(1) Aratuc vs. COMELEC 88 SCRA 251
Energy Regulatory Board
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the
Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar
concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the
provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and
Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc
sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board
of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial
results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the
petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the
mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers
issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal
was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the
Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and
one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the
Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB
candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of
canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of
Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the
voting centers in questions.”
“The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring
from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is
none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary
prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in
Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need
any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision
and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done.
(2) Maceda vs.
G.R. No. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was
granted by public no. the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court
dismissed the petition and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase without hearing
pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of said order, a hearing
was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said hearing. The petitioner
contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated due
process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior
notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final
disposition of whether or not: to make it permanent; to reduce or increase it
further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin to temporary restraining
order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree a price
adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order
the price increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome
of the proceeding. The Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the
grant of provisional authority; however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to
conduct one.
(4) Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.
GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-
qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an
Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice
announced that the last day for submission of pre- qualification requirements
(PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened on 12
December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1
at 2pm of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December
1988. All three were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of
10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December, petitioners file a complaint with
the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming that although they
submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept
them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16
December, defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground
that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary
injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD No. 1818, which
provides: “Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order… in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an
infrastructure project… of the government… to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or
implementation of any such project…” Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of
PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own
charter and separate existence and was not part of the national government or of
any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with
anomalies like the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the
restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared
that the building sought to be constructed was an infrastructure project of the
government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality
such that it would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality
as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering
special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCC’s. The same
Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institution—refers to any
agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes
state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear
from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent that the present controversy did
not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve
merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not
intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative
agencies such as the anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged
restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ
of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
(8) De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883
FACTS: Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the
Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed,
providing for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the
Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought
to prohibit the respondents from implementing BP 129, alleging that the security
of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
Furthermore, they assert that the reorganization was done in lack of good faith.
However, the Solicitor General denies his claim and maintains that the allegation
of lack of good faith is unwarranted and devoid of any support in law, and that BP
129 was a legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to
reorganize the judiciary.
ISSUE: Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?
HELD: No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary.
Citing the separate opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La
Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith
seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great
public need by the legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the
tenure of judges or any particular judge. While it is possible that the legislature
could deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good
faith, the Court is unconvinced that such was the case in this situation. Thus,
where the Court holds that the reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129
was done in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of
his office is valid and constitutional.
(9) Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic
Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said
region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like. Then came RA 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar
as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails
over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special
law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to
have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for
the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to
the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue
fishing permits for revenue purposes. Thus, it has to be concluded that the
charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on
matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
(10) Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board
151 SCRA 208
FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality
of PD 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” with
broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The PD was
also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code.
The amendment provides that “there shall be collected on each processed video-
tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall
be subject to sales tax.” The said law was brought about by the need to regulate
the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessen the revenue being acquired
from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are
to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise
by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and
that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue
delegation of legislative power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the
Board to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel
of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not
a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the
very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance
is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being
"subject to the direction and control of the Board." That the grant of such
authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the PD
as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not
be without adequate remedy in law.
(11) US vs. ANG TANG HO
G.R. No. 17122 - February 27, 1922
Facts:
During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act
No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay
and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating
the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General
issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang
Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro
Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said
Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering
that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues:
Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor
General.
Discussions:
By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the
power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is
elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question
here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the
organic law. Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be
put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which
the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms
and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary,
upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings:
Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of
the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it
was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the
sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any
cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also
to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not
the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law
should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or define what was “any
cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,”
Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should
be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The
alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the
different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of
one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater
than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
(12) Ynot vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74457- March 20, 1987
FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive Order No. 626-
A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the inter-provincial
transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose)
and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of
carabeef. In the case of carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as
the Director of Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported
six (6) carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated
by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery, which the
RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k. After trial on the
merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos, and as they
can no longer be produced, directed the confiscation of the bond. It deferred from
ruling on the constitutionality of the executive order, on the grounds of want of
authority and presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
such ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the main,
petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes
outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from invalidity because it is
imposed without giving the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court—as guaranteed by due process.
ISSUE
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due process
clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be present:
(a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. In US v.
Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with the above requirements—
that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so to speak, has a direct relevance
to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of the order, and that the method
chosen is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and
not unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those seven
years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit adequately
works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or breeding, and
prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO 626-A has the same
lawful subject, it fails to observe the second requirement. Notably, said EO
imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement. The object of the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
disputed measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of
the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can
be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their slaughter there,
any more that moving them to another will make it easier to kill them there. Even
if assuming there was a reasonable relation between the means and the end, the
penalty is invalid as it amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a
chance to be heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared
as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain occasions when
notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such as summary abatement
of a public nuisance, summary destruction of pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs. However, these are justified for reasons
of immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to
correct it. In the instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which
the disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid
delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman and
Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited discretion. The
usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said officers must observe in
making the distribution are nowhere to be found; instead, they are to go about it
as they may see fit. Obviously, this makes the exercise prone to partiality and
abuse, and even corruption.
(13) Pelaez vs. Auditor General
15 SCRA 569
FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive
orders creating 33 municipalities – this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines
may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-
province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision,
and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province
into one or more subprovinces. The VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a
special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be
appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are
unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by
Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the
areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or
municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues,
accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio,
can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios
are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the
bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing
barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks,
however, the main import of Pelaez’ argument, which is that the statutory denial
of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the
bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to
the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.
HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a
statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the
case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in
character not administrative.