ANAMA VS CA (Please read rule 15 sec.
4 and 5 first to Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and the Spouses Co,
appreciate the case. It has lengthy discussion but
interesting)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama
(Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine Savings Bank
(PSB), entered into a “Contract to Buy,” on installment
basis, the real property owned by the latter. Anama
defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB
rescinded the said contract and title to the property
remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was
sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas
Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in
full, caused the registration of the same in their names.
Anama filed before the Respondent Court a
complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title,
and specific performance with damages against
PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of
Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.
The respondent Court dismissed Anama’s
complaint and upheld the validity of the sale
between PSB and the Co Spouses.
The Supreme Court rendered judgment denying
Anama’s petition and sustaining the validity of
the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its
decision became final and executory on July 12,
2004. Pursuant thereto, the Co Spouses moved
for execution, which was granted by
the Respondent Court.
Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the
reconsideration of the Respondent Court’s
arguing that the Co Spouses’ motion for
execution is fatally defective. He averred that the
Spouses’ motion was pro forma because it
lacked the required affidavit of service and has a
defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap
of paper. Court, however, denied Anama’s
motion(s) for reconsideration.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC
Order before the CA for taking judicial
cognizance of the motion for execution filed by
spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina
Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1) not in accord
with Section 4 and Section 15 of the Rules of
Court because it was without a notice of hearing
addressed to the parties; and (2) not in accord
with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
because it lacks the mandatory affidavit of
service.
The CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It
reasoned out, among others, that the issue on the
validity of the deed of sale between respondents,
had long been laid to rest considering that the January
29, 2004 Decision of this Court became final and
executory on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was
already a matter of right on the part of the respondents
and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of
execution enforcing a final and executory decision.
Although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a
motion are mandatory requirements, the Spouses Co’s
motion for execution of a final and executory judgment
could be acted upon by the RTC ex parte, and therefore,
excused from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
The CA was of the view that petitioner was not denied
due process because he was properly notified of the
motion for execution of the Spouses Co. It stated that
the act of the Spouses Co in resorting to personal
delivery in serving their motion for execution did not
render the motion pro forma. It refused to apply a rigid
application of the rulesbecause it would result in a
manifest failure of justice considering that petitioner’s
position was nothing but an obvious dilatory tactic
designed to prevent the final disposition of the Civil
Case.
Petitioner argues that the respondents failed to
substantially comply with the rule on notice and hearing
when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution with the RTC. He claims that the notice of
hearing in the motion for execution filed by the Spouses
Co was a mere scrap of paper because it was
addressed to the Clerk of Court and not to the parties.
Thus, the motion for execution did not contain the
required proof of service to the adverse party. He adds
that the Spouses Co and their counsel deliberately
“misserved” the copy of their motion for execution, thus,
committing fraud upon the trial court.
Position of the Spouses Co
Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, a copy of the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution was given to
petitioner through his principal counsel, the Quasha Law
Offices. At that time, the said law office had not formally
withdrawn its appearance as counsel for
petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they sought to
be executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly
affirmed by the CA and this Court, thus, putting the
issues on the merits to rest. The issuance of a writ of
execution then becomes a matter of right and the court’s
duty to issue the writ becomes ministerial.
Position of respondent PSB
PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC had
long become final and executory as shown by the Entry
of Judgment. The finality of the said decision entitles the
respondents, by law, to the issuance of a writ of
execution. PSB laments that petitioner relies more on
technicalities to frustrate the ends of justice and to delay
the enforcement of a final and executory decision.
As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the notice
of hearing appended to the motion for execution filed by
the Spouses Co substantially complied with the
requirements of the Rules since petitioner’s then counsel
of record was duly notified and furnished a copy of the
questioned motion for execution. Also, the motion for
execution filed by the Spouses Co was served upon and
personally received by said counsel.
ISSUE:
1. WON the writ of execution needs to have notice
and hearing.
2. WON 3-day notice rule is absolute.
SC RULING:
1. No, the writ of execution need not have notice
and hearing. (It’s a lengthy discussion but very
interesting.)
The Court finds no compelling reason to stay the
execution of the judgment because the Spouses Co
complied with the notice and hearing requirements under
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said sections, as
amended, provide:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion.
– Except for motions which the court
may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to
be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing.
– The notice of hearing shall be
addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service
necessary. – No written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof.
Elementary is the rule that every motion must
contain the mandatory requirements of notice and
hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof.
The Court has consistently held that a motion that fails to
comply with the above requirements is considered a
worthless piece of paper which should not be acted
upon. The rule, however, is not absolute. There are
motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte if
these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They
are not strictly covered by the rigid requirement of the
rules on notice and hearing of motions.
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is
such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
judgment sought to be executed in this case had already
become final and executory. As such, the Spouses Co
have every right to the issuance of a writ of execution
and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the
same. This right on the part of the Spouses Co and duty
on the part of the RTC are based on Section 1 and
Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure provides, as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon
judgments or final orders. – Execution
shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that
disposes of the action or proceeding
upon the expiration of the period to
appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly
perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in
the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders
sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse
party.
The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of
execution.
The Spouses Co can have their motion for execution
executed as a matter of right without the needed notice
and hearing requirement to petitioner.
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court does not prescribe
that a copy of the motion for the execution of
a final and executory judgment be served on
the defeated party, like litigated motions such
as a motion to dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or
motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a
motion for execution of judgment pending
appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which
instances a written notice thereof is required to
be served by the movant on the adverse party in
order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist
the application.

It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be
executed in the case at bar had already become
final and executory. It is fundamental that the
prevailing party in a litigation may, at any time
within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have
a writ of execution issued for its
enforcement and the court not only has the
power and authority to order its execution but it
is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been
held that the court cannot refuse to issue a writ
of execution upon a final and executory
judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a
general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after
final judgment, to object to the execution by
raising new issues of fact or of law, except when
there had been a change in the situation of the
parties which makes such execution inequitable
or when it appears that the controversy has ever
been submitted to the judgment of the court; or
when it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective
in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been
issued without authority. Defendant-appellant
has not shown that she falls in any of the
situations afore-mentioned. Ordinarily, an order
of execution of a final judgment is not
appealable. Otherwise, as was said by this
Court in Molina v. de la Riva, a case could never
end. Once a court renders a final judgment, all
the issues between or among the parties before
it are deemed resolved and its judicial function
as regards any matter related to the controversy
litigated comes to an end. The execution of its
judgment is purely a ministerial phase of
adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it
that the claim of the prevailing party is fully
satisfied from the properties of the loser is
generally ministerial.
Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and
the judgment debtor need not be given
advance notice of the application for
execution.
Absence of such advance notice to the judgment
debtor does not constitute an infringement of the
constitutional guarantee of due process.
The failure to serve a copy of the motion for
execution on petitioner is not a fatal defect. In
fact, there was no necessity for such service.
At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was
not notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses
Co. The records clearly show that the motion for
execution was duly served upon, and received by,
petitioner’s counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena
Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a “signed
stamped received mark” appearing on said
pleading.[7] The records are bereft of proof showing any
written denial from petitioner’s counsel of its valid receipt
on behalf of its client. Neither is there proof that the
Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally
withdrawn its appearance as petitioner’s counsel-of-
record. Considering that there is enough proof shown on
record of personal delivery in serving the subject motion
for execution, there was a valid compliance with the
Rules, thus, no persuasive reason to stay the execution
of the subject final and executory judgment. He did not
dispute the ruling of the CA either that the alleged defect
in the Spouses Co’s motion was cured when his new
counsel was served a copy of said motion for
reconsideration of the RTC’s order.
2. No, the three-day notice rule is not
absolute.
A liberal construction of the procedural rules is
proper where the lapse in the literal observance
of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the
adverse party and has not deprived the court of
its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the
Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be
liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice,
and courts must avoid their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the
Court held that there was substantial compliance
of the rule on notice of motions even if the first
notice was irregular because no prejudice was
caused the adverse party since the motion was
not considered and resolved until after several
postponements of which the parties were duly
notified.
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v.
National Food Authority, the Court held that
despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion
for Reconsideration, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of due
process where the adverse party actually had
the opportunity to be heard and had filed
pleadings in opposition to the motion.
This Court has indeed held time and again, that
under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a
motion, which is rendered defective by failure to
comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion
without a notice of hearing is considered pro
forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due
process, the three-day notice required by the
Rules is not intended for the benefit of the
movant. Rather, the requirement is for the
purpose of avoiding surprises that may be
sprung upon the adverse party, who must be
given time to study and meet the arguments in
the motion before a resolution of the court.
Principles of natural justice demand that the
right of a party should not be affected without
giving it an opportunity to be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be
heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or
controvert the grounds upon which it is
based.
We have consistently held that a motion which
does not meet the requirements of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper, which the
Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial
court has no authority to act upon. Service of a
copy of a motion containing a notice of the time
and the place of hearing of that motion is a
mandatory requirement, and the failure of
movants to comply with these requirements
renders their motions fatally defective.
However, there are exceptions to the strict
application of this rule. These exceptions are:
(1) where a rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the
alleged defect in the questioned final and
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the
interest of substantial justice will be served; (3)
where the resolution of the motion is addressed
solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the
court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of
procedural due process to afford the adverse
parties a chance to be heard before a motion is
resolved by the court. Through such notice, the
adverse party is given time to study and answer
the arguments in the motion. Records show that
while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution contained a notice of hearing, it did not
particularly state the date and time of the hearing.
However, we still find that petitioner was not
denied procedural due process. Upon receiving
the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the
trial court issued an Order dated September 9,
2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its
comment. The trial court ruled on the motion only
after the reglementary period to file comment
lapsed. Clearly, petitioner was given time to
study and comment on the motion for which
reason, the very purpose of a notice of
hearing had been achieved.
The notice requirement is not a ritual to be
followed blindly. Procedural due process is not
based solely on a mechanical and literal
application that renders any deviation inexorably
fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally
construed to promote their objective and to assist
in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of any action and proceeding.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and
laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the
decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is
entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is
the trial court’s ministerial duty.
Petitioner mainly relies on mere technicalities to frustrate
the ends of justice and further delay the execution
process and enforcement of the RTC Decision. The
case has been dragging on for almost 30 years since
petitioner filed an action for annulment of sale in 1982.
ANAMA vs. Phil. Savings Bank
FACTS:
 Sometime in 1973, Douglas F. Anama
and Philippine Savings Bank (PSB),
entered into a “Contract to Buy,” on
installment basis, the real property
owned by the latter.
 However, Anama defaulted in paying his
obligations thereunder, thus, PSB
rescinded the said contract and title to
the property remained with the latter.
 Subsequently, the property was sold by
PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria
and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after
paying the purchase price in full, caused
the registration of the same in their
names and were, thus, issued TCT.
 Anama filed before the Respondent
Court a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, cancellation
of transfer certificate of title, and specific
performance with damages against
PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register
of Deeds of Metro Manila.
 The Respondent Court dismissed
Anama’s complaint and upheld the
validity of the sale between PSB and the
 Co Spouses. Undaunted, Anama
appealed, at first, to this Court, and after
failing to obtain a favorable decision, to
the Supreme Court.
 The Supreme Court rendered judgment
denying Anama’s petition and sustaining
the validity of the sale between PSB and
the Co Spouses. Its decision became
final and executory on July 12, 2004.
Pursuant thereto, the Co Spouses
moved for execution, which was granted
by the Respondent Court per its Order,
dated November 25, 2005.
 Anama twice moved for the
reconsideration of the Respondent
Court’s November 25, 2005 Order
arguing that the Co Spouses’ motion for
execution is fatally defective. He averred
that the Spouses’ motion was pro
forma because it lacked the required
affidavit of service and has a defective
notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap
of paper. The Respondent Court,
however, denied Anama’s motion(s) for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requisite notice of hearing that it
should be addressed to the parties and not to the clerk
of court is being complied.
2. Whether or not the requisite affidavit of service that it
should be in the proper form as prescribed in the rules
and it should be attached to the motion is being
complied.
RULING:
 Some issues in the case (that petitioner’s
allegations on the “dagdag-bawas operation of
the Transcript of Stenographic Notes,” the “fraud
perpetuated upon the Court by said spouses
and their lead counsel,” the “ownership,” and
“falsification”) had long been laid to rest in the
case of “Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine
[4]
Savings Bank, et. al.” For said reason, the
Court cannot review those final
pronouncements. To do so would violate the
rules as it would open a final judgment to
another reconsideration which is a prohibited
procedure.
 On the subject procedural question, the Court
finds no compelling reason to stay the execution
of the judgment because the Spouses Co
complied with the notice and hearing
requirements under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule
15
 Elementary is the rule that every motion must
contain the mandatory requirements of notice
and hearing and that there must be proof of
service thereof. The Court has consistently held
that a motion that fails to comply with the above
requirements is considered a worthless piece of
paper which should not be acted upon.
 The rule, however, is not absolute. There are
motions that can be acted upon by the court ex
parte if these would not cause prejudice to the
other party. They are not strictly covered by the
rigid requirement of the rules on notice and
hearing of motions.
 The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is
such kind of motion. It cannot be denied that the
judgment sought to be executed in this case had
already become final and executory. The
Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of
a writ of execution and the RTC has the
ministerial duty to enforce the same.
 Under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Spouses Co can have their motion for execution
executed as a matter of right without the needed
notice and hearing requirement to petitioner.
 In Pamintuan v. Muñoz, We ruled that once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right, and the judgment debtor
need not be given advance notice of the
application for execution. At any rate, it is not
true that the petitioner was not notified of the
motion for execution of the Spouses Co. The
records clearly show that the motion for
execution was duly served upon, and received
by, petitioner’s counsel-of-record, the Quasha
Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices, as
evidenced by a “signed stamped received mark”
appearing on said pleading
 Under Sec. 4 “Every written motion
required to be heard and the notice of
the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt
by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on
shorter notice”.
 The three-day notice rule is not
absolute. A liberal construction of the
procedural rules is proper where the
lapse in the literal observance of a rule
of procedure has not prejudiced the
adverse party and has not deprived the
court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Rules should be liberally
construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding. Rules of procedure are
tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, and courts must
avoid their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
 Anent the second issue, we have
consistently held that a motion which
does not meet the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court is considered a worthless piece
of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no
right to receive and the trial court has no
authority to act upon. Service of a copy of
a motion containing a notice of the time
and the place of hearing of that motion is
a mandatory requirement, and the failure
of movants to comply with these
requirements renders their motions fatally
defective. However, there are
exceptions to the strict application of
this rule. These exceptions are: (1)
where a rigid application will result in a
manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect in the questioned
final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein; (2) where the interest
of substantial justice will be served; (3)
where the resolution of the motion is
addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court; and (4)
where the injustice to the adverse party is
not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed.
 However, we still find that petitioner was
not denied procedural due process. Upon
receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Execution, the trial court issued an
Order dated September 9, 2002giving
petitioner ten (10) days to file its
comment. The trial court ruled on the
motion only after the reglementary period
to file comment lapsed. Clearly,
petitioner was given time to study and
comment on the motion for which
reason, the very purpose of a notice
of hearing had been achieved.
TAN VS. CA
Petitioner Annie Tan, doing business under the name
and style “AJ & T Trading,” leased a portion of the
ground floor of her building, more specifically described
as Stall No. 623, Carvajal Street, Binondo, Manila, in
favor of Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc. The
lease was for a period of five years starting on February
17, 1995 and ending on February 17, 2000, at a monthly
rental of P20,000 for the first three years. For several
alleged violations of the lease contract, petitioners filed
against private respondent a complaint for ejectment,
docketed as Civil Case No. 148798-CV. As its rental
payment was refused by petitioner, private respondent
instituted on July 13, 1995 a case for consignation,
docketed as Civil Case No. 148814-CV.
The two cases were consolidated. In due course, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch I,
rendered on February 1, 1996 a Decision which
disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 148798-CV for
[b]reach of [c]ontract, failure to pay rentals on time,
encroachment on the adjacent premises without the
consent of [petitioner], [she] failed to substantiate her
case with that degree of proof required by law. For this
reason, except for the costs of suit, this Court hereby
orders the dismissal of the complaint of [petitioner]. The
counterclaim and damages sought by [private
respondent are] likewise ordered dismissed. The case
for consignation in Civil Case No. 148814-CV has
become moot and academic for failure of [petitioner] to
appeal the decision of the Metropolitan [Trial] Court,
Branch 15, Manila, allowing the [private respondent] to
consign rental payments to the Court of
Manila. Besides, the [c]omplaint for consignation being
in conformity with law, [private respondent] is allowed to
continue consigning with this Court all rentals that [may
be] due.”
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 2, in its Decision dated July 18, 1996, affirmed
the aforementioned MTC Decision thus:
“WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reasons to disturb the
joint decision dated February 1, 1996 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, the Court sustains and
affirms in toto the said decision.”
Respondent Court related the incidents that ensued, as
follows:
“xxx [F]rom the Decision of the [RTC] dated July 18,
1996, [petitioner] filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision. The Motion for Reconsideration
did not contain any notice of hearing as required under
Section 5, Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: “Whether xxx the omission [through]
inadvertence of a notice of hearing of a motion for
reconsideration filed with the trial court xxx is a fatal
defect which did not stop the running of the period to
appeal[,] thus rendering the assailed decision final [and]
executor
RULING:
Petitioner admits the categorical and mandatory
character of the directives in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15
of the Rules of Court, which read:
“SEC. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions which
the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant.
“Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.(4a)
“SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.—The notice of hearing shall
be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.(5a)”
In De la Peña v. De la Peña, the Court presented a
resume of earlier decisions regarding the necessity of
the notice of hearing in motions for reconsideration:
“In Pojas v. Gozo-Dadole, we had occasion to rule on
the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration without
any notice of hearing tolls the running of the prescriptive
period. In Pojas, petitioner received copy of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3430 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tagbilaran on 15 April 1986. The decision being
adverse to him petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. For failing to mention the date when
the motion was to be resolved as required in Sec. 5,
Rule 15, of the Rules of Court, the motion for
reconsideration was denied. A second motion for
reconsideration met the same fate. On 2 July 1986
petitioner filed a notice of appeal but the same was
denied for being filed out of time as ‘the motion for
reconsideration which the Court ruled as pro forma did
not stop the running of the 15-day period to appeal.’
“In resolving the issue of whether there was grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioner’s notice of appeal, this
Court ruled—
‘Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court requires that
notice of motion be served by the movant on all parties
concerned at least three (3) days before its
hearing. Section 5 of the same Rule provides that the
notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the
motion. A motion which does not meet the requirements
of Section 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is
considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk
has no right to receive and the court has no authority to
act upon. Service of copy of a motion containing notice
of the time and place of hearing of said motion is a
mandatory requirement and the failure of the movant to
comply with said requirements renders his motion fatally
defective.’
“In New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho, defendant filed a
motion for reconsideration which did not contain any
notice of hearing. In a petition for certiorari, we affirmed
the lower court in ruling that a motion for reconsideration
that did not contain a notice of hearing was a useless
scrap of paper. We held further—
‘Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, xxx a motion is required to be accompanied by a
notice of hearing which must be served by the applicant
on all parties concerned at least three (3) days before
the hearing thereof. Section 6 of the same rule
commands that “(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the
Court, without proof of service of the notice thereof
xxx.” It is therefore patent that the motion for
reconsideration in question is fatally defective for it did
not contain any notice of hearing. We have already
consistently held in a number of cases that the
requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rules 15 of the Fe Tejero, on whom personal service was served, was
Rules of Court are mandatory and that failure to comply not its corporate secretary and was not a person allowed
with the same is fatal to movant’s cause.
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court to
“In Sembrano v. Ramirez,[we declared that— receive a summons. It also asserted that Tung Ho
cannot enforce the award in the Philippines without
‘(A) motion without notice of hearing is a mere scrap of violating public policy as Taiwan is not a signatory to the
paper. It does not toll the running of the period of New York Convention.
appeal. This requirement of notice of hearing equally
Ting Guan responded to the denials by filing a petition
applies to a motion for reconsideration. Without such
for certiorari before the CA with an application for the
notice, the motion is pro forma. And a pro forma motion
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the
period to appeal.’ preliminary injunction.
Ting Guan immediately proceeded to file a petition for
SEC. 8 RULE 15 review on certiorari before this Court to question the
Tung Ho Steel v. Ting Guan, G.R. No. 182153, April 7, CA’s rulings as discussed below. In the interim (on
2014 February 11, 2008), Tung Ho (whose motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision was still pending with
Tung Ho is a foreign corporation organized under the
that court) filed a "Motion to Supplement and Resolve
laws of Taiwan, Republic of China.4 On the other hand,
Motion for Reconsideration" before the CA. In this
respondent Ting Guan Trading Corp. (Ting Guan) is a
motion, Tung Ho prayed for the issuance of an alias
domestic corporation organized under the laws of the
summons if the service of summons had indeed been
Philippines.5
defective, but its motion proved unsuccessful.
On January 9, 2002, Ting Guan obligated itself under a
ISSUE: Whether Ting Guan made a voluntary
contract of sale to deliver heavy metal scrap iron and
appearance before the trial court.
steel to Tung Ho. Subsequently, Tung Ho filed a request
HELD:
for arbitration before the ICC International Court of
we cannot agree with the legal conclusion that the
Arbitration (ICC) in Singapore after Ting Guan failed to
appellate court reached, given the established facts.23
deliver the full quantity of the promised heavy metal
To our mind, Ting Guan voluntarily appeared before the
scrap iron and steel.6
trial court in view of the procedural recourse that it took
The ICC ruled in favor of Tung Ho on June 18, 2004 and
before that court. Its voluntary appearance is equivalent
ordered Ting Guan to pay Tung Ho the following: (1)
to service of summons.
actual damages in the amount of US$ 659,646.15 with
In this respect, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
interest of 6% per annum from December 4, 2002 until
requires the defendant to file a motion to dismiss within
final payment; (2) cost of arbitration in the amount of US
the time for, but before filing the answer to the complaint
$ 47,000.00; and (3) legal costs and expenses in the
or pleading asserting a claim. Section 1, Rule 11 of the
amount of NT $ 761,448.00 and US $ 34,552.83.7
Rules of Court, on the other hand, commands the
On October 24, 2004, Tung Ho filed an action against
defendant to file his answer within fifteen (15) days after
Ting Guan for the recognition and enforcement of the
service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by
arbitral award before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
the trial court. Once the trial court denies the motion, the
Makati, Branch 145. Ting Guan moved to dismiss the
defendant should file his answer within the balance of
case based on Tung Ho’s lack of capacity to sue and for
fifteen (15) days to which he was entitled at the time of
prematurity. Ting Guan subsequently filed a
serving his motion, but the remaining period cannot be
supplemental motion to dismiss based on improper
less than five (5) days computed from his receipt of the
venue. Ting Guan argued that the complaint should have
notice of the denial.26
been filed in Cebu where its principal place of business
Instead of filing an answer, the defendant may opt to file
was located.
a motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court
The RTC denied Ting Guan’s motion to dismiss in an
shall have denied the motion for reconsideration does
order dated May 11, 2005. Ting Guan moved to
the defendant become bound to file his answer.27 If the
reconsider the order and raised the RTC’s alleged lack
defendant fails to file an answer within the reglementary
of jurisdiction over its person as additional ground for the
period, the plaintiff may file a motion to declare the
dismissal of the complaint. Ting Guan insisted that Ms.
defendant in default. This motion shall be with notice to
the defendant and shall be supported by proof of the
failure.28
The trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is not a
license for the defendant to file a Rule 65 petition before
the CA. An order denying a motion to dismiss cannot be
the subject of a petition for certiorari as the defendant
still has an adequate remedy before the trial court – i.e.,
to file an answer and to subsequently appeal the case if
he loses the case.29 As exceptions, the defendant may
avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the
motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant30 or over the subject matter.31
We cannot allow and simply passively look at Ting
Guan’s blatant disregard of the rules of procedure in the
present case. The Rules of Court only allows the filing of
a motion to dismiss once.32 Ting Guan’s filing of
successive motions to dismiss, under the guise of
"supplemental motion to dismiss" or "motion for
reconsideration", is not only improper but also dilatory.33
Ting Guan’s belated reliance on the improper service of
summons was a mere afterthought, if not a bad faith ploy
to avoid the foreign arbitral award’s enforcement which
is still at its preliminary stage after the lapse of almost a
decade since the filing of the complaint.
Furthermore, Ting Guan’s failure to raise the alleged
lack of jurisdiction over its person in the first motion to
dismiss is fatal to its cause. Ting Guan voluntarily
appeared before the RTC when it filed a motion to
dismiss and a "supplemental motion to dismiss" without
raising the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over its person. In
Anunciacion v. Bocanegra,34 we categorically stated
that the defendant should raise the affirmative defense
of lack of jurisdiction over his person in the very first
motion to dismiss. Failure to raise the issue of improper
service of summons in the first motion to dismiss is a
waiver of this defense and cannot be belatedly raised in
succeeding motions and pleadings.
As a final note, we are not unaware that the present
case has been complicated by its unique development.
The complication arose when the CA, instead of
resolving the parties’ separate partial motions for
reconsideration in one resolution, proceeded to first
resolve and to deny Ting Guan’s partial motion. Ting
Guan, therefore, went to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari while Tung Ho’s partial motion for
reconsideration was still unresolved.
Expectedly, Ting Guan did not question the portions of
the CA decision favorable to it when it filed its petition
with this Court. Instead, Ting Guan reiterated that the CA
should have included additional grounds to justify the
dismissal of Tung Ho’s complaint with the RTC. The
Court denied Ting Guan’s petition, leading to the entry of
judgment that improvidently followed. Later, the CA
denied Tung Ho’s partial motion for reconsideration,
prompting Tung Ho’s own petition with this Court, which
is the present G.R. No. 182153.
Under the Rules of Court, entry of judgment may only be
made if no appeal or motion for reconsideration was
timely filed.36 In the proceedings before the CA, if a
motion for reconsideration (including a partial motion for
reconsideration37) is timely filed by the proper party,
execution of the CA’s judgment or final resolution shall
be stayed.38 This rule is applicable even to proceedings
before the Supreme Court, as provided in Section 4,
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court.39
In the present case, Tung Ho timely filed its motion for
reconsideration with the CA and seasonably appealed
the CA’s rulings with the Court through the present
petition (G.R. No. 182153).
To now recognize the finality of the Resolution of Ting
Guan petition (G.R. No. 176110) based on its entry of
judgment and to allow it to foreclose the present
meritorious petition of Tung Ho, would of course cause
unfair and unjustified injury to Tung Ho. First, as
previously mentioned, the Ting Guan petition did not
question or assail the full merits of the CA decision. It
was Tung Ho, the party aggrieved by the CA decision,
who substantially questioned the merits of the CA
decision in its petition; this petition showed that the CA
indeed committed error and Tung Ho’s complaint before
the RTC should properly proceed. Second, the present
case is for the enforcement of an arbitral award involving
millions of pesos. Tung Ho already won in the foreign
arbitration and the present case is simply for the
enforcement of this arbitral award in our jurisdiction.
Third, and most importantly, Tung Ho properly and
timely availed of the remedies available to it under the
Rules of Court, which provide that filing and pendency of
a motion for reconsideration stays the execution of the
CA judgment. Therefore, at the time of the entry of
judgment in G.R. No. 176110 in the Supreme Court on
January 8, 2008, the CA decision which the Court
affirmed was effectively not yet be final.
Significantly, the rule that a timely motion for
reconsideration stays the execution of the assailed
judgment is in accordance with Rule 51, Section 10
(Rules governing the CA proceedings) which provides
that "entry of judgments may only be had if there is no
appeal or motion for reconsideration timely filed. The
date when the judgment or final resolution becomes
executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry."
Incidentally, this procedure also governs before
Supreme Court proceedings.40 Following these rules,
therefore, the pendency of Tung Ho’s MR with the CA
made the entry of the judgment of the Court in the Ting
Guan petition premature and inefficacious for not being
final and executory.
Based on the above considerations, the Court would not
be in error if it applies its ruling in the case of Realty
Sales Enterprises, Inc. and Macondray Farms, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.41 where the Court,
in a per curiam resolution, ruled that an entry of
judgment may be recalled or lifted motu proprio when it
is clear that the decision assailed of has not yet become
final under the rules:
The March 6, 1985 resolution denying reconsideration of
the January 30, 1985 resolution was, to repeat, not
served on the petitioners until March 20, 1985 - and
therefore the Jan. 30, 1985 resolution could not be
deemed final and executory until one (1) full day (March
21) had elapsed, or on March 22, 1985 (assuming
inaction on petitioners' part.) The entry of judgment
relative to the January 30, 1985 resolution, made on
March 18, 1985, was therefore premature and
inefficacious. An entry of judgment does not make the
judgment so entered final and execution when it is not so
in truth. An entry of judgment merely records the fact
that a judgment, order or resolution has become final
and executory; but it is not the operative act that make
the judgment, order or resolution final and executory. In
the case at bar, the entry of judgment on March 18, 1985
did not make the January 30, 1985 resolution subject of
the entry, final and executory, As of the date of entry,
March 18, 1985, notice of the resolution denying
reconsideration of the January 30, 1985 resolution had
not yet been served on the petitioners or any of the
parties, since March 18, 1985 was also the date of the
notice (and release) of the March 6, 1985 resolution
denying reconsideration.1âwphi1
According to this ruling, the motu proprio recall or setting
aside of the entry of final judgment was proper and
"entirely consistent with the inherent power of every
court inter alia to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice [Sec. 5(g), Rule 135, Rules of Court,]. That the
recall has in fact served to achieve a verdict consistent
with law and justice is clear from the judgment
subsequently rendered on the merits." This course of
action is effectively what the Court undertook today,
adapted of course to the circumstances of the present
case.
OBANDO vs. FIGUERAS
FACTS:
Dona Alegria Figueras, together with her
stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for
settlement of the interstate estate of her deceased
husband Don Jose. While settlement of the estate was
pending, she died and Eduardo assumed administration
of the joint estates of Don Jose and Dona Alegria. Hardly
had the proceedings in both intestacies begun when
Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what
purported to be Dona Alegria’s Last Will and Testament,
filed by Felizardo Obando, a nephew of Dona Alegria.
The alleged Will bequeathed to Obando and several
other members of the Obando clan properties left by the
Figueras couple, including 2 parcels of land in New
Manila, Quezon City. When the probate case was
consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Obando
was appointed as Eduardo’s co-administrator of the joint
estates.
The document was submitted to the NBI for
examination and comparison of Dona Alegria’s alleged
signature therein with samples which both parties
accepted as authentic. The NBI found that the
questioned and the standard signatures were not made
by the same person. This led to the indictment and the
conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a
public document.
The probate court denied Eduardo’s Motion for
Authority to sell the aforementioned 2 parcels of land in
New Manila. Despite such denial, Eduardo sold the lots
to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of an Order
issued by the probate court. New titles were issued for
these lots in the name of Amigo Realty.
Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and
universal heir of Dona Alegria, filed a Complaint against
Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the nullification of the
sale. However, in the Special Proceedings, the probate
court removed Obando from his office as co-
administrator of the joint estate of the Figueras spouses.
Consequently, in the civil case, respondents filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss after Obando had rested his case.
The respondents built their evidence around the loss of
his legal standing to pursue the case. The trial court
granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case without
prejudice.
Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to no avail. The CA likewise dismissed
his Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and affirmed
the Order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CA gravely erred in
sanctioning the trial court’s radical departure
from the law when it granted a Motion to Dismiss
on the lack of capacity to sue/legal standing at
the time when the petitioners have already
rested their case and the respondents have
begun presentation of their evidence.
HELD:
The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may
be submitted only before the filing of a responsive
pleading. Thus, petitioners complain that it was already
too late for Eduardo to file a Motion to Dismiss after
Obando had finished presenting his evidence.
This is not so. The period to file a motion to
dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that,
in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within
reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading.
Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging improper venue
cannot be entertained unless made within that period.
However, even after an answer has been filed,
the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to
dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction,
(2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of action, and (4)
discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a
ground for dismissal. Except for lack of cause of action
or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of
Rules 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for
dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed
at all within the reglementary period, it is generally
considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the
respondents did not waive their right to move for the
dismissal of the civil case based Obando’s lack of legal
capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after he
had been convicted of estafa through falsification that
the probate court divested him of his representation of
the Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground
became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not
be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to
Dismiss filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if
the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the
pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the
defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss,
even after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing
a responsive pleading.
XXX PLANTERS DEVT. BANK VS CHANDUMALXXX
CARANDANG VS HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Quirino de Guzman and the Spouses Carandang are
stockholders aswell as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS), withequities at fifty four
percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%)respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was
increased, fromP500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000
of this increase was subscribedby the spouses
Carandang
Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its
capitalstock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, the spouses
Carandang yetagain subscribed to the increase.
They subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued
capital stock.
De Guzman claims that, part of the payment for these
subscriptions were paid by him, P293,250 for the
November 26, 1983 capital stock increase and P43,125
for the March 3, 1989 Capital Stock increase or a total of
P336,375.
Thus, on March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand
letter tothe spouses Carandang for the payment of said
total amount.
The spouses Carandang refused to pay the amount,
contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was
executed between Arcadio Carandang and de Guzman,
whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration
for Arcadio Carandang’s technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and
upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore,
there is no indebtedness on their part.
On June 5, 1992, de Guzman filed his complaint,
seeking to recover theP336,375 together with damages.
After trial on the merits, the trial court disposed of the
case in favor of de Guzman
Accordingly, the spouses Carandang are ordered to
jointly and severally pay de Guzman P336,375.00
representing the spouses
Carandang’s loan to de Guzman; interest on the
preceding amount at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum from June5, 1992 when this complaint was
filed until the principal amount shall have been fully paid;
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and Costs of suit.
Spouses Carandang appealed the RTC Decision to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same in the 22
April 2003 assailed Decision
Issues:
1.Whether or not the RTC Decision is void for failing to
comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
2.Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the
case for failure to state a cause of action, considering
that Milagros de Guzman, allegedly an indispensable
party, was not included as a party-plaintiff
3.Whether or not respondents were able to prove the
loan sought to be collected from petitioners4.Whether or
not the liability of the spouses Carandang is joint
andsolidary
Held:
1.NO
SC stated that unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter
which is conferred by law and is not subject to the
discretion of the parties, jurisdiction over the person of
the parties to the case may be waived either expressly
or impliedly.
Implied waiver comes in the form of either voluntary
appearance or a failure to object.
Not only do the heirs of de Guzman interpose no
objection to the jurisdiction of the court over their
persons; they are actually claiming and embracing such
jurisdiction.
In doing so, their waiver is not even merely implied (by
the irparticipation in the appeal of said Decision), but
express (by their explicit espousal of such view in both
the Court of Appeals and in this Court).
The heirs of de Guzman had no objection to being
bound by the Decision of the RTC.
Thus, lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject
to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be
asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by
silence.
SC ruled that the RTC Decision is valid despite the
failure to comply with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, because of the express waiver of the heirs to the
jurisdiction over their persons, and because there had
been, before the promulgation of the RTC Decision, no
further proceedings requiring the appearance of de
Guzman’s counsel.
2.No
SC agrees with the CA in its ruling that the joint account
of spouses Quirino A de Guzman and Milagros de
Guzman from which the four (4)checks were drawn is
part of their conjugal property and under both the Civil
Code and the Family Code the husband alone may
institute an action for the recovery or protection of the
spouses’ conjugal property.
Petitioners erroneously interchange the terms “real party
in interest ”and “indispensable party.”
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
A indispensable party is a party in interest without whom
no final determination can be had of an action,
A necessary party which is one who is not indispensable
but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is
to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.
The spouses Carandang are indeed correct that “(i)f a
suit is not brought in the name of or against the real
party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the
ground that the complaint states no cause of action.”
However, what dismissal on this ground entails is an
examination of whether the parties presently pleaded are
interested in the outcome of the litigation, and not
whether all persons interested in such outcome are
actually pleaded.
The latter query is relevant in discussions concerning
indispensable and necessary parties, but not in
discussions concerning real parties in interest.
Both indispensable and necessary parties are
considered as real parties in interest, since both classes
of parties stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment of the suit
.3.Yes
The petitioners offered the following argument
It is an undeniable fact that payment is not equivalent to
a loan. For instance, if Mr. “A” decides to pay for Mr.
“B’s” obligation, that payment by Mr. “A” cannot, by any
stretch of imagination, possibly mean that there is now a
loan by Mr. “B”to Mr. “A”. There is a possibility that such
payment by Mr. “A”is purely out of generosity or that
there is a mutual agreement between them. As applied
to the instant case, that mutual agreement is the pre-
incorporation agreement (supra)existing between Mr. de
Guzman and the petitioners --- to the effect that the
former shall be responsible for paying stock
subscriptions of the latter. Thus, when Mr. de Guzman
paid for the stock subscriptions of the petitioners, there
was no loan to speak of, but only a compliance with the
pre-incorporation agreement.
SC disagrees and offers the following justifications
If indeed a Mr. “A” decides to pay for a Mr. “B’s”
obligation, the presumption is that Mr. “B” is indebted to
Mr. “A” for such amount that has been paid. This is
pursuant to Articles 1236and 1237 of the Civil Code.
SC ruled that Articles 1236 and 1237 are clear that, even
in cases where the debtor has no knowledge of payment
by a third person,
and even in cases where the third person paid against
the will of the debtor, such payment would produce a
debt in favor of the paying third person.
In fact, the only consequences for the failure to inform or
getthe consent of the debtor are the following:
-the third person can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor; and
-the third person is not subrogated to the rights of the
creditor, such as those arising from a
mortgage,guarantee or penalty.
SC claims that this is merely a presumption.
By virtue of the parties’ freedom to contract, the parties
could stipulate otherwise and thus, as suggested by the
spouses Carandang, there is indeed a possibility that
such payment by Mr. “A” was purely out of generosity or
that there was a mutual agreement between them.
But such mutual agreement, being an exception to
presumed course of events as laid down by Articles
1236 and 1237,must be adequately proven.
The de Guzmans have successfully proven their
payment of the spouses Carandang’s stock
subscriptions.
Unfortunately for the spouses Carandang, the only
testimony which touched on the existence and
substance of the pre-incorporation agreement, that of
petitioner Arcardio Carandang, was stricken off the
record because he did not submit himself to a cross-
examination of the opposing party.
There being no testimony or documentary evidence
proving the existence of the pre-incorporation
agreement, the spouses Carandang are forced to rely
upon an alleged admission by the original plaintiff of the
existence of the pre-incorporation agreement.
As there was no admission, and as the testimony of
ArcardioCarandang was stricken off the record, we are
constrained to rule
that there was no pre-incorporation agreement rendering
Quirino deGuzman liable for the spouses Carandang’s
stock subscription.
The payment by the spouses de Guzman of the stock
subscriptions of the spouses Carandang are therefore by
way of loan which the spouses Carandang are liable to
pay.4.No
SC stated that when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of the obligation entered into by them, they
are being impleaded In their capacity as representatives
of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors.
Hence, either of them may be sued for the whole amount
,similar to that of a solidary liability, although the amount
is chargeable against their conjugal partnership property.
WHEREFORE the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
affirming the judgment rendered against the spouses
Carandang, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATION:
The spouses Carandang are ORDERED to pay the
following amounts from their conjugal partnership
properties:
(1)P336,375.00 representing the spouses Carandang’s
loan to Quirino de Guzman; and
(2)Interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from 5 June 1992 when the
complaint was filed until the principal amount can be fully
paid; and
(3)P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees. No costs.
Allied Domecq Phils. vs. Villon
FACTS:
 On May 8, 1996, petitioner ADPI entered into an
exclusive distributorship agreement with Pedro
Domecq, S.A. Under the said agreement, Pedro
Domecq granted petitioner the sole and
exclusive right to import and distribute in
the Philippines various Pedro Domecq, S.A.
products including “Fundador” brandy.
 Petitioner then applied for a Certificate of
Registration with the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(BFAD), pursuant to Department of Health
Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1979.
BFAD wrote then Director Quintin L. Kintanar of
the Bureau of Customs, requesting that entry of
 imported shipments of “Fundador” brandy
should not be allowed in the Philippines, unless
the importer presents a valid Certificate of
Registration issued by the BFAD.
 On April 12, 1999, Clark Liberty, a duly licensed
duty-free shop operating in the Clark Special
Economic Zone, imported 800 cases or a total of
9,420 bottles of “Fundador” brandy. Petitioner
then filed a motion to intervene in alleging,
among others, that it sustained damages caused
by respondent Clark Liberty’s illegal importation.
 petitioner sent respondent Clark Liberty a letter
demanding that the latter cease and desist from
importing, distributing, selling, or marketing
“Fundador” brandy in the Philippines. petitioner
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila a complaint for injunction and
damages with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction. RTC issued an Order
denying the same. On March 16, 2001,
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari. CA dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Its
ratiocination is quoted as follows: “The
respondent Clark Liberty is one of the duly
licensed and authorized duty free shops at the
Clark Special Economic Zone since 1998 which
sells imported grocery items including liquors,
appliances, household wares, etc. and is
exclusively regulated by the Clark Development
Corporation, created by Republic Act No. 7227,
known as the ‘Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals has
jurisdiction over CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 pursuant to
Section 21 of Republic Act 7227.
HELD:
The Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed CA-
G.R. SP No. 63802 for want of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a
cause.[8] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power
to hear and determine the general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.[9] Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred by law and not by the
consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by
erroneous belief of the court that it exists. [10] Basic is the
rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the cause or causes of action as alleged
in the complaint.[11] But where the actual issues are
evident from the records of the case, then jurisdiction
over the subject matter need not depend upon the literal
averments in the complaint, but on the law as applied to
established facts.[12]
Here, in order to determine whether the court a quo has
jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint for injunction, we
have to interpret the law as applied to the established
facts. There is no question that respondent
Clark Liberty is a registered enterprise of the Clark
Special Economic Zone and is primarily regulated by
R.A. No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992.
The underlying purpose of the Legislature in
enacting R.A. No. 7227 is provided by Section 2, thus:
“SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. – It is hereby declared
the policy of the Government to accelerate the sound
and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses
of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Station and Capas Relay station), to
raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila
military camps and to apply said funds for the
development and conversion to productive civilian use of
the lands covered under the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United
States of America, as amended.
It is likewise the declared policy of the Government to
enhance the benefits to be derived from said properties
in order to promote the economic and social
development of Central Luzon in particular and the
country in general.”
Republic Act No. 7227 goes on further to provide
that:
“SEC. 4. Purposes of the Conversion Authority. – The
Conversion authority shall have the following purposes:
xxx
(c) To encourage the active participation of the private
sector in transforming the Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions into other productive
uses;”
The establishment, registration, and operation of
respondent Clark Liberty and the other enterprises within
the Clark Special Economic Zone are projects (involving
the private sector) which convert Clark Air Base, a
military reservation, “into productive uses.” In this
connection, Section 21 of R.A. No. 7227 provides:
“SEC. 21. Injunction and Restraining Order. – The
implementation of the projects for the conversion into Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed
alternative productive uses of the military reservations this instant Rule 45 Petition.
are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or
enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines.” ISSUE:

Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err when it

dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 63802 for want of Whether or not the Municipal Trial Court properly
jurisdiction.
acquired jurisdiction over the case.

REPUBLIC V. BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT

CORP. RULING:

FACTS:
In this case, the application for original registration was
On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point filed on 17 July 1997.[29] On 18 July 1997, or a day
Development Corporation filed with the Regional Trial
after the filing of the application, the RTC immediately
Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land with an issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total October 1997, which was 96 days from the
assessed value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, more [30]
Order. While the date set by the RTC was beyond the
particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San
Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not
square meters, located at Barangay Barualte, San Juan, affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v.
Batangas.
Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner Republic therein
contended that there was failure to comply with the
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration,
application for registration on 8 January 1998 while the
because there were 125 days between the Order setting
records were still with the RTC.[6]
the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself.
We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court
the Order setting the date of initial hearing and the date
transmitted motu proprio the records of the case to the
of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the
MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the
application. Thus, we held:
property was allegedly less
than ₱100,000. Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order x x x [A] party to an action has
[8] no control over the Administrator or the
of General Default and commenced with the reception
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he
of evidence. Thereafter, it awarded the land to has no right to meddle unduly with the
business of such official in the
respondent Corporation.[13] performance of his duties. A party
cannot intervene in matters within the
exclusive power of the trial court. No
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, [14] the CA fault is attributable to such party if the
ruled that since the former had actively participated in trial court errs on matters within its sole
power. It is unfair to punish an applicant
the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to for an act or omission over which the
applicant has neither responsibility nor
raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is
control, especially if the applicant has
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the complied with all the requirements of the
law.[32]
lower court on appeal.
 Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to
penalize respondent Corporation by dismissing its
application for registration on account of events beyond
its control.
Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order
on 7 August 1997 setting the initial hearing on 4
November 1997,[33] within the 90-day period provided by
law, petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional
defect was still not cured, as the second Order was
issued more than five days from the filing of the
application, again contrary to the prescribed period
under the Property Registration Decree. [34]
Petitioner is incorrect.
The RTC’s failure to issue the Order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from
the filing of the application for registration, as provided in
the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the
court’s its jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period
was merely directory, and failure to issue the Order
within that period did not deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with
the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction
over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law.[35] It cannot be contingent
upon the action or inaction of the court.
This does not mean that courts may disregard the
statutory periods with impunity. We cannot assume that
the law deliberately meant the provision “to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter.”[36] However, the records of this case do not show
such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC
immediately set the case for initial hearing a day after
the filing of the application for registration, [37] except that
it had to issue a second Order because the initial
hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided
by law.
TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:
Spouses Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil
case in the CFI of Cebu against spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover sum of money
worth P1,908.00.
A writ of attachement was issued by the court against
defendants properties, but the same was dissolved upon
filing of a counter-bond by the defendants and Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as
Surety on the 31st of the same month. The court
rendered judgement in favour of the plaintiffs and, after
the same become final and executory, upon the motion
of the latter, the court issued a writ of execution against
the defendants. The writ having been returned
unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of writ
of execution against the suretys bond. The surety filed a
written opposition upon two grounds namely:
1.) Failure to prosecute and;
2.) Absence of demand upon the surety for payment of
the amount due under the judgement.
Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing
provided in section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
As the court denied the motion, the surety appealed to
the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from
one denying its motion for reconsideration. The Court of
appeals decided the case affirming the orders appealed
from.
On January 8,1963 – five days after the Surety received
notice of decision, it filed a motion asking for extension
of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled motion
to dismiss, alleging substantially that appellees action
was filed in CFI of CEBU, that a month before that date
R.A no. 296, otherwise known as Judiciary act of 1948,
had already become effective, section 88 of which
placed the original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value does not exceed P2,000.00.
That CFI therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide
the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean
vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just
cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was
not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated
— obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to
question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.
Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L.
Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three
cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan
etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962;
Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.,
G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The
Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26,
1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to
do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in
the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in
effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is
not only patent but revolting.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION VS. ALBERT
LIM
G.R. NO. 154338 OCTOBER 5, 2007
FACTS:
Universal Robina Corporation and Albert Lim entered
into a contract of sale wherein the petitioner sold to
respondent grocery products in the total amount of
P808, 059.88. Thereafter when partial payment was
tendered, respondent refused to settle his obligation
despite petitioner’s repeated demands. Due to the fact
stated ,petitioner, then, filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Quezon City against
respondent for a sum of money. However, the trial court
issued an order dismissing the complaint motu proprio
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper
venue.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration together with
an amended complaint alleging that the parties agreed
that the proper venue for any dispute relative to the
transaction is Quezon City. The trial court issued an
order granting the motion and admitted petitioner’s
amended complaint. Summons was served upon
respondent. Because of respondent’s failure to file an
answer seasonably and upon motion of petitioner, the
trial court issued an Order declaring defendant in default
and allowing petitioner to present its evidence ex parte.
However, the trial court still unsure whether venue was
properly laid, issued an Order directing petitioner to file a
memorandum of authorities on whether it can file a
complaint in Quezon City. But, subsequently, the trial
court again issued an Order dismissing the complaint on
the ground of improper venue. Petitioner then filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for review. But it
was dismissed due to petitioner’s failure to attach thereto
an explanation why copies of the petition were not
served by personal service but by registered mail, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court may dismiss motu proprio
petitioner’s complaint on the ground of improper venue.
RULING:
The Court ruled that in personal actions, the plaintiff may
commence an action either in the place of his or her
residence or the place where the defendant resides.
However, the parties may agree to a specific venue
which could be in a place where neither of them resides.
Citing the case in Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. vs. Registry
of Deeds of Parañaque where the Court likewise held
that under Rule 9 section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it states that defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. The court may only dismiss an
action motu proprio in case of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata and
prescription. Therefore, the trial court in this case erred
when it dismissed the petition motu proprio. It should
have waited for a motion to dismiss or a responsive
pleading from respondent, raising the objection or
affirmative defense of improper venue, before dismissing
the petition.
No legal capacity to sue
Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447,
April 29, 2005
Facts:
The title to and possession of the Subject Property
by petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest could be traced
only as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the
Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better
title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-
interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the
same Spanish title.
Issue: won the petitioner has legal capacity to sue
Ruling:
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens System.
This being the case and likewise being clear that
plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject
of this case, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal
standing to bring before this Court the instant complaint.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an
action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and
their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action.
Distinction between “the lack of legal capacity to sue”
from “the lack of personality to sue”. The difference
between the two is explained by this Court in Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the
Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to sue and that
the complaint states no cause of action. Lack of legal
capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the
exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the
necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does
not have the character or representation he claims. On
the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state
a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue"
should not be confused with the term "lack of personality
to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff’s general
disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the
fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. depends on whether petitioner is doing business in
Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion the Philippines.
to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity
to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for RULING:
a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint,
The petition is meritorious.
on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.

Section 133 of the Corporation Code provides:

G.R. No. 147905 Doing business without license. —
May 28, 2007 No foreign corporation transacting
business in the Philippines without a
B. Van Zuiden v. GTVL Manufacturing license, or its successors or assigns,
shall be permitted to maintain or
 Petitioner (plaintiff) filed a complaint for sum of intervene in any action, suit or
money against respondent. proceeding in any court or
 Petitioner is a corporation incorporated under administrative agency of the Philippines;
the laws of Hong Kong engaged in an but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine
importation and exportation of several products,
courts or administrative tribunals on any
including lace products. valid cause of action recognized under
 GTVL agreed to purchase lace products from Philippine laws.
[ZUIDEN].
 The procedure for these purchases, as per the
instructions of GTVL, was that ZUIDEN delivers
the products purchased by GTVL, to a certain The law is clear. An unlicensed foreign corporation
Hong Kong corporation, known as Kenzar Ltd.
doing business in the Philippines cannot sue before
(KENZAR), and the products are then
considered as sold, upon receipt by KENZAR of Philippine courts. On the other hand, an unlicensed
the goods purchased by GTVL.
 KENZAR had the obligation to deliver the foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines
products to the Philippines and/or to follow can sue before Philippine courts.
whatever instructions GTVL had on the matter.
 However, commencing on October 31, 1994 up
to the present, GTVL has failed and refused to In the present controversy, petitioner is a foreign
pay the agreed purchase price for several
deliveries ordered by it and delivered by corporation which claims that it is not doing business in
ZUIDEN the Philippines. As such, it needs no license to institute
 In spite [sic] of said demands and in spite [sic]
of promises to pay and/or admissions of liability, a collection suit against respondent before Philippine
GTVL has failed and refused, and continues to
courts.
fail and refuse, to pay the overdue amount of
U.S.$32,088.02 [inclusive of interest]
 Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[5] on the
Respondent argues otherwise by insisting that
ground that petitioner has no legal capacity to
sue since the latter while doing business in the petitioner is doing business in the Philippines.
Philippines did not secure the required license.
 Trial Court dismissed the complaint. This was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 7042 (RA

ISSUE: 7042) or “The Foreign Investments Act of 1991,” the

The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, an phrase “doing business” includes:
unlicensed foreign corporation, has legal capacity to sue
x x x soliciting orders, service contracts,
before Philippine courts. The resolution of this issue opening offices, whether called “liaison”
offices or branches; appointing
 representatives or distributors domiciled
in the Philippines or who in any calendar consummation of these transactions were done outside
year stay in the country for a period or
periods totalling one hundred eighty the Philippines.[8]
(180) days or more; participating in the
management, supervision or control of
any domestic business, firm, entity or As earlier stated, the series of transactions
corporation in the Philippines; and any
other act or acts that imply a continuity between petitioner and respondent transpired and
of commercial dealings or
arrangements, and contemplate to that were consummated in Hong Kong.[9] We also find
extent the performance of acts or works,
no single activity which petitioner performed here in
or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive the Philippines pursuant to its purpose and object
prosecution of, commercial gain or of
the purpose and object of the business as a business organization.[10] Moreover,
organization: Provided, however, That
the phrase “doing business” shall not be petitioner’s desire to do business within the
deemed to include mere investment as
a shareholder by a foreign entity in Philippines is not discernible from the allegations of
domestic corporations duly registered to the complaint or from its attachments. Therefore,
do business, and/or the exercise of
rights as such investor; nor having a there is no basis for ruling that petitioner is doing
nominee director or officer to represent
its interests in such corporation; nor business in the Philippines.
appointing a representative or distributor
domiciled in the Philippines which
transacts business in its own name and
for its own account. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ ruling that

The series of transactions between petitioner the proponents to the transaction determine whether a

and respondent cannot be classified as “doing foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines,

business” in the Philippines under Section 3(d) of regardless of the place of delivery or place where the

RA 7042. An essential condition to be considered as transaction took place. To accede to such theory makes

“doing business” in the Philippines is the actual it possible to classify, for instance, a series of

performance of specific commercial acts within the transactions between a Filipino in the United States and

territory of the Philippines for the plain reason that an American company based in the United States as

the Philippines has no jurisdiction over commercial “doing business in the Philippines,” even when these

acts performed in foreign territories. Here, there is transactions are negotiated and consummated only

no showing that petitioner performed within the within the United States.

Philippine territory the specific acts of doing business

mentioned in Section 3(d) of RA 7042. Petitioner did not An exporter in one country may export its products

also open an office here in the Philippines, appoint a to many foreign importing countries without performing in

representative or distributor, or manage, supervise or the importing countries specific commercial acts that

control a local business. While petitioner and respondent would constitute doing business in the importing

entered into a series of transactions implying a continuity countries. The mere act of exporting from one’s own

of commercial dealings, the perfection and country, without doing any specific commercial act within

the territory of the importing country, cannot be deemed

as doing business in the importing country. The

importing country does not acquire jurisdiction over the
foreign exporter who has not performed any specific
commercial act within the territory of the importing
country. Without jurisdiction over the foreign exporter,
the importing country cannot compel the foreign exporter
to secure a license to do business in the importing
country.
Otherwise, Philippine exporters, by the mere act
alone of exporting their products, could be considered by
the importing countries to be doing business in those
countries. This will require Philippine exporters to
secure a business license in every foreign country where
they usually export their products, even if they do not
perform any specific commercial act within the territory
of such importing countries. Such a legal concept will
have a deleterious effect not only on Philippine exports,
but also on global trade.
To be doing or “transacting business in the
Philippines” for purposes of Section 133 of the
Corporation Code, the foreign corporation
must actually transact business in the Philippines,
that is, perform specific business transactions within the
Philippine territory on a continuing basis in its own name
and for its own account. Actual transaction of business
within the Philippine territory is an essential requisite for
the Philippines to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation and thus require the foreign corporation to
secure a Philippine business license. If a foreign
corporation does not transact such kind of business in
the Philippines, even if it exports its products to the
Philippines, the Philippines has no jurisdiction to require
such foreign corporation to secure a Philippine business
license.
Considering that petitioner is not doing business in
the Philippines, it does not need a license in order to
initiate and maintain a collection suit against respondent
for the unpaid balance of respondent’s purchases.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
MARQUEZ VS BALDOZ
Facts: Respondent Simeon Baldoz is the son of
Spouses Dionisia Leonor and Aurelio Baldoz. They died
intestate, leaving behind a parcel of land located in
Halang, Taal, Batangas.
Simeon discovered that Francisca Leonor and
Candelaria Orlina declared certain portions of the same
land in their name, as evidenced by Tax Declaration
Nos. 0056 to 0058.1[5]
Simeon made several demands upon Francisca, Gaspar
and Candelaria urging them to vacate the premises and
to surrender possession thereof, but his demands
remained unheeded. On September 3, 1997, Simeon
filed Civil Case No. 9-97, entitled “Simeon Baldoz v.
Spouses Francisca Leonor and Gaspar Marquez, and
Candelaria Orlina,” for accion reivindicatoria and quieting
of title, with preliminary writ of injunction and damages.
On October 27, 1997, Francisca, Gaspar and Candelaria
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription
and failure to state a cause of action. The RTC denied
the motion to dismiss. It ruled that the complaint has
sufficiently alleged a cause of action. On the issue of
prescription, the RTC stated that it involves evidentiary
matters which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial
on the merits and cannot be determined in a motion to
dismiss as the question has become a matter of
proof.2[6] The motion for reconsideration filed with the
RTC was likewise denied.
Petitioners Francisca and Gaspar Marquez filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for denying their
motion to dismiss. However, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion as well as a reversible error in
affirming the trial court’s orders.
whether the trial court had violated Sections 2 and 3 of
Rule 16, of the Rules of Court, in denying petitioners’
motion to dismiss the complaint as well as their motion
for reconsideration.
Held:
Petitioners insist that the appellate court erred when it
held that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the trial court when it deferred the resolution of the issue
of prescription raised in their motion to dismiss.
According to petitioners, deferring the resolution of this
issue violates the above cited provisions of the Rules
which provide that the court must either grant, deny or
order the amendment of the pleadings, but must not
defer the resolution of the motion.
On the issue of prescription raised in the said motion,
the Court finds the same evidentiary matters which
should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits
and cannot be determined in a motion to dismiss as the
question has become a matter of proof.
Petitioners palpably misinterpreted the trial court’s
Order, particularly in regard to the matter of prescription.
It ruled that the prescription issue is “one involving
evidentiary matters which must be threshed out in a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a
motion to dismiss as the question has become a matter
of proof.” Petitioners misconstrued the trial court’s ruling
as one tantamount to deferring the resolution of the
motion to dismiss itself. This reading of the Order is
flawed. By denying the motion expressly, the Order
resolved the motion to dismiss as required by Section 3
of Rule 16.
However, what is prohibited by the rules is the deferment
until trial of the resolution of the motion to dismiss itself.
Here, the trial court did not defer resolution of the motion
itself but, in fact, categorically resolved to deny it based
on its finding that: (1) the complaint showed a sufficient
cause of action, and (2) the pleadings did not ipso facto
establish prescription.
Moreover, the trial court’s ruling requiring a full-blown
trial on the merits to resolve the issue of prescription,
finds jurisprudential basis in our ruling in National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) v. Court of Appeals,3[10]
reiterating Francisco v. Robles.4[11] In the NIA case, we
stated that:
[A]n allegation of prescription can effectively be used in
a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face
shows that indeed the action has already
prescribed.5[12]
This precedent finds application in the present case.
Nothing shows on the face of the complaint filed by
herein respondent as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9-97 that
the action already prescribed at the time it was filed. The
complaint merely averred that Gregorio Leonor, father of
herein petitioners, was a tenant of respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
Notwithstanding the jurisprudence which states that
prescription may be effectively pleaded in a motion to
dismiss if the complaint shows on its face that the action
had already prescribed at the time it was filed, We
believe, however, that there is no sufficient and
convincing showing that prescription as regards the
subject property has set in already. The reason is
simple: the court a quo noted on the face of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 9-97 that Gregorio Leonor,
father of herein petitioners, was the tenant of the parents
of private respondent over the subject property.
Obviously, perusing the complaint with an allegation that
the subject property was a tenanted property, the
contention of petitioners in establishing an uninterrupted
adverse possession for more than thirty (30) years
seems implausible. Besides, possession is not a
definitive proof of ownership, nor is non-possession
inconsistent therewith. 6[13]
Based on the pleadings, the issue of prescription was
not clearly established. On this point, it is but logical and
proper for the trial court to deny petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and, additionally, to require a full-blown trial on
the issue of prescription.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion, much less any reversible error, in
affirming the Orders of the trial court.
Jesse U. Lucas vs. Jesus S. Lucas
GR No. 190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a
Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Petitioner narrated that,
sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated
to Manila from Davao and stayed with a certain “Ate
Belen (Belen)” who worked in a prominent nightspot
in Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to
work. On one occasion, Elsie got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and
an intimate relationship developed between the two.
Elsie eventually got pregnant, she gave birth to
petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name of petitioner’s
father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live
birth. However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his
father is respondent. While petitioner was growing up,
Elsie made several attempts to introduce petitioner to
respondent, but all attempts were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to
establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial
court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the
petition.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try
and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the
RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing
and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition
to file his opposition.
On September 14, 2007, respondent also filed a
Manifestation and Comment on Petitioner’s Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Respondent
reiterated that the petition for recognition is adversarial in
nature; hence, he should be served with summons.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order,
respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration. Respondent averred that the petition
was not in due form and substance because petitioner
could not have personally known the matters that were
alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be
had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
respondent as petitioner’s father. Moreover,
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of
DNA evidence.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA, questioning the Orders dated October 20, 2008
and January 19, 2009. On September 25, 2009, the CA
decided the petition for certiorari in favor of respondent.
The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the person of respondent, as no summons had
been served on him. Respondent’s special appearance
could not be considered as voluntary appearance
because it was filed only for the purpose of questioning
the jurisdiction of the court over respondent.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17,
2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY REASON OF THE
MOTION (FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO) FOR THE CONDUCT OF DNA
TESTING.
SC RULING: The petition is meritorious.
Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the
trial court were orders denying respondent’s motion to
dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order
denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case, as it leaves something to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such,
the general rule is that the denial of a motion to
dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither
can a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In a number of cases, the court has granted
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the
motion to dismiss but only when it has been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[21] In the present case, we discern no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
denying the motion to dismiss.
The grounds for dismissal relied upon by respondent
were (a) the court’s lack of jurisdiction over his person
due to the absence of summons, and (b) defect in the
form and substance of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation, which is equivalent to failure to state
a cause of action.
We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether
it was necessary, in the first place, to serve summons on
respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
case. In other words, was the service of summons
jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on
the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.
An action in personam is lodged against a person based
on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against
the thing itself instead of the person; while an
action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that person's interest in a property to
a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment
of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth
certificate, is an action in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction
over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into
actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the
court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an
action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over
the case. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort to the right sought to be
established. Through publication, all interested parties
are deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements. This is but proper in order to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve
summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to
try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that
the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his
opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process
requirement with respect to respondent has been
satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to
file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
To address respondent’s contention that the petition
should have been adversarial in form, we further hold
that the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient
in form. A proceeding is adversarial where the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this
petition—classified as an action in rem—the notice
requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise
satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving
of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial
court.
The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied
upon by petitioner to establish his filiation to respondent.
In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of
cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made
in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not
whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint.
The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the
complaint, and no other. The test of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.
If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form
and substance but their veracity and correctness are
assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny
the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to
answer and go to trial to prove his defense. The veracity
of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the
trial of the case on the merits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December
17, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders
dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRM
ED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182779 August 23, 2010
VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM
LAZARO, Petitioner,
vs.
BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Brewmaster International, Inc. is a marketing
company engaged in selling and distributing beer and
other products of Asia Brewery, Inc.
Sometime in 2005, it filed a Complaint for Sum
of Money against Prescillo Lazaro and petitioner,
Victorina Lazaro, with the MeTC of Makati City alleging
that during the period of Feb 2002 to May 2002, the
petitioners obtained on credit from the respondent beer
and other products in the total amount of 138,502.92
evidenced by sales invoices. Despite repeated
demands, petitioners have failed and refused, and up to
now, still fail and refuse to pay their aforesaid obligation
to the defendant.
Annexed to the complaint are photocopies of
sales invoices indicating the amount of the goods
purchased showing that they were sold to “TOTAL” and
received by a certain Daniel Limuco.
Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim,
denying any knowledge of the obligation sued upon.
According to Prescillo, he and petitioner had lived
separately since January 15, 2002 and he never
authorized petitioner to purchase anything from
respondent. He pointed out that the purchaser of the
items, as borne out by the sales invoices attached to the
complaint, was Total, which should have been the one
sued by respondent.4
Petitioner, in her own answer with
counterclaims, likewise denied having transacted with
respondent, and averred that the documents attached to
the complaint showed that it was Total which purchased
goods from respondent.
MeTC dismissed the Complaint. Respondent
elevated the case to RTC through notice of appeal.
Attached to its Memorandum was additional evidence,
showing that it transacted with petitioner and her
husband, who were then operators and franchisees of
the TOTAL gasoline station and convenience store
where the subject goods were delivered and that Daniel
Limuco was their employee.
RTC affirmed MTC. Respondents filed an
appeal with CA. CA reversed RTC. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON The Complaint failed to state cause of
action because the sales invoice attached to the
complaint is named under “TOTAL” Gasoline station and
not to petitioners.
HELD:
YES. THE COMPLAINT STATES CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Petitioner avers that respondent’s complaint fails to state
a cause of action; hence, no relief can be given to
respondent. Petitioner points out that the sales invoices
formed part of the complaint and should be considered
in determining whether respondent has a cause of action
against her. Consideration of the said sales invoices,
she avers, would show that there is no contractual
relationship between her and respondent; the invoices
did not indicate in any way that petitioner was liable for
the amount stated therein.
Petitioner is correct in saying that no relief can be
awarded to respondent if its complaint does not state a
cause of action. Indeed, if the complaint does not state a
cause of action, then no relief can be granted to the
plaintiff and it would necessarily follow that the
allegations in the complaint would not warrant a
judgment favorable to the plaintiff.
The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint
to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the
facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
petition or complaint.18 To determine whether the
complaint states a cause of action, all documents
attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly
when referred to in the complaint.19 We emphasize,
however, that the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the
veracity of the material allegations in the
complaint.20 Thus, consideration of the annexed
documents should only be taken in the context of
ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint.
Petitioner argues that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action since reference to the sales invoices attached
to and cited in paragraph six of the Complaint shows that
it was not her who purchased and received the goods
from respondent.
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, we find that the
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of
action.1âwphi1 The following allegations in the complaint
adequately make up a cause of action for collection of
sum of money against petitioner: (1) that petitioner and
her husband obtained beer and other products worth a
total of P138,502.92 on credit from respondent; and (2)
that they refused to pay the said amount despite
demand.
As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not
actionable documents. They were not the bases of
respondent’s action for sum of money but were attached
to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged
transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not
even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint.
EVANGELISTA vs. SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
States no cause of action
FACTS:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners pray for the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64957,1
affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. 1220,2
dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for declaration of nullity
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 670 and all
other titles emanating therefrom.
In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they occupied
and possessed parcels of land, located in Sitio
Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban (now
Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by
virtue of several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April
1994 and 02 June 1994, executed by a certain Ismael
Favila y Rodriguez.
According to the Deeds of Assignment, the Subject
Property was part of a vast tract of land called "Hacienda
Quibiga," which extended to Parañaque, Las Piñas,
Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati,
Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan,
and Rizal; awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by
the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a Spanish title.
Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Acting as Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power
of Attorney executed by his "mga kapatid" on 25
February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the aforementioned
Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the Subject
Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring
around 500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the
labor and work done on the Subject Property by the
petitioners and their predecessors.4
penmanships; (3) OCT No. 670 was not printed on the
Official Form used in 1913, the year it was issued; (4) It
failed to indicate the Survey Plan which was the basis of
the Technical Description of the property covered by the
title; (5) Decree No. 10248 referred to in OCT No. 670
was issued only on 11 April 1913, while OCT No. 670
was issued earlier, on 13 February 1913; and (6) Decree
No. 10248 was issued over a property other than the
one described in OCT No. 670, although also located in
the Province of Rizal.
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary
Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses on 03 July 1996.
According to respondent, "[t]he allegations in the
Complaint would readily and patently show that the
same are flimsy, fabricated, malicious, without basis in
law and in fact…"8

Petitioners came by information that respondent was

planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of
As an affirmative defense, respondent claimed that the
the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate.
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint,
Their investigations revealed that the Subject Property
and thus, the Complaint stated no cause of action. Since
was included in Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) No.
OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face,
53028, No. 281660, No. N-39258 and No. 205270, all
then OCT No. 670 and all of respondent’s land titles
originating from OCT No. 670, and now in the name of
derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and
respondent.
conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world.

OCT No. 670 was issued in the name of respondent’s

The Trial Court dismissed the petition which was
mother, Isabel Manahan y Francisco, and three other
affirmed by the CA.
individuals, pursuant to Decree No. 10248, dated 13
February 1913, in Case No. 8502 of the Court of Land
Registration of the Philippine Islands. The whole
property covered by OCT No. 670 was subsequently Hence, this petition.
adjudicated in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago
(formerly Isabel Manahan y Francisco). Consequently,
OCT No. 670 was cancelled and TCT No. T-53028 was
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint stated a cause of
issued exclusively in the name of Isabel Manahan
action.
Santiago. On 28 December 1968, Isabel Manahan
Santiago executed a Deed of Donation transferring the
property to her son, respondent herein, who
subsequently secured TCTs No. 281660, No. N-39258 RULING: NO. The complaint did not state a cause of
and No. 205270 in his own name.6 action.

Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an
action for declaration of nullity of respondent’s
certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was
fake and spurious. Among the defects of OCT No. 670
pointed out by petitioners were that: (1) OCT No. 670
was not signed by a duly authorized officer; (2) Material
data therein were merely handwritten and in different
In the present case, this Court may assume that the
respondent is raising the affirmative defense that the
Complaint filed by the petitioners before the trial court
stated no cause of action because the petitioners lacked
the personality to sue, not being the real party-in-
interest. It is the respondent’s contention that only the
State can file an action for annulment of his certificates
of title, since such an action will result in the reversion of
the ownership of the Subject Property to the State.
The affirmative defense that the Complaint stated no
cause of action, similar to a motion to dismiss based on
the same ground, requires a hypothetical admission of
the facts alleged in the Complaint. In the case of Garcon
v. Redemptorist Fathers, this Court laid down the rules
as far as this ground for dismissal of an action or
affirmative defense is concerned:
It is already well-settled by now that, in a motion to
dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of
action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations of
fact made in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action, and not on whether these allegations of fact
are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit
the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint; that
the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer of
said complaint. Stated otherwise, the insufficiency
of the cause of action must appear in the face of
the complaint in order to sustain a dismissal on this
ground, for in the determination of whether or not a
complaint states a cause of action, only the facts
alleged therein and no other matter may be
considered, and the court may not inquire into the
truth of the allegations, and find them to be false
before a hearing is had on the merits of the case;
and it is improper to inject in the allegations of the
complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use
these as basis for said motion.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present
case stated a cause of action, the trial court should have
limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Complaint. It was proscribed from
inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint
or the authenticity of any of the documents referred or
attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed
hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court
evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity
of the Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in
favor of petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994;
and questioning the existence and execution of the
Special Power of Attorney in favor of said Ismael Favila
by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These matters may
only be resolved after a proper trial on the merits.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint, and respondent
hypothetically admitted that: (1) Petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest, in the concept of owners, had
been in actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse
possession of the Subject Property against the whole
world since time immemorial; (2) The Subject Property
was part of the vast tract of land called "Hacienda
Quibiga" awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the
Queen of Spain by virtue of a Spanish title; (3) Ismael
Favila, an heir and successor-in-interest of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez, acting as Attorney-in-Fact
pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed by his
"mga kapatid" on 25 February 1965, executed Deeds of
Assignment covering the Subject Property in favor of
petitioners; (4) Petitioners still occupied and possessed
the Subject Property, on which their houses were
erected, when they discovered that the Subject Property
was already covered by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of respondent; and (5) That petitioners filed the
Complaint to prevent their eviction by the respondent. To
determine whether these allegations are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action, it is important for this Court
to establish first the nature of petitioners’ action.
Indeed, petitioners’ Complaint filed before the trial court
was captioned as an action for declaration of nullity of
respondent’s certificates of title. However, the caption of
the pleading should not be the governing factor, but
rather the allegations therein should determine the
nature of the action, because even without the prayer for
a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the
proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the Complaint and the evidence introduced.
The trial court believed that petitioners’ action was
ultimately one for reversion of the Subject Property to
the public domain.
The Court disagrees in this pronouncement of the trial
court, and calls for a far closer review of its decision.
In the more recent case of Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala
v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, the difference between an
action for declaration of nullity of land titles from an
action for reversion was more thoroughly discussed as
follows:
Reversion
In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land. Hence,
in Gabila vs. Barriga [41 SCRA 131], where the
plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no
right to demand the cancellation or amendment
of the defendant’s title because even if the title
were canceled or amended the ownership of
the land embraced therein or of the portion
affected by the amendment would revert to the
public domain, we ruled that the action was for
reversion and that the only person or entity
entitled to relief would be the Director of Lands
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
whichNullity
is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
A cause of action for declaration of nullity of
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
free patent and certificate of title would require
to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the
contested lot prior to the issuance of such free
patent and certificate of title as well as the
defendant’s fraud An or mistake,
action may as
alsothebecase may to prevent a cloud from
brought
be, in successfully obtaining these documentsproperty or any interest
being cast upon title to real
of title over the therein.
parcel of land claimed by
plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly
not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Respondent’s certificates of title over the Subject
Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever
Property appeared valid or effective; but according to the
patent or certificate of title obtained therefore is
petitioners, they were fake, spurious and/or fraudulent,
consequently void ab initio. The real party-in-
and a cloud on their title to the same property that
interest is not the State but the plaintiff who
needed to be removed. A cloud on title has been defined
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over
as follows:
the parcel of land in question even before the
grant of title to the defendant

Cloud on Title. – A cloud on title is an outstanding

In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the
Subject Property was part of the public domain. On the
contrary, petitioners asserted title over the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual, physical, open,
continuous and adverse possession thereof, in the
concept of owners, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The
Deeds of Assignment executed in their favor and
attached to their Complaint referred to a Spanish title
granted by the Queen of Spain to their predecessor-in-
interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly,
petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject
Property, and consequently, their action could not be
one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that
rather than an action for nullity of respondent’s
certificates of title, theirs was more appropriately an
action to remove a cloud on or to quiet their title over the
Subject Property.
Article 476 of the Civil Code, on removal of a cloud on or
quieting of title, provides that:
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may
nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to
property. The matter complained of must have a prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. The cloud
on title is a semblance of title which appears in some
legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The invalidity
or inoperativeness of the instrument is not apparent on
the face of such instrument, and it has to be proved by
extrinsic evidence…31
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their
action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of
title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners had no
personality to file the said action, not being the parties-
in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for
not stating a cause of action.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual
possession of the Subject Property when they filed the
Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not
exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and
their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of
their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a
land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a
cloud on or to quiet title.

The preceding discussion does not bar holders of
Spanish titles from claiming ownership of the real
property on some other basis, such as those provided in
either the Land Registration Decree41 or the Public
Land Act.42 Petitioners though failed to allege any other
basis for their titles in their Complaint aside from
possession of the Subject Property from time
immemorial, which this Court has already controverted;
and the Spanish title, which is already ineffective to
prove ownership over the Subject Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an
action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and
their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this
Court to address the issue of prescription of the action.
G.R. No. 185454 March 23, 2011 STAR TWO (SPV-
AMC), INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HOWARD KO, MIN MIN SEE KO, JIMMY ONG, and
GRACE NG ONG, Respondents.
Facts:
Jianshe Motorcycle Industries Philippines obtained a
loan from RCBC from 2003-2004 to finance its
importation of motorcycles, motorcycle parts and
accessories, and other similar products. RCBC required
the execution of trust receipts, and to further safeguard
its interest, required the respondents to execute a
comprehensive surety agreement with a limited liability
of P50 million.
Jianshe defaulted in their payment, hence, RCBC filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for a
Writ of Preliminary Attachment against Jianshe (as
principal) and the respondents (as sureties).
the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against all the properties of Jianshe and
respondents as may be sufficient to satisfy RCBC’s
principal claim of P25,636,339.40 conditioned upon the
filing of the required bond. Howard Ko filed a Motion to
Dismiss10 on the ground that RCBC’s claim had already
been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished; but it was denied but the trial court.
Subsequently, the RTC granted Howard Ko’s motion and
accordingly dismissed the case against respondents,
leaving Jianshe as the only defendant. In dismissing the
case, the trial court stated that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that Howard Ko paid an amount more
than the limit provided under the Comprehensive Surety
Agreement.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the case against
respondents, RCBC filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.15 It likewise filed a
Manifestation/Substitution of Parties,16 considering that it
had sold, transferred, and assigned all its rights and
interests in the present case to petitioner Star Two.
The RTC denied RCBC’s Motion for Reconsideration,
hence, it elevated its cause to the CA under Rule 65.
The latter denied the petition, hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid dismissal of the case?
Ruling:
Yes, the dismissal was valid.
Pursuant to Article 2054 of the Civil Code that "a
guarantor [or surety] may bind himself for less, but not
for more than the principal debtor, both as regards the
amount and the onerous nature of the conditions,"
respondents limited their liability to P50 M, which is less
than Jianshe’s liability to RCBC. Howard Ko complied
with his obligations and made payments to RCBC
through the following modes:
 First mode of payment: certificates of time
deposit of Howard Ko and Howard Ko and/or
Harry Ko which were admitted by RCBC as
applied for the payment of Jianshe’s obligation.
 Second mode of payment: official receipts and
trust receipt debit advices which were debited
from Howard Ko’s current account (1-155-
13110-1) and savings account (1-155-30805-9)
and applied as payment to Jianshe’s obligation.
 Third mode of payment: certificates of time
deposit of Howard Ko which were withdrawn
upon maturity and deposited to Jianshe’s RCBC
Savings Account No. 1-166-30810-6. Thereafter,
the said amounts were debited by RCBC as
payment to several trust receipts issued to
[Jianshe].
 Fourth mode of payment: certificates of time
deposit of Harry Ko and Liu Guo Xuan which
were admitted as payment by RCBC. The
proceeds of these CTDs were borrowed by
Howard Ko from Harry Ko and Liu Guo Xuan to
be applied as payment for Jianshe’s
obligations.25
These modes of payment were adequately explained by
respondents and supported by documentary evidence.
We quote with approval the CA’s observations in this
wise:
The evidence in favor of the [respondents] consisted of
no less than RCBC documents showing that said bank
debited from their various accounts the amounts which
Jianshe owed RCBC under the trust receipts.
In view of the foregoing, the CA did not err in sustaining
the dismissal of the case against respondents as the
claim or demand set forth in the complaint has been paid
or otherwise extinguished.
URETHANE VS EDWIN ONG
The dispute started when the petitioner filed a complaint
for sum of money against the respondent before the
MTC of pasig city. Respondent where declared in default
and petitioner presented evidence ex parte. MeTC
ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner 295.026.01.
The petitioner moved for execution of said judgment on
jan. 10 2002. On July 9 2002 the respondent filed a
petition for annulment of judgment with damages and
prayer for injunctive relief on the stating that they did not
receive the summons issued by MeTC. the same shall
be annulled on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal stating 2 grounds. 1. That the cause of action
is barred by statute of limitation and 2. Claim or demand
set forth in the petition has been waived. Stating that
summons was in fact served. Sherrif went into the
respondents business address and residence but he
was not able to serve hence the former effected
substituted service. RTC denied motion to dismiss of
petitioner. Petitioner then raised the issue to the CA
which was also denied. Hence petitioner raised the issue
to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the petition for annulment of judgment be
dismissed on the ground that the claim or demand set
forth in the plaintiff's petition has been waived
abandoned or otherwise extinguished.
RULING
No. The petitoner' ground on motion to dismiss was
based on the assertion of the petitoner that the respond
the cannot invoke lack of jurisdiction over their person as
a ground for petition for annulment. This is a conclusion
that cannot be used as a foundation of the motion to
dismiss. The assertion needs to be proven or disproven
by the parties. These involve evidentiary matters
requiring a full blown trial on the merit and cannot be
resolved in a mere motion to dismiss. Further
prescription will warrant the dismissal of the case only
when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the
action has already prescribed.
XXX FERNANDO VS ACUNA XXX
MORATA vs. GO
FACTS:
On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D.
Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu,
presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a
complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma.
Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus
damages amounting to P49,400.00.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the
parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the
failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the
plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by
P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by
the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or
settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion
was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an
order denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied in an order dated October 3, 1982
In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, the Court
required respondents to file an answer, and likewise
granted a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their
answer and enter into trial.
ISSUE:
Whether the conciliation process at the barangay level,
prescribed by PD 1508 as a precondition for filing a
complaint in court, is also compulsory for actions
cognizable by the RTC.
HELD:
Yes.
Sec.6, PD 1508 provides that the
confrontation of the parties and
conciliation before the Lupon is a
precondition for filing a complaint,
except when:
The accused is under detention;
A person has otherwise been deprived
of personal liberty calling for *habeas
corpus* proceedings;
Actions coupled with privisional
remedies; and
Where the action may be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
Sec.2 provides additional exceptions,
such as when:
One party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality;
One party is a public officer/employee
and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
Offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 30 days or a fine exceeding
P200;
Where there is no private offended
party; and
Such other classes of disputes which
the Prime Minister may, in the inetrest
of justice, determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of
Justice and the Minister of Local
Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Secs. 2 and
6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who
actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to
the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised
at the barangay level. Where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences
through the intervention of the barangay leader and
other respected members of the barangay, the animosity
generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor
toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be
borne in mind that the conciliation process at the
barangay level is also designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to
decongest its clogged dockets and enhance the quality
of justice dispensed by it.
The law obviously intended to grant the Lupon as broad
and comprehensive authority as possible as would bring
about the optimum realization of the aforesaid
objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and
easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only
in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts.
Jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any
interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the Courts of First
Instance.
The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Sec.2
of the law; whereas Secs. 11, 12 and 14 deal with the
nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration
awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections
conferred upon the city & municipal courts the
jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions
for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration
awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount
involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is
nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis
that the mandated conciliation process in other types of
cases applies excluisively to said inferior courts.
Therefore, the conciliation process at the barangay
level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for
filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the
metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for
actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as
well.
Uy v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 167 (1994)
Facts:
Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde
(hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second floor of
a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets,
Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained
therein a beauty parlor.
The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993.
However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her
movable properties.
On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the
petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to
withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining
movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a
mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning
casing. The argument degenerated into a scuffle
between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and
several of Atayde's employees, including private
respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the
other.
On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had
themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries
inflicted on them by the petitioner. On 23 April 1993, the
private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay
captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as
Barangay Cases Nos. 1023 and 1024.The confrontation
of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for
28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner
appeared. The barangay captain then reset the
confrontation to 26 May 1993.
On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries
against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and
145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.
On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of
Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-
affidavit and those of her witnesses.On 14 June 1993,
the petitioner submitted the required counter-
affidavits. In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner
specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the
criminal cases for failure to undergo conciliation
proceedings as she and the private respondents are
residents of Manila. She also attached to it a
certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing
conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in
Barangay Case No. 1023.
On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-
compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on
prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant
to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras
handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss. A
motion to reconsider the order was also denied.
Hence this special civil action for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge abused his
discretion.
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit.
The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally
governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on 11
June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of
1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
thereof, revised the law on the katarungang
pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D.
No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section
534(b) of the Code.
It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang
pambarangay law has at least three new significant
features, to wit:
1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal
offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in
P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00.
2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the
workplace where the contending parties are employed or
at the institution where such parties are enrolled for
study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.
3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive
periods of offenses during the pendency of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph
(c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from
some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive
periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of
the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the
certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary." What is referred to as receipt by
the complainant of the complaint is unclear; obviously, it
could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the
above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the
complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption of
the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be
from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension,
however, shall not exceed sixty days.
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local
Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-
condition to the filing of an action in court remains
applicable because its provisions on prior referral were
substantially reproduced in the Code.
In Peregrina vs. Panis, this Court stated:
Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda.
de Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have
held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process
at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to
exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between family
members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.
The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D.
No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same
barangay and their disputes does not fall under any of
the excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This
Court said so in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:
In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to
the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is
not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with
which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and
non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably
raised as an issue before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is
proper.
xxx xxx xxx
The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the
same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted
with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there
alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
(emphasis omitted)
In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner
and the respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The
petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18.
None knew of the repeal of the decree by the Local
Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition,
the petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the
private respondents, realizing the weakness of their
position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their
grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the
decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that
on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against
petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local
Government Code." Yet, in a deliberate effort to be
cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said
law is not applicable to their cases before the court a
quo because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde
are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action,
as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law
applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should
have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the
private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was
necessary before filing the informations.
Respondent judge did not do any better. His total
unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991,
more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken
judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily
required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. He should have applied
the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the
Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this
petition would not have reached us and taken valuable
attention and time which could have been devoted to
more important cases.
In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at
the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which
the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint
for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the
MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing
then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with
the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and,
pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local
Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases.
He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section
412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which
states that the parties may go directly to court where the
action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier
stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the
Code, the prescriptive period was automatically
suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23
April 1993 when the private respondents filed their
complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela Makati.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents
are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body
which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling
with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to
attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead
filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot
be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the
barangay conciliation system.
Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were allegedly
inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor
would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the
private respondents' complaints with the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically
suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22 June
1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached
within the said period of suspension and, accordingly, a
certification to file action is issued, the private
respondents would still have fifty-six days within which to
file their separate criminal complaints for such offense.
Evidently, there was no basis for the invocation by the
respondent judge of the exception provided for in
paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government
Code.
Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the
respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before
the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that the
accused and the complainant are residents of different
barangays." The petitioner did not waive the
reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of
Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the
pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her counter-
affidavit.
Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private
respondent that the parties could not agree on a
compromise and that they had to request the barangay
captain to issue a certification to file action. The request
is dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months
after Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed
with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support
their contention in the said court that, in any event, there
was substantial compliance with the requirement of
referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that the private
respondents, after failing to appear at the initial
confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a
certification to file action.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234.
Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to
emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang
pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the
barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and
progress therein, and in effectively preventing or
reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to
disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity,
exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government
prosecutors should exercise due diligence in
ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should
not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-
compliance thereof.
Wingarts v Mejia
These administrative complaints
were an offshoot of three criminal cases
decided by respondent judge and
involving the Wingarts and Col. Rodulfo
Munar. Complainant Johan L.H.
Wingarts was the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2663 and 2664 filed in the
aforesaid municipal trial court for
malicious mischief and grave threats.
The first two criminal cases were
initiated by Col. Munar as the private
complainant therein. Thereafter, the
Wingarts made a counter-charge
against Col. Munar resulting in the third
criminal case for usurpation of authority
docketed in the same court as Criminal
Case No. 2696 with Col. Munar as the
accused.
In the administrative
complaint relative to Criminal Case No.
 2663 for malicious mischief, respondent
judge is charged with malicious delay in
the administration of justice. The case
allegedly dragged for one year and four
months 3 in respondent's sala and was
ultimately dismissed in a decision dated
June 8, 1994 after an ocular inspection
of the burned premises was conducted
by the court personnel. 4
Herein complainants
also charge respondent judge in their
second complaint here with
incompetence, ignorance of the law and
abuse of authority for taking cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 2664, entitled
"People vs. Leo Wingarts," for grave
threats and for issuing a warrant of
arrest against him despite lack of
prior barangayconciliation. The said
case was later dismissed and indorsed
to the barangay official concerned.
Required to comment on these
administrative charges, respondent
judge explained that he took cognizance
of Criminal Case No. 2664 in the belief
that there had been substantial
compliance with the requirements of
theKatarungang Pambarangay
Law since a certification of the barangay
captain regarding a confrontation of the
parties, the fact that no amicable
settlement was reached by them, and
that he was endorsing the filing of the
case in court, had been duly submitted
to respondent judge.
Sec. 412. CONCILIATION — (a)
Precondition to filing of Complaint in
Court — No complaint, petition, action
or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the lupon shall be
filled (SIC) or instituted directly
in court or any other government office
for adjudication unless there has been
a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the
pangkat, and that no conciliation
or settlement has been reached as
certified by the lupon secretary or
pangkat secretary as attested to
by the lupon or pangkat chairman or
unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
Issue: Whether or not there was compliance
with the requirements of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law?
Held: No, there was none. Respondent judge is
indeed liable for incompetence and ignorance of
the law for taking cognizance of Criminal Case
No. 2664 despite the legal obstacles thereto.
A judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence and
should administer justice impartially and without
delay. 12 He should be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence, dispose of
the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
A judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession
to know the factual bases of the complaint and the very
law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is
called upon to exhibit more than just cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.
Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration
of justice if judges cannot just be accused of apparent
deficiency in the analysis of the facts of the case and in
their grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the
judiciary means a continuous study and research on the
law from beginning to end. 13
Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias
or partiality on his part, respondent judge should have
exercised the requisite prudence, especially under the
environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal
case where personal liberty was involved. He should
have carefully examined all relevant facts and issues
and avoided the improvident issuance of the warrant of
arrest without a circumspect review of the case which,
after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or
complicated legal questions. The present controversy
could have been avoided had he kept faith with the
injunction that a member of the bench must continuously
keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential
developments because the learning process in law never
ceases.
[A.M. NO. MTJ-02-1402. December 4, 2002]
ABRAHAM L. MENDOVA vs. CRISANTO B. AFABLE,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Julian-Sulat, Eastern Samar.
FACTS:
Mendoza alleged that on February 18, 1998, he filed
with the Office of the Barangay Chairman a complaint for
slight physical injuries against Palada, however, despite
the hearings conducted thereon, the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement.
Therefore, on May 4, 1998 complainant Mendova filed a
complaint for slight physical injuries before the MTC.
However, the case was dismissed by Judge Afable on
the ground of prescription (the complaint alleging a light
offense, which prescribes in two months).
Mendova thus filed an admin complaint against Judge
Afable (who actually admitted his error and claimed a
mere mental lapse on his part). The complainant alleged
that, in dismissing the case, Judge Afable showed his
ignorance of the law when he did not apply the
provisions of Section 410(c) of the LGC, which
suspends the prescriptive period of offences upon the
filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay.
"Section 410. Procedure for Amicable
Settlement. –
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of
offenses. – While the dispute is under
mediation, conciliation or arbitration, the
prescriptive periods for offenses and causes
of action under existing laws shall be
interrupted upon filing of the complaint with
the Punong Barangay. The prescriptive
periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate
of repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary: Provided, however, That such
interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days
from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay." (emphasis added)
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge is liable administratively for
dismissing the criminal case on the ground of
prescription.
HELD:
No. Thus, SC DISMISSED the administrative complaint
against Judge Crisanto B. Afable for (1) being
premature; and (2) further inability of petitioner
(Mendova) to present proof of his receipt of the
Barangay Certification to File Action as required by the
provisions of Section 410(c) of The Local Government
Code of 1991,
An administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision
issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For,
obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge’s
challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion
to proceed against him at all. It is only where the error is
so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith that administrative sanctions may be
imposed against the erring judge.
In the present case, the complainant did not bother at all
to file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judge’s
decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was
advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus,
following our settled pronouncements cited above, his
instant administrative complaint is premature.
In addition, records fail to show when complainant
received the Barangay Certification to File Action. The
undated certification he submitted merely states that the
case was set for hearing before the barangay on March
16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. When he filed on May 4, 1998 the
criminal case for slight physical injuries with
respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case on
November 3, 1998, he still failed to present proof of his
receipt of the Barangay Certification to File Action.
Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for
dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
AQUINO VS AURE
FACTS:
Alleging that they acquired the subject property from a
Deed of Sale, Aure Lending (Aure and E.S. Aure
Lending Investors, Inc.) filed a Complaint for ejectment
against Aquino. Respondent countered that the
Complaint lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure
Lending do not have any legal right over the subject
property. MeTC rendered in favor of Aquino and
dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure Lending
on the ground; enter alia, of non-compliance with the
Barangay conciliation process. The MeTC observed that
Aure and Aquino are residents of the same
Barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has
been made to settle the case amicably at the
Barangay level.
Aquino posits that failure to resort
to Barangay conciliation makes the action for ejectment
premature and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers
that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial
and even subsequently in her Position Paper submitted
to the MeTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not non-compliance with the Barangay conciliation
proceedings is a jurisdictional defect that warrants the dismissal
of the complaint.
RULING:
(Procedurally yes but, in the case, the court ruled in the
negative due to waiver in the part of the petitioner; thus,
non-compliance of the requirement of Barangay
reconciliation, as a ground to dismiss, must be raised in
the answer or in motion to dismiss, otherwise it is
deemed waived)
As enunciated in the landmark case of
Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court :
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent
prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent
a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its
power of adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction in their answer and
even during the entire proceedings a quo.
Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture
by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot
be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the
case after having submitted herself voluntarily
thereto. We have scrupulously examined Aquino’s
Answer before the MeTC and there is utter lack of any
objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint
which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.
By Aquino’s failure to seasonably object to the deficiency
in the Complaint, she is deemed to have already
acquiesced or waived any defect attendant
thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move
for the dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure
Lending’s failure to resort to the Barangay conciliation
process, since she is already precluded from doing so.
The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the
pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for
the issue of non-recourse to Barangay mediation
proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:
Sec. 1. Defenses and objections
not pleaded. – Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it
appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between
the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis
supplied.)
While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading
(specifically, an Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar
or identical rule is provided for all other motions in
Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same Rule which states:
Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. -
Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading,
order, judgment, or proceeding shall
include all objections then available, and
all objections not so included shall be
deemed waived.
(reason of the rule) The spirit that surrounds the
foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a
pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for
relief during the single opportunity so that single or
multiple objections may be avoided.
Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non-compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for
failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by
the omnibus motion rule.
(Nota bene: the court cannot moto proprio dismiss a
case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement of Barangay conciliation)
XXX PANG-ET VS MANACNES XXXX
AGBAYANI V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012
FACTS:
Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas
City, working as Court Stenographer and Legal
Researcher II, respectively. Agbayani filed a criminal
complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City
for allegedly uttering against her, in the presence of their
fellow court employees and while she was going about
her usual duties at work, the following statements, to wit:
"ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA
TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG
GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI,
BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG,
STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA
LANG, ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA
TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO,
TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD
DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD
MO."3
The City prosecutor found probable cause. However,
upon a petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ
Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda (Pineda) found that:
After careful evaluation and consideration of the
evidence on record, we find merit in the instant petition.
Contrary to the findings in the assailed resolution, we
find that the subject utterances of respondent (Genabe)
constitute only slight oral defamation. The complaint-
affidavit (of Agbayani), however, failed to show that the
instant case was previously referred to the barangay for
conciliation in compliance with Sections 408 and 409,
paragraph (d), of the Local Government Code. Hence
case was dismissed by the DOJ. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether failure to comply with the mandatory barangay
conciliation is a proper ground for dismissal.
RULING:
YES. Failure to comply with a condition precedent is a
proper ground for dismissal.
Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent
Genabe are residents of Las Piñas City and both work at
the RTC, and the incident which is the subject matter of
the case happened in their workplace. 25 Agbayani’s
complaint should have undergone the mandatory
barangay conciliation for possible amicable
settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to
Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provide:
Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception thereto. – The lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality
for amicable settlement of all disputes, except: x x
x
Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the
workplace where the contending parties are
employed or x x x shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
Administrative Circular No. 14-93,26 issued by the
Supreme Court on July 15, 1993 states that:
xxx
I. All disputes are subject to Barangay
conciliation pursuant to the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law [formerly
P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by
Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III,
and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991], and prior recourse thereto is
a pre-condition before filing a complaint in
court or any government offices, except in
the following disputes:
1) Where one party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2) Where one party is a public officer or employee
and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
3) Where the dispute involves real properties
located in different cities and municipalities,
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
difference to amicable settlement by an
appropriate Lupon;
4) Any complaint by or against corporations,
partnerships or juridical entities, since only
individuals shall be parties to Barangay
conciliation proceedings either as complainants
or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules];
5) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each
other and the parties thereto agree to submit
their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate Lupon;
6) Offenses for which the law prescribes a
maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding
one [1] year or a fine of over five thousand
pesos ([P]5,000.00);
7) Offenses where there is no private offended
party;
8) Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary
to prevent injustice from being committed or
further continued, specifically the following:
a. Criminal cases where accused is under
police custody or detention [See Sec.
412(b)(1), Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law];
b. Petitions for habeas corpus by a person
illegally deprived of his rightful custody over
another or a person illegally deprived of or
on acting in his behalf;
c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support
during the pendency of the action; and
 d. Actions which may be barred by the Statute
of Limitations.

9) Any class of disputes which the President may

determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;
10) Where the dispute arises from the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
[Secs. 46 & 47, R. A. 6657];
11) Labor disputes or controversies arising from
employer-employee relations [Montoya vs.
Escayo, 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code,
as amended, which grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of
disputes, grievances or problems to certain
offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment];
12) Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise
which may be filed directly in court [See
Sanchez vs. [Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]."

xxx

The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-

condition for the filing of the complaint in court.
Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of
excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior
availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not
have a certification that no conciliation had been
reached by the parties, the case should be
dismissed.

Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the

instant case is not one of the exceptions
enumerated above. Neither has she shown that the
oral defamation caused on her was so grave as to
merit a penalty of more than one year.

XXX NM ROTHSCHILD VS LEPANTO XXXX