On February 13, 1989, Teresita Cañezal and Sotera E.
Cañezal, Sebastian
Caltex Inc. v. Sulpicio Lines Inc.
FACTS: On December 19, 1987, motor tanker MT Vector left Limay,
Bataan, at about 8:00 p.m., enroute to Masbate, loaded with 8,800 barrels
of petroleum products shipped by petitioner Caltex. MT Vector is a
tramping motor tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping
Corporation, engaged in the business of transporting fuel products such as
gasoline, kerosene, diesel and crude oil. During that particular voyage, the
MT Vector carried on board gasoline and other oil products owned by
Caltex by virtue of a charter contract between them.
On December 20, 1987, at about 6:30 a.m., the passenger ship MV Doña
Paz left the port of Tacloban headed for Manila with a complement of 59
crew members including the master and his officers, and passengers
totaling 1,493 as indicated in the Coast Guard Clearance. The MV Doña
Paz is a passenger and cargo vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. plying the route of Manila/ Tacloban/ Catbalogan/ Manila/
Catbalogan/ Tacloban/ Manila, making trips twice a week.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 20, 1987, the two vessels collided in the
open sea within the vicinity of Dumali Point between Marinduque and
Oriental Mindoro. All the crewmembers of MV Doña Paz died, while the
two survivors from MT Vector claimed that they were sleeping at the time
of the incident.
The MV Doña Paz carried an estimated 4,000 passengers. Only 24
survived the tragedy after having been rescued from the burning waters by
vessels that responded to distress calls. Among those who perished were
public school teacher Sebastian Cañezal (47 years old) and his daughter
Corazon Cañezal (11 years old), both unmanifested passengers but
proved to be on board the vessel.
On March 22, 1988, the board of marine inquiry after investigation found
that the MT Vector, its registered operator Francisco Soriano, and its
owner and actual operator Vector Shipping Corporation, were at fault and
responsible for its collision with MV Doña Paz.
Cañezal’s wife and mother respectively, filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, a complaint for “Damages Arising from Breach of Contract of
Carriage” against Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio). Sulpicio, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint against Francisco Soriano, Vector Shipping
Corporation and Caltex (Philippines), Inc. Sulpicio alleged that Caltex
chartered MT Vector with gross and evident bad faith knowing fully well
that MT Vector was improperly manned, ill-equipped, unseaworthy and a
hazard to safe navigation; as a result, it rammed against MV Doña Paz in
the open sea setting MT Vector’s highly flammable cargo ablaze.
Trial Court: dismissing third party complaint against petitioner.
CA: modified ruling and included Caltex as one of those liable for
damages. Third party defendants Vector Shipping Co. and Caltex (Phils.),
Inc. are held equally liable under the third party complaint to
reimburse/indemnify defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc. of the above-mentioned
damages, attorney’s fees and costs which the latter is adjudged to pay
plaintiffs, the same to be shared half by Vector Shipping Co. (being the
vessel at fault for the collision) and the other half by Caltex (Phils.), Inc.
(being the charterer that negligently caused the shipping of combustible
cargo aboard an unseaworthy vessel).
ISSUE: Is the charterer of a sea vessel liable for damages resulting from a
collision between the chartered vessel and a passenger ship?
HELD: NO.
The charterer has no liability for damages under Philippine Maritime laws.
The respective rights and duties of a shipper and the carrier depends not
on whether the carrier is public or private, but on whether the contract of
carriage is a bill of lading or equivalent shipping documents on the one
hand, or a charter party or similar contract on the other.
Petitioner and Vector entered into a contract of affreightment, also known
as a voyage charter.
If the charter is a contract of affreightment, which leaves the general owner
in possession of the ship as owner for the voyage, the rights and the
responsibilities of ownership rest on the owner. The charterer is free from
liability to third persons in respect of the ship.

In this case, the charter party agreement did not convert the common
carrier into a private carrier. The parties entered into a voyage charter,
which retains the character of the vessel as a common carrier.
Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act :
Sec. 3. (1) The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the
voyage to exercise due diligence to -
(a) Make the ship seaworthy;
(b) Properly man, equip, and supply the ship;
Thus, the carriers are deemed to warrant impliedly the seaworthiness of
the ship. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for
the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and
crew. The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition
the vessel involved in its contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty
prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
The provisions owed their conception to the nature of the business of
common carriers. This business is impressed with a special public duty.
The public must of necessity rely on the care and skill of common carriers
in the vigilance over the goods and safety of the passengers, especially
because with the modern development of science and invention,
transportation has become more rapid, more complicated and somehow
more hazardous. For these reasons, a passenger or a shipper of goods is
under no obligation to conduct an inspection of the ship and its crew, the
carrier being obliged by law to impliedly warrant its seaworthiness.
Is Caltex liable for damages under the Civil Code? NO
The charterer of a vessel has no obligation before transporting its cargo to
ensure that the vessel it chartered complied with all legal requirements.
The duty rests upon the common carrier simply for being engaged in
“public service.”[22] The Civil Code demands diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and that which corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, the time and the place. Hence, considering
the nature of the obligation between Caltex and MT Vector, the liability as
found by the Court of Appeals is without basis.
The relationship between the parties in this case is governed by special
laws. Because of the implied warranty of seaworthiness, shippers of
goods, when transacting with common carriers, are not expected to inquire
into the vessel’s seaworthiness, genuineness of its licenses and
compliance with all maritime laws. To demand more from shippers and
hold them liable in case of failure exhibits nothing but the futility of our
maritime laws insofar as the protection of the public in general is
concerned. By the same token, we cannot expect passengers to inquire
every time they board a common carrier, whether the carrier possesses the
necessary papers or that all the carrier’s employees are qualified. Such a
practice would be an absurdity in a business where time is always of the
essence. Considering the nature of transportation business, passengers
and shippers alike customarily presume that common carriers possess all
the legal requisites in its operation.
Thus, the nature of the obligation of Caltex demands ordinary diligence like
any other shipper in shipping his cargoes.
Caltex had reasons to believe that MT Vector could legally transport cargo
that time of the year.
Clearly, as a mere voyage charterer, Caltex had the right to presume that
the ship was seaworthy as even the Philippine Coast Guard itself was
convinced of its seaworthiness. All things considered, we find no legal
basis to hold petitioner liable for damages.
As Vector Shipping Corporation did not appeal from the Court of Appeals’
decision, we limit our ruling to the liability of Caltex alone. However, we
maintain the Court of Appeals’ ruling insofar as Vector is concerned .
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 39626,
promulgated on April 15, 1997, insofar as it held Caltex liable under the
third party complaint to reimburse/indemnify defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
the damages the latter is adjudged to pay plaintiffs-appellees. The
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it orders
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. to pay the heirs of Sebastian E. Cañezal and Corazon
Cañezal damages as set forth therein. Third-party defendant-appellee
Vector Shipping Corporation and Francisco Soriano are held liable to
reimburse/indemnify defendant Sulpicio Lines, Inc. whatever damages,
attorneys’ fees and costs the latter is adjudged to pay plaintiffs-appellees in
the case.
Negros Navigation v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter,
son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion.
The tickets were for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The ship sailed from the port of
Manila on schedule.
At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off
the Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker
owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V
Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy.
The bodies of some of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the
four members of private respondents’ families were never found.
Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation
(PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita de la Victoria
Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and
Elfreda de la Victoria, 26.
In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket
numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were
listed in the passenger manifest; and that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North
Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after being rammed
by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision,
some of the passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however,
denied that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the
vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned
by a full and competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the
fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City.
PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for
the payment and satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection
with the collision and releasing the PNOC and the PNOC/STC from any
liability to it.
Trial Court: in favour of the private respondents.
CA: affirmed with modification.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually
passengers of the Don Juan;
(2) whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew
members of petitioner to be grossly negligent in the performance of their
duties, is binding in this case;
HELD:
Petitioner contends that the purchase of the tickets does not necessarily
mean that the alleged victims actually took the trip. Petitioner asserts that it
is common knowledge that passengers purchase tickets in advance but do
not actually use them. Hence, private respondent should also prove the
presence of the victims on the ship. The witnesses who affirmed that the
victims were on the ship were biased and unreliable.
This contention is without merit. Private respondent Ramon Miranda
testified that he personally took his family and his niece to the vessel on
the day of the voyage and stayed with them on the ship until it was time for
it to leave. There is no reason he should claim members of his family to
have perished in the accident just to maintain an action. People do not
normally lie about so grave a matter as the loss of dear ones. It would be
more difficult for private respondents to keep the existence of their relatives
if indeed they are alive than it is for petitioner to show the contrary.
Petitioner’s only proof is that the bodies of the supposed victims were not
among those recovered from the site of the mishap. But so were the
bodies of the other passengers reported missing not recovered, as this
Court noted in the Mecenas case.
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the
trial court and the appellate court relied on the findings of this Court in
Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was brought for the
death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the
proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T
Tacloban City, the crew of the Don Juan was equally negligent as it found
that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong at
the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio
De Vera, admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the
imminent danger facing them. This Court found that Capt. Santisteban and
the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to prevent the collision or
at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the
ship.
In addition, the Court found that the Don Juan was overloaded. The
Certificate of Inspection, dated August 27, 1979, issued by the Philippine
Coast Guard Commander at Iloilo City stated that the total number of
persons allowed on the ship was 864, of whom 810 are passengers, but
there were actually 1,004 on board the vessel when it sank, 140 persons
more than the maximum number that could be safely carried by it.
Taking these circumstances together, and the fact that the M/V Don Juan,
as the faster and better-equipped vessel, could have avoided a collision
with the PNOC tanker, this Court held that even if the Tacloban City had
been at fault for failing to observe an internationally-recognized rule of
navigation, the Don Juan was guilty of contributory negligence.
Philippine Home Assurance Corp. v. CA
FACTS:
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI) loaded on board SS Eastern Explorer
in Kobe, Japan, the following shipment for carriage to Manila and Cebu,
freight pre-paid and in good order and condition, viz: (a) two (2) boxes
internal combustion engine parts, consigned to William Lines, Inc.; (b) ten
(10) metric tons (334 bags) ammonium chloride, consigned to Orca's
Company; (c) two hundred (200) bags Glue 300, consigned to Pan Oriental
Match Company and (d) garments, consigned to Ding Velayo
While the vessel was off Okinawa, Japan, a small flame was detected on
the acetylene cylinder located in the accommodation area near the engine
room on the main deck level. As the crew was trying to extinguish the fire,
the acetylene cylinder suddenly exploded sending a flash of flame
throughout the accommodation area, thus causing death and severe
injuries to the crew and instantly setting fire to the whole superstructure of
the vessel. The incident forced the master and the crew to abandon the
ship.
Thereafter, SS Eastern Explorer was found to be a constructive total loss
and its voyage was declared abandoned.
Several hours later, a tugboat under the control of Fukuda Salvage Co.
arrived near the vessel and commenced to tow the vessel for the port of
Naha, Japan.
Fire fighting operations were again conducted at the said port. After the fire
was extinguished, the cargoes which were saved were loaded to another
vessel for delivery to their original ports of destination. ESLI charged port.
After the fire was extinguished, the cargoes which were saved were loaded
to another vessel for delivery to their original ports of destination. ESLI
charged the consignees several amounts corresponding to additional
freight and salvage charges, as follows: (a) ESLI charged the consignee
the sum of P1,927.65, representing salvage charges assessed against the
goods; (b) ESLI charged the consignee the sum of P2,980.64 for additional
freight and P826.14 for salvage charges against the goods; (c) charged the
consignee the sum of P3,292.26 for additional freight and P4,130.68 for
salvage charges against the goods; and (d) ESLI charged the consignee
the sum of P8,337.06 for salvage charges against the goods.
The charges were all paid by Philippine Home Assurance Corporation
(PHAC) under protest for and in behalf of the consignees.
PHAC, as subrogee of the consignees, thereafter filed a complaint before
the Regional Trial Court against ESLI to recover the sum paid under
protest on the ground that the same were actually damages directly
brought about by the fault, negligence, illegal act and/or breach of contract
of ESLI.
In its answer, ESLI contended that it exercised the diligence required by
law in the handling, custody and carriage of the shipment; that the fire was
caused by an unforeseen event; that the additional freight charges are due
and demandable pursuant to the Bill of Lading; and that salvage charges
are properly collectible under Act No. 2616, known as the Salvage Law.
The trial court dismissed PHAC's complaint
Evidence has been presented that the SS "Eastern Explorer" was a
seaworthy vessel and before the ship loaded the Acetylene Cylinder No.
NCW 875, the same has been tested, checked and examined and was
certified to have complied with the required safety measures and
standards. When the fire was detected by the crew, fire fighting operations
were immediately conducted but due to the explosion of the acetylene
cylinder, the crew were unable to contain the fire and had to abandon the
ship to save their lives and were saved from drowning by passing vessels
in the vicinity. The burning of the vessel rendering it a constructive total
loss and incapable of pursuing its voyage to the Philippines was, therefore,
not the fault or negligence of defendant but a natural disaster or calamity
which nobody would like to happen. The salvage operations conducted by
Fukuda Salvage Company was perfectly a legal operation and charges
made on the goods recovered were legitimate charges.
Act No. 2616, otherwise known as the Salvage Law, is thus applicable to
the case at bar. Section 1 of Act No. 2616 states:
"Section 1. When in case of shipwreck, the vessel or its cargo shall be
beyond the control of the crew, or shall have been abandoned by them,
and picked up and conveyed to a safe place by other persons, the latter
shall be entitled to a reward for the salvage.
Those who, not being included in the above paragraph, assist in saving a
vessel or its cargo from shipwreck, shall be entitled to like reward."
In relation to the above provision, the Supreme Court has ruled in Erlanger
& Galinger v. Swedish East Asiatic Co., Ltd. that three elements are
necessary to a valid salvage claim, namely (a) a marine peril (b) service
voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a
special contract and (c) success in whole or in part, or that the service
rendered contributed to such success.
The above elements are all present in the instant case. Salvage charges
may thus be assessed on the cargoes saved from the vessel. As provided
for in Section 13 of the Salvage Law, "The expenses of salvage, as well as
the reward for salvage or assistance, shall be a charge on the things
salvaged or their value." In Manila Railroad Co. v. Macondray Co., 37 Phil.
583, it was also held that "when a ship and its cargo are saved together,
the salvage allowance should be charged against the ship and cargo in the
proportion of their respective values, the same as in a case of general
average . . ." Thus, the "compensation to be paid by the owner of the cargo
is in proportion to the value of the vessel and the value of the cargo
saved."
As provided by the Civil Code:
"Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
require the assumption or risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were
inevitable."
"Article 1266. The debtor in obligations to do shall also be released when
the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the fault of
the obligor."
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that defendant had exercised the extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods as required by law.
HELD:
In our jurisprudence, fire may not be considered a natural disaster or
calamity since it almost always arises from some act of man or by human
means. It cannot be an act of God unless caused by lightning or a natural
disaster or casualty not attributable to human agency.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that a small flame was detected on the
acetylene cylinder and that by reason thereof, the same exploded despite
efforts to extinguish the fire. Neither is there any doubt that the acetylene
cylinder, obviously fully loaded, was stored in the accommodation area
near the engine room and not in a storage area considerably far, and in a
safe distance, from the engine room. Moreover, there was no showing, and
none was alleged by the parties, that the fire was caused by a natural
disaster or calamity not attributable to human agency. On the contrary,
there is strong evidence indicating that the acetylene cylinder caught fire
because of the fault and negligence of respondent ESLI, its captain and its
crew.
First, the acetylene cylinder which was fully loaded should not have been
stored in the accommodation area near the engine room where the heat
generated therefrom could cause the acetylene cylinder to explode by
reason of spontaneous combustion.
Second, respondent ESLI should have known that by storing the acetylene
cylinder in the accommodation area supposed to be reserved for
passengers, it unnecessarily exposed its passengers to grave danger and
injury. Curious passengers, ignorant of the danger the tank might have on
humans and property, could have handled the same or could have lighted
and smoke cigarettes while repairing in the accommodation area.
Third, the fact that the acetylene cylinder was checked, tested and
examined and subsequently certified as having complied with the safety
measures and standards by qualified experts before it was loaded in the
vessel only shows to a great extent that negligence was present in the
handling of the acetylene cylinder after it was loaded and while it was on
board the ship. Indeed, had the respondent and its agents not been
negligent in storing the acetylene cylinder near the engine room, then that
same would not have leaked and exploded during the voyage.
Verily, there is no merit in the finding of the trial court to which respondent
court erroneously agreed that the fire was not fault or negligence of
respondent but a natural disaster or calamity. The records are simply
wanting in this regard.
Prescinding from the foregoing premises, it indubitably follows that the
cargo consignees cannot be made liable to respondent carrier for
additional freight and salvage charges. Consequently, respondent carrier
must refund to herein petitioner the amount it paid under protest for
additional freight and salvage charges in behalf of the consignee.
Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping v. Philippine First
Insurance
(nilagay ko na lahat ng decisions para safe. Free naman magprint sa mga
office niyo haha)
FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the MN ‘Anangel
Sky’ at Hamburg, Germany 242 coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel
sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel
Trading Corporation. On July 28, 1990, MN Anangel Sky arrived at the
port of Manila and, within the subsequent days, discharged the subject
cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order. Finding the four (4)
coils in their damaged state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the
consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as total
loss.
Despite receipt of a formal demand, defendants-appellees refused to
submit to the consignee’s claim. Consequently, plaintiff-appellant paid the
consignee P506,086.50 and was subrogated to the latter’s rights and
causes of action against defendants-appellees. Subsequently, plaintiff-
appellant instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by them,
to the consignee as insured.
Defendants-appellees imputed that the damage and/or loss was due to
pre-shipment damage, to the inherent nature, vice or defect of the goods,
or to perils, danger and accidents of the sea, or to insufficiency of packing
thereof, or to the act or omission of the shipper of the goods or their
representatives. In addition thereto, defendants-appellees argued that
their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability
provided for in the bill of lading and other pertinent laws. Finally,
defendants-appellees averred that, in any event, they exercised due
diligence and foresight required by law to prevent any damage/loss to said
shipment.
Trial Court: The RTC dismissed the Complaint because respondent had
failed to prove its claims with the quantum of proof required by law.
CA: Reversed. The CA ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the
damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on common carriers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “PACKAGE LIMITATION” of liability under Section 4 (5)
of COGSA is applicable to the case at bar.
In sum, the issues boil down to three:
1. Whether petitioners have overcome the presumption of negligence
of a common carrier
2. Whether the notice of loss was timely filed
3. Whether the package limitation of liability is applicable
HELD:
Negligence:
Corollary to the foregoing, mere proof of delivery of the goods in good
order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their
destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the
carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the
loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the transporter shall be held
responsible.
That petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence is
revealed in the case at bar by a review of the records and more so by the
evidence adduced by respondent.
Notice of Loss:
Petitioners claim that pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), respondent should have filed its Notice of
Loss within three days from delivery.
We are not persuaded. First, the above-cited provision of COGSA
provides that the notice of claim need not be given if the state of the goods,
at the time of their receipt, has been the subject of a joint inspection or
survey. As stated earlier, prior to unloading the cargo, an Inspection
Report as to the condition of the goods was prepared and signed by
representatives of both parties.
Second, as stated in the same provision, a failure to file a notice of claim
within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed within one
year. This one-year prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the
consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the bill of lading.
In Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that a claim is
not barred by prescription as long as the one-year period has not lapsed.
Package limitation:
Assuming arguendo they are liable for respondent’s claims, petitioners
contend that their liability should be limited to US$500 per package as
provided in the Bill of Lading and by Section 4(5)[52] of COGSA.
On the other hand, respondent argues that Section 4(5) of COGSA is
inapplicable, because the value of the subject shipment was declared by
petitioners beforehand, as evidenced by the reference to and the insertion
of the Letter of Credit or “L/C No. 90/02447” in the said Bill of Lading.
A bill of lading serves two functions. First, it is a receipt for the goods
shipped. Second, it is a contract by which three parties -- namely, the
shipper, the carrier, and the consignee -- undertake specific responsibilities
and assume stipulated obligations. In a nutshell, the acceptance of the bill
of lading by the shipper and the consignee, with full knowledge of its
contents, gives rise to the presumption that it constituted a perfected and
binding contract.
Further, a stipulation in the bill of lading limiting to a certain sum the
common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction of a cargo -- unless the
shipper or owner declares a greater value -- is sanctioned by law. There
are, however, two conditions to be satisfied: (1) the contract is reasonable
and just under the circumstances, and (2) it has been fairly and freely
agreed upon by the parties. The rationale for, this rule is to bind the
shippers by their agreement to the value (maximum valuation) of their
goods.
It is to be noted, however, that the Civil Code does not limit the liability of
the common carrier to a fixed amount per package. In all matters not
regulated by the Civil Code, the right and the obligations of common
carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and special
laws. Thus, the COGSA, which is suppletory to the provisions of the Civil
Code, supplements the latter by establishing a statutory provision limiting
the carrier’s liability in the absence of a shipper’s declaration of a higher
value in the bill of lading. The provisions on limited liability are as much a
part of the bill of lading as though physically in it and as though placed
there by agreement of the parties.
In the case before us, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting
the carrier’s liability. Neither did the shipper declare a higher valuation of
the goods to be shipped. This fact notwithstanding, the insertion of the
words “L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for petitioners’ liability.
First, a notation in the Bill of Lading which indicated the amount of the
Letter of Credit obtained by the shipper for the importation of steel sheets
did not effect a declaration of the value of the goods as required by the bill.
That notation was made only for the convenience of the shipper and the
bank processing the Letter of Credit.
Second, in Keng Hua Paper Products v. CA we held that a bill of lading
was separate from the Other Letter of Credit arrangements. We ruled
thus:
“(T)he contract of carriage, as stipulated in the bill of lading in the present
case, must be treated independently of the contract of sale between the
seller and the buyer, and the contract of issuance of a letter of credit between
the amount of goods described in the commercial invoice in the contract of
sale and the amount allowed in the letter of credit will not affect the validity
and enforceability of the contract of carriage as embodied in the bill of
lading. As the bank cannot be expected to look beyond the documents
presented to it by the seller pursuant to the letter of credit, neither can the
carrier be expected to go beyond the representations of the shipper in the
bill of lading and to verify their accuracy vis-à-vis the commercial invoice and
the letter of credit. Thus, the discrepancy between the amount of goods
indicated in the invoice and the amount in the bill of lading cannot negate
petitioner’s obligation to private respondent arising from the contract of
transportation.”
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners’ liability should be computed based
on US$500 per package and not on the per metric ton price declared in the
Letter of Credit.
Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas (basura ng pagkakasulat ng full text)
FACTS:
Appeal of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., defendant in the Court below,
from a judgment of the said court (Court of First Instance of Batangas) in
its Civil Case No. 834, wherein appellee Herminio L. Nocum was plaintiff,
sentencing appellant to pay appellee the sum of P1,351.00 for actual
damages and P500.00 as attorney's fees with legal interest from the filing
of the complaint plus costs.
Appellee, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a
trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a
consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in
said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and
miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The findings of fact of the trial
court are not assailed. The appeal is purely on legal questions.
According to Severino Andaya, a witness for the plaintiff, a man with a box
went up the baggage compartment of the bus where he already was and
said box was placed under the seat. They left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in
the morning and when the explosion occurred, he was thrown out. PC
investigation report states that thirty seven (37) passengers were injured.
The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a
passenger whose name he does not know and who told him that it
contained miscellaneous items and clothes. He helped the owner in
loading the baggage which weighed about twelve (12) kilos and because
of company regulation, he charged him for it twenty-five centavos (P0.25).
From its appearance, there was no indication at all that the contents were
explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box because he just
relied on the word of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of defendant company corroborated the
testimony of Mendoza and he said, among other things, that he was
present when the box was loaded in the truck and the owner agreed to pay
its fare. He added that they were not authorized to open the baggages of
passengers because instruction from the management was to call the
police if there were packages containing articles which were against
regulations.
Trial Court: against appellant. The main basis of the trial court's decision
is that appellant did not observe the extraordinary or utmost diligence of a
very cautious person required under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred as a matter of law in not absolving
appellant from liability resulting from the explosion of firecrackers
contained in a package, the contents of which were misrepresented by a
passenger.
HELD:
There is no question that Bus No. 120 was road worthy when it left its
Manila Terminal for Lucena that morning of December 5, 1960. The
injuries suffered by the plaintiff were not due to mechanical defects but to
the explosion of firecrackers inside the bus which was loaded by a co-
passenger.
Turning to the present case, it is quite clear that extraordinary or utmost
diligence of a very cautious person was not observed by the defendant
company. The service manual, exhibits "3" and "3-A," prohibits the
employees to allow explosives, such as dynamite and firecrackers to be
transported on its buses. To implement this particular rule for 'the safety of
passengers, it was therefore incumbent upon the employees of the
company to make the proper inspection of all the baggages which are
carried by the passengers.
It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were
allowed to be loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with
the passenger carrying the same as to what was in it, since its "opening ...
was folded and tied with abaca." According to His Honor, "if proper and
rigid inspection were observed by the defendant, the contents of the box
could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by the
passenger to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated
by Dispatcher Cornista, employees should call the police if there were
packages containing articles against company regulations." That may be
true, but it is Our considered opinion that the law does not require as
much. Article 1733 is not as unbending as His Honor has held, for it
reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be
"according to all the circumstances of each case." In fact, Article 1755
repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances."
In this particular case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true
the passengers of appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for
something over which they had no control, fairness demands that in
measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance
must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to
be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to
the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be
lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is
entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests
the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally
made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are
already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as
suggested by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling
the passenger to submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger had
already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally
protected domain. Police officers acting without judicial authority secured in
the manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of constitutional
inhibitions designed to protect individual human rights and liberties. Withal,
what must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement
of the fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein
involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose on the
right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how
easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
Since We hold that appellant has succeeded in rebutting the presumption
of negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for
the safety of its passengers, "according to the circumstances of the (each)
case", We deem it unnecessary to rule whether or not there was any
fortuitous event in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the trial court is reversed and
the case is dismissed, without costs.
Cangco v. Manila Railroad
FACTS:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. Upon the occasion in
question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with
his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's office and extends along in front
of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several
coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio
Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level
of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff
Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact
with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under
him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from
the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
It is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition,
and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious.
He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result
of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was performed and the
member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in
evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the
process of his curation.
Lower Court: plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment
was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the
plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent is liable.
HELD: Yes.
It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were
guilty of negligence. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is
liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex
contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and
not to culpa contractual
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract
two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption
of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer
either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he
is relieved from liability.
As a general rule it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing
creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact
upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of
negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if
the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would
have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their
wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be
no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to
alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
At the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk,
and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment.
Brinas v. People
FACTS:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of
January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad
station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool
and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio
Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left
Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter among the
passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were relieved, with
Victor Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor,
and Hermogenes Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching
Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train
slowed down and the conductor shouted 'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Thereupon,
the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of
Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the
other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly
picked up speed. As a result, the old woman and the child stumbled and
they were seen no more. It took three minutes more before the train
stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the victims were not among the
passengers who disembarked thereat.
Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were
found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to
investigate, they found the lifeless body of a female child, about 2 feet from
the railroad tracks, sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand
resting on the forehead, and with the back portion of the head crushed.
The investigators also found the corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away
from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left
hand missing. The head was located farther west between the rails. An
arm was found midway from the body of the child to the body of the old
woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the
scene. Later, the bodies were Identified as those of Martina Bool and
Emelita Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina was a
train ticket.
CFI: Clemente Brinas guilty of double homicide.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner is guilty.
HELD: Yes.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common
carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they
slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a
matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed,
some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to
disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of
a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they
are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop
when said stop was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent
Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant's announcement was
premature and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact
that immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated
to full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train
suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was made while
the train was still in Barrio Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and
erroneous announcement of petitioner' appelant Briñas. This
announcement prompted the victims to stand and proceed to the nearest
exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely
seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up
speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct
and natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.
Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina
Bool to go to the door of the coach while the train was still in motion and
that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent
court that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and
erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the
deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the
victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from
criminal liability.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed slim of P12,000.00 corresponding to the
indemnity for the sole fact of death. This indemnity arising from the fact of
death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others are still subject to the
determination of the court based on the evidence presented. The fact that
the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no
moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and
distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award
for death indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina
Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita
Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Philippine National Railways v. IAC
FACTS:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union
and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which
was on its way to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the
railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in
the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's
express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its passengers,
eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) others suffered physical
injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer,
Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection
without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn
the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed
the instant action for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in
their Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and as
affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the
negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver,
Romeo Hughes.
Lower Court: in favor of defendants. Ordered plaintiffs to pay damages.
ISSUE: Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit
Incorporated and Honorio Cabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine
National Railways was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles, or whether or both were negligent?
HELD:
Defendants endeavored to show that the proximate and immediate cause
of the collision was the negligence of the bus driver because the driver did
not make a stop before ascending the railtrack; he did not heed the
warning or shoutings of bystanders and passengers and proceeded in
traversing the railtrack at a fast speed; that the bus driver was in fact
violating the Land Transportation and Traffic Code for failure to "stop, look,
and listen" at the intersection, before crossing the railtrack; that it is
incumbent upon him to take the necessary precautions at the intersection
because the railroad track is in itself a warning; and the bus driver ignored
such a warning and must assume the responsibility for the result of the
motion taken by him.
Except the testimony of the train engineer Cabardo, there is no admissible
evidence to show that indeed, the bus driver did not take the necessary
precaution in traversing the track. Note that he first noticed the bus when it
was only 15 meters away from him; he could not have possibly noticed the
position of the bus before negotiating the track.
On the other hand, it was shown by plaintiff that the bus driver Romeo
Hughes took the necessary precautions in traversing the track.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and in fact asked
the conductor to alight and made a "Look and Listen" before proceeding;
the conductor had done just that and made a signal to proceed when he
did not see any oncoming train.
The evidence disclosed that the train was running fast because by his own
testimony, the train engineer had testified that before reaching the station
of Calumpit the terrain was downgrade and levelled only after passing the
Calumpit; the tendency of the train, coming from a high point is to
accelerate as the gravity will necessarily make it so, especially when it is
pulling seven coaches loaded with goods and passengers.
Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was dragged and
thrown into a ditch several meters away; the train had stopped only after
the engine portion was about 190 meters away from the fallen bus; several
passengers were injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively
indicate that the train was speeding, because if it were moving at moderate
speed, it would not run some 190 meters after impact and throw the bus at
quite a distance especially so when it is claimed that the train's emergency
brakes were applied.
It may be argued that a railroad is not subject to the same restrictions to
the speed of its train as a motorists; but it does not follow that a train will be
permitted to run fast under all conditions at any rate of speed it may
choose. It must regulate its speed with proper regard for the safety of
human life and property considering the surrounding circumstances
particularly the nature of the locality.
Cabardo's route included the passage over the said intersection; he could
have noticed that it is a very busy intersection because the crossroad leads
to the Calumpit Poblacion as well as to the neighboring town of Hagonoy;
there was a parking lot by the side of the track whereat passengers board
jeepneys for the neighboring barrios and towns; stalls abound in the vicinity
and bystanders congregate nearby. A prudent train operator must, under
the circumstances, slacken his speed almost for the protection of motorists
and pedestrians, not only when a collision is inevitable but even if no
hindrance is apparent on the way;
Moreover, there was an intermittent rain at the time of the collision (see
stipulation of facts and photographs); the condition of the weather was
such that even if for this reason alone, the train engineer should have
foreseen that danger of collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery
road; he should have taken extra precaution by considerably slackening its
speed. This he failed to do even if the nature of his job required him to
observe care exercised by a prudent man.
The stipulation of facts between the parties show that there was no
crossing bar at the railroad intersection at Calumpit, Bulacan at the time of
collision; the plaintiff contended and the defendants did not deny, that
there were no signal lights, semaphores, flagman or switchman thereat;
the absence of such devices, the plaintiff argues constitute negligence on
the part of the Philippine National Railways.
A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a flagman, or to
maintain signals at every intersection; only at such places reasonably
necessary; what is considered reasonably necessary will depend on the
amount of travel upon the road, the frequency with which trains pass over it
and the view which could be obtained of trains as they approach the
crossing, and other conditions.
As has been amply discussed, the crossroad at the intersection at
Calumpit is one which is a busy thoroughfare; the flow of vehicular traffic
thereat is huge. It can be said also that, since there is no other railtrack
going North except that one passing at Calumpit, trains pass over it
frequently;
A portion of the intersection is being used as a parking area with stalls and
other obstructions present making it difficult, if not impossible, to see
approaching trains (see photographs).
The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross bar, or signal
light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance
requiring it, because public safety demands that said devices or
equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid jurisprudence. In the
opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of "STOP, LOOK, LISTEN"
warnings would not be sufficient protection of the motoring public as well
as the pedestrians, in the said intersection;
PNR was perforce estopped from disavowing the prejudicial repercussion
of an admission in judicio. Even as the laws governing the creation and
rehabilitation of the PNR were entirely mute on its power to sue and be
sued, respondent court nonetheless opined that such prerogative was
implied from the general power to transact business pertinent or
indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the railroad company under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as amended by Republic Act No. 6366.
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the authority in this
jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of a railroad company to install a
semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the
public of the passing train amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of
respondent court AFFIRMED.
Junio v. Manila Railroad
FACTS:
At about 11:40 o'clock on the night of April 13, 1930, the plaintiffs herein
with some other persons were traveling in a PU-Car on the road between
Calasiao and Santa Barbara. When they arrived at the intersection of the
road of the defendant's railway, the car tried to cross the track and collided
while the engine of the night express which left Dagupan for Manila at 11
o'clock that same night and which was then passing over the crossing in
question at great speed. As a result of the collision, the car was thrown
some distance, plaintiff Junio's right leg was amputated and her right arm
fractured, and Soloria received various injuries on her head.
The aforementioned crossing is situated in the town of Calasiao and the
same is presumed to be dangerous due to the fact that gates were
required at that crossing. On the night of the accident, the gates were not
lowered and there was no notice to the effect that they were not operated
at night or that they were temporarily out of order. However, a notice to the
effect that that was a railroad crossing was there.
As a general rule, the rights and obligations between the public and a
railroad company at a public crossing are mutual and reciprocal. Both are
under mutual obligation to exercise due care to avoid causing or receiving
injury. Each is in duty bound to exercise reasonable or ordinary care
commensurate with the risk and danger involved.
In the case under consideration, the driver alleges that he slowed down
from 19 miles an hour, at which rate he was then going, to 16 miles, and
that he was on the lookout for any approaching train, while the engineer
insists that he rang the bell and sounded the whistle before reaching the
crossing. Both parties claim to be free from guilt, and if the defendant
company were completely so, the plaintiffs would have no cause of action
against it.
Trial Court: driver of the car was negligent. Held that plaintiffs are
responsible for the driver's alleged negligence.
ISSUE: whether or not there was contributory negligence
HELD:
From the evidence, it is obvious that the defendant as well as the driver of
the car in which the plaintiffs were passengers were negligent, the former
because, by installing the gates at the place or crossing where the accident
occurred, it had voluntarily imposed upon itself the obligation to operate
them even at night and to close them every time a train passed in order to
avoid causing injury to the public. It has been said that the gates constitute
an invitation to the public to pass without fear of danger, and failure to
operate them conveniently constitutes negligence on the part of the
company.
The driver was, likewise, negligent because he did not comply with his duty
to slacken the speed of the car and to "look and listen" before crossing the
intersection and above all, because he did not maintain a reasonable
speed so as to permit him to stop any moment if it were necessary in order
to avoid an accident. If, in the present case, the car had been running at a
reasonable speed, there is no doubt that he could have stopped it instantly
upon seeing the train from a distance of five meters.
If the action for damages were brought by the driver, it is certain that it
would not prosper in view of the fact that he had incurred in a notorious
contributory negligence. But the persons who instituted the action are the
appellants who were mere passengers of the car. Therefore, the question
raised is whether the driver's negligence is imputable to them so as to bar
them from the right to recover damages suffered by them by reason of the
accident.
A well-recognized principle of law that the negligence of a driver, who, in
turn, is guilty of contributory negligence, cannot be imputed to a passenger
who has no control over him in the management of the vehicle and with
whom he sustains no relation of master and servant. This rule is applied
more strictly when, as in the present case, hired cars or those engaged in
the public service, are involved.
The doctrine prevails in a few states that the contributory negligence of the
driver of a private conveyance is imputable to a person voluntarily riding
with him. But the general rule is that the negligence of the driver of a
vehicle is not to be imputed to an occupant thereof who is injured at a
crossing through the combined negligence of the driver and the railroad
company when such occupant is without fault and has no control over the
driver. And the law almost universally now recognized is that when one
accepts an invitation to ride in the vehicle of another, without any authority
or purpose to direct or control the driver or the movements of the team,
and without any reason to doubt the competency of the driver, the
contributory negligence of the owner or driver of the conveyance will not be
imputed to the guest or passenger, so as to bar him of the right to recover whatsoever why they should be made responsible for the driver's
damages from a railroad company whose negligence occasions injury to negligence. The doctrine established in the cases cited above should be
him at a crossing while he is so riding. This rule has been applied in a applied to the case at bar and it should be held that the appellants herein
number of cases involving the corresponding relation between the driver of are entitled to recover from the appellee damages occasioned by the
an automobile and an occupant having no control over him. The rule is not accident of which they were victims.
confined to cases of gratuitous transportation, but has been applied where
a conveyance is hired, and the passenger exercises no further control over
the driver than to direct him to the place to which he wishes to be taken.
Nor is any distinction made between private and public vehicles, such as
street cars and stages.

As a general rule the negligence of a driver of a vehicle approaching a

railroad crossing, in failing to look and listen for approaching trains, cannot
be imputed to an occupant of the vehicle who is without personal fault,
unless such driver is the servant or agent of the occupant, unless they are
engaged in a joint enterprise whereby responsibility for each other's acts
exists, or unless the occupant is under the driver's care or control or has
the right to direct and control the driver's actions, or where the driver is of
obvious or known imprudence or incompetency. This rule that negligence
of the driver is not imputable to an occupant only applies to cases in which
the relation of master and servant or principal and agent does not exist
between the parties, or where the occupant has no right to direct or control
the driver's action, as where the occupant is a passenger for hire or is the
guest of the owner or driver and has no reason to believe the driver
careless or imprudent, or where the occupant is seated away from the
driver or is separated from him by an inclosure so that he is without
opportunity to discover danger and inform the driver thereof.

A passenger in the automobile of another having no control over the owner

driving the car or the operation of the car which he occupied merely as
passenger was not chargeable with contributory negligence of the owner
and driver at a railroad crossing.

In railroad crossing accident, negligence of truck driver was not imputable

to truck passenger not himself guilty of contributory negligence.

There is nothing of record to show that the appellants herein have incurred
in any negligence imputable to them and we do not see any reason