In re Cunanan, 94 Phil.
554 declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is
known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing
Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall
have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar
candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed
that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general
average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to
the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should
affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It
was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the fact
that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was
to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The
portion that was stricken down was based
under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for
admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the
fact that this was very close to the end of World
War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court on the petitions of the
said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s
primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in
excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid
down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the
judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and
amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect,
the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed
in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner.
The same may also rationally fall within the
power to Congress to alter, supplement or
modify rules of admission to the practice of
law.
In Authority to Continue Use of Law Firm
Name, 92 SCRA 1
Facts:
The surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta
filed a petition praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the name of their firm, the
names of their partner who passed away. One
of the petitioners’ arguments stated that no
local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional
firm’s name in so far as Greater Manila Area is
concerned. No custom exists which recognizes
that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
They also stated that the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of
law partnerships has been consistently allowed
by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in
the legal profession of most countries in the
world.
Issue:
Whether or not the law firm “Ozaeta, Romulo,
De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes” is allowed
tosustain the name of their deceased partner,
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, in the name of their
firm.
Held:
NO. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association
stated the following: “The continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use.” No
local custom permits or allows the continued
use of a deceased or former partner’s name in
the firm names of law partnerships. Firm
names, under Philippine custom, identify the
more active or senior partners in a firm. Firm
names in the Philippines change and evolve
when partners die, leave or a new one is added.
It is questionable to add the new name of a
partner and sustain the name of the deceased
one since they have never been, technically,
partners in the first place. When it comes to the
arguments of the petitioners stating that U.S.
Courts grant the continued use of the deceased
partner’s name, this is so because in the U.S., it
is a sanctioned custom as stated in the case of
Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
(33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the
Philippines. The petition filed herein is denied
and petitioner is advised to drop the name
“OZAETA” from the firm name.
Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 792, January 25
2006
FACTS:
While driving on his way home, a taxi driver
(herein complainant) overtook the car driven by
herein respondent. Incensed, respondent tailed
the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make
a turn. An altercation resulted therefrom that
got to the point that the respondent fired and
shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He
fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter
pushed him out and sped off.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.
RULING:
Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as
“everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.” It is also glaringly
clear that respondent seriously transgressed
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of
an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.
Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated
by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Monsod has worked as a lawyer in the law
office of his father (1960-1963); an operations
officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970);
Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank
(1970-1986); legal or economic consultant on
various companies (1986); Secretary General of
NAMFREL (1986); member of Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of
NAMFREL (1987); and member of the quasi-
judicial Davide Commission (1990).
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On June
18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.Challenging the validity of the
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod’s nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent posseses the
required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod
possessed the required qualification. In the
case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs.
Agrava: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out
court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. “To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession. In general, a practice of law
requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court. As such, the petition
is dismissed.
In re Carlos Basa, December 7, 1920
Facts:
Carlos S. Basa, 29 years of age, a member of
bars in California, USA and in the Philippines.
He was convicted by the Court of First Instance
the crime of abduction with consent and
sentenced for two years, eleven months and
eleven days of prison correctional. Attorney-
General Feria asks for the disbarment from the
Phil. Bar of Atty. Basa as a consequence of the
court’s conviction to the latter. The Code of
Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A
member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office of lawyer by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude .
Issue:
WON the crime of abduction with consent, as
punished by article 446 of the Penal Code,
involves moral turpitude.
Held:
No. "Moral turpitude," it has been said,
"includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."
Although no decision can be found which has
decided the exact question, it cannot admit of
doubt that crimes of this character involve
moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act
is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins
[1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard vs. Lyon [1875],
91 U.S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty.-Gen. P. I., 46, 185;
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
Ruling:
Atty Basa was not disbarred, rather, suspended
only for one year.
 HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, Complainant, vs.
DIOSDADO S. FLORES, Respondent
A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356
November 21, 1979.
Facts:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch
VI City Court of Quezon City, recommended the
dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S.
Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City
Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and
persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI and gross
discourtesy to superior officers as manifested
by his uncalled for and unjustified use of strong
and contemptuous language in addressing the
City Judges.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute
grounds for dismissal from the service.
Held:
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before
then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10,
1969, the respondent stated that I am a person
of good moral character and integrity and have
no administrative, criminal or police record.
This claim is not true because the respondent
had been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No.
Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967.
This prevarication in a sworn statement is a
ground for serious disciplinary action.
That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No.
212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the
respondent admits having acted as counsel for
three companies; and that the giving of legal
advice by notaries and others who are not
admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to
the welfare of the community, because such
persons have not demonstrated their capacity
by submitting to examinations lawfully
established in the practice of law.
The respondent's conviction for libel shows his
propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in
his letter toJudge Minerva C. Genovea, then
Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City which contains defamatory and uncalled
for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent
regarding different cases pending in Branch VI
of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by
the complainant, show that the respondent had
exerted undue influence in thedisposition of
the cases mentioned therein. Respondent,
Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk
of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of
Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement
privileges and with prejudice to reinstatement
in the national and local governments, as well
as, in any government instrumentality or
agency including government owned or
controlled corporations.
In re Integration of the Philippine Bar, 49 SCRA
22
FACTS:
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act
Providing for the Integration of the Philippine
Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was
passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within
two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar.”
The Supreme Court formed a Commission on
Bar Integration and in December 1972, the
Commission earnestly recommended the
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all
comments on the proposed integration.
ISSUES:
 Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine bar?
 Would the integration of the bar be
constitutional?
 Should the Court ordain the integration
of the bar at this time?
RULING:
In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first
adopted the definition given by the
Commission to “integration” in this wise:
“Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires
membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term
“Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons
whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys.
An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce
must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so; the
State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the
setting up by government authority of a
national organization of the legal profession
based on the recognition of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as
an instrumentality of justice and the rule of
law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may
integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power
“to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the
power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following
constitutional rights: freedom of association
and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues
exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not
the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
Integration is not violative of freedom of
association because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. All that it
does is “to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.” The lawyer
too is not compelled to attend meetings,
participate of activities, etc. The only
compulsion is the payment of annual dues.
Assuming, however, that it does compel a
lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar,
the court held that “such compulsion is justified
as an exercise of the police power of the state”
Integration is also not violative of the freedom
of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer
may be used for projects or programs, which
the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would
make every government exaction a “free
speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free
to voice out his objections to positions taken by
the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the
nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of
regulation.
As to the third issue, the Court believes in the
timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored
integration.