687460

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ISS0010.1177/0268580916687460International Sociology ReviewsAlagha

Review essay
International Sociology Reviews
2017, Vol. 32(2) 180­–188
Ibn Khaldun: A sociology © The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0268580916687460
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Joseph Alagha
Haigazian University, Lebanon

Abstract
Alatas’s two books reviewed in this essay offer a new reading of an important sociologist by
shedding an important contextual light on Ibn Khaldun’s works. They interpret and analyze Ibn
Khaldun’s philosophy of history, social theory, and sociological doctrines, not only by stressing
their modern relevance, but also by demonstrating how they could be employed to forge a new
reading of the social sciences. Thus, Alatas’s methodology applies Ibn Khaldun’s seemingly dated
theories and concepts to modern sociological and historical thought, while avoiding anachronisms
in either interpretation or meaning. This essay is organized thematically, and the first section
explores Ibn Khadun’s key classical concepts of ‘asabiyya, nomadic, and sedentary from a social
science perspective. The second section elaborates on how Weber’s three ideal types of authority
(charismatic, traditional, rational-legal) could be applied to Ibn Khaldun’s reading of Muslim society
in his own time and afterwards, and Alatas includes the Weberian distinction between functional
and value rationality. The third section applies the classical distinction between authority and power
to caliphate authority and kingship. The fourth and fifth sections of this essay deal with soft power
and culture as well as Ibn Khaldun’s social history. Thus, Alatas’s two books could be considered
rich reference books rather than critical evaluations of Ibn Khaldun’s works.

Keywords
‘Asabiyya (social cohesion), history of sociology, Ibn Khaldun, philosophy of history, social
theory, sociology of history

Syed Farid Alatas, Applying Ibn Khaldun: The Recovery of a Lost Tradition in Sociology (Routledge
Advances in Sociology), Routledge: Abingdon, 2014; 207 pp.: ISBN 9780415678780, US$145.00
(hbk), 9781138125964, US$46.70 (pbk)

Syed Farid Alatas, Ibn Khaldun (Makers of Islamic Civilization), Oxford University Press: Oxford,
2013; 160 pp.: ISBN 9780198090458, US$24.99 (pbk)

Corresponding author:
Joseph Alagha, Department of Political Science, Haigazian University, Rue Mexique, Kantari, PO Box 11-
1748, Riad el Solh 1107 2090, Beirut, Lebanon.
Email: jalagha2001@yahoo.com
Alagha 181

The role of the historian isn’t the search for truth, but the verisimilitude of truth – what seems
like truth. (Richard Bulliet, 1995)

Introduction
In light of the above quote, Bulliet (1995: 179) writes,

. . . my goal has been to provide, through a view from the edge, an explanation for the evolution
of Islamic society, from the unity of the early community inspired by the personal charisma of
the Prophet, through the diversity of the early centuries after the Arab conquests, to a recentering
through institutional and doctrinal homogenization after the twelfth century, I have completed
my argument.

However, Bulliet concedes that ‘one major task remains unaccomplished . . . to demon-
strate the importance of this retelling of medieval Islamic history for the world of today’
(p. 180), and this is precisely what Alatas endeavors to do in his two monumental books,
which are the subjects of this review.
In this respect, Alatas clarifies, ‘the territory of theoretical history has a number of
provinces, two of which are: (1) the study of the pattern and rhythm of history, and (2)
the study of driving forces of history. It is these two concerns of theoretical history that
have been brought together in the integration that I have attempted’ (Applying Ibn
Khaldun [AIK], p. 147). As such, the crux, the kernel of the argument is that Alatas ‘has
tried to show that Ibn Khaldun can, and indeed should, be assessed apart from Orientalist
interest evoked by him, moving from pre-modern readings of Ibn Khaldun to modern
applications of Khaldunian theory to history and the contemporary state’ (AIK, p. 155).
Although this seems to be the aim of AIK, it also informs Ibn Khaldun (IK). Although Ibn
Khaldun’s salient distinction between Bedouin and sedentary social formations might
have affected disciplines such as international relations, politics, history, humanities, and
philosophy, Alatas confines his contribution mainly to the sociological and civilizational
dimensions, as conveyed in the titles of the series in which the books were published:
‘Routledge Advances in Sociology’ and ‘Makers of Islamic Civilization.’ The author of
the two books, Syed Farid Alatas – head of the Department of Malay Studies and
Associate Professor of Sociology at the National University of Singapore – is an admira-
ble, prolific author, social scientist, and scholar. He is an accomplished academic who
thinks outside the box.

Ibn Khaldun and social science: ‘Asabiyya, nomadic, and

sedentary
Many books have been written on Ibn Khaldun in Arabic and European languages,
including, of course, English. What is the merit of Alatas’s books on Ibn Khaldun? In
addition to his sharp insights and deep analyses, these books offer original and timely
contributions to our knowledge. Unlike authors who tend to duplicate their earlier
research and embellish it by packaging it differently, Alatas’s innovative contribution
lies in ‘the application of Khaldunian concepts and methodology to contemporary issues
182 International Sociology Reviews 32(2)

in the social sciences, educational philosophy and culture,’ while some Western scholars
have already conceded Ibn Khaldun ‘a progenitor of sociology and modern historiogra-
phy’ (IK, back cover). In this respect, I found Chapter 5, ‘The significance of Ibn Khaldun
for the modern social sciences’ (IK, pp. 117–134), the most interesting. Following the
same thread, Alatas’s original contribution to knowledge in AIK fills a gap in the litera-
ture. He writes, ‘The idea of developing Khaldunian concepts, combining them with
those of modern sociology and applying the resultant theoretical approaches to a variety
of empirical and historical fields outside his own, remains marginal. This book is an
exercise in such application’ (p. 146). I think Alatas is too humble when he writes ‘exer-
cise,’ when it appears to me as a masterpiece, a monumental work. In the following
review, I attempt to shed a spotlight on the most salient points, thus falling short of an
exhaustive review, which perhaps does not give Alatas his due. The two books are a
‘must read’: they are by far the most up-to-date studies on Ibn Khaldun; in terms of theo-
ries and concepts, they employ interdisciplinary social sciences and humanities
approaches. It is worth noting that I will be accused of name-dropping if I list all the
social scientists Alatas refers to. Thus, I confine my analysis to a select few.
Alatas voices his dissatisfaction with the classical definition of sociology, arguing that
it is lacking in many respects and perspectives. He writes, ‘Sociology has been defined
as the “product of modernity, born of the great intellectual and social upheavals that
destroyed the medieval European world.” . . . The vast majority of sociologists, however,
tend to have a more parochial (limited) view of the history and origins of sociology’
(AIK, p. 154; cf. IK, pp. 112–115, 120–121, 139–140).1 Furthermore, Alatas criticizes
what he labels the ‘forerunner syndrome,’ i.e., the pigeonholing of social scientists with
words and phrases such as ‘founder,’ ‘precursor,’ ‘father of sociology,’ ‘established the
principles of modern sociology,’ and ‘father of economics’ (AIK, p. 158).
Ibn Khaldun made groundbreaking contributions to social theory, historiography,
epistemology, discursive tradition, the traditional classification of sciences (IK, pp. 114–
116), philosophy, logic, rhetoric (language), legal treatises, ‘human or social ecology,
rural sociology, political sociology, urban sociology, and the sociology of work [which
portray] the uniqueness of his science of human society’ (AIK, pp. 21ff.). Thus, Ibn
Khaldun could be regarded as a pioneer in modern sociological and historical thought, to
the extent of claiming him as one of the founders of social theory and the first philoso-
pher of history, four centuries before Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel systematized the
doctrine and gave it a new interpretation. As Alatas aptly writes, ‘The problem is not the
omission of references to Ibn Khaldun but the lack of consideration of Ibn Khaldun in a
non-Eurocentric manner (in addition to Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Comte, de Tocqueville,
etc.), that is, as knowing subject and as founder of the concepts and categories for the
social sciences’ (AIK, p. 152). Alatas adds, ‘Ibn Khaldun’s work, for example, contains
concepts and theoretical explanations that emerge from his own period and cultural set-
ting and suggest interesting ways in which they can be applied to the study of social
phenomena both within and outside his own time and milieu’ (AIK, p. 154).
For instance, Ibn Khaldun’s distinction between Bedouin and sedentary social forma-
tions has an important bearing on contemporary political and social philosophy. The
foundational dynamic between Bedouin (AIK, pp. 29–31) or nomadic (badawa) (IK, pp.
51–52, 55–58, 122–123), on the one hand, and sedentary2 (hadara) (IK, pp. 51–52,
Alagha 183

55–59, 62–63, 68–69, 121–122, 129–130),3 on the other, might correspond to Isaiah
Berlin’s seminal distinction between ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from.’ ‘Freedom to’ (i.e.,
‘positive freedom’) refers to the freedom to do whatever one wants in the Bedouin state
of nature without restraint, but within the narrow confines of the ‘harm principle,’ tem-
perance, and self-actualization. On the other hand, ‘freedom from’ (i.e., ‘negative free-
dom’) refers to freedom from external constraints or impediments that are imposed in
sedentary society. This might explain why the collective identity of ‘asabiyya (i.e., social
bond, social cohesion, community cohesion, or Mitsein using Heidegger’s terminology)
is so strong in Bedouin society because of the collective memory, shared consciousness,
and strong coexistence among the members of the community. However, as civilization
creeps in by way of the transition to sedentary society, luxury and extravagant lifestyles
take hold of ‘asabiyya, weakening it and dismembering it, therefore resulting in a grad-
ual disintegration of the community and the destruction of the social fabric of the dynasty,
which, as a rule of thumb, lasts for four generations (IK, pp. 36–39, 55–71, 118–119,
142–147; AIK, pp. 22–24, 29–35, 41–42, 69–73, 88–98, 108–110, 125–129, 134–149).
Nevertheless, unlike Heidegger’s Mitsein, Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyya contains no existen-
tial aspects, only social theory.
In a nutshell, Alatas writes: ‘Using the example of Ibn Khaldun, I have shown how
Eurocentrism and the resulting marginalization of non-Western ideas in the history and
teaching of sociology obstruct the emergence of a more multicultural social theory and
suggest that conditions must be fulfilled in order that multiculturalism in the teaching of
the social sciences can be realized’ (AIK, p. 152). He adds, ‘In this book, I have discussed
a specific case of such marginalization, that of Ibn Khaldun. . . . One way is to bring in
multicultural sensibility in the teaching of the social sciences’ (AIK, p. 153).

Weber and Ibn Khaldun

In both books, Alatas confines his analysis to the classical divisions Max Weber made
among three ideal types of authority: (1) charismatic; (2) traditional; and (3) rational-
legal authority or bureaucratic leadership (IK, pp. 126, 127) . He employed the term
‘rational-legal authority’ to denote power legitimatized by law. In Ibn Khaldun’s context,
the charismatic authority might correspond to the judge or Khadi justice: the judge who
decides everything without any jury; the judge who pretends to know God’s law and
whatever he does and decides is true, right, and binding. The traditional authority could
be illustrated by the mufti. The legal-bureaucratic authority corresponds to the reforms
aimed at bureaucratizing and systematizing the function of the judge (AIK, pp. 74–91).
However, this attempt led to inconsistency because the legal system as a whole was not
codified during Ibn Khaldun’s days. This was done in the 19th century with the advent
of the nation-state, where the charismatic authority of the judge and the traditional
authority of the mufti were reduced (i.e., rationalized and routinized) to bureaucratic
functions; thus, the legal system was downgraded from the sacred (charismatic) to the
profane (bureaucratization). However, according to Weber, the codification of Islamic
law is rationalization, and legal rationalization means that the law is predictable. Thus,
the judge lost his charisma and supernatural sanction to become a mundane state-
employed person, a bureaucrat executing justice as a procedural matter (rationalization
184 International Sociology Reviews 32(2)

and routinization). Moreover, employing Durkheim’s terminology, the issue of social

transactions (mu’amalat) remained in the domain of profane and mechanistic solidarity
(AIK, pp. 1–2, 48–49, 152–154).
Furthermore, the Weberian distinction between functional rationality and value
rationality has a bearing on the issue at hand, as it informs at least three chapters of AIK:
Chapter 5, ‘A Khaldunian theory of Muslim reform’ (pp. 74–91); Chapter 6, ‘Ibn Khaldun
and the Ottoman modes of production’ (pp. 92–111); and Chapter 7, ‘The rise and fall of
the Safavid state in a Khaldunian framework’ (pp. 112–130). Functional rationality
(Verantwortungsethik) implies acting as efficiently and effectively as possible in attain-
ing a goal or end, i.e., thinking, acting, and calculating leading to a systematic way of
thinking based on means and ends. This was the case of the old paradigm charismatic
(judge) and traditional (mufti) authority. This changed to value rationality
(Gesinnungsethik), viz. rationality oriented towards a value, i.e., legitimizing the func-
tion of ‘tradition’; or more precisely, national reform giving life to the ‘correct Islamic
shari’a’ or Islamic law, which corresponds to the bureaucratic authority of the judge and
mufti in the new paradigm (AIK, pp. 66–67, 70; IK, pp. 10–11, 37–38, 66–68, 119–120,
125–126). Alatas highlights the importance of Marx’s structural-functionalism when he
stresses: ‘What I have attempted in this book is to provide an economic basis [system]
for Ibn Khaldun’s theory of state formation by integrating into his theory a modes of
production framework’ (AIK, p. 146). Thus, Alatas creates a fusion of Marx and Weber
on this issue.
Finally, the Weberian notion of work as a drug that causes people to forget their reli-
gion (praxis) applies to the muftis, rather than the judges who practiced in Veblen’s
(1994) ‘conspicuous consumption,’ which is not at all consistent with Weber’s ‘Protestant
Ethic Hypothesis.’ Thus, the ‘elective affinity’ between the two Weberian variables,
namely, the Protestant ethic, on the one hand, and the spirit of capitalism, on the other,
seems to fit, more or less, the muftis and the founders of the modern Arab states (e.g., the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Arab Republic; cf. AIK, pp. 131–142).

Authority and power

Furthermore, building on Ibn Khaldun Alatas distinguishes between ‘caliphate authority’
(khilāfah) (AIK, p. 37) or ‘caliphal authority’ (Khilāfa) (IK, p. 125), on the one hand, and
power or ‘mulk or kingship’ (IK, p. 125; AIK, p. 37), on the other.4 Alatas clarifies that
‘[k]ingship differs from caliphal authority in that it is founded on the ability of the ruler
to rule by force’ (IK, p. 126), and that it ‘is something natural and inevitable’ (AIK, p. 38).
Alatas adds that ‘[k]ingship refers to the ability to dominate over humans and to have
power and authority over them, in order to restrain one against the other’ (AIK, p. 38).
Alatas gives the following summary:

Ibn Khaldun makes the distinction between two types of kingship: (mulk siyasi) royal authority
and (mulk taba’i) (unbridled kingship). . . . When authority is combined with a strong and intact
‘asabiyyah [group feeling or solidarity or cohesion] – that is, when power wielded by the ruler
is founded not on unbridled kingship but on the acceptance of his legitimacy – it is royal
authority. As ‘asabiyyah disintegrates and the element of kingship is replaced by alliance and
Alagha 185

citizenship, another kind of authority is established, that is, natural or unbridled. . . . For Ibn
Khaldun, then, ‘asabiyyah (1) referred to kingship ties; (2) was buttressed by a socially cohesive
religion such as Islam, which provided a shared orientation and legitimized the leader’s
aspirations for power and authority; and (3) was characterized by the strength of the leader
being derived from trade, booty, pillage, and conquest. . . . In other words, sedentary life was
antithetical to a strong ‘asabiyyah and had the effect of reducing the strength of group feeling.
. . . A dynasty generally lasts for four generations. Power may transfer within a nation to another
group that shares in the same group feeling, or kingship may be passed on to an entirely new
people. The ruling tribes and elites are replaced on a cyclical basis but the system remains
stable. This is the nature of the Khaldunian cycle. (AIK, pp. 38, 41, 42)

Alatas writes, ‘An example of a Khaldunian concept relevant to the study of the modern
world is that of authority,’ which he links to the ‘Prophet as lawgiver’ and the ‘four
rightly-guided caliphs’ (IK, p. 125). Alatas compares the transition to the Umayyad
dynasty – which he characterizes as kingship (power) – to ‘Weber’s patrimonialism’ (IK,
p. 127), without actually defining patrimonialism. According to Weber, patrimonialism
is any type of arbitrary personal or administrative political power under the hegemony of
the ruler. Further, Weber believed that the state should be the sole authorizer of the use of
force or ‘coercive power.’
In light of the above, I think a more nuanced distinction between ‘authority’ and
‘power’ ought to be made. In 1887, Lord Acton admonished, ‘Power corrupts; absolute
power corrupts absolutely.’ Power is without mandate, whereas authority is legitimate by
being grounded in the will of the people via a social contract. Power lacks people’s con-
tractual consent; it is the ability of a person or a group to exercise their hegemony.
Authority is the inner order of a human association; it is power legitimized by way of
consensual democracy. In other words, authority is power that has been institutionalized
via the constitution of the land that stipulates the rights and duties of the rulers and ruled.

Soft power and culture

Because Ibn Khaldun believed in the ‘soft power’ of cultural heritage, a few works on the
topic seem fitting, especially in light of his distinction between ‘authority’ and power or
‘kingship.’ Alatas refers to neither Geertz nor Nye. That is why I would like to add some
background and conceptualization in order to give a more nuanced picture. The late
renowned anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926–2006) conceived of culture in terms of
power. He defined culture as ‘an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which
men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’
(Geertz, 1973: 89). Following his lead, the American social scientist Joseph S Nye5 defines
culture as a set of values and practices that create meaning for a society; stressing that both
high and popular culture are a source of ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004: 44–45).
Nye coined the concept of soft power and distinguished it from the commonly used
notion of hard power, which usually refers to the military and economic capabilities of a
nation through waging wars or threatening to employ sanctions, as measures of stick or car-
rot. According to Nye (1991), soft power is different because it refers to the values and
186 International Sociology Reviews 32(2)

culture that characterize a nation and its people, ‘the image it projects, and the expectations
it generates,’ and how these attract others in order to emulate these behavioral patterns. Nye
(1991) stressed that a country, or for that matter the international community at large, ought
to lead through the exercise of its soft power, rather than the traditional hard power. Nye
argues that soft power ‘co-opts people rather than coerces them. . . . It is the ability to entice
and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation. Soft power arises in large
part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture . . . soft power is more than
just cultural power’ (Nye, 2011: 6–11). Nye (2011: 21) cautions that culture is only one of
the resources of soft power; other resources comprise values, ideas, institutions, and poli-
cies. The optimal combination of hard and soft resources results in smart power, which,
according to Nye, ‘is an evaluative as well as a descriptive concept’ (2011: 22–23).
The best example to illustrate soft power in this context is the ‘Sahifa’ (IK),6 ‘Sahifah’
(AIK) or the Constitution of Media. Alatas refers to this watershed document (IK, pp.
131–134; AIK, pp. 95–96) that governed the Prophet’s 10-year rule from 622 to 632 ce,
i.e., the last 10 years of his life. Some historians refer to this period as the ‘Golden Age
of Islam’ because the lawgiver was himself the enlightened ruler who governed with
equity and justice among the mosaic constituents who formed the umma (Muslim nation)
at the time: Muslims, Jews, Christians, Zorstrians, Sumerians, and others. Alatas lists
some of the merits of the community cohesion the Sahifa preached:

All groups are part of the umma; the security of God is equal for all groups; non-Muslim
members of the umma have political and cultural rights equal to the Muslims and freedom of
religion and autonomy; non-Muslims will join Muslims in the armed defence of the umma and
share the cost of war; non-Muslims will not be obliged to take part in the religious wars of the
Muslims. (IK, p. 131)

In short, this outstanding progressive document, which exhibits tolerance and acceptance
of the other, stands in sharp contrast to Ibn Khaldun’s ‘asabiyya (tribal blood tie), which
characterized Bedouin society, and pointed to the possibility of a positive group feeling
or solidarity in the sedentary society. This unity of a new civil state – transcending tribal-
ism, race, ethnicity, and even religion – most likely implies a civil society based on the
credentials of civility and citizenship: notions that seem to be reminiscent of Karl
Deutsch’s recipe for the integration of political communities.

Ibn Khaldun’s social history

Ibn Khaldun’s social history produced a lively way of constructing and deconstructing
history based on rational-intellectual thinking, as Emmanuel Kant admonished in bridg-
ing empiricism and rationalism: everything originates from experience, but a social sci-
entist cannot form a theory without resorting to reason. With this background in mind,
Ibn Khaldun’s meticulous transition from Bedouin to sedentary social formations has
affinities to Western sociological thought, where we notice great minds adopting this
dynamic, such as Ernest Gellner’s pendulum-swing theory (AIK, pp. 45–46, 84–85). It
should be noted that in order to engage his readers, Alatas used the provoking title of
‘Gellner on Ibn Khaldun: An insufficiently sociological theory’ (AIK, pp. 79–80).
Alagha 187

Although Alatas repeatedly refers to the great sociological contributions of ‘Marx,

Weber, Durkheim and other founders of sociology and social science disciplines’ (IK, p.
114), he seems to idiosyncratically sideline Ferdinand Tönnies’ seminal static-passive
terms of Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) as well as Weber’s
dynamic and active distinction between Vergemeinschaftung (communitarization: the
process of community formation) and Vergesellschatung (the process of socialization).
Unlike Durkheim, Weber’s interpretive sociology merged social structures and institu-
tions with meaningful human actions. The reason for Alatas’s avoidance of these terms
might be to give his two books a smoother read, and not overload them with comparative
theories and concepts, although these might be usefully compared to Ibn Khaldun’s dis-
tinction between Bedouin and sedentary social formations, and the shift from the former
to the latter. Another striking similarity to Ibn Khaldun’s shift from Bedouin to sedentary
structures is Robert Redfield’s (1964) discussion of the one-directional pendulum swing
from ‘folk society’ to ‘urban society.’ As such, Alatas’s social science approach might be
considered selective, albeit, as he admonished, not at the expense ‘of interpreting the
Muqadimmah out of context and anachronistically attributing to it modern meanings that
distort the intent of the author’ (AIK, p. 158), which is an extremely difficult job because
one has to be always selective.
Another bone of contention seems to be stylistic, rather than doctrinal. In both books
a glossary of terms would have been useful in order to capture the richness, thorough-
ness, and diversity of the works, as well as to highlight the many approaches in sociology
and social science that were referred to. I would also note that the IK book has an intro-
duction, but no concluding chapter as such – only a short concluding paragraph (p. 134).

Conclusion
Despite these minor shortcomings, Syed Farid Alatas – a distinguished professor in
sociology – has produced thoroughly and meticulously researched, documented, and
well-written books, which reflect his analytical, scholastic mindset. They are master-
pieces that employ multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary social science and humanities
contextual approaches, which make them academic edifices – monumental works. They
are rich in theories and concepts; they include a range of impressive primary sources
and archival material as well as a large spectrum of references arranged thematically.
They endeavor to portray a living piece of Ibn Khaldun’s philosophy of history as well
as his discursive, epistemological, and traditional classification of sciences – but most
importantly, they convey his contemporary theoretical and practical relevance. Alatas
has encyclopedic knowledge and is a polyglot who has apparently mastered at least six
languages: Arabic, English, French, Dutch, German, and Malay. These haughty creden-
tials equipped him with all the needed stamina to produce a cutting edge perspective
and invaluable contribution to preserving the culture, social and political history, and
social theory of the presumably well-researched 600-year-old works of Ibn Khaldun. As
such, Alatas’s two books could be regarded not only as critical evaluations of existing
works but as rich reference works.
Ibn Khaldun could be regarded as the first philosopher of history long before Hegel
received recognition for coining the subfield. Through his impressive sociological mind,
188 International Sociology Reviews 32(2)

Ibn Khaldun made an important contribution in preserving Arab and Muslim heritage and
culture and disseminating it to the Western world. His rational-intellectual thinking and
building blocks of heritage are all that we need to stand in the face of the obliterators of
cultural heritage in the Middle East and North Africa which contributed to the destructions
of their civilizations – such as the notorious Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
which has wreaked havoc on social artifacts and the cultural heritage of Iraq and Syria.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or
not-for-profit sectors.

Notes
1. Listed incorrectly as p. 155 in the Index.
2. This key term is not listed in AIK’s index.
3. The inconsistency in terms could be a bit misleading to the reader.
4. Despite the inconsistency in terms and transliteration, Alatas’s overall distinction between
‘authority’ and ‘power’ seems understandable.
5. Nye served as dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, was an Assistant Secretary
of Defence in the Clinton administration, and was former chair of the National Intelligence
Council.
6. Missing from Index.

References
Bulliet RW (1995) Islam: The View from the Edge. New York: Columbia University Press.
Geertz C (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Nye JS (1991) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.
Nye JS (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs.
Nye JS (2011) The Future of Power. New York: PublicAffairs.
Redfield R (1964) The Folk Culture of Yucatan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Veblen T (1994) The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions. New York:
Dover.

Author biography
Joseph Alagha is Professor of Political Science at Haigazian University. He is the author of four
academic books. A prolific writer on the politics and ideology of Islamic movements, his current
research deals with popular culture and lifestyles. His latest publications include ‘Moderation and
performing arts in contemporary Muslim societies,’ American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences
32(3) (2015): 44–68; ‘Al-Farabi’s political philosophy and Shi’ism,’ The Maghreb Review 40(3)
(2015): 319–355; and ‘G Al-Banna’s and A Fadlallah’s views on dancing,’ Sociology of Islam
2(1–2) (2014): 60–86.