08Conc

Retrospect and Prospect

Reactionary conservatism has been a feature of Britain’s parliamentary politics for several

centuries. Fundamentally relational, in so far as it is bound up with and defined by the position

adopted by moderate and pragmatic politicians on the right, it is striking that this dynamic has

nevertheless exhibited enduring preoccupations with nativism and xenophobia, the political and

moral corruption of progressive politicians, great power status, and the unreliability of their own

party leaders. Throughout, these have often been expressed in doom-laden prognostications

which reveal an inherent defensiveness and paranoia. If this suggests continuity then it is worth

recalling Karl Mannheim’s distinction between ‘universal traditionalism’, an instinctive aversion

to change found in most societies, and ‘conservatism’, which, although tied to traditionalism,

articulated an aspiration on the part of its proponents to locate themselves politically in the

course of profound social, economic and political change.1 His dichotomy is not simply another

expression of the binary division outlined in the Introduction, between positional and doctrinaire

conservatism, as it applies to both of these. Old Tories, Ultra Tories, ditchers, and diehard

Conservatives alike might have invoked the notion that they stood for conservative principles,

but the articulation of what this meant in practice was inevitably bound up with and changed

over time by the dynamic processes unleashed by modernisation.

The key elements of Ultra politics, its protestant constitutionalism, patriotism, pastoralism,

protectionism and philanthropy, changed considerably in meaning and varying intensity in the

hands of later generations on the Conservative Right. Even something as specific as anti-

Semitism, a seemingly abiding feature—in old Tory, Ultra, empire first Unionist and diehard

politics—underwent change, from being bound up with anti-Catholicism and anti-

1Colin Loader, The Intellectual Development of Karl Mannheim: Culture, Politics, and Planning (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), p. 78.

1
 08Conc

latitudinarianism in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries, to being associated with

socialism and communism in the twentieth. This applies also to the hostility towards democracy

which is a prominent characteristic of reactionary conservatism from its emergence, and which in

certain forms has survived through to the present day. Whereas most Ultras were reluctant to

utilise democratic forces against democracy, diehard MPs in the twentieth century relied almost

completely on such tactics to make their influence felt in the Conservative party. Anglican

exclusivism could not survive this transition, at least as the means of embodying and rallying

elements committed to Conservative principles, and so from the last quarter of the nineteenth

century the union and overseas empire increasingly stood in its stead. The defence of property

remained a marked feature throughout, yet it too underwent significant change in response to the

growth of democracy, from Ultra hostility to the bourgeoisie and its political pretensions, to

actively working together with the middle class in opposition to ‘socialism’, even to the extent of

cultivating local political alliances with rate payers.

If anything, the substantive continuities between Ultra and diehard politics are

overwhelmingly negative: the inability of both to offer a viable prospect or programme for

government; and related to this, their lack of any suitable leader of national standing. The Ultras

and the diehards alike were reluctant and unable to articulate a coherent and distinct political

philosophy, viewing their roles as ultimately subordinate to the very same front bench they held

in suspicion. What came closest to this, the spontaneous, aggressive right-wing journalism

practised by the likes of Henry Bate Dudley in the early nineteenth century, and that of Leopold

Maxse and Howell Gwynne a century later, was greeted with indifference by ministerial opinion

and a measure of wariness by otherwise sympathetic parliamentarians. The Ultras and the

diehards, therefore, were most identifiable by and visible in their acts of defiance, which tended

to cluster around certain highly sensitive issues, such as anti-Catholicism in the case of the

former, and for the latter, opposition to any measure deemed to weaken British imperial power

and prestige.

2
 08Conc

The three distinct vectors of right-wing dissent within the Edwardian Unionist party, the

empire first Unionists, the legion of leagues, and the ditcher peers, were all attempts to articulate

approaches to conservatism which could meet the challenge of resurgent radicalism at home and

economic, imperial and military rivalry abroad. As Mannheim suggests, all were tied to

traditionalism, even if it was more explicit and existential in the case of the ditcher peers. This

seemingly pressing need to change certain modes of Conservative politics helps to explain the

overlapping personnel and ideas of the three vectors. These still remained distinct, however, as

they disagreed with one another on tactics and emphasis, even, for that matter, within their own

ranks. Collectively, they were a product of and contributor to the Edwardian ‘crisis of

conservatism’, but the differences between and amongst them ultimately weakened their

particular remedies. Yet, their capacity to whip up a party crisis was not without consequences. It

contributed to the removal of a party leader, Arthur Balfour, the more aggressive political style

of his successor, Andrew Bonar Law, and triggered the long overdue reform of the Unionist

party machine.

Against expectation, the political upheaval wrought by the First World War did not bring

about a more coherent and united Conservative Right. Crucial steps, nevertheless, were taken

along that road, in particular, the spontaneous establishment of backbench organisation. This

encouraged right-wing MPs to focus their activism in parliament and in co-ordination with other

backbenchers, rather than relying on applying pressure to ministers and MPs through external

leagues and associations. Increasingly vocal and willing to challenge their party leader directly,

and under the pretext of patriotic necessity, it had the effect of producing significant changes in

wartime government, from the establishment of a coalition in 1915 to the restructuring of that

coalition in favour of the Unionists the following year. These were not necessarily what the

government’s critics desired, but such changes were the result of the destabilising effects of

growing backbench influence. The responsiveness of the front bench produced two contrasting

reactions among right-wing discontents. For a majority, it demonstrated the utility of working

3
 08Conc

within the Unionist parliamentary party. For a small minority, however, the restraining

consequences of this signalled the need for a breakaway National Party more committed to

Conservative principles, albeit in the guise of supposedly ‘national’ politics.

The split amongst right-wingers over political strategy gradually healed in the years

immediately following the armistice, spurred on by the continuance of the Unionist-Liberal

coalition. The attendant risks of some sort of fusion between the two parties, and the

accompanying loss of a distinctive Conservative identity, produced the increasingly coherent

‘diehard’ reaction within the Unionist party that was committed to avoiding this outcome, and

which had a magnetic effect on erstwhile allies in the National Party. These diehards’ efforts also

struck a chord among Unionists in the voluntary party, creating alarm amongst the party

leadership about what it could mean in practice if left unchecked. It was this which ultimately

convinced important sections of the parliamentary party in 1922 to withdraw from the coalition

and return to the pre-war party system. Pursuing this outcome went a long way to promoting a

measure of unity on the right, symbolised by the abandonment of the National Party. But it was

also lent greater coherence and distinctiveness through a number of other questions. These

included the right-wing’s support for protectionism, particularly whole-hog food taxes, both for

the sake of imperial unity and for the depressed home agricultural sector, pronounced hostility to

government spending, and strident opposition to post-war imperial constitutional reform, which

drew upon and now explicitly included the delicate question of Great Britain’s relationship with

the Irish Free State. Rather than churchly affairs and parliamentary reform, which still mattered

to some high profile diehards, the epithet became more readily identified by contemporaries with

strong opposition to nationalist demands in Ireland and the empire.

Having achieved this measure of unity and sense of purpose, the diehards had an ambiguous

relationship with inter-war parliamentary democracy, deeply hostile to the rise of Labour but still

willing and able to work within the constitutional bounds of Conservative party politics. The

indigenous forms of fascism which emerged in the 1920s were attractive to some; these were,

4
 08Conc

after all, ultra-Conservative rather than fascist on continental lines, but the overwhelming

majority were convinced of the need to work within their own party. The resulting acquiescence

with Stanley Baldwin’s leadership was cultivated deliberately by the further development of

backbench organisation. This to some extent satisfied the diehards’ desire for an enhanced place

in party policymaking, but it also exposed them to the limited appeal of their viewpoint on the

backbenches. As a result, most of the diehards toed the line on domestic reforms, however

reluctantly, finding some satisfaction that Conservative policies were necessary and

fundamentally Conservative in intention. As a result, it became clear that subjects which had

once defined the Conservative Right no longer aroused the same level of concern and passion,

including the sanctity of monarchy, the protestant constitution, extending the franchise, and

defending the agricultural interest. In contrast, it was in Irish and imperial affairs, and to some

extant also in economic matters, that the diehards felt able to demonstrate to the wider party that

Conservative principles were under attack, from without and within. Rumblings about Irish

policy in the early- to mid-1920s hinted at what was to come a decade later over India, and

throughout the diehards were prominent in the campaign for greater imperial unity through

trade.

The spectacular series of party battles over India orchestrated by the diehards in the early

1930s proved to be the highpoint of their organisational capacity and common purpose.

Thereafter, they remained united on most imperial questions, in particular, opposing the

restitution of former German colonies, and were highly prominent in the rearmament campaign.

However, the broader policy of appeasing the Nazi government divided diehard ranks. For a

sizeable minority, Britain could only preserve its great power status by opposing German

aggrandisement in Europe. The majority, however, assumed that risking conflict with Germany,

even if Britain could emerge victorious, would exacerbate its weakness at home and abroad.

These contrasting positions were both grounded in peculiarly diehard readings of recent history.

Opponents of appeasement regarded it as further evidence of Britain’s decline, and a dangerous

5
 08Conc

departure from the country’s decades old hostility to German territorial expansion. Supporters

believed that appeasement was rendered necessary because of years of weak Conservative

leadership and two Labour governments, the result of which left Britain unable and unwilling to

fight.

The Second World War and the Conservatives’ defeat at the 1945 general election brought to

a close the first phase in the development of the Conservative Right, by removing from the

House of Commons the generation of diehard MPs which included Henry Page Croft and John

Gretton. A small number of the younger generation survived, of course, and as the

Conservatives recovered electorally in the 1950s, they were joined by others in parliament, and

the constituency associations once again became a reliable prop in right-wing campaigns against

the front bench. Like the Edwardian inter-party conferences, the 1916−18 and 1918−22

coalitions, and the National Government, the post-1945 ‘political consensus’ provided a context

in which calls for a return to Conservative principles thrived. What this meant in practice

reflected very contemporary concerns, just as it did for previous generations of Tories, Ultras,

Unionists and Conservatives. Yet, as noted above, enduring themes remained, and in the case of

anxiety about national and imperial decline, and the accompanying rhetoric on race, in an

intensified form which left an indelible mark on late-modern British conservatism. Indeed, in the

late 1960s and early 1970s the Conservative Right achieved an unprecedented measure of

organisational unity and congruity, in the form of the Monday Club, only for it to decline just as

rapidly after succumbing to infighting and public controversy over links with the extreme right.

Even so, its preoccupations with Britain’s place in the world, non-white immigration, left-wing

disorder, moral and economic decline, all of which long predated the Monday Club, also

survived it, albeit below the surface for much of the 1970s and 1980s as the breakdown of the

post-war consensus, and the accompanying ascendancy of the ‘New Right’, brought a qualified

6
 08Conc

measure of satisfaction to the imperialist Conservative Right.2 Thus incubated, these concerns

resurfaced with vigour at the turn of the twenty-first century, encouraged by three successive

general election defeats in a row, and expressed, very often, through strong resentment at the

United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union. It even led a sizable number

of Conservatives to join the first electorally significant challenger party on the right, the United

Kingdom Independence Party. The 2016 referendum on EU membership, called by the

Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, was meant to arrest this development. Against

expectation, it brought about what is arguably the Conservative Right’s greatest triumph.

2See, Camilla Schofield, “A Nation or No Nation?’ Enoch Powell and Thatcherism’, in Ben Jackson and Robert
Saunders (eds), Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 95−110; Stephen
Howe, ‘Decolonisation and Imperial Aftershocks’, ibid., pp. 234−251.