KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG

BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. vs.HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ

Facts:

On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality),

Metro Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG
BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez,
for the latter's management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract
provides for a twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a
like period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at
a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM
within the first five (5) days of each month which shall, however, be increased by ten percent
(10%) each year during the first five (5) years only.

The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the
New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to PD No. 175
and Letter of Implementation No. 23

Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr.,
petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of
the agreement, directed a review of the aforesaid contract. He sought opinions from both the
Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the
instrument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken
towards its rescission.

Bunye approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution,
Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine
Constabulary, proceeded to the public market and announced to the general public and the
stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the management and operation of the
facility, and that the stallholders should henceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality,
thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.

On 22 August 1988, the KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a
complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers. The complaint was premised
on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market effected "in excess of his (Bunye's) alleged
authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a public official."

The writ applied for having been denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye
and company to complete the take-over; they continued holding office in the KBS building,
under their respective official capacities.

On 26 August 1988, Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
charging Bunye and his co-petitioners with oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for taking over the management and
operation of the public market from KBMBPM.

In the early morning of 29 October 1988, a Saturday, respondent Madriaga and Coronado,
allegedly accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters' heavily armed men, both in uniform
and in civilian clothes, together with other civilians and other unidentified persons, allegedly
through force, violence and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of
petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building, new Muntinlupa Public Market,
purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28
October 1988, and to implement the same, by taking over and assuming the management of
KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding
and prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful
functions as such.

The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the
general membership of the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance "in the removal
of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership" of
the cooperative and that the "ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of
Agriculture auditors show (sic) that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that
cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the
provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM." It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by
the Department "in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of
P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113

Issue: WON 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture is valid

Held:

Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot
be deprived of that right.

The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated
unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove
the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175
which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not
give him that right.

An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. 72 These powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution. 73

Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of
subordinate officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs;
and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative
supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently
and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission
of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection
to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take
such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including
rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass
upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them.

The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner
by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better
than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of
the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a
power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly.

SOLANO LAGANAPAN vs. Mayor ELPIDIO ASEDILLO

Facts:

The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan,
Laguna, with a compensation of P660.00 per annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1
July 1960, his salary was increased to P720.00 per annum, and he was extended an
appointment which was approved as provisional under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by
the Commissioner of Civil Service.

On 1 April 1962, the petitioner was given another increase in salary and a corresponding
appointment was made which the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved under Sec. 24(c) of
Republic Act No. 2260, to continue until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30) days
from receipt of certification of eligibles by the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna."

Then, on 1 July 1963, 1 July 1964, and 1 July 1965, he was again given salary increases, and
new appointments were extended to him, which appointments were also approved under
Section 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was summarily dismissed from his position by
respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his appointment was provisional and
that he has no civil service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender his firearm and other
office equipment to the Municipal Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of
petitioner's dismissal on the same day. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting
chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna on the same day, in place of the petitioner.

Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the
salary of the chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna. In view thereof, the petitioner complained to
the Police Commission which advised him to file an injunction suit against Mayor Asedillo.

Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo warranto with preliminary mandatory
injunction against respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna,
and Epifanio Ragotero, before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, seeking his reinstatement
to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages.

Respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the
petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the petitioner having no civil service
eligibility, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the
appoint power; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, declaring his dismissal illegal.

Issues:

1. WON the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies was observed

2. WON the appointment of petitioner is provisional in nature and thus, temporary
3. WON respondent mayor alone should be held responsible
 4. WON the dismissal of petitioner was illegal

Held:

I.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in terminating the services of the appellee, the
appellant Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any semblance of compliance or
even an attempt to comply with the elementary rules of due process. No charges were filed; nor
was a hearing conducted in order to give the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite
the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966,
which took effect on 8 September 1966, that "Members of the local police agency shall not be
suspended or removed except upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board of
Investigators herein provided for misconduct or incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the
Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law."
Following the rule, there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before appellee
could come to court for the protection of his rights.

Besides, it appears that the order was immediately executed and the appellee was immediately
removed from office and replaced by the appellant Epifanio Ragotero on the same day, so that
appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, even if available to the appellee, was not an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

II.

The court find no merit in the appellants' contention that, since the appointments extended to
the appellee as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna were all provisional in nature, and not
permanent, his services could be terminated with or without cause, at the pleasure of the
appointing officer. While it may be true that the appellee was holding a provisional
appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary official who could be
dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days
after receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligibles from the Civil Service
Commission. 16 Here, no such certification was received by Mayor Elpidio Asedillo thirty (30)
days prior to his dismissal of the appellee.

III.

The court find no merit in the contention of the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna
that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held liable for the back salaries of the petitioner,
because the records show that the action was instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally,
but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared and defended
the action in such capacity.

Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of the petitioner by respondent
Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of opposing or
at least protesting the petitioner's summary dismissal from his position, even abolished the
appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider this act of
the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent
Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner, as to make said municipality equally liable, as
held by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the reinstatement of petitioner and for the
payment of his back salaries.
IV.

The trial court, therefore, did not commit error in finding that the summary dismissal of the
petitioner was illegal and in ordering the respondent Mayor and respondent Municipality to
reinstate him with back salaries from the time of his dismissal.

The appealed judgment, however, needs some modification in the light of supervening events. It
would appear that the reinstatement of the petitioner-appellee to his former position of chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna, as ordered in the appealed judgment, is no longer feasible and
hence, it cannot be enforced, in view of the appointment of a permanent chief of police (now
called Station Commander) in accordance with PD 482, issued on 13 June 1974, which
provides for the integration of police and fire departments and jails in certain provinces,
including the province of Laguna.

BF HOMES, INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE WATER-WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION vs.

NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL

Facts:

Petitioners BF Homes, Inc., is a residential subdivision owner-operator and as such,

constructed water distribution systems at its several subdivisions so that residents would have
an adequate supply of potable water. Petitioner applied for and was granted a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity in respect of its water distribution system at its Las Piñas
subdivision. Petitioner sought authority from the respondent National Water Resources
Council to transfer the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to its co-petitioner, the
Philippine Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC). To date, the application for
transfer has yet to be acted upon by the respondent Council.

Petitioner also has a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to operate its water
distribution system at B.F. Homes Parañaque. On 25 June 1985, petitioner sought authority
from respondent Council to increase the water rates at B.F. Homes Parañaque. Petitioner
alleges that the increase in rates was not opposed by the residents of that subdivision who, as
a matter of fact, sought immediate approval so that the increased rates would enable petitioner
to meet the power bills from the Manila Electric Company, power being essential for operation
of the water distribution system. Respondent Council similarly failed to date to act upon this
application to increase rates.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the respondent appellate court to compel
respondent Council to act on the application for transfer of the franchise at Las Piñas to PWCC
and also to act upon the application for authority to increase water rates.

Respondent appellate court, in two Resolutions, dismissed the petition for mandamus upon the
ground that mandamus will not issue to compel the respondent Council to act on the matters
pending before it, since such acts are not ministerial in nature.

Issue: WON matters pending before the respondent council is ministerial in nature

Held:

The respondent appellate court feR into reversible error here. It is established doctrine that
mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties,
that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a
particular way or to approve or disapproue a specific application.

Petitioner, however, does not here seek to compel respondent Council specifically to approve
petitioner's applications pending before it. What petitioner seeks, and this it is entitled to, is a
writ that would require respondent Council to consider and deliberate upon the applications
before it, examining in that process whatever evidence lies before it and to act accordingly,
either approving or disapproving the applications before it, in accordance with applicable law
and jurisprudence and in the best interest of the community involved. Per the records of this
case, respondent Council has failed, for unexplained reasons, to exercise its discretion and to
act, one way or the other, on the applications of petitioners for a prolonged period of time
imposing in the process substantial prejudice or inconvenience upon the many hundreds of
families living in the two subsidivisions involved. It appears, further, that respondent Council
failed to inform petitioner of a supposed need for additional data concerning petitioner PWCC.

NATIVIDAD Q. SALOMON, vs. NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

On July 20, 1986, petitioner Natividad Q. Solomon was elected Director of District II of
respondent LUELCO for a term to expire in April 1988. However, Eduardo P. Marzan, who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the election, filed an election protest with
respondent National Electrification Administration (NEA).

On the basis of a finding that petitioner was not a bona fide member of the LUELCO at the time
of her election, NEA decided the election protest against petitioner.

Petitioner filed a letter-appeal dated February 25, 1987, which was in the nature of a motion
for reconsideration of the NEA ruling.

Being the Barangay Captain of Natividad (Poblacion), Naguilian, La Union, petitioner was
appointed by the then Minister of Local Government Jaime N. Ferrer as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, representing the barangay officials of the province.
And on March 18, 1987, petitioner took her oath of office and thereafter assumed her duties as
such.

In April 1987, respondent administrator Rodrigo Cabrera, in his capacity then as Deputy
Administrator, ruled on behalf of the NEA that the designation of the petitioner to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union disqualified her from further acting as LUELCO
Director and that the Board of Directors could appoint her successor for the unexpired portion
of her term.

The ruling of the then NEA Deputy Administrator Rodrigo Cabrera was grounded on the
provision of Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 269 to the effect that "elective officers of the
government; except barrio captain and councilors, shall be ineligible to become officers and/or
directors of any (electric cooperative)." (Section 21 P.D. No. 269). That the said legal proviso is
also incorporated in section 3, Article IV, of the LUELCO's by-laws which runs: "No person
shall be eligible to become or to remain a board member of the cooperative who holds an
elective office in the government above the level of a barangay captain.' (Rollo, p. 3)

Respondent NEA Deputy Administrator Rodrigo Cabrera, ruling on petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, sent a radio message to the LUELCO Board of Directors stating that the letter
appeal of the petitioner to the NEA had been rendered moot and academic and the Board may
now avail of Article IV, Section 12 of the By-laws in filling up the vacancy in District II and
pursuant to the said radio message, the LUELCO Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 15-
04-87, appointing Mr. Eduardo P. Marzan as a member of the Board of this cooperative
(LUELCO) to serve the unexpired portion of the term of Mrs. Natividad Salomon;

Petitioner filed with NEA another letter appeal addressed to NEA Administrator Ernesto Tabios
requesting that Resolution No. 15-04-87 be declared null and void.

In reply thereto, Editha S. Bueno, NEA Director for Cooperative Development, in a letter dated
May 7, 1987, furnished the petitioner with a copy of the Memorandum dated October 7, 1980
of Atty. Manuel P. Senar, Chief Corporate Legal Counsel of NEA

Said letter dated May 7, 1987 was in effect a denial of the request to annul Resolution No. 15-
04-87.

On August 25, 1987, the petitioner wrote the President of the Philippines thru the Honorable
Executive Secretary praying that she be reinstated as Director of LUELCO. The said letter
appeal is in pursuance of Section 13 of P.D. No. 269 which provides that "all orders, rules and
regulations promulgated by the NEA shall be subject to the approval of the Office of the
President."

On January 21, 1987, the office of the President, thru respondent acting Deputy Executive
Secretary Samilo M. Barlongay, in its letter sustained the NEA ruling.

Issue: WON petitioner was legally disqualified from continuing as a duly elected Director for
District II of respondent, La Union Electric Cooperative, Inc., (LUELCO) on account of her
designation as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union as the representative of
the Barangay officials of the province.

Held:

This Court finds petitioner's contention untenable.

Although the disqualification mandated by the provisions pertains to elective officers of the
government, except barrio captains and councilors, the same is equally applicable to an
appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which is an elective office. The prohibition
should be construed to refer to a person holding an office, the assumption to which, while
generally determined by an election, is not precluded by appointment. The purpose of the
disqualification is to prevent incumbents of elective offices from exerting political influence and
pressure on the management of the affairs of the cooperative. This purpose cannot be fully
achieved if one who is appointed to an elective office is not made subject to the same
disqualification.

A person appointed to an elective office can exercise all powers and prerogatives attached to
said office. Thus, an appointed members of a Sangguniang Panlalawigan, like petitioner, can
wield as much pressure and influence on an electric cooperative, as an elected member thereof.

Petitioner, having been appointed as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union, a

position decidedly above the rank of Barangay Captain, cannot remain as Director of LUELCO
without violating the spirit and intent of Section 21 P.D. No. 269, as amended, and Section 3(c)
Article IV of the By-laws of Electric Cooperatives.