CHAPTER 10 St. Thomas Aquinas As Tey po for so many areas in the history of Western thought, the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (12257-1274) play a key role in the development of views con- ‘cerning nature and the relation that human beings have to it. Aquinas belonged to the second generation of Christian scholars who had access to the writings of Aristotle and his commentators in good Latin transta- tions. He was among those who saw in Aristotelian principles a way of making better sense of Scriptural teachings than the Augustinian neoplatonic metaphys- ios that had been followed for almost a thousand years. Aquinas's highly original and powerful synthesis of Biblical, Aristotelian, neoplatonic, and Stoic teachings were at first the subject of great controversy, but within fifty years his body of work served as the theoretical framework for much of the Catholic intellectual tradition (a role it retains today). Although Aquinas's views did not go unchallenged until the dawn of “modern” thought in the seventeenth century, the predominant “scholastic” philosophy was largely based on Thomistic {ie., Aquinas's) principles. There are two aspects of Aquinas's thought that are especially important for tracing the history of Western attitudes toward nature and natural things. First, Aquinas locates within a Christian context the Stoic notion of a hierarchy of earthly natural things with human beings at the summit. Although agreeing with Aristotle that each living thing is a substance unto itself, and hence possessing its own internal teleology directed toward its own good, Aquinas adopts the Stoic no- tion that the whole cosmos can, at the same time, be considered a single organ- ism, whose intrinsic goal is the knowledge and love of God. Like the Stoics, Aquinas takes human beings to be the only beings on earth capable of achieving this goal. Accordingly, he follows the Stoies in seeing everything on Earth as designed by a providential deity for the sake of the benefit of human beings. The Genesis story is interpreted in this light. Second, Aquinas employs explicit arguments against the notion that peopie have ethical obligations to living things other than human beings. He does so when he argues against the possibility of showing charity to animals. “Charity” is under- stood as a special kind of friendship (friendship with God), made possible only through revealed religion. In contrast to friendship in the ordinary sense, which can be shown only to good people with whom we have a special bond, charity ought to be shown toward all human beings, because of the special relationship that each person has to God, the true object of charity. Animals other than human beings lack the faculties that would. make it possible for a human being to be a friend on the level of ordinary friendship. Further, they are without the special rela- O1492 Human Life and the Natural World tionship to God that would allow them to warrant special consideration as objects of charity, Aquinas infers from this that there are no ethical obligations to animals other than human beings but gives two reasons why cruelty to animals is to be avoided. First, cruel behavior is a sign of disrespect for God, to whom these ani- mals ultimately belong, Second, cruel behavior toward animals would tend to make ‘one more cruel toward other humans as well, and this is a direct violation of our nature as social beings. tee ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Summa Contra Gentiles ‘TR VERNON J. BOURKE Book Three Chapter 78: That Other Creatures Are Ruled by God by Means of Intellectual Creatures 1. Since it is the function of divine providence! to maintain order in things, and since a suitable order is such that there is a proportional descent from the highest things to the lowest, it must be that divine providence reaches the farthest things by some sort of proportion.” Now, the proportion is like this: as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so the lower creatures are under the higher ones and are ruled by them. But of all creatures the highest are the intellectual ones, as is evident from what we said earlier. Therefore, the rational plan of divine provi- dence demands that the other creatures be ruled by rational creatures. 2. Again, whatever type of creature carries out the order of divine providence, it is able to do so because it participates in something of the power of the first provi- dential being; just as an instrument does not move unless, through being moved, it participates somewhat in the power of the principle agent, So, the beings that parti pate more fully in the power of the divine providence are executive agents of divine providence in regard to those that participate less. But intellectual creatures pattici- pate more than others in it, because an ability to establish order which is done by cognitive power, and an ability to execute it which is done by operative power, are both required for providence, and rational creatures share in both types of power, while the rest of creatures have operative powers only.3 Therefore, all other creatures are ruled by means of rational creatures under divine providence. 3. Besides, to whomever any power is given by God, the recipient is given the power together with an ordination toward the effect of that power. For in that way all things are arranged for the best, inasmuch as each thing is ordered to all the goods chat can naturally come from it, Now, the intellectual power by itself is capable of ordering and rulings hence, we see that the operative power follows the direction ofSt. Thomas Aquinas 93 the intellective power, when they are combined in the same subject. In man, for instance, we observe that the bodily members are moved at the command of the will. “The same is evident even if they are in different subjects; for instance those men who excel in operative power must be directed by those who excel in intellectual power. ‘Therefore, che rational plan of divine providence demands that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. 4, Moreover, particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers; this is evident quite as much in the artistic as in the natural sphere. Now, itis obvious that intellectual power is more universal than any operative power, for the intellectual power contains universal forms, while each power is operative only be- cause of some form proper to the agent. Therefore, all other creatures must be moved and regulated by means of intellectual powers.> 5. Furthermore, in all powers arranged in an order one is directive in relation to the next, and it knows the rational plan best. Thus, we sce in the case of the arts that one art, which is concerned with the end from which the'plan for the entire artistic production is derived, directs and commands another art which makes the product, as the art of navigation does in regard to shipbuilding. So, the one that introduces the form commands the one that prepares the matter. Instruments, on the other hand, which do not know the plan at all, are simply ruled. Since only intellectual creatures can know the rational plans for the ordering of creatures, it will therefore be their function co rule and govern all other creatures. 6. Again, that which is of itself is the cause of that which is through another, But only intellectual creatures operate by themselves, in the sense that they aré masters of their operations through frce choice of their will. On the other hand, other creatures are involved in operation resulting from the necessity of nature, since they are moved by something else.” Therefore, intellectual creatures by their operation are motivat- ing and regulative of other creatures. Chapter 81: On the Ordering of Men among Themselves and to Other Things 1. Asa matter of fact, human souls hold the lowest rank in relation to the other intel- lectual substances,® because, as we said above, at the start of their existence they re- ceive a knowledge of divine providence, wherein they know it only in a general sort of way. But the soul must be brought to a perfect knowledge of this order, in regard to individual details, by starting from the things themselves in which the order of di- vine providence has already been established in detail. So, the soul had to have bodily organs by which it might draw knowledge from corporeal things. Yet, even with such equipment, because of the feebleness of its intellectual light, man’s soul is not able to acquire a perfect knowledge of che things that are important to man unless it be helped by higher spirits, or the divine disposition requires this, that lower spirits acquire per- fection through the higher ones, as we showed above. Nevertheless, since man does94 Human Life and the Natural World participate somewhat in intellectual light, brute animals are subject to him by the or- der of divine providence for they participate in no way in understanding. Hence it is said: “Let us make man to our own image and likeness,” namely, according as he has understanding,? “and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the ais, and the beasts of the earth” (Gen. 1:26). 2. Even brute animals, though devoid of understanding, have some knowledges! and so, in accord with the order of divine providence, they are set above plants and other things that lack knowledge. Hence it is said: “Behold I have given you every herb beating seed upon the earth, and all crees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth” (Gen. 1:23). 3. Moreover, among things utterly devoid of knowledge one thing comes under another, depending on whether the one is more powerful in acting than the other. Indeed, they do not participate in anything of the disposition of providence, but only in its execution. 4, Now, since man possesses intellect, sense, and bodily power, these are inter- related within him by a mutual order, according to the disposition of divine provi- dence, in a likeness to the order which is found in the universe. In fact, corporeal power is subject to sense and intellectual power, as carrying out their command, and the sensitive power is subject to the intellectual and is included under its command, 5. On the same basis, there is also found an order among men themselves. In- deed, those who excel in understanding naturally gain control, whereas those who have defective understanding, but a strong body, seem to be naturally fitted for serv- ice, as Aristotle says in his Politics 'The view of Solomon is also in accord with this, for he says: “The fool shall serve the wise” (Prov. 11:29); and agai all the people wise men such as fear God ... who may judge the people at all times” (Exod, 18:21-22). : “Provide out of Chapter 111: That Rational Creatures Are Subject to Divine Providence in a Special Way 1. From the points which have been determined above, it is manifest chat divine providence extends to all things. Yet we must note that there is a special meaning for providence in reference to intellectual and rational creatures, over and above its meaning for other creatures. For they do stand out above other creatures, both in natural perfection and in the dignity of their end. In the order of natural perfection, only the rational creature holds dominion over his acts, moving himself freely in order to perform his actions. Other creatures, in fact, are moved to their proper workings rather than being the ac- tive agents of these operations, as is clear from what has been said. And in the dignity of their end, for only the intellectual creature reaches the very ultimate end of the whole of things through his own operation, which is the knowing and loving of God;!!St. Thomas Aquinas 95 whereas other creatures cannot attain the ultimate end except by a participation likeness. Now, the formal character of every work differs according to the diversity of the end and of the things which are subject to the operation; thus, the method of working in art differs according to the diversity of the end and of the subject matter. For instance, a physician works in one way to get rid of illness and in another way to maintain health, and he uses different methods for bodies differently constituted. Like- wise, in the government of a state, a different plan of ordering must be followed, de- pending on the varying conditions of the persons subject to this government and on the different purposes to which they are directed. For soldiers ate controlled in one way, so that they may be Feady to fight; while artisans will be managed in another way, so that they may successfully carry out theit activities. So, also, there is one orderly plan in accord with which rational creatures are subjected to divine providence, and another by means of which the rest of creatures are ordered. Chapter 112: That Rational Creatures Are Governed for Their Own Sakes, While Others Are Governed in Subordination to Them I. First of all, then, the very way in which the intellectual creature was made, accord- ing as it is master of its acts, demands providential care whereby this creature may provide for itself, on its own behalf; while the way in which other things were cre- ated, things which have no dominion over their acts, shows this fact, that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as subordinated to others. That which is moved only by another being has the formal character of an instrument, but that which acts of itself has the essential character of a principal agent. Now, an instrument is not valued for its own sake, but as useful to a principal agent. Hence it must be that all the careful work that is devoted to instruments is actually done for the sake of the agent, as for an end, but what is done for the principal agent cither by himself or by another, is for his own sake, because he is the principal agent. Therefore, intellectual creatures are so controlled by God, as objects of care for their own sakes, while other creatures are subordinated, as i were, to the rational creatures.!2 2. Again, one who holds dominion over his own acts is free in his activity, “for the free man is he who acts for his own sake.”!3 But one who is acted upon by another, under necessity is subject to slavery. So, every other creature is naturally subject to slavery; only the intellectual creature is by nature free. Now, under every sort of government, provision is made for free men for their own sakes, but for slaves in such a way that they may be at the disposal of free men. And so, through divine providence provision is made for intellectual creatures on their own account, but for the remaining creatures for the sake of the intellectual ones. 3. Besides, whenever things are ordered to any end, and some of these things cannot attain the end through their own efforts, they must be subordinated to things which do achieve the end and which are ordered to the end for their own sakes.96 Human Life and the Natural World Thus, for instance, the end of an army is victory, and this the soldiers may achieve through their own act of fighting; that is why only soldiers are needed for their own sake in an army. All others, who are assigned to different tasks—for instance, caring for the horses and supplying the weapons—are needed for the sake of the soldiers in the army. Now, from what has been seen earlier, it is established that God is the ultimate end of the whole of things; that an intellectual nature alone attains to Him in Himself, that is, by knowing and loving Him, as is evident from what has been said, Therefore, the intellectual nature is the only one that is required in the universe, for its own sake, while all others are for its sake.!4 4, Moreover, in any whole the principal parts are needed in themselves in order to constitute the whole, but the other parts are for the preservation or for some bet- cerment of the principal ones. Now, of all the parts of the universe the more noble are intellectual creatures, since they come closer to the divine likeness. Therefore, intel- lectual creatures are governed by divine providence for their own sakes, while all oth- ers are for the intellectual ones. ... 6. Again, as a thing is acted upon in the course of nature, so is it disposed to action by its natural origin. Now, we see that things do go on in the course of nature in such a way that intellectual substance uses all others for itself:!5 either for the perfecting of its understanding, since it contemplates the truth in them; or for the exercise of its power and the development of its knowledge, in the fashion of an artist who develops his artistic conception in bodily matter; or even for the support of his. body which is united with the intellectual soul, as we see in the case of men. There- fore, it is clear that all things are divinely ruled by providence for the sakes of intellec- tual substances. ... 8, Nor is what was shown in earlier arguments opposed to this, namely, that all parts of the universe are ordered to the perfection of the whole. For all parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole, inasmuch as one is made to serve another. Thus, in the human body it is apparent that the lungs contribute to the perfection of the body by rendering service to the heart; hence, it is not contradictory for the lungs to be for the sake of the heart, and also for the sake of the whole organism. Likewise, it is not con- tradictory for some natures to be for the sake of the intellectual ones, and also for the sake of the perfection of the universe. For, in fact, if the things needed for the perfec- tion of intellectual substance were lacking, the universe would not be complete. 9. Similarly, too, the foregoing is not opposed by the fact that individuals are for the sake of their proper species.!6 Because they are ordered to their species, they pos- sess a further ordination to intellectual nature, For a corruptible!” ching is not ordered to man for the sake of one individual man only, but for the sake of the whole human species. A corruptible thing could not be of use to the whole human species except by virtue of the thing's entire species. Therefore, the order whereby corruptible things are ordered to man requires the subordination of individuals to their species. .St. Thomas Aquinas 97 11. Hence it is said in Deuteronomy (4:19): “Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars, and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations are under heaven’; and again in the Psalm (8:8): “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, moreover the beasts of the field”; and in Wisdom (12:18) itis said: “Thou, being Master of power, judgest with tranquillity and with great favor disposest of us.” 12. Through these considerations we refute che error of those who claim it is a sin for man to kill brute animals.'8 For animals are ordered to man's use in the natu- ral course of things, according to divine providence. Consequently, man uses them without any injustice, either by killing them or by employing them in any other way. For this reason, God said to Noah: “As the green herbs, I have delivered all flesh to you" (Gen. 9:3). 13, Indeed, if any statements are found in Sacred Scripture prohibiting the com- mission of an act of cruelty against brute animals, for instance, that one should not kill a bird accompanied by her young (Deut. 22:6), this is said either to curn the mind of man away from cruelty which might be used on other men, lest a person through practicing cruelty on brutes might go on to do the same to mens or because an injurious act committed on animals may lead to a temporal loss! for some man, cither for the agent or for another man; or there may be another interpretation of the text, as the Apostle (I Cot. 9:9) explains it, in terms of “not muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn” (Deut. 25:4).?0 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Summa Theologica ‘TR. BY THE FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE M-Ml, 23, 1 Whether charity?! is friendship? .+- Objection 2. Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2),23 But charity extends even to one’s enemies, according to Mt. 5:44: “Love your enemies.” Therefore charity is not friendship. Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous.24 Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his lerter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: “True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures.” No more is it friendship for the98 Human Life and the Natural Worid virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtu- ous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship. On the contrary, Ie is written (Jn. 15:15): “I will not now call you servants ... but My friends.” Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship. I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves (thus we ate said to love wine, of a horse, or the like), itis love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.25 Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication. Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): “God is faith- ful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God. --- Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friends: sec- ondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when 2 man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so chat, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed. Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.26 ILI, 25, 3 Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity Objection 1. It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves “all things that are” (Wis. 11:25), andSt. Thomas Aquinas 99 whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity. Objection 2. Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the resemblance of a trace.27 Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures. Objection 3. Further, just as the object of charity is God, so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures. On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life28 Therefore charity does not extend to itra- tional creatures. T answer that, According to what has been stated above (13, 1) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which wwe desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friend- ship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, prop- erly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses.29 Hence the Philoso- pher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically, Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in lifes since “nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together,” as the Philoso- pher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in hu- man life which is regulaced by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain, Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature. Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so fas, co wit, as we wish for their preser- vation, to God’s honor and man’s use; thus too does God love them out of charity. Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.