THIRD DIVISION

AC No. 99-634 - June 10, 2002

DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

The Case

Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta. Filed by Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the following:

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"That in connection with my business, I was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September, 1998,
in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City,
who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of
contract;

"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and some other
legal papers, for which services I have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a settlement of
the dispute, Atty. Magulta suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which he subsequently drafted, copy of
which is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);

"That having the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount
of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that I
needed the case filed immediately;

"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court,
and that I should receive notice of its progress;

"That in the months that followed, I waited for such notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there seemed
to be no progress in my case, such that I frequented his office to inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to
wait;

"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my last visit
to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at about 4:00 p.m., where
he left me at the Office of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building and told to wait while he
personally follows up the processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came back and told
me that the Clerk of Court was absent on that day;

"That sensing I was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court
with my draft of Atty. Magulta's complaint to personally verify the progress of my case, and there told that there

1
was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the Certification dated May
27, 1999, attached as Annex C;

"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his office the
following day, May 28, 1999, where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00
and P8,000.00, respectively, copies of which are attached as Annexes D and E;

"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"

x x x - x x x - x x x.1

On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, 2 respondent filed
his Answer3 vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally outrageous and baseless." The
latter had allegedly been introduced as a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the
former never paid. After Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied to this letter, the
latter requested that another demand letter -- this time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer, complainant asked the process server of the former's
law office to deliver the letter to the addressee.

Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-hour meeting, respondent drafted a
complaint (which was only for the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared a compromise
agreement. He was also requested by complainant to do the following:

1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson Tan

2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC Corporation

3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation

4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed by complainant's wife

All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by complainant.

Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the
Regwill case. However, when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a complaint for breach
of contract. Respondent, whose services had never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about
his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay on installment basis.

On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to respondent's secretary and told her that it was for
the filing fee of the Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint could be
filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should
give the filing fee later.

2
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend for the meantime the filing of the complaint
because the former might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had
offered to buy a parcel of land owned by Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the
parties never arrived at any agreement.

Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his interest in filing the complaint. Respondent
reminded him once more of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the complaint be filed
first before payment of respondent's acceptance and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant
demanded the return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own personal checks because
their law office was undergoing extensive renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by complainant.

Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was he.

The IBP's Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:

"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees
of the Regwill complaint. With complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of
the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which
caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part of the
money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said
funds. Thus, to impress upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year."4

The Court's Ruling

We agree with the Commission's recommendation.

Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on
behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee.

Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's
failure to file the complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount delivered by complainant to his
office on January 4, 1999 was for attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.

We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense of the
client's cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client,
but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6

3
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant,
because the latter never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents
as a personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his partners.

We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not
essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.

If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then
the professional employment is established. 7

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer
and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. 8 Hence, despite the fact that complainant
was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a
personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.

This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the exertion of
their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied.10

Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the receipt issued by his office to complainant on
January 4, 1999 was erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite incredible for the office personnel
of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for something else.
Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken
steps to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling complainant's attention to the matter and should
have issued another receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.

The Practice of Law -- a

Profession, Not a Business

In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice of law is a profession and not a
business.11 Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.12 The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty to
public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of law is a noble calling in which
emolument is a byproduct, and the highest eminence may be attained without making much money. 14

In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law
office of respondent -- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to them in their professional capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.

Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be true that they have a lien upon the client's funds,

4
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until their
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees
and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their duty to promptly account for the
moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they must still
exert all effort to protect their client's interest within the bounds of law.

If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18 Respondent fell short
of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed to
file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the amount does not exculpate him from his breach
of duty.

On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The
power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent's file.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, J.*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

5
 EN BANC

[Bar Matter No. 712. March 19, 1997.]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is a
privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed our"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from
taking the lawyer’s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become
less than irreproachable.

2. ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER’S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR FORMALITY FOR PRACTICING LAW; EVERY
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES WEIGH HIS ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER’S OATH AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following, admonition: In allowing Mr.
Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary,
the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court
is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him
the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We
stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL
TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with
the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to
his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner’s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites
sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner’s application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer
recommending petitioner’s discharge from probation.

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath based on the order of his
discharge from probation.

6
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner
Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among
others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts
of the latter’s family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner’s prayer to be
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than
accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte’s
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused’s plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity
for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the
father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son’s involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had lost
a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of
the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter
to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of
lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to
"weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer’ s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner’s
admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the participant
[herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character." 1

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner
has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one’s child is, for
a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death
is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes
a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan’s statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and
commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a
lawyer.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

7
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, sign
the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’ s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to
give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath. If all lawyers conducted
themselves strictly according to the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer
he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer’s oath on a date to be set by
the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

8
 EN BANC

B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same
year’s bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together with the
successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his
scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he
went home to his province for a vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was
then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably
just an attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation
work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he
ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten.”9cralaw virtualaw library

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and
submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition
be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that, based on his answers
during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and
the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the
Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was
Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar
Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

9
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t
know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And,
finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than
what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima
facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law
Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19cralaw
virtualaw library

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental
fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in
the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.”22cralaw virtualaw library

We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice
or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when he
thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of
fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all
the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and
acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the filing of charges and the
conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see
it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt
of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice
of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will

10
be dealt with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado
is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay
a FINE of P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law,
and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be
dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.

11
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A. CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be admitted to the
practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of
the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their
secondary education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his
graduation, complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business Administration in
1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11
Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years,
complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in
Muntinlupa.9chanrobleslaw

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where
he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged
from the PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with
his wife, Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college
degree.12chanrobleslaw

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school
in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar Examinations
and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's
College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15chanrobleslaw

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant
did not confront respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support.17chanrobleslaw

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head office
of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was
requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that
point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-
Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his
and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation
Office's records showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that
complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's
University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's photograph under the name
"Patrick A. Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal
sponsors at respondent's wedding.20chanrobleslaw

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it

12
upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A.
Caronan.21 However, problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In
July 2013, PSC received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be furnished with
complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning
respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a certain
Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of
land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities,
illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his
own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to
resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the
former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.28chanrobleslaw

In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed
and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her
spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33chanrobleslaw

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties failed to appear. 34 Instead,
respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both parties again failed to appear, thereby
prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the
parties submitted any.37chanrobleslaw

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic
records.39 He observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to
prove his identity.40 On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan."41chanrobleslaw

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August
31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-
Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43chanrobleslaw

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that .the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed
complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity, and
academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the
Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069
be dropped and stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan"
be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.47chanrobleslaw

On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

13
 The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of
the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick
A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and
academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to
Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan," among which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of
his high school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c) NBI clearances obtained in
2010 and 2013.55chanrobleslaw

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school
records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the
IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to
the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted
unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later
and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law degree
under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit
for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good moral character:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not
satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty.[60] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the
name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to
fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who
would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him and
his client, as well as between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw

14
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer.
He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal
cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary
duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming
the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the
Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby
resolves that:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
and cralawlawlibrary

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts of the
country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of
the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno C.J. Carpio,Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., on official leave.

15
 SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015

SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the requirements of
the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.

The Antecedent Facts

In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this Court to the practice of
respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012,
and "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the Court that he
inquired from the MCLE Office about the status of respondent's compliance and received the following Certification, dated 2
January 2013, from Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter
did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the following compliance periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

a. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 -April 14, 2004)

b. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 -April 14, 2007)
c. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 -April 14, 2010)

This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application for Exemption from the MCLE requirement on (sic) January 2009
but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January 14, 2009 meeting. 1

In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office,
forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15
April 2004 to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The
MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that
respondent neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.

In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish respondent with
complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise required respondent to file his comment within ten days from notice.

In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014, respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5 August
2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was wondering why his application for exemption could not be granted. He further
alleged that he did not receive a formal denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing Board, and that the
notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and Arnado Law Office, the
law office of his political opponents, the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family controlled Camiguin
and had total control of the judges and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the law firm had control of the
lawyers in Camiguin except for himself.

16
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years. He
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

xxxx

Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,
offered, immediately after she took over government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the Supreme Court but I refused the
intended appointment because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to get me to the SC in an effort to buy my
silence;

Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap
elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;

xxxx

Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national canvassing before
the National Canvassing Board when she ran for President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other counsel was former
Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN CUEVAS;

Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR and
COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO TRILL ANES;

Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national elections, still
undecided up to this day;

Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of the Corona
impeachment which the SC only decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona conceding to the
decision, thus the SC declaring the case moot and academic;

Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the Committee on
Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;

Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;

Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in the
complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND MARCOS;

Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when Justices were
like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;

Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;

x x x x6

Respondent further claimed that he had written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and
Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption from
MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE requirements.

In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the OBC

In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014, the OBC reported that respondent applied for exemption for the

17
First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC
reported that according to the MCLE Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance) pursuant to expertise in
lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to
establish his expertise in a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent failed to meet the requirements necessary
for the exemption.

The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings filed with the courts
the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The OBC further
reported that the MCLE Office has no record that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his representation in
a pleading that his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.

The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, non-
compliance with the MCLE requirements shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of the pleadings from the
records.7 The OBC also reported that under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a member of the Bar who
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to explain his deficiency or to show
his compliance with the requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a member who fails to comply within the given period
shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent
to respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended
that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption
number for the immediately preceding compliance period and that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.

The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's failure to
comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off
from the records and considered invalid.

The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the
MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also
recommended that respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE Governing Board.

The Issue

The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.

The Ruling of this Court

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout their career,
they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice
of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15 April
2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered
respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.

The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply with the four compliance periods. The records also
showed that respondent filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board,
respondent's application for exemption covered the First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for
exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009 on the ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of
Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The
MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received
inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status
of respondent's MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which
the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to
respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.

18
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not follow-up
the status of his application for exemption. He furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to the MCLE Office
asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.11 He
did not comply with the Fourth Compliance Period.

In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the First to Third
Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his
application for exemption. The OBC also reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013.
Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days from receipt of the notification to comply.
However, in his Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of his involvement in public
interest issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and
that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.

Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 12. Compliance Procedures

xxxx

(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.

A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his
specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise
show compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall be written in capital letters as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT
MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS
RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.

The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during
this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall
be listed as a delinquent member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.

Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the
First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has not been
furnished proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.

The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He
assumed that his application for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the
MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the
Court to again reconsider the MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his motion for reconsideration was
already denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the Court that
the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section
12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he intended to comply with his deficiencies br
the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue practicing law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.

The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14 January 2009,
it took the office three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office only informed respondent
on 1 October 2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the period
when respondent indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of

19
the MCLE Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been informed of the denial of his
application for exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion
for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when
respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.

Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee
should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents
the Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors o declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a
delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law until such time as he
submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE
Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six months or until he has fully
complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later,
and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly act on matters that require its immediate attention,
such as but not limited to applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested parties within a
reasonable period;

(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already been
denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;

(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from
the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also
furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for their appropriate actions.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.

20
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974

JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals,
respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the Philippine Bar, respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:p

Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt proceedings both in the Court
of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself
and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica
vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al" which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of
merit.

Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon the antecedents of
this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the acts of contempt perpetrated by
respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.

As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly calling the latter
"stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in
Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of
the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court
found that Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court rendered
judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory
damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.

Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of
Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was
then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-
G.R. No. 46504-R.

The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner
Francisco M. Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come
from Montecillo's lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and
instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.

It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a
reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of
Appeals allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of
October 24, 1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an unjust
judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty. del Mar to remember that
threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in
his second motion for reconsideration, filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal
violations placed under the jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised
Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that will he
interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."

The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its resolution of Oct. 24,
1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his threats, and that the Appellate Court,

21
impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why
he should not be punished for contempt of court.

On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate Court could not be
threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of the course of action he would follow.
On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he
sent a letter to the President of the Philippines, furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into
consideration the contents of said letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that
move, on December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he reminded
them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the amount of P200,000 for a decision
rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We
pause here to observe that respondent del Mar seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with
law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord
with his views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the interpretation
and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in accordance with law and justice.

The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more eloquently depict the
very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its
decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client. Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful
arguments on the merits of his plea for a reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in
their decision, resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by
insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust judgment, or doing it
through ignorance.

We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):

A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just or unjust, can be
threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will not, but the offense is committed, whether
the threats do or do not succeed. As to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in
his letter to his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it was under the
Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the constituted authorities, there was abuse,
worse than abuse, there was arrogant abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including
the courts, not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in the New.

This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found guilty of contempt
and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let
certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full
force and effect to this order of suspension from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial
Consultant of this Court was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico
del Mar from the practice of law.

Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and
Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was
terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the
Court of Appeals and the Justices concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices.
This is the undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate Court but he
actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their minds in the case they decided in
accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from pure conviction.

To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before Us, asking that his
suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored because of the amicable settlement reached in
Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of
the Appellate Court.

22
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when We denied on May
14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G. R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he
filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices
of this Court who supported the resolution denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for
reconsideration. This motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then,
filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time reveal to you that,
had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the
Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent
falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not
with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in
our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a
language certainly not complimentary to the Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of
retribution aimed at the Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.

Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond suspicion the integrity
and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent
del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in
his manifestation.

At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our own in G. R. No. L-
36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful wrath of respondent del Mar which
drove him to make his contemptuous statements.

The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to what was the
statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na" (That act is senseless or done
without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the statement uttered was the former, Montecillo
should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the
preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and,
therefore, what was really uttered by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus
making him liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for disturbing the Appellate
Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which would warrant overturning its decision.

On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate
Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of Appeals was so informed.

To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be disciplined for his
statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation dated August 1, 1973, wherein he
stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex
"A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S.
Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the
Government needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that human
efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).

This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements contained in the
manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the Justices of this Court who voted to deny
del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.

Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at the hearing of his
explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an additional explanation with this Court, wherein
he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of
things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my
manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-up
of human deficiencies."

23
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to his explanation of
August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology or regret. Respondent is utilizing what
exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification
for his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there
is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-
36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow
respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension, commiserate in the pitiable state of
mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-
consuming obsession emanating from a one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all
wrong.

When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize to all courts
concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, respondent del Mar
filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated
December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit
a memorandum in support of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further
investigation of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed
submitted for decision.

In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he suffered repeated
strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and physically; that his sight is blurred and his
reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have
committed he asked for forgiveness; he reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and
that the Justices thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view that
the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the Penal Code in trying to
make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic standing during his school days; that "with all
the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice
of law. He hopes and expects that, with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the
obligation he has contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."

It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a mitigation of the
contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous statements. We quote:

The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme Court a case for damages
against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the American regime in the Philippines
which was still subject to the jurisdiction of the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and
Article 204 of the Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up to now,
there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon

While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his physical and mental
ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated at the end of his explanation that he has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We
may decide to impose on him and thus making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of
whatever this Court may decide to do in this case.

With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to
voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for
contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del
Mar without prejudice to his making arrangement directly with his clients.

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We
do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

24
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an officer of
the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has
taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be
resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil. 595).

As We stated before:

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may
suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more effective, in calling the
Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)

Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting
judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C.
J. S. 7).

We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy or connivance with
the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the accused, and implicating said judge in a
supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were
highly derogatory and serve nothing but to discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification.
Statements of that nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious
disrespect. We said:

As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high
esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis
supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43 O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G.
6150).

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on
only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We
found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and
this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of
alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly
rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the
law, in disposing of the case of his client.

We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal knowledge of the law
and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but
tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly
invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in
seeking both abstract elusive terms, he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to
comprehend that what to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him
may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We understand that respondent's
mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of change. It is with deep concern that We view such a
state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is

25
broadmindedness and tolerance, coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and
circumstances.

For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to challenge the integrity
and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but commiseration and sympathy for his
choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action
with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to
himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973, suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November 19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.

Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb.
18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)

The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines regarding the
indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

26
 FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 5281 : February 12, 2008]

MANUEL L. LEE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with
violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.

In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.
Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses
to its execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which
he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed
out that the residence certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5,
1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing
his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s]." 5

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and
Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters' affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the
certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and
is available in this Office['s] files.6

Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was validly executed and actually
notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9

Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by complainant
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."

Respondent did not dispute complainant's contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA.
He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.

Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file
an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.10

27
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law
as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon
111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:

[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for one year and Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified fromreappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years.14

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity.16

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself.
In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.17

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.20

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the
same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testator's wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly
nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator's old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and
those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.

28
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or
instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. - Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper [cedula]
residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of
such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act26 which stated:

When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it shall be the
duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence
certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is
issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired
residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax
Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives
division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for
disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial
register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:

1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him;

2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;

3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;

4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;

5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;

6. give each entry a consecutive number; andcralawlibrary

7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the instrument.27

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed out a
prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit
of Bartolome Ramirez.

29
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent
must first prove the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be
admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondent's notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry of the execution of
the will because it failed to comply with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondent's attempt to controvert the certification dated September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he
present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of entry of
the contested will in his notarial register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their duties,
otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined. 33

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken
lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case,
are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable
for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35

In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. - The following derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion
of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.36

These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and
obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes
responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover make
himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far as respect
for the law is concerned.43

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action against
the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in
professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less severe - such as reprimand, suspension, or
fine - will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims
that he "exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had

30
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very irresponsibly in
notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission50 and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.51

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the
Lawyer's Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art.
806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial
commission REVOKED.Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer
of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

31
A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962

IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.

Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.

Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-
793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal
mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the
judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19,
1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before
this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented
his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the
decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil.
275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.

The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the
scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was
convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor
and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption
that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the
citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said:

We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer be
used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an
unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony."
Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would
not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191.

And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon
is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and

32
 disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his
term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense
by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact
of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal
mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness.
For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the
lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S.
263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to
ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

33
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998

FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PRICILIANO B. GONZALES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

The issue of whether or not a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court may resolve the issue of ownership of the property
involved in an unlawful detainer case has been discussed by this Court in a number of cases, the more recent of which is that
of Hilario v. Court of Appeals.1 Jurisprudence on the matter has in fact been reflected in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under
Rule 70, to wit:

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. (4a)

These developments in the law notwithstanding, there remains some misconceptions on the issue of jurisdiction of inferior
courts in ejectment cases where ownership is raised as a defense that the Court deems proper to clarify in this petition.

Private respondent Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area
of 2,000 square meters. The land with improvements, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-54556 (383917), is situated
at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New Manila, Quezon City.

In June 1988, private respondent obtained a four million peso - (P4,000,000.00) loan from the China Banking Corporation. To
guarantee payment of the loan, private respondent mortgaged the Gilmore property and all its improvements to said bank. Due
to irregular payment of amortization, interests and penalties on the loan accumulated through the years.

On April 13, 1992, private respondent, through its president, Antonio B. Gonzales, signed and executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage covering the Gilmore property and its improvements, in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and
Felicidad L. Oronce.2 The deed, which states that the sale was in consideration of the sum of P5,400,000.00,3 provided inter
alia that

x x x the VENDOR (PBGDC) also guarantees the right of the VENDEES (petitioners) to the possession of the property subject of
this contract without the need of judicial action; and possession of said premises shall be delivered to the VENDEES by the
VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage.

On the other hand, petitioners bound themselves to pay private respondents indebtedness with China Banking Corporation.

In fulfillment of the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private
respondents indebtedness with the bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession of the
premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period from April 13, 1992. Almost six months later since the
execution of the instrument or on October 2, 1992, petitioners caused the registration of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage with the Register of Deeds. Simultaneously, they obtained a new title, TCT No. 67990, consistent with the fact that
they are the new owners of the property.4 Sometime in July 1993, they paid the real estate taxes on the property for which
they were issued Tax Declarations Nos. C-061-02815 and C-061-02816.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On November 12, 1993, petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter asking it to vacate the premises. Said letter, just
like three other consecutive notices sent through the Quezon City post office, was unclaimed. Hence, on April 11, 1994,
petitioners filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, a complaint for unlawful detainer against private
respondent. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8638 was raffled to Branch 41. Petitioners alleged that by virtue of the

34
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, they acquired from private respondent the Gilmore property and its improvements,
for which reason they were issued TCT No. 67990. However, they added, in violation of the terms of that document, specifically
Sec. 3 (c) thereof, private respondent refused to surrender possession of the premises. Consequently, they demanded that
private respondent vacate the premises through notices sent by registered mail that were, however, returned to them
unclaimed.

In its answer to the complaint, private respondent raised the issue of ownership over the property. It impugned petitioners
right to eject, alleging that petitioners had no cause of action against it because it was merely a mortgagee of the property. It
argued that when the parties executed the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, its real intention was to forge an
equitable mortgage and not a sale. It pointed out three circumstances indicative of an equitable mortgage, namely: inadequacy
of the purchase price, continued possession by private respondent of the premises, and petitioners retention of a portion of the
purchase price.

During the preliminary conference on the case, the parties agreed to stipulate on the following: (a) the existence and due
execution of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, and (b) the issue of whether or not the premises in litis are being
unlawfully detained by private respondent.6cräläwvirtualibräry

On March 24, 1995, the MTC7 decided the case in favor of petitioners. It ruled that petitioners are the owners of the Gilmore
property on account of the following pieces of evidence: (a) TCT No. 67990; (b) petitioners payment to the China Banking
Corporation of P8,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage entered into between private respondent and said bank; (c)
payment of real estate taxes for 1993, and (d) Tax Declaration No. 02816 in petitioners names. The MTC further held that
private respondents possession of the premises was merely tolerated by petitioners and because it refused to vacate the
premises despite demand to do so, then its possession of the same premises had become illegal. Thus, the MTC decreed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant and all persons claiming rights under it to
vacate the premises-in-litis located at No. 52 Gilmore St., New Manila, Quezon City, and to peacefully surrender possession
thereof to the plaintiffs; to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 a month as compensation for the unjust occupation of the same
from April 11, 1994 (the date of filing of this case) until defendant fully vacates the said premises; to pay plaintiffs the amount
of P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees plus costs of suit.

Counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.8cräläwvirtualibräry

On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 219, of Quezon City that
docketed it as Civil Case No. Q-95-23697. Private respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding
possession of the premises from petitioners because the latters basis for evicting it was the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention of the parties to enter into an equitable mortgage. Clearly in pursuance of that
allegation, private respondent filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal. On the other hand,
petitioners filed a motion for the immediate execution of the appealed decision. The RTC granted the motion on September 21,
1995 and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on September 25, 1995. The following day, the sheriff served upon
private respondent the writ of execution and a notice to vacate the premises within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of its appeal, private respondent filed an action for reformation of instrument with the RTC. It
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24927 and assigned to Branch 227.

In a resolution dated December 7, 1995, RTC Branch 219 asserted jurisdiction over the appeal. It ruled that the issue of whether
or not an action for reformation of a deed of sale and an unlawful detainer case can proceed independently of each other has
been resolved by this Court in Judith v. Abragan.9 In said case, this Court held that the fact that defendants had previously filed
a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the
same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff.

On December 12, 1995, private respondent filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners and RTC Branch 219. It assailed the September 21, 1995

35
order granting the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, the writ of execution and the notice to vacate served upon
private respondent (CA-G.R. SP-39227).

On December 13, 1995, RTC Branch 21910 rendered the decision affirming in toto that of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Stating
that in ejectment proceedings, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises
involved, RTC Branch 219 held that:

x x x the plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are vendees of the defendant (PBGDC) by virtue of a deed of sale where the extent of its
right to continue holding possession was stipulated. In the agreement, the existence and due execution of which the defendant
had admitted (Order, December 16, 1994, Rollo, p. 111), it was clearly stated that the defendant shall deliver the possession of
the subject premises to the plaintiffs at the expiration of one (1) year from the execution thereof, April 12, 1992. The defendant
failed to do so. From then on, it could be said that the defendant has been unlawfully withholding possession of the premises
from the plaintiffs.

In any case, this ruling on the matter of possession de facto is without prejudice to the action for reformation. This is because
`the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in
no wise bind the title or effect the ownership of the land or building nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in
a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession (Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court, 154
SCRA 153; Section 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court).11cräläwvirtualibräry

On that same date, December 13, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining RTC Branch 219
from enforcing the writ of execution and the notice to vacate the premises and on January 15, 1996, the same court granted
private respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of both the writ of execution
pending appeal and the decision of RTC Branch 219.

Around six months later or on July 2, 1996, RTC Branch 22712 issued an order declaring private respondent non-suited for failure
to appear at the pre-trial and, therefore, dismissing the action for reformation of instrument in Civil Case No. Q-95-24927.
Private respondent, not having sought reconsideration of said order, the same court issued a resolution on August 15, 1996
directing the entry of judgment in the case.13 The Clerk of Court accordingly issued the final entry of judgment
thereon.14cräläwvirtualibräry

In the meantime, on July 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein questioned Decision. 15 It set aside the December
13, 1995 decision of RTC Branch 219 and declared as null and void for want of jurisdiction, the March 24, 1995 decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 41. It made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners
from implementing the decision of RTC Branch 219, the writ of execution and the notice to vacate. In so holding, the Court of
Appeals said:

It is quite evident that, upon the pleadings, the dispute between the parties extended beyond the ordinary issues in ejectment
cases. The resolution of the dispute hinged on the question of ownership and for that reason was not cognizable by the MTC.
(See: General Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Castelo, 13 SCRA 652 [1965]).

Respondent judge was not unaware of the pendency of the action for reformation. However, despite such knowledge, he
proceeded to discuss the merits of the appeal and rendered judgment in favor of respondents on the basis of the deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage which was precisely the subject of the action for reformation pending before another branch of
the court. Prudence dictated that respondent judge should have refused to be drawn into a discussion as to the merits of the
respective contentions of the parties and deferred to the action of the court before whom the issue was directly raised for
resolution.

On whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of the MTC since it voluntarily
submitted thereto the question of the validity of its title to the property, the Court of Appeals said:

This is not so. As earlier pointed out, petitioner (private respondent here) had, in its answer to the complaint for unlawful
detainer, promptly raised the issue of jurisdiction by alleging that what was entered into by the parties was just an equitable
mortgage and not a sale. Assuming the truth of this allegation, it is fairly evident that respondents would not have had a cause
of action for ejectment. In other words, Petitioner, since the start of the case, presented a serious challenge to the MTCs

36
jurisdiction but, unfortunately, the court ignored such challenge and proceeded to decide the case simply on the basis of
possession.

`The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not, if it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law,
and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). (La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 236 SCRA 78 [1994]).

Contrary to respondents pretense, the filing by petitioner of an action for the reformation of contract may not really be an
afterthought. As we understand it, Petitioner, to support its allegation that the contract was a mere equitable mortgage, cites
the fact that the price was inadequate; it remained in possession of the premises; it has retained a part of the purchase price;
and, in any case, the real intention of the parties was that the transaction shall secure the payment by petitioner of its loan,
adverting to Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Under Article 1604 of the same code, it is provided that the presence of only one
circumstance defined in Article 1602, such as those cited above, is sufficient for a contract of sale with right to repurchase to be
presumed an equitable mortgage. Without in any way preempting the decision of the court in the action for reformation, it is
our considered view that, under the factual milieu, the action was initiated for the proper determination of the rights of the
parties under the contract, and not just an afterthought.

No derogatory inference can arise from petitioners admission of the existence of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.
The admission does not necessarily dilute its claim that the same does not express the true intent of the parties.

Verily, since the case at bench involves a controverted right, the parties are required to preserve the status quo and await the
decision of the proper court on the true nature of the contract. It is but just that the person who has first acquired possession
should remain in possession pending decision on said case, and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in petty
warfare over possession of property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this will be highly dangerous to individual
security and disturbing to the social order. (Manlapaz v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 795 [1990]).16cräläwvirtualibräry

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the following assigned errors allegedly committed
by respondent Court of Appeals:

I.

THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 33 (2) OF THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 CONFERRING EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ON THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN
EJECTMENT CASES AND VESTING IT WITH AUTHORITY, INDEED MANDATORILY, TO RESOLVE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP TO
DETERMINE ISSUES OF POSSESSION.

II.

THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IS CONTRARY TO CURRENT AND PREVAILING DOCTRINE AS ENUNCIATED IN
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 208 SCRA 108; SY VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 200 SCRA 117; AND ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 229 SCRA 627.

III.

THE FILING OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OVER THE
EJECTMENT CASE; THE DISMISSAL OF THE REFORMATION CASE CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED MERELY AS A PLOY TO
DELAY DISPOSITION OF EJECTMENT PROCEEDINGS, AND BARES NOT JUST THE ERROR BUT THE UTTER INEQUITY OF THE
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION ANNULLING THE EJECTMENT DECREE AND SETTING ASIDE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DECISION OF AFFIRMANCE.

Petitioners argue that the precedent laid down in Ching v. Malaya17 relied upon by the Court of Appeals, was based on the old
law, Republic Act No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948), as amended, which vested in the city courts original jurisdiction over forcible
entry and unlawful detainer proceedings and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon the question of ownership for

37
the only purpose of determining the character and extent of possession.18 They claim that since the original complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed on April 13, 1992, then the applicable law should have been Section 33 (2) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). That law vests in the city courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases and the corresponding power to receive evidence upon questions of ownership and
to resolve the issue of ownership to determine the issue of possession.19cräläwvirtualibräry

The history of the law vesting Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts with jurisdiction over ejectment cases has invariably
revolved upon the assumption that the question of ownership may be considered only if necessary for the determination of the
issue as to who of the parties shall have the right to possess the property in litigation.20 Thus, under the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, Section 88 vested municipal and city courts with authority to receive evidence upon the question of title therein,
whatever may be the value of the property, solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and
damages for detention. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5967 that was enacted on June 21, 1969, provided that city courts shall
have concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance over ejection cases where the question of ownership is brought in
issue in the pleadings and that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in conjunction with the issue of possession. Expounding
on that provision of law, in Pelaez v. Reyes,21 this Court said:

x x x We are of the considered opinion that the evident import of Section 3 above is to precisely grant to the city courts
concurrent original jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over the cases enumerated therein, which include `ejection
cases where the question of ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. To sustain petitioners contention about the
meaning of the last phrase of paragraph (c) of said section regarding the resolution of the issue of ownership `in conjunction
with the issue of possession is to disregard the very language of the main part of the section which denotes unmistakably a
conferment upon the city courts of concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of first instance over ejection cases in which
ownership is brought in issue in the pleadings. It is to Us quite clear that the fact that the issue of ownership is to be resolved
`in conjunction with the issue of possession simply means that both the issues of possession and ownership are to be resolved
by the city courts. And the jurisdiction is concurrent with the Courts of First Instance precisely because usually questions of title
are supposed to be resolved by superior courts. In other words, this grant of special jurisdiction to city courts is to be
distinguished from the power ordinarily accorded to municipal courts to receive evidence of title only for the purpose of
determining the extent of the possession in dispute.

Upon the approval on August 14, 1981 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, however, the
power of inferior courts, including city courts, to resolve the issue of ownership in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
was modified. Resolution of the issue of ownership became subject to the qualification that it shall be only for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession. In effect, therefore, the city courts lost the jurisdiction to determine the issue of
ownership per se that was theretofore concurrent with the then Courts of First Instance. Thus, Section 33 of B.P. Blg. 129
provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Accordingly, the Interim Rules and Guidelines in the implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides as follows:

10. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases. Metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts, without
distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the
question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

Explaining these provisions of law, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court said:

These issuances changed the former rule under Republic Act No. 296 which merely allowed inferior courts to receive evidence
upon the question of title solely for the purpose of determining the extent and character of possession and damages for
detention, which thereby resulted in previous rulings of this Court to the effect that if it appears during the trial that the
principal issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any question of possession which may be involved
necessarily depends upon the result of the inquiry into the title, then the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts is lost and
the action should be dismissed. With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over
an ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership, with the

38
express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the
dismissal of the case for forcible entry and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.

Another development in the law has emphasized the fact that inferior courts shall not lose jurisdiction over ejectment cases
solely because the issue of ownership is interwoven with the issue of possession. Under the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure,
as amended by a resolution of this Court that took effect on November 15, 1991, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
shall be tried pursuant to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, regardless of whether or not the issue of ownership of the
subject property is alleged by a party.23 In other words, even if there is a need to resolve the issue of ownership, such fact will
not deprive the inferior courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases24 that shall be tried summarily.

When the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded,
thereby amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7691 that took effect on April 15, 1994, the
jurisdiction of said courts over ejectment cases was retained. Thus, in Hilario v. Court of Appeals this Court said:

x x x. As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot
be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat that the issue posed as to
ownership could be resolved by the court for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.

Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or
material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.

In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised
by the parties in an ejectment suit.25 These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment
case where a determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Considering
the difficulties that are usually encountered by inferior courts as regards the extent of their power in determining the issue of
ownership, in Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, the Court set out guidelines to be observed in the implementation of the law
which, as stated at the outset, has recently been restated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The guidelines pertinent to this
case state:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which
case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, x x x, the
legal provision under consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows
that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the
restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly
establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the
averments plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue
of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real property.

xxx,

5. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is,
the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the
real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and
interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may
likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between
the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and
in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. 26 (Emphasis supplied.)

39
In the case at bar, petitioners clearly intended recovery of possession over the Gilmore property. They alleged in their
complaint for unlawful detainer that their claim for possession is buttressed by the execution of the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage, a copy of which was attached as Annex A to the complaint and by the issuance of TCT No. 67990 that
evidenced the transfer of ownership over the property.27 Because metropolitan trial courts are authorized to look into the
ownership of the property in controversy in ejectment cases, it behooved MTC Branch 41 to examine the bases for petitioners
claim of ownership that entailed interpretation of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.

However, while it quoted paragraph (c) of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that embodies the agreement of the
parties that possession of the Gilmore property and its improvements shall remain with the vendor that was obliged to transfer
possession only after the expiration of one year,28 MTC Branch 41 apparently did not examine the terms of the deed of sale.
Instead, it erroneously held that the issue of whether or not the document was in fact an equitable mortgage should not be
properly raised in this case. Had it examined the terms of the deed of sale, which, after all is considered part of the allegations
of the complaint having been annexed thereto, that court would have found that, even on its face, the document was actually
one of equitable mortgage and not of sale. The inferior court appears to have forgotten that all documents attached to a
complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as
part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.29cräläwvirtualibräry

Article 1602 of the Civil Code provides that a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage by the presence of any of
the following:

(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;

(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;

(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed;

(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;

(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;

(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.

Article 1604 of the same Code provides that the provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an
absolute sale. The presence of even one of the circumstances in Article 1602 is sufficient basis to declare a contract as one of
equitable mortgage.30 The explicit provision of Article 1602 that any of those circumstances would suffice to construe a contract
of sale to be one of equitable mortgage is in consonance with the rule that the law favors the least transmission of property
rights.

The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage covering the 2,000-square-meter lot located at No. 52 Gilmore Street, New
Manila, Quezon City provides as follows:

3. That the total consideration for the sale of the above-described property by the VENDOR to the VENDEES is FOURTEEN
MILLION (P14,000,000.00) PESOS, in Philippine currency, payable as follows:

a) The VENDOR shall be paid by the VENDEE the sum of FIVE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P5,400,000.00) PESOS upon
the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage after computation of the mortgage obligation of
the VENDOR with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the amount of ______________________ which the VENDEES agree to
assume as part of the consideration of this sale. The VENDEES hereby assume the mortgage obligation of the VENDOR with the
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION in the total amount of ___________________.

b) The VENDOR hereby undertakes and agrees with the VENDEES that the first-named party shall warrant and defend the title
of said real property hereby conveyed in favor of the VENDEES, their heirs, successors or assigns, against all just claims of all
persons or entities; that the VENDOR also guarantees the right of the VENDEES to the possession of the property subject of this

40
contract without the need of judicial action; and furthermore, the VENDOR binds itself to execute any additional documents to
complete the title of the VENDEES to the above-described property so that it may be registered in the name of the VENDEES in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act.

c) It is hereby expressly agreed and understood by and between the VENDOR and the VENDEES that the house and other
improvements found in the premises are included in this sale and that possession of said premises shall be delivered to the
VENDEES by the VENDOR at the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the signing and execution of this Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage.

d) It is furthermore expressly provided and agreed by and between the VENDOR and the VENDEES that the capital gains tax
shall be paid by the VENDOR while any and all fees and expenses incident to the registration and transfer of the title to the
aforementioned property shall be defrayed and borne by the VENDEES.

e) Attached to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage as Annex `A thereof is the Certificate of ROSANA FLORES,
Corporate Secretary of PRICILIANO B. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine Laws who certified that at a special meeting of the Board of Directors of said corporation held on December 3, 1991
at which meeting a quorum was present, the following resolution was adopted and passed, to wit:

`RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that the company, PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT is (sic) hereby authorized
the President, Mr. Antonio B. Gonzales to enter into and/or negotiate for the sale of a property described as Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 383917 with an area of TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQUARE METERS under the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;

`RESOLVED FURTHER, that Mr. ANTONIO B. GONZALES, is hereby authorized to sign, execute any and all documents relative
thereto.

That aforesaid resolution is in full force and effect.

(sgd.)
ROSANA FLORES
Corporate Secretary
(SGD.)

f) Full title and possession over the above-described property shall vest upon the VENDEES upon the full compliance by them
with all the terms and conditions herein set forth.31 (Underscoring supplied.)

That under the agreement the private respondent as vendor shall remain in possession of the property for only one year, did
not detract from the fact that possession of the property, an indicium of ownership, was retained by private respondent as the
alleged vendor. That period of time may be deemed as actually the time allotted to private respondent for fulfilling its part of
the agreement by paying its indebtedness to petitioners. This may be gleaned from paragraph (f) that states that full title and
possession of the property shall vest upon the VENDEES upon the full compliance by them with all the terms and conditions
herein set forth.

Paragraph (f) of the contract also evidences the fact that the agreed purchase price of fourteen million pesos (P14,000,000.00)
was not handed over by petitioners to private respondent upon the execution of the agreement. Only P5,400,000.00 was given
by petitioners to private respondent, as the balance thereof was to be dependent upon the private respondents satisfaction of
its mortgage obligation to China Banking Corporation. Notably, the MTC found that petitioners gave private respondent the
amount of P8,500,000.00 that should be paid to the bank to cover the latters obligation, thereby leaving the amount
of P100,000.00 (P5,400,000.00 + P8,500,000.00 = P13,900,000.00) of the purchase price still unpaid and in the hands of
petitioners, the alleged vendees.

Hence, two of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are manifest in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage,
namely: (a) the vendor would remain in possession of the property (no. 2), and (b) the vendees retained a part of the purchase
price (no. 4). On its face, therefore, the document subject of controversy, is actually a contract of equitable mortgage.

41
The denomination of the contract as a deed of sale is not binding as to its nature. The decisive factor in evaluating such an
agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown, not necessarily by the terminology used in the contract, but by their
conduct, words, actions and deeds prior to, during and immediately after executing the agreement.32 Private respondents
possession over the property was not denied by petitioners as in fact it was the basis for their complaint for unlawful detainer.

Neither does the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in petitioners favor import conclusive evidence of ownership or
that the agreement between the parties was one of sale.33 In Macapinlac v. Gutierrez Repide, this Court said:

x x x it must be borne in mind that the equitable doctrine x x x to the effect that any conveyance intended as security for a debt
will be held in effect to be a mortgage, whether so actually expressed in the instrument or not, operates regardless of the form
of the agreement chosen by the contracting parties as the repository of their will. Equity looks through the form and considers
the substance; and no kind of engagement can be adopted which will enable the parties to escape from the equitable doctrine
to which reference is made. In other words, a conveyance of land, accompanied by registration in the name of the transferee
and the issuance of a new certificate, is no more secured from the operation of the equitable doctrine than the most informal
conveyance that could be devised.34cräläwvirtualibräry

A closer look into the allegations of the complaint would therefore show that petitioners failed to make out a case for unlawful
detainer. By the allegations in the complaint, private respondent as a mortgagor had the right to posses the property. A
mortgage is a real right constituted to secure an obligation upon real property or rights therein to satisfy with the proceeds of
the sale thereof such obligation when the same becomes due and has not been paid or fulfilled.35 The mortgagor generally
retains possession of the mortgaged property36 because by mortgaging a piece of property, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien
but ownership thereof is not parted with.37 In case of the debtors nonpayment of the debt secured by the mortgage, the only
right of the mortgagee is to foreclose the mortgage and have the encumbered property sold to satisfy the outstanding
indebtedness. The mortgagors default does not operate to vest in the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property,
for any such effect is against public policy.38 Even if the property is sold at a foreclosure sale, only upon expiration of the
redemption period, without the judgment debtor having made use of his right of redemption, does ownership of the land sold
become consolidated in the purchaser.39cräläwvirtualibräry

Petitioners tenuous claim for possession of the Gilmore property was emasculated further by private respondents answer to
their complaint. The latter claimed ownership of the property, alleging that the agreement was one of mortgage and not of
sale. Private respondent alleged therein that in March 1993 (sic), it borrowed money from petitioner Felicidad Oronce alone to
redeem the subject property from China Banking Corporation. She agreed to lend it the amount on condition that the Gilmore
property should be mortgaged to her to guarantee payment of the loan. However, petitioner Flaminiano took the money from
petitioner Oronce and paid the mortgage obligation of private respondent to the China Banking Corporation while claiming that
50% of the amount was hers. Petitioner Flaminianos husband, Atty. Eduardo Flaminiano, forthwith prepared the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage and, without private respondents knowledge, had it registered for which reason a new certificate
of title was issued to petitioners. In claiming that the agreement was one of mortgage, private respondent alleged in its
answer, inter alia, that the actual total value of the property was thirty million pesos (P30,000,000.00); that while it had
possession of the property, petitioners did not then attempt to repossess the same, notwithstanding the lapse of one year from
the execution of the document; that petitioners did not pay the real estate taxes even after the transfer of title in their favor,
and that petitioners did not deliver to private respondent the alleged purchase price.

Considering these claims of private respondent, MTC Branch 41 should have passed upon the issues raised on the ownership of
the Gilmore property for the purpose of determining who had the right to possess the same. As it turned out, it simply accepted
the allegations of petitioners without examining the supporting documents. Had it closely analyzed the documents, it would
have concluded that petitioners could not have validly ousted private respondent from the property since the basis for its claim
of ownership, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, was actually a document evidencing an equitable mortgage. It
would have accordingly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

In fine, had the MTC exercised its bounden duty to study the complaint, it would have dismissed the same for lack of cause of
action upon a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership based on the allegations and annexes of the complaint. Or, exercising
caution in handling the case, considering petitioners bare allegations of ownership, it should have required the filing of an
answer to the complaint and, having been alerted by the adverse claim of ownership over the same property, summarily looked
into the issue of ownership over the property. As this Court declared in Hilario v. Court of Appeals:

It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment should sufficiently make out a case for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court. Jurisdiction over the

42
subject matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or pleaded in the complaint. Thus, even where the
defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its
jurisdiction. A contrary rule would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature,
as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership. 40cräläwvirtualibräry

As discussed above, even a perusal of the complaint without going over the claims of private respondent in his answer would
have sufficed to arrive at a provisional determination of the issue of ownership. The importance of such provisional ruling on
the issue of ownership is demanded by the fact that, in the event that the claim of the plaintiff in an ejectment case is
controverted as in this case, any ruling on the right of possession would be shaky, meaningless and fraught with unsettling
consequences on the property rights of the parties. After all, the right of possession must stand on a firm claim of ownership.
Had the MTC made a provisional ruling on the issue of ownership, the parties would have availed of other remedies in law early
on to thresh out their conflicting claims.

Private respondents action for reformation of instrument was in fact a step in the right direction. However, its failure to pursue
that action41 did not imply that private respondent had no other remedy under the law as regards the issue of ownership over
the Gilmore property. There are other legal remedies that either party could have availed of. Some of these remedies, such as
an action for quieting of title, have been held to coexist with actions for unlawful detainer.42 There is a policy against
multiplicity of suits but under the circumstances, only the institution of proper proceedings could settle the controversy
between the parties in a definitive manner.

Hence, although the Court of Appeals resolved the appeal under the misconception that the action for reformation of
instrument was still viable, it correctly held that the controversy between the parties was beyond the ordinary issues in an
ejectment case. Because of the opposing claims of the parties as to the true agreement between them, the issue of ownership
was in a sense a prejudicial question that needed determination before the ejectment case should have been filed. To reiterate,
a decision reached in the ejectment case in favor of any of the parties would have nonetheless spawned litigation on the issue
of ownership. At any rate, proceedings would have been facilitated had the inferior courts made even a provisional ruling on
such issue.

The contentious circumstances surrounding the case were demonstrated by an occurrence during the pendency of this petition
that cries out for the resolution of the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property.

After the parties had filed their respective memoranda before this Court, private respondent filed an urgent motion to cite
petitioner Rosita L. Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, in contempt of court. 43 The motion was founded
on an affidavit of Dr. Tadeo Gonzales who resided at the contested property, deriving his right to do so from private respondent
corporation that is owned by his family. Gonzales alleged that on September 20, 1997, petitioner Flaminiano and her husband
entered the property through craftiness and intimidation. At around 5:30 p.m. on that day, two (2) men knocked at the gate.
When the houseboy, Luis R. Fernandez, opened the gate for pedestrians tentatively, the two men told him that they would like
to visit Gonzales mother who was ailing.

Once inside, the two men identified themselves as policemen and opened the gate for twenty (20) men, two (2) trucks and an
L-300 van to enter. When Gonzales went outside the house, he saw thirty (30) to forty (40) men and two (2) trucks entering the
driveway. The person he asked regarding the presence of those people inside the property turned out to be the brother of
petitioner Flaminiano. That person said, Kami ang may-ari dito. Matagal na kaming nagtitiis, kayo ang dapat sa labas. After
Gonzales had told him that the property was still under litigation before this Court, the man said, Walang Supreme Court
Supreme Court. When Gonzales asked petitioner Flaminiano, who was inside the premises, to order the people to leave, she
said, Papapasukin namin ito dahil sa amin ito. Maglalagay ako ng tao diyan sa loob, sa harap, sa likod. Wala ng pakiusap. When
a power generator was brought inside the property and Gonzales pleaded that it be taken out because the noise it would create
would disturb his ailing mother, Emiliana Gonzales, petitioner Flaminiano said, Walang awa-awa sa akin. Atty. Flaminiano
butted in and, referring to Gonzales mother, said, Ialis mo na, matanda na pala. When Gonzales prevented the switching on of
some lights in the house due to faulty wiring, Atty. Flaminiano suggested, Bakit hindi mo ipasunog ito? May insurance pa kayo 5
million, madali lang yan. Short circuit. Since the Flaminianos and their crew were not about to leave the property, Gonzales
called up his brother, Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and informed him of what happened. However, instead of confining themselves
in the driveway, the Flaminianos and their group entered the terrace, bringing in food.

Gonzales was all the while concerned about his 81-year-old mother who had just been discharged from the hospital. However,
the Flaminianos stayed until the next day, September 22, 1997, using the kitchen, furniture and other fixtures in the house.
Gonzales took pictures of Flaminiano and his companions. When Atty. Flaminiano arrived, he confronted Gonzales and told

43
him, Hindi ako natatakot kahit kanino ka pa mag-report, kahit pa sa Supreme Court, gusto ko nga mag-reklamo kayo para
matapos ang kaso. Sa September 25, may shooting dito, gagawin ko ang gusto ko dito.44cräläwvirtualibräry

The affidavits of Renato C. Mola, driver of Atty. Antonio Gonzales, and that of Luis R. Fernandez, houseboy of Dr. Tadeo
Gonzales, as well as the xerox copy of the sworn statement dated September 21, 1997 of Pria B. Gonzales before the Philippine
National Police in Camp Crame where she filed a complaint against Atty. Flaminiano for the illegal entry into their house,
support the affidavit of Dr. Gonzales.

In its supplemental motion45 to cite petitioner Flaminiano and her husband, Atty. Flaminiano, in contempt of court, private
respondent alleged that the Flaminianos committed additional contumacious acts in preventing another member of the family,
Mrs. Cipriana Gonzales, from entering the property. In her affidavit, Mrs. Gonzales said that the Flaminianos and their people
used the whole house, except the bedrooms, for their filming activities.46cräläwvirtualibräry

Thereafter, private respondent filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with this Court to enjoin petitioners, Atty. Flaminiano and their representatives and agents from
preventing private respondent, its agents and representatives from entering the property and to cease and desist from
occupying the property or from committing further acts of dispossession of the property. 47 On October 13, 1997, this Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for.48 In the motion it filed on October 21, 1997,49 private respondent informed
the Court that the TRO could not be served upon petitioners immediately because, Atty. Flaminiano, their counsel of record,
had changed address without informing the Court. It was served upon said counsel only on October 15, 1997. However, instead
of complying with this Courts order, petitioners continued occupying the property. On October 16, 1997, after receiving a copy
of the TRO, petitioners put up a huge billboard in front of the property stating that it is the national headquarters of the
Peoples Alliance for National Reconciliation and Unity for Peace and Progress (PANRUPP).

In their comment on the motion for contempt, petitioners noticeably did not controvert the facts set forth by private
respondent in said motion. Instead, it reasserted its claim of ownership over the property as evidenced by TCT No. 67990. They
alleged that they had mortgaged the property to the Far East Bank and Trust Company in the amount of thirty million pesos
(P30,000,000.00) for which they are paying a monthly interest of around P675,000.00 without enjoying the material possession
of the subject property which has been unlawfully and unjustly detained by private respondent for the last four (4) years as it
was used as the residence of the members of the family of its President ANTONIO B. GONZALES without the said private
respondent paying rentals thereon for the period from January 1995 up to October 5, 1997 when the said property was
voluntarily vacated by the members of the President (sic) of respondent corporation, ANTONIO B. GONZALES, who has since
then been a fugitive from justice having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document and has succeeded in evading his sentence.

They averred that Tadeo Gonzales erroneously claimed that the rights of ownership and possession over the property are still
under litigation because the issue of ownership is no longer involved in this litigation when the complaint for reformation of
instrument with annulment of sale and title filed by private respondent was dismissed with finality by reason of non-suit.
Hence, they claimed that they now stand to be the unquestionable registered and lawful owners of the property subject of
controversy and that the July 24, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals has already lost its virtuality and legal efficacy with the
occurrence of a supervening event which is a superior cause superseding the basis of the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 39227 of
respondent court.

They informed the Court that they are now leasing the property to PANRUPP from October 1, 1997 to September 30, 1998.
They alleged, however, that the property is in a deplorable state of decay and deterioration that they saw the need to act
swiftly and decisively to prevent further destruction of the property where they invested millions of pesos of their life-time
savings to acquire the same. Hence, they sought the assistance of barangay officials in Barangay Mariana, New Manila who
helped them effect the peaceful entry into the property of the petitioners without the use of strategy, force and intimidation
contrary to what was alleged in the motion for contempt. They peacefully took over possession of the property on September
20, 1997 but allowed the immediate members of the family of private respondents president to stay on. The family finally
agreed to vacate the premises on October 5, 1997 upon the offer of the petitioners to shoulder partially the expenses for the
hospitalization of the ailing mother at the St. Luke General Hospital where she was brought by an ambulance accompanied by a
doctor at petitioners expense.

Petitioners questioned the issuance by this Court of the TRO on October 13, 1997, asserting that when it was issued, there were
no more acts to restrain the illegal occupants of the subject property (as they) had already peacefully vacated the premises on
October 5, 1997 or more than a week after the said TRO was issued by the Third Division of this Court. They prayed that the

44
motion for contempt be denied for lack of merit and that the TRO issued be lifted and set aside for the act or acts sought to be
restrained have already been done and have become a fait accompli before the issuance of the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER on October 13, 1997.50cräläwvirtualibräry

As earlier discussed, petitioners claim that the dismissal of the action for reformation of instrument for non-suit had
written finis to the issue of ownership over the Gilmore property is totally unfounded in law. Petitioners should be reminded
that the instant petition stemmed from an unlawful detainer case, the issue of which is merely possession of the property in
question. The issue of ownership has not been definitively resolved for the provisional determination of that issue that should
have been done by the MTC at the earliest possible time, would only be for the purpose of determining who has the superior
right to possess the property. Inasmuch as this Court has resolved that the rightful possessor should have been private
respondent and its representatives and agents, the TRO issued by this Court on October 13, 1997 should not be lifted. That the
TRO was issued days before private respondent left the property is immaterial. What is in question here is lawful possession of
the property, not possession on the basis of self-proclaimed ownership of the property. For their part, petitioners should cease
and desist from further exercising possession of the same property which possession, in the first place, does not legally belong
to them.

The conduct of petitioner Flaminiano in taking possession over the property as alleged by private respondent through Tadeo
Gonzales is deplorably high-handed. On an erroneous assumption that she had been legally vested with ownership of the
property, she took steps prior to the present proceedings by illegally taking control and possession of the same property in
litigation. Her act of entering the property in defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals
constituted indirect contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court that should be dealt with accordingly.

Be that as it may, what is disturbing to the Court is the conduct of her husband, Eduardo Flaminiano, a lawyer51 whose
actuations as an officer of the court should be beyond reproach. His contumacious acts of entering the Gilmore property
without the consent of its occupants and in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction issued by the Court of
Appeals and making utterances showing disrespect for the law and this Court, are certainly unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar. To be sure, he asserted in his comment on the motion for contempt that petitioners peacefully took over the
property. Nonetheless, such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was
still in force. Notably, he did not comment on nor categorically deny that he committed the contumacious acts alleged by
private respondent. Through his acts, Atty. Flaminiano has flouted his duties as a member of the legal profession. Under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.52cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by either party of an action regarding the ownership of the property involved. The
temporary restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to
turn over possession of the property to private respondent.

Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the writ of injunction issued by the Court
of Appeals and accordingly fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B. Flaminiano, is ordered to pay
a fine of P25,000.00 for committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his record at the
Office of the Bar Confidant.

This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part.

45
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity
and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private
respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal
concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity.
Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as
sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His
employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power,
telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm
such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on
the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He
suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he
underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over
four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter,
for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner
continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty.
Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.

Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch
No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay
for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work
and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor
and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was
affirmed in toto.3

46
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting
the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will
necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to
function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is,
whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator.

In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein
public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of
November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the
findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:

This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of
the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the
Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's
namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father.9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this
labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private
respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly,
if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal relationship to come in the way. 10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-
observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the
findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator,
thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that
it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law
may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent
faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously
citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground
for dismissal of an appeal.

Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain
the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.

It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for
that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who
penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with
due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of
and evidence submitted in the case.12

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein
from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually
decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of a public officer's functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.

47
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in
labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be
interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick
on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but
on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized cause provided by law and after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an
employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to
the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued
employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for
termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that
abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment.17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the
executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative
agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:

It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be
construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from
perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio
Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).

This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn,
Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).

During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of
private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that
city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human
experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of
October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without
notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

48
 The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear
intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and
Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company
v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more
interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for
abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and
his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family
relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work,
petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized
he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner had no intention to abandon his
employment.20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various
afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's
state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in
Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to
necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of
said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are bereft of any
suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it
is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute
abandonment as a valid ground for termination of employment.22

With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial
employee23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated
that "I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his
authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all
times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs
the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this
regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner
was in charge of farm operations.

If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the
period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm
operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was
necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm
administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at
the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin
with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the
termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably
among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee
relationship.

49
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his
confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social security
purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was
only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter
to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent,
whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as,
in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him
to jail.

Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged
statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of
petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at
the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the
initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation.25

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for
his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his
persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at
the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the
monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was
entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator.27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence
of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by
some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in this case.

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of
petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work,
private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983, when private
respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as
picking up some farm machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment
and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional
cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent
through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31

It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the
farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely
that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone
who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details
relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private
respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters
relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine
what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-
related tasks:

50
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and
referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-
member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;

That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks
and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

JON de YSASI III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my
check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign
for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the
same over to me for my proper disposition.

That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.

That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment.
Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the
issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to
work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements to
petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such
deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance
notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of
the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an
important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to
examine and cross-examine a witness.

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension, allowance or ex
gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his
capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared
by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar
circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern
for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary
business expenditures.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied
voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation,

51
were in consideration for services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character
that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee
conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee
of his employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process
requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2,
Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to
terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the
situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who
allegedly abandoned his employment.40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment
of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of
dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional
Branch of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having
jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the
names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and
termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other information as may be required
by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process
since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard.
Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this
particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification
issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of
the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto.41

Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served
upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly
requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is
the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due
process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it
has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee.42

52
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:

The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required
by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an
employer was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed
on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement.
(Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C"
Petition), . . .

This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule
applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The public
policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the
rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of
due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable
excuse.43

II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor
Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of
the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part,
maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's
report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the
implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. 44 To
give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of
its denial:

Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual
reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for
dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the
relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial
employees are concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed
employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him.48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:

As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his compensation was
withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in Pacific Cement

53
 Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a
company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner.
The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently
order the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who
had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).

In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of
Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a
harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible.49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad
faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for
exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful
act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated.51

We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a
wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition
would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal
where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were
undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which
gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them
negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the
other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General:

The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary
abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does
not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal
dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date of
dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being considered as one (1) year in
accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should
be dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault.54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites
reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more
importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration
of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a
lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often
called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation.56

54
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end
or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what
was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to
initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted
exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter
and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor
dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in
this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases
involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly
meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the
legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that
we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our
adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In
fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial
exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to
an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is
ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered as one (1) whole year.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

55
ORONCE v CA
G.R. No. 125766. October 19, 1998
ROMERO, J.

Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally

took possession of the property in litigation using abusive
methods. She was aided by her husband, a lawyer. The
illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the
CA & while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Flaminiano should be held liable.

Held: Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property

without the consent of its occupants & in contravention of
the existing writ or preliminary injunction & making
utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court,
are unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he
says that they “peacefully” took over the property, such
“peaceful” take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force.
Through his acts, he has flouted his duties as a member of
the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is prohibited from counseling or
abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.”

56
A.C. No. 8391 November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez)
filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was
there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being
represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the
hearings of the case.

On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of ₱30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed
that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the
money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a
Japanese client.

On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of ₱60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical
expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check
amounting to ₱60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling to ₱90,000.00 "within a short time."

On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message on July 12, 2005 at
2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:

I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of our friendship. You see i've long
expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and its
release is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4 august 5.
N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.

Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez claimed that his daughter
needed ₱70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him
that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez
said:

As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick and now my bro in law
died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my
immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to
miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.

However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment
of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give him another week
to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.

Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005. Gutierrez, on the other
hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account
number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the payment.

57
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail.

Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).

On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.4

In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the assistance he
extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to
compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts, but he is
currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition
improves.

On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to
attend on two occasions.

On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.

Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended. There was no
appearance on the part of Gutierrez.

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,6 had already disbarred Gutierrez
from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless checks.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and
ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering the instant
case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004
Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple
disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the minimum
requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(₱90,000.00), this time, without interest.

We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They
must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the
same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition.
Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.1avvphi1

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining
debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his
debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while
simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts

58
demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as
officers of the court.

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross
misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to disbar
Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out,
we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-
year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we
cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty
of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to the
complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to
all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

59
 SECOND DIVISION

[ADM. CASE NO. No. 5195 : April 16, 2009]

NELIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY. EUGENIA J.

MUÑOZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME B. LUMASAG, JR., Respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco against respondent Atty.
Jaime Lumasag, Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 11 December 2001,1 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Milagros
San Juan found respondent guilty of the charges and recommended the penalty of disbarment. Subsequently, the IBP Board of
Governors reduced the penalty to a five (5)-year suspension in its Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29 June 2001. In a Resolution
dated 9 December 2002, the Court, however, remanded the case to the IBP in view of its findings that no formal
hearing/investigation was conducted.

Upon remand to the IBP, the case was re-assigned to IBP Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and hearings were accordingly held
thereafter.

Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J. Muñoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint2 that she was a resident of the
United States of America together with her husband, Mario Blanco. She also stated that she owned two (2) adjacent parcels of
land in Quezon City, each with an area of 400 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 22162 and
22163 registered in her name. In a document dated 20 November 1989, she authorized respondent, who were her husband's
first cousin, to sell said lots.3

In a letter dated 20 March 1990, respondent reported that he had sold only one lot for the price of P320,000.00 and therefrom
he deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and commissions. And, allegedly, per complainant's instructions, he remitted the remaining
balance of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes.4

In 1995, complainant was informed by respondent that the other lot remained unsold due to the presence of squatters on the
property.

In December 1998, Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2) lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to the spouses Celso
and Consolacion Martinez for the price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco
confronted respondent with these facts in a letter, but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in May 1999, complainant,
through Atty. Muñoz sent a demand letter to respondent directing him to remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of the
sale of the properties.

Soon thereafter, respondent admitted the sale of the properties and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never tendered or
offered to tender the same to complainant. Despite repeated and continued demands, respondent has since not remitted the
amount equivalent to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for the second).5

Complainant also averred that the Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January 1989, which respondent had used to sell the lots
is a forgery and a falsified document, as the signature therein were not the real signatures of complainant and her spouse. In
addition, they could not have acknowledged the document before a notary, as they were not in the Philippines at the time. 6

For his part, respondent vehemently denied all the accusations of deceit, dishonesty and gross misconduct. 7

Respondent countered that Mario Blanco was the true owner of the properties, which had to be titled in complainant's name,
as Mario Blanco was a U.S. citizen. Mario Blanco had requested him to look for a buyer of the properties and, in the course of

60
selling them, respondent claimed that he had only transacted with the former and never with complainant. Respondent
averred that he had been authorized in November 1989 to sell the property, through a Special Power of Attorney, for a price of
not less than P250,000.00 net for the owner.8

Respondent also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March 1990 but, only one
lot was initially paid in the amount of P281,980.00, which he immediately remitted to Mario Blanco. The payment for the other
lot was withheld, pending the relocation of the squatters who had been occupying the premises. And when respondent had
finally collected the proceeds of the second lot more than three (3) years after, he asked Mario Blanco if the former could use
the amount for a real estate venture whose profit, if successful, he would share with the latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not
think twice and consented to the proposal. The venture, however, did not push through.9

Respondent strongly maintained that the two (2) lots had been sold for only P563,960.00.10

Finally, respondent denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that complainant and her spouse, Mario Blanco, had in fact
signed the Special Power of Attorney, but it was only notarized later.11

In his Report and Recommendation dated 4 December 2006, Atty. Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the following findings:

It appears from the records that the two lots were sold by Respondent for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00 as alleged by
Complainant. The basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 11, 1990 which shows that the two lots composing 800 sq.
meters being sold for P560,000.00. There appears to be no documentary basis for the claimed amount of P1,120,000.00 of
Complainant. However, Respondent in his Comment stated that the two lots were sold by him for P563,960.00. In any case, we
shall uphold and apply the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.

In Respondent's letter dated March 20, 1990, he acknowledged that he already received P320,000.00 as the "total value of one
lot". Moreover, the computation shows that the P320,000.00 was only for 400 sq.m. as the computation stated: "400 sq.m. x
800p/sqm=P320,000.00." Therefore, if the first lot was sold for P320,000.00, then the second lot must have been sold
for P240,000 x x x

x x x there was clear deception on the part of Respondent when he wrote the letter dated March 20, 1990 "informing" the
Blanco spouses that he had sold only one of the two parcels of land for P320,000.00. This is belied by the fact that on March 11,
1990, or 9 days before he wrote the letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by him selling the two lots for P560,000.00.
This Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on March 19, 1990. During the hearing, Respondent admitted that the Deed of Sale
covered two lots. Clearly, Respondent was not forthcoming towards the Blanco spouses.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

xxx

x x x Instead of representing that two lots had been sold for P560,000.00. Respondent only represented that he sold only one
lot for P320,000.00 and pocketing the balance of P240,000.00.

xxx

During the course of hearing, Respondent claims that the Deed of Sale referred to above is a fake, and that there is a Deed of
Sale showing a selling price of P320,000.00 which is the real Deed of Sale. However, no such Deed of Sale has been presented
by Respondent and no such Deed of Sale appears in the records. Later in the hearing, Respondent retracted his statement
claiming he was merely confused.

As for the alleged falsification of a Special Power of Attorney dated January 16, 1989, wherein the signatures of the Blanco
spouses appear in the SPA when they were not in the Philippines on January 16, 1989 but were allegedly in the United States,
their absence in the country has not been satisfactorily established since mere xerox copies of their passports, although noted
by a notary public, cannot duly establish their absence in the country on that date. Other acceptable documents such as a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration would have been appropriate but which, however, had not been presented. In any
case, Respondent denies the charge of falsification.12 (Citations omitted) [Emphasis supplied]

61
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner recommended that, in view of the fact that respondent was already 72 years old, he be
meted out the penalty of suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not disbarment as had been prayed for and not 5 year-
suspension as had been earlier resolved by the IBP Board of Governors. Moreover, the IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be ordered to deliver to Complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal interest rate of 6% per annum
computed from March 1990.

On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVII-2007-222 adopting and approving the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner.13

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the recommended penalty is called for,
following the dictum that the appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.14

A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an
officer of the court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity
and integrity of the legal profession. Specifically, Rule 1.01 thereof provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

There is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent committed dishonesty and
abused the confidence reposed in him by the complainant and her spouse.

Records show that two lots had been sold by respondent as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11 March 1990.
Respondent, however, taking advantage of the absence of complainant and her spouse from the Philippines and their complete
trust in him, deceitfully informed them in a letter dated 20 March 1990 that he had sold only one. It can be reasonably deduced
from the exchanges between the parties that the proceeds of the first lot had been transmitted to complainant and her spouse.
Respondent's contention, though, that he had been authorized to retain the proceeds of the second is specious, as complainant
and her spouse could not have given the same, having been left in the dark as regards its sale. And despite repeated demands,
to date, there is no showing that the outstanding amount has been paid. Thus, respondent's deceitful conduct warrants
disciplinary sanction and a directive for the remittance of the remaining proceeds is in order.

As to the charge of falsification, the Court agrees with the IBP that the same appears to be unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule
that, in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.15 Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.16

Respondent's actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may
be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.' A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party to a case without authority to so do.

Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. The Court finds, however, that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient
to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While the Court will not
hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, the Court will
also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end. In this case, the Court finds the
recommended penalty of suspension of two (2) years for respondent to be too severe, considering his advanced age. The Court
believes that a suspension of six (6) months is sufficient. Suspension, by the way, is not primarily intended as punishment, but
as a means to protect the public and the legal profession.17 chanrobles virtual law library

62
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Further, respondent is ordered to deliver to complainant the amount of P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 1990.

Let notice of this Resolution be spread in respondent's record as an attorney in this Court, and notice thereof be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two
cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.

A.C. No. 7973

On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was
docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan
City. Garcia alleged that in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually granted.

Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for
support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39
years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and
Garcia’s children learned abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he
learned that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and
thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his practice of law.

In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono counsel for Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth.

63
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation.

A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)

A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before
the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint
against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.

In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory
penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against
him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.

The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved:
whether moral turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found
Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court downgraded
the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreño was released from
confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing
International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court
convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved
moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:

Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of respondent and neither
had the victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply happened to be at
the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.

The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude.
Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks
who may have shattered the stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud bravado of
drunken men who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not
even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only
vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2

Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of
frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD
misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate,
distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of executive clemency to
him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that after his wife died in an ambush,
he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients
to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.

64
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for
reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case
No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C.
No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.

The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013
and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this
Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate
penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.5

The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice
Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes
mala in seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude
does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se
and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It
follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.7

In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois
hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a
minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the presence of moral
turpitude.

The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco)
were walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went out of his
house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five meters, more or less, from the
gate of Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming
his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes),
recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while
Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado
fall down after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the
gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did
not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado.

We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreño cited In
re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted "an absolute and unconditional
pardon"11 which restored his "full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not mentioned
when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the

65
commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by
the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years and 1
day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14

Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and unconditional and restored Sesbreño to his full civil
and political rights.

There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations,
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency merely
"commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The
penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x
accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no
application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full and
unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good
moral character.20 A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.21

WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to
all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

66
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit relations,
chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in
1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and
being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that
while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal
knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while
still being romantically involved with CCC.3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a
bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.4cralawrednad

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KDC). However, despite being a
public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted
KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of the Philippine Government.3cralawrednad

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor

67
General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return
for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate
number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and officemates being driven
and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself. 6cralawrednad

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a Senate inquiry
concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of
KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees
recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and
corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal
Code.7cralawrednad

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the evidence by
requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in
their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request, however, was refused by the spouses
when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8cralawrednad

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable cause
against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 3019.9cralawrednad

Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian
College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal
preoccupations" and entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades. 10cralawrednad

The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to file his
verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in support of his defense. Instead,
respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed
to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition entitled
"Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the
allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly established. Respondent further argues that the
statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and deserved scant consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint were deemed
admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of complainant's accusations in the petition,
allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof." 16cralawrednad

On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for
mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion to
Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously scheduled hearing on the
same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his
Order19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several
persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was
scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,22 praying that the Order
dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of October. In said motion,
respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as "sore eyes" and has been
ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated. Attached to his motion were
photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.

68
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based on his
personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no
case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is another ploy of
respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and was only in the country for a
limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was denied and complainant was
allowed to present his witnesses.23cralawrednad

Complainant presented his witnesses, as follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos
(Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report, as well as
on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted by complainant
indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, particularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or
2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be respondent's
girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought with him his students
during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations with his students.
Atty. Corpus also testified that DDD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had broken
up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her telephone conversation
with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during
complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000
or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their testimonies were
based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was terminated and the
parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting documentary evidence within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was considered submitted for report and
recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments),24 pertaining to respondent's
Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paranaque City
to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled mandatory conference. On the same
date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with Comments),25cralawred submitting the certified photo copies
of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information
dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any decision
or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper.28cralawrednad

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report, 29 finding that there
is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an
officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the Senate Report,

69
the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials,
complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's assertion that respondent is
guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Report, complainant was not able to
discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this adulterous affair; thus, they were
deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct by having illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage
in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession".32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

V. Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's gross
misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar. this Commissioner
respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years with a STERN
WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms prescribed by the Canons of
Professional Responsibility."33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred respondent,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to which complainant was
required to submit his comment.36cralawrednad

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012)37 dated August 17,
2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27, 2013. On the
same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).39cralawrednad

70
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Leave40 dated September 12,
2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition41 dated September 20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on November 11,
2014.43cralawrednad

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty.
Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to maintain
one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of the Bar.
Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative
penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than
that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court
may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it docs not mean
that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision
should be against the party with the burden of proof according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys
the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint.
The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the
parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.46

71
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found
committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain good
moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by
maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the
law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be a
lawyer.47cralawrednad

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his
philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an
officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent's philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the day for
him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest
him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative
and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate,
possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all
members of the bar.49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig
for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal strategies to render a facade of
validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both married
and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in
the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented, complainant was able to
establish respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC by preponderant evidence.

Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently established. In his
answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not supported by evidence.
Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents. Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper, the existence of
respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.52 (emphasis in the original.)

72
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings that respondent violated Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and
corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be investigated
and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367" herein attached as
Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the above- mentioned committees to suffer the penalty of disbarment, among
others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft and corruption against him is still
pending with the Sandiganbayan.''53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce additional
evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied complainant's averments for "lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this Commission.
Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic) clearly had knowledge
thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant" s position of being not present in the country and not being
able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as
well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a
member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent has
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the
original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention was more so
established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate
Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took before
admission to the Bar, which states:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

73
I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; [will support its Constitution
and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent
to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations
without any menial reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and taking
advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the proceedings. His
actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating Section 2 of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

74