SSSS9SSSRDRDHNSOONOIAISDOSOAIIPAOVIBSISOOAIOIDIIIOOODVSD ific PYLON DOCTRINAL NOTES POLITICAL LAW ON CASES PENNED BY Associate Justice ESTELA: PERLAS-BERNABE FROM 201. TO 2019oo oO eea09eee esse g9sgggg9ggsggggggggood a XL LX 71 N DOCTRINAL NOTES _ LAN Se Ne a TT NN Sust Compensation Question: How is just compensation determined? When is potential use considered? Answer: For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking. In the implementation of RA. ‘No. 6657, Section 17 provides the manner by which just compensation is determined, thus: Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acgui sition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, fetual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by goverment assessors shall be considered. The social and cconomic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property 1s well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to defermine its valuation, The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control the dotermination of just compensation. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs Montinola- Esearilla and Co., Ine,, G.R. No178046, June 13, 2012) f Py eee iy : oe Question: RA 88745 arseded he system ef sei under Re 7 witthe scheme of ‘immediate payment’ in case inivolsiig natigndgovernment in frastracture::In.this cA8é, the government had pn co werner 1 a petitioner initiated inverse COhulemnation proceedings after the effectivity of RA $974 on November 26, 2000, What lave shall govern? geil 355 : Answer: RA 8974 will govéin, Sfatutes are generally applied prospectively Ainless they expressly allow a retroactive application. [tis Well knovei that the principle that a yew law shall not have retroactive effect only governs’ rights arising from, acts done under the’ rule of the former law. Howevel, if'a right-be- declared for the first-time bya subsequent lawyit shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the Former laws, provided that it does not prejudice anotiér acquired sight of the same originSince, petitioner initiated :infVerée condemnation ~ proceedings aller the effeetivity_of RA'8974.on November 26; 2000, procedurally and substantially, the said law shal)“govern:-(Felisa Agricultural. Corporation” vs.“ National Transmission Corporation, G.R. Nos. 231655 and 231670. July 2, 2018) Question: What is the principal basis of the computation for just compensation? Answer: The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the determination thereot (1) the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual usc, and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans PUP COLLEGE OF LAW [2>e9gqggq0909090990R0090 ecee0eee9ssseegsegse9s ZLoL LX 241 NDOCIRINAL NOTES _ a EE ETE] secured from any government financing institution on the said Jand, if any. (Land Bank Of The Philippines vs. Virginia Palmares Et al, G.R. No. 192890 June 17, 2013) Questions: What is the “cut-off rule” in the application of RA 9700? ‘Answer-The application of DAR AO 1, series of 2010 is limited to those where the claim folders were received on r subsequent to July 1, 2009. It cannot be applied in the determination of just compensation fof“ tlie’ Babject laid WHEE WE Elsi TOLUETS Were’ UileispUTEATY teeived by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, atid,'as such, should be valued in atcordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its further améndinent by RA.9700 pursuant t0 the cut-off date. set under DAR AO 2, series of 2009. (Heirs of Bablo Reliciano, Jr. et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, GR 215290, January 4, 2017) 4 fair market value of an expropriated property dete Question: How is Answer:For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the "time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of is property,” such as when litle is transferred in the rname of the beneficiaries, as in this case. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 16657, i.., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom, (@) the owner”: aluation, (¢) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (2) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans sectred from any government financing institution on the said land, if ‘any, must be equally considered. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA, represented by BIBIANO C. SABINO; G.R. No. 21134 4, 2015) : q Question: How to determine just compensation under Republic. Act’No.-(RA) 6657, otherwise Known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Lav of 19882 Answer: For guidance of the bench, the bar, aid the’public;: Out of regard for the DAR's expertise as the concemiéeimplementing-agency, courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their detefmination of just Compensation for-the properties covered by the, said law. If, in.the exercise of their judicial discrotion, courts) ind that:a strict application of said formulas. is not- warranted ainder the specific circumstances of the before them, they may deviate or-depart theiefrom, provided that this oparture or deviation is supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In coher words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of just compensation Accordingly, while the parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010, the Court finds the need to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of just ‘compensation to ensure compliance with the law, and to give everyone - the landowner, the farmers, and the State — their due.44 To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case: 1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, in this ease, when emancipation patents were issued PUP COLLEGE OF LAW [3seseseeseqgeqgq9seqgqesgqgqgqgqqgqgqggggqsgsgsggsgaosgoes in the names of the farmer-beneficiaries in 1989. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties, before the RTC for the valuation of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands, 2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA ‘6657, as amended, prior o its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC is reminded that while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their application. In any’event, should the'RTC find the said-guidelines to be"inapplicable, it must clearly explain the reasons for-deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formula.in arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the acquired propatty. 48, 3. Interest may be awarded as may be wairanted by the circumstancés of the case and based on Prevailing jurisprudence. In previous. casts; the-Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cages where there is delay. the paymeit since the just compensation due to the landowners wis deemed to be an effective forbéarané®’ on: the part of the Stite’ 49:Legal interest on the unpaid balance shall’be pegged.at the ‘ate"of 12% p.a. from the time of taking in 1989 when Emancipation Patents were issued, witil June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% pa. 50 in line with the amendment. introduced by. Bangko Sentral. ng Pilipinas-Monetary BoardCircular No, 799,51 Series of 2013.-(Hefiy.of: Pablo Filiciano, Jr. Vs. Land Bank of the Philippines; G.R: No.215290. January UU; 2017) 7522. : ‘Polvor of the President to Reorganize Execiitivé Depariinent Question: Is thé President mithoriéédinder any existin@laiv'%0" create: the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the. Depmy Eveciive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA)? Answer: Section 3] of Executive Order No, 292 (E-0,,292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests:ia. the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and. efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose: é (1)Resiructuie the internal organization of the Office af the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistanis/Advisers System and the’ Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring, functions: from one unit to another, (2)TPingfer’ any function undér the, Office of the President to any’ other Department or Agency as well as-transfer. functions to the ‘Office of the President. from- other’ Departments and ‘Agencies; and (3)Tsansfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIB y. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's ‘authority to cary out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an ‘express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: Bur of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in tive executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power ~ that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book IIT of Executive Oreler No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), “the President, subject to the PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |4eecogqgogga goose eee9eoco Q¢ 898898 8 eo0sese 2 1 1X71 N DOCTRINAL NOTES SS policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President, (Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for ‘Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R.No.196495, July 24, 2012) Question: What Devolution? eR Answer: Devolution i is the act by ‘which 'the national government confers power the various local, govertiment units to perform specific: functions and responsibil Section 17(i) of the. Same,Code prescribes the matine ‘of devolution, as follows: ‘The devolution cOnieinplated in this Code shall inchude the transfer to local-goversiment units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national'agencies and offices| corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities. jd authority upon 8. Specifically, Personnel of said: faliofal agencies oF offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong; oi: sohose areas they are assigned (othe extent that itis administratively viable as determined by the shid Syersight corhrajtiee: Provided, furtier, That regional d seg who are career ee tenure. (CSC vs Yu, GR [No.189041, July 31, 2012).-} 5 1 vnmittee"s Power of ot Sd 5 Committee possess the Bower of Inquiry in aid of legislation? Answer: Yes. The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No, 459 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated eases of Inthe Matter of the Petition fr Habeas Corpus of Camilo L, Sabio!! which cited Anticle V1, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: ‘The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The, rights of persons appearing in ot affected by such inquiries shall be respected ‘The Court explained.that sich éonfeiral-of the legislative’ power of inquiry.upon-any committee of Congress, inthis case the respondents Senaie Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. On this score, the respondents Senate Comnmitices cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Commitice Resolution No. 312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted, The wide latitude given to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled, otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 would be rendered pointless (PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corp., vs Senate, G.R. No, 180308, June 19, 2012) Ci Law PUP COLLEGE OF LAW 5999990909 898 ese0ooe 4 1X71 N DOCTRINAL Notes Question: May an official who was dismissed from service due to an administrative case be entitled 10 his terminal leave benefits? Answer: Yes, Section 65. Effect of decision in administrative case. - An official or employee who has been penalized with dismissal from the service is likewise not barred from entitlement to his terminal leave benefits. Jurisprudence is likewise replete with cases wherein dismissed judges and government personnel or officials were allowed to claim their earned/accrued leave credits and other monetary beneis, Gocelyn C. Talens-Dabon vs. Judge Hermin E. Arcee, AM, No, RTI-96-1336 November 20, 2012) Public Officers Question: If an Ombudsman is removed via impeachavent, how then may ne Ombudsman be removed from office? oe Answer: While thé removal of the Ombudsinan himself is “also expressly prdvided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 244 ofthic'same Article, there ‘is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from dffice of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By-enacting Section 8Q)6rR A. 677 ‘Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running afoul of any provision in the, ‘Constitution 'ot existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2; anthorizes Congress. to provide for. thegrémoval of all other public officers, ineluding the Deputy Onibiidsmai and Special Proseculde= Whore not subject to impeachment. (Emilio A. Gonzales II vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, acting through and represented by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR. No, 196231, September 2012) ae Question: Can administrative agencies exercise quasi-legislative or rulé:making power? Answer: Yes, administrative agencies may exercise quasi-législative:o:' srule-miking power only if there exist a law which delegates these powers to then. Accordinly, the rales so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must ot invélve vas to what the taw shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution: oF enforcement of the policy sett in the tai itself, so a8 to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers. ‘An adminisiritive fegulation’ may, be classified as a legislative fule, an. interpretative rule or a contingent rule, Legislative-rules are’ in the natufe of ‘subiordinate -legislatii“a d designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement cxisting law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by the congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which affect individual rights and obligations. Mcanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory reguiations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely 10 construe the statue being administered and purpory to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they «ry to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concer all tose belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said nules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |6900090 ee0s9e9qq9qgqg9g9g9a9 eseeseese00eqgeqqsq9qee9 88 Qo o& 71 N DOCTRINAL NOTES In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by BO 292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing and publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself hhas already prescribed. When, on the other band, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca. facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially ine burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affect @ to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the force apd elfetsof Jow-.(Republie of. the Phiinpnes ys Drugmaker’s Laboratories IntsGRIN0, 19089? Mirch S20) Question: What is the distisiction Bebveeaaam ~ = judi fen Answer: The term ‘adisinistative" sons, or petsins {9 Fadministration, especially management ‘as by managing or conducting, direct oe Speriatendin (¢’execution, application, or conduct of persons oF things. It does not ental an: opportu. to Lgsheard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision oF resolution. thete applies to the action; diserétion, etc., of publio admtist investigate facts, or ascertain the existence tfc hold hears, aod deg’ conehisions from them, as basis for thei offigial action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature; (Romeo G. Jalosjos v¥s. The Commission Qn Elections Kt al, G.R. Nd{205033 June 18 208 ial function’: is @ term which ~anaee se : Arrest (Bill’of Rights) Question: Is the aet (faling along the resected iLholding something which appeared to be dubious, coupled with a previous eine change fer a ae eos ifient 10 create probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest! Answer: No, appellant's ‘acts of walking, along: Sede sapeding in his hands, even if they appeared to be dubious, eoupled with bis pievicus.Suimjpdl charge forthe same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incité suspicion of crinlinal activity or to créate probable cause enough to justify a warrantless-arrest under Section 5 above-quoted, "Probable causc”:has been understodd to meat « reasonable ground of suspicion supparted by Circumstances sulficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious Tai’s belief that the person accused is guilty'of the’ offense with which he is charged. Specifically with respect to arrests it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably disereet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, which clearly do not obiain in appellant's case. (People Of The Philippines vs. Nazareno Villareal Y Lualhati, G.R.No. 201363. March 18, 2013) Elec Law Question: Are picture images of the ballots considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out? PUP COLLEGE OF LAW I7999090900 ee°o 8 8 9ee00o0o00q 08 Lod L711 N DOCTRINAL NOTES Answer: Yes. We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the pictu ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.(Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs House Of Representatives Electoral Tribunal And Elmer E. Panotes, G.R, No, 199149, January 2, 2013/Elmer E. Panotes vs. House Of Representatives Electoral Tribunal And Liwaywayvinzons-Chato, 201350) ‘Me distinctions betwveén petition for ‘isqui ification anid 4 petition to deny certificate of candidacy? Question: What i due course. aa ‘Answer: Primarily disqualification éase under Seciion 68 of the OC is.hioge! on either: (@) a candidate's postin? wa“of a permaneit resident stitus ina foreign country; of (b) his or her cnn oF gets of disqualification. Anent-the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election See aver the OEC; and not to violations of other penal laws. th particular, these ae: (1) giving nioneyof other material consideration to influence, indice or Corzpt the voters or public officials performing electoral Rinctions; (2), committing acts of terrorism ‘to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spendifig i one's lection eainpaign in ayhount in excess of tha alldwed by the OE @) soliciting, recai¥ing 07 making aay-coftribuiion prohibited -under Sections 89, 95, 96,97 and 104 of the OBC, and: (3) Wilatng Sections 80,83, 85, 86 aid 261; paragraphs. ek, v. and co, sub- paragraph 6 of tie OBC: Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, Jn an action or prgtesein Which he o: shi is a partyyis declared by Snal decision Of competent court guilty of, or for Th COMELEC to fiave committed any ‘of the foregoing acts shall be Aisquatitied from sGntun asia.ggndidate for public office, ox disallowed a 1g the same, if he ose bad ae Peeks . = It must be stressed fiat one who is disqualified under Section 68 is sill techmially¥eonsidered to bave been a candidate, albeit proseribed to continue'as such only because of supervenig infractions which do not, however, “deni Bs her Statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate's compliance ‘with the eligibility requirennits’as prescribed by law, such as age, residenéy, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, oxdered to discontinue such edndidacy as a form of penal sanction bright by the commission of the above:mentioried election offenses. On the other hand;’a detiial of due course to and/or cancellation of d CoC proceeding under Section, 78 of ihe OBC is premised of a:person's.misrepresentation of any.of the material qualifications required for the clective offiéé aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must bave also made a falée'Fépresentation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78, petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, where the Court illumined: Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office helshe is running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office heishe seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate, Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |8eesessq9eae0q9qeqgqgqgqgqgeq9 eessee0eqqsqsqqee9 eo¢ 4d LX 1 N DOCTRINAL NOTES 78 to 2 quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Scetion 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied) Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the mistepresentation, rauch less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person's declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the-person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of litte consequence in the determinatior of whether one"s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not Whigt remains material is thal the petition gssenlially secks to deny, due" course io. and/or canéel she’ CoC.on ‘the basis of one’s incligibilty and thatthe same be granted without any qualification... 2“ >. Pertinently, while disqualified candidate rider Seétion: 68 is still: coheed to have been a candidate for all jntents and purposes, on thé'other latid)-a,person whose Co€*hiad been denied due course to and/or éancelied under Section 78 js deemed to shave, jiot een a,candidate’at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered¥oid ab’ initio“and thus, éénhot- -give rise to a valid ily to valid votes, In Talag v COMELEC (Talaga}, the Court ruled that: tion: 68 18 merely "priited to continue as 2 fon 78 is not treated as The toesine lb “gains uimgst importance 9 the ‘resent ise contidecing candidate substitilion. (Silverio R. Tagolino vs. House of Representativg Lucy Marie Torres: Goinez, G.R: No. 202202 Match 19,2013), \ i Answer: Peitone! is dail tp baw nat bea oe in the 24 sngay Blections, and all his votes are to be considered stray votes.A person, whose COC had: been. cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all beeause his CoC. is considéred void ab-initioy aid thus, cannot give rise toa valid candidacy and neéessarly (o-valid-votes. The canéellation of the, Cot ‘essentially renders the ‘votes cast for him or her'as stray ‘votes,and are iiot considered in detérmining the, winner of an clection:70, This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation aigventile the qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes tothe position. ~--When there ite participants who turn out o be ineligible, their vetOryiis voided and the laurel is awarded to the next iit rank whi dbes not possess any of the disqualifitations nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the files to be cligible as candidates. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.Thus, the qualified candidate for the said post ‘who received the highest number of valid votes shall be proclaimed the winner. It is likewise imperative for the eligible candidate who gamered the highest number of votes to assume the office. In Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the Court explained: “There is another more compelling reason why the etigible candidate who garnered the highest number cf votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility, ‘The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal PUP COLLEGE OF LAW J}9eee9s9qe99q09 9990990909009 ese0o0se009gq0geqgeqe0 d dL LX 71 N DOCTRINAL NOTES: right to assume the position. (Joseph C. Dimapilis Vs. COMELEC; GR, No. 227158. April 18, 2017) Taxpaver’s suit Question: What is a taxpayer’s suit? What are the two requisites necessary for it to prosper? Answer: It is hombook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public fands are illegally disbursedyor that-public-mioney is being deflected'to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public finds through the enforcement of-an invalid or unconstitutional Jaw. A person suing. as a taxpayer, however’ mist Show that the’ ae! complained of direcily involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation, In other words, for'a taxpayer's suit to prosper, two requisites mst be met namely, (1) pibli¢ funds derived from takition are disbursed by a political subdivision” or ‘instrumentality and. it dbifig;so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2), the" petitioner is diréebly affected. by: the alleged act..(Land Bank Of The Philippines vs. Kduardo M. Cacayuran, GR No. 191667 April 17, 2013) Question: Is there dle entitled o full retirémé Answer: No. The: Genefong extent of the Court's bey in granting retire Re: Justice Efren ee aye 1 may also be stfessed thal under the, beneficien! provisions of Rep, et ‘ag. amended, a Justice sv aches age 10 EaLUB1 @ MATHEEEen tts wil nO TERE of Eg iebuired, Thus, a 69 year old lawyer appointed {6;the bench will get fall retirement benefits for thé: rest of his life upon Teaching age 70, ever if be served in the goverment for only ove year, Justice Plana served the government with distineti 33 years;)5"iidnths® andl H- days, rhore:thait 5 years of which were served as a Justice of the Coutt ct Appeals of this Cour. (Rey Request, OF Ret) Chief Justice Artemio V. Pang an Foy _seppietin Of His Creditable Servite For The Purpose Of Public Officers ass Question: When'is a person ekarged with simple miscondhict and conduet prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service ‘Answer: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a publie officer. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procare some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |10A 2 LX YL NDUUIRINAL NUL 0 —————— ‘On the other hand, dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty.It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of bonesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. ...Nonetheless, for the above-said violations, Faller should be held liable for simple misconduct. A person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, as in this case, Faller, despite the lack of proof to show that his infractions were tainted with comuption, should have ‘been more cirowhspect in complying with the pertinent OGCC and procurement niles, for which he should remain accountable. SO Eto RE In the same light Faller’s mistakes and/or the irregularities involved in the contested disbursements which he actually received resulted in an anomaly thal-tainted the public's perception of his office, thereby subjectidg, him to administrative: liability: for conduct prejudicial to: ie “bést interest of the service. Jurisprudence’ states that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial fo thé best interest of the service as long ag they-tamish the iniage and integrity of his/her public officé, a6 inithis case. (Office of The Ombudsiian' And [ield Investigation Office vs. Rolando B. Faller; GR. No. 215994, June 06, 2016) . : i age ‘Executive Clemency ardon without parole, conditions. granted ta Answer: No, the'¢ spear loneney ineffective. It must, be. emph: ardon is an act of grace, proceeding: irdm the’ power entrusted with, the ex« wise Which exempts the individual, on whoit: it bestowed, from the Punishment the law inflicts for @ crime he has commitied. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, deliveréd to the individual for whose benefit itis intended and not-commiaicated officially to-the court: A ‘pardon is a deed, to the validity of whieh'de ety is essential. » "The executive clemency. extended by PGMA. on. Jhme-3, 2010 to a number of prisoners including petitioner was made "subject to the conditions indicated in the corresponding documents."-It is undisputed, however, that iio individual pardon ‘papers were issued“in petitioner's favour, thereby rendering’ the grant of execiitive’ clemency io him as incomplete and ineffective, as clarified-by Depuity Executive 'Secietary Aguinaldo;:The necessity for the individual paitlon papets is best explained by the naturé of a Conditiorial pardon; which is “a contract betiveen.tho sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommilted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one, By the pardonec's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the ardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.” The individual pardon papers, therefore, contain the terms and conditions of the contract of pardon, the compliance of which is ‘essential to the pardonee's freedom from recommitment to prison. (Ruben E, Tiu V. Hon, Natividad G. Dizon, G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016) PUP COLLEGE OF LAW JIL ° 3 ° o oO ° oO o o o @ oO Oo o a ® ® Q oO Q Q o oO a oO oO QO oO o oO oOA of L771 N DOCTRINAL NOTES leer ee ee PSeeee9gqggqggasgqgsgsgogqggsda S9SsgaagaONaINOSsRaGBODSD € Administrative Law Question: Should a complaint be filed during the incumbency of a publie official or employee in order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over the administrative proceeding? Answer: Yes, Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction ‘over an administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding ofa postion ot office in the government service. Hoswever, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not lost by the meré fact thatthe public officiaHor employee was no longer in office during the pendency of the case Tn fine, cessation fein office resignation, dealh or retirement is nota ground lo‘dismiss the case. fled agaiast the § af reconstitution? cials oF agents, <]Thus, whether of tiles) does not bar ich it claimed to ver, it bears to vate party, the ‘Answer: No. The StatScannot be put in, sonnet b absent any showing that itiad dealt capriciously oF dishofiorably with i not the OSG's métion.to-vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules ae the Republic from assillag the propriety ofthe reegndtitution ordered by hhave acted withdat jutisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolying! the ‘emphasize that even’ assuming that no ppesition’ yas. filed by the Reput person seeking réconstitution isnot relieved of his barden-of proving pot 88 or destruction ‘of the title sought io, be reconstinited, but that also at that time, she was owner thereof, As such, the Republic ig nt estopped froma assalinig the decision granting she petiion if, on the basis, ofthe law and the gvidence on record, such pettii.has no merit-(Republi¢ oF the Philippines Vs. Gertrudes V. Susis'G.R. No. 213209. January 16, 2017) ne Question: Does the COMELEC has the duty to. mota proprio bir from running for public office those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office? Answer: Yes. Under Section! 2 (1); Article IX (C).of the:1987 Constinition, the COMELEC has the uty to " enforce and administer all laws and regulations relativé to the conduct of an election x x x." ‘The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising, ym criminal conviction. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty 10 “enforce and administer all laws” relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from: nenning for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment, (Joseph C. Dimapilis Vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 227158. April 18, 2017) PUP COLLEGE OF LAW [12SBSQSQ990009009 290090 399009 € 690e99g99qg9009 Th DO 2 LX 7/1 N DOCTRINAL NOTES Acts that constitute Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct of a Public officer Question: Does the petitioner's failure to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years 1997 10 2003 despite the legal obligation to do so constitute Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of dismissal from service Answer: No, Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses of Dishonesty and Grave Misconductare lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from services -oer-noenerne Dishonesty is cofnmitted when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact, practices of attempts to practice’ any*deception. or flaud in ordér to secure: his examination, registration, appolalmeat, of prombtiba’ Wis tiadsTobd (6 imply the disposition tole, cheat, deceive, betray or defraud untrustworthiness; lack ‘of integrity; lack of honesty, probity ‘or integrity in principle; and the Jack” of fairness and st oa On the other, hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violatisn’gf aw or standard of Behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct slic uldelate = connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a publicio! Se In grave misconduct, as distinguished. from simple misconduct, the elements of comuption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifesi. Without any of these elements, te transgression of an established rile is properly characterized as simple misconduct only. Mos import, wilhout a nexus beeen tcl complained of and thesischarge of duty, the charge of grave miscoitduct shall necéssaily fli Indeed, the failure Io-fe a truthfad SALN pul i Fle nicgry ofthe pbc ofceror employes, and would norially-amount to dishonest). It ‘puld be emphasized, however, that mere non- declaration of i data in the SALN dois not automatically ainounit to, such an offense. Dishonesty requi i¢us intent to'conceal the truth or to make false ateinents. In addition, a publie officer or éimployee becomes susceptible toxdishonesty only when Sack not-declaration results in the accumulated Weal becoming manifestly difproportionate toxhis/heriicome,,and income from other sources, and “he/she. fails to properly acgpunt or explain these sources of income and acquisitions. (Cohedision Daplas,, City Treasoktr, Pasay City, and Concurrent OIC, Regional et. abs GAR. No, 221383. April 17,2017)" Effect of Resi vitioit pending the Administrative ease Question: Will the resignation of « publie officer/employee pending the administrative case against hiss render the case moot and acidemic? = Answer: No. Peeisiatersisnétion.of a soveiniment‘emplovee charged ‘by dismissal from service does not render moot the administrative case against hi ‘The Court's pronouncement in Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr. is instructive on this matter, to wit: In OCA v, Juan [(478 Phil 823, 828-829 [2004))}, this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service docs not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. ‘The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service, Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from ‘service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed ffense punish: PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |13Q°0 do oL N71 N DOCTRINAL NOTES ee nr rer ner en ennerennt a eed ie ‘on her if she is Tater found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits. Here, the Executive Judge of the RTC and the OCA correctly pointed out that respondent's failure to report for work, which ‘eventually caused him to be declared in AWOL, and his resignation during the pendency of the investigation against him did not render this administrative case moot and academic, especially so that he is being charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from service, (Waura Judaya and At Arevalo Vs. Ramiro Balbona, Utility Worker I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu Citys A.M. No. p-06-2279, June 6, 2017) OC F a Quantum of Evidence in Administrative Cae sf § j Question: Who his the buiden OF BYb6f tnd whi is thé quantum af edit’ roqhired to charge a public ofceradginisratively? Answer: Jurisp proving the alle their complaints vs substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manfet‘thg, facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception of defense. The same goes with administrative cases disciplining for grave offense court. cempligeet fr fagisirac. ‘The evidence seainat ‘he respondent should be ‘competent and should be derived fiom direct knowledge. Moreovef: ig appears that complaiaanis did not Baye personal setae of the acts imputed against respondentsas: they merely.-reliedon hearsay to. support their. aims} The Court has emphasized that onsat Sty the substantial evideyee requirement for administrative cases, hearsay evidence shoulda oe au be supplemented: aid cotroborated by othr: €vidence that are not earsey whic, ee presented here, (Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes alleging iticit activities Of a:eertain Atty. Cajayon involying cases'in the Court Apnea, Cagayan De 2990909 SSO908 > ¢ Oro City; A.M. a 3-CA. June 6 2017)" D o o ® Sagem eee he dein or astng an order? od ‘AniSWers"Now'The Gling of ix anlsistnive comiploin is not the oper femedy for the cScselién of . actions ofa judge perecived to have one beyond the noms of propriety, whete a sufficient judicial © remedy @xists, "The, Jaw, provides ample judicial remedies against errors. or irvegularties being ‘ commitiéd by a Trial: Court in the exercise of ts jurisdiction, The.ordinary remedies against errors or @ irregularities whieh may. be regarded’ as" normal in-nature (i.c.; error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include ‘2 motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i, whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, ) tc.) are, the special civil actions of certiorari, prokibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.” Relative thereto, “disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the eniry of judgment in the ‘corresponding, action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with 9 e9 PUP COLLEGE OF LAW |14 999000909990090 9809000900000 SG9ODSBNBANIPPBINABINGASO Lo 2 LA 1 N DOCTRINAL NOTES finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative lability may be said to have opened, or olosed.(Oscar Rizaldo Vs. Presiding Judge Gil G. Bollozos; OCA IPI No. 11- 3800-RTJ. June 19, 2017) Warrantless arrest Question: Manago was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The RIC found that the police officers conducted a valid warrantless arrest search of a moving vehicle. Thus, the item found in the.search-issadmissible in.evidence.andis.enough to-sustain a conviction against Manage: The CA affirmed: Manago’s conviction in toto; It held. hat the police officers conducted «vali hot pursit operation against Manago! Shad Monee! 'stojsétion for violation of Section 11, Aiea WefRA 965 be'tipheld? °F Answer: No, Seton 2, Article Il of the 1987 Cobstittion mandates ee aieand seizure most be carried out thioiigh oF on the stren; a ifthe existence of probable cause, seit suhich such search an sabecoines “unreasonable! within the meaning of the said constitu ra canines and seizures, Section 3 (2), Arti the oceasion of such wi for being the proverbial fruit of: edocs iuee. unreasonable searches nd seizures shall be. inadeiss proceeding, nett One of the recom sxceptions to Ue need of a arnt befall sear incidental to a loll Sten ‘his initance, the laf requires that there fil search can be made-t'the process cannot be rever ee cenied tainted fend: ‘sljould be excluded “ot er wor dsss- evidente obtained from in, iene Br ‘diye purpose in any ea Seneiteniod tha thebotice vei ol Biucted a thorough investigation and-yerification proceedings, which*yielded, among othefs:-(@) thé identities of the robbery suspects; wa the place where they reside; ca (0) the ownershig sway vebicles used. in the robbery, ic, tibimiotoreyéle and the md.ToYta,Corolla. As advertedt earlier, these picess of information were alieady eigiigh for said pol ee officers to secure th yw robbery suspects. Cotsequenily, there, wos. fo longer. aby, exigen Bhiglice that would have justified the necessity of setinig up the checkpoint in this DliBas€ of searching the subject vehicle. n addition, itis well to point ot that the checkpoint Was yrfangéd for the targeted arést of ‘Manago,-who was already identified a ihe culprit of NE fobBery pele. To this regard, it caunot, therefore; be said that the checkpoint was meant to c6ndict a Yotinary and indiseriminate search of moviiig vehicles. Rathér;"it was used as.a subterfuge to-put-int bg capture of the fleeing suspect. Unfortunately, this setup’ camot take: the place ofaor‘skirt the legal-requirement of = procuring a valid search/arrest warrant given’ the’ civéumistaitces of this case. Hence, the search ‘conducted on the red Toyota Corolla and on the person of its driver, Manago, was unlawful. In fine, Manago's warrantless arrest, and the search incidental thereto, including that of his moving vchicle were all unreasonable and unlawful. In consequence, the shabu seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under Section 3 (2), Article Il of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Manago must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILAPPINES v. GERRJAN MANAGO Y ACUT; G.R, No. 212340. August 17, 2016) Question: Are arrests involving civilian port personnel of Buntay Bayan conducting security checks PUP COLLEGE OF LAW [352ecseseq0sqeqqeqeqeqgqe9qgq9qsqqq9g9a9s coseee0saeee6 7 EL LN 41 N DOCTRINAL NOTES = a Le LT TTT illegal? Answer: In this relation, it is worth noting that his arresting officers, ic., BB Baboyo and BB Velasquez, are mere Banlay Bayan operatives of Makati City. Striclly speaking, they are not government agents like the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigation in charge of law enforcement; but rather, they are civilian volunteers who act as “force multipliers” to assist the aforesaid law enforcement agencies in maintaining peace and security within thei designated areas, Particularly, jurisprudence described the nature of Bantay Bayan as “a group of male residents living in-{the}-area-organized-for-the-purpose of-keeping. peace in their-community[, which is] an accredited Sunitiary of the x x x PNP” Jn the case of Dela Gruz.v. People, 779 SCRA 34 (2016), involving civilian, port personnel conducting. security checks; the Coirt thoroughly discussed that ‘while the Bill of Rights under Arti¢ie HI of the: 1987 Coxistitation geftcrally éannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals, the sine may nevertheless be applicable if such individuals act under the color of a stato-related function. (JEFFREY MIGUEL y REMEGIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PEULIPPINES, | GR. No. 227038, aly 3 20) u) Question: Is the Sheriffs failure ta reports on the execution proceedin ake. di return on the-writ of execution tnd to make perio ‘and to furnish the parties copies gfe refurn and periodic Ansiver: Yes. n ire respondent as a Sheriff ought to Know that purstai o Section 9,23 Rule 39 of the Rules sf Couita judement debtor, in case he has insufficient cash (pay all or part of the judgment debt, i§ gives Use option fo choose which among his properties or a ‘pat thereof may be levied upon. Moietiver:iespondgngstiould have ign thatidersSection: 1424 of the same Rule, he is required to make a reunion the writ of exection and make periodic reparts'on the execution proceedings until either the full satisfaction of the jtidgment or the expiration of the writ’s effectivity, as well as to furnish the patieS copies of such relia and periodic reports. Contrary to the aforesaid provisions and as comettly ‘pointed olif by the OCA, tie was’ no® showing that complainants and (b) they chose the subject truck to be levie 1 for ne “payment oft their judginent debt, Instead, respondent inninédiately levied upon tie subject truck without regard’to complainanis’ pleas not to do so, since they were using the subject {fuck\for their livelibood. Indeéd, ‘respondents’ brazen act not only deprived complainants of the option given to them by the Rules on Execution but also caused undue prejudicé-to them since they were’ asing the subject truck for livelihood purposes, Worse, respondent himself admitted ‘that. he file ‘take a rétum on the ‘writand to make periodic reports on the execution process, thus, putting int6 serious doubt that an auction sale involving the subject truck was ‘actually conducted. Irrefragably, the OCA correctly concluded that respondent's foregoing acts constitute Grave Abuse of Authority and Simple Neglect of Duty. (Sabijon ys. De Juan, 748 SCRA 298, A.M. No. P-14-328] January 28, 2015) PUP COLLEGE OF LAW [16