Disomangcop vs Datumanong

GR NO. 149848

TINGA, J

Facts: By way of the 1987 Constitution, the country finally had the ability to
establish regional autonomy in its territory. In the case of Art X Sec 1 and 15, it
was the establishment of Autonomous Regions in the Muslim Mindanao area
and the Cordillera mountain area that "share common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines".
Pursuant to such mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 was passed. A Plebiscite was
held, 13 provides and 10 cities were called, only four voted and became the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. It was then formed on 6 November
1990 though at that point President Corazon C. Aquino had already signed
seven Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of cabinet departments
regarding local government, labor and employment, public works, social
welfare and etc. A few years later DO 119 was passed to which Mr.
Disomangcop claim is unconstitutional with grave abuse of discretion

Issue: Is DO 119 unconstitutional?

Verdict: The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers,
is a duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order takes back powers
which have been previously "devolved" under the said executive order and runs
counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. Also, R.A. 9054 states that "all laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly." With the repeal of E.O. 124 the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily
follows that D.O. 119 is also rendered functus officio (it expired or accomplished
what it was meant to do) by the ARMM Organic Acts. Without doubt,
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion.
 Santiago vs Guingona

G.R. No. 134577

PANGANIBAN, J

Facts: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S.
Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5,
Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minority
leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful
minority leader. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject
petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been
usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader,
a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. In the
regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction1 to hear and decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts.
However, petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House have been recognized as exceptions to this rule.

Issue: Does the Court have jurisdiction?

Verdict: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government . It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.

In other words the Court has jurisdiction.

 PHILJA vs Prado

GR NO. 105371

CRUZ, J

Facts: Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal

Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. These measures withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel
that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures. They say it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of
the Judiciary.

Issue: Does it encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary?

Verdict: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. However it
does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things
without distinction which might sometimes result in unequal protection. This is
not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is
a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
 COMELEC vs Cruz

GR NO. 186616

BRION, J

Facts: On October 29, 2007 the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of
the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with
the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 entitled "An Act Providing for
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections

which states: No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official was elected." The RTC agreed with the respondents’ contention that the
challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit
for barangay officials. COMELEC files to a higher court disagree because they
say it's not a political question.

Issue: Is such a political question

Verdict: Political questions are " those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Clearly, the intent of the
framers of the constitution is to exempt the barangay officials from the three
term limits which are otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from
the Members of the House of Representatives down to the members of
the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three
term limit should be applied by enacting a law for the purpose.
 Gonzalez vs OP

GR NO. 196231

BRION, J

Facts: On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed charges with the Philippine
National Police Internal Affairs Service against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila City then dismissed Kalaw’s complaint against Mendoza, et
al. for his failure to substantiate his allegations. After that, President Benigno C.
Aquino III directed the Department of Justice and the Department of Interior
and Local Government to conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident.
The two departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an
Incident Investigation and Review Committee

Issue: Is this issue a justiceable one?

Verdict: The court clarifies that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may
be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President
(concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political
question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being
decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a
political branch of the government.

In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the Congress’
choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the President.
 ABAKADA vs Ermita

GR NO. 168056

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Facts: On May 24, 2005 , the President signed into law RA 9337 known as the VAT
reform Act. The ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code. These questioned
provisions contain the following: the President, upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
Value-added tax collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 2 4/5% or National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and 1 ½%. The groups argues that the law is
unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes

Issue: Does the President passing RA 9337 constitute as an excess of delegated

power?

Verdict: There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the

discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. R.A. No.
9337 originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution
does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments
that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
 David vs Arroyo

GR NO. 171396

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Facts: On February 24, 2006, the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
its Edsa People Power I. President Arroyo then issued PP 1017 declaring a state
of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces the PNP, to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. It cancelled
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. The police then arrested Mr.Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist along with his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. After about a month, President
Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court with
three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue: Was there a violation?

Verdict: The Court found that PP 1017 is constitutional because it was a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever
becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
There are also extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power to issue decrees direct the AFP to enforce obedience , to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President, and to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on
the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
 Phil Bar Assn vs COMELEC

GR NO. L-27833

FERNANDO, J

Facts: On February 7, 1986, Petitions were filed questioning the validity of BP 883
that called a special election for President and Vice-President. The law was
enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was
"irrevocably vacating the position of President effective only when the election
is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as Pres. by taking his
oath of office ten days after his proclamation."

Issue: Was BP 883 unconstitutional?

Verdict: The Court failed to get 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883.
Unconstitutional. As to its constitutionality, the issue became a political
question where only the sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean and
honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions
 San Narciso vs Mendez

G.R. No. 103702

VITUG, J

Facts: The district of San Andreas was created by an executive order. After 30
years San Narciso declared the San Adreas was illegal and unconstitutional
because it was made by a presidential act and not by the legislature. San
Andreas argued that since it was made after the implementation of the Local
Government Code which says that municipalities existing after it's
implementation would continue to exist .

Issue: Is San Andreas unconstitutional?

Verdict: Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres
was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on
05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge
the legality of the executive order. Also, since the Local government code is
clear then the court decides that San Andreas is contitutional
 Gerochi vs DOE

GR NO. 157036
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J

Facts: Mr.Gerochi contends that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of
a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue that the
cases19 invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the
charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench. In said cases, the
respective funds were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil
and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the changes and adjustments in
prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and
timely monitored by the legislature. Thus, there was a need to delegate powers
to administrative bodies. Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed
not for a similar purpose.

Issue: Is there undue delegation?

Verdict: The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters
falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. In the face of the
increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with
and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute
laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
 Disomangcop vs Datumanong

GR NO. 149848

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J

Facts: In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech

before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in
all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She declared: " THUS, I AM
DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO
CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE
LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO
CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES.FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN
IN THE MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN
OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES.
THOSE WHO WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN
SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE.
AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE
PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE." Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, contends that the President and the PNP
chief has no authority to do so

Issue: Do they not have delegated authority?

Verdict: The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to
regulation. The maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the
people against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to
bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties. The PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of P.D. No. 1866 .As for the President, she holds the steering wheel that controls
the course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her
plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to
implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act
directly or merely direct the performance of a duty. A PTCFOR is just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time.
 People vs Dacuycuy

GR NO. L-45127

REGALADO, J

Facts: On April 4, 1975, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation
of Republic Act No. 4670. They say it is unconstitutional not only because it
imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, but that it also constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.

Issue: Is there undue delegation?

Verdict: Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable

period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having
been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly,
this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the
rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative
powers
 BOC Employees vs Teves

GR NO. 181704

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts: On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed

into law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. The
BOC employees contended that there is undue delegation of power.

Issue: Is there undue delegation?

Verdict: In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of

legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an
exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal
adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence,
the need to delegate to administrative bodies. Two tests determine the validity
of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to
be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a
sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits
of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the
conditions under which it is to be implemented. RA [No.] 9335 adequately states
the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
 Albada vs COMELEC

GR NO. 188078

CARPIO, J.

Facts: Apparently, the R.A. 9591 violates the minimum population needed for a
legislative district in a city. Before May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the
Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill
1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007. Mr. Albada contended
that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city and that they can't be represented in congress.

Issue: Is RA 9591 unconstitutional?

Verdict: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is
unconstitutional and violates of Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds
that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000
population. As such, Regional Director Miranda issued a certification which
based on the demographic projections declared RA 9591 without legal effect
because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O.
135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which says" The certification on
demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the
Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB"
 Baguilat vs Alvarez

GR NO. 227757

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts: On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Fariñas and Rep. Jose
Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the
latter elicited the following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the
winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for the other
candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall
likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority.[3] Thereafter, the Elections for the
Speakership were held, "with 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, 8 voting
for Rep. Baguilat, 7 voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and 1 registering a no
vote,"[4] thus, resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the 17th Congress. Mr.Baguilat expected the "long-
standing tradition" of the House ( where the candidate who got the 2nd highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader )
would continue and would be declared and recognized as the Minority Leader.
However, despite numerous follow-ups from respondents, Rep. Baguilat was
never recognized as such. Instead MR. Suarez was elected as the Minority. Thus,
he filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that he should be
recognized as the Minority Leader Leader.

Issue: Should Mt. Baguilat be the minority leader?

Verdict: "Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,

board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty." After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no
clear legal right to the reliefs sought. Records disclose that prior to the
Speakership Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Fariñas
responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect
the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the election of
the Speaker of the House proceeded without any objection from any member
of Congress, including herein Mr.Baguilat. Therefore, the mandamus won't apply.
 Atong vs COMELEC

GR NO. 203766

CARPIO, J.

Facts: 54 Petitioners for Certiorari filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations

assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations
under a myriad of reasons such as " the political party, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941" and so forth.

Issue: Did the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the
elections.

Verdict: No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming
elections. However, since the Court adopted new parameters in the
qualification of the party-list system, the COMELEC must deal with all present
petitions to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system
and to participate in the coming elections themselves with the new parameters
prescribed.
 Lico vs COMELEC

GR NO. 205505

SERENO, C.J.

Facts: On Nov. 30, 2009, Ating Koop filed his intent to participate in the party-list
system of representation for the May 10, 2010 elections with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascariña as second nominee. Ating Koop then earned
a seat in the House of Representatives and Atty. Lico then took his oath of office
and assumed office. On Dec. 5, 2011, the Interim Central Committee expelled
him from Ating Koop for disloyalty . Later he filed a motion for reconsideration
with the ICC which was denied. Apart from allegations of "malversation" and
graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner. Lico's refusal to honor the
term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his
expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.

Issue: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction to expel a sitting party-list member?

Verdict: The court says that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition
to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its
jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion
from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason,
the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. However, the
COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of petitioner Lico's
expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in
Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible
by a writ of certiorari. The COMELEC should not have encroached into the
expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so
 Zquino vs Comelec

GR NO. 120265

KAPUNAN, J.

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly
created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district
(284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months. Move Makati,
a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP
of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of
the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the
entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The
Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May
6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes,
won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.Aquino then filed a Petition of
Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue: : Is the COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency

requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid

Verdict: Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous
with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. Therefore, the framers
intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile. The
place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,”
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
 Aldaba vs Comelec

GR NO. 180078

NACHURA, J.

Facts: Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city
of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by
creating a separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City
was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact
but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification
issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that “the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.

Issue: Is RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population

threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

Verdict: YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative
district, the city must have “a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such
projections are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board
(NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued
only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third,
intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year. Any
population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district
must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.
 Navarro vs Ermita

GR NO. 180050

Nachura, J. :

Facts: On October 2, 1996, the President approved RA 9355 creating the

Province of Dinagat Islands with an income of 82.69 M, a population of 106,951,
and a land area of 802.12 sq. km. On December 3, 1996, the COMELEC
conducted a mandatory plebiscite for ratification of the creation of the
province. Voters from the mother province, Surigao del Norte, and the Dinagat
Islands participated. The voting yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes. The President then appointed an interim set of provincial
officials. On June 1, 2007, a new set of provincial officials elected and assumed
office. On February 10, 2010, RA 9355 was declared unconstitutional as Dinagat
Islands failed to meet the minimum land area requirement for a province. In the
same decision, the Court declared as null and void a provision on the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9355 stating that the land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed on one
or more islands for being beyond the ambit of the Local Government Code,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. The present
action is an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment.

Issue: Whether or not a territory composed on more than one island is exempt
from the minimum land area requirement.

Held: Yes. When the local government unit to be created consists of one or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided
in the Local Government Code if the local government unit to be created is a
municipality or a component city. The exemption is not found in the
enumeration of requisites for the creation of a province under the same Code,
although it is expressly stated under the IRR. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR,
which amounted to both executive and legislative construction of the LGC, the
many details to implement the LGC had already been put in place, which
Congress understood to be impractical and not too urgent to immediately
translate into direct amendments to the LGC. However, Congress, recognizing
the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted RA 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement,
which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can only be found as an
express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative
powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating
the Island Province of Dinagat. The Court then declares RA 9355 constitutional
and valid.