic philosophy. First, the non-conceptual = and that means non-intepretation ~ functions of icons and ices, that fs functions i the sense of presenting rlation-free suche (frsiness) and pointing to causally ffecive existent beings (secondnes in the sense of the encounter between the I and the non: etablsh a connection between Iaguage and elity that iat least not fully accounted for by mainstream analytic philosophy. ‘Thus the function of presenting relation-fee suchness of icons, ‘which ae co-functoning with indices and interpretative symbols in| the use of language (eg. through the exemplary introduction of ‘predictors within the context ofa situation), shows that ts in fact, ‘ossble to rehabiitate Huset's evidence phenomenology 103 cer tain extent within @ transcendental semiotics of world interpret ton.” This later has of course to combine an account of the re-interpretative function of presenting suchness (which was byoltied in Hsse eidetie phenomenology with its acount fr the conceptually interpretative function of the symbols which is indispensable forthe consttion of true or false cognition. Within linguistic philosophy ~ which in its semantical phase (eg. with (Camnap and Tarskt. as with Popper) considered evidence not 1 be reason (Le. a non-sffcent criterion) forthe legitimlzation of tue knowledge but only asa causally effective psychological feeing ~ it was only Kripke's and Putnam’ so called “realistic semantics.” ‘speclly the theory of the “original bapssm of individuals and natural kinds by ‘gid designators that accounted forthe epi ‘ological funtion of the indexisl and ~ nmplicy ~ ofthe iconic sign-funcions of language. til these achievements of “realistic sermantc’ have tobe integrated into a transcendental semiotics of Pelcean provenance, I would suggest.” This holds expecially with regard to the relationship between the (transcendental) “semiotic logic of inquiry” and the (empirical-hypothetical) “metaphysis of natural evolution’ which, on Pie’ account, canbe established by 2 semiotic analysis ofthe co function of natural and conventions Signs (eg in perceptual judgements or in mathematical diagrams). AAPEL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 2 Also with regard to the overcoming of methodical solpssm. trom Descartes through Husserl) by a recognition of the quast transcendental function of the community of language use of sign interpretation, there isan important diference between the Wagensteinian and the Peircean version. With Witgenstein the point of the overcoming of methodical solipism is represented by the famous arguments against the possibilty of ‘vate rule- Following’ or a ‘pivate language” have already mentioned that can really consider these arguments as exits! ones but cannot follow Witgenstein’s at leas imimated - affirmative answer to the question of the eriterla of correct rule following, for this answer seems to make all corectrule-flowing, and thus even the concept ofa rule, dependent onthe factual usage (and so far the fe form) of 2 foetal (and so far Limited) community. Now, with rire there ‘may be found different but complementary arguments against the Cartesian mentalism and methodical slipsism, arguments in favour of the supposition of an indefinite transindvidval process of ‘thought qua inference and sign Interpretation. From the vantage point of the posible progress ofthis trans-Indivdual process of sign bound thought the insstence on individual mental evidence by Peirce reduced 10 the insistence on idosyncrasy and thus on err. However, the subject ofthe trans-indvidual process of sign interpre tation, on Peirce's account cannot be any factual finite community ‘that would be bound toa specifi socio-cultural form o ite fo such resection for Peirce would also amount 1 a xaton to idiosya- crasy and hence the blocking of the posible progress toward the truth. Tis later. however according to Peirce can be defined only by the regulative idea of the consensus (Le. the “ulimate opinion ~ ‘never completely reached ~ of the indefinite community of investigators” T must confess that always preferred this Pltcean account of ‘the semlotic process and is subject to the Wingenstlnian (or post- ‘Wittgenstcinian) account atleast with regard to epistemology and Plilesophy of science, but partly with regard othe problematic of| ‘ethics and polies as well ahough here 2 mediation between "universalism and panicularisiccommmunitaranism has tobe accom: plished Atleast the Peircean account opens up a perspective of ‘acknowledging along with Witigensein, the publicand community hound character of any rule-following without fling a victim to intolerable relativism and ethnocentrism, In what follows 1 willbriefly outline some particular problem dimensions in which If lowed Percean inspirations rather than those of mainstream analytic philosophy. ‘touched above upon the intemal connection, in the Peircean philosophy, between the nations ofthe indefinite process of infer fence and sign invezpectaton, the indefinite community of invest fntors and interpreters, and the lea of explicating the meaning of truth withthe ai ofthe counterfactual supposition and regulative lea of the ulimate consensus ofthe indefinite community. With Peirce this explication of the meaning of truth ix in fact only an application of the ‘pragmatic maxim’ of explicating all conceptval meanings by “‘mellonization’, thats by asking forthe posible con: sequences with regard to our acons and experlences in the fate “Thus far there is common ground in the theories of Peirce and of James. But James” ~ as now again Rory ~ allowed for, or even suggested. an explication of the idea of uth in terms of he frit foruseul consequences ofa personal bei ust within the context of 2 fine fe and is sving for happiness. Contrary to this ‘human ism jor existentialism), Piece insted from the beginning on the stricly universal inter-sobjective validity thats bound up with the ea of wuth. Hence he had 10 restrict the posible ‘mellnization with regard 10 the concept of truth to the context of experimentation tnd argumentative discourse of the indefinite community of those Who search for consensus. Staeting out frm this conception as well, and combining it with ‘ealstic semantics within the context of & twanscendental semiotic, [attempted to outline a consensus theory of th that would be cteriologically relevant (in contaditinction to the metaphysical and the logico-semandical correspondence theory) by Is capability of taking into account (by cra weighing ‘up against each ether within the horizon ofa stiven-for synthesis of Imerpretation all avaiable ruth crtena ~ for example evidence, coherence, prospective fruulness~ which, taken for themselves ae never sufficient” ‘The conception of progress towards the truth Jus outlined, on my account, stands n close connection to the peciiar mode of Peirce’s transformation of Kant transcendental logic into a norma te semioxcal logic in inquiry, In ths regard Peirce’ residual tan seendentalism i quite difeent not only fom Witigenstein's ut also ftom that ofthe so-called “ranscendental arguments dscused by Swawson, Bennett and many oftheir followers. The main diference APEL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY as scem tobe thatthe later focused on the problems ofthe consti tion’ of the structare of possible experience whereas Peirce focused, from the beginning. on the regulative princples that (together with the empirical reference of signs) would make up the conitions of ‘he possiblity ofreacig the tuth ithe long run "Thus Strawson and hs followers set out fo reconstruc mean ing cically that i by eliminating the conception of unknowable things in themselves’ and the pertinent conception of tanscenden- tal idealism ~ Kant’s transcendental aalye ~ and thereby to ave the funtion ofthe “categorical schemes” an the a prio validity of| the ‘prindples of inellec” (Grands des Versande) by “wanscea: densa arguments. this context they completely neglected Kans “wanscendental dialectic’ and its problematic of ‘principles of res son’ forthe completion ofthe whole proces of cognition inthe Tong run, Therefore they had to give up transcendentalism altogether, ‘when i tured out that wanscendental arguments for “categorical Schemes’ are no longer tenable. ‘By contrast. Peirce, who fist reduced the fundamental cateyo- Fes 10 the three elements of semioti representation ofthe world (oamely presentation of suchness, encounter between I and non {and conceptual mediation or interpretation) had neither to cae for transcendental idealism nor forthe 2 pro! validity of “principles because for him all prepositional sentences ~ synthetic judgements 4 prior as well as perceptual judgements ~ were only sedimented, Sand hence provisional results of 4 continuous proces of ~ mostly ‘unconscious ~ ‘syathetle inferences’ inductive’ and ‘abductive fone) and sign interpretations. Hence, for Peirce the problem of a residval transcendental was ftom the beginning reduced to the ‘question of the condllons of the possibly ofthe validity of syn ‘the inferences and sign interpretation inthe long run. Peirce gave the definite answer to his question in is nonnative semioilogic of inquiry. There he would concentrate on those regulative principles ‘that- like the pragmatic maxim of meaning explication andthe idea ‘of truth as ultimate consensus, which lself follows from the pra matic maxim ~ are requized as procedural norms for guiding the research process, Through this shit fom constitutive’ to regulative brincpes 1 suggest, Peirce has infact reached a solution of the problem of a wanscendemtal logic that is immune to the recent citique of "wranscendental arguments, for even the holistic ‘itigue of the very Mea ofa categorical seme doesnot aflect theive ideas’ that are a prio elated wo the whole of 2 meaning {ul proces of inference and discursive interpretation In this contexta final remark has 10 be made about the Peircean theory of meaning as i is implied in the pragmatic maxim and the relevant concept of sign inezpretaion 3s compared with the explication of meaning in terms of use as they are characteris of the pragmatic turn of linguistic philosophy. especialy that of the later Witgenstein. I touched pon this topic already when { mentioned that I refused the afirmative criteria of a correct rule following to be found in Wingenstin’s Phisophic! Investigations “These criteria appear to me to be in line with Wittgensein's sug sted deinsion of inguistic meaning in terms ofthe factual use Now. in order to understand the meaning of words, i of course seul to look forthe use, and fra linguist or a sociologist this may even exhaust the problem if he or she needs a realistic corrective ‘agains the semantial fictions suggested by the system of language But for Perce the problem of meaning explication dealt within the Pragmatic maxim, and later in his semiotic lope, was dillerent ‘one from the outset His problem wae primarily a normative one whieh he later isolated semiotcally by distinguishing the “logical Interpretan’ of a sign from the ‘immediate’ and the “dynamical ‘ones. His maln examples were those ofthe hardness ofa diamond and heaviness inthe sense of physical gravity, and he suggested from the beginning that, inorder to apply the pragmatic maxim, one has ‘look not forthe factual use but fr the possible use of words in the context of thought experiments that try to relate experitental ‘operations to possble experiences. This method of carfcation of ‘meanings was obviously intended not or lngulsts (or behaviourist Ssemioticians ike Moris but for philosophers and slentife research es who know from the outset that observation of people's behaviour (or even empirial-hermeneutic understanding of tet factual use of language) finally could not help them because the factual use of the words simply does not provide an adequate elucidation of their problematic deep meaning. (This does not mean however that the pragmatically oriented explication of meaning had tobe given up in favour ofa return to pure mentalism ~say ofa dialects of concepts burt means that an explication of the deep strucute of meaning has to go beyond all factual use towards the possible use by future ‘oriented imaginaton, by ‘mellonizaion’ in Peirce’ sense) ‘A good example af a meaning explication along the ines of Pelnce’s pragmatic maxim was delivered by Einstein's special theory of relativity, which essentially consists of thought experiments in fonder to find out how the meaning ofthe concep ‘siultanelty af toro evens” could be clarified by possible measurements. I is well ‘Known tha the outcome of Einstein's meaning explication though Imagined measurements delivered quite novel definitions of the physical terms ‘ime’, “space” and ‘simultaneity’: definitions that were quite diferent even from the former common use of the [hysiciss. think However that this method of meaning explication "through thought experiments is by no means restricted othe natu tal sciences. For another good example ofits application i delivered by John Rawis'sconstrucive explication of the meaning of justice ‘through imapinng the “orignal position of establishing a just social ‘order by a socal contac that would he based on consenting rational Aecisions in that situation.” In order to iusrate the significance of the difference between the mainstream pragmaticexplction of meaning in terms of use, on the one hand, and Peirce’ pragmatics method, onthe other, point to another result of analytic philosophy in recent times that has strony impressed me. John Searle, in bis book tnewonaliy (1983) has writen a fascinating chapter on “the background! of| ur understanding linguistic utterances or making understandable tterances The "bckgrond comprises presuppositions i dhe sense fof ‘knowing how to act” and ‘knowing how things ate’ that make the application of our understanding of linguistic meaning to the lieworié possible, but cannot be made, in principle, completely controllable, thats representable by propesitiona sentences. To that extent Searle's conception ofthe background! is closely related to Heidegger's and Gadamer’s concept ofthe (existential presructure fol) the “pre-understanding” of the ifeworld, but even more 50 10 ‘Wittgenstein’ conception ofthe contingent paradigmatic certains that must be presupposed in a functioning language game. Like ‘wingenstein and the latest Suawson, Searle suggess that all rhe background presuppostons of our meaningful speech or under Stoning linguistic meaning are not transcendental but contingent i the sense of soft naturals, Now. I will only mention ere that 1 could question the last tenet 8 dd above, by pointing to that pat ofthe prestructure’ of ‘our understanding meaning that cannot be disputed in sevious argu ing without commiting a performative sel-contradiction. What 1 want to stress here i that the pragmatic meaning theorles of ‘Wingenstein on the one hand, and Peirce on the other standin veryferent relationship to Searle's theory ofthe ‘background’ Fr it 's the equation of meaning withthe factual use, that isthe ual pplication of our understanding of linguistic meaning. that com. pletely confirms Seats tenet that or understanding meaning fannot win control in principle. over the background of our being able to apply the understanding oflinguistle meaning tothe lifeworld. 8y contrast, Ptxce’s theory of meaning explication shows thar it sat least posible ~ in principle ~ to expand our control progressively over the comingent background’ of our understanding linguistic meaning with regard 0 is possible application 10 the Meworld ‘A final comment on my encounter with Wigenstein’s (as well, as Strawson's and Searle's) and Peirce's pragmatic tories of mean {ng and understanding may peshaps serve as an example for making ‘understandable ~ a the end of the present retrospective = that and ‘why through my long paale study of linguistic plosophy (in the narrower sense) and pragmatics semiotics in Pete's sense) came fo the conclusion thatthe later approach (hich can also be con ‘cived of sa supplementation of analytic philosophy inthe twent eth century) had afterall the greater impact om my pilosopizing 1k provided, soit seems, @ wider hosion for my transcendentait ambitions which, nowithstanding all my aitemps at a radial teansformation, are deeply rooted in the Kantian tradition and hhence cannot so quickly comply withthe programme ofa thorough etranscendentlization’ (Rory). which, a8 1 appears to many, stands atthe end of the pragmatic tur of analytic pillotonhy. t have to stop shor of tying to outline my own conceptions of rane- ‘cendental semiotes and transcendental pragmatics, for example in 3 ‘conception ofthe thre paradigms of Fist Philosophy (tobe derived {rom the tadicty of semiosis)" and of discourse ethics These ‘conceptions no doubt are rater remote in their spit from analyte philosophy. But hope that they, neverheles, have preserved and show up what t have leamed from thar whole movement of crcl ‘hough 10. Ane Sain dr ion de tomas on Bae Bs 2B Sten, Wits’ Thats A Cr Epon of ft Mate Lines of ‘hug (Oalr laches fechas ave en ne |APEL AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY » text ob Wingenen, Trans Lag piloaphing tans. DF, Ras and [BR Neciaten and Roaledpe and Kean Pa. 98 henge, em Beg a M. Svan. 197) eodenaorgmatichenRekonstaktn es Unesies Pisen ‘esand unde Neate A Woche Peace ‘Apel Di Elon det “spachanayschenPabwpe ud as Probie Ge “cect Ae aman Ij hp ase en "Ginn Dore Rel "ber ope im Apel Tea Tamcndnl Some ane Highense {6.GW. Mortis owndtion of the Theory of Sige: eration Broo of ‘ne Same vl no. 2 Chiao Unveasty of Chieage Pes 938) Be Camap. "Epic, Sera and Ontology nna cata Pry (1950, 2040p in Cy, Mea nd Ney cee (Co. More Stamnes (ew Yr: Brace, 148) ty neon v0 the Geman aaton, Zach: Sate and kon (Door Stamm. 1979), 94 ee A xchat 8), eee 186, 25-82, {9B Carap‘Om Soe Concept of Pasir Php! eat (1955), ‘ragmane Arner: No land 1959); R Monae, mal Pho: Po cand odie by Tomson (New Have Yale Uae 11 We. Soper, Probleme and Ree der Wiehe Re: De 12 Apel. ‘Das. Problem der phllosophischen.Levzbegrindung_im Licht ‘Ser canendenaenspncpragmath Vere ener Mees Ses Secon Ratwoalamae's ht B Raniscede eh raed ‘emus eee 197, 35-82 Enh wansaton Maa Wor 8 2 (ists 2-75 ree dct "The Pde o Masai Pan amet Groumingin iit Trscendental apatite” XE bayoce 1 Boman and TA. Mary tes fer Poop. Pao Trongematon eambrie Man: MI Press 1987) 290 90. 1 Inpanvor Ape Tord «Teen! Smit 14 sas on Woes Ape: Dafrmtin dr Psp, opal Anas an Witory (New Yor: Harper 8 ROW. 1966) and T. Abe “he Opes caled"Verehen" in H Fegan odeck(e, eng Pay of se eB Winch The sof Sl Sm on lie Psy (onda ouedge an a 1998), 12 Apel te Ensakane 1 Princ, Underage Socey Ameria Psp Qua fhe oe 5034« 19 See eg, Apel, “Univeral Mince and fara (neammensrbie) Dion an Romo le Problem of tht ba pst Ka nd poser In cata (Yah ond._Unartnag ay fv Por wim (London Rou. 1990)" 720K an Ape, “witgenstein nd Heeger heiche Widely oes Verge 2 iabers (ed). Der Lae sh nd 7 Kee i a serch Tank. suvhamo. 1991 Erglsh anton Ia c. Nacton (ed Mern deer Cia! dncomens (London apd Ncw York outge 1002, Sed. Apel "Dar Aauegen or ange omeranhe ‘ommastatamat” tn ter Skt der eaaenembropnaches) Datuk Worl been die" Kenmuniten Reagent Persnkcher ota? in M Rromlk and Brkt (eb Sons wi Gear (rank aM she 1982, 19-72. 29 Litgeostein, Crows (on Cane CE, Anat sd GH on Wight (Oxford ea Blake 1943). Alber, au er nice Yer binge, 1986); a. Rady ‘fetes a ei apple Ciel Rtn nitro ala sunt ed), Asn Vatar ands oe Wal ew Yo: Imeraiona Ctrl Foundation Pye. 1983), sl 3, 105463. For my Stgie af these postions see nate 12 and ao Ape alin Konsensbeore der Waban Lebegrndng i Fon fat Paap een Patten rng aon 2 Steamon, Seton an aarti Some Yr, Te WoodgeLs ‘urs Lando Neen 1985). Se Apt Das Problem de phsophiscen Letbcgrandang ‘efor. Yethetonsn and Tensei argent Nw, 5 (1971) ony, “Crean Necesity” Nw. 7 (973 Roy, piemooge ‘etait an the Deans adetazaton of Avalos Rese Ife ir Pp. 4987, Rar. ‘Tansenentl Auten. Se ‘erence nd rg Ble oa Tame rn ‘nd Sm Dordrecht: Kher 1979, 77-10% For a cre sat oe ony’ apne se M. Niue. Trewin rset Kat Sou Inde Apa er Dersler (ankle Saban "With eau 0 this popame se the slrences In note 21, ana ‘Ape ed Srstramant nd Psp (eran © M. Subang. {stay W. Kahinann snd Behe (i), Romina een (Penutun2 Mt: Shea, 1980} Kahtun ee Leste Umchinge a7 Tanda Preoarg ane Men Ae {oes} A. Dorcel. Keiet, W Kuban and’. Niue (et ‘oncenieragma frank 2 M4: Sabhamp. 1993) Sceln price Apel bss Apion der Kemmntstonspeench nd ‘he Grange er Bin Froufrmatonr Pspi wo 2h Ae Se eur (an Sova 8 gh ‘pe ‘Sprectteore und eabtendniae Srecpeagmaic si Fae fthscher More. Al ( Sraceagmatwed Papi 10-18 ‘pee Logue de ences Sprache ic plone eevane der Specatiheme io HG. Bosh fe) Pept af ‘Sree 3 New ork: De Gry, 1986), 45-87 ae leention thy more Bahan tnguste Meg: Lepae and Kan Gul {etn Sra he Cris came, Me Blac 191) 31-35 a Spe Noam ChomsysSpahthear nd he bsp det Gegenwart rapt Terma Pepe val 2 264-310 295 Hbermat “Was tet Univeralpagmatr eel (el). Spc (geask a Php 127% Haberman. The de Koon ‘nie 2‘ (rane » M Shrkamp, 191). we 3: Ete 30 ) aber Morse ad mats Han andar 2M Sultan. 1983 10st 21 See Habeas nd my contusion 0. Lepore and vn Gul ee) 33 ly pontaar Apel “Spetche Bolewtong, Wane und aomave ures aroma (1987) 51-885 ‘en seteichenSpacgetenact nanan in. Burka ed). Dh ar Sra fWirebre Kosausen 14 Laden “The New Dasa nthe Posey of Mind’, Ri of Maar 1919656) 329-19. 2 Ginn wh mst ding hse NY: Ca Ui 2 Scape Dr EU Vk Kore codec St Tara M: Sorta, 199), Soc sonlten Unsrandng and [plas anurnenta rama Pesci as. Wake (Ca twige Mas: IT ress 1984. 27 Apel ‘Das "Verehen” (ene Beiliechete sl roblempesle ‘As ir eraccie | (on: Bowne. 1988) 12-99 a st aly Ape ‘DaheysUmeschedng wen “Elec” und "Vertes UEGht de Epetaite der deren Wisenscsieare a BW. On (el ithe nde Pooper Cv eure Besse: Aber 194s) 242-3; sce Engh arlaoniley’ Dincin beet “Esplinsion” aad “Uncestandng” andthe Psi a 8 Medaon™ orl he ey Psp 2.1 (198) 131-0. 38 Git vn Wh, pont ad Under. 2 3 Aye Types Socal Scene In the Lp of Human Cog ners Sil tacarch 4.3 (1977 425-70. ep IS. row ed, Popa Dupe Sel Sane Brighon: Harese ress 197), 30. 40 Gi vor Weigh pao and Undertning 0 real object sien (denote) real subject of cognition (sign interpreter) Figure ‘The schema may be interpreted by the definition of the sig, 35 ‘was given by Charles, Pltce, whom {consider the mos impor- ‘ant insirtor of the conception of transcendental semiods. The definition reads: “A sign. ot represntamen, is something which ‘sands to somebody fo something in some respec or capacity’ ofA sgn sa conjoint relation tothe thing denoted and tothe mind’ Ione assumes that the structure of the sign-elation is a the same time the steutue of sign-mediated cognition ofthe eea and ‘this constitutes a distinctive mark of transcendental semiotics}, then ‘ones able to derive our thre paradigms of First Philosophy from the teodie signteation according wo 8 logic of absraction, 0 to spe For the three paradigms may be distinguished according to whether the foundation of First Philosophy takes ito consideration only the fst poston, or eke the frst and the thd rele all three positions ‘ofthe triadic sgn-elation, The thematizing of objecvized being the sense ofthe fist position ofthe wid is characteristic of metaphys: les qua ontology; that of he fist and the tid position in the sense of the subjct-object relation asa transcendental condition of the pos sity of knowiedge is chareceristc of classical transcendental phi losophy of consciousness, say Kant or Huser: and thematizing all thre positions inthe sense ofthe function of sign-medised wold Interpretation ie characteristic of transcendental semiotics ‘Tobe sure, there are stil four other possibliles of combination Implied inthe inadie structure of the sign-relaton. We could also thematze the fist poston combination with the second (i), ‘hat isbeing and the sgn as such, or the second in combination with the third (II) that is the consciousnes. And it can be shown that these four possiblities of combination can alo be co-ordinated to Philosophical postions which in fact have been defended in the ‘course of history, postions that can be understood as sub:paradigs {in connection with the theee main paradigms of Fst Philosophy.” ‘But Iwill concentrate on the three main paradigms and show the following with regard to them, ‘Prom the vantage pot of the third paradigm, whlch takes into account all theee places ofthe trladc lgn-reation in order to 3¢- ‘count for the idea of First Philosophy, the two other paradigms namely ontological metaphysis and (transcendental philosophy of ‘consciousness can be considered as being based on absracive oF Feductve fallacies with regard to the conditions of posit for knowledge of thought, 9 that from these absactve fallacies the characteristic aporas of these deficient paradigms of First Philosophy fan be derived ina cerin manner. But Ldo not pretend to develop this aporeticsin a purely system. atic way that i by abszaction from the process of history. Rather I ‘wll ty to show thatthe sequence ofthe three main paradigms of irs Philosophy canbe understood a a historically pause suces son that was brought about trough an intense tendency of phil Sophical reflection towards overcoming scepsiism with regard tothe rents ete If these presuppositions of the language game of angi fentave discourse are not taken for cerain. the philosophical verdict about doubting everything, or unrestricted fallin, makes ro sense but sf it does make sense, ven is paradigmatic pre Suppostions of cenalntes, it cannot be true, according to the ‘Winigensteinian insight that every meaning language game of doubting must presuppese paradigmatic ceates. Hence the lan ‘guage game of unrestricted faliilsm is self-contradicory. Te shouldbe note tha inthis argument che remaining problem ‘of expliatng the meaning of the undoubuable presuppositions of ‘oubung Is rater irrelevant." For there ithe fame ofthe transcen ‘dental language game oF discourse, in which the presuppositions of ‘meaningful doubting can be identified as thse presuppostions of arguing that cannot be denied without rendering the language game meaningless. Hence atest procedure becomes possibie fo he ul mate transcendental pragmatic foundation of principles, which 1 have indicated by the fllowing formu: “ll those principles can be considered tbe grounded ultimately flebyrander that cannot be denied without commiting a performative sell-comtadicion of a fing and. precisely fr that reason, cannot be grounded by dev ‘on without commiting a “peti princi" To conclude. 1 can only affirm that there are also discourse ‘tical presuppositions of aging that can be grounded in accord lance with the test procedure of transcendental pragmatic uimate foundation. This ultimate foundation of discourse elhies Is possible {or the third paradigm of Fst Philosphy, because we can rellect on the fat that as interiaators, we are members ofa weal communica tion commonity and, athe same tne, im addressing our discourse firtners ust counteractally anticipate an ideal communication ‘community and its noms of commoniation and interaction. ‘These transcendental presuppositions of arguing were not avai able forthe second paradigm of First Philosophy, because that one twas based on the presupposition af the wanscendentl solipsis of| the ego cgi. Therefore Kant ad to introduce ao the metaphys {al presupposition ofa ‘ealm of purposes that Is ofan deal com=| ‘unity of inellbe reasonable beings (Veroyusen) in order 10 Unite his foundation of ethics in his Grunaork ofthe Metaphys of “Moras, And within he fame ofthe fst paradigm of Fist Phiiso- phy, thats ontological metaphysics. there was ony the posit of ‘dogmatically deriving git rom hing. Plato is tue, asserted that ‘the idea ofthe good has ts place “beyond al presen being eedeina ‘escwsia), But this in the ight of Aristotle's ontology was conceived ‘of asthe divine or of being) “Thus it appears that onl the tied paradigm of Fits Philosophy «an redeem she promise of grounding ethics bythe selt-refection of reason (which was anticipated by Pato and Adstoe 25 God's nei rocco and by Kant as Selsintinmighi der Vertu However. i must be clea that this grounding of principles of self-reflection of feason cannot integrate the whole scope of substantial (historical) knowledge as Hegel suggested theough his monologcl speculation, "which belonged to the second paradigm of Fist Philosophy Ulimate foundation avording tothe hid paradiga of Fst Piosophy can ‘only mean to provide regulative principles fr seeking the truth by Unlimited theoretical diacourses and for the procedures of grounding ‘atela oral norms throvghpractieal discourses of those aflected by a norm or, i mecessary, thelr advocates” Notes 18, Kun, The Sc Ste ene (CBee: Une C 268 Re lind Pp, Hanne a. ws (amb 110 Apel Slee Dy wo ow amar Si Aare tighants ts mura Fes. D0, 120 441 Kane pC. ve nea F Mos 180) 5.a FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW 66. Frege, Ghar Sinn und Belen. Zehr Jor Pll and Panes new sees 100 (193). 19508, ween ree Fino ay Resuming. Pang (istinge 198 and Fe tu (97 rpIn Senco and paige Ca Li paneer nf te Praga Wana (eR ‘emetic Sstcruceee T966 78-9, Gh Mead Mn Saf and oy (Chiao: Chap Unt res, 13). 10 nique "eanendette Inna st A Doel al Me Niue es Tomocepragase(eaekir ML Subamp. 199), 1 Tosh -Der Wann den orate Space’ Beth nd owe ey L Tow (eri: De Grantee 171), 4330: ‘onl, "De seams Ronoso dr Wabi he Grondgen et Seana in Siow (Za Pvp tal sac an aK er Ohr Aele An iin Arma (Or 1 Hum a tanga ad ety (Cambie Cambie Unversty Bren 197) cape: Ape Sead aay vl 14 $"tnpe, Napa say (Oxf: So ahve, 1980), 15 nr drt or Ch on foes deBry ik de ‘nan: Chara ue Fm Prgmaon Pragmatics Un ‘ety of Masachses Frets 981 ser by Homan Pee alae Tiga 908 Ape GS, Pains and oe fo Tnaan Poem ‘Ehpnpoat Moy ot akin Freeman fe Te Rete Cs {Eater n Frm fr Filo Ba Homburg) opie ‘daring rt Sa, 10) ea pea ts ace Ta Bertie Yr bg: Mb, 168 19 ser Apel ‘bar Doble der phbsopbches Leesan i Lee Sher TrastendenalenSpachpapnail In B. Kanscheider Sohn Eos mk, 7 3-42 ean athe Seal Papa of Language Mono Wit 1999) 339-9. Baynes? Bohman and a cary es a ep Bao rae rman? feambe, Mase MT Pres T067.350-8W Ruhl Ieee Leshyancng Unreal ee {TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS AND FIRST PHILOSOPHY a 20 Apt ae Apo der Kommunikation und le Grandagen Aer et Snape “aniormanon ar Php. Taner. "ominda tronformation Pip tas. Ade ane Dish ean ‘euledge Rep al 1980) rep in pe Sd Ey Yl 2 Eon Sy of ant ihongs M amtc3 Transcendental semiotics and truth: the relevance of a Peircean consensus theory of truth in the present debate about truth theories Introduction Tes not my primary ata to contribute to the hermeneutic interpre tation of Pic's theory of ruth. Lundertok this task elsewhere In ‘what follows Iwill consider the elation between Peece’s concep tion oftrth and cenain prominent truth theories of our century such as the phenomenological evidence theory of truth, the logico-emantical they of truth and the coberence theory of trath, attempt to demonstrate the following thee pont, "esa he prominent truth theories just mentioned have thelr specific merits in comparison with an ontologal-meraphysical Correspondence theory of truth whichis citerilogcally ferelewan Moreover, they ace capable of partly supplementing une another i the content of a dilectica discourse. Tiss due to the fae that these diferent tuth theories luster around different truth criteria ‘Second, neverteles, since none ofthese irah cieia fs su ficient in isl. and since none of dhe wuth theories { mentioned ‘overs necessary uth criteria, there ate shortcomings nd aporas| Femaining with regard to all of ther, These shortcomings call for a further supplementation. integration or AuPbung (in the Hegehan sense of his word), within the framework ofa more comprehensive {theory of ruth, This postulated comprehensive ruth theory should be capable prior, that is through is fundamental conception 2s 2 reglaive dea of setting trth aims by empirical inquiry and Sngumentativediscoure, of taking imo account all posble tra {era and, furthermore of weighing them zgains one another and bringing them to a synthesis in the long run. (This postlae, of ‘course, ill have to become more specific) My third contention i that Petce’s conception of teath — o¢ pethaps rather 3 transcendenta-selonc consensus theory of tri that is strongly inspired by Peirce ~ can full preeisely the ask ‘outlined so far. can provide the relative principle of collecting Weighing and Inteyating all relevant teh cera the long ‘The aporias of the ontologico-metaphyscal correspondence ‘theory of truth Let me star out with some remarks om the ontological correspond ence theory of teuth whose casa os read a follow to Sy of the being that itis nt. and t sa of the no-being thats ase wt to say of the non-beng that i isnot and ofthe eng that ts, In my opinion theresa very weak version ofthis correspond: ence theory that expresses a correct and indispensable inition ~ an Inuiion a is presupposed and must be aken ito account by any plausible truth theory. shall ater try to corroborate and elucidate this point. However, there i also a stronger version ofthe core spondence theory which i atthe centre of ontolglal metaphysis, for example in Assrl's conception of homoioss and in Aquinas’ conception of equator timer Tie strong version ofthe ‘correspondence theory, claim, i obsolete for a post-Kantan type ‘of cea philosophy. And so i the whole paradigm of ontological metaphysics. ‘The reason for this verdict does not ke in is eealism taken asa ‘ommonsense intuition, Rather ites in the fact that it conceives of the relevant relationship between the mind or consciousness and the things a8 object of coptition asa relationship berween two things in the word thats, between two objects This conception etal either thatthe relation of tre cogition and its dllerence from falsehood is someting like 4 natural reladonshlp wo be detected by natural selence or that we, humans are capable of standing outside ofthe sulbject-object relaion of our actual cogation and observing i 50 %0| speak rom outside such asa lationship between the mind and the ‘hings in themselves. ‘regard both of these paradigmatic presuppositions as charac: teristic implications of onologeal metaphysics inthe pre-Kantlan| sense The fst presupposition that the quas-natraitic concep ‘on of rue cognition as homo, namely adequation a the sul to ‘the things ouside. is especially testified toby Aristotle's treatment ofthese problems in De Anima: the second presuppositions rather Characteristic of Aquinas wh, s0t0 speak looks upon the elation Ship of adequai nett tres 9 the light of God's extramundane ‘sandpoin. ‘Now in both cases We cannon principle arsve at an explic tion ofthe meaning of trath thar would be eriterilogicaly relevant. For In the fist ease, which was later continued by natural science, sve cat never detect sch a thing ashe dileence Dewen truth and falsehood. For natural processes or relations are completely infer. cent ith regard 0 this dsintion. In the second case, however, we "Would have to look behind the mistor ofthe given phenomens, Which is impossible for us, since we are under the spell of the subjet-objct relation of atua cognition. “Therelore Kant Brentano and ather modern philosophers have claimed that every alert (© compare our judgements with the thingsin dernselves must lead to a reyes ad imtum, since we can ‘only compare our judgements with other judgements aboot the ‘Phenomena. which, in tar, would have to be compared with the things in thesselves, and 50 on a ifituoe® ‘Kant nevertheless upheld the metaphysical presupposition tha ‘our empirically tae knowledge has ro be traced back 1 he affect of four senses by the unknowable things ip themselves. Thereby he fan into an unsolvable aporia of his truth theory. For owing 10 his Supposiion of she existence and causal eleacy of unknowable things in themeves, Kant stuck to the metaphysical solution ofthe problem of correspondence whose central ifcuity he himself a fxposed. This very. problem, however, was solved ia a pest metaphysical sense by the phenomenological evidence theory of ‘ruth as proposed by Husserl Merits and shortcomings of the phenomenological evidence ‘theory of truth “Tis theory i dlstinguished, in my view. By the fac that it com Dletely dispenses with the old metaphysical presupposition of con= {civing of the subjeciobject relation of cognition as a kind of ‘bject-object relation that cul be looked upon, as it were rom an fexternal poston, Thus Huser dispenses withthe problem ofthe lkovsabe thing i themselves aswell. He construe the relation Ship of uth (ve. of rue cognition) sicily as cognition and its sell seflecton. From this vantage point he defines ruth, as distin frm falsehood, as falilment ofthe subjet’s noematic intentions by the sell-givenness ofthe phenomena.” ‘Thus to offer an example, the asserted proposition ‘elind my tack there a cat that Hes om a mar” would be true if and only if, er tuming ound, {could ascertain by a perceptval judgement thet the norma of my propositional intention isin fact ule by te sell- ‘venness of the phenomenon that thee sa eat ying on a mat. [think indeed that by this phenomenological analysis of the futfiment relaon of evidence Musser! has succeeded in explcaing = without presupposing an ontological objectification ofthe subject= objec relation ~ the natural intuition that les atthe ground of| the common sense-noton of ruth as correspondence between our Judgements and the fas “There is, however, one serious deficiency i this phenomen: logical evidence theory of truth. Its satisfactory only a long as we ‘can presuppose as a matter ofcourse that all people invaved in the sexing of truth claims are sharing common lingulstc interpreta ‘on of the given phenomena. Now, precisely this can indeed be supposed in ordinary communication. that isin the lifeworld in ‘usse's sense, thus for instance in the case of statements kei raining’ or ‘the cat im the mat’. The fac that all phenomena that can be grasped 25 something that is being significant. must already bbe mediated by a lingistc world interpretation, can simpy be ne lected inthe case of everyday communication “This doesnot mean, however, chat a philosophical ruth theory ray ignore tat fat For the station changes completly once we come to scenic slatements about experimental phenomena, oF teen we encounter communication between eiferent cultures and their diferent linguistic word interpretations. n these cases the tadily presupposed linguistic world interpretation becomes con: splcuous or surprising so to speak. The ascertainment of the rath of 2 propenition in such cases, no longer simply 2 mater of percep tual evidence fora solitary subject with regard to its subject-object, ‘elation of cognition, Rather, such eases show that every tue of ake judgement about something i also a matter of hermeneutic com- ‘munication, chat i of coming 10 a consensus with oes about the ‘correct interpretation ofthe phenomena taken 2 igs. (In the ease fof scence this could mean that the given phenomena in order tobe _rasped 38 something. cal for nove theories or even language gamesthat are based on novel paradigms’ of research In the case of an encounter with foreign cltures it ould mean that one has to lear 5 language in the light of sich even the heworld of ordinary Communication has fo be lange reinterpreted.) Already at this pint could introduce a Peicean conception of sign interpretation find consensts-ormation on sign interpretation in the long run in onder to suggest an integration of Hussers tanscendental [Phenomenological evidence theory of ruth ito a transcendental Semiotie consensus theory of truth, Before this step, however. Iwill first conser two other prominent rath theories which may also lai to correct. by taking ita aesount the necesty or even prlonty oF inguistie world interpretation, the phenomenologleal recourse immediate evidence. “Tarski abstract inguistic tur alternative to Husser's phenomenological evidence theory truth {Compared with Huser phenomenological evidence theory. ‘Tarski’ logicnsemantical theory of tu” is the polar-opposte con cpton which provides a one-sided but instructive supplantaion of the former theory. The relationship between the theories could be ‘characterized in the following way. Whereas Huser ihe ast clase ‘ofa pre-linguistc or pre-semiotc type of transcendental philosophy fof consciousness, Tarst isan cary classic of linguistic pilosophy. that sa asl fits semantics phase porto the pragmatic turn of its onentation towards Kleal-constructied) languages prior to the turn to the analysis of ordinary language. This difference between Huser and Tarski has the following implications with regard tothe respective theories of truth Whereas Huser does not rllect at all on the Hngulste pre Inerpetation of what he ells phenomenological evidence, Tarski ftom the outset restricts is analysis ofthe meaning of rh tothe explication of the meaning of the peedcate true with regard 10 ‘the sentences ofa certain constructed formalized language or seman tie system. Thus Tarski, in contrast to Huser, apparently has no problem with the indefiniteness ot ambiguity of ngustic world Interpretation, since he tells from the outsct on the definiteness fof the meanings of signe within a formalizable semantial system, ‘Through his definition of tue inl’ (eg. a cetain language). so to speak all sentences off get their definite meaning. since they ae quipped with their truth conditions through ruth rules! But the Pree for this advantage fies in the abstraction of the semanvial systems, By his expcalion ofthe wut of sentences in, Taskl must exclude all stuatlon-bound meanings of natural language as pra ‘matically applicable languages. fr example the meanings of indea cal terms’ hence he cannot reac the given phenomena ofthe real ‘world 3 al ‘Ta put itn other worn bis convention 1? ~x i te i and ‘only ipo. tn another versionp' sue if and only ip ~ Tarski ties Indeed to feconstrut the point of the Aristotelian corespondence theory of trath as does Musser By the second p ~ the p without {quotation marks ~ Task is indeed pointing to the real word in the light ofthe meaning o sentence ofthe objet language’. However, by the resection of his expeation tothe meaning of sentences of 3 semantical system he also wishes o avoid all ontological or episte ‘ological implications of his theory. The theory i toe both meta physically neuteal and tee of any implications with regard to the problem of verification (35 Tarski himsel emphasizes." ‘The price for this absiractive semantiistresition of Task’ ‘theory of uth, agai, that it doesnot reach the phenomena of the real world; and that mcans, a Tarski himself confirms. that the ‘theory has no eriterioogieal relevance foe epistemology. accounts ‘only fora necessary semantic precontion ofthe concept of cnet Siveness, that sof truth transfer ina semantic system in disinton tothe merely symiacical concep! of implication. fut this supplemen: tation of lop yatex by loglal semantics by no means warrants tha the constricted semantic system can be applied to the actual ‘work! ~ say, as a reconstuction of sclenuie language In onder to assure contact with the actual word, it must be presupposed - at least tacitly ~ thatthe whole semantic system — together sith the pertinent (cursive) definition of is true sentences ~ can be pragmatially interpreted. Bot this ean be done ‘nly with the ai of a natutal language. as Is use even by the Scientists. Natual language, which also comtins inden signs, is the ultimate pragmatic meta-language ofall abstact hierarchies of semantic language syste 10s therefore false vo suppose - with Tarski and Carnap ~ that the lgico-semantic definition of tut 2 siicient basso pron tition forthe explication of the meaning of truth such that under this precondition the problem of verification could be solved by the” FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW empirical sciences themselves. Conteary to this supposition, 1 would ‘aim thatthe solution of the problem of verification ~ or of contr ‘mation and falsification ~ presupposes an explication of the meaning (of trth with regard to natura language as the ulimate pragmatic rncta-anguage, with the aid of which every constucted semantic system must be inezpreted inorder tobe applicable to the phenom fea ofthe acta word Now if this analysis is correct, follows tht all those problems of ingulste word interpretation that sof the ambiguity or indeter- rminacy of linguistic meanings that are connected withthe primor dial pereption ofthe given phenomena will appear when i comes the question whether a construed semantic system can be pragma cally applied Brelly ots a gap remains between Massed’ phenomenological evidence theory, bch doesnot consider a all he linguistic inter pretation ofthe phenomena, an Tarski’ abstract semantic truth "heory which neglects the pragmacc interpretation of ls constued language systems. Neither of these opposite conceptions deals with the problems ofthe linguistic interpretation ofthe given plenomens by the human (co-subjects of communication, and hence withthe Imer-subjectve dimension of tue cognition as publly valid cogn ‘ion. Forin Husser's conception ofthe fllment of noematic inten tions only the “ranscendenta-solpssic’ aspect ofthe subjec-object relation of true cognition ts taken into account without any elle tion on its mediation by inter subjectively valid rearing of lings: ‘ie signs. In Tarski’ conception, on the other hand, only the prefixed meanings ofa semantic system and their reference to the possible dinate abstract system ae taken into account, whereas the Pssility of applying the semanci system through communicative Understanding (Verstindigung) and through the dentiiation of real leno in space and time) must be tail presupposed ‘At his point the question obviously arises what kind of tush theory can close the gap between the perceptual evidence of the fiven phenomena and the absitictlgicosemantieexplcation of truth asf presupposed in @ consistent system of tuth-preserving statements. Should not the coherence theory of rath full this function? after all, dhe coherence theory of th has always been taken to be able to deal with the conceptual, and to that extent linguist, interpretation ofall posible phenomena of theoretical ‘cognition "TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTICS AND TRUTH n Merits and shortcomings of the coherence theory of trth: Hegel's case Hegel sill the mest influential eepresentative ofa coherence theory ‘of truth, praised “anguage as the ‘more truthful in comparison to the immediate “sense ceaieiy (SiontcheGewieit) which he called ‘the untrue’ (das Une). He di so i the famous fist chapter of the Phenomenol of te Spirit And va his Sclence of Log” he ted to show that and how) the a prio coherent development of our concepts can display the whole of what we can and mst understand 2s being the wth of things in God's ile Tn is ehaprer on ‘sense cenaity” Heel has iced shove that toe indevical word of language that represent our sense certainty ~ swords The “this, “here” and “nos =i taken in isolation shat separated fom the meaning of he concepts swords of language have no referenal meaning and no relevance forthe teu of ur World representation. “The This or the Here” or ‘the Now, a Hegel Caricatures the hyposttization of sae certainty cain represent any definite object of cognition a al However, Hegel suggests by these examples that only the ca ‘eptual words of our language can trough thelr coherence cons tate the truth of our ingusic world representation, He doesnot see for take into account that the indexial words by their station. hound meanings can and must provide some specific and indispen ‘Sble coniibution 1 on knowledge if and when they ate sed 3s Pans of perceptual judgements, as for example in the context of {experimental protocols. In these cases indexical words. through thet thvecting our attention = in a way that is stl concepsonally deter ‘mined ~ to the given phenomena, provide exactly that kind of| evidence thats needed by the empiri sciences in so ars they are Aistinc from the typeof cancer philosophical cence that Hegel, lke Pat, favoured s providing the coheeent tah af the whole. In other words: within the context of percepual judgements, indexial ‘words in pointing to qualities of suchness. provide precsly the kind of knowledge that makes i posible for us to distinguish between the real world of experience and all merely possible worlds that may {ull enteral conditions ofa coherence theory of truth My cial comments on Hegel should not be taken to suggest that we tur hack tothe phenomenological evidence theory of rh and simply set peengulsie lntultion over against the truth of‘conceptual coherence. (Lag Feuerbach’ crtique of Hegel can be Interpreted as a fegression to the evidence of pre-linguistc intl vin.) Rather, Lam suggesting that Hegel. in appealing co the “uth Of language, filed 10 understand the ngs function of the in texical words and thus the whole possible tuth ofthe linguistic world interpretation. The point of the perceptual judgements a6 Compared with mere assertive propositions rests predsely on the fat that the former through the function of indexica signs are capable fof integraing novel empisical informations into the conceptual linguistic interpretation ofthe world. They extend the extensional fan hence ako the intersonal weaning of terms, for example the Teaning ofthe term ‘swan by stating (hat) this over there is a black son’ ‘Only Charles Peirce distinguished semltially beeen diferent types of dinguisiie and non-lingusic) signs, namely “symbols indices’ and icons, and assigned to these diffrent types of signs shee fundamental categories thirénes, secondness and frsness Peiee tus made it possible to understand the interaction and syn- thesis of phenomenological or phoneroscopi evidence and concep: tual coherence within the coatext of linguistic world interpretation For him pre-lingulsti evidence of the given phenomene af suchness was not nota for Hegel and the tweatieth-century semantics bout elder wast already the 1b of cognition, asit was for Huss. (n Pete's account, phenomenological evidence provides indeed a| necessary ingeedent of ruth on the level of fesiness and seconds| ‘hat enters ito those active inferences that underie perceptual jdgemens. Bur only by the conceptual-syinbolic interpretation, whlch om the level of thitdness completes the abductve inferences. can the cognitive result of the perceptual judgements and hence their truth oF falsehood emerge ‘Clearly, our assessment of the tuth or falschood of percepval judgements most depend also on their coherence (or non Coherence) with the whole body of our well-confirmed knowledge Yet this postulate should not be taken to mean that truth oF fase hood of perceptual judgements depends metely on ther coherence ‘with some posible coherent systems of propesitions. The selection of ‘systems a5 canaidates forthe postlated coherence between propos tlons (or between whole theories) mastin urn be constrained bythe ‘very possibility of justiying uth daims of propositions fr of whole theories) by the contimatory powers of percepual judgements that ae based on the evidence of given phenomena.” ‘Thus the relationship between perceptual evidence and concep tual or propositional caerence is one of competing and comple ‘mentary truth exits which agoin and again must be weighed and brought to proviory relive equilibrium by means of cm Sensus formation in the community of researchers. This yell ‘onsenss formation cannat be construed as a matter of deducing “consensus from the exitera of evidence and coherence, Nor ca it be construed as an appeal to consenss as an adtional truth ee- terion, Instesd we should think of as a process that resuls luncoetced trom all kinds of inference processes eduction. induc tion and abduction) and sgn interpretations that lead to plausible arguments in the community of discourse. Integration of truth criteria within a Peicean consensus theory of truth The preceding sections already seveal my contention that 2 transtendental-semiotie and twanscendenal-pragmatie consensis theory in the vein of Peirce’ philosophy can integrate all truth triers that are taken into. account by the three modern truth ‘cores tha [have ouined. Fist, fom a (uanscendemtal-jsemiotie point of view, it can be scen that Peizce's theory of sgn interpretation covers precisely the scaled pragmatic dimension of semis. That pragmatic dimen: Sion, as Charles Mois recognized,” mus be presupposed in order 0 make use ofthe modern apparatus of syntactical and semantic con- structions of ideal formaliable languages of sence. Peirce’ theory is based on the trac structure ofthe sign-relation oF semioss. This means that, in contradistinction to formal semantics, it does aot abstract fom the lace and function of the sign interpreter or ~ in| traditional terms ~ ofthe subject of cagnition and his or her wrath ‘aims, Peice’s theory shows that tls function has to be integrated fio that of an indefiste community of interpretation and con: sensus formation about truth claims because non-medlated ogni tion depends on # semoie process of sig interpretation through “ipterpretans’ that is indefinite in principle (although ti always related ~ through the triadic sgn-elation ~ so “the cea” as its” FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW transcendental significatum’ as any Peircean philosopher would have to insist against Dertida." ‘Connected with this semiotic tansormation ofthe traditional function of the subject of cognition and ruth clans ate two other basic features ofa Peicean consensus theory of uh, ‘Second. Peirce’ sete foie of ingiry which 6 part of a ‘normative sciences dstinguished from Morss’s and Carnap's con: ceptlon of empirical and formal pragmates™ bythe fact that t pro ‘ides not only sass fora description ofthe use of language but a et (of regulative principles forthe procedures of inference and sig Interpretation that have to be postulated inorder to reach in the long run a consensus about the Topical interpretants’ of signs or the timate opinion’ about the real through te Join enterprise ofan Indefinite community of investigators In particular the pragmatic maxim of “how to make our Wdeas dear” Is lstagulshed from other pragmatic theories about the use of signs in the praccal contexts of Me (eg. from Witgenstei’s Sungestion) by the fat thatthe pragmatic maxim i pe of norma tiveand methodologically relevant theory which relies on ‘counter actuals It doesnot fell he scentist who asks for the real meaning ‘ofa concept that she should lok for the usage, that is forthe usual behaviour and experiences asocated with the use of sigs. This would be of litle help to her in eases of dificult concepts, Instead the pragmatc maxim provides a normative guideline for thought experiments according 10 which if her... connections between pesible actions or erations and possible experiences can be disco fred. Thos even the unconscious background! of our ordinary use of| Sens (background as meant by John Searle in his book on inten: tionality)” may be progeesively brought to light, and a. deeper understanding ofthe meaning of terms anda novel use of dhem in the language games of scence and philosophy may be brought about would exemplify this by Einstein's specie theory of re tivity’ which ean be seen 36 an ingenious experiment of thought in order to cary ~ in accordance withthe prescriptions of the pragmatic maxim ~ what the phrase wn events are occuring simul- taneously’ could mean when we sek how the imulanety could be measured "The normative characcr of Pires semiotic loge of inquiry and the fc that provides postulates and regulative principles 38 cond: ‘ons of inter-subjectively valid sign imerpretation and thes of truth by consensus ~ this feature testifies to the fact that it grew out of| ants “transcendental oie’ and thar i even preserves the status ff a semiotic wansformaton of that logic." Therefore its nota part fof empirical science ~ not even of hypothetical metaphysis in Peice’s sense." Rather, aceounts for the condnions ofthe possi fay of al enterprises of progzesive sign interpretation as search for the trath, On this level the postulate ofan ulkimate consensus of a Indefinite community takes the place of Kans ‘synthesis of apper ‘ception’ 35 the “supreme point ofthe “transcendental deduction” of ‘principles. The Peizcean ‘principles’ that ae functionally related to the highest point ofan ultimate consensus are no longer “sybetic jdgements 3 prior” but the procedural conditions ofthe validity of the theee kinds of Infeences deduction, induction and abuetion) and of sign interpretation” ‘Thing, there ako an intemal connection betwen the hormative-ranscendentalcharacer of Peice’s semiotic. logic fand the fact that his consensus theory of truth can also function 36 2 semiotic integration of Hussee’s phenomenological evidence theory of truth” The crucial feature in this context is constituted by the fact chat Peire's semiotics most not treat the subjective of intersubjective conditions of sign interpretation merely 35 Jntramundane objects of the semantic reference of signs (more precisely of the semantic reerence ofthe signs of a meta-language fof semantidized pragmatics) as iS suggested by Moris’s and Cmaps conception of pragmatic.” Instead, a anscendental semiotic of Peircean provenance prescrves the sats ofthe ite preter or the comminity of interpreters asthe tanscendenta subject ‘of cognition and th. For only thereby can it preserve the special place ofthe interpreter inthe triadic elation of emios as has een shown.” ‘rom this it flows that phenomenological evidence for one's consciousness mast not be abtractvey excluded fem semlotic log 35.2 merely empiecl pragmatic, that is psychological act, say. 2 ‘ental feling shat may function asa cause of my judgements (eg ‘of my ‘bass sentences) as Cammap and Popper supposed. instead. the ‘evidence of the suchness of phenomenon given to my conscious nest can function a6 9 cognitive reason of as a ctelon for teue percep judgements as Huss! supposed in his phenomenctogy. But Huser! equates the phenomenological evidence of a siven suchness withthe tah of@ perceptual judgement, overlooking thefact thatthe later rests om a Linguistic imerpretation of the phe rhomenomn as well, whereas Fetce considers the pure evidence of suchness, tht isthe ‘fisines” of a given phenomenon, a only a ‘necessary ingredient ofthe unconscious abluctive inerence which 25.2 whole # constitutive forthe meaning and posible tat ofa perceptual judgement ‘Hence for Perce the immediate intultive awareness of pure ‘phenomenological or "phaneroscopic’ evidence does not yet mount to the truth of cognition, As i is immedlately given to Imy consciousness, 2 phenomenon of fsines (of being sand: $0) and of secondness (ue. relaton of I and non-t) isnot yet Interpreted as being something tha fs mediated by the genera smcaning of conceptual sign (thidnes). This interpretation. which constitutes 2 perceptual judgement chat_may eventually be lnter-subjectvely valid, that is tu, requires thre further cognitive procedure, Fast, the grasping of pre suchness or being so-and-so (Le. of qualities and their phenomenal relations) must somehow provide a premise for an abdctive inference ‘Second, the ablctve inference, inorder o subsume the given ‘phenomenon of suchness under a general concept, must for that Purpose introduce a linguistic interpretation through a symbol. "hic, a= a preicate, this symbol makes possible the predicative proposition that tums out to be the conclusion ofthe abductive inference shat constitutes the perceptual judgement. That conclusion ‘may then engender futher processes of sig interpretation that are subjected tothe regulative principe of scaring ~ according tothe pragmatic maxim ~ for the correct logical imerpretan’. This entire Interpretation process part of the research process though which the truth qua consensts ofthe reerach community about specific truth claims may be attained in the long run. Bu the truth about the real ca be defined only by the regulative idea of the ultimate consensus of an infinite reseach community dhat isin terms of &| total ele that principally could not be called into question by any further objection, 1W seems clear that this ultimate ideal consensus the nowion of which defines the idea of sath can never be reached, that's realized inthe courte oftime, since a regulative idea cannot be equated with, lany empirical fact aceonding to both Piece and Kan. But the regu lative ide of an ultimate consensus is nevertheless citeriologialy| relevant iv comtraditincion 10 the ontological notion of correspondence) in virtue of the following normative procedural) implications ust, suggests looking fr al possible truth eter and weigh. ing them agains each othe in order to reach factual ut alle and hence provisory consensus through the argumentative dscourse of 2 real community of investigators ‘Second, equally, the regulative Wea of an ultimate consensus suggests that we shoul look for any counter arguments in order to question every factual consensus ofan existent finite research com unity, thereby Keeping open the way of esearch toward the uli ‘mate consensus of an indefinke community. Only this inl ‘consensus. which could no longer be questioned by argument, ca find must be be equated withthe uth that we can strive for ~ if Striving forthe truth is 19 make sense at all for usin terms of procedural pron “Thus Ht turns out, In my view, thatthe Peircean consensus theory of teuth can itself be considered as an application of the pragmatic maxim of meaning clarcaion on the very Mea of truth Ie provides the procedures through which the search fr tuth can be pursued an it yields 3 conception of the rexss we can eeasonably| texpectin this way, Iedoes not reduce the pragmatic meaning of uth to the satisfactory ot sell effect which the belie in certain opin Jons could have forthe life of some person or some group of human tings This way of applying the pragmatic maxim on the concep of truth Peirce lett shose who borrowed the ides of pragmatism but ‘only to atibute to i iferent connotations.” (The Tas of thems in| ‘our day is Richard Rory who, following in the steps of Wiliam ames, defines the predicate “irue’ by “what is good for us to believe") For Peirce the context for the application of the pragmasc maxim tothe concept of teuth isnot to be const by the finite horizon and subjective perspective of hunan hfe ands vial needs and inerests" Iti constituted by the potentially infinite horizon of Snguinentative dscourse within an infinite community of research fers, Asa moral precondition of their pra, the members ofthis “community must even commit themselves to ‘surrendering’ ll their Private or group interests in favour of the long-term saterest af the indefinite community 4s search forthe fnat consensus by arguments”” FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW Notes 1-0, Apel Der Dk tw Car Sends Pre ie mung i den roc Poms ru» St: Sahar 1979), Arlo care Poe Pow Prego 2 Pagan (Ae: the Rot Tarkisn Problem of an Adequate xpliation ofthe Meaning of {un Toward rarsendena rate Theat ofan rea (Sh te Rima of Char ee ha Sle Il ele: ste 198, ‘Aula, Sm Pog, 2: De eat (ne Lag eG Josche Ronse Nolvs, 1800), 30. Hust room ed Tarn Lg ale Miemeye 192), 10 {EE Kut he Sacre Scat (Chg Universi of Chi ‘ta Der Wate inden matric Space’ n Keka nee a ow ein De Got, 4730 a Sonn nivel ol), 2 Pp de een Sac (uh {8 Stemi, Dor Wabrigbiom and ie er Semon en ond New frk 1968, <7 thaw eten btn objected apie ok ha ret Sova pat ol sentences to propos This sorely eo) Tonks sharng te phyeam of Camap seems to me howeve tha “kis ration tho fhe semen seman sD 3) De Tndstnd ina air sane whch cones sh ot seman 5 ‘is tae henge rn n pls. Ascoring os m the {ery moins of props servo ter Bo the meanings Sin cy sea Tsp ay at oy ‘wimgentens sateen tat the ogi be snicane semenc Der ‘edanke der single Sir (ran) an even Tore cea 1 the Cdn heft wh cores a een Wao FRE. the semence" erm Bom (aks: Subehamp 1977 ep alihe eqndece The see mae aly tower's tascenenal-phomenologxal theory of preshgusi 12 GW. eel Phono dr Gis ep: Meier, 194), 794 EFM Ketner, Hig‘ Cee amon Komment 1a revemach "urate gece Psp’ im Wek Band Sol 3 anki 98 sua 1975, 19 To fa mua merece nee andl ies ‘sd 1990 a TC Hoya Carendon Pes. 16 Ce Mer Potion te Thy ofS (Cg A: Unie of 17 Are rear emis a tpt Ac of Homans Prev 1954); and Ligue Messing. im KL ete fe) Danan oenpvey Tht Ne Yrs Pars Unvrsiy Pee 993 Popa ut 851 1 Charers esce, ald Mp Marsborne an Wes Cambie a0 J some, nny (Cambsape: Came User es. 1983) ‘anoratne Haneda agen Apel Towards anformatn. Psp Landon: Rote Kean aa 18D, 2 Aye rsaendctalSemioio and Hyputesal Meuphyscs of i, “Gro of he Vay of the La f Li Ct Ae ol 318-38. ako Apel Ber fone. tape ee 24 Spee le nae es ow Ue ne Ue anamnestic Papua Wonca (enna Tondo Spomat: Pager taserane Nowland, 1939, ad entgve.apmati ia KK (et) Llp oem 2 no ag rapmatce Sprapi onic i vansrendenaenocherSewn ohio Pama 4 a 1 anh Bs on Tasco Seti Apel Sekt By of Twas a7 Cs eer, Clin Pps wl 5 414 32 4 Can an ultimate foundation of knowledge be non-metaphysical? IU we abandon traditional metaphysics, must we also abandon the notion ofan ultimate phisaphical foundation in theoreti 8 wel 438 in practical philosophy? Mest advocates of 2 post- metaphysical Philosophy take this position, aso the more radial adwocates of a theory $0 post-metaphysical that it can oaly be pest phlosopia. Such advocates include the postmodernists in France (inspited by Nictsche and Heidegger)” andthe neo-pragmatiss in America,” 36 well as Jurgen Habermas. (a fact Habermas seems more concerned to avold the term ulimatefundaron than to avoid what the term cially refers to. After al, he seeks 2 “normative foundation’ foe ‘tics and aerial theory of the socialsciences. tn other words he Seeks a foundation that would have no alternatives) ‘Can we advocate, atone and the some time, 3 pox metaphysical shilosophy and the possibilty of (or even neces for) am ulate foundation? To push this apparent paredox to its imi, 1 would suggest the folowing thesis. A-postmetaphysical philosophy is -nceded ody for the very sake ofan ultimate foundation of know! ‘edge. The greatest single weakness of metaphyscs (and of mythical thinking) 8 that metaphysis can only intimate, bat never eelly prove, an mate foundation. Examples of this kind af dogmadc thinklog include the doctrine of God qua cause su, as wel as the Indian myth thatthe work! ress on an elephants back, that the tfephant in urn rests on a turtles back ~ at which point the sory breaks of. Together with Karl Popper’ followers (ans Alber in pace lan, 1heteve tha atonaiste metaphysics the type usualy aso ated with the notion of an ultimate foundation ~ inescapably fentangled In the ‘Baron von Nunchbausen selma’, which con- fronts any project for an ulimate foundation. Accoring 10 thisa FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW trlemma, aa ulate foundation leads ether w an endless regres {in myihs about the worlds origin. for example), or to & logical “reularity in which what was to be proved (namely, a foundation) is actually assumed by the prool. Or alternatively, an ultimate foundation mast break out ofthe regression by simply declaring dogmatically hat the notion ofan ultimate ground of all things ‘quite simply, inutively obvlous = for example, God as casa su sve 1 acct my critics a a weakness in he local structure by hich metaphysis temps to ground sel do not dispute the Potential profundity ofthe foundations that might be developed in Sry paniculr case, especially those foundations tht attempt 0 put to rest questions concerning foundations. The quality of metapnysi cal theories of foundations varies widely. We see ths for example, in the great explanatory power of sciemifie heories, whose basic hyporheses are demonstrably inspced by metaphysis. Yet no one today expects the hypotheses of empirical scence to have an ulti: mate foundation. Rather, we do expec these hypotheses always (0 be subject to the principe of falibism. that is. to an open-ended proces of rigorous srutiny and possible falsification. ence the notion of metaphysis as an irreplaceable bass forthe universal hypotheses of scenoe does aot contradict the cxtque of| traditional metapiysic asa scence of ultimate foundations. On the Contrary, Charles Pete's notion (shared by Popper) ofa flit tetaphsies ua scence of universal hypotheses, i usually thought to imply thatthe goa of providing an ulate fourdasion must be abandoned ~ along withthe corresponding concept of metaphysis Tt should be abandoned because the structure underlying a rational metaphysis does not admit of an ulimate foundation ~ no more than any scence of experience (any scence heuristically inspired bby metaphysical hypotheses) does. Most logically oriented cris of tuadtional metaphysics share ths View cin. later pages turn 10 postmodernist critiques inspired by Nietsche and Heidegger) 1 too, ama crtie of the taltianal notion of ontological meta- pinysic. tam persaed by Pelee’ notion of metaphysics (shared by the lates Popper asa speculative discipline of universal hypotheses. tam especialy persuades by the snsght that radiional ontological taps, 36 ell 35 modern hypothetical science, presupposes the same structure of explanation, hence that neither can provide an ‘ultimate foundation for knowledge, But, unlike Poppers followers 1 do ot conchade that we most therefore abandon all notions of| fn ultimate foundation. On the contrary 1 Believe that a pos tnetaphysical philosophy capable of providing altima fonda ‘on is nothing les than necessary. By such a philosophy I mean a philosophy thar presupposes a notion of foundation etn frm the ‘notion presuppose by both empirical scence and traditional onto logical metaphysics — hence a philosophy that can provide an ult mate foundation that is spectcally philosophical ‘The necessity, possibilty and functional relevance of ‘a non-metaphysical yet specifically philosophical, ‘ultimate foundation Having sketched out my tase postion, 1 now want to develop and ‘round Hn doing so, 1 wil address myself three questions First. either empirical science nor hypotheiea) metaphysis requies an ultimate foundauna: why, thea, should philosophy? ‘Why would anyone insist on a foundation that {as L concede) beyond! the competence ofthe logic f science? Does not such rss ence simply reveal a pxychologcal need for secunty, a need that could he satisfied only dogmatically, beyond all rational erique? Do 1 not simply reveal a ned for what we nowadays call “tundamentalism”? ‘Most people wil immediatly associate my concept of ultimate foundation’ (which 1 otter as an alenatve to Albers notion of ‘uhimate foundation} with a notion of religious-metaphysicalTan- damentalism. ndeed some people might expect someone who be- Teves inthe possibly of an ultimate philosophical foundation to claim personal nfl for himsell oF here. Given that many ‘people may view mein just these terms ~a prospect find distinctly Aiscomfking = why would 1 nevertheless insist that philsophical foundation is necessary? ‘The ansve oss fist question can hardly be separate from a second ome, a question concerning the very posit ofa ultimate foundation no subject what Hans Albert has called the Baron von Munchhausen ulemma’ AS Ihave already indicated, the ante this question assumes that a specially phiosophical nodon of an tultate foundation i wholly distinc from the notion presupposed by tational ontological metaphysics as well as by the logic ofthee FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW “Thin what can my proposal accomplish both theoretically and practically? Should i a8 we might suspect asuming the standpoint Ur iraditional conceptions of metaphysics = domineer. Hike some “Queen ofthe Sciences’, overall siences, and over moral discourse in both politcal and legal questions, by claiming a piileged access fo ith? OF can we concelve ofa completely diferent relationship tetwecs an ultimate pllesophical foundation, onthe one hand and the open-ended discourse in science and in the Ieword on the other? ‘Why isa transcendental reflexive, ultimate foundation necessary for a post-metaphysicalcritiea-falibilstic philosophy? Fits Lwillattempt to answer the question concerning the necessity of “indeed, need for ~an ultimate pilosophical foundation. Fr ack at Space. [can ony alle to the foc tha this question is best answered inthe field of ethics. Imagine a young person in the midst of an ‘aolescent criss ho, like Niewsche, has come to question al tad tional moral conventions = who asks: "Why should Lact morally?” ‘What posible comfort coulsuch person derive from an ansiver that provides no uimate foundation, but that immedbately relaivies fiset as being limited or wholly revisable? Twill return to this point later when lexamine the very possibilty ofan ultimate foundation, ‘Less evident the need or an ultimate foundation in theoretical plilonophy for example, in epistemology oF in the philosophy of feience. Why should we be satisfied in these fields ~ as we are in “mpircal sence with contiaually developing new ypodeses that {we then expose toa searching and open-ended eique, as envisaged by an unestited principle of faliblism? As Popper would say. in this way we would replicate, atthe level of Theory construction, the tvolution of file tarugh mutation and selection. In pace of our Selves we would expose our epistemological hypotheses tthe Treuggle for existence, a struggle in which solely the best adapted hypotheses survive.” Is this Popperian vision inadequate to explain theoretical knowlege and its possible progress? Cannot the question | fo an ultimate foundation be regarded as obsolete, indeed, as a Source of inesfrence, a6 seach for security tha. in fat. hinders the imaginative construction of hypotheses and precludes the capac iy ofextque tobe dhoroughgoiag? “To answer this question | would certainly accept Popper's vision ‘ofthe progress of knowlege: indeed. [ake this vision as my point ff departure. Nevertheless 1 should pont out ~ sli agreement With Popper tha comparing evolutionary theory to the practice of| Scholarly research involves several additional. specifiy human ~| Indeed spiritual presuppositions. Hi place of ourselves, we are to expose lyposheses or theories to he struggle for existence such that ‘hee asiieation maybe compared with the extinction of l-adapted forms of life then, as humans, we must appreciate what t means to {ality » hypothesis or theory: Une the extinction ofa species, the fafsication ofa theory doesnot simply accu with rate factty: sus frst be accepted by ism the basis of arguments and justia tions. Even a theory of the practice of scholarly research, whic ‘regards the asication of hypotheses as the continuation of eval tion by other means. cannot he a merely desrntive or explanatory theory it must alo be normative. Chaees Pire, who anticipated Popper's evolutionary concept, was quite clear on this point? In this context nce nt discuss the barely understood problem of adequate cites of falsification (ia the sense of a iasfieation Sophisticated, not nave). think it enough to advocate the following feneral thesis I we do not want to describe advances in scientific knowledge i vers of a natueal process (in which theories simply expire one day, along with heir buman advocates. as Thomas Kul suggests), more radically, we do not wish to declare, tether ‘with Pau) Feyerabend, that ‘snyting goes” (hie implies our in sly to distinguish between scenic theories and fairy takes" in short. together with Popper (and the later Kuk)? we want to ‘understand science and it advances as ational enterprise then we ‘ust understand that what it means to advocate 3 hypothesis or theory is quite diferent from mere fiction or fairytales, to put 2 hypothesis o¢ theory up for dscussion, and (where warranted) 1p Lalslly a hypodnesis or theory through formal or empitical ‘A question of gzeat importance folows: can everything that we must know and presuppose in order to understand the thematization, examination, ctique and (if necessary) asfaton of hypotheses ie reduced to asifiale hypotheses. such that we need ‘ot presuppose anything as ceriain «prio? So argue the proponents fof an untested principe of fllblism: they consider an utimate Philosophical foundation of epistemological peincples not onlyimpose but also unecessary. What, then, should we make of the epistemological presuppositions of a fallible logic ot sience? In order not to make things too easy for mysell 1 want co imroduce an argument (inspired by the late Wittgenstein” and the early Petce) that only apparently conrad the unrestricted fab principle. Every concrete doube which paces a scene theory nto question must set lay aim to paradigmatic certainties, to certaes that are pat of language game and that make that Tanguage game possible, Hence my ist conclasion f sha a universal doubt (or coeespondingly, an unrestricted principle of falls) thas no methodoogialy relevant meaning. Is nothing more than wat Peirce called psper doubt “The radial fallbiist may counter this argument as follows Cenainly we cannot doubt, of othenise place into question, at a stoke everything we consider to be certain. We can (indeed us) concede that every concrete doubt together withthe core sponding language game) presupposes paradigmatic certains in| ‘Wingenstein’s sense). Yet precscy this eicumstance gives rise 10 a ‘mettodologclly relevant, vitally universal doo concerning any language game and is paradigmatic certainties. None of these lan {guage vames ~ hence no paradigmatie cerainty ~ Is mune from ‘outs and revisions forall time, of even inthe long eum. Repeated Tatedigm changes throughout the history of sence show this 0 be the case, Unlike some Witgenstenians. Jo not think that the renewal ofa vinually universal alism principle (atthe level of formal methodology oF ofa theory of science) is completely mean- ingles. On the contrary, n sch a renewal es the necessary adden- ‘dumto te paper daub’ doctrine, as Pelce himself realized when he Jnrodoced the flitilsm principle” Scentfc-theoretial enlighten- rent, which seck t0 save itself fom dogmatism and ‘paper doub ust recognize both the fat that every substantive doubt about the Paradigmatic presuppostions of cerinty i ell dependent on a presupposition of certainty ad the fact that al fru certains — Including those of language games ~ can be doubed universally (at the level of methodological reflection) ‘Docs this mean tht, a dhe level of reflection the unrestricted principe of flltism demonstrates the impossibility and non- cess of every attempt to provide, inp fasion, an ultimate foundation fora prion ceraities?" Wha, then, should we make of the presuppositions of certainty tha the pincpl of aim isl must presuppose in onder be understandable with dhe gontext of 2 Tanguage game? If we folow Witigenstein’s approach tin On Ce aim tots log eons.” we wil conch tha paradigmatic Eertaintes must aso exst fr the language game ofthe theory of| lala in order to make its concepts and statements understand able inthe fst place. Nori i dificult to dently the presuppes tions concerning existence, and the presuppositions concerning rules, which mast themssives be presupposed 2s paradigmatialy| eran In the very language game that establishes the falibiism Principle inthe ist place. Here { would st the following as just a Few af these presuppositions. ‘We mus presuppose thar there are ue statements in dstintion to false statements. Further, we must presuppose that there are statements ~ hypotheses ~ chat ea be thematized in an argument tive discourse In which truth claims, although noe claims to cer tainty, are made, We mest presuppose that these statements admit of| ‘examination, and that they can be prove iby means a erie) tobe Imer-subjecively valid (capable of achieving consensus} oF to be {alse. This farther implies tha theres 2 community (in principle | ‘unlimited community) of discourse or argumentation that has atts dsposal a sulfenly shared and clear language in which i can formulate not only its problems but also possible solutions to these problems This farther presupposes that ceiin rules of agumenta ton are tobe followed as normative conditions forthe very possbil- fay of discussion, that is of the cansenssal redemption or extique of truth aims. For example: ll discussion partipanis are principle ‘equal in the sense that no arguments may be excluded, and solely the beter argument (rather than hidden or open force, such as iheats oF suggestive influences) guides the discussion of truth claims, regard these suggestions (incomplete as they ae) as sifcent tw demonstrate thatthe fais principle in order toe under Standable, must itself presuppose a discourse prindpe asthe con dition of 6 own possibilty. Clearly the later principle (an the [mesuppostions about existence and rules impli in the ater pri {ipl} mast be pressed 38 certain «prio i the fails pri tiple a meaningll argument anf is methodological application isto be possible "Thetein este indispensable uhimate philosophical foundation ofthe fallbility principle. This ultimate foundation reveals sell 3snecessary because argumentative discourse, precisely in its ant Alginate openness and its reedom fom force, must be guaranteed asthe normative condlon forthe very possibilty ofthe ertique and possible falsification of hypotheses, Hence the necessity foe an ul ‘mate philosophical foundation in no way follows fom some need for ogmatle security. Rather, it follows from our intrest n guarantee ing the greatest posible scape forthe falibism postulate of modern |AS is well Known, the ‘pan-rtcal rationalism’ of some Popperian in no way concedes is point. The argument here is that the discourse prinople’s presuppositions concering existence and fules must themselves be revisable, ence must themselves be sub- ject to the (unrestricted) faim principle. Indeed, the argument 0es 50 Lar a 1 suggest that even the falibilism principe together with its presuppositions, mus itself be regarded 3 fle 1 would reply to these arguments as follows. 1s true thatthe presupposiions af the discourse principle ~ without which the {alibism principle is incoherent is ise aways in need of explea- tion, and that all such expications are revsable. But what does this mean? Can it mean that we ean no longer know «priv that the ‘existence of truth and falsehood, and the possibilty of savestgating i dscursively, mast be implied by arguments i the flibilsm prin ‘ple self to Be meanngtul? Clearly this possibilty is excioded ‘even when we subject the presuppositions of he Laliblsm principe themselves again and again, ad stu wo the alibi principe Im order to-do justice to che fact thatthe presuppositions of the {alibi principle must themselves aways be open to explication “The falibism principle s coherent at all conceivable levels of apn- eatin only sf ls presuppositions are coberent in their « priv! senainty This axgument can be developed and strengsnened by the fo: lowing consideration. Every imaginable revision (revisions thet ‘make fr greater completeness for example) inte explieation ofthe ‘meaning of the falibilism principe’ presuppositions must always presuppose « pri knowledge at the very presuppositions t0 be explicate A possible revision in the explication of the falitism Principles presuppositions must be able to appeal to those very presuppositions as a standard ‘Thus it i at mest. only sell-corection (ie through sel reference) thats possible i the explication af the relevant presup- FOUNDATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICS » postions’ meanings. Under these circumstances possible revisions in the explication ofthe meaning ofa peor philosophical knowledge aller om the fasieatons of (even very powerfl) empl! the Fes or hypotheses, for the later presuppose contingent data of| experience 3s the criteria of posible venfiation oF revsion. OF course they also presuppnse the presuppositions ofthe alibi Principle. Yet they presuppose the latter presuppositions. not as| rte of veriication but as presuppositions ofthe concep inves ‘gation or falsneaion I we wanted to contest this difference in prineiple between the Investigation of empirical theories and hypotheses, on the ane hand, And the possible revsion In explcatons of meaning of @ prio knowledge, om the othe, we would have to argue tha the presupe Positions ofthe meaning ofthe concepts investigation” and flies tion’ admit of empirical examination. This, however, would lead to 8 paradox: we would have tobe able 0 ably the presuppositions In question and, atthe same time, thereby presuppose these same presuppositions as vali ‘Tis paradox reaches its outer limits inthe notion ofa alibi, Prine)ple that applies 1 sel. According 1 this notion we would have to be able ro simultaneously both refute and confirm 95 valid the unrestricted falibiism principle. This notion not only engenders 2 Togial contadicion but even immunizes itself agains posible eritcism, which Popper sighystigmatizes asa mortal sin again the holy spit of etl philosophy. ‘We observe heres in Feyerabend, and asin postmodernism a dialectic of reason'sadalized sell-crtis* f this ease reasons sel-rtgue, despite ise, eads vo a non-criézable, hence appa ently ifalible, postion. By contrast, the claim that an ultimate philosophical foundation is needed and possible does not amount to a claim to personal infliilty. For this equation ress on a Psychologie lacy. The concession of subjective flit. hat that mistakes are possible at anytime ~ in philosophy asin empiical science, indeed, even in mathematics ~ is consistent with the poss Pity tha, we made the idealized assumption that a person makes hho mistakes whatsoever. cenain presuppositions of argumentation {hence ential scholarship a wel) reveal Themselves to be absoltely necessary, Now, are we ented fo make this idealized assumption, for we imply could not argue that we might be continually dupe by some malign god i we could not exclude this posit through» FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW idealization? Siaty, Alber then could not offer the “Baron von ‘Munchhausen trlemma asa fal faw in de loge of an ultimate retaphysial foundation ‘The possibilty of a post-metaphysical, ultimate foundation depends on a transcendental reflexive concept of foundation My effort to understand corey the necessity of an ultimate pio Sophia foundation s inseparable trom arguments forthe poss fof such a foundation. But forall that, { have Yet to answer the {question of how 2 non-metaphysical method for attaining an Ultimate foundation fs posible ~ a method liferent trom that which Albert crtclzes by applying the ‘Baron von Munchhavsen’| teers ‘0 course, in having dscussediefutabe conditions of posi: ityand meaning. oF the presuppositions of coherence, fr fundamen tal concepts of erital scence hence of the flibitsm principle 3s wel [hove already intimated the kind of question we must ask i ive ae to establish a non-metaphyscal lime foundation. Here it ‘Sa question of something that we must always presuppose as val AE the examination or critique of possible conditions is sell 10 be coherent and theretore possibly valid Hence my argument implies a ‘combination of two aspects that 28 hall show) distinguish it from the foundatonalism cetized by Hans Alber. ‘The first aspec concerns the necessary conltions of validity “te second aspect involves the fat tht this quest also applies othe preconditions of the relevant aegumentaion of the person who ‘would rtcze foundational argumens: and I apples by means of fle reflection.” ‘With raed to the fist aspect we ask for example, about the ‘conditions requisite for the validity of the falibiism principe. tn ‘answering this question we run up against the precondition ofthe fiscourse principle, as a condition forthe coherence of our own use ofthe concep faim. We thereby founder upon she irrefutabils ity of presuppostions of existence. and of presuppositions of rls, forargumentative discourse in general, The cterlon for dhe iets bily of the presuppositions of argumentation (and thereby of thei tlimate foundaton) tes in the pragmatic or performative se ‘contradiction that would occur wete the argument ever contested ‘Tis would happen i for example. a person claimed the following ‘onthe bass of anguments contest the noton that tage a that 1 therefore must recognize as irefutable the presuppositions about ‘he very existence of, and rules for, valid argumentation’ ‘The principle of performative sll-contradicton also contains the erterion for a test by which se can distinguish the method of an ultimate philosophical foundation (concerned wih he conditions for the validity of Yali argumentation} from any empirical exam pation of able hypotheses of science (and of a metaphysics qua science of universal hypotheses, The spectcally philosophical method of achieving an ulimate foundation cannot be subsumed under the concept of foundation” presupposed in taditional ontological metaphysics, o inthe moder logic of scence or in Alben’ ‘Baron von Minchhausen’ eile Inall hese ases ‘foundation’ may be broadly defined 3s the deriva ‘on of something from something else, In the narrow sense of 3 ‘compelling proo, ths definition refers to logical and mathematical deduction. In broader terms i alo refers tothe empirical examina tion of hypotheses through induction, and tothe slog form of albducion discovered by Peirce. According 10 Pete, these three ‘methods of foundation, in their interdependence (and together with the constant ow of the interpretation of sign) form the normative presuppositions of science (including speculative-hypothetica metaphysics.” To what extent i this conception eiferent from the specify philosophical method of ultimate foundation that I developed i previous pages? Fist iis easy to see why the dee sllogistic fons ~ deduction, induction and abduction - must end in the Baron vox Minchhausen’ilemma whenever these forms are used 10 con= steuct an timate foundation, As the deduction of something from Something ee, they must always give rise to forther questions if they are avid generating a ogcal ctcularty and dogmatism This ‘saute ifferent rom the specially philosophical concept o proce- dure of foundation that propose. As the elective recourse tothe ‘conditions ofthe validity of argumentation, my method never finds Ise in the situation of deducing something from something ee, hence it never develops into an endless regress. My method ascer- tains only what itself relies on as a method of foundation: i ascertains only those kinds of presuppositions that itself cannot ‘spate ii to avoid performative sel-contradicion. I can provide no ontological cosmological explanation ofthe whole word rather,a FROM A TRANSCENDENTALSEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW it provides soley fo he sefascertainment of argumentative reason, Burt the exten that ead o indisputable statements dest lead to fivialor insignificant statements? “The practical, everyday relevance of an ultimate, postmetaphysial foundation ‘With sis question tome tothe penimate part of my chapter. This port is concerned with the relevance ofa non-metaphysialvtimate foundation. Consider the following example: according to Poppe. the mos radical question a philosopher can pose himsel or herselt js Why should Ibe rational? thats, ‘Why should I recognize the hormative conditions of a erkcal-argumentatve dscoutse and not Some obscurants, wshfa rye of thinking that wall submit © | ‘ritique whatsoever?” Obvionsly this question is relevant not only to the philosophy af scence bu to ethics ar wel we sought to answer this question i the manner of deducing something fom something tse, we would have to presuppose what we wanted to show ~ the Commitment to reason. We mould then be tapped ina log ‘relay. In tha ase, Popper concludes, no foundation is possible whatsoever, rather, solely 8 re-atonalo rational (but neverthe less moral} decision could replace an timate foundation.” ‘This answer Is coherent and, if we assume the usual nom: reflective concept of foundation, unavoldable. But the reflective ‘icthod of foundation {have developed indicates ~ coiraty to this answer ~ that the decionise situation imputed by Popper never ‘bias. Whoever poses Popper's question ina serious manner, In bother word, whoever thematizes i (at lest lonely conversation With nsf or herself, can asute himself or herself that he o she has already entered the teretory of argumentative reason, that bof discourse, and that he oF she thereby has already recognized the ‘aormativecondons for such a dscouse. Indeed, he orsbe can now rasp that this is preisely why we cannot provide a foundation for fur being rational, without Becoming mired in circularity. if we ‘presuppose the wsval, non-relletive concept of foundation, "he fat that Popper like many ether overlooks the possbiicy ‘ofa refletvewltmate foundation, and instead resorts ultimately ‘ecisonsm, may have another reson, indeed one quite under andable. In a ellective tikimate foundation we realize that fannot argue (Bence that we cannot think in a way that involves FOUNDATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICS a Validity laims} without recognizing the normative conditions af argumentative dscourse. Yet ths i no way guarantees that in 3 ‘concrete situation where there fsa conflict of interest, or example = we will actually pursue the form of reason we recognize to be ‘superior. that we wil notin fat reject this form of reason when i Isto our selish advantage to da s0, This decisional problem ~ the problem of a good or eul will ~ cannot be solved through the reflective ultimate foundation of what shouldbe. Consequently many ‘philosophers cancude that the problem of an ultimate foundation must be replaced by the problem of ae ultimate decison. egard this ‘oncusion as mistaken, Firs, rexts on a confusion between the problem of foundation and the problem of efficient motivation ‘second, i overlooks the fact that we cannes assume that the insight ‘reflective whimate foundation, which docs not determine how ‘any particular human will should decide, therefore is without power to motivate 2 person. Let us ask anew: wherein lis the posible practical meaning of @ reflective vitimate foundation, that the Possible practical meaning ofthe peoo! that we have sways already recognized the normative conditions of reason in the manner of argumentative disourse? "ean now formulate an ansver (one i keeping with Popper's radical perspective} to the question of relevance. To aim the dis cursive principle of reason isto recognize the norms of argumenta te discourse presupposed in ctl scence as wel a ina discourse tics of practical reason. Ths meats that we can always assure ‘ourselves through st reflection not only that ~ 25 the case of| Descares ~ it fs not possible 10 gain a level somehow beyond oF below or behing our own sottary thought. Through the same reflec ‘on we can also assure ourselves ofthe fact hat we are arguing and hence are commited t0 the raional form of argumentative ds course. which iro be sharply distinguished from the rational foxm of instrumental and stategc thought." For the theoretical reason of| ‘human knowledge and science, tis means that we have always already recognized that such reason presupposes an unesticted fetal discourse, in which every participant, ftom the very sar. forgoes the use of stateg.e~ rhetorical or otherwise manipulative etods for geting others to accept hs or er own opinion ~or for dogmatically immunizing his or her own thought rom all possible criticism. For practical (ethical o politcal) reasoa, it means that we ‘know that al binding norms of ethics and law can be legitimizedoo FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SERIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ‘only in the capacity of all concerned persons 0 find consensus ina iscourse fre ofall forge, At the level of aa ethic of responsibility ‘capable of finding ideal consensus. we can. of course. also see that the conditions fr the appllation of an weal discourse ethics do not ‘obtain anywhere In reality. This condo amaonz requires. in the broadest sense of politi! praxi. mediation (sel capable of finding an ethical consensus} between dlscursve-thical rationahity and Strategie rational (I cannot further adress this question here)" |A non-motaphysical, ultimate foundation as the task of «post metaphysical paradigm of prima philosophia In conclusion £ want to return to the question of why Tall the Llimate philosophical foundation ‘non-metapysial” oF “post ‘metaphysical. You may have wondered if my proposed method has ‘any precursors inthe philsophica adton.” I most certainly does. ‘The method {propose bas historia root nthe soa “Indice roo eens found in Plato and Aristotle found in antique e> Tations inthe sceptics (in Augustin, in particular, found in the Imovcmn era in Descartes, and found above all fn what, since Kan has come to be knovn as "transcendental plosophy’ (to which belong the ‘sranscendental arguments’ of the ordinary language philosophy of Peter awson and oshers.” Tould not, however, ascribe all ofthese historical precursors ~ cspectlly the transcendental approach in philosophy ~ v0 the pa ‘igm of metaphysis, but rather to the rejection of metapasis by rellection on the conditions for dhe possibilty of intersubjective ‘ality In the modern era this ext retection fst brought forth the paradigm of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness. oF the philosophy ofthe subject rom Descartes to Kant to Husse) Finally. n the twentieth century this paradigm has served as &| bss for a language-pragmatic transformation of palosopby qua reflection on the conditions of the imer-subjecive validity of segumentaion, ere I cnet adequately explicate my notion of a succession of the three paradigms of prima phlosophi: ontological metaphyses. the transcendental philosophy of consciousness and aranscendental semiotics or language pragmatics” Moreover, | cannot comment here on the fat that, unlike Thomas Kuhn.” 1am thinking not of 3 sucession of tncommensurable paradigms but rather ofa sequence In the Hegellan sense of che “sublimadion’ of dhe actly preceding paradigms by increasingly radical crical reflection, Vd, howeves, ‘want to ouch 9 one major poi, ‘Why dot assocate the paradigin of ontoagial metaphysis with the non-relecive concept of foundation in modem empirical seience? Because, unlike transcendental philosophy both ontolot cal metaphysics and empirical scence consider thee proper object domain to be a domain of contingent phenomena, Bott maintsin that we can make a contingent phenomenon into an abjet of posible knowledge, and that we can place contingent phenomena Into question and that we en do s0 from a standpoint we nee not thematize. The empirical sciences thus ask the ‘why? question” of anything inthe world that adits of thematization. These sciences ‘do not (and need not) thereby releet on the conditions for the possibilty of sucha question. Ontological metaphysls, hy contra, sks the "why? question” of the world as a whole, including the hhuman being asa subject of Knowledge. And as we have known ever since Kant, metaphysis thereby ais to reflect on the conditions| for the possibity of such a question, OF cours, at dhe dawn ofthe modern era, one regarded a6 a sell-evident teat (indeed as theo Jogicaly and metaphysiclly self-evident) the idea thatthe funda ‘mental metaphysical question = "Why docs something exist rather than nothing (Leni ~ean be pose by the human being because the human being (35 the mago del er qual ler deus (Cusanus) can ose the question from the standpoint of Go the Creator, and from the standpoint of God's eats mand x ni Even for he language hitsophy ofthe early Witgestein (Tatas) ~a philosophy thats ‘quastranscendental. yet one free of transcendental reflection = to ew the world sub spec ater i to view it asa whole ~a limited whole. Richard Romy gh identifies this a an example of 2 metaphysical standpoint” But how can acieal philosophy overcome the reflective deficit of this metaphysial standpoint? Can it do so perhaps (as Rorty argues) by resting tel in its questions and elections wo the fempirial sciences. and by declaring ewerhing 10 be contingent foithowt having to reflec on the conditions for the postr of| thinking about contingeny2)” ‘Transcendental philosophy’ which, of couse in Descartes and even in Kant is sil connected with (ontoogieal) metaphysis im 2 ‘manner not well understood ~ was the fist to ask adequately about6 FROM & TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW the (rational) conditions of valid knowledge fom which we cannot distance ourselves (as we can distance ourselves from something ‘contingent because any thematization of contingency must Hel presuppose those conditions of valid Knowledge. From Descartes 10 Huser philosophers believed that only sell-conscousness could or shouldbe thematized. and thematized in the sense of transcendental ‘elipss through transcendental election, asa resid of brack ting everyting ese in the world. Bur since Peirce and Wittgenstein te knw that a solkary, autarkic subject of inte-subjectively valid interpretations of the world i unthinkable. Such a subject is un thinkable because al nter-subectively valued conception of “some: thing as being something’ (Heteger) depends on language. (This in| tno way implies that the great achievements of modern subject: philosophy ~ in theoretical philosophy: the insistence on evidence for me; in practical philosophy the notin ofthe autonomy ofthe ‘conscience ae somehow pat and shouldbe abandoned. The pint ‘ol the tied paradigm is rather tht. with the evidence of ‘categorical incon” (iusser, L can realize that even irreplaceable pees of ‘experiential evidence ~ evidence for sense perception, and even ‘more so, categorical evidence inthe sense of 0 go, eg sum ~ ae always linguistically interpreted pieces of evidence, and thar wath ‘qa intersubjective validity not guaranteed uatl the last possible shes of intspretatons capable of consensus, and not merely by the synthesis of my appercepions” Likewise, an sight of on: science tells me that | must not arbitrarily break of the discourse on ‘aims to moral correctness by appealing tomy subjective conscience 353 court of final appeal)” Contemporary philosophy, seeking to draw the proper conse ‘quences frm the ‘linguist turn i philosophy, stands belore the following two alternatives. The fis alternative would be to abandon | ‘the approach of universaltc transcendental philosophy, because of the contingency of all thinking on language games and on socio cultural life forms. We sould simply classy the conditions for sub Jectve and inter-subjctive knowledge. aswell as for argumenation.| 1 the contingent, inmerworily objects of scence oF of everyday Knowledge, Most postooderiss ~ especially the American neo: Pragmatsts ~ sce in this kind of‘detranscendentalration”™ the det rite overcoming of metaphysis. {seems 10 me, however. that Ignoring the anscendental (hence non-contingent) presuppositions ofthe valid discussion of contingency merely leads us back 10 the FOUNDATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICS 7 halve attitude of pre-Kaniian metaphysics, OF course the neo Pragmatsis want to avoid any kind of metaphysis. Butt think “detranscenentaizaton’ leads to a station where we mist either completely abandon discursive philosophy and i clin to tuth = Say. favour of its becoming Bless. as Rorty recently proposed or fll victim to areductionstic metaphysis in the manner of an bsolutized empiial science. ‘We can contrat the latter option for contemporary philosophy With the following atemative. While recognizing the dependence of fr thought and vinderstanding on contingent, “background” pre suppositions of the Kleworld on language games and ife forms.” further, in electing om the univers validity claims that belong 10 argumentation, we must also recognize the conditions of valé| Knowledge about contingent phenomena, namely, conditions| beyond or below of Behind. which we cannot” go, hence roncontingent conditions, These transcendental-pragmatic cond ‘ons of thought ~ 2s conditions of language-based communication shout anything admitting of thematization ~ are distinguished from the contingency ofthe finite conditions of human reason solely by counterfactual postulates. One example would be the postulate of {and counterfactual anticipation of) an infinite, deal community of ‘communication, asthe ranscendental subject ofa definitive consen- sus about truth and normative correctness ere the determination of the wanscendentl condions of va lity is placed to what Kant called the ‘regulative Idea’ of fle tive judgement’ ~ and, orrespondingy, tothe process of inference {and argumentation tha, in she long run, guarantees the exhaustion of all civeria of invesigation.” This displacement enables the manseendental-semiotc or wanseendentalpragmatic paradigm of tuanscendemtal philosophy to expose even what Kant called the “constitutive conditions of objectively valid knowledge (the forms ‘of ntltion’ and. the “categorical schemes) toa falibiisie relaivization - by restricting thei validity 1 that of a protophyses having todo only withthe means of posible human experience (Romy’s demand for 2 “dewanscendentaliztion’ finds sell 4 ‘wanscendental-phlosopical justification in this a prior rela tivation of Kat's conte principles} But a relatvizaton of the knowledge-constiutve apriorsm of transcendental philosophy’s Kantian paradigm ~arelativiation un- sdeiaken according 10 the theory of the regulative Keas and theproces of Inference and argumentation = cannot mean that we {hereby forgo an ukimate transcendental foundation for the cond tions ofthe validity of argumentation and thereby of cognition. and thar everything must be seen 10 be contingent. To postulate any regulative eas (and conditions) of procedure whatsoever (s0 a8 not to have o say anything goes’ we must assume that We ae ales, soto speak, in truth’. For example, we must assume that (contrary to Deria’s suggestion)" we can share suficiertly Mlemtial mean ‘gs of signs in a suificiently adequate language Fale pointed out ‘hat the most basic understanding ofthe meaning of ality (hence iso the understanding ofthe meaning of what some people today [sppeal to as an “other of reason, by means of which our own reason ‘ould be refated) already presupposes the paradigmatic ertanty of the puindple of discourse and hence a transcendental pragmatic ‘explication of (communicative reason, Every attempt 10 dispute the implications ofthe «prior co: dvions of argumentation ‘unavoidably leads 1 a perlormatve seit-contradition, Ths indicates thatthe implications of the argu- mentation principle are more fundamental in a transcendental Dlllophica sense than what Kant thematized asthe categoria a rari conditions of posible kaosledge of a word of objects. These ‘mplkations veler not 1 a structure jconsidered to be necessary a {ror of the propositional contents of knowing but rather to the Dresuppositions (presupposed even in the eelativization of these structures theough arguments) ofthe performative aspect of act of Sngumentaton and 10 the corresponding validity aims.” Hence a performative sel-contradicton, with ts own validity claim, must at the same time sublate the possibilty of criiczable argumentation, I the posiility of an overcoming or ‘getlng over” metaphysis de pends on enduring the perlomaive se-comtadiction (as many Post-Nletscheans or postmoderiss today clam) hen 110 my pat ‘would stil prefer to be called 3 metaphysical philosopher However, seems so me thatthe attempt to see everything — even our claim to reason ~ as contingent, and in this fashion to Imitate the relecive innocence of the empirical sciences, merely leads back not only ta performative sell-conradiction but beyond that othe perspective of dogmatic metaphysis. Namely n sofa as the philosopher, in apparently ericl fashion, reduces everything — ‘nclidng his or her claim to reason = contingent grounds or else to what Heidegger cals Seingeshik asthe bass forall contingency. = he or she once again assumes a quasiedivine standpoint from which they believe that they can think the world sn its contingency. as a “ited totality” ~ without ever having examined the conditions of ‘he validity of such thought. Notes Pe pedi ual f Sela Pay, 7,3 (1993), 371-80. 14, Habeas, he sophia Dice of Moder Cami, Mas: Sy Rept ae pnt Tae fant ‘Aer Phish nd or awomaton? (Came, Mas MI Pre Rony, aly anh Mier f Nae (Pneton: era Ueersty rem, 193); Row, come fragman (inca alert ‘ct inetota Pree 1962, Roy, Cogn, Don. an sy ea Snape: Cambrdge Univers ese 989) Se a Kayes a fe) ‘Aer Py. 3 Agel "Normtvly Grounding “Ctl Theory” through Recourse 1 he (Cs, Psp meres The nied Pes Bir (a dg, Me te Pes 953, 125-7 ree te al aan ALY. Roy (xeon: Princeton Untesty ess. 1984), ‘fe Tascenden Semis nt Hypothetal Mepis valuta ITheeren snd QuaseRercan Anse to 2 Recent Pref Pos an Panes KL Kener ed) Prin and Couey To aac i Snatch ngs es Te 6 ie" robin of Propel Fundamental Grodin nig of ‘arene! Papa ange Man War 8 1975) 23973 (ep In Baynes ee) Ae spy, 250-9, ‘hopper “The Desh of Teas and Lewes. in Hele Lee de Pope‘ el). Lafont (Abe Eee Se Phonphe eto 1972, 29639 Roper One Kale Be (Games et isha and h Mase fe) Conon he ruth ‘nul’ (ambadpe:cambrige Univerty Pres 1970), 91-198 0 F5" Kahn Pe Scare of Sai Rs (Capo Unvery o hag Pew 1980 Fevertend. tains Med ew Yor: Ye, 1985), 127, Rub. -anmertungen mu akc. mW. Diederh (68), Thien der Tncenchafenhde rack 8M. Saean 998) 130-36100 FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIONIC POINT OF VIEW 13 Witgerste herGewisOn Cena. GEM. Anscombe an 14 Chou Te fn of Belo! ape C Horse a8 8a Cd Po hE ssslaisees site dewatering oan te Sod Cua Foudson ed Abie one Con he 1 Ths tamer argument (nd igi a meaning iinet y the ‘nicht we mus 0h petra el made. The ogineh Teles ugesigows a of Descanso ean proto he “asenc fC) rece the psy as mals who coi “Sy seccves By ang) wes abo rele escaters eam rumen tnguent at evering me ake tbe vel sly 2 eam Wel an an, Kenn, Reletve Uegrindung2ar Tes on er Unie fehtaie dcr Apumenaionstusten 2dr ar Plea ‘Boohuny 98 198, Dt Kohirann, fee erento Une Sesame ar Thandie rang and Munir 21 fon conten ce Ap eprng nL Seiler and Rady Fania or Winmchaehoe t: Een 1989 a hp chr © Poe Pom Mamata Pragati (Amer Unies 23. Pnpor Cone and fin for ed Landon: Rowe & egal 73) 57s Pop The Open So a i Ee Londen 24 oc restr tan Yeni Ape ys oR In Gea es) asain Tay tama Ona Univers Pes. 17, Sroka Yomi ‘mcs Hon and Gtr cs Germinal Vr. 88, 25 Agel Busan Vrms aot ML Suhearp 1968) (Engle 26 W ahinann, Bee caring chapter 5. sm as Ayt “The Tantenera! Conception a Language Communication and FOUNDATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICS wo ‘he Mes of Fin Puy’ rman Frc es) Hay of ig 29 Eu, Snare of Sao Rr Route Reo Fl 196 Se Roy. wth, Has 2 Taian coe ds Wake dL (ed) cal a ea Poly aan Sate nes New York free 1987, 2-5: Aplus Problem de pasnendlogsehen burger fol, Dw Arte tr Phinomensage nde Praga act ‘sensation: Ostertiche Saracen 186), 78 33 Inthe peace to Te Moma of lin Hegel were: he ma Cenarion rae nna hee ‘words he ample the reo humariy rt. Pr Te nate (GWA. Hegel The Phenomenology of Mind. ans 8. Baile (Mew York ‘Mele 1951-127) la 159 of hsp fh ge! ences evrswningy tat nce losses as eed he othe Shecr iwadnen se sl hs Become pony Sv a Php of it ane TM. Koox (Oxford. Carendon Pres 194,90, ‘gumentatonpemensul in Ape. Doer an Rebel es “inciting Any Poy ee a a 35 See copecally JR. Sea, ewonaliy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univesy Frew tsar 3Ehe Baan and Haberman Pe Tey of Commons Aton tan Mca (esto Reson Pres. 1984-8 34 el Tora Tratsrmatn of Pi Wats Ade abd Faby 2 io oa Ken Pa 281 bern of crammtln,sam, G.Spnak (kino: ohne Hepa ney Poe es Wt nt ns, a aeto FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW 39 aber, Ty of Comme Aa vo chapter Se Ap “Die ‘cont der Sprecher In HG. Bohne, Pople 5 Meaning constitution and justification of validity: has Heidegger overcome transcendental philosophy by history of being? ‘The problem as a consequence ofthe present impact of Heidegger's philosophy Let me start out with = question: what explains the fascination af Heidegger’ philosophy in the present era? Certainly, hs fascination no longer emanates from the so-called philosophy of ‘existence ‘hich was, no doubt, formulated in Being ard Time in an expressive and appealing way. Nor suppose, the concer of a fundamen {al ontology’ that she response tothe question ast the ‘meaning of being, which Heidegger himself opposed to what he called the “existentiolst misunderstanding’ of hls main work. The source of fascination in our day is ether, seems to me, his venture of & destruction’ of occidental metaphysics which was postulated aleeady in Being and Time but later. ater the so-called “turn (Kehre) was ected against the conception of fundamental ontology a5 well. fa other words: at present the following programme of Heieager’s ‘seems to stand in the foretound of interest: is atempt at chinking back - by cial reconstruction and destruetion of al current com ‘ceptval schemes, metaphysics and scence ~ beyond the beginnings ‘of classical Greek philosophy. in order possibly to regan the ree space’ (Sper) ofan ‘inital thinking” that might have existed in the time of myth or even ofthe pre-Socrari philosophers. Ths ree space, on Heldegge’s account. might eventually open up the precon {ions fora pos-metaphysicl and post-technoogical thought ro the fextent that seb 3 possibilty may be actualized by the "happening of| being that ke through a ‘clearance’ of the meaning of beng, tis expecially the las suggestion of 2 post-meraphysial, nay even post philosophical and pos-rational (although not ~ aconding to Heddegeer—irationa', thinking that within the last decade has aroused the gfeaten tacination ~ for example in the sphere of08 FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ‘French and allan postmodernism but even beyond this Ina special verslon of American neo:peagmassm which thinks it posible ithough with certaia polieal reservations = 10 being nto line the thought of Dewey, Wikgenstin and Heidegger” However, beyond this vague out ofthe history of Hedeggers impact let us ask more closely> which forms or schemes of Heidegger's thought lend support to these aspects of is reception history inthe present era? Iwill ry to sum up the ane to this ‘question In a thesis that allows me to lntroduce the topic that 1 Indcatd in the gle of this chaper. ‘The facinaion ofthe Inter Heeger and the fr-eaching im plications of the reception of his though bythe postmodernist and the pos-Wittgenseinian neo-pragmatiss derive primarily fom the lac that i Heeger’ late philosophy (ol the hStoy of Being) the Inially sanscendental-phenomenolgical problem of the const tution of meaning is subject to a detanscendentalization and historizatlon. In Hekdegge’ philosophy this isa consequence of| fis conception of truth aed, a conception that was already implied in Being and Tine inthe exstenta-hermenetcal analy fof the ‘pre-arucure’ of all worldundersianding. conceived as “dusclosednes of heingin-the-world and Later terminated in the ‘oneeption of the caring (Liang) of (the meaning) of being. The later, asa happening of dscosuee and simultaneously concealment. ‘recedes the possibilty of ue and false judgements. Within the Context of French post-strucuralism - for example in the work of| Dereia = the stractare of the “oicontaogial dilerence’ which in Heidegger's philosophy was connected with the ‘happening’ of ‘learance” as a condition of the possibiity of linguistic meaning constittion, came to be fused seth Saussure's notion of 2 semio- tial constitution of difference and Derid's conception of difranse 2 the happening of simultaneously opening up and shifting of sieaning ut why or in what respect may one say that by Heidegger’s analysis of “islosedness in Asey and Time 9 tanscendental or ‘quas-transcendental problem is alse and at dhe same time i ten {entily subject to a dewanscendentazation? “To addres this question {wil fist dsinguish and elucidate wo pertinent dimensions of Heidegger's 0 calle pre-stracture” of exis: Fenal world-undersanding and seltundessanding. For this pre CONSTITUTING MEANING AND JUSTIEVING VALIDITY 05 structure of what is “always already presundersiood’ has & quasi transcendental function in Seng aed Tine ‘The ‘pre-structur' of the ‘dsclosedness’ of being-in-the-world as an answer to the transcendental ‘question as tothe conditions of the possiblity of the World's meaning constitution Heidegger's analysis shows that the subjct-obect relation of sc etic knowledge is always already embedded in the contextual structure of being-in-he-world as understanding the coherent sig- nificance of the world. The beings encountered within the world are not primarily understood as existing or preset (vorhanden) objects of theoredcalabservaion and prdicative determination but (rather) 235 equipment to hand (zukexdenerZeug), looked upon from the viewpoint of care and presundersiod trom this point of view ‘as Something’ (Le. as significant). Therefore, the world Ksell Is ot primarily an aggregate of presen objects of ~9 for Kant and natal science ~ the ‘existence of things in as far a5 they make up a coher: ence according 10 las but, for Heidegger, the world is “he situational context of understanding according to relerence-marks 435. (elelogical) horizon of possible encounteriogs of beings that have a specific significance’. (In German: ‘Das Warin des sich vemesenden Versiehens als Worauthin des Begegnenlssens von Seiendem in de Seisart der Bewandtnis:)" ‘On the presupposition a his Heideggerian concept ofthe word, those eritica-epistemologlal(erennoskrtiche) questions that are suggested by the treitional reflection upon the pure objectivity of beings prove to be pseudo-problems: for instance. the question wither perhaps all objects (and that means: even al human su- Jets of action and knowledge qua objects) might be only within human consciousness. This mast be a pscudo-problem, since those modes of being-in-the-world that ae supposed in the erica ques tion = namely “being with” mere representations or sense data or ‘being solitary in prindple ~ can be understood by us only as ‘Se ‘lent modes” of being-in-the-world a ‘beng with the beings them Selves’ and ‘ing togeher-with other people.” This Hcideggerian analys, which ke phenomenological and cevistentia/-hermeneutica is almost exacly conflimed by 3Witgenstinian analysis of longuage games — namely of the Incerwovennes of language games. word interpretations and activ ties as pars of Iie forms. For this analysis reveals thatthe idealisic tnd sobpsiic parodigns of the philosophy of consciousness are parasite upon non-ieaist and non-sopst everyday language umes, that fom language games that even Descartes (and Huser) must make wie of inorder to articulate their problems linguistically ‘Thus with regard so the Cartesion dieam argument, one may rove thatthe meaning of he phase‘all thats considered tobe real Imight possibly be merely my dream” is parasiic upon a language fame, acording 19 which there must be a difference in principle fetmcen a real world outside my consciousness and that which might be “merely my dream’ Thereby one may justly also Heidegger’ objection to Kant that the ‘scandal of philosophy’ does not ie inthe lack of @ proof for the existence of an outer work! but rather in demanding such a proof” To put it briely: the hermencuticsphenomenologcal reflection on the “beingealways- aleady-in-the-world” proves ks prioity with tegard to the post. Cartesian reflection om the objet-consciousnes in the same sense 2 the pragmatically oriented analysis of language games can prove that those language games of ordinary language that are interwoven ‘vith the rans of ie are presupposed by the philosophical languoge fumes ~ and also by the constructive languages of the logic of “Thus far we have alteady’ shed ight on the point of Heidegger’ interpretation of what the late Huser called ronswel and of the fundamental elation ofthis lifeworld tothe abstactve and ideal iving worl-thematizaion of the scences. And the point af Heidegger's analyss of the Meword appears tome tobe more radial and more illuminating than that which ean be found inthe remain. ing pat of Hussrs lst writings on the Kris” This olds especially with regard to the quas-transcendental fonction of oUF pre ‘ondertanding of the lifeworld as 8 precondition of the subject sbjet relation of scientific knowledge. For on Heidegger's account, ittecomes clear that a pure transcendental consciousnes of objects ‘does not suice a a bass for the constiuton ofa world of signif ‘ance ~ and ths for atleast two reasons, On the one hand, there isa lck of the horizon of practical engagement and hence of cog tive interests that could guide our searching and asking for some. ‘ing a8 something’. On the other hand, thete is aso a lack wih regard 10 the medium of language by which the interpretation of Something 38 something must be mediated in order to be inter subjectively vai However, given the features ofthe lifeworld that we have ei dated hus ft, we have not yet revealed the whole significance of what Heidegger always characterizes asthe ‘pre-sructae of being Incthe- word by using the phase ‘alwaysaleady” mer oho orf selon). Our explanation of this by pointing to the Mfeworld as a presupposed embedding ofthe abject-consciousness could sill be "understood in the abstract sense of claiming only necessary precon ditions of knowledge as Kant does i his transcendental log. And already on the ground ofthis understanding, one could speak of « heightening of the transcendental problematic of the conditions of meaning canstiution beyond the special problematic ofthe const ‘ion of “objectivity inthe Kansan sense. Bu inthis case the dimen- sion of exlsteatal temporality, which f also indicated by Helegger’s ‘using dhe terms always already, would nox yet be taker into consid eration. In fact the world and Self-understanding of human Daten according to Heideger is dependent on is pre-strucare’ not only in an absiractive tanscendensa-iogial sense ut als i the temporal Sense of being ‘always already ahead of ise” (si vrwey) The ase cannot pull up, soo speak. is thrownness' into a histoially| conditioned stuation-world (and its having always aleady become ‘acted to this world in a specie way). Now, lf one cartes through the analysis of the temporality structure of being-alays-already-in-the-word, then the inescap- able insight into the ‘historicity’ ofthe finite Davie and is poste Understanding of meaning must be the rest, It inthis respect, 1 suggest, that the mos radical elfects of Heideyger's philosophy fan the rest of contemporary. philosophy have been exerted those effects that, a5 being quas-anseendental conditions of the world-meaning consttation, have contributed most elfectively t0 the dewanscendentalization of contemporary philosophy in Rory sens, for example ‘Thus the following Heidegerian insight, which was further elaborated by Gadamer has presumably found 3 world-wide acept ance; theres temporally and historically determined (conditioned) pre-understanding ofthe world that belongs to the pre-stuctute of all cognition that of everyday a5 well as that of the sciences. This pre-understanding i always already ingsially articulated in thesense ofthe ‘public interpretation’ of the Hleworld, This Is svhat Heidegger elucidated in Being and Tine 2 lows The Doxin is never ale 10 cxcpe ths everday work intespoetation to which ha ben lamized from the Binning. {Within om. and gaint i all genuine understanding terpetng td communicating all ppropition les pecorme. i not the case that a Dasin should ever be pone before or confronted ‘with the open space ota world in itl. untouched by the pe Serpeetaio, jst to gaze upon what is presente oi! Here is an cucidation of that dimension of the pre-sructure of heingin-the-worl! by which Hedegger’s hermeneutical phenom nology i definitely distinguished from Hussers optical and pre linguistic typeof “evidence-phenomenology’. And it Is this dimension that stade possible the convergence ofthe hermeneutic ‘phenomenology with the post-Wingenstlsian development of Ii substc philosophy. But in wha respect may those insights nto she termporaty and historicity sll be considered a dimensions ofa possible reconstruc- tion and transformation of transcendental philosophy? Does this ‘ueston realy expose the problematic and lneiguing aspect of our opie? rt it hast be polnted out that itis Heidegger himself who, in his arly work, established an internal relationship betveen his analysis of the pre-siructre of the disclsedness of being-in-the> ‘World and the problematic of transcendental philosophy. Heidegger's attempt at understanding his undamental ‘ontology’ as a radicalization of Kants project of 2 transcendental philosophy ning and Time Heidegger emphasized that his programme of & ‘fundamental ontology’ which paced the question 38 to the ‘mean- ing of being” belo the question of traditional ontology and tried 10 answer this question by recourse 10 that “understanding of being” ‘that belongs to human Basin, may by n0 means lake Is axentaion| toward a pre-Kantian understanding of cognition as an innerwordly feiaion between 2 subject and an objec. Thus fr Heidegger disso ‘Gated bimsell fom Max Scheler’s and furthermore from Nicolai Hartmann’s conception of ‘ontology’ oof cogition as an onto ‘gical relationship between beings. He wrote: “Scheler as well 35 ‘Martmann, novvithstending ther diferent phenomenological point of departute, overlook the fat that ontology iis tradtonal base foriemtation fas with regard to (human) Datei and that precisely ‘hat “elaionship of being” that i imple in cognition enforces & revision and not only a cit repair of ontology.” The ‘relation of being’ that is at stake here cannot, on Heidegger's account bere jgatded! aa relation betwen twa Beings in the word but has to be thought of as ranscendemal in sofa 3s, along with Dan's under standing of being. the horizon of 8 world, which transcends every posible objet as well as every possible subject, s projected and, 50 to speak, extended in a primordial ay. Thus fa in Beng and Tie Heidegger can sill maintain (in cons nection to Husser's eas: compared with realism, idealism, how: ever opposed and untenable it sin effet, has priory i principle Wit doesnot misunderstand itself s “paychologeal” idealist” And hhe explains i the ter “deals” means as much as understanding that being [Sen] can never be explained by beings, since itis always slreay the transcendental with regard to each being then Meas Lmplies the only and eight possibility ofa philosophical problematic But he adds: ‘if idealism means reducing all being to a subject oF consciousness that is distinguished cml by the fact chat i erains "undetermined in ts beng and at bes is negatively characerzed as *non-substandal”(unnglih, dhe idealism no ess nave than the crudest reals" Here Heidegger seems to make explicit the need fora fundamenal-ontologicaltansiormation of Kant’ tanscenden- tal philosophy ‘Bur Heidegger clarified the relationship between his programme of fundamental ontology and ianscendental philosophy much more precisely and thoroughly in is fist took on Kant. Kent end te Problem of Metaphyss. There he aso had to pose the most dificult {question with regatd to the relation of his own approach to classical transcendental philosophy: the question regarding the relation of pure eason to human Dae, which precisely in (or onthe ground its temporality and historicity is presupposed a contin ofthe Possibility of the understanding of being. A wanscendental phi- losopher might ask immediately: how ist possible + compare the pre-stractire ofthe temporal-hioricalBeing.in-the- wor = charac tenzed by Heidegger a6 that of a "thrown project” (seworfener10 FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ‘Frneurf)~ with the transcendental basic stractute of pure reason ‘which is presupposed by Kant? isis book on Kant Heidegger ried to solv sis problem by Interpreting Kan’ “pre reason’ primary as “nite reason thls sense he ted to lay open the toot ofthe transcendental symihesis bf apperception as that of “understanding being’ in Kan’s faulty fof imagination (Einbldungsraf) and vo understand this faulty 3s “ovginal temporality” ofthe uanscendental projection ofthe wor For Heidegger the transcendental fact of imagination isthe capac ity ol pure syathess’ and thereby of projecting by which the finite reason of human beings must display the horigon of ll understand ingof being in advance of al possbe alec by beings. Asa projecting of pure intulton’ in the Kantian sense, the transcendental faculty of| Imagination most generate (den) the horizon of time in such a way that it simultaneously engenders the ecsatlc dimensions of the present he past and the future and thereby opens up the conditions| fof the possiblity ofthe ‘pure succession of the now’ as providing {2 “schema-image’(Schemabild) for the posible givenness of objec, representations. Thereby Heidegger teconstruced Kant’ transcendental faulty of imagination as a testimony and iustaton for what he himsel| hhad claimed in Being and Time to be the threefold ecstatic temporaiing funtion ofthe “original time’. And Heidegger leit no doubt about the fact that the original function of estat temporaization, which comesponds to Kans laculty of imagina- ton’ as ‘original synthesis. constitutes the essence of understanding thats of the synthesis of perception’ and moreover the essence ‘of theoretieal and practical reason, However, already in Heidegger's first book on Kant there 5 some evidence forthe fact that Heidegger’ separation of empirical Iniratemporalty (nerceicktin, that is of the succession of the rows within the horizon of time, from the orignal time as esate {emporalization or ‘pure synthesis counte-inutive and cannot be sustained It does not sem tobe posible for Heidegger simply to raw a parale between his distinction of orginal and vulgar time land Kant's transcendental distinction of reason a6 synthesis and Imereti as epic soccession of moment. Fora the end of his fst book on Kant, where he summarizes his interpretation of the Cig of Pure Reason along te ins of 3 fundamental ontology. ‘deger is compeled to abandon the analogy between Kan’ and his own rehitectoni’. This happens, 1 thnk, 36 a result of his \Uscussion ~ appareaty only in pasing ~ ofthe occurrence of the finiteness of the understanding in Daein and the “anscendental subject. According co Heideyger, this occurrence isto constute ater all the transcendental subjeciviy” ofthe subject, the finiteness of ‘The failure of the Heideggerian quasi-transcendental Interpretation of original time’ and the abandonment of ‘transcendental philosophy after the turn of his philosophy In what sense may one say thatthe use ofthe word ‘occurence’ oF| happening’ (Eris or Gacheen) amounts to an overthrowing of the Kantian atchiteconice of transcendental plosophy? & hidk tha the woud “happening”, which, asi well known, characteristic of Heidegger's later philosophy and has als a central siifeace in Gadamer's Toth and Method. points to a difculy of Heidegger's analysis of time already in eng ard Time i fcuk that must become visible, if (or, rather. when) one parallels Heidegger's ont ‘ontological diference’ with Kans ‘empirio-tanscendental dir tence’ as Heldeguerhinsel i his first book on Kant stil endeavours todo Heidegger assert time and again cht the ‘originale’, which constitutes the esence ofthe transcendental sythes x eadically Ailerent rem the vulgae conception of time inthe sense of a succes sion of moments within the horizon of time because the elgnal exstatle me precedes the “inteatemporality” as a condition that enerates the horizon forthe succession of omens. This apeats ‘quite ramcerdental~ even in dhe Kantian sense. But dhe question Is whether in this case Heidegger is ight to talk meaningfully about a happening’ of transcendence’ or ofthe “weanscendenta shes generating the horizon? Ist posse to speak in a meaningful way fof a “happening” without already making use of the traditional concept of time as 2 succession of moments, that 1 10 say, of Intatemporaty? ‘One may easly grant Heldenger that the tadonal concept of time does not heed the moment of (quas-transcendentl) ‘emporalizaion’ (Zz), hat bof gencrating the three ecstatic Almensions of the present, the past and the future, and that this exstatle structure of temporalization {which may be paralleled tom FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW the odie structure of the ‘apprehensive’, “eproducive™ and “recopnitve faculty of imagination) ialways already presupposed in ‘our talk of now’ in contradiction toa minute ao" and soon’) [At the same time, however, one has nevertles to insist that DY relrsng to “happening. the factal ‘one alter another’ ofa succes- son of moments and thos far empial“inwatemporaiy’ in the Kantian sense is presupposed too. I one absiracts completely from “atratemporality’~ as Heidepgcr seems to sugges in Beng ar Time and sil in his fst book on Kant ~ that is fone ties to conceive of ‘origina time’ only in the sense of the simultaneous originating of| the thee ‘estas then one can no longer understand the moving ofthe time, (t snot aceldental that mos philosophers, fr example Kant James and Husserl, used the metaphor ofa steam in talking shout the te or the consciousness of ime. But a steam ~ being a ‘continuous happening ~ i something that in Kant’s sense i aso intratempora 1 can be experienced within the frame of Kans temporal form of intuition, an that means: it must be empiialy| ascertainable, eg, by the distinction between the simultaneity and The succession of two events) Thus far the suspicion aries that Heidegger's reconstruction of ants conception of tanscendentalsyrhesis in ters of ‘riginal time may be doomed to failure. And this suspicion, think. fully confirmed by the changes in philosophical ‘architectonic’ that are connected with Heidegger's Keir. The quas-transcendenal under Standing of the original) time and thereby alo the quasi-Kandan distinction between estate temporaizaton’ and iniratemporaly, ‘snow tac given up rogtier wit the whole philosophy of subjee tity which now has to be overcome Meidegace nov speaks quite openly ofa happening’ of clearing” and simultaneously “concealing of being and thus ar of ‘history of being” Stilt may not be overlooked that Heidegger. by the “hap- pening’ (Erignn of the mision (Schikung) of Being. still means "emporaiztin’ (and “spacing’ or ‘spacaizaton’) as primordial constiution of meaning horizons of ifeworld eather than “occu ence’ within the world that hasbeen already constituted. The quasi transcendental notion of emporalzation” qua meaning constitution by Dan's project is transformed into the nction of a world- and ‘meaning constitution by the mission Schicung) of being. But it must ‘not be overlooked also that Heidegger now talks "epochal happen- ings ol the history of being’ that of happenings that followed each (CONSTITUTING MEANING AND JUSTIFYING VALIDITY 18 “other and may be considered as corresponding to the wel-knowe tnratemporal and ittahistorcl epochs of the history of philoso ‘hy as fr instance the foundation of metaphyskcs by the Greeks. the "uansformaton of ths foundation by the Romans and Christian and finaly the instauration of modern scence a ecinology asthe frame (Gest Tus precy ths inatemporaity and intra-historicy of “hap pening’ (Erie, which at the same time are consesed to ave ‘opened wp and thus originated the meaning of being that precedes the possibly of true and false judgements. And itis this itertwin ing of quasi-ranscendental temporalization and satatemporalty thar makes up the challenge of Heidegger’ ater philosophy to 2 transcendental philosophy that i orlented toward Kans conception ‘of 2 wnverslly valid constitution of the world’s objectivity by the synthetic functions of understanding oF reason. This challenge ‘culminates in Heidegger's aims thatthe whole philosophy ofthe transcendental subject ~ and, moreover. the whole philesophy in ‘genet as.an enterprise ofthe lg. reason (Vern), a8 acy af demanding and providing reasons ~ is now to be understod with regard tot valdty asa init result of am originating event of the history of being, Here a question might arse: ow can this Heideggerian thesis itself all be thought oF stated with a claim to universal valdty? Does it not tur uN, ater all, that ime inthe traditional sense, ‘which was already considered by Parmienides and Plato as the most serious endangering ofthe possibilty of thought’ valdty~that ume In this sense in Heidegger’ late philosophy holds sway over reason Which according to the eater Heidegger was toe identical with ‘orignal ime"? (With Gadamer the same problematic reappears — the only diffrence being her that Gadamer doesnot take pains to ‘deny the inratemporal character of what he calls Singer ot ‘even Wahrhengecheon. He sll wishes to respond in # sense to the tanscendental question as 10 the “conditions of the posibiity of understanding.” but he no longer sees any dificlty in answenng this question exclusively i terms of historical happenings or ever processes ~ finally n terms of ontological or cosmological processes of playing that seem to be conceived in a pre-Kantian sense of fontology" ‘Nevertheless. after this reconstruction of Heeger’ time phi losophy which finaly amounts to 2 destrction of transcendentalue FROM A TRANSCENDENTALSEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW Philosophy, we must again ask the question whether Heidegger’ Soproach fs justified as an answer to the question about the cond tions of the possibilty of the meaning constitution forthe hfewod ‘With regard to tis question we have suggested that i points wo the heed for a transorination of transcendental philosophy. since a pre transcendental consciousness cannot explain the constitution of the concrete pre-understanding ofthe signtiance ofthe Meworld ‘hati presupposed by all cognition. To this extent eters trans formation of Kans transcendental philosophy seems to be plausible But our reconstruction ofthis transformation as also led us to make the following point Heider’ presupposition of a meaning: Constitutive temporality and hisoncty of world-undersanding ‘which finally leads 10 the meaning-constvtive happenings of the history of Being turns out tobe incompatible wih the possibilty of answering Kant’ question as 10 the conditions of the possibilty of| the universal objectivity and hence inter-subjecuve valdty of our ‘understanding, Which consequence may be drawn from this a Jemma? bo we perhaps ~ following Heidegger ~have to consider the possiblity tht all objective valty of knowledge and thus far the Possible truth and falsehood of judgements is dependent ina uni tral way, on the preceding happenings of a word disclosure that aricultes and delves self nthe historical languages? “The splint of our time appears w be prepared to acept this principled subordination of te question of the validity of knowledge fan, by the way, also of norms) under the questian of historical ‘world dlscosure qua meaning consttution. Thus the truth and fae hood of scientific discoveries ~ according to Thomas Kuh ~ may be understood as dependent upon the preceding constituion of the ‘paradigms’ of ‘rormal science” Which themselves may be compared vrith the historical ‘earings’ of ‘cancealings” ofthe “istry of be ing’. tn accordance with this conception also the rightness or wrong- ‘est of moral arms sees be dependent on a particular. contingent ‘eonsensus-bast at Romy suggests, in brie the validity ofthe ls {ceason) and its modes, which serve universality and identity seems to be subordinated 0-2 meaning-constiutive happening. of temporal-hstrial generation ofdferences (hat Derrida tems 1a silfeance') However, there sa transcendenta-ellenve argument that we «ould oppose to this tendency: she universal validity daim of the etranscendentalation arguments themselves is not compatible ‘with the propositional content ofthese argument: arguments that relative heir own valiity cai to sempora-historks! happenings cannot state a least tis telativzation itset with 9 corresponding validity claim, Apart from this central paradox, he question arises ‘whether there is infact 9 unilateral relation of dependence berween | the truth and falsehood of empirical judgements andthe preceding clesting-oncealing world disclosures as suggested by Heidegger's theory of th. Could it not be that there i rather relation of reciprocal dependence beeen both sdes = sch that ako the in suis disclosure of meaning on its part is dependent om is being tested in those processes of experience and learing that itself has rade them possible? In Being and Tine Heidegger himself had ested the possibilty of such a relation of mutual correction by Introducing is notion ofthe ‘hermeneutic dele’ However, ven one defends the later strategy 1 would, one is blatantly sspposing in contradistincton to classical tanscenden tal plosophy ~ that the question a tothe conditions ofthe possi ity of meaning constitution Is not the same asthe question aso the «conditions ofthe posilty of justifying the validity of knowledge {or of norms). This distinction, which, om spar, makes possible 9 new relating of both dimensions of the transcendental problem. appears o me to turn out a an intern result of our reeansruction ‘of Heidegger's transformation of transcendental philosophy. in my opinion this interim result may serve as a vantage point for another sategy which san alternative to the fashionable sat ‘egy of deranscendenvalizaon: this alternative should do justice, on the one hand, wo she history of the world's meaning constiution and its being the precondition for tre an fase judgements, bu also to the condltions of the universal and timeless validity of these judgements, on the other. (This holds not only for the empitea Judgements that have been! made possible bythe meaning constitu tion but also forthe philosophical judgements about the relationship between meaning constitution and the vay of jadgments) "To cotrbwrate this thesis I must discuss in a detour the internal felation and the difference between the problematic of meaning onstitation and ofthe justification of vaiity within the history of| transcendental philosophy.ning constitution and justification cof validity in the frame of a transcendental pragmatics of language ‘The relation between the question of meaning constitution and the question of validity within the history of ‘ranicendental philosophy Let me fist state that for Kant the question ast the conditions ofthe posibity ofthe objecive validity of scientific Knowledge coincides trith the question a 1 te transcendental conditions ofthe const tion of the a prior meaning of objectivity (i. Gegnstndihein ‘More specially. Kant does answer the frst question by reducing it to the second, This constitutes the point of the “Copernican tur ‘which inspired by the baste po of modern philosophy, according to which we can understand «priori only what we ourselves have made or in a certain sense can make-” But Kant could make plu sible his solution ofthe transcendental problem only by confining bis entre problematic to the question of the consation ofthe @ Prior valid form of objective experience and hence ofthe objectivity fof the world tobe experienced ‘This situation was changed however i a fundamental way by Huset's expanding of the Kantian problematic of transcendental Constitution, that is by Hussed’s transcending Kan’s question In fonder to account oF the constitution of the concrete mantfldness of the meaning contents of experience of the Meworkd — such as it texpresesitsetin language. Such an expansion implied as its imme: tite consequence, t elieve, thatthe Kanan ideniaion ofthe formal «prior conditions of meaning constitution withthe cond tons of the justification of the valaty of knowledge could no longer be redeemed. For the presuppositions of meaning constitution in the sense of the concrete manifoldness of world dscesure reler indeed to those temporal-hstorial conditions that were assumed by Heidegger. Re that ast may, the pecllaety andthe deficieney of Huser’ transformation of transcendental philosophy ated to the fact that the preserved te solution strategy of Kans philosophy of the ta scendental subject even with regard to his expanded problematic of meaning constitution, For akhouh he ha extended the question in the way 1 pointed out he nevertheless wished to give the answer ~| ina certain analogy to Kant ~by reducing the meaning consittions| ofthe lifeworld tothe intentional achievements ofa transcendental onsciousnes, without taking ino account the language medkaton ofthe vas variety of the meaning contents ofthe Hfeworl, Thus he twas able, 26 It appeated, to escape Heidegger's problematic of @ temporal-historical world-meaning constitution and thereby adapt his newly detected problematic of the pre-sientitie meaning om suuuilon of the Meworkd to that of a Kantian transcendental Philosophy, But this restoration af the programme of classical tr Scendeatal plosophy was evidently dooried o failure because Huss! totaly overlooked the rle of inguistic mediation and thus of ‘the dependence on history ofeancrete meaning consitation Does this rejection of Husser's projet of tanscendental phi- losophy allows for an alternative to Heidegger's transformation and destruction of wanscendentalplilesophy? Must the alternative to Hussea’s strategy of reducing the justification of the valdty of ‘experience to meaning constitution by the transcendental subject be ecesarily- the reduction of al validity to the meaning const tion by the history of being, as suggested by Heeger? ‘A transcendental-pragmatic renegotiation of the analysis ofthe ‘prestructure’ of understanding in Being and Time Inmy opinion thre san altenatve to the Heideggerian suggestion, tis opened bythe same reflection that ~a st step ~ enforced the assumption of tempora/-historkeal meaning constiution: namely by the reflection on the language mediation of our understanding of the lifeworld For ths reflection poins not only wo the undeniable historcty of meaning constitution but also tothe fact tha, aleady fom the level of communicative understanding ofthe meaning of ox ‘tteranees,aelaim to universal vad of meaning is presupposed: « claim tothe validity of meaning which can be definitively redeemed Fit at all = only by the possible consensus of an indefinite, eal ‘community of ommuniciton and interpretation (4s understood by Peirce and Royce). In a semotically transformed transcendental ‘hiksophy this regulative idea” as to take the place (40 10 speak) ff the tanscendeatal subject of meaning constitution (which on usse's account as to warrant the universal intersubjective va lity of meaning by ts solitary intentional achlevezents). Ie the definite consensus of the ideal community of interpreta ion may be presupposed ~ which of couse can never be supposed ‘empirically ~then the universally valid redemption of ll usable1 FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ‘meaning calms would be dentical with the historical meating eo stitution (te. everybody wovld atleast understand anybody else)” [And therefore, under this ideal presupposition and the additonal supposition ofan exhaustion o al tuth criteria that are avalabie to an indefinite community of searchers ~for example ofall possible ‘ela of evidence and coherence ~ the redemption ofall set" sively justifiable trth elim would ao be possible 1 argue that cis counterfactual supposition of the ideal of 2 ‘consensual justification ofvaliity claims (which was fest envisaged by ince) represents the alternative, of, $0 to speak, “ounter {instanceof reason, to Heidegger's conception ofthe history of being nd tothe tanecendental subject of asia transcendental philoso phy. Being a counterfactual suppostion and 2 regulative idea of ‘what consensual justification of validity woud be it obviously does hot contradict the factual dependence of our understanding. for ‘example of oor capability of asking questions and hence also ofthe teuth of Lalsehood of possible answers, on the tempora-histrical meaning constitution of he lifeworld. as His artclated in the language 2s medium of undestanding. Nevertheless. we have 10 ins that rom this dependence - which was explored by Heidegger it does not folow thatthe possible justification of vality ~ of neering and truth ~ is conditioned in a unilateral way by the preceding historical meaning consttion, in lght of the variety and diversiy of languages or language ames, the postulate of consensual ustieation of validity firstly inctlons as a regulative Hea of transltability and hence for 3 progressive translation and hermeneutic interpretation of meaning furthermore it functions as a regulative idea for the progressive research qua Searching forthe truth under the restrictive contions of asiracive meaning constitutions. Even these reste cond tions however do not constitute themselves merely in dependence fom the background conditions of the Iieword a6 they ate always ready opened up by the istry’ of being. For they are also always aleady constituted in dependence on learning processes in the sense ‘ral and error, an this means tthe ageo science, on method {ally controlled processes of discursive redemption of refutation on the bass of rte, Tehas to be conceded that we shall aways remain under the say ofthe historical and socioculral ‘background’ assumptions! the hfeworld. Up otis poi, view that, along with Helegger and ‘wingenstein, focuses only on dhe factual conions of understand: ng may appear ast ally considers only the historical happening fof meaning and truth, However, sich position would be Bind to the actual. performative valuty claims that are brought forward ‘nthe station of communication, and it i nally the validity lms ‘ofthe pilesophers themselves wh argue forthe histories postion that have tobe put under scrutiny. As Tse i, Heidejger hime who discovered the idea of the temporality of being (which isnot to he confused with the abstract beingness of traditional ontology. could never bring to bear 3s agains the generative power of time, a counter instance of reason, Tor example such thing as Ken's ‘regulative idea. This fandamen- tal deticiency secs 4 because in the lst resort, by the fact that Heidegger. already in Being and Tine, in his analysis of the pee structure of being-in-the-world or of understanding being, did not sccount by strict ranscendental reflection ~fr the csi iosaniver Ss1 validity and the presuppostions of his own analysis of the {exstendal-ontologcl) seucutes of being-inthe-word. instead bis analysis soto speak, fell upon the contingent, historically cond tioned structures of scicty”(geworenr-Entwar). Hereby he in ‘deed dlacovered for the first time those structures that today are called ‘background’ presuppositions of the lifeworld. Thas in Being {and Time the later utn of his philosophy in the sense of deriving the “thrown projet trom the ‘happening’ of the ‘mission of being” ad already been grounded ~ at leas in the sense that here was n0 gs ‘ofthe philsophical though self chat could be couaterposed tothe Iisory of being. The way 10 “dvranscendemtalization’ which today seems so plausible for many people was paved then, Bur this hol surtender ofthe Loto the supettorty of ime — at leas in Heidegger ~ rests om the fact that one part ofthe pe siracture of world understanding was overleat, 0 1 speak: namely that part which conains te specie valid claims and presuppos: tions of the philosophical analysis of being-in-the-world. In short 8 deficiency of refection came about that ~ by contrasting i with Heidegger’ talk of blivion of being’ (Seinergesenfet) ~ we may all it ‘oblivion of the fr (Lagosvergexenei). And should be oted that by “log would not understand the laos of the Gesel, that is of making avaliable by objecting or making present Heidegger's and Derrid’s sense, but a much wider fogs, which | presupposed by 9 communicative understanding and ~ Bray in =1 FROM A TRANSCENDENTALSEMIOTIC POINT OF ViEW ocr that connote retlectively denied without sel-comtradiction| bythe philosophical discourse sel At this point the task of 3 reiteration of Heidegger's analysis of the pre-srcture of world-understanding arises. if we desie a transformation of wanscendental philosophy that would be foviented toward a pragmatics of language communication, Such ' transformation should avoid Keidegsers reflection defict of the Zagssergexonhet without lesing sight of his discovery of the temporal-historical background presuppositions of the lleworld ~ ‘specally ofthe dearing-concealing trace ofthe meaning cor stitution by the linguistic world closure. I seems clear that this task cannot be canned theough to the end bya retin toa wanscee dental philosophy of the transcendental subject of consciousnes, that is either bya restriction ofthe problematic of meaning const tution to the constitution of objectivity in Kans sense nor by xe- ‘course 40 @ meaning constitution that ~ along Hussein lines ~ ‘ould be conceived as an intentional achlevement ofa sel-suliient Subject inthe wake of transcendental solipssm’. Instead {suggest that, atthe beginning ofthe philosophical venture, we rellect on those anscendentalprogmatie presuppositions of arguing thats of the argumentative discourse, that must be acknowledged ~in oeder to avoid a performative sell-contradicion ~ by each imerlocutor, in| ther words, even by each subject of empiially solitary thinking. ‘And [do insist on is suggestion, ever i at present, his appeas 0 be very unfashionable with regard to the opening move of the hilosophical language same, Notes Fie pubbed in Aga (eEurope ie. Aces Co [Cmts use Maghe grec Gees 199 (ova: Academe Ligeti 1A act nd er ini de des Denso ‘hoi pisophigue des types de rapa, Le Dba, 4 (198), 141-83. 1 Ato nsf main ane: Ley of ne SEAL Mecaiy tds. ft Pip nor Tafa? (Cami a Bind ne Nene, 1A FE iaser, ie Ris der each Wasi nd ae anced Phnom (the aoe Mt 1963), seis oranda 3 a Meerkat und des Problem der Mevephyik (Prankur a. Me 14 Tn rt ook om Kan, Hedger cme ‘hat se the pats fn fr eaence semper h 74) ater the Keres a #8 nde. ‘ood odes phony, coacened ram cpt snbence eS 1s Calne alr we Ma, othe second ein Ti ‘Mot & Siebeck. 1965), xv fy 15 Far be stry osc pe. lee er Spade de Tain er emeten ene Hepes Peblengeche) Ae ‘tigen | (Bon Hover 1955), 142-9 1 Apel Sewn eer vanmcedentle Hermeneuk in Fame Ze Paso anaes M: Stomp, 193), vl 2 178-31 Bag {easaon: overs «Tne of Piophy (London: Kuedge ‘cen, a ptr Bingo ry ede ana 1 hoe ‘ng eg od ine, he Cai of se Framework ol a-rariendet Semitie”in )Siverman snd. elon (ct), Conon Dea Powel alan Sate Unies f New 2a Aptis. Kensensthcre der Wabi und Leberundong in orum for Pope Sad Herb fe, Porte ond Bens (rn 9s stang,o),e ‘ekvns der Sprshkebeves nhc. Bouhar (ei Freee uf Spm Bein tnd New Yor: Be Gres, 1980), 45-476 Wittgenstein and Heidegger: language games and life forms ‘Thirty years on: a retrospective overview T would like to take up once again and develop stil further the comparison between Wisgensein and Heidegger which I undertook the Begining ofthe 1960s ina series of papers In what follows | {shal therefore be concemed with such questions a5: what new insights have been opened up since the Beginning ofthe 1960s with regard to the evaluation of Wingenstin and Heidegger? And what follows therefrom forthe critical development of the comparison I ‘made at that ime between the two thinkers? ist Ir scems to me that my positive evaluation ofthe epochal significance of both thinkers and of their~a that me stl surprising affinity has been confirmed both by she worldwide influence and by the now apparent convergence oftheir thinking. We no longer =| 4a In my stadent days in the decade after 1985 — have to contend ‘with the hermetically sealed and starkly opposed fields of (Anglo- Saxon and Scandinavian) analytical philosophy and coatinentl European) phenomenological philosophy. Rather, 2 convergence slong the fines of a linguistic pragmatic, or even 2 hermeneutical tum hat taken place ~ ght up to (post-Kuhnan) philosophy of| "science ~ and this situation f die largely to the historia impact of the convergence between Witgenstein and Heidegger ~ whereby ‘American pragmatism functions as the sounding-bosrd and amplifier. ‘On the other hand, i seems to me that my critique of Heidegger and Wittgenstein ~ ot, more exactly, ofboth thinkers inadequately Conducted reflection pon the ler (Le. of dscursive language fames and their unquestionable presuppositions) ~ which wa i fended only as provisional at the Begining ofthe 1960s, has inthe rcantime, acquired an increased relevance. Briefly, the reduction of WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER oy blosophy oself.therapy, a reduction which Wittgenstein’ rtigue df language and meaning linked withthe pseudo-peoblms of ad tional metaphysics, was paradoxical from the very beginning: for IC represented negation of cite) ptilosophy’s own aims 10 meaning and truth. Precsely this tendency created its ov Ascites. “Moreover. in Heidegger's ever more radical destruction’ of Western metaphysics (and more completely in Derida's ‘deconstruction’ and in Lyotard’ ‘postmodernism’, which veler back to Heldegger and ‘Wingenstein| this tendency is strengthened to the point of attesting to something lke the slt- destruction of philosophical reason.” The ‘opportunity opened up by Witgensein and Heidegger of efecting a post-metaphyscal transformation and reconstruction of philosophy | from the standpoint of discursive language games containing the conditions of the possibilty and validity of artical hermeneutis and a philosophical critique of language and meaning ~ seems to hhave gone to ground in self-destruction of philosophical discourse ‘through an all too uncial pursuit ofthe more problematic sugges- sions of two of the most prominent thinkers ofthe century The theme of ths chapter is aleady indicated in advance wid this ambivalent retospective view of the historical impact of ‘Wintgenstein and Heidegger Tn this frst part of the chapter woul ike once again to set out ‘the main point of convergence of the postive echevements of Witgenstin and Heidegger inthe form ofa summary and a supple- _mentation of my previous comparison. Admitedy. and owing othe Jack of space, this cannot be done with reference to the Witigenstein and Heidegger editions which have appeared inthe meantime. 1n- ‘ead we shall concenrate upon. selection and a description of what is essential i the historical impact of the to thinkers fom the Asiaing perspective of the present In the second ctl part ofthe chapter sehich wil carry the ost weight, { would lke to enter mote osely into an argument With Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Finally 1 would like to show that ‘either thinker wa folly cognizant of (and so both failed o measure ‘up to) the primary requlrement of philosophical Joes oF language fame, namely a rigorous teflection, in the medium of public lan- ‘uage, upon whats undertaken, believed in and presupposed when Dllosopbical questions are ralsed and theses developed ~ or ever ‘only siggestod. These latter, no matter hove sell they may {turnout tobe nus after al claim to consist of statements capable ofne FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ling asent about how things are in general that about the "atus of philosophy and its relation tothe world, "rst ofall then, let ws proceed with our comparson benween the postive achievements of Witgenstein and Heidegger. “The linguistic and hermeneutical tur in philosophy [As already indlated, what the achievements of Wigenstein and Fedegger have in common s the rendering possible ofa philosoph cal ctique of language and meaning. on the one hand, and a ‘Pragmatic hermeneuti, on the other. Whats meant by this? Let us first try to point out the paradigmatic function ofthe citique of language and meaning with reference 10 a problematic whieh plays an exemplary role in modern philosophy. Wittgensten’s and Heidegger's critique of the mentalism of ‘modern philosophy ‘The may In which the problem Is posed in modem philosophizing might be expressed inthe following train of thought. In reality ~ and this the basic assumption —enly that is certain wich i evident to me in inner experience, cherefore not the exis fence of things and persons in the external world but only that 1 believe Iam perceiving something here and nov. Thus my senss- tional experience or at best my representation of the extemal word isthe only genuine object of my consciousness whilst the things and persons which occupy the external world, inciuding thereunder the common world, reat best result of justified con ‘usions drawn on the bass ofthe data ofimmanental consciousness Indeed, even the fact that such conclslons ate justified in principle ‘must in principle, remain doubifl for epistemological philosophy. In the end, everything {take to be real could be something which ‘only appears in my consciousness, for example, could only be my ream, Or, the being of things might consist only in their being petecived, and soon, ‘With this sketch ofa problem, which could always be extended and spun out further, | wanted 19 pat tothe paradigmatlepresup- positions of modern philosophy, which already Sgured with Augus fine and with the Ockhamism ofthe late Middle Ages, and which have atleast served to determine the problem of consciousness in modem philosophy from Descartes to Huse. Even today philoso WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER ws ‘hers can be found who take the questions mentioned above 0 be Incaningful and pressing, But one may then be sure that they are thinking in accordance with a pre-Wigensteinian and a pre Hedeggerian paradigm. The intellectual revolution’ implied in the critique of meaning which has taken place ere can be most elec: tively ustrated with reference to the language games’ of late ‘Wirgenstein: more precisely, with reference tothe famous Thess that private languages impossible, n ther words that 'asoltary| Individual cannot follow a rule* ‘rom this standpoint, precsely what, after Ockham, and even. more $0 alter Descartes, leatured as the only cealmty of human ‘knowledge ~ the evidence of my inner experience ~ became ite ‘evant inthe framework fan inter-sobyectively valid world and sei understanding ‘With this however the subjective certainty of inner experince, for example the certainty that Ihave pains of the Cartesian certainty that [think or that I have spectc representations. i not called in ‘question. What i denied is only that this purely subjective certainty ‘can be distinguished epistemologically and that an (epistemological) primacy can be accorded to it over any inter-subjecively valid knowledge of the extemal word ‘The reason why the epistemological primacy af nner experience ‘cannot be legitimately sustained i that our knowledge daims are bound up with the assumption ofa shared language (net only with regard to thei possible truth but also with regard to thei ineligible meaningfulness and to this extent are inthe course af the language fame, bound up with a publedy controllable rule-folowing pro: cedure. In this linguistically founded assumption of the inter subjectively vali understanding of something lies the new paradigm | for philosophy, For it follows thercirom that the never certain But stl public ineligbe (and with regard to criteria controllable and ‘otrecable) experince ofthe external world mus assume a primacy ‘ver the subjectively private certainty of inner experience ‘should the epstemaogial primacy ofianer experience be up- held, t would have to be possible forthe epistemological subject 0 validate the eras of lner experience (for example the certain ties of pain sensations or ofa reflection about thinking oF about representations immanent to consciousness) n a private language, thats, na language which no one else could understand because it ‘would be characterized only by “pvae ideas" n John Locke's sense.26 FROM A TRARSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW ‘Such a language is however unthinkable, because its ules ~ bo | syntactic and semantical ~ cannot be learned and taught with reference to rue-following rites Ifthe certainty of ne experience were to furnish the bass for the traduction and application of semantic rules there would then. ‘sccording to Witgenstein, have co be something like a “icionary which would exist nly in my mind: that i, is word meanings ‘would have to be established by means of definitions relating (0 brvate sensations or representations. And in order 10 reidently| these sensations and tepresenations one would have to reler the table of meaning i the dictionary tothe representations in ques tion nother words, witha view to justifying the correctness of my “pplication of the semantic rules I would never be able to appeal 0 “anything independent of my consciousness. Rather would have to fely upon memory. According to Wtgensteln, tis would be asi ould decide about the question of whether Thad corectly noted the ‘departure tine ofa rain’ only by remembering an image ofthe page ‘ofthe timetable and not by testing ths memory image with relerence to a publicly accessible timetable” This means however that it {impossible to establish the distinction between right and wrong. For Without recourse to an instance sadependent of my consciousness there could be no distinction besween ‘following the rue’ and inking one llowang the eu’ In fac the indubitable certain of inner experience in the pos Ccanesian philosophy of modern times exists precisely because the sstincion in question between doing and thinking one fs doing that Js between being and appearing, would be suspended. And this postive paradigm serves to account forthe direction ofthe modern ‘ertique of knowledge, namely scepticism. For Descartes’ ‘problem- tc Hdealiem’ which was taken s0 Seriously by Brish empiricism | land which Kant accepted as meaningful even ifzefutable, this doubt fundamental tothe modem ertque of knowledge ress on the sup position: whatever is not certain inthe sense of inner experience that is those judgements which are at times true and at times fase because they telate roan external world independent of me, these Judgements could always be fale because there might be no external ‘worl, because might be the ese that everything which i taken 10 ‘be rea simply exists as my dream, ‘A this point the cxtique of meaning implicit in the considera- tion of language games underying all world and self-understanding WITToENSTEIN AND HeIDEGceR oo ‘wil become still clearer than withthe destruction of the paradi atc illusion of the epstemologieal primacy of “inner expesence For is enough to check the language game with reference to the phrase ‘spy my dream’ (i.e. ‘simpy in consciousness’) in order to recognize the meaninglessness of the statement ‘everything. could simply be my dream’ (he. could simply be in consciousness) For the language game which makes the dramatic meaning ofthe phrase ‘simply my dream’ possible clearly presupposes asa paradig ‘matic certainty that not everythings my dream but that areal world ‘exists, For this language game would have to be suspended as 2 possible language game if everyting were simply my dream. But then, in pracice, nothing has changed. One has only introduced 2 ‘new language game ofc a kind that what was previously under ‘ood by ‘snply my dream’ now has to be introduced with the ™ more petinenty, & similar imitation of our understanding must perhaps be assumed fr the understanding of foreign human lle forms, that is, so-called primitive cukures. "To this primarily synchronous relativism of the Wigensteinian perspective there now largely corresponds the primarily diachronic relativism of epochal world daring which (as bas been shown above) with Heidegger emerges out ofthe historical ransformaton ofa Dascin-elated concep of wth a ‘disclosure’. Above all its the following intellectual configuration which seems 10 correspond to {the function of Kuhn’ concept ofa paradigm. tna later statement in| ‘he Task of Thinking” Heidegger conceded on the one hand that it would be “inappropriate” to interpret his concept of world clearing lor example, revealing-conceling or altel as he ‘orginal con cept of truth’. For the element of correcness. in the sense of a ‘correspondence with something pre-gven, i Lacking. On the other Inand, he emphasized once again that with the concept of ighting 1 dimension had been opened up which systematically preceded the traditional concept of truth. For i this instance i was a question of the condition of the possibilty of tue or false judgements tat is statements about beings “The connection ofthis intellect coniguration with the fune: tion ofthe Kuhnian paradigm is clesely tobe found inthis consid eration: that in both eases where the possibility of an advance in “knowledge i in question = incuding the proces of verification and falsification ~ the later i, a one-sided manner, made to appear dependent upon a preceding condition. To Kuhn's normative para figm there coresponds Heidegger’ dering, a clearing which, as linguistically world-dsclosve, Hist opens up the meaning horizon for possible snc questions. And true or false judgements mus {5 Gadamer has shown, be undersiood a answers to actual, or at Teast to possible. questions” Tp this extent It would be true 10 ‘onchude thatthe findings of Wester scence in general are depend: ‘ent upon paradigmatic meaning oF interrogatve horizons, harzons which could not be opened up at all in cultures with eitferent linguistic modes of word disclosure ~fo example the Hop people of [New Mexico,” At this point the convergence berteen Heidegger’ hermeneutical undersanding of language and Witgensein’s ana yea understanding ofIangvage games becomes even clearer. ‘One diference between Heidegger and Kuhn or Witgerseinoa FROM A TRANSCENDENTAL-SEMIOTIC POINT OF VIEW seems to consist in this, thatthe uncovering-covering. meaning ‘eating inherent in Heidegger's undersanding of Westen world istry is a¢ a whole quite expiily characterized bythe ‘event’ of the founding of philosophy a¢ metaphysics by the Greeks, To this fexent the diferent scientific paradigms sshich follow theretrom ‘an obviously not be regarded by Heidegger as incommensurable’ in very respect since they have 4 be understood as consequences of ‘he founding of metaphysics, The pot of Heidegger's supposition is tobe found inthe thesis that lveady inthe metaphysical uncovering ofthe meaning of being with Pato ~tha is inthe so-called theory fof Kdess = the mode of uncovering ofthe world assumes the form of| the subject-object relation and therewith also of an ‘entraming’ of sce technology, that is ofthe technological scence of modern Europe. ‘By comparison with this Heideggrian vision (which corr sponds to his ifelong attempt at a reconstruction and destuction of Western metaphysics) the Witgensteinin representation of n= ritely many langage games and ile lems, on the one hand and as we have already noted, marked by an a historical intelectval ‘model ~ especialy In the transitional period between the Tracats| and the Philp! Investigations. On the other hand, ts usrated fn late Witigensein along the lines of ethnologial examples an slobaly, with reference to the idea of a ‘natural history ‘These diferences donot however make It impossible for us ~ as the example of Kuhn has already shown ~10 establish a convergence of the Heideggerian and the Wittgenstenian perspectives. in the sense, 09, of2 relativistic and hisorcalstie orientation of Western philosophy in genera. Frequently these very characteristics are re jected a5 4 misunderstanding ~ a5 the consequence of a way of thinking which itself metaphysical and which has not learned how to assimilate the new standpoveteyond relativism and abjectvism [At the end of the chapter I would like to resist precisely this suggestion “To this end, I would Ike frst to set out what in my opinion. ‘constitute the most important philosophical results ofthe historically eflectve convergence ofthe intelectual claims of Wigensteln and Heidegger. With Heidegger the most important claim consist inthis, ‘that meaning-cearing andthe trath which. inthe final analysis, dependent upon i, must be thought as meaning (or truth) even ‘that ints most rdiclaccentuation. Even the insight ~ opened up swith the philosophical truth dlalm that our aby te pose questions Is genetically dependent upon the clearing event ofthe history of being is clearly, according to Heidegger, sell dependent upon the temporal occurence of the history of being fr its validity, The loos of our thinking (for instance, our argumentative procedure) which twas above all taken to be independent of time by the Greek of| Dhllesophy now has to be regarded as dependent upon the “other fof reason’ ~ the temporality of being. Nevertheless it should be possible o frame this insight in the form of 2 universally valid philosophical tess about the history of being. Is this claim, a claim which has been carried over from Heidegger into pilesophical postmodernism, tenable fom the standpoint ofa critique of mean- Ing? Or does it not rater lead toa sll-suspension ofthe language same of philosophy? ‘Witha view 1oanswering these questions we shall have recourse to Witgensteins criique of language and meaning. However, i ‘ust be sai that Witigenstein and the Witigenstinians donot offer ‘uch in the way of helpful objections but rather tend to complete tnd to strengthen the Heldeggerian claims. To be sore, Witgenstela| tirelessly traced the diseae of seemingly unsolvable pllesophical problems back to 4 misunderstanding of she function of language ‘And in this sense he di indeed - a¢ shown above = take into ‘consideration the phenomenon ofthe sel-suspenson ofthe pho “opbica language game. But he never applied these kinds of analyses ina sticly reflective manner to his own, suggestive statements about philosophy as a disease resulting from a misuse of language [Above all (and particularly after the poradoxialsll-suspension of| the philosophical language game in the Traqans) he never again posed the reflective question concerning the linguist conditions of the possiblity of one's own language game, that Is. the question ‘concerning the presuppostions not ofthe pseudo-language-games o ‘metaphysics which were 10 be critically resolved by him, but about the language game involve in is own entically therapeutic philoso: ‘hy which, clearly, could only ‘show the fly dhe way out ofthe My-bottle” and cure the sickness through lingustally formulated Insights, and not throug the dispensing of medicaments. 'A his point we have to take account ofthe fllowing circu: stance, The well-known statements by Witigenstin in the Pisophi- fal Investigations on the method of philosophy such as. for example, ‘ave may not advance any kind of theory... We might do away withail explanation, and description alone must ake is place” (1, § 109) ‘or Philosophy simply pus everything belore us and nether explains ror deduces anything. Since everybing lies open to view there i ‘nothing to explain. For what I idden, for example, of no interes to us (1. § 126) Statements of this kind ceainly attest to the ‘originality of his method. But they do-not make it dear to wnat fexent they make # possible for Witgenstein to communicate, ‘through the summoning-up of examples those insights into the ‘workings of our language’ (2, § 109) which should help us to get ‘things ‘straight’ and which ae so complete ‘that philosophical prob Jem should completely disappear’ (1. § 133) ttisjust not enough to simply set out of 10 describe, the everyday language games on the fone hand and, on the other, the empty language games of philoso phy. Rather, i is necessary a east to point aut the reasons = that is the universally valid sights af philosophy ~ which make i possible to play lf the one language game against che othe, These reasons are atleast suggested by Wittgenstein in his ever renewed intima tions towards philosophical theory-building a the level ofa specie Dllosophical language game in which he, as much a any other philosopher, was obliged to participate. Here we run up against a rellectve deficiency which s bound up With his ~ ip many instances helpful ~ predisposition fr the ‘pure describing’ of examples. Certainly i s possible ~ as Witgenstein’s| ‘work demonstrates ~ to correct the a pir assumptions and aver hasty generalizations of systematic philosophy with the analysis of ‘examples, But one cannot hope to render intlighble in this way the specific aims to vat ofall philosophical statements ~ even those Satements which bear the brunt of the eriigue of language and ‘meaning. To put it otherwise: one cannot render intelligible the cual function of philosophical language games trough language fame analysis in this way By presenting this language game as just, fone language game among these or alongside others. which means emesed ina particular form of if with particulat “conventions "uses" or ‘customary practices. For the clam satis raised by the philosophical language games practised by Wittgenstein in the de- Scriptve presentation of pantcular ‘conventions has 0 ise above the embedding ofall language games in particular fe forms and, 10 thisextent, above the facticty and contingency ofall language games lndlife lorms and so express something thats universally valid. This ‘unavoidable claim to universality can be rendered intligile oniy nthe following way, one that seeks to analyse the function ofthe philosophical language game in strict rellection" upon what one {oes and presupposes asa philosopher, with the description of par ticular language games and Ife fons, Such a methodological aim would however, atleast for the pos-Traaams Witgensten, be tab00 = as though, forthe pragmatic language-game analysis the view ‘oriented towards the semantics ofthe statement were still re, the ‘lev, namely, that any actual eflecion upon language has to ead to semantic antinomies* ‘radically pragmatic questioning ofthe semantic paradigm, of the kind intoduced by Wittgenstein in his anguage-game theory leads however to the conclusion that the pragmatic huncion of language games must also be analyse, which means suspending the semantically orented prohibition against the self-reference of the speech act. Only inthis way does one find onesell in a postion to recogite the denial ofthe specifically philosophical claim to univer salty as a peelormative contradiction and, 10 this extent, as sl suspension of the philosophical language game. ‘As things stand today, Witgenstin’s one-sided and unsatisfac. tory thematzaion of the philosophical language game ~ just 36 Heidegger's one-sided (ongetfulnes of the Lge) analysis of the factctyof beingin-the-world (a a historically thrown projection’) has tended to promote a very general confusion concering the Setlundersanding of palosophy and provoke an era of pragmat cally inconsistent philosophical statements. { would Ike to support, this wth relerence to two famous Witgenstcinian theses the arp ‘ment against dhe possibilty ofa ‘prvate language’ and the argament ‘gaint the possiblity of universal doubt in On Certain. Inboth cases Tam deeply indebted 10 Wittgenstein’ theses. And 1 would bere lke to interpret these theses in a transcendnally pragmatic fashion as have attempted todo elsewhere What does this mean? In the case of the argument against the possibilty of a pevate language, the emphasis should be placed on two points Fist it isnot possible to talk meaningtully about a person $ following a rule ~ for ‘example, speaking a language ~if ts not in principle posse for lother subjects — fora community ~ £0 contol the following ofthe rule on the basis of publ erteria which make t possible for them too t0 follow the rule, for instance, to enter into communicative relations with the person S, Second, in addton, the following mustalso be emphasized. The person S~for example the speaker $~ us link up with an already existing procedure for rule-following = for ‘eaample an actual language usage. To this exten, one might say, Sis in fac subjected 10a factcal apron and w histrlaty ‘These two requltements can be grounded in a pragmatclly teanscendental manner. Their rejection though arguments which must be capable of eliciting aceptance must lead 0 performative contraiction in the argumentative procedure. The later eould not Oo tse avoid the objection of having. in the couse of his or her ‘argumentative procedure, followed a rule whichis in principle pr ‘ate, For in tha cise he or she would have suspended the language fame of arguing rather ike the one wih says (or think): "Perbaps am always dreaming” ‘Solar, so good. But the dificult with Wittgenstin’s argumen- tative procedures begin when one asks with him the question who ~ fon the basis of what exterion- decides whether a rule ~for example ‘udion in arlehmelc ~ has been followed correctly. Two possible Snswers for Wiigenscin can be distinguished here, even though both will have to be rejected inthe end. Fest the possibilty of recuering to the remembered rule: following intentions of indvidval subjects asthe actual sates of &| posse inner experience. Here Witgensein can quite appeopratly| object that in inner experience no distinction can be established between following the rule correctly and thinking that one has followed the rule correctly, The last ofthese alternatives ean only be subjective & pointed out eae. Second, for Witgenstin the possibilty is also excluded of pos ting the erterion of validity fr folowing rales with Plato or Frege ~ ‘or with Kal Popper ~ as the ideal conten ofa third world beyond the material outer world and the subjecive world of inner experience). Wittgenstein is always able 10 object 10 such a rule- be posible in principle? Teshould be emphasized that of course itis not necessary t hold that the history ofthe world o of humanity has ancestry path’ or rust be conceived of or prophesied as a causal or teleologically determined proces. Tis metardct of modernity (Lyotard) a5 de ployed by Hegel, Comte or Marx may well be declared to be dead." But before this hubris onthe par of reason arose, Kant had into: duced an entzely diferent concept of progress. He had, a biting the subject at hand, aleady established that its our moral duty to hold a morally relevant progress of humanity to be, at least in principle, posible and, in an atitude resting, soto speak, fuses Son, to reconstruct history again and again such that is practial ‘continuation from 2 moral perspective can appear to be posible* A post-Heideggerian or post-Gadamerian hermeneutic must hold this rounded dea of a practical progres, (one) which would be Internally related toa progress in understanding. aso to bea met rr of modernity which, in the meantime, has died! What would ‘then stl remain? ‘Gadamer at east does not wish to give up the Mea of moral, ‘obligation. For him and his German followers there sl remains a neo-Aristtelian ete with neo-pragmatic and Witgenstinian | “undertones. nits name one could explain how there til can be an ethicotphronss and ofthe commonly accepted (Wittgenstein would say: the “pracces’ of ae form’, which determine respectively the language game and to that exten also the fre-strctare of ob pe understanding ofthe world) even i there can be no ete with 2 ‘aim to universal vality and thus a claim to ground the progress of