Case Name Monsanto v.

Factoran
Topic Executive Clemency
Case No., Date G.R. No. 78239 – February 09, 1989
Ponente C.J. Fernan
Case Summary Petitioner was convicted by Sandiganbayan. She was granted
absolute pardon by President Marcos. She sought to be reinstated
to her position without the need of a new appointment. The Office
of the President, thru Factoran, held that she needs to secure
reappointment first. The Court ruled that pardon does not ipso
facto restore her position although it restores her eligibility for
appointment.
Digest Author TANGI, Jerwin A.

RELEVANT FACTS

• March 25, 1983 – Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) and 3 others, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents
o Sentenced to imprisonment of 4y2m1d of prision correccional as minimum to 10y1d
prision mayor as maximum, and pay a fine of P3,500
o Indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 which is the amount defrauded
• She appealed to the Court. Court affirmed Sandiganbayan. He filed a motion for
reconsideration.
o While his motion for reconsideration was pending, she was extended absolute pardon
by President Marcos on Dec. 17,1984 which she accepted on Dec. 21, 1984
• She wrote to Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former position
as assistant treasurer
o Her letter-request was referred to Ministry of Finance (Local Gov’t Code transferred
powers of appointment from city governments to Ministry of Finance)
o Ministry of Finance ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the need
of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended absolute pardon and
to satisfy civil indemnity to the gov’t
• She sought reconsideration arguing that:
o The full pardon bestowed on her wiped out her crimes which implies that her service in
the gov’t has never been interrupted
o The date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is Aug. 1, 1982
o She is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension
o She should not be required to pay the amount of P4,892.50
• Ministry of Finance referred her letter to the Office of the President for further review and
action
• Office of the President, thru Deputy Exec. Sec. Factoran, held that:
o Citing People v. Lising, That acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is
the only ground for reinstatement to her former position and entitlement to payment of
her salaries, benefits, and emoluments due to her during the period of her suspension
o Must secure a reappointment before she can reassume former position
o RPC expressly provides that a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment
of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence
o
RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue Ratio
W/N a public officer who NO
has been granted an • Prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute pardon by the absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
Chief Executive is entitled from the right of suffrage
to reinstatement to her o Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict
former position without from public office or employment
need of a new • Prision correccional carries the accessory penalty of suspension
appointment from public office
• Accessory penalties remain unless expressly remitted by the
pardon
• Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador applies the
doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland (hindi ito ang sagot, ni-reject
ito ng court)
o An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction
• Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Involves
forgiveness, not forgetfulness. It is not retrospective.
o Petitioner cannot be entitled to backpay for lost earnings
and benefits.
• State v. Hazzard – pardons may relieve from the disability of
fines and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they
cannot erase the stain of bad character
• Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to a public
office necessarily forfeited by reason of the conviction although
such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment
• Petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which
was forfeited by reason of her conviction
W/N the petitioner was • Civil liability arising from crime subsists notwithstanding
exempted from the service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served
payment of the civil by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence
indemnity imposed upon • Civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
her by the sentence recognized in the Civil Code
 o Payment
o Loss of the thing due
o Remission of the debt
o Merger of the rights of creditor and debtor
o Compensation
o Novation

RULING
Assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April
15, 1986, is AFFIRMED

NOTES

Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
officially to the Court

Ex Parte Garland case:

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offendor;
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities
and restores him to all his civil capacity rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him
a new credit and capacity.”