SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No.

161417, February 8, 2007

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK, Respondent.
Ponente: TINGA, J.:

FACTS: Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa

Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained
several loans from the respondent bank.As security for the
payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land which
the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses
Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its
due date, respondent bank through counsel sent him a written
demand,however, proved futile.

Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage

against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa Biaco before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco
through Ernesto at his office (Export and Industry Bank). The
RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the
spouses.

Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court

decision contending, among others, that the trial court failed to
acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her
through her husband without any explanation as to why
personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC
decision invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are
actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power
of the court is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by

respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the trial court with
jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an
action quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court
is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis

of his personal liability.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of
against the person.
An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely
for satisfying the due process requirements.
A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court,
such as petitioner in this case, must be personally served with
summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If she cannot be personally served with summons within
a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (1) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK INC., Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
BENEDICTO & TERESITA YUJUICO, Respondents,
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: In August 22, 1996, the City of Manila filed a complaint

against the respondents for the expropriation of five parcels of
land located in Tondo, Manila and registered in the name of
respondent Teresita Yujuico. Two of the parcels of land.
Regional Trial Court in Manila rendered its judgment declaring
the five parcels of land expropriated for public use. The
judgment became final and executory and was entered in the
book of entries of judgment. Respondents moved to dismiss the
complaint on several grounds, namely: that the suit was barred
by res judicata; that the complaint stated no cause of action;
and that the plaintiffs claim had been waived, abandoned, or
extinguished.

Spouses Yujuico filed their reply, in which they raised for the
first time their objection on the ground of improper venue. They
contended that the action for the recovery of the deficiency,
being a supplementary action of the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, was a real action that should have been brought in
the Manila RTC because Manila was the place where the
properties were located

ISSUE: Whether or not CA's dismissal the ground of improper

venue only raised in the motion for reconsideration filed in the
lower court after it denied respondents' motion to dismiss is
valid?

HELD: No, the Makati RTC observed, and the observation is

correct in our view, that it would be improper to dismiss Civil
Case No. 03-450 on the ground of improper venue, assuming
that the venue had been improperly laid, considering that the
respondents had not raised such ground in their Motion to
Dismiss. As earlier indicated, they came to raise the objection of
improper venue for the first time only in their reply to the
petitioner's comment on their Motion for Reconsideration.
They did so belatedly.

We underscore that in civil proceedings, venue is procedural,

not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if not
seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court thus expressly stipulates
that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. As it relates to the
place of trial, indeed, venue is meant to provide convenience to
the parties, rather than to restrict their access to the courts. In
other words, unless the defendant seasonably objects, any
action may be tried by a court despite its being the improper
venue.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
VICTORIANO AND MELANIE RAMOS, Respondents.
Ponente: REYES, JR., J.

FACTS: In July 2012, Spouses Victoriano and Melanie applied

for several credit lines with Planters Development Bank for the
construction of a warehouse in Barangay Santo Tomas, Nueva
Ecija. The application was approved, secured by Real Estate
Mortgage over properties owned by the spouses.

Due to financial woes, Spouses Ramos were not able to pay

their obligations as they fell due. They appealed to PDB for the
deferment of debt servicing and requested for a restructuring
scheme but the parties failed to reach an agreement.

PDB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real

Estate Mortgage under Act 3135.

Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate

Mortgages and Promissory Notes. Instead of filing an Answer,
PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the venue
of the action was improperly laid considering that the real
estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation
that any suit arising therefrom shall be filed in Makati City only.
It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and must therefore be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parties may stipulate venue in a

contract?
HELD: Yes. Parties may by stipulation waive the legal venue
and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal
privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to
third persons. It is a general principle that a person may
renounce any right which the law gives unless such
renunciation would be against public policy.

Spouses Ramos had validly waived their right to choose the

venue for any suit or action arising from the mortgages or
promissory notes when they agreed to the limit the same to
Makati City only and nowhere else. True enough, the stipulation
on the venue was couched in a language showing the intention
of the parties to restrict the filing of any suit or action to the
designated place only. It is crystal clear that the intention was
not just to make the said place an additional forum or venue but
the only jurisdiction where any suit or action pertaining to the
mortgage contracts may be filed. There being no showing that
such waiver was invalid or that the stipulation on venue was
against public policy, the agreement of the parties should be
upheld. It is therefore a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC to deny the motion to dismiss filed by PDB on the
ground of improper venue, especially when the said issue had
been raised at the most opportune time, that is, within the time
for but before the filing of an answer. The CA should have given
this matter a more serious consideration and not simply
brushed it aside.