custo:

184. Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 377 (1940)

185. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Macondray, 70 SCRA 122 (1976)
186. Papa v. A.V. Valencia, 284 SCRA 643 (1998)
187. PAL v.CA, 181 SCRA 557 (1990)
188. Reparations Commission v. Universal Deep Sea Fishing, 83 SCRA 764
189. Paculdo v. Regalado, 345 SCRA 134(2000)
190. DBP v. CA, GR 118342, 05 Jan 1998
191. Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Philippine Acetylene,111 SCRA 421 (1982)
192. De Guzman v.CA,137 SCRA 730 (1985)
193. TLG Int’l Continental Ent. Inc. v. Flores, 47 SCRA 437 (1972)
194. McLaughlin v CA, 144 SCRA 693 (1986)
195. Soco v. Militante,123 SCRA 160(1983)
196. Sotto v. Mijares, 28 SCRA 17 (1969)
197. Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan, 359 SCRA 409 (2001)
198. Astro Electronics v. Phil Export FLGc, GR 136729, 23 Sep 2003

Case Title: OCTAVIO A. KALALO vs. ALFREDO J. LUZ

Case Number and Date: G.R. No. L-27782; July 31, 1970
Ponente: ZALDIVAR, J.:

Doctrine: In order that estoppel may apply the person, to whom representations have been made and
who claims the estoppel in his favor must have relied or acted on such representations.

Facts:

On 17 November 1959, Octavio Kalalo, a licensed civil engineer doing business under the firm name of
O. A. Kalalo and Associates, entered into an agreement with Alfredo Luz, a licensed architect, doing
business under firm name of A. J. Luz and Associates, where he was to render engineering design
services for a fee. On 11 December 1961, Kalalo sent Luz a statement of account where the balance due
for services rendered was P59,505. On 18 May 1962, Luz sent Kalalo a resume of fees due to the latter,
and a check for P10,861.08. Kalalo refused to accept the check as full payment of the balance of the fees
due him. On 10 August 1962, Kalalo filed a complaint containing 4 causes of action, i.e. $28,000
(representing 20% of the amount paid to Luz in the International Research Institute project) and the
balance of P30,881.25 as fees; P17,0000 as consequential and moral damages; P55,000 as moral
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; and P25,000 as actual damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses). The trial court ruled in favor of Kalalo. Luz filed an appeal directly with the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Whether or not under the doctrine of estoppel would apply in this case.

Ruling:
No. The statement of accounts could not estop appellee, because appellant did not rely thereon as
found by the Commissioner.

Under article 1431 of the Civil Code, in order that estoppel may apply the person, to whom
representations have been made and who claims the estoppel in his favor must have relied or acted on
such representations.

The essential elements of estoppel in pais may be considered in relation to the party sought to be
estopped, and in relation to the party invoking the estoppel in his favor.

As related to the party to be estopped, the essential elements are: (1) conduct amounting to false
representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert;
(2) intent, or at least expectation that his conduct shall be acted upon by, or at least influence, the other
party; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts.

As related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of
the means of knowledge of the truth as the facts in questions; (2) (reliance, in good faith, upon the
conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; (3) action or inaction based thereon of such
character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment
or prejudice.

The first essential element in relation to the party sought to be estopped does not obtain in the instant
case, for, as appears in the Report of the Commissioner, appellee testified “that when he wrote Exhibit 1
and prepared Exhibit 1-A, he had not yet consulted the services of his counsel and it was only upon
advice of counsel that the terms of the contract were interpreted to him resulting in his subsequent
letters to the defendant demanding payments of his fees pursuant to the contract Exhibit A.” It is
established, therefore, that Exhibit 1-A was written by appellee through ignorance or mistake. Anent
this matter, it has been held that if an act, conduct or misrepresentation of the party sought to be
estopped is due to ignorance founded on innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. Regarding the
essential elements of estoppel in relation to the party claiming the estoppel, the first element does not
obtain in the instant case, for it cannot be said that appellant did not know, or at least did not have the
means of knowing, the services rendered to him by appellee and the fees due thereon as provided in
Exhibit A. The second element is also wanting, for, as adverted to, appellant did not rely on Exhibit 1-A
but consistently denied the accounts stated therein. Neither does the third element obtain, for
appellant did not act on the basis of the representations in Exhibit 1-A, and there was no change in his
position, to his own injury or prejudice.