International Studies in Social History

Rgvor,urroN AND
Gsnerøl Ed,itot': Mørcel vøn d'er Lind'en, CoUNTERREVoLUTToN
Int e r n øti on ø I I n sti t ut e oJ' S o ci ø I Hi st or y, Arn'st er d' ørn
Cløss Straggle in ø Moscrw Metø,l Føctot )t
Trøde (Jnions, Imru.igrøtion ønd' Iznrnigrønts in Ewrope 1160-1113
Editecl by Rinrrs Peuniux and Judith Roosblad

Cløss ørud. Other It{.ent'iti.es

Eclited by Lex Heertna vau Voss and Marcel varl cler Linden

Rebelliows Førn'ilies
Edited by Jan l(ok Kevin Murphy

Experiencing Wøges
Edltecl by Plter Scholliers ar-rd Leonard Schwarz

Th e IwøginørY Reu olwtion

Michael Seidman

/â
Bergbabn Boohs
NElÙl YORK. OXFORD
 First published in 2005 by

Bergltahn Boohs

www.BerghahnBooks.com CoNTnNTS
O 2005 l(evin Murphy

All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages

for the purposes of criticism and review, lÌo part olthis book
may be reprocluced in any form or by any fiìealts) electronic or
rnechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any Archives VI
infclrmation storage and retrieval system now known or to be Glossary of f'emrs vii
invented, without written permission of the publisher.
Acknorvledgenlents ix
Berghahn Books and tlre author would like to thauk Europe- Introduction I
Asia Studies for perrnission to use the author's article in,Chapter 5.
I The Emerging Working-Class Movemenr 9
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
2 Revolution and Collective Acrion, Civil War and
Mur¡rhy, Kevin (Kcvin joseph), Ph.D.
Personal Survival 43
Iìevoluti<xr ¿nd countcrrei,olution : class strugglc in a Moscorv metal factory / by Kcvin Murphy.
p. cm. -- (Lrtcrnational studies in social history)
Includes bibliographical refèrenccs ¿nd indcx. 3 Class Conflict during the New Economic policy 82
ISBN I-57181-429-9 (alk. paper)
l. W<rrking class--Soviet Uniou--History. 2. L¿bor--Sovict Union--History- 3. Social 4 Everyday Life under Developing Stalinisni 122
classcs--Sovict Union--Histortr 4. Soci¿l confìict--Soviet Union--History. 5. Sovier
Union--Soci¿l condititxls--I917-1945. ó.Moskovskiæ mctallurgicheskiæ zavod "Ser¡r i
nrolot". I. Title. II. Selics. 5 Catalysts for Dissent: Oppositior-r Groups ancl Tendencies t55
HD8526.M79 2005 ó The Stalinist Counrerrevolution: Production fbr
947.084'l--dc22 2004055430 Production's Sake 186

Conclusion: Revolution versus Counterrevolution 11^

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper.

 Ancrrryes Gr,oss¡ny oF TERMS

Gosudarstvennyi archiv Rossiiskoi fècleratsii ( GARF ) brøk defective output

State,A'r'chive of the Russian Federation
bed,niøh poor peasant
Rossiskii gosuclarswennyi archit, ekorlomiki (RGAE) l¿hozrøschet commercial cost accounting
Russian State Archive of the Econorny holhhoz collective fàrm
' kuløk rich peasant
Rossiiskii gosuclarsrvennyi archiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASpI)
Left SR Left Socialist Revolutionary Party
Russian State A.r'chive of Social-Political History
MI( Moscow Committee of the Comrnunist party
Tsentr khrane'iia dokumentov molodezh.ykh organizatsii (TsI(hDMo) MKG Moscow City Party Committee
center for Preservation of Records of Youth organizations (to be merged MKK Moscow Control Comurission of the Conrmunist partl,
with RGASPI)
MOPR International Aid Society fbr Revolution Fighters
Rossiiskii gosudarsrvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv g. Moskvy (RGIAgM) Narkomtrud People's Commissariat of Labor
Russian State Historical fuchive of Moscow NEP New Economic Policy
NKVD People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
Tsentral'nyi Munitsipal'nyi archiv Moskvy (TsMAM)
Okhrana Tsarist secret police
Central Municipal Archive of Moscow
OGPU Unified State Political Adrninistration; political police
Tsentral'nyi arkl-riv obschesrvennukh dvizhenii Moskvy (TsAODM) othhod.nilz peasant engaged in seasonal labor
Central A.r'chive of Social Movements of Moscorv pud approxirnately 3ó pounds

Rossiiskii gosudarsrvenr-ryi arkhiv Moskovskoi oblasti ( RGAMO) Centr.al

røikorn District Committee of the Communist party
State Archive of Moscow Oblasr søbbotnil¿ Voluntary rvorkday
RSDLP Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party
Rabkrin Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate
RI(I( Ratcs Conflict Conlrnission
sørnol¿r,itil¿ø self-criticism
seyed.niøþ. middle peasaur
 \4tl Glossøry of Terws

sovhhoz state fàrrn

sruychkø link betweell town and country
SR Socialist Revolutionary Party
Sovnarknonr Council of People 's Commissars (Sovnarknom)
TNB Norm Setting Bureau
Vesenkha Supreme Council of the National Economy
VTsSPS All-Union Central Trade Union Council
vKP(b) All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
VLI$M All-Union Leninist Cornrnunist Youth League (the
AcTcNowLEDGEMENTS
I(omsomol)
VTsII( All Union Central Executive Committee of Soviets
TsI( Central Comr¡ittee of the Cornr'¡runist Party
TSKK Central Control Colnmission of Cornmunist Party
Zhenotclel Women's Section of the Cornmunist Party Ma'y people ha'e aided me duri'g rhe course of this project. I owe much of
ZRK Closed Workers' Cooperative the strength of the study r.vliich follows to being in the right place at the right.
titne, and surrouncled by so much experrise, cledication to ìcholarship, a-nd
pure talent. I owe a special thanks to the peerless dissertation committee that
snpervisecl this project in the Compararive History program at Brandeis uni-
'versity. I am grateful for their thoughtful comlnents and advice
over a long
and, at times, difficult process of research and rvriting. Gregory Freeze, thi
preeurinenr social historian of Russian aud Soviet sociery fìrst suggested a
systematic factory study and insistecl that I pursue rigorously any and all
archival materials, challenges which I have done my best to porrrr.. Donalcl
Filtzer, the indisputable ar.rthority on rhe soviet working clais, made special
arral.ìgemeltts to act as an outsicle reader and repeatedly inquirecl about the
status of my "fiual" revisions of the nranuscript. without Don's friendship
and belief in the importance of my project this book would never have seer.r
the light of day. A.ntony Polo'sky acted as commirtee chair and conrinued to
of-fer encouragement long aÍìer his insdtutional relationship with the projcct
had e¡rdecl.
,\mong Antor.ry's many words of rvisdom, trre most fortuitous u,as his
suggestion that I contact Berghahn Books. Having heard a litanl, ef f¡q¡¡s.
stories frorn first-tirne authors who l-rave published elsewhere, I irave to say
that I arn absolutely elated with the professionarism a'd generosity with
rvhich my work has bee' handled by everyone at Berghahn Books a'd the
Institute for social History in Amsterclam. I thank Marion Berghahn for her
advice and her patience during an extended delay afier the bir-th of my son
Peter. Catherine Kirby meticLrloLrsly copy eclitecl the entire manuscript a¡cl
chlistine Marciniak did a remarkable job typesetting the book. vivian
Berghahn and Michael Dempsel' responded promptly roa seemingly e'dless
string of inquiries I posed about the rnysterious producion prociis, wl-rich
turrls out to have been not quite as nrysterious as I had in-raginecl. Anclrew
Ësson cleployed his considerable artistic talent in desigr-ring ãou.. that cloes
"
credit to the story it introcluces. Marcel van der Linden,s enthusiastic com-

,S,
 Achnowlodgetnents Achnowledgernønts
-..------------ l-'^

melìts reassured me that rny rvork rvas iurportant enougl-r to reach a wider inspirational and principled voice. I especially wanr ro thank Briar-r I(elly,
audience beyond Russian specialists, and IQistina Graafï developed a mar-
Ahmed shawki, David crouch, Mike Haynes, Alpana Mehta, John charlton,
ketir-rg strategy to make sure thar this would happen. Two anonyrnous read-
sebastian Budgen, and Bill Roberts for helping rne keep things in perspective
ers offered very constructive and detailed criticisms. I hope that I have done o\rer the lasr ren years. If this book offers even just a few irxightì for those
their suggestions justice. actively involved in fighting for a better world, then my efforts will have been
The A,merican council of reachers of Russian and the cornparative His- lrrorth it.
tory Prograrn at Bra¡rdeis university sponsored several of r-r-ry trips to Russia.
Numerous scholars offered tlioughtful conÌments on parts of this manu- kevinj.rnurphy@umb.eclu
script. I owe a special thanks to Brian IGll¡ wl-rose scholarship in Alnerican January 2005
labor l-ristory sets a high standard and whose close reading of this stucly
improved it immeasnrably, and to lan Plamper, Frank schauff, Michaer David
Fox, Sally Boniece, Wendy Goldura^, and Jeffery Rossman for their many
suggestions. My colleagues at the Universitl, of Massachusetts ar Boston-
Lester Bartson and Esther Kingston-Mallll-generously offered their encour,
agement and advice.
This project involved five lengthy research trips to Moscow, none ofwhich
rvould have been possible-or productive-rvitl-rout the l-relp and support
offèred by urany historians, archivists, friends, ancl family. I offer special
thanks to the Moscow archive expert) Leonid wientraub, a dear lì-iend wirh-
out who¡n tlis project would havé been impossible. I also"waur to thank
Lena Drozdova, Marina Dobronovskaia, ancl all of the many archivists who
generously assisted me during my visits. Andrei Sokolov kirldly pointed me in
the right direction during rny first trip to Moscow. Alexei Gusev ancl Simon
Pirani challenged many of my assumptions about the Russian Revolution and
repeatedly reminded me about the irnportance of critical, non-dogrnatic
Marxism. Philip Gerstein reviervecl literally hundreds of nry Russian transla-
tions. I also r,vant to thank Bob Dahlgren, Kaveh A-t'asiabi, James and Jodi
Murphy, and cathy a'd George woods for their friendship. James and Else
Murphy gave rÌÌe the fì'eedon'r to p.rsue rny dreams. oksana and peter gave
me their love and toleratecl the long hours it took to finally finish this book.
Last, but not least, I want to acknorvledge the intellectual and personal
contribtttions of the mauy intelnational socialists I worked with over a period
of fìfteen years, liour whom I have learned much. For revolutionary socialists,
the problem of understanding rhe fate of Russian Revolution has always
meant far rnore than it has for the small community of acadelnics who have
grappled with it intellectually. The "Russian Qr-restion" remains, even after
the collapse of Stalinism, one of the central issues that those who seek to
change the world must colìfront and arlswer. How rvas a movement based on
egalitarianism and freedon-r transformecl into a system based on exploitation
and repressionf In rnauy ways this book is rry auswer to questions that I
startecl to ask as a teenager sneaking into the stacks ofPriucetonrs Firestone
Library. I u,ill not fèign neLrtrality or-r the trvo topics that fì-ame the Russian
Revolution: october and stalinism. There is no doubt in my mind that the
Marxists got it right. Leon Trotsky ar.rd Torr1, ClifTprovided the theoretical
groundlvork for mr.rch of my understancling of the Russian Revolution, u,hile
Victor Selge acted as the "conscie nce " olthe Revolution by giving it such an
 In Mernory oJ'
Jørnes Hørold. Marphy II
 fNrnouucrroN

The opening of the archives of the former soviet union has altered funda-
mentally the stucly of the most globally significant social upheaval of the
twentieth centur)¡' preseuting historians of the Russian Revolutioll with both
exciting opportunities a'd awesome challe'ges. The .,hiclclen tra'script" of
the sentiments ancl actions of ordinary people , which social' historians in
western Europe and North America ha'e labóred io pai'staki'gly to recover
in recent years,t has until now been left armost entireiy uirexamlnld in soviet
historiograph} Archival limitations compellcd even the ¡rost clilige¡t a¡cl
objective historians to reconcile themselves to a predominantly top-down
view of the soviet state's attempr to realize cha'ging goals and prlorities. The
availability of new sources rìearìs that it is no* poriibl., for thi first time, to
measure the reliability of prevailing historiography agai.st an e.rpirically
grounded reconstruction of working-class lifè in the revolutionary era.
The astounding variety and volu¡ne of accessible primary'raterials
_ 'ewly
that focus on the working class is not accidental. Not just soviet authorities,
but all contemporary contestants recognized the combativeness and poten-
tial power of R¡-rssian rvorkers in the earry twentieth cellrury. Repotøtiin ønd.
counterrwolwt'ion atternpts to fill a lo'g-vaca't gap i' the srudy of the Russ-
ian working class by providing the fìr'st systemaìic, archival-cliii'e¡ str.rcly to
span the revolurionary era. It examines that period through the prism of a
single strategically important fàctor¡ tracing the fluctuatións in sl-rop floor
activisnr and bringing the voices of r,vorkers themselves to bear on the central
questions about the characrer of the Russian Revolution and the orisins
of
the- Stalinist sysrem.
_ For the better part of the last fifty years, rhe historiography of the Russian
Revolution rvas itlextricably bound up in the all-consuming co¡fr-o¡tatio¡
known as the cold war. The stakes in that clebate r"... .*tr.rrrelt, hish: its
outcome would determine not rnerely the ascendancy of on" á
",iotl-re,
school of scholarly thought, but also the icleological legitin-racy of each of the
two preeminent world powers. Westeru scholarship u,as clominatecl þy rvhat
stephen cohen has aptly termed the "continuity i¡r.rtr,,, which posited an

N","r f*,htr ,*,t-r begin on page 7.

... rJ,
 Ret, o lu.ti on øn d Coøtøterrø, o lu.tion

uucomplicated, natural evolution from early Bolshevik organizatio'al

prac- rnents by Soviet historians ar-rd inflating the level of support for Stalipis¡r.
lT: t" the Gulags. These accou'ts typicalry bega' by hãtaing up Leni',s while historians could clraw on a lnountain of ernpirical data to prove popu-
whøt Is to Be Done? as a' embryouic àictaioriaf blueprint, fuñy áeveroped
lar participation during the epochal events of r9L7,6 several historia¡s rather
well before rhe Revolution. From here it was but a shoit step to tl-re
assertiol-r clumsily tried to do the same for stalin's "revolutior-1." Attenrpts to demon-
that a co'spiratorial had seizecl power in 1917 tlrrf ugh a cor_rp d,é_
strate such popular support legitirnized a revisionist version of the co¡tipu-
tat, morÌopolizecl tlie'rinority
state fbr its owr purposes, and created tie totalitarian
ity thesis, positing that various stalinist campaigns were indeed .,radical," rhat
party-srare. Through iro'discipli'e and brutal terror, the
Bolsheviks subse_ they authentically had reflected popular aspirations.T This ..revisionist" body
quently prevailed i' the civil war of lglg-1921, but the exhausted
vicrors of work-construcred, like the scholarship it targeted, ol1 scant archival evi-
u'ere forcecl to rerreat temporariry duri'g the Nerv Eco'omic policy
(NEP, clence of workers' sentiments-has left a lasting impression on the field, par-
r92l-1928). Drive' by ideological zealitry,the thesis co'cludes, the totali-
ticularly among u.s. scholars.s Yet fìfteen years after the doors to the archives
tarian machine then proceeded to pulverize society. state-iniposecl
collec- swung wide open, not a single source-driven study has supported either of
tivization, forced rapid industrialization, and mass te[ror ale thus viewecl
as the contending speculative argurnents-that workers rv..e èith". terrorizecl
organic elemenrs i' an i'evitable process clrive' by the Bolsheviks'
i'ner by the early Soviet srare or impressecl rvith Stalinism.
totalitarian logic.2
More recenrl¡ the postmodern (or linguistic) trend has challengecl both
For its part, the Soviet academl, took up the gauntlet thrown down
by the lneaning and utility of class as an analytical method for understanding the
critics of the ussR, mirrori'g wester' efforts i' the battle to
collsrruct a past. At its inception, as Alex callinicos has shown, postmodernism reflected
usable past. Lewis siegelbaum a'd Ronard Su'y ha'e characteriTed the Soviet the failed aspirations of the French New Left and the rightward drift of many
arademy's glowing, u'complicated re'dering of the past as
the ,.Immaculate fbrmer Marxists who had rejected class as the fundamental division in society.
conceptualization" of the soviet rvorki'g clãss.3 ThË depictio' of the steady '

The refusal to ground societal power relations within the class strucrures of
and heroic marclr of the soviet people frotn 1917 to*".d cçr',munism
under capitalisrn not only led postmodernisrs to pessimistic conclusions about the
the leadership of tl-re party was a'i'vertecr inrage of the ,,örigiual
sin,, ver- future, but also made it harder to attribute any coherence to the past. while
sion put forrvard by wester' acadernics. soviet scholars aJuan.ed li,rea,
postmodernism cloaks,itself ir-r a veneer of sophiótication, it offers no nerv
accourìrs purged of contingency, in which alternative political
strategies and tools for historians.e In a sumnary of recent trends in'European labor h,is-
possibilities were trivialized or completery ignored, a'å rvhich
depicted orcli- tory, Lex Heerma van voss and Marcel van der Linden sirnilarly situate the
.ary Soviet citizens as passive follor.vers of the dictates of an oner.i'g pa.ty.
rise of postmodernism rvithin the right shift in European and Arnerican pol-
Few issues in Soviet historiography have been more co'tesred
than that of itics in the 1980s ancl 1990s. while the optimism of the social movements of
working-class attit¡-rdes torvard the evolutio' of the stalinist
system. ,.It the 1960s and 1970s ir-rspited a generarion of historians to recor-lsrruct..his-
would be harcl to i'ragi'e alì irìterpretive colltroversy rvith the opposi'g
tory fiom below" by exploring the actions and recovering the voices of rvork-
sides farther apart," stephe' Ibtkin has arguecr, noti'g trrat historians depict
ing people, a sharp clecline in labor's fortunes over the next two decacles
"either disgru'tled workers who despisecl the regime or conterted workers
created the context ft¡r the pessimism that permeates much of the postmod-
who applauded it."a fu the government clair¡ecl to rule i'the'ame
of the ern vision. While van Voss and van der Linden cr.iticize the postmodern clrift
proletariat, questions about the relationship benveen the state
ald tìre work- for its retreat from overarching interpretations and argue fbr a return to the
ing class ellcompass issues crucial to an unclerstancling of Soviet society.
Horv "Grand Narrative" to explain the past, they applaucl the call to integrate gen-
did a lnovement that promised thoroughgoi'g sociafeqLrarity transform
i'ro der, religior-r, ethnicitl,, and non-workplace experience into the fabric of
its opposire-a sysrem of exploitatio' a'd repressio'i why dicl rhe rnosr
working-class history.l0 Indeed, the neecl fbr scrious atterìtion to the rnany-
u.ruly proletariat of the ce'tury corxe to toleràte the ascenianc), of a polit-
sided complexity of r,vorking-class experie'ce is nor,v almost universally
ical and eco'olnic systerl that, by every co.ceivable measu.., p.åu"d
accepted amollg labor historians, though this consensus calìnot be attributecl
onistic to working-class interestsl "irt"g-
to the postmodernist trantra.
scholarly responses to these problerns rrave bee' framed try the icleorogi-
cal irnperati'es of the cold war rather tha' by a thorough a'aíysis
The postmodern tum came rarher belatedry to soviet labor stuclies,
of archival occirrring almost silnukaneously with the collapse of the former soviet
sources. An integral compollent of the continuity thesis is the
,nass ,,Ììed Ter- union and the oper-ring of its archives. At a confèrence in 1990, prominenr
ror." while most of rl-re_historiography on terror fbcuses o'the 1930s,
eve. labor historians assertecl that the nerv lnerhoclology would offer qualitative
studies of early sovict labor have attempted to explairr the clemise
of worki'g- advauces over the previously dominant social history. Severai scholars
class militancy by echoir-rg continuity argLrmerlts with grossl¡,
inflatecl esti_ clairned that a more rextured view of Russian and Soviet labor could be
mates about early state repressio', corce.tration carnps]a'd
coerciou.s drarvu if historians turued arvay fiom their concem with class ftrrmation ancl
Rejecti'g cold war-i'spired paradigrns, rna'y ',revisio'ist" scholars of
class conflict in the factories and insread shifted their focus to workers, lives
tl-re 1980s lea'ed too far i'the opposiie crirection, raivery
repeati'g arg*- outside the rvorkplace. The linguistic influence inspired a call for close i¡r'es-
 R ev o lution ønd Coøntt:n ¿p olu.tion Introdøction

tigation of the "lang'age of class" and to reduce class to merely one of many considering the profbuncl social, political, and economic crisis that eruptecl at
"contested" identities. I I
the ver1, height of NEP." The state response e'tailed bri'gi'g together
Several rvorks demonstrate that postmodemisln provicles neither
the the- "forces that were to become the vehicles of extremist solutions'i and required
oretical fì'amework tlor tlìe r-nethodical tools necessary to address the
larger a ruling social stratuuì, "separated fiom the people and hostilely disposecl
interpretive questio's about the soviet working class. i. his Møgnetic
Mown- toward it." Moreover, Reirnan rejects the absurd ider4ification of Stalinism
tøin, steven Kotkin has the confidence to addiess these issues,iut his
study with socialism: "These two systems of ideas are not only different; in rnany
of "power at the micro-level" is tainted by the postmode'rist proclivity tå
respects they are diametrically opposed." In the most conpelling scholarly
view language as the source of power rerations, with rvorkers ,,speaki'g
ilol- study to date, Donald Filtzer argues that stalinism arose against thã backdrop
shevik." In his conclusion Kotki' cires a I93l visitor to Magniiogorsk
who of an increasingly divided and apolitical working class. preoccupied with pei-
recalled the piled corpses of starved peasants who had frozeÁto
àeath after sonal survival, rvorkers found the ffleans to subvert and challenee the state.
bei'g forced to live in tents during the wi'ter, and later wrote. ..The ceme-
but they did so on less favorable and less overtly confrol-rtatiorralte.ms than
tery grew faster than the steel works." Hostile to a nraterialist explanation
for previously.ls
the rise of Stalinism, ltowever, I(otkin concludes rvith a bizarreãnd indefen-
Reuolwtion ømd counterrevolutòon attempts to build on the strengths of
sible assertion o' rhe same page that the regirne's self-co'gratulatory,
çl¿i¡¡ the rich but limited pre-archival studies that have avoicled tl-re crucle cold
that "the recognized evils ofcapitalism" hacl been overcome-.,\4,as available
to war methodologl,. Rather than pickir-rg and choosing anecdotal data to
quell eve' the deepest doubrs" among workers.12 Like lfurkin,
David Hoff_ feconstruct evellts, a systentatic archival study of a strategically imporrant
man crudely associates Stalinism rvith socialism, asserting that tþe industrial-
metal factory restricts the selection of source rnaterials and minir-nizes the
izatiot'¡, of the 1930s "represenred a momeur of truth for
the Bolshevik issue of bias. The ce'tral role of the factory in soviet society has encouragecl
Revolutio'-a Marxist revolutio^ i' an overwhehni'gly peasant country.,,
several Western historians to follow the example set by Soviet scholars.rZ It
Yet Hofïn'ran largely avoids theor.etical quesrions aborit"stglinism,
focusiirg was iu their workplaces that Russian rvorkers forged an unprecedented se¡se
instead on recolìstructing the "sociar identity,, of peasant in-migrants
to of class solidariry ancl porver; here that socialists succeedèd i¡ infusi¡g the
Moscow, atte'rpting to do so by i'corporating a rnere hancrf-ur of archival
labor movement rvith revolutionary politics; ancl liere that both Tsarist ancl
workers' quotations.13.Matthew payne;s more serious rno'ograph
on the soviet authorities fbcused their social engineering eflorts. Moreover, the
consrruction of the Turksib railway inclucles a chronicle of brutãl aitacks
per_ soviet factory was much more than just a place of employment-it lay at the
petrated by ethnic Russians agai'st Kazhakh workers. payne takes
the ,,equal very heart ofr¡'orkers' civic life. fu Kenneth Straus has argued, the soviet fac-
opportunity" approach to ide'tity fetishism to absurd,levels, protesti'g tl-,"t,
tory acted as the cornmunity-organizing cenrer for food ar-rcl housing distri-
"Race should not be privileged above other funclalnental-åiuirior-,, in
the bution, as well as rvorkers' leisure activities.tZ
soviet worki'g class, such as peasart rvorke.versus urba' worker
or Because the party and the state clevoted extraorcli'ary effort, over a long
stakhanovite versus the 'selrìsh workers.',, yet pay'e's ow'evide'ce
shorvs period of tine, to winuing the hearts and minds of rank-ancl-file rnetahvorkl
tlrat race wøs the nrost divisive issue-certainly nrore significant than
tensio¡s ers, the Halnmer and sickle Factoryts (Guzhon or Moscorv Metalworks
caused by the stakhanov rrovemeut that only startecl seveu years
later. At a company for the pre-soviet period) provicles a potentially unequallecl source
loss to explain the dy'amic of the eth'ic tersions trrat he describes, pay'e
base for a case history of u,orkers' attitucles towarcl the Revolution ancl their
offers only the tautological assertion that the racis'r surged on Turksib
acquiescence in or support fbr the developrnent of Stalinism. Central conr-
because of "a crisis of identity.,'la
tnittee members spoke regularly at the plant, the party producecl one of the
several pre-archival studies point the way tovr,arcl an approach that'roves
earLiest fàctory llewspapers, and metalrvorkers located in a high-priority
beyor-rd the sirnplistic cold war srereorypes a'd rhe prjåuncl
co'fìrsion of industrl, in the political ceurer enjoyed considerable material ãduàr,tug.,
postmodemis'r. These rvorks fi'alre the evolution oistalinislr as
a process compared to their coullterparrs in other i¡rdustries and locales. If Soùet
ainred at rvhittli'g away the power workers had won in 1917. E.H.
carr and u'orkers gelerally exhibited a ser]se of "terror" in their relations with the state
R.w. Davies detail the intensifìcatio'of the labor process i'their semi'al_
in early soviet society, or later volunteered their support fbr stali'isnl, o'e
but fì'eque'tly overlooked-stLrcly of Soviet society duri'g NEp. Rather
than would reasonably expect that evidence of such senriments could be fou¡cl i¡
state repression, strike actions rvere avoidecl by tracle uni,cn interventiou,
as the largest metal factory in the capital.
over six million vt'orkers turued to arbitration in industrial clisputes.
Chris A rich and diverse docuurent base provicles the fbundation ft¡r the r-nost
ward's study of cofto'r workers shorvs trrat in 1923 the regirnË was .,rnore
extensive archival study of the Russian rvorking class during the Revolution-
than willi'g to accor-'lodate itself to trre rvorkf'rce
,,, bit later, ,.as the ary era. Three fàctory-specifìc collections in the Central Archive of Social
1920s drerv to a close, there was a move arvay fì-orn comþrornises
a,rã torvard Movements of Moscow (TsAoDM), rhe central Municipal Archive of
something rese'rbling mobilizatio' on the part of the g'over'rnent.,,
Michal Moscorv (TsMAM), and the state,A,r'chive of the llussiar-r Federation (GARF)
Reima' posits that the cha'ge i'state poricy .,ca'not bã u'derstoocl without
of-fer an unparalleled source base for a vierv of rvorker-state relatiol-rs. For thá

,.'.:{,
 R et o lution øn
;;;;;i;;;;;;.;;;,,;;;;;
managelltent) ancl owners'
;;:;;;; ö;;;;:;;;;;il;;.
association reports and annoturcemeuts are uti-
lized, supplemented u,ith pertinent material from workers'autobiographies.
For r9r7, managefirellt, press reports) fàctory committee, union, and-party
records illustrate the general trajectory of events, rvith workers, lnemoirs
employed as supplcmentary material rvhen their general accuracy can be ver-
ified in colltemporary sources. Factory and shop-level union and party min-
utes offer a largely untapped view ol workers' discussions, grievances, and
activity for the early revolutionary period through NEp, along with factory
anrlouncefftents and alìonymous lÌotes to speakers. soviet, partr and union
summaries (wod.ki) are included bttt uot emphasized in reconstrucring evepts
during the l920s.re All historians who study the period after l92g will
encounter a source problem that mirrors the repressirre descent of the regime .
While open and vibrant discussiot-l on various issues was the norm cluring the
early revolutionary period, the state's most ardent loyalists at the factory
level later attempted to curb public prol'loulìcements against state policies,
aud were largely successful in doi'g so. saod.ki and factory rlewspaper
(Mørtenoukø) articles offer iuvaluable insights on workers'disse¡t, the effects
of intimidation campaigns, and party corruption at rhe grassroots level.
The book is chro'ological for the pre-revolutionary, rçvolutio'ary, and
First Five-Year Plan, and thematic for the NEp period. The focus on NEp is
iutentional: this rvas the golden'era for documentary evidence about Soviet
society, precisell, because lively and animated voices florn'below could still be
heard. This was also the period i¡r which Stalinism clashed heacl-on with the
ideals of 1917. Extensive evidence shows that the late NEP rift berween state
and society extendecl beyond class conflict (Chapter 3) to developmenrs in
cliverse areas of workers' day-to-day lives (chapter 4), ancl formal opposition
politics (Chapter 5).
Every historian lnust choose rvhich questions to ask and what topics are
most important) even when the arena of study is a single factory. Marxism
provides the theoretical fralnework fbr Lrnclerstanding rhe contours of the
Russian Revolution and stalinism. The sirnple but pithy passage fiom the
first page of the covnrnunist MøniJbsto abour class struggle is utilized
because a grasp of the clynarnics of "uou, hidden, rlow operl fight" benveen
exploiter and exploited is absolutely critical to unclerstanding botl-r Rgssiar-r
and Soviet society. The cor-rtinual conflict beflveen ernplol,s¡5 and workers
over the sr-rrplus value produced by labor included disputes over rvork hours,
wages, and the inter-rsity of rvork, but also less overtly econoqric issues such
as benefìts to wonÌerÌ) religious holidays, and workers' behavior inside and
outside the workplace. At times labor grievances took on a political dimen-
sion-particularly during l9l7 u,hen class conflict escalated into class war-
fare. The mulriple issues over which workers' clesires and state priorities
clashed are examilted in the colÌtext of a constantly changing relationship
benl,een rank-and-file workers ancl the state. The explicit ernphasis on work-
ers' grievauces and their willinglless or unvvillingness to challenge manage-
tnent atld regime is viewed as integral to the dcveloptrellt (and later clerr-rise
of the proletariat as a class "for itself." class unity and the decline-later
d Coanteryev o h¿tion. Introd.øction
absence-of this solidarity are treated as the ce ntral historical problems of
the Russian Revolution.
stalinism is defined in this monograph as the long-term trend and ir-rter-
est ofthe stare bureaucracy as it developed into an exploitative class in oppo-
sition to the proletariat.20 while the Marxist analysis provides the most
convincing fi'amework for rurderstanding the political ecolìomy of the Soviet
union, very little systematic archival work has been done fi.om anv DersDec-
tive to explain the advent of stalir-rism in the factories and th. .ät. of tl-r"
rvorking class during the transformation. Repolution ønd, Coønterreyoløtion
airns, therefore, to plot a new course in the study of soviet working-class his-
tory-one that avoicls both the condescension of cord war historiography
and the incoherence offèred by the linguistic tum.
Notes
l. Tlre rrotit¡¡r of the "hidclen transcript" rvas pioneercd by Jarnes C. Scott inhis Wcøporu ¡f
the weøh: Everydøy Forms of Peøsønt Resistøncc (Nerv Haveu, l9g5) and has been applied
u'itll Positive efIèct in the fìclds of American labor irnc-l Afiican-Anlcrica¡ fiistgr.y Sec, fìrr
exarrrple, lìobin G. Kelley, Høntøer ønd Hoe: Aløbø¡øø comm.anists Døring tfu Deprcslion
(Chapel Hill, t990).
steplren colten, Rethinhittg the sotiet Ex[terience: politics ønd. History since l9t7 (Nctt,
Y<>rk,1985), I-74.
Ler,vis siegelbaum and lton¿ld Suny, "class Backrvar.dsl In se¿rch of the sovict w<rrking
class" in Møhing wo¡'l¿ers sortiet: Power, cløss, øntl klentity, sicgclbaum anci suny ecls.
(Itlraca, NY, 1994), 13. I.I. Mints, Istori,iø wlihogo ohtiøhriø,3 vols. (Moscow, 1967-
1973).
+- stcphen Kotkin, Møgnetic Moantøiø: stølinivn øs ciuilizøtit>t'¡ (Bcrkele¡ lggs),lgg-200.
Fcrr exatnple, Jtrnatltan Aves in Worhers øgøinst Lenin: Løbor Protest ørtd the Bokhevit¿ Dic-
tøtorshilt (Nerv York, 199ó) argues that u'r>rkers' griev'ances cluring the Civil War s,ere
[-¡¿sed t>ll the state's coercive labor strategy, r¿ther th¿¡r on tlre nater.ial c6nditi<;ns arrcn-
dâllt to tlcar-totel eci>¡r<>mic collapse. Similarly, Di;rnc l(r>elrker in "Lal-ror Relatit¡rrs rn
Strcialist l{ussia: Class Values ¿¡rcl Prodnctir¡n V¿lues in rhc Printcrs' IJrú<>n, I9l7-1921,,,
in Møhing wn'lrcrs sotiex Pover, cløss, ønd ld.entity, I92, contencis tìr¿t rvhile w<¡r.kers
"nright engage in 'stoppages,' by r92l ¿ 'strike' u,as a serions pr>litical act ar.rr{ ptrnisheci
accolclingll'," àrld ¿sscrts, that thc s<¡ci¿lism that enrerged fì'om the Civil War "r.elicc-l ou trrc
p<lrvet'of the state agencies-the Chcka ¿nd thc colrcentràti()n câmp-to e¡sure aclþer.e¡ce
to its centrally definecl goals and policies." Andrer.v pos¡rielovsky, in ..strikes Ì)uring r¡c
NEP," Revoløtionøry Røssiø, t0, I (June 1997), notes that after ì922 reports <.¡f *,r>rkcr
.arrests lverc rare b¡.rt suggcsts that it is "like\' that leading shop-flor>r orgauizers u,ere
arrcsted irl the gertcr:al rouudups of 'auti-soviet' elenter'ìts, Socialist ller,<>lutic¡rarics, Men-
slreviks, and 'utembcrs'of other political par.ties.,,
l)avid Mandel, The PetrogrødWorhers øn¡l the Souiet seizøre of pon¡er (Lt>ndott, r9B4); s.A.
s¡tith, Red Petrogrød: Revohrtion in tbe Føctories tglT-l9t B (cam bridge, l9g3); Alexan,
c{er ll¿binorvitch, Tbc Bohhcvihs cilnte t0 power: The Rewtfution of 1917 irt. petnprød (Netv
York, 1976); l)iane Koenkcr, Moscoy wn"hers ønd tlte lgIT Revolørlaø (princet6¡, lggI).
willianr chase in worha's, society, øød thc soui¿t støte: Løltoy ønd Life in Moscoty, lgly-1929
)
(urbana, rl., 1987) 299, clainis thar ir I928-1929 "tl'te parrv ancl u,orkcrs, es¡recially
 R ep o løtion øød. Coønrørrey o lø.tion

urban u'oikcrs, relirrgcd the old ¿lli¿nce of l9l7-l9rg." Ar.:h

Gctn, i¡ orþins,f the Grøøt
Pørges: Tht soviet comtøønist pørty Reconsidcred, tgs3-lg3g
(cárnbrirlg'e, töæ¡, zoo,
asserts popular supp()rr fìrr tr're purges, u4rich was a ..racrical,
.u.n rryrt",î.ár, reacrion rt>
burcattcraclr " Lynnc viola, in The Best Føthers ønd Sons ¿f thc
Føtheítønd: út¡rhcrs *t the
vøngøørd' of collectiuizøtìazr (oxfìrrc1, r9g7),21s, argues
trrat in rhe c()¡ntryside ir r¡,¿s
"tlÌe lnost active stlppol'tcrs <>fthe rcvolutir>n fìrrm aurt>ng the u,<¡rki¡rg
class,, rvho ..hel¡retl
to iuplenlent tl'rc Stalin tev<¡lution." Sheila Fitz¡ratrick in "Cultural-llevoluti.n
as Class
war," cørtarør R¿volution iø Rassiø, Ig2g-Ig3l
iBlor>rni'gt.r, rgTg),2l,asscrrs a p()sr_
tivc response t<¡ Stalinist rhet<>ric, particularly among Koms<'rl¡ol membcrs
lvlr.rn she
describes as "enrhusiasts of Cultr-rral l{evolutioir.,,
8. David slrearer, in Ind.astry, støte, ønd society in størin\ Ru.ssiø,
rg2ó-rg34 (Ithaca, Ny,
r996), 14, clai'rs that st¿li¡r *,as able "to d.'aw on signifìcart r,<>rking.r.r,
an alliancc r.vh<¡se existe¡rce is n<>rv ell ..incrcasingly accepted
vicrv.,,
,,,pp.r.i'iiiri Trrn EùrsncrNc WomrNc CLASS
9 AIcx Callinicos, Agøirnt postnaod.øntisw: A Møriirt Crliqøe (Cambri<ige,
r0 Lcx Heernra van vrss and Marcer van der Lincren ecrs., Introc{uct;rrn1r,
l9g9).
crrrinn¿ otber MovsMENr
Gender, Retigion øncl Ethnicity in the Writing oJ'Eøropeøn
lle?titces: Løltonr History (Ncw
York,2002).
II ' Siegelbatrnr and Suny, "Class ßackwardsf In Se¿rch of rhc Soviet wrrrkirrg Class,, in Møh-
irt¿¡ Worhets Soviet.
12. K<rtkin, Møgnetic Moøntøin, L9g-237, 359.
13. Davicl HoflìIan, pet srrnt MetrLpolis: sociøl ld.cntities iil Mosco|, Ig2g- Ig4j (Ithaca, I994),
36-40, 61, Ll6, t24, t97, t98.
l4' Mattlrerv J. Pa1'nc, Stølids Røilroørl: Tarhsih ønd the Bøilding
of Sociøiisw (pittsburgh, "Fincl the otìes at the fàctor1, u,ho are the r.l¡orst scou¡tlrcls lnrl
200I). I2ó-15s.
l5' EH'c¿rraudl{.w. I)avies, who set thc tone ft¡t others."
Foøndøtionsoføprø,ncd.Ecottotnl 1lrrn.i.,n, 1969),r:s4s;
chris w¿rd, Il¡.rssia's cotton w<rrkc¡s anci trre Nerv Econt>rnic n.rìi.y iMayor's ofïìce memorandum ro Okhiana, |une l9l2
riclgc, 1990),
261; Michal lìcir'a., The Bùth of størinism (Br.r>'rirgt.r.r, ]Dez¡ì,lc",rrt
lß-t2i; D.'arcl
Filtzcr, Soviet Worhers md Stølinist lr¡lastriølizi;øtion(Nerv york,
lggg). Iulii Petrovich Guzhon, the largest shareholder of the Moscow Metal,
16. s. K<¡stirrchcnk. er ,.r. Istorüø hirovsrzrgo zøvodø (r9r7-r9<5), (uosc<iu,
r9óó). works and presidenr of the Moscow society of Factory and Mill owners
K.tkin,
Møgnetic Moøntøirt'; clayt<>n Black, "Ma..fàcturing c.mmunists: .I(r-asnyi putilovcts,
and the Prrlitics t>f soviet Industrializatir: tt, 1923-193i,'
(MSFMO), addressed the sociery's annual converìriol-r in March rgI3. The
( ph.l). Dissertation, Indiana u.i_
versiq', 199ó). French-born industrial mogul congratulated his collcagues fbr their steadfast
17. Kennetlr M. Srr:urs, Føctory, ø71fl, Cowmunity i¡t Støliùs Rassiø (pittsburgh,
1997).
unity and fbr "creating ftrr thernselves a conception of the migl-rt of the indus-
I8. Thc cornmon Englisþ transration of "serp i norot'2 is usccl througt,.rJt trial corporation that could not be ignored." Thc nrost inrportant resporìsi-
i1.,. text but is
reverscd-thc liter¿l transÌati<¡n is ..sickle ancl ham¡ncr.,,
bility for the group's rìewest lrìembers) he reminded rhem, was guarding
19. on svodhi as s()Lr'ccs, see S¿rah navies, poltørør o\tinitnz in størin\ Røssiø(cantrtricrge,
1997), I-19. "the prestige of that rnight,"I
20 Tony Clifl, Røssiø: A Mørxist Anøþsls (l_ondon, l95S). .Guzhon's collfiderìt posturing caught the attention of one of the factory
owners'principal adversaries. Ten days larer, in thc pages or prøud.ø,the Bol-
shevik leader Vladirnir Ilyich Lenin describcd the presenrarion as ,,fi.rll of
rrrrogance?' ancl "relnir-riscent of the speech of sonre arrny clerk." L.r their
¡u-urual report, the owners had expressed concern over the "fì.equenc)' of the
dcrronstration strikes, u,hich happen one after another, and the unusual vari-
cty and difference in the importance oÊlnotives for which workers consiclered
it necessary to interrupt work." Significantly, the report detected "uot only
a considerable thickening of the political atmosphere, but also the decli¡e of
lìrctÒry discipline." In response, industrialists resolved to adopt "severe mea-
sures," inclucling the impositiorì of fìnes, tl-ìe retractiol-r of bonuses a¡cl-i¡
cxtreme cases-lockouts. Increasing Russia's industrial output, they resolvecl,
"urgentll, demands the raising of fàctory discipline to the l-righ level at rvhich
it stands in the westem European coulltries." Although "the fàctory owners
wish to raise 'discipline' to the 'Westem'level," Lenin retorted, they, sl-lowed
rìo sr-lch proclivity ftrr "raising the'political atrnosphere'to the sarÌ1e level."2

Norcs for this section begin on page 37.

 l0 R cv o h.t tion øn d. Cou.nterrcv o løtion Wrhing-Cløss Mov etnent u
..Despite
the ernployers' ack'owredgme't that trrey faced renewecr
labor competitors in the West (a fèature thar would later characterize Soviet society
militancl,, the l9l2 statistics co'ipilecr by the ow'ers showed
that they had as u,ell), which extended the longevity of a stagnant and brutal fèudal regime
been slightly nlore successful at defeating economic
strikes. Leni' countered and imposed harsh impoverishn-rent on its subjects. The absence of an inclige-
that in compariso't9 the previous y"".l ,rort of trre r9ì2
sroppages were nous nascent bourgeoisie meant that the srare and ftrreign capital played
offinsiue actio.s i' which.workers hacr fought fbr i'rproved
.ondìtio',r, unusually prominent roles. Russian society made up for its late conversiol-r to
in which a llew sellse of determi'atio'rvai evide't, with
workers willi'g"nd
to industry with an astounding pace of growth, doubling between 1905 and
stay out for lo'ger periods of time . "you are wrorlg)
you gentlernen who orv' 1914. Moreover, Russian industry cliverged fiorn the path of increlnental
the factories! Eve' in the eco'olnic sense) to say
strikes, the workers, gains are terrifying.,'3 'othi'g of the poriticar development that had been evident earlier in Europe, where industry devel-
oped from srnall artisans' workshops to slightly larger enterprises and evelÌtu-
The intransigence evident i' the perspectives of Guzho'
and Russial.l ally large industrial fàctories. Russia largely skipped the intermediary srage : by
capital o'. orìe side and Lenin ancl the newly reawake'ed
workers, move- the start of the war, nearly half of Russian enterprises ernployed more than a
menr or the other is indicative of the deep social rift
that had develo¡red in thousand workers. significantl¡ however, Lenin's quip about the flagrant dis-
the years before the rvar. Leopold Haimsá' has shou,'
that, far frorn bei'g crepancy between econouric d),na¡lism and political stagnation iu prewar
diverted fr'om the path ofgraàud a'd peaceful reform
uy ,É. *"., prerevo- Russia exposecl one of the critical fèatures of Russia's industrial evolutio¡.
lutionary Russia' society was racked with wiclespread urban
u'resr and Political advances clearly did r-rot rnatch economic developrnent: u,orkers
moulting class confrontation. Socialists intervenecl in these clevelopme'ts,
labored nrrelve hours a day and were regarded legally as peasants excludecl
playi'g "a significattt catalytic role" i'the revival ofworki'g-class
militancl,, from even token participation in Russian civil society. T'he exceptional con-
particularly e'ide'r i' the activity of the Bolsheviks
in st. p"etersburg.a rhis ceutratiort of industrial rvorkers in colossal euterprises; the fàilure of political
notion of chronic "social instability,, exacerbated by the
conscious inter_ reforms; the intense character of govemmellt pcrsecution; and the irnpulsive,
ve'don of revolutionaries can be extended to describË most
of the first third ness of an unruly proletariat all combined to procluce an extraordinary level
of the twentieth century
of political strikes with the potenrial to shake Russian society ro its core .5
A survey of developments in Guzhon's metar fàctory prior
to rgr z revears The importance of machine builcling, railways, arìd armarnents placed metal
nulb_er of key aspects i'the evor*tion of tr',. *orri..ð,
.a mouemerrt. Fi.st, production at the center of Russia's inclustrial rcvolution,. By L917, the metal
horv did the volatile shifts in the political climate cha.ge
the confide.ce ancl industry employecl more than 60 percent of st. Petersburg's ft¡Lrr hundrecl
mood of the r'vorkers a'd ma'age'renrl seconcl, a variãty
of*å.tj".. inrtr- thousand workers. Moscow industry was more cliverse, yet eveu iu "calico"
tutions (legal-inclucling Tsarist a'd manage'ent, semi-legal,
a'd ilregal) Moscow (so-called because of the preclominance of textiles) fifty-seven thou-
competed fbr labor supporr. To what ."t.,-ri dicr these
bodiä jain workers, sand metal vvorkers ournumbered textile workers by seven thousand by 1917.
trust and participationì Third, the workers' rnovemelìr .u.',,uíily
overcame Government war contracts drove the 40 perceltt expansion of Moscow's
many obstacles and imposed a' ethos of solidarity upon
a workforce divicrecr industry By l9l7 Moscow had two hundicd thousaird industrial workers,
by mul.tiple and overlappi'g royarties. whar fàctors contributed
ro weakeni.g over half employed ir-r enterprises of more than five hundred workers.ó
these divisions and forging unity among emplol,çss
against their employer The son of a French merchant who owned a silk fàctory in Moscorv, Iulii
and, conversely, what caused these sectio.al cliflère'ceito
be rei'forcecü Petrovich Guzhon had invested his family ftrrtune in lìussia's burgeoning
metal market. Arriving in Moscow in 1871, Guzhon rvorked alongsicle his
brother to construct ancl then lnanage a nail fàctor),. In I8B3 he opened the
Background Moscorv Metalworks, employing two hundred workers in a rolled metar
shop. A voracious demand for metal and the ready availability of a large pool
Guzhou's huge rletalrvorks epitornized the maiu features of Russian
i'dus- of cheap labor permitted Guzhon to expand his enterprise during the eco-
trial developtnettt, embodying the striking contraclictio¡s
that f.lowed fiom nomic boom of the late nineteenth centr-rry. Enrploying two thousaud u,ork-
the autocracy's late, halfhearted co'versiã. to moclernizatio^.
By rrre time ers by 1900, it was the largest metal factory in Moscovr,, and through its
industrializatio' fì'ally bega' to si'k cleep roots ir-r Russia'
soil i' the late operation Guzhon reaped nearly a million rubles in profit a year.7
nineteerth and early twe'tieth ce'turies, the cou'try's
political a'd eco_ Guzhon's values personified both the paternalism and intransigeuce of
nomic backward'ess rnearlt that manufàcturi'g developed,
accorcli'g to Russian corporate liberalism. Among the Moscorv industrial communit¡ he
I-'eon Trotsky, in a "combi'ed ancr ureven"
n,",-,,raa, incorporati'g some of was col-tsidered an enlighter-recl industrialist-assistir-rg workers in need, set-
tl: t:"rl modern aspecrs of capitaris'r, snch as huge industrid erîerprises, ting up a workers' cooperative, helping workers construct dachas, allowing
side by side wirh the most backrvarcl eler¡enrs.
regular chr-rrch services in the plant, ancl ofÏèring his ernployees a rhree-year
.hadunder rnilitary pressLrre from its r,r,ealthier European rivals, the
extracted a fàr grearer rerative portio' of the peopl.,,
Tsarist state technical course.s In 1895 rhe fàctory opened a school for worke rs' children
,"."rti-, tt-,"n it, because, Guzhon asserred, "if rvorlcers know that education f-or their chil-
 W n4zìng - C I øss Mov emen t Ì3
dren is guara'teed the'they wiil value their service ro rhe factory.,,e yet
Guzhon also e'joyed a reputatior"r as a tough ancl The handful of unskilled women workers eamed lorv wages ancl sufïèred
outspoken ctetèuaer of his abuse in tl're traditionally male-dominated metal industry. Cãnditions in the
class' His refusal to yield to workers' cremands
of a'y kind helped propel shop were "particularly difficult for teenage girls" as heavy conclitions
G.uzh-on ro a leading position in the Moscow
stock E*åha,rge committee .r0 "messed up hair, tore dresses, a'd forced mary to leave the factory.,,ì8 A
Like Lenin, Guzhon studied his class e'ernies carefìrlly.
õu.rng the and- 1905 Russian social Democraric workers' party (RSDWp) leaflet claimed
German riots of May r915, the okhra'a raided
his øon¿ that the bolt shop timekeeper repeatedly "raped *om.il and gir-ls working in
in-rpressive collection of poritical leaflers, "p".i,o.,rt "ìra
rists of workers, "n
dema.ds, and his shop."le Most had been drive' to the fàctory by economic'ecessity, tñeir
social dernocratic literature .lr
The massive Moscow Metarworks was located ir entry made possible by fàmily ties. For exarnple, after E.I. voronina,s hus-
the easter' Rogozhskii band lost both legs in an accident in the steel foundry, Guzhon agreed to hire
(later Rogozhsko-simo'ovskii, then proletarskii)
drrt.i.t of trre city.12 her to work in the bolt shop, where soure fifty women r".r.
Employing berweer r,806 a'd 3,289 rvorkers i. in the
the y."., r-lõi to l9ró_ early years of the cenrury.20 All fèmale workers earned either"-ployed
the largest fluctuatio's due to two rnajor wartime eighth or ninth
drafts-trie sprawring fàc- category (of ten) rates-slightl)'less tha¡ half that of a skilled metal worker.2r
tory complex encornpassed enorrnous shops i' acrjace't
buildi'gs. By r9r4, By 1909 women also started rvorki'g i' the rolled metal shop, where they
half the workforce of three rhousa'cr *"s emproyeã
in the three îarger ..hot,, had to unclergo an initiation ritual that involved havir-rg male workers expose
departme'ts involved^ i' various stages of steei procruction.
Five rru'dred themselves rvhile the entire shop laughed.22 clearly theie women represented
workers in the steel fou'dry used ãur forty-ton
a'd three s'rater ope'- an exploited, rnarginalized, aud particularly vuhrerable minoriry of ihe work-
hearth fu'races to produce.steel *om pig iro'and
depart'rent four rruncrred "-orded coke. In the form-castirg force in the prewar period.
employeeì ;,.;ì t,"..ïågî,., *t ..rr,
machine gears, ancl other_ large steer products, rnaki¡g
use of ã1.u.,, ou.r",,
and te' large casti'g machinés. over five
hu'crred rolLcl metal crepart'rent
employees worked on six large rnills and The Workers'Movement Before LgL2
an assorrmer-ì, àrp.Ër*,
dred bolt shop workerr pu'.h.d out bolts a'cr screws
ih... l-,u,-,-

thirty five machi'es while a hu'dred

o' o'e hu'drecr and The 1ìrst stirrings of rvorker discontent in the Mosbow Metalworks arose our
shop workers tvorked rvith similar of disputes over u'ork hours. Management hacl clefèatecf the first knorvn strike
'air
machi'ery. o'e hundred and forty stretching-departnÌerlr
ated pressing mills to produce various grades
.,',floy.., op..- in February lB94 by fìrirg thirty bolt shop workers who refirsecl to work fìf-
ãr*ii", with similår nïmbers i' teerì-hour days.23 The fàctory was one of a clozen Moscow workplaces fìrst
the mechanical, electrical, and repair sÃops.l3
The partirio' of the organized by socialists in the workers'Ijnion in lg9s. By lg96 the group
.factory g.ou,rcrs illto separate productio' crepart-
rnents fosrered shop-loyalty (tsehhoushchina) had two thousand members in forty plants and agitated with some success
among.employees. Tserehoyshchinø around economic grievances and work hours. The workers, [Jnion most
transcended craft divisions because former peasants
maintained stro'g ties likely played a role in a second strike in Guzhon in lg96.2a In November of
betwee'.specific.shops and particura. villages.
Nair makers, for exampre, were that year, managemerÌt agreed to shorten the workday fì-oln twelve to eleven
recruited frollr the Tver' regio'.ra The mãss exodus
of peás"'ts from and a half hours in cold shops,2s and wher-r other r-netal factories, owners
provi'ces suppliecl the labor-power f.r Moscow,s 'earby,
rapid i'dustrialization, but
many of these workers rerai'ed their lancl holcri'gs sliortened work hours in 1897,labor unrest in the industry clissipatecl.
ìn th.i. At the Tþugh socialists played a modest role i^ the early workers' moverne'r, their
turn of the celltury only about a quarter olthe workfèrrce "irì"g;r5
Moscow provi'ce, rvhile
hacl been bor' i'
-,r.rig."t.d influence should not be exaggerated.26 That labor advocates espousinq auro_
tr¡,o-thirds of trre workforce t-r"d
from the seven other provincei 'earlyof cratic politics succeeded in eclipsing the authority ol the riewly fårmed
the central incrustrial ..giorr,ï-igratio' (1898) Russian Social Democratic workers'party says rnuch abourthe rveak
pattenl similar to those for other Moscow factories.ló
Ideological' skill, and age crifferences also divicrecr influence of socialism arllong inclustrial rvorkers in the formative periocl of
trre workfbrce. Ma'y industrialization.
rvorkerswere sy'rpathetic to the autocracy)
embraci'g Russian In the first years of the llew century a surprising competitor outflanked
nationalisrn, while others rvere eirher actirõ revolutioriaries "n "ggr"rriu.
ãlry,rrpìr¡,"ri. ,o socialists fbr q,orkers' allegiance in Moscorv-the police-sponsored zubatov
the dema.cls of trre left orga'izatio's. Twenty-five
skiil categories rangecr uuions. Between 1898 and 1903, deep social unrest affected all sections of
fiom the most skilled metalworkers, rathe operators)
smerters, a'cr rolri'g'rill Russian society, inclucling the growing working class. Fearfi-rl of socialist
operators to appre.tices a'cl unskilled laborers.
A skillecl ,"o.k..
tha' nvice the rvage of an *nskilred worker, a disparity ¿-r"t earnecl nore influence among the city's workforce, the chief of the Moscow okhrana,
*"r-rr*ally tiecr sergei Zubato\ creared the council of workers of the city of Moscor% an
to experie.ce a'cl therefore age. The *,orkforce was yoL''g,
rvith about half olganization that explicitly promoted loyalty to the Tsar. Zubatov believed
u'der the age ofthirty, a thircr betrvee'thirty ancr-fortf.years
olcr, a'cr a that rvorkers had rnany legitimate cornplaints, and that mo¡archial refbrmis¡r
snraller groltp ovel-ftrrty. l7
had to address their grievances lest they turn to more radical solutions. The
 t4 R ay o ht tiou øn
council's activities included lectures, general meetings that discussed the
material needs of n orkers, mutual aid funds, and the filing of over a thousand
collective complaints against employers. By 1902, the Zubatov unions had
gained enormous iuflueuce in Moscow and throughout the central industrial
regiorl. on I9 February, the anniversary of peasant ernancipation, a peaceful
Zubatovist demolìstration of fìfþ thousand workers marched witlrin the walls
of the li'emlin in rnemory of Alexander II. The procession inclucled a
requiem mass and the patriotic hymn "God save the Tsar," impressing elated
government offìcials while horri$ing socialists. The Socialist Revolutionary
press ackrrowledged that zubatov "succeecled in ir-nparting the aspect of
unity between workers ancl governrnent" and even the Moscorv Conr¡rittee
of the RSDWP admitted, "social democracl, was porverless to deal rvith
police socialisrn."2T
The council's attempt to control labor discontent, however, also necessi-
tated proving to skeptical workers that it was rlot a rrere tool of manage-
ment-a strategy that led Zubatov to a col-rfì"or-rtation rvith factory owners.
Zubatov's society of Machine workers gained a follorving in the Metalworks
as employees repeatedly petitioned rhe governmenr abour unsanitary work
conditions and other grievances.2s one worker recalled that the Zubatovs
were particularly strong in the steel foundry shop.2e ¡ crowd-killing over one hundred and detonating the 1905 Revolution.32
The "Guzhon affair" rvith strikir-rg weavei's and in his silk mill attracted
national attention and catapultdd rhe French industrialist inio Moscorv,s
indnstrial inl-rer circle. zubatov had asserted that the èouncil was ,,com-
pelled" to side rvith the workers "fbr the maintenance of its reputatiorl," and
went so fàr as to organize a strike fund. Even the Moscow govemor-general,
Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrov, supported the council, exerting his influence
to wrest concessions fiom fàctory owners. The strike had wider implications
because under the council's leadership, labor milifancy spread in 1902, with
workers expecting governûìellt support for "a rapid and great improvement
in their position at the expense of the o\¡,rners.,, A factory inspector noted
that workers believed that the council had gained the prestige of a govern-
meut orgau) "created specifically for the defense of workers' class interest."
unyielding in the fàce of the rveavels' demancls, Guzhon blamed the conflict
on okhrana interference, refused to negotiate, and rnarshaled the industrial
community to support hirn in a showdown vvith the rvorkers. After a bitter
battle involving leacling $ovemment officials and industrialists, Zubatov was
reassigne d to St. Petersburg ou l T August. Police unionism rvould conrinue
in Moscow ft¡r several more years) but zubatov's departure markecl the
beginning of its clecline.30
Althougli the RSDWP clevoted much energy to clenouncing the ZLrbatov,
the demise of police unionism hacl rnore ro do rvith its embrace of a ne*'
n]ore conservative strategy that prohibited confrontations with manage-
mellt-a tactical shift that inevitably led to a loss of workers' allegiance. The
activities of the Moscorv okhrana again emphasized repression rather than
appeasemellt. So powerful was the Okhrana in the city that experienced rev-
olutionaries often refused to work in Moscou,, rvhile rnany u,orkers fèared
colltact rvitl-r theur. Repressiou, isolation, the internal schism over "ecor-ro¡rislll"
d Coønterrep løtion Wrhing-C løs
o Mov ent ent. l5
(agitation fbcused exclusively on workers' econornic, rather than political,
demands), and a brief period of rvorking-class retreat at the start of the
Russo-Japanese War in January 1904 all limited the activities of the Moscorv
RSDWP after 1902. The few party members working in rhe Moscow Metal-
rvorks managecl to establish a fàctory cell only ftrr a brief period during the
1905 rebellion.3r
The organization that led the lanuary 1905 r'r,orkers' revolt in St. peters-
burg, Father Gapon's Assernbly of Russian Factory ancl Mill Workers, had
much in common rvith the zlbatov lroverÌlenr. originally funded by the
police, the Assembly briefly eclipsed socialist influence amolìg workers in rhe
capital in I904. The atrempt ro conrain labor disconrenr by initiatives from
above again entailed the risk of events moving beyond the boundalies accept-
able to authorities. After some of its rnembers were disrnissed from the
Putilov works, Gapon's fusembly helped initiate a strike of 120,000 workers,
and then organized the huge Sunclay 9 January procession to the Winter
Palace. The peaceful demonstration of sixry thousand, replete with orthodox
crosses and icons, anticipatecl a sympathetic response from "fàther" Nicholas
II to their humble supplication that included an appeal fbrr an eight-hour day;
higher wages) and free elections. Insteacl, govemrrìent troops firecl on the
The events of "Bloody srrnday" represented a fiurdamental tuming point,
severely undermining rvorkers' faith in a benevolcnt Tsar and a synrpathetic
state that would voluntarily acquiesce to their concerns.'T'hercafter socialists
dominated the leadership of the labor movemel-rt) contributing ro an
increased level of organization and confidence. More irnportantly, as orlanclo
Figes has argued, this new militancy rvas the result "of rvorkers themselves
becoming more class conscious and violent as their conflicts with ernployers
and police became more bitter and intense." Thc rebellion also gave rise to
the general strike and a new revolutionary institution: the workers' soviet
(council). From St. Petersburg, soviets spread to other cities and provicled
th.e embryonic forrn of a workers' governrnent-organizing rnilitias, pub-
lishing newspapers, and distlibuting fbod supplies.33
The 1905 revolt in the Moscow Metalrvorks started at l:30 on 12 Janu-
ary. Tsekhoashchinø shaped the form of the strike as workers liom the nail
shop, then the repair and bolt shops stopped work, in turn gather.ing wor.k-
ers fì'om other departnÌenrs. Cognizant that the strike movelnent had started
in Moscow two days earlier, the adrninistration sumrnoned cavalry and troops
into the territory of the fàctor),, though a confrontation was avoided as work-
ers peacefully left the factorl, grounds and conrrened a rneeting. The next da},,
elected senior workers issued nrarìagerìrent a rvritten list of demands for an
eight-hour day, a u,age iucrease, better conditions in the shops, regular pay-
clays, lowering of fìnes, and the disn-rissal of four abr-rsive managers.3a The
goverlìment had established a systen-r of "fàctory elders" in 1903 in an
attempt to channel worker grievances through offìcial channels,3s but the
strategy olcontaining labor discontent by fbrming workers' institutions from
above again led to unexpectecl consequences as tl-re elders issued the workers'
ciernands. Managemeut agreed to lower fines, issue pay regularly, and shorten
 ló Reyoht tion ø.nd. C,ttfiterrluLlati\?, Wrhing -C løss Mov ement L7

work hours fiom eleven tote' hours in the cold shops, but refused the other iucrease, and then were joined by other print rvorkers, followecl by workers
demauds, and the stoppage ended.3ó
i¡r other industries. Police battled workers on the cenrral boulevards and
socialist groups compered for workers' loyalty duri'g the r905
Revolu- many employers attenpted ro counrer the labor unrest ivith layoffs and lock-
tio'.The RSDWP had split in 1903 berween the Bolsheviks ancl Mensheviks
outs. After the strike wave abated somervhat, railway workers gave both new
over disagreements about the defì'itio' of party membersl-rip, but
more pro- lifè and a more political dir¡ension ro rhe movement. Nearly fifty thor-rsand
fou.d theoretical differences er'ergecl. Thé Ménshevits rhar beca.se Moscou, workers participated in a general strike thar spread quickly through-
the prerequisite economic develop'rent nnder capitalisnr" ".guåd
had yet to frrily out the empire, advancing demands fbrr legislative power based on universal
develop i'Russia, the revolutio'rvourd rre boLrrgeoiì-democraticl-a
positio' suffrage, political amllesty, and the eight-hour day. The Tsar responded to
that led them to a*empr to pursue an ailiance with the riberal bourgeoisie
public pressure with the "october Manifesto," prornising a legislative body
and to argue agai'st socialists bidding fbr power, as this .,would cause
the and civil liberties-a rnarleuver that effectively divided the opposition rnove -
bourgeois classes to recoil from the rèvolution and this rvould diminish
its ment. Many workers continued to take political action, and by the end of
sweep."37 Leni' and the Bolsheviks harbored no such illusio's
about the November socialists helped organize the Moscow soviet. once again,
Russian bourgeoisie, whom they repeatedry co'dem'ecr as trroroughly ,,reac-
authorities reverred to the hard-line approach, arresting leaders of rhe st.
tionary." In what became the Bolshevik theoretical credo for the Je*t rwelve
Petersburg Soviet. when police arresrs spread to Moscow, the Soviet
years, Lenin argued in Two Tøctics of Soc,iøl Dewocrøq, in the
Denoocrøtic Rep_ responded with a call to renew the political strike movement, and over eighty
olution that the decisive role in the coming revolution hacl fallen on the
pro- thousand rvorkers participated. During the December uprisirlg workers' lnili-
letariat a'd the peasalltry, though he also chastised ..the absurd a'd tias fougl'rt pitched lrattles rvith government forces. The state regainecl the
semi-anarchistic ideas of givi'g irnmediate effect to the lnaximum
program upper hand only after it became clear that the uprising had failed to rvin acive
for a socialist revolurion." socialists should call fbr a clernocratic republic,
the support among the troops. on l8 December the last stronghold of the revolt
confiscation of the landed estares, and the eight-hour cl4y.as -an^
Socialist in the Presnia district was crushed.a2
Revolutionaries (sRs) also organized a'roi'rg Moscow rvorkers..The
sRs Moscow Metalworks rvorkers' demand ft¡r the removal ofabusive rllanagers
encompassed mar-ry political tendencies, includi,'g terrorists,
and their rank lemaiired their main grievance. Although workels'did not parricipate in the
and file was often far to the left of the fbrmal party leadérship.3e
october strike wave, on 4 November tl"rey again demanded the removal of t{re
Both the sRs ancl Bolsheviks vied for the allegia'ce of workers i, rhe
fbur managers. Managernent responded rvith a threat to shut down the fàc-
Moscorv Metahvorks. one Borshevik activist asserred that the bad
blood tory on 2l November, bur workers preempted this by striking on l2 Novem-
between the organizatious was basecl on the SRs' unscrupulous recruitment
ber, renraining out throughout the December rebellion and only retumil-rg to
methods rather than larger political questions. ,.I' ordeito amract
Guzhon work nearly two months later. Factory-centered demands gave way to rrìore
workers to them," he wrote, "they would resort to enticing them
and began general political issues as rvorkers elected representatives to the Moscow Soviet
organizing not far fiom us, in Annengoßkii Grove, and handine out a
lot of and participated in the December uprising. A handful of rvorkers died in the
sausages, cheese, and bread at mass meetings."40
revolt; many orhers were jailecl or exiled after the rebellion was crushecl.a3
Durir-rg the first seven lnolltlis of r9õ5, the workers, moveme't
i' . Guzhon's aggressive inrervention during the I905 Revolution solidified
Moscow followecl closely rhe everlrs u'foldir-rg in the politically charged
his position as a champion of order. Before 1905, the Moscow owners'asso-
atnrosphere of the capital. Moscow strikes invorved +i,zoo workers
and ciirtion had supported liberal refbrms, including equality befbre the larv, fì-ee-
started i'large fàctories, rnost of the'r metal plants with a history
of social clom of speech, and even the right to organize unions. But during the 1905
Democratic (or Zubatov) ir-rfìue.ce. Eco'ornii issues triggerecl
all the rcvolt, Guzl-ron headecl a special owners' commission that brandecl the
strikes that lacked coordinatio' benveen e'terprises. Gñernme.t 'earry
officials Novelnber strike by post and telegraph workers "a criminal undertaking"
respondecl to the labor unrest by creati'g comrnissions a'd by issuing a that "must be plosecuted by the larv." By December, manufàcturers had col-
decree o' l8 Februar¡ which co'cecled limited popular r"p.ese,-,tátion. After lccted 165,000 rubles to aid the fòrces of orcler. In direct response ro rhe
Ja'uary and Februar¡ the of Moscow strikes decri'ed sharpry, resurgence of the vvorke[s' r-novenent, Moscow capitalists fomred thc Cen-
though the political ferrnent 'umber
gave rise to unprecedentecl lnass rallies, mecr_ tral Society of Manulàcturers (later the MSFMO). Its leader, S.I. Chet-
ings, and a wide clistribution of socialist literåture.ar
verikov, expressed their concern that "as long as they do not rneet the
By the late surnmer, the regi're reverted to a harcl-li'e strategy that
lnet necessary resistance, the rvorkers rvill find it hard to Lrnderstand rhe possible
with stifrpopular resisra'ce. o' ó Augusr, Tsar Nicholas II resciñâed earlier
limits to their dernands."44 In 1907 tlie owners' society elected Guzhon pres-
refo'rrs regardi'g freedom of speech ancr assernbl¡ a'cl clecreed thar
the iclent, and by r9l4 the MSFMO representecl owllers of over six hundrecl fàc-
Duma rvould acr o'ly as advisory bocry. StLrde.rs and rvorkers defiecr
the tories that employed nearly three hundrecl thousand workers.a5
authorities, howe'er, a'd co'tirned to orga'ize. I' Moscour, Sytin prir-rt
The political repression introduced by Minister of Inrerior Petr Stolypin in
workers weut or strike in Septenrber for shorter work hours
unã ,urn. thc u'ake of the defèat of the 1905 revolr was harsh. From lg0ó to 1908-
"
 l8 Rev o hûion øtotl Coanterrev o lruøort
;;;; ;;;;;;;;ffi;,;;;;;.;,;;: ;.;;ä; ;;;;;;;,
or executed withour trial.aó whereas the Moscow Bolsheviks' membership
expanded to fìve thousand in 1905, it dropped to 150 members by 1909 and
the next year, with okhrana agent l(ukushkin at its head, cornpletely col-
lapsed.aT Every Bolshevik central committee rnember inside Russia was
arrested at least once, and Lenin cornplained to Gorky about "the trenìen-
dous decline among the organizations everyrvhere."4s
Despite state repression, a handfìrl of Bolsheviks a'd sRs conrinued
underground agitation in the Metalworks throughout this period. one
worker later recalled, "for workers the years of reaction rvere particularly clif:
ficult" because "Guzhon had many methods to extract profits out of us."
Management blacklisted militant workers: "Revolutionary workers in
Guzhon were fired," wrote allother r{,orker, "and this was comn'rul'licated to
other factories."4e One Bolshevik claimed that he had been arrested near the
end of I9l0 for participating in a strike and had been imprisoned fbr several
months.5O Other memoirs stress the sense of political isolation ancl fear that
dominated fàctory life . "For the first three or four years of my u,ork in
Guzhon, from 1908 to l9ll, all workers were suppressed," recailed one
worker, "and it seemed that at that time no kincl of revolutiol-lary work rvas
conducted."sl An SR member recalled being unaware of açy Bolshevik pres-
elìce: "At this time the Socialist Revolutionaries were the only pa¡ty in the
factory," l-re asserted. "I did not hear or see anything about the Bolsþsvik5.'52
In the face of such challenges, a small group of revolutionaries ma'aged
to maintain an underground network. Illegal May Day meetings in
Izmailovskii woods included several dozen Guzhon rvorkers with workers
from fàctories.53 one Bolshevik described horv. "before l9l2 we were
'earby
driven deeply underground ... we received l(røsnøiø zpezdø that we passed
around fiom hand to hand until it became impossible to read thern because
of mucl and because we had concealed them in our pockets." Signifìcantly,
even among socialists shop lo1,al¡y prevailed: "I consiclered the nail shop the
leader in political work because there we had a strong group of Bolsheviks.,'5a
The naclir olRussian labor activislrì canÌ€ in 1910, rvhen just over 200
strikes took place involving less than fìfiy thousand workers. The persever-
ance of small groups of revolurionaries through this difficult period helped
lay the groundwork for a palpable, but renuous, uprunl in strike acrivity that
more thall cloubled in l9ll.55 Memoirs record two short-lived strikes in
Guzhon during this peliod. An sR member described a srrike in the form-
casting shop at the end of l9ll, iu rvhich workers "did not leave the shop,
but did not work ftrr the entire day." Eventually Guzhon acceded to their
economic denrands.só A,nother econornic srrike in |anuarv of rgl2lastecl for
three days.57
A rvave olstudent activisln and an economic revival likervise contributecl
to the moclest uptunÌ in labor confìdence bef-ore rhe Lena Goldfields mas-
sacre. Stndents demonstrated in the autumn of l9l0 in commelnoration of
the cleath of the former liberal Dtuna president Muronrtsev; then in mern-
ory of Leo Tolstoy; and later against rhe rrearment of political prisoners.
The death of rolstoy also spurrecl demonstration strikes in the RSDWP
Worhiør-Cløss M ov ¿went
strongholds of Bromlei, Gustav List, Bari, and other factories.ss In l9ll, a
student general strike against state repression spread throughout Russia,
and the general ferrnent created an atmosphere in which newly raclicalized
students initiated contacts with workers.se A Bolshevik described how stu-
dents had met with Metahvorks workers in apartments, "discussed revolu-
tionary themes rvith us and provided leaflets on the economic situation of
workers. " At the end of I 9 I I , he recounted, "We began to get leaflets from
students and distribute them in the shop."oo Similarly, an SR member
recalled participating in a study circle led by students who supplied rvorkers
with both SR and Social Democratic literature.óÌ Renewed labor acrivisnl
coincided lvith an unprecedented expansior-r of the Russian econony
between l9l0 and the beginning of the war) a crucial factor in giving the
movement new life.ó2
The Lena Goldfìelds Massacre and Continued State Repression
while an economic revival and the student movefirent contributed to
renewed proletarian confidence, the Lena Goldfìelcls ffìassacre signalecl the
rebirth of working-class rnilitancy olì a mass scale. On 4 April 19I2, govcrn-
rnent troops opened fire trpon striking Lena miners, leaving five hLurdred
casualties. Minister of Internal Affairs Makarov's r'érnarks offerecl a menacing
warning to the workers' movement: "so it has been, and so it will tre in the
future," he declared.63 Across the empire, workers responded with a show of
force. During the post-Lena and May Day strikes several weeks later, police
estimated that nearly three hundred thousand workers struck in st. Peters-
br,rrg alone, a figure that exceeded the total nurnber of all strike participants
in the entire nation befween 1909 and l9l l.ó4
In the Moscow Metalworks, accorcling to the Okl'rralìa, "the form of the
protest was not limited ro the evenrs of the Lena utassacre but also displayed
a.negative attitude towards the govemrnent, thc clerg¡ the death senrence)
and the speech by the Minister of Intemal Affàirs." Bolsheviks participatecl in
"a group that made it their goal to organize a strike at the fàctory ... against
the best interest and wishes of the rvell-intentioned workers."6s Prøud.ø
reported that rvorkers met in tl-re steel ftrundry clepartnrent at eight o'clock
on 23 April, passed a resolution for a one -day strike, and senr the resolution
to Duma cleputies.óó Participants describe how two hundred mostly young
workers strLrck alld mer ill Vadlinsky Woods, listened to speeches about the
rrìassacre) sang the Mørseilløise, and raised the red flag. The Bolsheviks col-
lected between three ancl ft¡ur hundrecl signatures fbr a petitior-r against the
nlassacre and forrvarcled it to Duma deputies.ó7
The turnout ofseveral hundred was extraordinarily low, given that 140,000
stluck in St. Pete rsburg and 70,000 in inclustrial plants elserdtere in Moscow.6s
Menoirs recall that the Bolsheviks and SRs did not enjoy signifìcant support
bcyond their immecliate circles, and that their first artemprs to organize after
thc I.ena nìassacre met with only lin-rited success. The revolutionaries'inabil-
ity to connect with a larger cilcle of rvorkers and the ease with rvhich govern-
 20 R ep o løtion ønd. Coanterrett o lation.

ment alld plant ofiicials managecl to isolate and victin'rize tllem indicate that
steel foundry shop.82 The May Da1, aç¡¡our in the Moscorv Metalworks were
socialists in the Moscow Metalrvorks fàced exceptional clifficulties.
apparently led by the SRs, as everì the Bolsheviks acknowledged the srrorìg
The small Moscorv Bolshevik organization macle the fàctor1, a political pri_
SR influence in this shop.83
ority, with alnrosrl0 perce.t of their rne'rbership working i,i tl-,e plant, tut The Moscow okhrana organized more tha' thirty rounds of arrests after
okhra'a infiltration, arresrs, a'd firi'gs thwarted these eifòrts. A'Augr_rst each of the political strikes between l9l2 and 1916:4 These arresrs were
l912 report noted that I.M. Lidvanskii had sat in Butyrskaia Jail because he greatly facilitated by fifÌy-five agent provocareurs in Moscow, including
lvas "unnìasked as belonging to the social Democratic organi zatiott,
and was twenty working in the RSDWP and seventeen ir-r the sRs.85 wren central
"a leader in the o'e-day strike in the Guzhon Factãry after the Le'a corlmittee member Alexander Shliapnikov traveled to Moscorv in Novem-
incideuts."óe State agents also jailecl F.I. Riabtsov for his leaclership i¡
tl-re ber 1914, he found the organizarion shatered. An attempt to unify parry
one-day strike ancl Durna petitio', a.d police reports listed fbur other ,,¡rar-
rvork in the summer of I915 also rnet with arrests and led to a collaose olthe
ticipants" who worked with Riabstov.z' A few weeks later, okhrana reporrs
ce¡lter.8ó After the Moscow committee collvened a rneeting in Aprii l9l ó, its
name two other factory Bolsheviks arrested.zr In addition, agents cletai¡ed
leaders u'ere again apprehended.sT Many Bolshevik leaders in the Moscow
v.F. Medvedev on 27 August l9l2 who, like most otheis, ãlaimecl uncler union rnovement were okhrana agents.88 A Bolshevik organizer who worked
iuterrogatior-r that he did not belong to the RSDWp.72 Síqnificantlv. ,.an
in rnany cities, cecilia Bobrovskaia, clairned that Moscow "broke the recorcl
agent belonging to RSD-\Mp a'd factory party committee" prãvided
thË Ápril for provocateurs," and that ef-forts to restore the Moscow Committee
and May l9l2 reports.T3 one Bolshevik rater claimed they irad been betrayed
"inevitably got entanglecl rvith one of these provocateurs." plans to establish
by a provocateur iu the construction shop ancl that the ai-rests,resulted
in..a a Bolshevik press in Lefortovo collapsed in l9r2 because the most acrive
collapse in the organization in the fàctory."za other workers, men-loirs
attest worker in the clistrict turned out to be an Okl-rrana agent.se
to the arrest of betr.veen sixteen and eighteen mernbers.zs ,
The okhrana had also infiltrated the st. Petersbr.rrg Bolsheviks but the
The Moscow okhrana apprehe'ded socialists throughout r9r2; with organization managecl to sustain its operations and continued to act as alì
ni'eteen RSDWP members arresred o' r5 ltpril 1912, anãther, eight in Mag
,
effective catalyst for the lab'or movement. Despite three okhralla age¡rts ol-r
fiftee. i'August, seven in Septé'rber, and six more in Nove'lbeizó The ll the St. Petersburg Central Committee and repeated ronudups, tnc group
August arresrs included most of trre Moscow committ'ee along witlr Dim-
was able to bounce back, rebuild a center) and agitate for str.ikes, ancl lry
itreev frorn the Guzhon factory.zT okhrana rou'dups of socialñts were rlor
l9l6 had expanded to three thousand members.e0 The most reliable mem-
limited to the Bolsheviks. In october 19r2, the sRs appare'tly led strikes i'
bership figures fbr Moscow are about two hundred menrbers in the spring
the defe'se of courr-martialed sevastopol sailors,u,ìd ,ubr.que'tly the
of l9l3 and about six hundred rhree years larer.el The heightenecl political
Okhrana arrested seveuteen of their members.Ts
attnosphere in St. Petersburg and the extraorclinary ability of Bolshevik cells
The May Day test of re'olutionary stre'gth several rveeks after trre Le'a
to articulate demands that connected with workers' fì'ustrations meant that
strike shows that the Bolshevik organization i' Guzhon's fàctory was llo
cluring the war, three quarters of all political strikes occurred in St. peters-
match for the okhrana. st. petersburg police estimared that 120.0'00 work-
b*rg, compared with only 9 percent in Moscow.e2 state repressior-r had a
ers struck orr May Day l9l2,l10,000 rhe next year, a'cl 125,000
itl Lgl4.7.) turore deleterious effèct on the relatively weaker Moscow labor movement.
Memoirs claim that Bolsheviks a'd sßs orga'izecl separare May Day r9r2
Yet tirne and again, the okhrana and factory owuers mistakenly believecl
gatherings, and five hundred u,orkers walkecr out two years later
on the r.er,- that arrests of key activists would be sufïìcient to re¡rel the move urenr. An
olutionary holiday.s' Yet despite the participatio' of tens of thousands i'
âstounding transfbrnation in the confidencc of the Russian vvorking class
Moscorv, okhrana ancf MSFMO reports co'spicuously o'-rit refere'ces
to had occurred in the aftermath of the Lena rnassacre, a shifi too powerful to
May Day strikes in the Metalworks. A' atte'rpt to revive the Bolshevik cell
bc derailed by police operarions.
in l9l3 failed when the secret police arrestecf fìve Bolsheviks in the clays leacl-
ing up to May Day. The pree'rptive arresrs) rather tha' the *sual raicrs after
the eve.t, illustrate the secret police srength in the factory. The okhra'a
The Rebirth of Militancy:
detained an eighteen-year-old Borshevik, N.s. Boronin, fbr åistriburi'g
sev- From the Lena Goldfìelds Massacre to the War
eral'hundred leaflets and agitating for a May Day strike, ancl expelled hi'r
from Moscow f.r a year ar.rd a half. N.p. I(omarov, who agitatecl for tlre May The Lena Goldfìelds ffrassacre led to the revival of the workers' ll]overrent as
Day stoppage, supporred Bolshevik cleputies ir the Durnal helped orga'ize six times as ll1auy workers in the Russian empire participated in strike action
a
"factory Social Democratic þ,uzbkø fcircre),,, and was exilËcl because his cluring L9r2 as in the previous year. This sea change in labor's confìdence
activities rvere deemed "harrnfirl for the peace and orcler of society.,'8ì A aficr the Lena massacre drove the r.novellent foru,ard. An sR nre¡nber u,rote
post-revolution list identifies just f'ìfiy-f-our prerevolutionary May Day that after the Lena evellts "we saw that rve hacl strength. For us,', he rvrote,
demoustrators in the Metalrvorks, with ahr-rost half of them locatecl ip
the "and for all the activists in the fàctor), this had þee p a touchstorle eveut.,'e3
22 Rev o lutìon øn d Coønterrey o httion
soon after the Lena strike, ernployees petitioned Guzhon for a' eight-
hour rvorkday and organized economic strikes in clifferent shops. on 17 Jury,
334 workers in the form-casting departmeut srruck. "The strike is econornic,
asking for a raise in pay," an okhrana telephone dispatch explained. "previ-
ously work was done ir-r two shifts, but at a certain point work began in three
shifts, and workers tvatìt to know why there is a diffèrence in pay." Five days
earlier, workers in the department had demanded a raise, and even the
Okhrana noted that ûranagement had not posted the rate for tl're three-shift
work at fewer hours. workers complained to the factory inspector that they
wanted to receive the same total as they had when they had worked longer
hours on trvo shifts.ea
The strike becalne increasingly bitter when managernent brought in strike-
breakers fronr southern Russia.es The okhrana reported that all 334 workers
in the steel foundry deparrrnent were srill our on 20 luly ancl that if they did
not retunl to work by the 23rd, they would be replaced. A factory announce -
rnent two days later stated that "ft¡rmer workers" could pick up their pass-
ports at the factory entrance) but that their pay u,ould be transferrecl to the
court.eó The strike was strong within the departrnent: the okhrana figure of
344 participants represerlted the roral number employed in the shop in July
r9L2.e7 New workers started at the factory on 26 Jtly,o.e of whom told the
okhrana that strikers had followed him from the factory ar\cl had threatened
that "they rvould deal with hirn," while another clairned that strikers threat-
ened to "throrv him ofïthe bridge."ee The next da¡ apparently having rost
confidence that they could rvin, strikir-rg rvorkers sought negotiations with
malìagemeut, but "the administration had no clesire to have any negotiatior-rs
with them."ee
Management attenpted to foment divisions between departments by
threatening lockouts in secrions affected by thg strike. A 17 lúy factory
annoullcement declared that the unauthorized stoppage had resulted in
shortages of materials and that steel founclry workers "probably will not be
working tomorrow or the day after" and would lìot be paid. A similar man-
agemellt annoLutcemellt was adclressed to rolled metal shop workers.l00
Guzhon apparently exerted his political influence i' the city in order ro
target strike leaclers. The mayor's office sent an order to the okhrana chief of
the third precir-rct in Lefortovo on 2l July, asking him to "Find the ones ar
the factory rvho are the u,orst scoturdrels and who set the tone for others.'lot
In response, the okhrana reporred that eight workers had played important
roles in the strike and that at least three rvere Bolshevik members or sympa-
thizers, one of whom, accordir-rg to an unclercover Okhrana age l-lt, had
u,orked ir-r the fàctory for eigl-rteen years and "enjoyed a certain popularity
among the workers in the afbresaid fàctory."l02
Althougl-r the strike was solidly organized within one shop, it lacked soli-
darity frorn rvorkers in other departments. The okhrana categorized it as one
of several seasoual stoppages related to speedups ft¡r sumurer rail construction
that rvere pr.rrely economic and not coordinated by "the revolutionar), uncler-
grouttd." While it was t[ue that revolutionarics were l]ot the only instigators,
the arrests shorv that they were part of a rvider r-r-rilieu of militants rvho col-
laborated to organize economic acrions) though the weak level of intra-shop
coordination is evident in that the workers in other departments clid not par-
ticipate. Agents reported a noticeable "disorganization of politically con-
scious and generally left elements among the rvorkers.Dr03 olÌe worker wrotc
that after the defeat "not everyorle was taken back to work.'104 Many skilled
u,orkers participated in the strike nrovement, but women workers and
teenagers were noticeably absent. Though they earned lorv wages and expe-
rienced financial harclship, "they remained outside the rnovernent and did
not participate in strikes."lo5
A distinguishing feature of the post-Lena movement was the lack of sig-
nificant involvemenr by working worìell. If strikes were largely spontaneous
events that lacked coordination, the wor"nen's telìuons connectioll to the
developing political radicalization ar-rd their inclination against taking risks
would help to explain their rernair-ring aloof l'rom the movement. Bur a
plethora of okhrana reports on strikes and subsequent arrests delnonstrate
that the stoppages were highly organized acriol'rs and suggest an alternative
explanation. Organizers themselves apparently macle little ef-fort to involve
womett) focusing their efforts on traditional socialist strongholds in thc metal
and printing inclustries. A wave of strikes in early November in supp<lrt o'f
court martialed Sevastopol sailors was overwhelming rnale, yet women rvork-
ers, including four hundred fi'om the Bonaker Metalworks, dicl participatc.r0ó
Thus, the reason women workers "remainecl outsicle the ntovetnellt" hacr
more to do with the priorities and mindset of the prcdorninantly rnale orga-
luizers than any innate disdain ftrr militancy anlorìg worreu rvorkers.tOT As we
shall see, when male militants in the Moscow Metalrvorks started to take
women's concerns more seriously in l9ló ancl I917, women workers joined
the strike moveûtetlt in large nuubers.
The relative weakness of revolutionary infìucr-rce, however, rrìeaut that
eveu male rvorkers in the fàctor), refrained from strike activity ftlr the rest of
1912. Sixty thousar-rd St. Petersburg workers srruck in suppor-t of the Sev-
astopol sailors involved in a muriny, an actiou supported by fourteen thou-
sancl u,orkers in eighty-nvo factories in Moscow, including nine factories in
the Lefortovo district.los By the spring of 1913, the okhrana rvas confident
that it had again managed to obliterate the revolutionary unclerground in
Moscow, ar-rticipating a detnonstration-fì'ee annivcrsary of the Lena lrìassacre
because, "To have any organized event, appropr.iate agitation is necessary,
rvhich assumes the presence of some kind of Lrndergror.rncl party organiza-
tion." However, "thanks to the most [ecellt arrests, everytþi11g has been
extracted that was considered more or less capable of even creating a selr-
blance olsuch activity ... the most col-lscious carriers of social Democratic
ic{eals, are terrifiecl and avoid even appearillg ar meetirìgs and lectures that are
completely larvful and have been perrnitted by the adrninistration." The
Okhrana did not rule out "the possibility of certain indiviclual arrenlpts at
temporary stoppages of work in several of the skillecl rvorkshops or the larger
fìrctories ancl mills.'loe
The okhrana, like all colÌrelnporary protagonists in Russia's class conflim,
ncknorvledged the leadership of revoh-rtionaries in political strikes, and their
 prognosis was provelì correct. On the anniversary itself, eighq,_five thousand
viding inspiration for workers in other factories. But in the Moscow Metal-
workers struck in st. Petersburg, but the Moscorv respouse was weak, with
works, rvhere the cell had been decimated by repression, workers hesitated
less than three thousand workers from eleven different enrerprises participat-
and either did not strike or else struck in small nulnbers several days after the
ing in the sroppage. The Moscow Metalworks was nor umoìrg thèse, but in
start ofthe protests.
Bromlei, where the Bolsheviks continued to agirate, the okhrana reportecl
The Bolshevik collapse ûreant that the SRs set the tone for political strike
that I,100 workers stoppecl tvork.,wishing to honor the memory of the action in the factory for the duration of the prerevolutionary period. SR
anniversary of the'Lena gys111s.'r'tì()
members wrote that they had attracted fifty young workers, had organized a
The c)khra'a's co'fidence was misplaced, however. o' May Day 1913,
study circle and a drama group, and apparently led a successful econornic
four weeks after the secret police claimed that the revolutionary undergrourd
strilce in the steel foundry shop in April l9l3.rr8 One of the few Bolsheviks
hacl been crushed, thirty-three thousand Moscow workers'struck.úr The
also admittecl that the SRs had had more influence in organizing political
revival of Moscorv's political strikes conrinued in June rvith fbrry-eight of
strike action.lie
fifty-seven stoppages overtly political, bur only a small rninority oi'Mor.o,,"
By the eve of the war the sectarian bad bloocl appears to have subsided as
Metalworks employees participated because of the previous rounds of arresrs.
socialists cooperated in an attempt to establish the rnetal'¡,orkers' union in
Moscow workers struck "in memory of the anniversary of executed Sev- the plant as they did in other Moscow factories.l20 One SR member noted a
astopol sailors." okhrana agents reported that the strikes were,,of a peace-
strengthening of ties amoltg different factories, including a general strike
ful character and norvhere were there attempts at demo¡.rstration actiol.rsr', fund established through cooperation berween the SRs and Bolsheviks, Men-
but notecl the distribution of RSDWp newspapers. The largest strikes were in
sheviks, and the metalworkers' union.l2l The metalworkers' union attenrptecl
the social Democratic strongl-rolds of Sytin printing, Diriarno and Bari. In
to agitate against maltagerneltt's increased imposition of fines.l22 Manage--
contrast) workers in Guzhon's fàctory did not participate., on 24 June ment had irnposed l,lll fìnes for "violation of orcler" in 1912, bLrt that
reuerved strikes ir-rcluded six 1àctories in the Lefortovo clistrict but only 198
rrumber rose dramatically to 2,320 by 1914.t23 The "besr way ro fight against
of 2,759 Moscow Metalworks employees participated threè days larer.iì2
increased fines for absenteeisffr and lateness," according to the Bolshevik
By July l9l3 Guzho' expressed concern to other factory owners rhat ,,the
newspaper, was to "join the metalworkers' union.'" l\enetved collaboration
strike movement taking place at present in Moscow indtrstrial organizations
probably encouragcd several economic strikes, thc first of their ki¡rcl since tlre
does not show a clear economic form and thc essence of the clemands and
spring of 1913. Prøvd,ø reportecl a work sroppagc in the steel ftrundry sliop
other characteristics are reminiscenr of t905-190ó with all the oualities of a
in March 1914.r24 Workers' memoirs also llentiol.l two short one-day strikes:
political demonstration." A.gain the industrialists, responr. *"i to call ftrr
one in the cable shop, which was defeated, and a second in tl-re bolt shop,
harsh rneasures. Guzhon reported that the Meral Group of the MSFMO had
which resulted in a wage increase.l2s
called for "listing the names of the rnost zealous strikers," and requested that
Though factory owners claimed to support the right of unions ro orga-
members circulate information about the movement's leaders.lß Although
nize, they made it clear that they were against uuion intervelìtion in strikes.
Guzhon was justifiably concerued aboLrt the reernergeuce of political strikes,
After the MSFMO complained about the Moscorv r.¡rctalworkers' activities in
the only other political actiou during l9l3 in his Metalworki occurred dur-
August 1913, authorities conducted raids and carried out arresrs) temporar-
ing september, wheu a urere seventy-five ernployees stopped rvork to proresr
il¡i s1-tl'r,atut dorvn the union. The dilemura fbr union acrivisrs was rhat
against the harassment of the labor press in Moscorv.rra This was at a time
although they had the legal right to recruir members and publish rlewspapers,
wheu uot only itrdustrialists but also government officials expressed cleeÞ
as sool-t they engaged in activities to defènd their mernbership they were sub-
collcern about the r-nood of Moscow workers.t l5 jcct to state repression. Therefore legal unionism did not gain a srrorlg
A comparison with the Bromlei fãctory, a metahvorking plant rvith a ltrothold in Moscow in the pre\4/ar yeal's-the rnetalworkers counted less
strong Bolshevik cell,lló illustrates the degree to which rvorkers respondecl
than two thousand members.l2ó
to shop floor agitation. At Bromlei 900 (of 1,r00) u,orkers srruck or1 rhe In early l9l4 owners once again believed that tliey had routed rl-re politi-
anniversary of Lena, while Moscorv Metalworks ernployees cor.rtinued to
cal strike movemel.ìt. On 15 March 1914, Guzhon reported ro rhe owners
work. on May Day 1913,800 Bromlei workers stoppecr work, b*r agairì "the latest workers' demonstration in St. Petersburg shows an extrernely rveak
the re u,as no reported stoppage in Guzhon's factory. At the beginning oithe
reverberation" in Moscow with only seven hundred workers participating. A
strike in defense of Baltic sailors in June, ó00 Brornlei employees werlr olrr) fèw days later four thousand employees were ou strike in Moscou, but by then
but less than 200 Moscow Metalworks ernployees particþated o. the last the rrovement in St. Petersburg that had earlier included fift1, ¡l1oor"tld rvork-
clay of the action. Bromlei's 1,100 rvolkers lecl the srrike wave i¡r November
ers had collapsed.r2T On May Day I914, Guzhon infbrmed the MSFMO that
l9l3 in sllpporr of arrested st. Petersbulg u,orkers; cmployees in Guzhon,s rìlore than tu'enty thousand urorkers in sevent¡,-¡hree enterprises had struck ir.l
en,terprise dicl not participate.llT where Bolslrevism exercisecl a porverfìrl
Mosco'r,i' but that the citywide total represented a dorvnu,arcl trend fì'om
influence, rnany rvorkers repeatedly went out at the start of the strìke, pro- thirty-eight thousand in l9l2 and thirty-three thousand in 1913.128
 zo R n o lu.tion ønd. Cou.nten'ep oløtion.
The owners rvere again overconfìdent about the clecli¡e ol the labor
rnoverrellt. over one million workers struck in the first seven lnonths of
l9l4,a level of strike activity comparable ro rhar of the 1905 revolt. More-
over,74 percent of the participa'ts were i'volvêd ir-r political stoppages. St.
Petersburg conrinued to provide a leacl, with 621,324 ,vi,orkers pár-ticipating
in political strikes.r2e In July of 1914, after gove'rmerlr rroops fìred on
Putilov workers, a general strike developed and rvorkers erected bårricades o¡
the streets ofSt. Petersburg.ls0
Two SR-led political strikes in l914 moved the Moscow Metahvorks to
tlre fbrefront of the Moscorv political rìovemerìt. on26April rnanagemenr
inft¡rrned the factory inspector that r,120 Guzhon *oik.rr had struck
"because of the expulsion of sonre melnbers from the state Duma frorn sev-
eral meetings." The strike includecl all ernployees in the nail, cable and pat-
,
tern sl-ìops) two-thirds of the workers in the steel foundry and repair shàps,
and half of the rvorkers in the bolt and consrruction shops.ì3r EmploymËnt
statistics indicate thar 187 workers struck in unison i¡r three smailer-shops
ancf in a porrion of the shops, but of rhe four large shops, orrìy
'redium-size
trvo-thirds of the workers in the steel foundry shop, an sRstrãngholcl, par-
ticipated.l32 Thus, a fèw orgar-rizers successfully carriecl the strik-e proposal
in srnall departments, but insuffìcient organizatiol"r on the sl-rop floor i¡ the
larger shops resulted in either partial actiol'ì or cornpleté absiention from
the strike.
The stoppage in response to the ]uly l9l4 ge'erar str,ike of 120,000 in st.
Petersburg was larger and better organized. Managenent infbrmed the fac-
tory inspector that 1,500 (of 3,000) Guzhon workers had struck on7 July.r3|
The weaker Moscou'response began on the Sth and peaked two clays later,
with just under ten thousancl workers out on strike r34 Thus Metalrvorks
strikers represented l5 percent of Moscou, strikers in support of putilov
workers-an extraordinary ihow of class soliclarity. Mun"geniËrrt lerters ro the
factory inspector inclicate that tl-ris rvas a well-organized actior-r: workers left
in unison at 8 a.m. on 7 Jtly ancl the next day all workers returnecl ,.at the
usual time and startecl work." Trvo days later the same workers ,,after lunch
again stopped rvork in the form of a protest against the imposition of fines ftrr
the above-nrentioned urìauthorizecl vvork stoppage. "r35 The SR-dominatecl
steel foundry shop was) yet agair.r, the only "hot" shop to participate ancl
apparently fèw women struck, as no workers fi-om the rolled metal shop rvent
out and only from half the bolt shop.l3ó
Before the war, the long-term trencl throughout industrial Rgssia towarcl
conl'rontation betrveen capital and labor resonatecl in the factor\,. as work-
ers struck over ecollomic and political issues. While all corlteurporary pro-
tagonists recoglrized that the revolutionarl, undergronr-rcl playecl a cataìytic
role in recurrenr political srrikes, the Bolsheviks' presencè was
having beer-r deci'rated by repeated arresrs) wrrile the sRs played'egligi6le,
u t.ãaing
role in several large stoppages in the n-Ìontlls prior to the rvar. A variety of
obstacles hacl yet to be overcorne in ftrrging shop-fìoor unir1,, inclucling
divisions bettveeu different departments, berweeu skillecl and u¡skillecl,
youllg and old, and lnale and fèmale workers. while political strikes hacl
lregun to transcend such divisions, tsekhoushchinø continued to dominate
economic strikes.
Wartime Patriotism and the Decline of Worker Activism
On l9 July I914, Nicholas II declared war on G.r-u,ly, a movc that founcl
an immediate resonarìce at tlìe fàctory level. "On the day the war was
declared," wrote one worker, "there was a demonstration fiom the factory to
the city center to the governor-general's office with slogans of 'Down with
Germanyl'and'Long live Russia, France, and Englancll''I37 (\ /hell the war
was announcecl," recalled another worker, "a large procession was organized
and many of our workers took part in the demollstration."l3s
World War I brought working-class militancy to a virtual halt. The factory
inspector reported that less than ten thousand lvorkers in the rvhole of the
empire had gone on strike in the last five months of l914.l3e No strikes were
recorded in the Moscow Metalworks for the first seven ¡llonrhs of the war.laO
-I'he
Okhrana repeateclly reported that throughout the district, "the mood of
workers rvas calm."l4l "At the start of the war," wrote an SI{leader, "therè
was a complete stoppage of strikes and later, although they happenecl, they
u'ere small and short-lived.))r42 The decline in strike activitv clid not correlate
rvitlr the deterioration in workers' living stanclarcls n.r",l"g.,rent utilized
",
tl"re patriotic mood to cut the average rnonthly wage fi'om 48.3 to 34.I rubles
try March l9l5.r43.A,nother mernoir recalled tlrat during the first year of the
war "it was tense and you could not say a worcl against the war ... afier the
capture of Przemysl, workers were taken to Red Square for a prayer service"
and if one did not participate "you were considered an oppollellr of the
war."I4 In the March 19l5 pro-war demonstration after the capture of Prze-
mysl several workers "grabbed a portrait of the Tsar from the main office and
about five hundred workers left the factory."tas
The first wartime strike on 15 April l9l5 shorvs horv far soliclarity had
slipped. The Okhrana reported that eighry workers in the rolled metal shop
nightshift had turned down management's offer of a l0 to 30 percent raise
irnd then struck, demanding a piece-rate increase of 50 to 100 perceirt. The
fìrctory administration claimed the strike occurred because of "sorne secret
ngitation" connected with work stoppages at other factories.iaó In the entir'e
district, however, this small, short-lived strike was the only sroppage in April
1915.r47 Guzhon's strategy for defeating this strike involved a combination
ol compromise and intirnidation. On the same day, managerneut informed
the fàctory director, "because of the rise in prices of goods, all workers in the
llctory would receive an increase of ten kopecks an hour."l48 The average
tttonthly wage jurnped fr'om 34.1 to 52.5 rLrbles-the largest rvartirne wage
increase in the factory.lae The MSFMO reported that managemeur fired
thirty-four strikers.Is0 Additionally, rnanagelllent apparently victirrized the
rcn-raining rolling mill operators as their real wages fell to half their l9l3
lcvcl.tsl An activist admittecl that "things went badly" during the strike
lrccause "other shops would not support it." Significantly, tl're sectional clivi-
 28
Rep o løtion ønd. Coønteryey o lønon

sio's between older skilled workers a'd yourger workers were strengthelled
future Bolshevik fàctory secretary expressed frustration in dealing with those
at the start of the war: "we had many youllg workers a'd
at that time it was rdro did not understaud Russian.lól ,A.nother account notecl that Austriar"r
impossible to raise the issue of equality i' the shop.,,ìs2 As rvorkers
rerreated prisoners working in the rolled rnetal shop had been kepr at a distance by
from u'ified actio', late't divisions within the workforce resurfaced,
allow_ native ernployees, "but later when tlìey started to speak Russian, rvorkers
i'g ma'agerìrerìt to regain the upper hand a'd fèrrce through concessions.
l¡ecame very friendly with them and treated them wel[."Ió2
Hundreds of skilled rvorkers were conscripted duri'g the"war. Duri'g
the An outpouring of nationalist sentiment at the start Of the war helped set
first mobilizario' i' Joly r9r4, the male workforceãecrined by
s94, to the stage fbr anti-German riors iu May 1915. The political colìrexr for the
2,402, i' just a monrh. Although mauagement gradually replaced
these unrest was the Russian withdrawal from Przeml,sl. "Instead of giving way to
u'orkers, anodrer call-up of the s"rr-r. ttr"g.ritude toãk place in ihe
spring of despondenc¡ as after previous defeats, public opinion is protesting, quiver-
l9ló. A disproportionare nurnber of skilied workers fi.òm ..hor" sh'ps rvere ing with iudignation, demanding penalties and remedies, and affìrming its
recruited, including 159 fou.dry workers in
July lgls and 3ló rolled metal detenninatiorì to lvin," the French ambassador recorded just two days before
rvorkers in the spring of l9Ió.153
the outbreak of riots.ló3 Rumors of German wrecking activities in nrunitions
Ma'ageme't used.the threat of rnilitary conscriptio'to criscipli'e ernploy-
fàctories were rampant, and city officials inflarned the xenophobia by issuing
ees. one worker recalled that, "the factory regirne becarne
'be ,no.e se.,ere tha¡ orders that no foreign language was to be used in telephone conversations
earlier. For the slightest offense one coulcl sent to the front."Ìs4 The extent and that all German signs rvere to be removed.lóa Mayor General A.A. Aclri-
to which malÌagement and the okhra'a used conscription to punish
rvorker auo\,'s report on the causes of the riot stated that six workers at the
activists is not clear, but the loss of skiilecl workerc gèuerally
h"d a,, aclverse Trekhgornaia mill I'rad died of intestiual sickness and another 140 becarne
eSct on war profits. I' ocrober r9ló rnanage're'tãppealeå t'o goue.nme,rt
sick. As rumors quickly spread that German spies had poisoned the water,,
officials, complaini'g that, "eight hu'dred workers have beerr."î1..r
,o *"r, exaggerated casualty courìts clirnbed to sixty de¿rths and three hundred sick
the majority of whom are skilled ¡vorkers" while .,all requests and
efforts,, to u,orkers. At the Giubner mill, rvorkers struck on 26 May and demanded the
recall ernployees from the fro't hacl failed. The letter sugjestecl
that calli'g fìring of several Alsatian employees, then Tsindel' mill workers also struck
back workers fì'om the front ",gives us the possibiliry ãî run,lti,.,g
,rrg.nî 'and demanded the firing of GernarÌ persolìrìel, arguing that while the Gcr-
defense orders or tilne ancl ahnost tr,r,ice as fast.,, Mairagenent,s
entreaties man military used asphyxiating gas at the front, within, Russia the IGiser.'s
e'e'tually bore fiuit. "Iu agreeme't with the resolutior, ãt th. factory
meet_ spies rvere using poisorl.ló5
ing for the Moscow region," wrote a Lieutena't Ge'eral, 206 workers ..shall
On the night of 27 Ma1,, accordingto Rwsskoe slouo, workers at the 'fsin-
be retumed fì'om the army to the stated fàctorv.,'ls5
del' and Shrader mills attacked German office rvorkers in their apartlrenrs.
The shortage of skillecl labor lecl Guzrron tå use his positio' of authority 'lhe next morniug, a srnall crorvd gatl-rered near llorovitskii Gates with Russ-
with the war Departrne'r ro import skilled workers ftoÅ Riga, paradoxicaily
ian flags and portraits of the Tsar. They sang "God Save the Tsar," and
a Bolshevik srro'ghold. Riga i' r9l4 had eclipsed Mos.or.nTiir'rtrikes
com- sl-routecl, "Long Live the Emperor, Our Ruler, ar-rd Russian Arrny." As they
mernoraring Bloody su'day (9 Ja'uary l90s) with armosr forty
thousa'd hcaded for Red Square, new groups joined then"r. At rhe outsct, leaders
workers participati'g cornpared witl-r just seven thousand i'Moscorv.l5ó
one herded small numbers of rioters frour store to store;,where proprietors could
Riga n-retalworker wrote that a' offìcial from the war Department
ancl a' prirve that they r'vere neither German nor Austrian, their stores were left
engi.eer h'om Guzhon arrived at his factory in the fall ort-pts and
orderecl irlone. But after the crorvd grew to a "colossal size" of thousancls, including
seventy army reserves to work at the Moscorv Metalworks. ,,We
decicled we nrrrny who were intoxicatecl, riot leaders lost their ar.rthority.ló6 A Guzhon
would go only uncler the condition that the1, gave us a written agreemelÌt
to participant in the riots also noted that at fìrst, "among the pogromists there
guara.tee that our real pay and other conditions ir-r Moscorv r.ioulcl
be no rvere those who indicatecl which stores to tear apart."ló7
wolse than in Riga." such a demand was not enor-rgh to scare 'fhe anti-German riots grew in size and ferocitl,, eventually spreading
Guzhon rnan_
age.rìeut, though Riga rvgrkers, accordi'g to this metalworker,
woulcl be the throughout Moscow. city Duma speakers addressing an emergency session
mai'i'stigators of the Decernber l9l6 strike i'the fàctory.rsi
on 28 May l9l5 rvarned of the "threatening character" because rioters
. Guzl-ron also deployed priso'er-of-wa. rabor to deal with tl-re shortage . In
August l9ló ma'agement reported to the factory i.spector that 225
started to loot Russian as well as German fimrs and ftrrty fires raged through-
Aus- out the .ity.tut The riots illustrate the volatile shilt in popular opinion duritig
trian prisoners of war hacl an'ived and rvere living in barracks in the
factory the war. The French ambassaclor noted that press reports did not accurarely
)¡ard.l5tl workers' nrernoirs also note Ruthenian, õ2e.1.,, ancl slovak priso¡ers cùpture the crowds' political sentiments. Whereas the capture of Przern),sl
working i'the factor),.15e one rvorker wrote that priso'ers hacl bee.,.kept
trvo months earlier had led to prayer services with portraits of the Tsar in Red
u'cler brutal colrtillnous supervisio'" i. tl-re rvooåe'barracks, but
that he Scluare, the May riots explessed strong indignation against the autocracy. The
had become "goocl fiiends u,ith a fèrv of the priso'ers,, a'cl
ofte, u,e'r ro clowd in Red Square "insulted the royal family, demanded that the Empress
their barracks witl-r his balalaika to music rvirh rhe¡n.ló0 I¡ conrrast,
¡rlay the shcluld be incarcerated in a conve[t, the Emperor deposed and the crown
 30 Rep olation t nd Cltr.Trterreullati¡n
tralìsferred to the Grand Duke Nicholas, Rasputin hnng, etc.',róe Despite
the
presence of troops on the streets of Moscor¡,, the distuibapces
contipued for
t\\/o more days. Moscow Duma member M.M. Novikov wrote that troops
had fired on a crowd pokrovskii Bridge in Lefòrtovo,
'ear killing n".lu.
wounding thirty.lTo ",ìd
city authorities rvere horrified try the scope of the riots ancl prefèrred to
have workers at their benches. I'a'emergency session of the À.ioscow
city
Duma, constitutio'al Democrat (Kadet) N. Astrov cornparecf the everts
to
1905 and asked, "when u,ill it endr" Russr¿oe slouoprinied an appeal
fio'r
150 Kerti.g Brothers workers who dema'decl tl-re sèquesteri'g àf G.r,ru,.,
firms for the Russian people and protested against their ruin andlestruction.
The appeal included a donation "to oLlr brotlrers in the front positions who
are holding back the mosr evil eremy."rzr (Jwo Rossi.i. iveigheã the military
sacrifices at the front with those req*irecl by i'd'stry, sayi'g that
e'terprises
needed "every rvorl<er standing by his bench."lz2
Moscow Metalworks ernployees participated in the riots. MarragenÌenr
clisingenuously stated to the fàctory i'spector. six weeks larei ..'one
of the
Moscow Metalrvorks company office staff or u,orkers left the factory."rze 1¡-r.
okhrana, however, reported that o' 29 May,,,after the pogrom incidcnts il-r
Mosco'w, none of the factories retumecl to operation,' tbi feãr that emplot
ees
would leave rvork to participate, i'the riors.lza o'e lnemoir claiméd. l.À4",ru
Guzhon workers participated i' the procession," includi.g o'e worker.rvhå
aunounced: "we just smashed the Keller Factory aucl now we are going
to
burn the vogay warehouse."lzs olìe riot participaut \,vrote that, ,,a lumor
spread that the tea-weighing factory 'caravalì,' a Ge¡man firm. was
on fire.,,
Workers stopped work and ran to Caravan: ,,I saw many people grabbing
tea
and sngar .. . I also decided to take tea.Dt76 Anotl¡er GurÈoo *oiker recalled
seei'g "workers from the Guzho' factory had loaded up a whole sack of
goods." After the riots had ended, "the police entered apartments and arrested
those rT'ho had participated in the lood'g. I' a short ti,r',. ,r,"ny peopre
were
arrested, as participants of the pogrom started to infbrm o,-r ...i-r ^other.Ðt77
Many of tl-re riot participarlts were worki'g-class lllen, but tl-re press ancl
authorities rvere especially appalled that even womell a'd youth looted busi-
rlesses. un o Rossii exclaimed tlìat "rvomen and sr.rspicious-looking
youths,'
had pillaged srores.rzs The vicious acrio's of a srnall nurnber of thrigs
appar-
e'tly conrrasted with the festive ar'rosphere amollg the rnajoriry oip"ììiu-
pants. A Duma mcmber claimecl to have seeu ,.rÌta¡1, very-yogltg people,,
participating with happy faces "like it was Easter nþht.,; ¡u.,orhl, Duma
member saw a cro\\¡d Red square that rvas ,,mainlv vo'ths ancl
women.'Ì7e Russl¿oe slopo'ear also claimed ,.womell ancl juveniles sia.ted grab-
bi'g piles of goods fi'om the pogrom places." Nor were all those who stole
goods proletarian: "Soon after darkness," the sarre accour-rt noted, .,von
began to see evell well-dressed people with looted goods on the rrr..rr."'rro
More scanclalous than the croud's composition was the role of the police.
I' the e'rerge'cy Duma sessio' Mayor Guchkov accused the police of n"g-
lige'ce. "Police officers stood peacefully i' their places smoking their cigã-
W¡r hinø-Cløss Mop ewent 3l
rettes, talking, joking and cloing nothing to return Moscow to peace," he
charged.Isl "At first," wrote the French ambassador, "police let the rioters do
as they liked" but later "the agitation assumed such a scale that it has become
necessary to suppress it by force."i82 A British citizen visiting Moscorv
clairned that he had seen "the Govemor-General of Moscow himself seated
on his horse, quietly rvatching the pogrom of large German firn'rs. Neither he
nor the group of police officials around him were making ally arternpt to stop
the rioters."l83 Moscow Duma deputy M.M. Novikov confìrrned police
involvement in the riots. Among the rvounded rvas a policeman fi'om the
Lefortovo precinct who had been in the fì'orrt row of the dernonstration.
Moreover, "in the preceding days the same policeman participated in the
street demonstrations and pogroms and even led some of them.'184
Mernoirs similarly attest to official and police involvenlent in the riots.
One worker wrote that socialist literature that circulatecl among workers after
the riots had devoted "rnuch attelltiolì to the State Duma ancl anti-German
pogrom in Moscow," rvhile another u,orker posited that the police had orga-
nized the riot in an attempt to create a "lift" because the war was dragging
on. "Workers understood the police had organized it-this was clear."l8ã
Labor historian and socialist Margaret Dewar wrote thar when she lived in
Moscow in 1915, rurtors spread that governmeut agents and Black Hun-
clreds hacl led the riots.l8ó
The war and the anti-German riots demonstrate the volatility of workers'
¿rttitudes and actions. After a strike in solidarity
with St.'Petersburg workels
in July 1914, the war broke the momentum of the labor rnoverleut, and
rnallagement easily crushed the single isolated economic strike. Nationalist
scntimellt permeated the factory as workers palticipated in patriotic demon-
strations, prayer services for the troops, ancl chauvinistic anti-Gernran riots.
Yet continued war losses, workers' deteriorating economic position, and their
perception that gendarrnes had led the riots and then arrested other partici-
¡rants all undermined the patriotic mood that had scemed so irnpregnable.
Renewed Worker Activism
Workers' lnemoirs indicate that after the riots the political mood began to
chirnge. "Soon afier the pogroms in May 19l5 were over," one activist
lccalled, "workers began to €xpress their dissatisfàction rvith the rvar.'187 A
lìolshevik activist wrote that "cornrades again renewed work that hacl beer-r
interrupted" after the upheavals.lss Another Guzhon worker described the
clcteriorating living standards and growing political anger against the regirne:
"OLrr skillecl vvorkers began discr.rssions about political events ... that the
'Iìsar was a fool incapable of govelning and that Rasputin ruled Russia." The
lcvolutionary underground becarne bolder, putting up political leaflets in
tlrc general lavatory near the sheet uretal shop calling for "the overthrorv of
l'ltc Tsar, for arming workers. Frequently these included quotes fiom the
s¡:ecches fì'orn tl-re meetiltgs of the State Duma by the Bolshevik deputies,
bccause thc newspapers did not publish the full text of these meetir.lgs."lse
 JZ R ct, o løtit¡n ønd Coønterrev o lu.tion
By the sulnmer's end, the patriotic fervor had dissipated, giving way ro a
new rouncl of militancy. Six hundred and fifty r.vorkers iu the rolled metal
shop struck for seven days in August 19l5 and prevailed in the first substan-
tial wartime econolnic stoppage, securing a small wage increase .le, In a meet-
ing of the Russian council of Ministers on 2 september r9rs, Minister of
Intemal Affàirs N.B. shcherbatov rvamed that, "The tesrimonv of all aqellts
is unanimous ... the labor movement will develop to an extent whicñwir
threaten the safety of the state ." In Moscow the sentiment rvas "violently
anti-governlnent" and "workers and the population as a whole are gripped by
some sort of madness and are like gunpowcler." He complained that "author-
ities in Moscow have virtually no ftrrces," and rhat those at their disposal
weie "fàr from reliable." Moreover, Moscow had a "wild ba'd" of thirty
thousand couvalescent soldiers who clashed with police and fieed prisoners.
In the event of disorders, shcherbatov fèarcd, "this whole horde will be on
the side of the crorvd."lel
on the follorving day Tsar Nicholas proroguecl rhe Duma and triggered the
Iargest wartime political strike wave in Moscorv. Alexander shliapnikov wrote
that in Moscow during the late sumlner of I915, rising prices and the dismiss-
ing of the state Duma led to "nreetings and rallies everlnvhere.'le2 Guzhon
reported to the MSFMO that on 4 septernþer 31,166 rvcn'kers in sixty-one
enterprises struck.Ie3 SR agitation again placed the Moscow Metalwcjrks at the
heacl of tl're nìovernent as the entire fàctory strr-rck
in unison. On 5 Septernber
1915, "workers in all departments appeared at work at the prescribed time, but
therl did not start work and rvithout permission left the factory without issuing
any kind of clemands."te4 The okhrana reported that three thousancl Guzhon
workers had "stopped work for two days in the fbrm ofa protest about the inci-
dent of interrupring the activiry of the State Duma.".le5
This brief SR militancy during the war was exceptioual, as their members
in Moscow tencled to be r¡rore conservative than in (now renamed) petro-
gracl. on 19 August 1914, sRs from Guzhon and other factories resolved
that, because of "tlre liberationist character of the war," no attenìpt should be
made to hincler it. Nevertheless, responding to the grorvth of antigovernrnent
seutimellt fbllou,ing the dismissal of the Duma, Moscorv sRs shifted to the
left, playing an imporra't role in the Septen-rber t9l5 srrike rvave . on 3 se p-
tember, the Moscorv SRs issued an antigovemment proclarnation calling for
the creation of factory cornmittees, but retreated again after auother round of
arrests. Moscow SRs convetrecl to pass resolutions that de-emphasized strikes
and demonstratiotls in favor of builcling their party organization.leó
The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, rvere so rveak in the clistrict tlrat in
september l9ló their Moscow cornmirtee decidecl to combine the Lefor-
tovo alÌd Rogozhskii districts thar hacl a cornbined membership of only
thirty-three: ten in Dinarno and srnaller cells in Bari, Guzhon, Tsindel', and
Postavshchik. Dinamo rvas the only cell that survived an okhrana sweep in
October, and went o' to spark three political strikes in 1916.tr)7 The SRs,
strategy of refì'aining fì'om political strike acrior-r, together with the clecirna-
tion of the Bolsheviks' orgariization helps explain the absence of overtly polit-
ical stoppages fbr the duration of the prerevolutionarv period.
Wn'lúng-Cløss Mou cment 33
Factory SRs also advocated participation in the War Industries Commit-
tees. The govenlmellt ancl industrialists established the Comlnittees in an
attelnpt to co-opt workers into championing wartime production.les In Pet-
rograd, the Bolsheviks rnanaged to turn the War Industries Comntittees
against the government by winning positions on all autiwar platform that
openly denounced cooperatioll in the war. In Moscow, however, authorities
prohibited preelection meetings.lee One SR recalled, "the Bolsheviks were
against workers participating in the War Industries Committees, but we had
Socialist Revolutionaries who proved that it was necessary." Either apathy or
possibly Bolshevik agitation caused an extremely weak initial respolìse to the
Committees as only 102 of 3,048 employees participated in their electiot-ts.200
SRs and other activists attempted to reuder the Committee an effèctive
weapon in their confrontation with Guzhon. In May 1916, during the
largest wartime econolnic strike, workers petitioned the War Industries
Cornmittee, complaining, "In the current conditions it is impossible to con-
tinue working." They also attempted to wield Guzhon's preeminent posi-
tion among Moscow industrialists against him, asking the Committee "to
take into account that the head of the factorg Iu. P. Guzhou, is also a merl-'
ber of the Moscow War Industries Committee." The petition also coutained
a patriotic aspect, requesting the rvorkers' release and transfer to work at
,other defense enterprises.20r
Seven econon-lic strikes in the year and a half befbre 19I7 demoustrate
renewed labor confidence and improved organization in the face of Okhrana
and managelnent threats of reprisals. Two strikes in August l9l5 involved
400 and ó50 workers, extended beyond a single shop, and lasted nitte and
seven days respectively. A two-day strike in December 19l5 involved nearly
500 workers. Strikes in 1916 were even stronger: 3,000 workers partici-
pated in a May stoppage,7ó0 struck in Juue, aud more than 1,000 partici-
pated in an eight-day strike in September, with another 489 going out for six
clays in December.2o2
.The May l9ló stoppage was the best organiz.ed of the wartime strikes.
Plant managers, possibly sensing trouble, issucd a factory altnouncemetlt on
30 Apiil that increased insurance benefìts f'or workers and their depert-
<lcnts.203 On 2 May three thousand emplol,eçs stoppecl work and demanded
a raise in the minimum rate from 2.5 to 4 rubles.2Oa On the fbllowing day,
irccorcling to managene[ìt) sotr-re departmeuts began work, but under threats
fì'om strikers in other shops the strike soor-r engulfed the entire factory. At
9:30 a.nr., rvorkers from all departmeuts gathered at the lnain offìce ancl
h¿rnded the factory adrninistration a list of dernands. These included: dou-
bling sick pay; minimulÌr \r¡ages of fifteen kopecks f-or apprentices and
women) nventy-five kopecks for urale workers, and thirty kopecks for skilled
u,orkers; ending work at 2:30 on Saturdays and the day befbrre holidays; and
issuing wages and bonus pay ou Saturday.20s
The new grievances reflected a denrographic shift to a youlÌger aud more
fcmale rvorkfbrce that had occurred during the war. Whereas on the eve of
the rvar, teenage rvorkers made r-rp 15.7 percent of the workforce) t\4¡o years
lrrter they col-rstituted 2ó.ó percent. Similarly, the number of rvomen had
 JA Repoht tion ønd. Coantcrrøtt olution
steadily increased from l93 in July 1914 to 3ó3 in December r9ló, an
increase frorn 5.8 to l3.l percerìt of the workforce, rvith wom€n working in
six shops iustead ofjust rwo as they had earlier.2'ó Thus, the project of forg-
ing unity against management necessitated the drawing up of more inclusive
demands that addressed the concerns of an increasingly significant minority.
The strike apparently ended in at least a partial victory ftrr the workers.
The okhrana reported on 3 May that afier lunch, all workers with the excep-
tion of seven hundred workers in the rolled metal and repair shops returned
to work.207 Some workers expressed dissatisfaction with the results, ancl a
subsequent 22-day strike by 760 workers i'June was rhe longest of the pre-
revolutionary period. One memoir describes the difficulties of maintaining
such a long action because in "the tliird week of the strike. the morale of
many workers suffered. Many were forced to sell their things to somehow
survive." By the fifth rveek, many workers secretly returned to work, and by
the sixth week "almost all" workers retumed. Management managed to
break the strike with "some comrades" not returning to work as they were
"subject to repression."2os
In the context of the rising u'orking-class rnoveffrelìt, such mauagement
tactics only encouraged more effective labor organization. The eight-day
strike of more rhan a thousand workers in,september anlc october 1916
shows the increased level of workers'solidarity, organization, and coirfidence:
The okhrana reported that this was rhe only stiike in,the district fbr the
rnonth.20e To avoid victimization, shops elected delegates to meet with
Guzhon and workers did not leave the plant. "we were Italian strikers,"
wrote one participant.2l0 The strike startecl in the fbrm casting and steel
foundry shops o'2ó september and spread to the bolr and cable shops the
next day. Employment figures show that the strike inclucfed all ernployees in
the four shops, includi'g 123 women in three shops and 33 teenage labor-
ers. This was also a well-timed strike, as lnanagement complained it caused
delays in "orders for various items needed for state defense." Management
was compelled to ask the inspector to certifl, that the strike had caused the
holdup, reporting that o' 5 October the strike had been ,.liquidated,', but
provided no details of the result.2ll
Form casti'g rvorkers struck again a few weeks later. The six-day strike by
almost fìve hundred rvorkers in December rvas the last action ol.the prerevo-
Iutionary period, ar-rd again shorved a high level of organization with solid
participation of the entire shop and elected delegates to avoid victimiza-
tion.212 workers demanded pay for days when it'r,as i¡rrpossible to rvork
because the lnachines were frozen,ancl clespite the threat of se nding military
reservists to the front, almost all workers in several shops strr-rck.2l3 The strike
endecl in a partial victory for the workers, as lnauagement conceded to some
of the demands.2la
workers' activism in the Moscou, Metalworks closely mirrored the con-
tours of the Russialt labor uroveulellt tllät weut through three waves of mil-
itancy afier the turn of the cerìtury. Asicle from the repressive interlude
following the 1905 Revolution and the more rransirory rs¡..rar during the
first months of the Russo-]apanese war ancl worlcl war I, the normative pos-
Wo rh it tg-Clø ss Muv en t e n t 35
ture of the Russian working class was combative. The first upsurge cuhni-
nated in the 1905 Revolution in which almost two million workers struck.
t-erv workers participated in strikes after 1907 but the Lena Goldfields rnas-
sacre in April l9l2 triggered the rebirth of labor activism. More than
700,000 workers participated in strikes in I9I2; nearly 900,000 the follow-
ing year; and over 1.3 rnillion durir-rg the first sevelì months of 1914. The
rise in patriotic sentiment at the start of the rvat' brought a tenìporary decline
in industrial unrest, but the third phase brought a resurgelìce of rnilitancy,
rvith over a half million workers engaged in strikes in l9l5 aud almost
900.000 in l9ló.2r5
The class polarization evident throughout Russia society during this
period reverberated porverf-ully in the Moscow Metalworks. From the Lena
lÌlassacre in I9I2 to the end of 1916, workers struck nineteen times, with
ruearly fifteen thousand ernployees participating. Eight of the strikes were
overtly political and ir"rcluded over seven thousand workers.2Ìó The ternpo-
lal clelimiters to these volatile shifts in Moscow Metalworks workers' confi-
clcnce can be discerned almost to the day. Tl-re defeat of the December 1905
rebellion and the start of World War I usherecl in temporary periods of
l'etreat. Bloody Sunday 9 January 1905, the Leua nrassacre, aud the arrests
irfier the May l9l5 alÌti-German riots were tun-rirìg points in which work-
ers took the of-fensive .
Marry workplace organizations-inclucling those loyal to the Tsarist state-
vied fc¡r employees' loyalty. The Zubatov movemerìt) the fattory elders systetn,
rrncl War Industry Committees illustrate the risks for employers of building
latror associations from above. Workers' pressure fì'om below gave each a
t1¡,namic more rnilitant than originally intended by authorities. Yet thc l'rard-
line strategy adopted by Guzhon and other captains of indr.rstry was hardll, a
viirble alternative. Their policy of economic and political iutrausigence) coln-
trined with their fàilure to build and sustain loyal employee institutions) meant
that they conceded participatory politics to the revolutiouaries.
Worker involvement in political su'ikes began modestl¡ but showed a clear
trajectory toward increasing radicalization and rnore effèctive organization.
All the colìtemporary protagouists-nonparry workers, revolutionaries, matt-
iìgement) the MSFMO, and the secret police-rccognized that socialists
pliryecl a leaclership role in the thirty political strikes that took place between
tlre Lena massacre and 1917. Believing that political and econornic power
lcsided at the point of production, mernbers of the various Marxist parties
concentrated their efftrrts in the factories, ancl strike activity was ofteu deter-
mined by shop-level agitation for action. Only several hundred Moscorv Met-
rrlrvorks employees participated in the political strikes that fbllor,r,ecl the April
l9I2 Lena lrìassacre, the May Day l9l2 strike, the ]une l9l3 action in sup-
port of Baltic sailors, and the September I9l3 repression of labor press in
Moscour The three political strikes in early l9l4 includcd 500, 1,120, and
1,500 rvorkers respectively ancl the entire rvorkforce struck after the'fsar
¡rrorogued the Duma in September 1915. Ernployees refrained fiom the fir,e
¡rolitical strike rvaves in I9l6 because the SRs aclopted a nìore cottscrvative,
¡.rirtriotic stance and fbcusecl their ef-forts on econonlic issues. If caution and
 Rct, o lu.tion øtt d. Couuterrev oløtion Wrhing -C løss M ot, ernent 37

pragmatism marked sR policy, audacity and tenaciry de fìned Bolshevism, bur
repeated okhrana sweeps ¡neallt they paicl a heavy price ftrr their boldness.
workers, however, were not passive recipients to socialist agitation. prior t.
to 1917, most workers did not shorv loyalty ro arly particular party. The 2.
salient question is, why were Russian workers so receptive to revolutionaries'
call to actionl The "us against them" rnentalité increasingly evident among
groups of workers was rooted in the commonality of their workplace experi- ( Lecrn Trcrtsky, The History of the Røssiøø Revoløtiott', 3 vols. (Nerv York, 1998 ), I : 3-
ences and the fàilure of political and economic refor¡ls. Moreover. the 6.
unyielding and repressive malìagelnellt strategy paradoxically encouraged 7.
subversion and fbstered strong solidarity. with the threat of arrests ancl con-
8.
scription, the choice was either to acquiesce or improve their organization to
deter victimization. Fluctuations in workforce divisiols coincicled with the 9.
waves of retreat and advance in labor movement power. When workers welìt t0.
on the offensive in 1905, after the Lena massacre, ancl again in the summer u.
of 1915, the tendency was for various divisions benveen shops, between 12.
t3.
older and youllger workers, and between male and fèrnale workers to weaken
and for workers to develop bold strategies to counter management and the
okhrana. conversely, when workers were pushed onto the defènsive, sec- t4.
tional interests were reinforced, repression becane rnore effective, and fear I5.
and suspicion dolninated the workplace. By l9ló workersi demands had ló.
become noticeably more inclusive, supporting grievances of wom'en and
17..
younger rvorkers, moving beyond the confines of single shops, aud electing
represelttatives to strelÌgthen interdepartmental cooperatiolì. tB.
Though the Moscow Metalworks was swepr up in the risi'g tide of work- 19.
ers' militancy in the Russian empire, in his own elìterprise Iulii petrovich
20.
Guzhon maintained an advantage in the conflict bet#een capital ancl labor
during the prerevolutionary years. The war years were the best of times for 2t.
Guzhon as company profits doubled in the first fiscal year of the war and 22.
again in the second year.2L7 But it was workers who paid for this profit, their
wages falling in an almost inverse ratio to their owner's increasing prosperiry. ¿õ-
By March l9l7 real wages were half of rvhat tl-rey had been f-our years ear-
Notes
Prøud.ø,30 May l9I3, cited in Lenin, Collecte¡I Worla (Moscorv, 1977), 19: 125.
Prøtdø,30 May, 2, 5, 9 June 1913, cited in L.enin, Collccted' Worhs, 19: 125-l3l
Prøud.ø,30May,2,5,9June 19I3,citedinLenin, CollecterlWorhs, 19: I25-131.
I-e<>pold Flainson, "Tl-re Problern of Social Statriliq' in Urban l{ussia; 1905-1917" (part l)
Sløt,ic Retiew 23 (l)ecernber 1964): 619-42; (part 2) 24 (March L965): 1-22.
I5.
Koenker, Moscor Worlzers,25-26. Chase, Worhers, Society, ørt'rl the Soviet Støte, L06.
I.L. K<rrnakovskä, Zøt,od.'Serlt i Molot' 1883-1932: Opyt Istoriho-Sotsiologichcshogo Issle-
doy ønn ii ø (Moscorv, 1979 ), 36- 41.
fererr-rialr Sclrrreiderman, Setgei Zu,ltøtot, ønd Revoløtionøry Mørxisnz (Ithaca NY, 1976),
150. GAIìF, l.7952, op. 3, d. 273,1.9L. F.I Karpuklrin ureut¡ir.
K<rrnakovskii, Zøvod. 'Stp i Molot' 18B3-1932,46.
Sclrneiderrnan, Serge Zabøtov ønd Revoløtionøry, Mørxistn, 150.
GAÌìF, f. 63, op. 35, d.444.11.45-ó. Okhran¿ report,29 May 19I5.
Thc Lefìrrtovo Okhrana reported on the fàctory.
I{GAMO, f. 18ó, op. 3, cl. 3, ll. I-17. Empkryment statistics by shop, Mt¡scou, Met¿lu't>rks;
RGIAgM, f. 498, op. 1,d,.229,11. 5-ó. 19l4 fàctor1, tr1"tt.t.tt't.nt rep()rt to fàctory inspec-
tor on clepartmcnts, u.c'1. 1914.
GAIìF, f. 7952, <t¡t. 3, tl.274,1. 34. P. V. Lcshkovtscv trrctuoir.
GAIìF, f 7952, op. 3, d. 275,1. 10. P V. Lavrenov Incrìx)rr.
GAllF, f. 7952,<>p.3, d.209,l. 25. Workcrs' pàsspotts fitxn 1898. I(t>enker, Moscon Worh-
ers,47 -48.
GARF, f. 7952, <'tp. 3, d. 209,11.24-25. Wage and age (as of !905 ) statistics collccte t{ ¡rfter
revolutit¡n.
GAIìF, f. 7952, <tp. 3, ð. 276,1. 45 P. I. Tarasov uet¡t¡ir.
GAI{F, f-. 7952, op.3, d.2O9,1. 70. Itogozhskii clistlict Mosct>r,t, Ct>urtnittcc of the
RSDWP leafìet, n.c1. 1905
GAJIF, f 7952, op. 3, d. 271,1-234. E.I. Vonrninir treuroir; I\GAMO, fi lBó, op. 3, cl. 3,
ll. l-12. Employurent statistics by shop.
RGAMO, f.2122, op. t, d. 248,11.4-8. Wage categ<>t'ics in thc Mt¡sct¡r,r'Mct¿lworks.
GARF, f. 7952, L>p.3, d.272, l. 60. N.I. Igorov nretnoit'. Igorov clairns that u'omen
alrcady working in the clepartment participated in thc laughter.
GAI{F, f. 7952, t'tp. 3, d.209,l. 30. Prerevolutit>nar¡, tlocuurcnt collcctio¡.t.
Laura Engelstei n, M osc otr, 1 905 (Stanfirrd, 1982), 56-57
.

25. Kornakovskii, Zøvod.'Serp i Moh¡f I B 83- 1932, 43.

lier,2l8 and as one worker mernoir notes, employees seenred inireasingly ¿o. Engclsteirr, Moscor 1905, 56-57.
aware that Guzhon's earnings during the rvar had come at their expense.2ìe 27. Sclrneic{errrran, Setgei Zwltøtou øn rl Repoløtionøry Mørxism, 99-134.
ultimatel¡ the hard-line strategy of war profiteering calne at a price that 28. Schneicierrran, Sergci Zø.høtot, øn¡l Repoh¿tionøry Mørxisrn, l5I.
could not be measured in rubles. It fueled workers' fierce hatrecl toward 29. GAI{F, f. 7952, op. 3, d.275,1. 10. P.V. Levrentov urcnroir.
JU. Sclrrreiderrrran, Set'gei Zøltøtot, and Repoh¿.tionøry Mørxivn,l4l-172,350; GAI{F, f.7952,
their bosses and contributed to the widening chasm benveen rulers ancl ruled
op. 3, d. 275,1. 10. P.V. L¿t'r'rcrtov rlletnoir.
in a society increasingly divided along class lines. 31. Sclrrreiclerrrrarr, Sørgei Ztl.bøto't, ønd Ret,ohttionøry Mørxisw, 173-192.
o¿. Orlando Figes, á Peoples Trøgcd1 (Nerv York, 1996),174-178.
33. Figes, ,4 Patples Trøgerly, 179-187.
34. Mørtcnovleø,19 l)ecembcr 1925. GAI{F, 1.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 209,1.61.
35. Engclstein, Moscotv 1905,6 -.
36. Mørtenoilaø, 19 Decclnber 1925. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, cl. 209,1. 61.
37. Lenin - Collecte ¡1. Wor hs. 9 : 23 - 57.

38. Tlreodore Dan, The Origins of Bohhevisw (Nat, Y<'trk, 1964), 332.
to Michael Melancon, Th¿ Sociølist Repohllionøries ønd the Røssiøn Anti-Wør Movenoent,
I I I 4- I 7 (Coll.l,'ttbus, 1990).
40. GAIIF, f. 7952,op.3,d.27l,l.7. M.M. Avcleev urctr.roir.
41. Errgclsteirr, Moscont 1905, 64-73.
4.2. Engelstein, Moscon, 1905, 7 3-229.
38 Reu o ht tion øn d. Coø.nterret,
43. GAIIF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 209,1.70. 1905 IìSDWP lcâfler, n.d. Mørtenovhø,19 Deccmber
t925.
44. Thornas Owen, Cø1titølism øncl Politics in Rassiø (Can'icriclge, 198 ì ), 186, l9g-202.
45. RGIAgM, f. 52ó, o¡r. l, d..24,1. 79. Guzhon lctrer ro MSFMO, l5 March 1914.
4ó. Figes, A Pmple\ Trøqedy,224.
47. D¿vid Lane, The Roots of Røssiøn Com.mønisnt. (Asscn, I9ó9), I04, Trotsky, Stølin (New
York, ì941),95.
48. Lcnin, Collected. Worlu, 17:5BI; 34: 4tl.
49. GAIìF, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 275,1. 17 . P.V. L¿zrenr>v rììeruoir.
50. GAIìF, f. 7952, <>p. 3, d.27L,l. 35. V.N. Arapt>v menroir.
51. GAllF, f. 7952, tlp. 3, d. 276,1. t2. I.F. To¡rtov rncrnoir.
GAIIF, f. 7952, <tp. 3, d.. 273, l. 97. Kochcrgin memoir.
53. GAIìF, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 271,1. 34. V.N. Arapov menx:ir.
54. GAllF, t. 79 52, <tp. 3, d. 27 5, 11. 48 - 49 . S.S. Leshkovtscv mcmt¡i r.
55. Leopold Hairrs<>n ancl Eric Brian, "I-abor Unrcst in Inrperial l{ussia," in Strihu, Sociøl
ClltÍlict ønd tbc First World Wør,Leopolc| Haimsou and Giulio Sapelli, ecls. (Milan, 1992),
444.
56. GAllF, f. 7952, t'tp. 3, d. 273,1. 94. Koclrergin mernt>ir.
57. GAIìF, f. 7952, <tp. 3, d. 274,11. 39-40. P-L. Lavrerrt'ev nrcmoir.
58. Ocherhi istorä Mosl¿o'r,shoi orgønizøtsii Ir-PSS, IBB3- 1945,2 vols. (Moscor.rr, 1966), l:257 .
59. T<rny Clifl, Lenin: Bøildingthe Pørt1 (L<>l.:lJ,on, I975), 3lB.
ó0. GAI(F, f. 7952, <>p. 3,,J,. 276,1. 12. L F. Toptov rnc¡rsir
ot- GAIìF, t. 7952, o¡'t. 3, d.. 271,1. 39;,V. N. Ara¡rov meurr¡ir.
62. Leorr Trotskl', "lleport on thc World Econor¡ic Crisis ancl the Nerv Tasks of the Conullu-
nist lrrternatiorral," in First Fiue Teørs of the Cotnrnunist InternøtionøL,2 vols. (Neu,Yrrr:k,
1972), r:2r0.
63 Michael Melaucon, "Thc Ninth Circle: The Lena Goldficltl Workcrs antl tfie M¿ss¿crc 6f
4 April 1912," Sløvic Repiep 53:3 (fàll 1994): 786-795.
64. It<lbcrt McKcan , St. Petersltørg Behveen th¿ Repoh,ttions: Worheys ønd Ret,olution.øries, Ju.ne
19}7-Fehrøøry l91Z(Neu, Havcn, 1990),495; Haimson ancl Brìan, "Labor Unrcst," 444.
ó5. GAIìF, f. 63, <>¡t. 32, d. 1497,1. 22. Okhrana re p()rr, ì2 Iunc 19t2.
66. Prøt dø,26 April 1912.
67. GAllF, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 265,1. 17. Scruev rccollection; .1. 271,1.30ó. S.S. Gerasrmov
nrerrrtrir; d.274,11.40, 103. PL. Lavlcnr'cv, I. Litlvanskii rrcmoirs; d,.275,11. 17,49.P.V.
L¿zlcnor,, S. S. Leshkovtsev r.nerroirs; I{GASPI fì 70, op. 3, d. 150, l. BB, F.I. Karpukhin
recollecti<>ns of ìISDWP in llogozhskiria district, 190ó-1917. "llecollecion" denores a
speccìr ol sumlìrary that is zlatPart of tlte Harnmer ancl Sickic Factorl, lllemoir collection.
The Slìs organized à scpà[atc protcst, in which, accor<ling to olle menber, "u'e lrrought
<¡ut u,orkers fìr>m all the shops." GAIìF, f. 7952, <tp. 3, d. 273, l. 9ó, Kochergin nlcnl<>ìr.
ó8. I(otnnntnisticheshoi pørtii Sovietshrgo Soiuzø, 5 vols. (Moscorv 1966),2:381.
69. TsMAM f . 176, o¡t. 2, tl. 7,11. 2-5. Okhrana rcporrs relc¿sed in l9l7 . men. At that time the cl¿ss-c<¡nscit¡usness of the ur¿rss of the r.vt¡rkers wâs still littlc clevcl-
70. GAI{F, f. 63,<t¡t.32,tl. 1497,11. l0- 23. Okhrirn¿ reporrs, I2 Jtrne I9l2,13 March t9I3.
71 GAI{F, f. 63,<>p.32, cl. 1488, Il. l-9. Okhlanà rcport,25 May l9I2;d. 1489, ll. I-10.
Oklrr¿n¿ rcporr, 22 May 19l2 .
72. GAllF, f. ó3, op. 33,tI. 1206,11. L-17. Oklrr'¿na reporrs, 27,28 Augusr 1912.
73. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 32,t1.448. Okhr¿na lep()rrs, April, May 1912.
74. GAIìF, f .7952, o¡r. 3, cl. 275,1.49. S. S. Leshkovtsev ruenxrir.
75. ,GA.llF,.7952, op. 3, d. 257,1.72. I.M. Lidv¿nskii r:ecollcction; d.271,1.30ó, S.S.
f ìt0. GA.I{F, f. ó3, op. 33, d. f 399, ll.44-45. Okhr¿na report,4 April 19ì3.
Ger¿sir.nov nrcuroir; d.273,1. 5; PN. Klinranov meulrir; tI.274,1.40,P.L Lavrenr'ev
nrerloi¡l d.275,1.5. P-V. L¿zrenov rremoir.
76. GAltF, f. ó3, op. 32, c1.934,11. l, 7, 8, 13, 16; d. l0l9 l. 3, d. 1422,1.1; cl. 1573, l.t,
1578, l. 5. Okhran¿ re¡rorts I912.
77. GAI{F, 1.7952, o¡r. 3, i{. 256,1. 33. Koclrergiu recollecion.
78. GAI{F, f. ó3, op. 32,c1. 1645,11. l-8. Okhranir rcp()rts, Novcmber 1912.
79. McIGan, St. Petershutg lteñre en the Rc'r,oh.rions,495-496.
oh.ttion Wr hin ø- C løss M o'p emcnt 39
80. GAfìF, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 276, l. 13. I.F. Toptov r.ncuroir; d. 256, l. 89, K<>chergin
rec<¡llcction.
81. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 33, d. 458, ll. t-34. Okhr¿n¿ rcports, l3 May 19I3,4 October 1914.
82. TsAODM, f.429, op.l, d. I, l. l. List of fàctory May Day participants.
83. G,4,1(F, f .7952, op. 3, d. 263,1. 182. P. N. Kliur¿r'rr*,recollection.
84. See GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 32-36 (1912-1916).
85. Victor Serge, Whøt Everyone Shoøhl. I(nop Aboøt Støte Repression (l,onclon, 1979),8.
8ó. A.lexancter Shliapnikov, On the Et,e of 1917, Recollections finnt the Rettoløtionøry Uøder-
groant.d. (I-,r>nclon,f982) 100; Slrliapnikov, Kønøn sørnnødsøttsgogodø,2 r't¡ls. (Moscorv-
Petrograd 1923) l:10-l J.
87. Ocberhi i.stoyii Moshoyshoi otgønizøtsii KPSS, ).883-)945, l:334.
88. Victcrria ßonnell, Roots of Rehellion: Worhers'Politics øn.d. Orgønizøtìons in Petersbur¿¡ ønrl
Moscont, 1900- 19 14 (Berkeleg 1983), 417 -427.
89. Celilia Bcrbnrvskaya, Tt,eø4,'Ièørsin Unflergrou.ndRøssiø(Chicago, 1978),222-223.
90. S lrliapnikov, I( ønan s e mn ø dts øtog o g o rl ø, | : 29 2.
9l . G.A. Artrtitrnov, Røhochie d.vizhenie r Rossi.i r periode nouogo revoliøtsionnogo pod'ewø 19I0-
l9l4god.ou (M<>scorv, 1975), 214.
92.'lony Cliff, Lenin: All Poper tt¡ the Sotiets(Lonclon, ì975), 28.
93. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, <1. 273,1.98. Kochergin memt¡ir.
94. GAIìF, f . ó3, r>p. 32, d.. 1142, Il. l-2, 9. Okhran¿ telc¡rhone dispatcl.res, 12, 2l
17 , Jvly
t912.
95. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 255, l. 83. Ermt¡laev recollectior.r.
9ó. GARF, f. ó3, o¡r. 32, d. 1142, ll. I, 16. Okhran¿ telephone clispatch, 20 July l9l2
Mosc<>rv Metalwolks Cclnrpany allltouncetrent) 25 July 1912.
97. I{GAMO, f. IBó, op. 3, cl. 3, l. 12. Month\' eurployrncnt fìgures.
98. GAI{F, f. ó3, op. 32, d,. 1148, ll. 12,22. Okhrana telcf)hone dispatch, 26 Jtrl5, l9l2;
Okhr¿n¿ rcport, I August 1912. Under c¡restioning, the nvo accusect lc¿dcls dcnicd intir¡-
iclating strikebreaker s.
99. GAI{F, f. 63, o¡r. 32,1722,1. 18. Okhran¿ report,27 July 1912.
100. GARF, fì ó3, op, 32,d. Il48,ll. ó-7. Moscow Metalu,olks ànnor.urcerrents,lT July 1912.
I0l. GAIìF, f. 63, op. 32, cl. II48, l. ll. Okhran¿ rep()rt,2l July 1912.
102. GARF, f. 63, o¡r. 32, d. 1I48, ll. 18-19; d. I20ó, ll. Il, 19-32. Okhrana reports, August
and Septenrber 1912.
103. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 32,d. lI48, l. IB. Okhrana report,3 August 1912.
104. GAI{F, f.7952, op. 3, d. 255, l. 83. Ennol¿ev recollection.
105. GAIìF, 1.7952, op. 3, cl. 276,1. 13.I. F. ftptov menroir'.
l0ó. GAI{F, f. ó3, op. 32 (1912), d. ró45,11.74-217.
ì07. N¿dezhda Itupskaya, in her prefàce tr> V.I. Lcnin's The Ewønciltøtion of Wonccn (New
York, 1972),5-6, cxplaincd horv the perception ofrvt¡mcu rrs "backlvard" infìuencccl Social
Democratic pl'àcticc during the 1890s: "The le¿flets t,cre usuall¡, adclressed tt> thc lvolk-
oped, thc rnost baclc\,àrd àr.nong thcm bcing lrolking*,omcn. They reccivecl vcr)' lou,
rvages and their: rigl.rts u,ere flagrantly violatec{. So the le¿fìets rvere usually acldresseci to thc
nten. . . "
I08. McKean, St. Pctersltørg hetwcen the Ret,olations,495. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 32, d. 1645,II. 7 ,
8, 7 4-7 6, 97, 150- 152. Okhrana reports, Novcmber 19 1 2.
109. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 33, cl. 1399, l. 38. Okhrana rcp()rt, 3 A¡rril 1913.
Ill.l{GlAgM, il1076,t>p. I,d. 17.l.3l;TsMAMf.52ó,op. l,c7.24,l.24.Guzhonlerterro
MSFMO, I May ì914.
I12. GAI{F, f. ó3, op. 33, d. I399, ll. I I3-ì I5, l7l, 209. Okhr¿n¿ fcp()r'ts, Jr.rne 19I3.
ll3. IIGIAgM, f. 1076, op. l, d. 17, l. 15. Guzlro¡r letter', 12 Jul.v 19I3.
I14. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 32, cì. 19l -î2,1.494. Oklrrana report, 2 Octol¡cr 1913.
I l5.Iìobert Thurston, Liherøl City, Con;erpøtitte Støtc, Moscov ønd. Røssiø\ Urltøn Crisis,
1906- 19l4 (Ncu, Y<rrk. l9B7). I 15.
I I (r. Arutirrnrni Røltochæ rh,izhenit: v Rosii, 374.
40 Ret, o lation øn. d. Cotl nterrat, o løtion Worhing-Cløss Mov emeu.t 4l
ll7. GAIIF, f. 63, op. 33, d. 338, 11.43-4;d. 1399,1. l4l; c{. 1400, ll. Zt}-2tt. Oktrra'a ló2. GARF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 275,L 92. M.G. Ob"edkov rnet¡oir.
reports,1913. ló3. M¿urice Paléokrgue, An Anobøssødor's Mewoirs(Ncw Ytrrk, 1925), l0-Il.
f 18. GAIìF, f . 7952, op. 3, d. 275,1.79. M.G. Ot.¡"edk<¡r. GAIìF, f. 7952, <tp. B, d. Ió4. All¿n M<rnkhouse, Moscotp I9ll-1935 (Boston, 1934),48.
256,11. 47-60, d.273,1.97. F.I. liarpukhiu rccollecti<>n'rer-r.ir.
and nren<¡ir. 165. Røsshoe sh¡r,¿,2 l)ccenrber 1915.
I f 9. GAIìF, f .7952, op, 3, c{. 265,1.23. Kliurant.¡v rccollection. 166. Russhoe sloun, 3I May I915.
120. B<rrrnell, Roots of Rchellion, 41,5. t67. GAllF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 275,11. 18-19. P. V Lazrenov ¡nenìoit'.
l2I. GAllF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 256,11. 47-60; d. 272,1.97. F. r. I(arpukhin rect>llection ¿nd 168. IIGIAgM, f. 179, op. 22, d,. 3384,11.252'266. Mt>scotv l)urna meeting minutes, 28 May
nlcrlt¡ir. t9r5.
122. I{GIAgM, f. 498, op. 1,d.241,1. 14. Factory àrìrlolrncenìenr, 12 August 19Il. ló9. Paléologue, An Amhøssødor)s Memoirs, ll-12.
I23. l{GIAgM, f.2322, op. l, d. 3,11.52-60. Annual fàctory sur¡maries. 170. ltGIAgM, f . 179, <t¡t. 3, tl. 62a,1. 13. M. N<¡r,ikt>v letter, 3 )une 1915.
124. Prøud.ø, 18 March 1914. I7l . Røsshoe slopa, 30 May 1915.
125. GAllF, f.7952,op. 3, cl. 256,1.54,d.275,1.91,d,.76,1. 59. F. I. Karpukhin recoilection; 172. Utro Rossi.i,30 May 1915.
M. G. Ob"edkor', and E. l). Tumanov rlremoirs. I73.RGIÂgM,f.498,op. l,d.229,l.24.Managernerìtlettertofàctoryinspector,2TJtnc
l 2ó. Bonnell, Roots of Re ltellion, 358, 38ó-389. 191 5.
127. RGIAgM, f.526,<tp.l,d.24,11. 79,8f . Guzlrt¡n rep()rrs ro MSFMO, 14, 19 March 1914. 174. GAIIF, f. ó3, op. 32, cl. 19I'15,1.277. Okhran¿ re¡rort, 4 June 1915.
128. Iì.GIAgM, f. 1076, o¡r. t, d. 17.l.3L Guzhon lertcr to MSFMO, I May 1914. 175. GARF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 27I,1.39. V.N. Arapov ucuroir.
129. Haimson and Rrian, "Lab<>r Unlcst," 444-448. I76. GAIìF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 275,11. 18-19. P.V. L¿zlenov t¡cur<¡ir.
130. McKearr, St. Petersltørg Betlteen the Revoløtions,297-817. I77. GAIìF, f . 7952, op. 3, tl. 274,1. 54. A.F. Kuznetsov uremoir.
l3l.l{GIAgM, f.498, op. l, d.2ì1, l. 5. Managcurenr lcmer to fìrctorf inspecor, 26 April 178. Utro Rossü,29 May 1915.
1914. 179. lìGIAgM, f. 179, <lp. 22, d. 3384, ll. 258, 269, M<>sct>w City Duma tÌrcetirrg) 28 May
I32. IìGAMO, f. 18ó, op. 3, d. 3, l. 14. Sho¡r ernployees pcr mi>nrh. 19t 5.
133. l{GIAgM, t- 498, op. l, d. 2t l, l. 10. Managemcrlr lcmcr ro fàctor¡' ins¡recror, 8 July l9ls. 180. Ru.sshoe sloro, 3l May l9l5.
134. IìGIAgM, L 1076, op. I, d. 17,1.45. lice presit.lent lerrer rr.r MSFMO, 12 Jol1, t914. lB I. I{GIAgM, f. 179, tlp.22, d,. 3384,1. 2ó4, Moscou, City l)trma rrccting, 28 May 1915.
I35. ltGIAgM, f. 498, o¡r. l, cl. 195, ll.25l-253; d. 2lt, ll. l0-12. Factofy managenenr ler- 182. Paléokrguc, An Amltøssødols Meøoirs, ll. A sirnil¿r clescription of tl)c policc its "cottt-
ters to fàctory inspecror 8,9, l0 July 1914.
irletely passive" àr rlìe sràrr of ilie riot is in Serge Sergecvich Oldenbur:g's Tbørtuop¡tiø
l3ó. RGAMO, f. 18ó, op. 3, d. 3, l. 14. Monthly cr.nplo¡,nrcur sr¿risrics. I wp er ttt 0r N o ho I øy ø .I1 ( Belglacle, 19 39 ), 2 : I 68.
137. GAI{F, f.7952, op. 3, d. 273,1.91. F.I Karpukhin menroir. 183. Allan Mt-rnkhousc, Mosco; 19lI-1933 (Bostorr, t934),48.
138. GAllF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 275,1.91. M.G. Ob"cclkov nlcrìr()rr. l84. l{GIAgM, f. I79,t'tp.3,d.62a,1. 13. M. Novikovlcttcrtorrìiryor, SJrrne 1915.
139. Haimson antl Rrian, "Labor Unrest," 446. l85. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, tl. 271,1. 39, d.274,1.41. V.N. Ara¡rov, 1ìL. Lavrcnt'o' nrcnroirs.
Ì40. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 209,1.24. Fact()r)¡ list of u'artirnc strikes. l8ó. Margaret Dewar, The Qtiet Revohdtionøry (kntdon, 1989), 5ó.
l4t. GAllF, f. ó3, op. 32, d.. 19I't411.249,278,344,380; TS il. S0, 103, t 30, I82. Mt>nth\, 187. GAIì.F, 1.7952, op. 3, cl. 275,1. 19. P.V. Lazrcn<¡v nretnoit.
Okhrana rcports 19l4-19 t5. 188. GAltF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 276,1. 14. I.F. Î>ptov tneuroit'.
142. GAI{F, f.7952, op. 3, c1. 271,1. 38. VN. Arapov nrcn¡<>ir. l89. GARF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 273,1.39. F.I. Karpukhin urcuroir.
143. llGIAgM, t.2322, op. l, d. 3,1.246. Rept>rr t>f nlrnrhly u.ages, B May l9ló. 190. I{GEA f.9597 op. I, cl. ló, 1.42;M.1. Gil'berg history of Guzhotr fàctory.
144. GAllF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 276,1. ll7. E.D. Trrranov nrcmoir. 19l. Michael Cherniavsky', ed., Prologøe to Revolution (Englewood ClifIì, Ncrv Jerscy, 1967),
145. GAllF, Í. 7952, op. 3, d. 256,1.86. Kochergin recollecri<.¡rr. 234-237.
14ó. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 35,d.25 TI,l.88. Okhren¿ reporr tS April 19tb. 192. Alexarrder Shliapnikoi', On tlte Evc of 1917, l0l.
147. GAllF, f. ó3, r4r. 35, d. ì9I T5,1.263. Okhr¿na reporr,4 May t9lS. 193. tlGIAgM, f'. 179, <tp.2l, ð,.3391,1. I53; Guzhon lctter to MSFMO, n.d. Scptcmber
148. llGIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d.229,1. 20. Management lerrer to fàctor-y irspecror, ì5 April t915.
t9t s. 194. ltGIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d. 241,1.4. Mauageurent letter t<¡ fàctory inspcctor', 5 Septem-
149. llGIAgM, F.2322, op. l, d. 3,1.246. Month\,u,agcs lcporrec{ on 8 NIay 1916. ber 1915.
150. lìGIAgM, f. 1076, op. l, d. 17,1.62. MSFMO vicc ¡rreside.r lertet t. MSFMO,20 April 195. GAIìF, f. ó3, o¡r. 32, d. l9I'15, l. 263. Okhr¿n¿ rcport, 2 October 19 I 5.
l9r 5. l9ó. Melancorr, The Sociølist Revoløtionøries ønd. the Ru.ssiørt Anti-WLr Mlleølcnt,67- Bl.
l5l. GAI{F, r.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 209,1.24. Fact<>r:y statistics collccted aftcr llevolr¡ti<>n. 197. L. A. Iiarkrva, Istoriiø zøpotlø "Dinønø0" (M<tscorv, l9ól ), 135-137.
I 52. GAIìF, t. 7952, op. 3, d. 2ó5, l. 81. Kochergin recollccti<¡n. 198. Lcu,is Siegelbaum, The Politics of In¡løstriøl MobikzrLti¡rx in Røssiø, 1914-1917. A Stad'y of
153. tlGAMO, f. l8ó, op. 3, d. 3, ll. l4-ló. Factory rronrlìly e'plt>yrne'r sràristics. the Wør-Itrlustries Comtnittees (London, 1983).
154. GAllF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 276,1. 14.I.F. 'fo¡rtov meuxrir. 199. Ttrny Clitf , Lenin: All Power to the Soviets, 42.
155. ltGIAgM, f. 848, op. I cl. 38, 11.64-65. Lettcrs cìared 27 ocrober,l Novcnrber I9ló. )00. GAllF, f.7952, op. 3, <1. 255, ll. 84-5. Ennol¿ev rccollection.
I5ó. GAI{F, f. 102, ch. 4,<tp. r22, cl. I44, l. I I4. Depirrtrnent of Police report, Februâry ì914. ?,01. Rt,tsshoe sh¡tto,6 M¿y 1916.
157. GAI{F, Í.7952, op. 3, d. 271,11.22I-222. LI¿. Breclis nrer.noir. ?02. GAI{F, t. 7952, op. 3, d. 209,1. 24. List <>f fàctory ec<¡norric strikes dr'uing the war that
ì58. l{GIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d.249,1. 14. Man:rgcmcn¡ lerrer r() rhc fàc()r), inspector, 13 <¡urits the May sto¡rpage. GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 33, d. 1403, l. 32, Oldrrana rcp()rt, 2 May l9ló.
August 19ló. 303, l\GIAgM, f'. 498, o¡r. l, d.249,1. 9. Factoly àtruounccrncnt, 30 April 19ló.
159. GAltF, t.7952, op. 3, cl. 271,1.41. VN. Arapov merr.ir; d,.274,1.41. S.S. Leshk.i,ets å()4. GAIìF, fi ó3, op. 33, d. i403, l. 32. Okhrana rcport 2 May 19ló.
rrer.noir; d.276,1. ó0. E.D. Tulnirnov rncmoir. 105. GAIìF, f.7952, op. .3, d. 2L0,l.93.ltGIAgM, f. 498, op. 1,d.249,1. 7. Managemcnt
ló0. GAIìF, t.7952, op. 3, d. 271,,1.41. V.N. Arapov mcmt¡ir. rcport to fàctor), inspector, 3 Mav Ì91ó.
ló1. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, ci. 276,1. 60.I.D. Tum¿nov urcmoir. i0é. llGAMO, f, 186, op. 3, d. 3, ll. l4-17. Factory curployurent stàtistics.
 Á1
R ett o lu.tion md. Ooøntcrrep o løkon
207. GAtlF, f. 63, <4r. 33, d. 1403, l. 34. Okhrana reporr, A Mav 19ló.
208. GAIìF, f.7952, op. J, ¡1. 27S,ll. lg-20. pV. Lazrenirv nrc,u,,i..
209. GARF, f. ó3, op. f 2, d. t9l T5, l. 5Zg. Okhrana reporr fì)r
September. 1916.
2Ì0. CAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 27S,ll. 92-93. M.G. Ob"eclkov rremoir.
2l L RGAMO, f. tBó, op. 3, d, 3, l. ló. Mo'thly errplt¡vurc¡rr sraristics; RGIAgM,
f. 49g, op.
I, d. 272,1. L Managcnlcrlr repo¡r to fàctory inipector, U October 19t6.
212. cAtìF, !.7952, op. 3, d. 209,1.24.
213. GAIìF, t.7952, op. 3, t{. 2S7,Il. l-2. p.N. Klimanov rec<¡llectjo¡r. 2
214. GARF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 274,1.20. pV. Lazrenr¡v nìcnlorr.
215. H¿inrsr¡n ancl Brian, ..Labor lJnresr," 444-44g.
2ló' Exact nuurber of participants is problenratic bec¿usc of the cliscrepancv in sources.
Onc
slrop-specific ccou<>lltic str.ike lrefìrre thc u,¿r is basecl <>n Prøt,dø
May Day strikes are based on u,orker lncnlt>irs.
an.t tivo econ.mic anc.l RBvor,urroN AND Cor-r.gcrrvn ActroN,
217' GAI\F f 7952, op. 3, d. l8ó, l. 23. Atrnttal fisc¿l year'profits (in rubles q,irhour
u4rith appr<lxirnate\' d<rubled benveen the beginning of 19l3 ro the cntl
inflarion
of l9ló) *,erc:
Crvrr, Wen AND PnnsoNRr- Sunrrn¡Rr-
l9l0-19ll:31ó,700;l9ll-t9Ì2:497,000;t912_t913:551,t00;19t3_Ì914:755,800;
l914-19t5: 1,399,000; t9t5-l9ló:2,980,800; t9t6_t917: l,ó8i,000. cAlìF, f.2952,
op. 3' cl. lB5' l. 5 sl-r<xvs that fàctory outpr.rt droppecl each fisc¿l y..i. wi,l.¡
I9l3-19I4 ¿s
abasclinc(l00pcrcent)thcfàctoryproclucedl5.333million pøds(ctneTrzrletlualsab.ut
3ó p.unds) r>fsreel proclucts; in 19r4-l9ls: 7s.gó perccnt; i' l9r5-19lã:
53.49 pc*-ent;
in 19 L6- 19 17 : 42.45 percent.
218.Theevcr¿lgcmonrhlyu.orkeru,ageu,as43.5rublesinJuner914,clr6ppçcrtoar.wof34.l
rubles in March 1915, incrcased to 59 rublcs by Septenlber 19lS,'ùrcn "The vvorkers made new threats of violence in the peacekeeping clriunber."
srårri¡g Fàlli'g
again to 42'7 r..l,.]es i'rrb^rary lEr6 (RGIAgM,f.2322,.¡r. l,
trt 3,1.246).Totar paiã Mirnagelnent letter to the Provisional Government, 9 June l9I7
wagcs <lropped fi<>n2Q38,092 in 1914-1915 to i,gó5,017
the ncxr yeàr, even t6o'gli the -
nru¡l'¡erofe'rpl.],eesincreasecr rrt:tn2,666to2,907 (rtGIAgM, r.izo,op.2,d,.2,r.g)
Tlrcse r'vage fignrcs do not inclucte infìatiorr, which had more tllarÍ doub
At the beginning of l9l7 the vast Russian einpire was still ruled by the
lJd IZOZ'.s percent)
flom tlre bcgin'iug of r9l3 ro rhe end of l9tó (I.. p. ß.karev, ,,Røbf ì epohha uoinø i I\omanov mollarclly. Eight months later the Bolshcviks stoocl at thc helm of
repoliiøtsii" it't: Rr.sshü Rubl', Dt,ø pehø istorii xlX-xx r.r. (M.scow, 1994),
l7g). using the world's fìrst workers' govemment. "You will not fìncl another such shalp
March l9l3¿sab¿seline<>f r00¡rcrce't,rear rvagescl,.oppeábyMarch tçrâ,to
72.0per- turn in history-especially ilyou remernber that it involves a uation of 150
cent, i'creascd slightly t.79.5 perce't by Ma.:h 19r6, theri fèlr to 53.3 perce't
by Mach n-lillion peopler" rvrote Leon Trotsky in the introcluctiou t<¡ his classic work
l9l7 (GAItF' f- 7952, op. 3, d. 209,1.24. Facrory real wagcs fìrr the.prerevoluti.'ary
ycars).
on the Russian Revolution. It was not merely the magnituclc of the political
219. G,A.llF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 271,1. 46. V.N. Arapov ilernoir. upheaval or the rapidity of events, but the active intcrventiou of ordinary
¡reople that made the revolt the most far-reaching social upheaval of the
twelìtieth century.l
. Class conflict de fined the events of l9L7 , aud tlìose who labored in the
làctories were at the center of the rebellion. Unrest in the Moscow Metal-
works exhibited all of the characteristics comlron to the Russian Revolutiorl
ås a whole: the spontaneous flowering of a public political discourse, the rise
of popular dernocracy, direct action and the threat of fbrrce) arìd the complete
collapse of a possibility of compromise in a decisive confì'ontatioll between
contending classes. While scholars have producecl countless hundreds of
books from a range of perspectives on the evelìts of 1917, few present-day
scholars would dispute the lìndings of social historians ill the 1970s and
1980s that demonstrated that there was indeed a profbuncl social transfor-
rìlation at the heart of tl-re revolutionary process.2 The compelling interpre-
tivc problenl no longer collcems whether or not an authentic revolution
occurred. but rvhich social f-orces drove it forwardl3
While the upheaval fiom l9lT to the erìd of the Civil War can be properly
lu]derstood as a single, colltilìLrous ful]llir-rg battle u,hose olrtcome deter-
nriued who u,ould rule Russian sociery within the Moscow Metah,vorks three
distinct periods markecl the revolutiollary el'a. First, beÛ,veen February and

Notes fbr this section begin on page75.

 R ett o løttion øn d, Cou,nterrep oløti.on
late lune, emplol'ss5 battled rvith management over control of the factory.
Second, during the sumrner, fundarnental political questions cam€ to tlìe
ftrre and in the Moscow Metalworks-as in the Russian vvorking class as a
whole-revolutionary politics rather than ref'orm strategies dominated.
Third, if the workers' movement of l9l7 approximated the Marxist ideal of
a united class, conscious of its power to collectively transform society, then
the Civil War witnessed the opposire-rhe disintegration of proletarian unity
and a regression to the politics ofpersonal survival. This chapter, theu, rraces
both the rise of the workers'powerful collective élan and its precipitous dete-
rioration under conditions of intensifting deprivation.
February to |une: The Workers'Movement versus Guzhon
The revolutiollary year in Moscow started wl"ren thirty-one thousand work-
ers went on strike to colnmemorate the twelfth anniversary of Bloody Sun-
day; ir-rcluding those in the Bolshevik stronghold of Dinauro.a Only 272
workers in the Moscow Metahvorks participated in tl-re stoppage, however, as
neither the few Bolsheviks nor rhe sRs (because of their reluctânce to strike)
provided such a leacl.5 No olte could have pledicted that within a feq, weeks
a spontalìeotls revolt would render tlre presence or absence of revolutionary
agitation somewhat irrelevant.
The fall of rsarism came swiftly in Petrograd. on International women's
Day (23 Februarl,), working-class wolnen demonstratecl outside the munic-
ipal Duma demanding bread. The nexr cla¡ half the workforce of the city
went on strike and govemmenr troops clashed with protesters. By 2ó Febru-
ar¡ police had conceded the Vyborg side to tl're rebels, rvho ther-r marched
across the ice to the city center. Police fired ol'ì tlìe demorìstrators, killing
fort¡ but large nurnbers of soldiers began to break ranks and side rvith the
revolt. The liberal president of the Duma, Rodzianko, demanded that reliable
troops be sent from the front to crush the rebellion, but by 27 February the
entire garrison of I50,000 had already collapsed. The insurgenrs rher"r fi'eed
political prisoners, arrested rsarist ministers, and sacked the central head-
qnarters olthe okhrana. on 2 March, Nicholas II abclicated his throne.ó
The Petrograd rebellion triggered spontalleous strikes tl-rroughout
Moscorv. on 28 February 3,500 Metalworks en'rployees left afier lunch and
"did not preseut any kind of demancls. Order has been violated,,'reported
the okhrana.T one worker later took credit for spreacling the nervs. "lJnder
full steam, I ran fi'onr shop to shop and shouted, 'Down with the Tsar.'They
asked me, 'A'r'e you crazy?' I told them the whole story." After a hastily orga-
nized meetiug, "everlroue, like an avala¡che, aclya¡ced through the rnai¡
gate towards the city center." Tl-re festive atrnosphere rvas shared eve n by the
administratiou, udrich made no attelrpt to curtail the actions ancl "eveil con-
gratLrlatecl us for the holiday." Shop loyalty (tsekhoushchinø) predoniLratecl in
the procession. "workers from the form-casting and steel fbundry shops rvere
in the first two rows," rvrote another rvorker. "l was in the thircl row rvith
u,orkers fì-om our shoD." 8
Rcv o løtion ønd. Co lle ctip e Actiort
Shordy after leaving the factory, the rvorkers' contingent engaged tlre police
in a violent coniiontation on the bridge over the lauza River. After uoon,
according to the Okl-rrana, the three thousand-strong contitìgellt surged over
the bridge "rl,ithout inciclent" and headed toward the city center. Marching in
an orderly processiorr, they returned fì'om Taganskaia Square at six o'clock to
the bridge over the lauza. The "noisy, growing crowd" was too large for the
police even to attempt to disperse as the throng shouted "Hooray!"e Con-
spicuousllr, the police report fàiled to explain why the crowd returned to the
bridge that evening. After leaving tl-re factor¡ the rvorkers had been blocked by
the police as thelr attempted to cross the bridge ancl in the first violent incident
ol the revolution in Moscow, the police shot Illarion Astakhov. Another
Guzhon worker then "threw the police officer into the Iauza River" and the
crorvd proceeded "quietly to dre l(t'emlin."l0 Another account also describes
how rvorkers disarmed the police and "threw the head of the ger-rdarmes aud
his assistant flom the bridge iuto the lauza. The remaining police, who sarv
that they were powerless, fled."rr One ofthe first acts of the newly created fàc-
tory comrnittee was to send a collection to Astakhov's parents.12
The February Revolutior-r established a regime of "dual power'" with two
institutions vying fbr political supremacy. Believing that the revolution was
"bourgeois," moderate Menshevik, S\ and even Bolshevik leaders of the
Petrograd Soviet of Workeró' and Soldiers' Deputies insisted that Duma rep-
resentatives should fonn a Provisional Governmeut. Because the Duma elec-
toral laws heavily favored those with property, political parties of the
bourgeoisie and the landowners (IGdets and Octobrists) dominated the new
government. Throughout Russia, workers and soldicrs had immediately reor-
ganized the institutions of popular power flom the 1905 Revolution: the
soviets. The central contradiction of the February Revolution was that the
upheaval from below had elevated to formal political power those pro-war
political parties that possessed such profound conternpt for the revolutiou.
During rhe course of l9l7 , the institutional tension between the Provisional
Govemment and the soviets became lltore prollounced as attempts to recon-
cile the elite prerogatives of wealth, properg', and privilege and the desires of
the dispossessed workers, solcliers, and peasants faltered, and then collapsed.r3
Popular democracy emergecl throughout Moscow as rvorkers shut down
fàctories, immersed thelnselves in newspapers ancl revolntiouary literature,
participated in political discussions ancl mass meetillgs, ar-rd elected repres€n-
tatives fìom their own ranks. Moscovv Okhrana reports during the February
,llevolution confirm both workers' euthusiast¡ and the Okhrana's grorving
disorientation in the face of "urgelÌt" events. As workers left their f,actories,
lreld meetings, raised the red flag, and sang revolutionary songs, Okhrana
clispatches on 28 February ¡1o,"¿ with consternation that strikers clicl not
issue "any dernands", the reports rnerely clairned "the cause was to protest
the dissolution of the State Dr-rma and lack of bread."la A few days later the
Okhrana headquarters was set on fìre and a large crorvd prevented firefìght-
ers fì'om stopping the blaze.r5
The Moscorv Metahvorks, like other factories throLrghout the city, did
not operate during the festive clays of February Revolution. Enrployees
 46 R ev o htt ion. øzt d Cottnt¿rrcv o løtion R ct, o ht ti on øn ¡l Co llectitt e Action
attended llleetillgs at Taganskaia Squar:e and listened to speakers fropr sixtee¡
but the Bolsheviks wallted the masses. otherwise, their goals were the
different parties debate the issues of the revolution aird war.16 They also
same."25 Even tl're Bolsheviks' cell secretary admitted that, at the fìrst rneet-
immediately recreated the i¡rstitLrtions of trre l90s Revolutio': factory com-
ing, the sRs had the advantage eve n though "there were nor large diffèrences
rnittees ancl workers' councils, or.soviets. When workers finally retur¡ecl to
betwee n us."26 while the sRs contilÌued to accon-ìffrodate a number of vary-
the factory on 4 March, their first orcler of busiuess was ro .i..t factory
ing political tendencies, the Bolsheviks were also in a slare of theoretical dis-
commirtee.li Four or five hundrecl rvorkers hastily gathered for the "commit-
arra1,, embracing an assortment of positions over the party's attitude torvard
tee election. workers fi'orn "oue shop after another yelled out the names of
the Provisional Government, cooperation rvith the Mensheviks, the war, and
the candidates," according to the secretary of the committee, SR member
the role of the Soviets.2T
v.N. Arapov. workers' democracy was not impeccable. In one conrmittee
Factory-wide political discussions centered on the issues of the rvar and
meeting, recallecl Arapov, "Pugachev infor.med us that he ancl l(ochergir-r
governmental power. The Bolshevik sotsiøl-Dewohrøt reported that one
were elected to the Moscow soviet and Lebedev to the district soviet. I was
thousand employees gathered in the factory srore on I2 March and resolved
extremely surprised to hear about the elections to the soviets because I knerv
to support the Provisional Government on the condition that it did not delay
nothing about them."l8
sumrnoning a Constituent Assernbly. The paper explained that rhe Bolshe-
with years of political experience as the only alrernari'e to Tsarism oper-
viks' sloga. "Down with the War" disti'guishecl the party from the ,.p.tty-
ating in the factories, socialists dor¡rinatecl the elected leadership positiàps.
bourgeois opposition" (SR), which rallied under the slogan, .,Long live peace
The sRs' srance of refi'aining fì'orn poritical strikes because of their pro-war
and the brotherhood of people." workers resolved "to quickly restore rera-
patriotism placed them i'a positior of stre'gth, as they had bee'less sub-
tions between socialists of all countries to make preparations for peace."28 on
ject to okhrana arresrs. During the factory election to the Moscow
Duma in 23 March, the factory cornnrimee respor-rded to a conscl'iptecl fbrrner
Ianuary l9l7 , 522 workers (of r,477 erigible vorers) elected two sR candi-
employee's appeal against being sent to the front. In a letter to the Moscow
dates.re The most reliable estimare,srares rhat the sRs hacl thlrty to thirty-five
soviet, the factory $,orkers' representatives reqr,rested that "revolutionary
members.20 Arapov clescribed his sR comrades as ,'the most ac;ive fèllows."2l
tl'oops remain in reserve for defense of the Revolution and that the first otles
other non-sR melnoirs claimed that the fàctory comlnittee mehlbers ,,were
sent be the police and gendarmes." An adclendum to this me¡norandurn incli-
all sRs," and even the leader ofthe factory Bolsheviks dèscribed the period
cated that the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Dcputies hacl taken nìeasures
of early l9I7 as one of "SR strengrh.', 22
to carry out these requests.2e
The Bolsheviks had been decimated by their audacious proclivity fòr
workers' direct action addressed immediate workplacc grievances.
hurling thernselves i'to rvave after rvave of political ,strikes. ò'e mernber
Ernployees immediately irnplemented the eight-hour working day when they
claimed that in April the party had only one hundred members in rhe enrire
returned to the factory in early March. The sR and pro-war newspaper Trød.
district and a solitary member in the fàctory, though a more believable
reported that the implementation of the eight-hour day would..in no way
accoulìt asserts that the Bolsheviks had three or four in the factory after the
interfere with defense rvork because, in the case ofurgent need; the factory
February Revoh.rrio'. The party accuurulated a hanclful of new recruits dur-
can organize three shifts."30 on 2l March, the Moscow soviet passed a res-
ing the spri'g of 1917, though the Bolshevik secretary later wrote that
olution fbr the eight-hour da;', which workers in many fäctories throughout
there were "rlo rnore than nine people" in the cell at ihe time. Another
the city had already implernented through direct action.3l Management's 23
party activist recalled that "lnembers of onr organization were poorly devel-
March factory arlllouncement appealed to the workfbrce: "such a reduction
oped," and as a result they repeateclly callecl upon the clistrict cãmmittee for
of work time is coutrary to the duty of the entire populace who musr strain
help because "not only the Latvians, but also simon Ivanov ancl other Bol-
every llerve to bring the rvar to a victorious encl. It is our duty to support our
sheviks were bad orators." In the first general factory meetings,,the Bol-
army... in the service of guardir-rg their country."32 only the provisional
shevìks rvere really houndecl," and cruring their speeches= th.y rvere
Govemment, "which everyone has a duty to obe¡" had the power to rìrake
"overrvhelmed rvith shouts of 'Down! Enough!,,, Another rvorker recallecl
a final resolution on the question, though, "bowing to the coercion ap¡rlied
that in the early tneetiugs "the Bolsheviks rvere whistlecl at ancl sometimes
pulled down fì'om the podir.rm and not alrowecl to speak. In our fàctorv the
to it," managenÌelìt conceded that it would imrnediately implement the
eight-hour day.33 on I May, managelrent cornplained to various provisional
SR irìfl uence clominated."23
Government offices that the fàctory comlnittee had ,.fbrcibl)¡ introclucecl
Workers' fàilure to distinguish between different socialist parties was cor-r-r- the eight-hour rvork day," unilaterally changed the nightshift to seven hours,
poundecl by tlie diversitl,, conrrnotion, and confusio,', the socialists and "took upon itself the prerogarive of deciding when shifts woulcl start and
themselves in the early days of the Revolution.'.Beftrre ",roìrq
the F-ebruar), Revo- end.t'34
lution," one employee recalled years later, "l had a rveak unclerstanding of
ThroughoLrt 1917, workers' delnands became more inclusive ancl were
the programs of the dif}èrent parties."24 Another worker explainecl that in his
distingr,rished by their support ftrr previously marginalized sectior-rs of the
opir-rior-r, "the difïèrence was that the SRs rvent into battle aione, like k¡ights,
workforce. Wage con-rplaints focusecl on the gap in pay betrveen skilled ancl
 Rey o hl tion ønd. Coan trrev httìon
o R et, o løti on ønd. Co lle ctiv e Action 49
unskilled laborers' A,23 ,{pr'-fà*ory general meeting una'imously vored
that skilled workers shourd refuse managers and wage demands needecl to be resolved quickly lest they "disturb
u,age rates ard dema'decr that the defense work at the factory." Apparently recognizing the power of the
these funds be give' to "xceísive
ernployees. The admi'istration refused,
'on-skilled
claimi'g that there was not rvorkers, the arbitrators ruled that the lnanagers should rernaiu suspended
e'ough n',on.y, but ..obviously wa'ti.g to
a distinction berwee' draw but asked the union to exert its influence to prevellt similar incidents in the
pioposed that skilred workers get a raise
îgrk.-.r: ro future, noting that it was "necessary to avoid undesirable excesses." Similarl¡
twetve rubles a'cr no'-sk'recr rblr iubres."
to aconflict commission of the Soviet.35
Th";;;;;ililü;,. was serr on 2ó May representatives from the Moscow Soviet called for office stafïto
Marage're't's r May letter to the gove r'mellt return to work, with tl're two managers temporarily removed, and for the
i.cluded a detaired sum_ Central Conciliatory Chamber to irnrnediately investigate the issue.a3
mary of factory costs_ a'd incorne, a¡rd ãonclucrecr .,rna'agerrrÀilonrra.r,
duty to i'fbrm you that,it ca'not satisfy rhe it, fubitration failed, illustrating the more general contradictions that beset
workers, dema'ds, wrrich might the Provisional Governrnent as class polarization macle it increasingly difficult
possibly result in a rvork sroppage beiaus"
of a strike .,,r" s;ii,'the Factory to stradclle the interests of capital and labor. The issues of pay and the
commis^sion, the governn-t.utår Ëody ruri'g
pay' A l0 May fàctory arìnouucenle
o' the iss*e, orcrerecr a raise i' rernoval of managers were brought before the Conciliation Chamber but
after the'in..."r" ..r""g., in remained unresolved because the board was equally composed of r',,orkers
certaiu categot'ies of skillecl workers't are
'oteJthat
in complete accorclance with the
uormal pay in metal factories in the Moscow and businessmen. On 9 Jr,rne, management sent a letter to various Provisional
area.,,37
The work slowdown over wages also led Government bodies cornplaining about the tulrest:
to re¡ewed co'fro¡rtatiorì over
hiri'g a'd fìri'g, a'd illusrrared h--ow seemi'gly disparate
the workers'
ir*., l.rr"pped as The workers' representatives declarecl that they âre rìot willing to wÍrit, tlut they
grew in scope a'd confideìrce. The factory
'lovemerìt
tee resolved that not a single employee commit_ reserve fbr themselves the fì"eedom to act, and n"rade the tlrreat of violencc agirinst
coulcr be dischargea
*arrã", its sa'c_ the fàctory administr¿.rtion quite unambiguously unclerstood. The Conciliation
tio''38 Ernptovees then dãcidedì',"t th.v
arso rrad ,h; ;ñ; ;;;;poi't a'cr Chamber completely lefirsed to consider the issue of removing the ofïìce st¿rf1.
dismiss nanagemerlt personr.rel. Ma,ragernènt
complai'ed that å,r 23 May This was somewh¿rt underbtanclable given that thc workers made uew thle¿ìts of
"workers in the fo'n-casti'g d"p"rtñe't
a,r,roL'rced, ,o iÀ.-n."a of the violence in the peacekeeping charnber. '
deparrme't, Mattis, that trrey dii not *"n, On Friday, 2lune... at the general meetiug of workers, their rcprcscnt:rtiyes
,o rrave him as their mauager,,
ard "immediatery dis¡lirsed rrim from trris posirio'.,, reported that the Ch¿rmber harcl not s¿tisfìed the workers' denriurds. The workers
The next day, bort shop
workers fired their rìanager. The shop ,',-r",-,"g.., became agitated and startecl to fàvor the imlnecliate occu¡rirtion of the fìrctory lry
accordi'g to one worker
acco'nt) was particurarly abusive towarcr the f'orce and the use of the rnost violent measures irgair"rst rniìl-rirgelnerìt and ofTìcc stirfT
women in ihe shop, firing
womell who became pregnant and forci'g living at the fìrctory.
femare produ.tiãrr-.,"orkers to
wash floors.3 Ensign Kolikov, rhe representative in charge of rnetal distribr,rtion, managecl to
The rna'ageme't board argued that ernployees persuade the u,orkers to delay carryir-rg out their takeover ancl violeuce at least until
could appeal to the direc- Monc{ay in orcler ftrr the entire case to be consic{ercd by the Factory Cornmission
tor or ro arbitration bodies about manag..r,
';bu, uy no n å* is it possiute of the Moscorv Region on Saturclay.
to allow workers, o' their orv' i'itiati'e]si,npty
to disnliss orn." p..rorrn.r.,, The board, after they lr¿rcl he¿rrcl of the workers Llnrest at the fàctory, zr¡rpealecl
They rvarned "if workers rhrearen the offici
staff with then the to the Cl.rairman of the Factory Comrnission; to the head of the Security of Fac-
possibrv conrinue op.."ting rhe facrorv" "iol;,r.;,
P:1 :it:|rt and affiect to the tories Mills, anc'l llanks, G. Marts; ancl to the Govemlnent's Commissirr ftrr the
lactory cor'mittee to rein i'the rvorkers. ..u.rfortt,'ately, ,nË'a.io.y.o,r_,_ Ciry of Moscorv, with the request to provide assist:ruce and to t¿ke measLues to
lnittee delegates declared that they coulcl inviolirbility of ernployees.
not guaralltee that there would gr.rard the
be a'y viole'ce towarcr the ofÌìce stafï.,,a0Si'rilarly,
a represerltative fiom 'ot
the
Moscorv soviet tord ma'ageme't that it
was ..now irnpossible to tark about That the danger to n-t¿ulaÌgeme nt u,:rs corrrpletely'r'r'ell fbuncle d became ¿ìpparellt
methods of mai'taini'g personal safèty u4ren Ensign Kolikov persuac{ecl the fìrctory director to cscape fiom the fàctor1'.
as rvas done .r'àer trre orcr regirns.,,+r
The confro'tation was co'nectecr to the rvork Were it not for his intervention, there is no c{oubt that the rvorkers-completely
'e'r'r' slorvdowr. .,For
sixtee'
days in April, the
bolt depa'tme't prodLrceã tz,ooo pra, o,i goir; runobstructecl ancl with irnpr-rniry-rvoulcl h¿rve committed all kincls of violencc, t-tot
entire nro'th of May,- r0,200 paìs. Tr-te for the only to fàcrory propert)¡, but ¿rlso to office workers. Hacl this violence gone ftlrthcr
shop rna'ager becalne i'crigna't
about this ancl demandecr that tirey.o.k, than rhe dragging out in r,r,heelb:rrrows) beartings and other iusults, the¡r the role
uuì workers rnacre hi'r leave under of Moscor,r, ¿rdlninistration would be lirnitecl onlv to registering the occurreuce of
the threat of violence.',a2
such grievous exccsses tlut, f'or tlte fìrst tirne, u'ould have taken plirce in tl-re
Matragement's threat to close the fàctor1,
led the provisio¡al Goverpmept Moscorv Metalu,orks CornÞ,rn\,.4
and the Moscow Soviet ro artempr co'ciriatio'trrat
would resorve a, prob-
lems."exclusively in a larvful n-n,r". by
arbitratio'bocries, trre crecisions of Neither management conccssions llol intralìsigence seemed capable of steur-
which rvould be bindirrg r,rpo' rrotrr sicrcs."
The co'fìict over the re'ro'ar of ming the ticle of rvorker militancy. As rvorkers had gained alt acLrte seuse of
 50
R ey o h¿ti on øn¡l Cou.nterrn o lwtion Repoløtion ønd Collective Acnun 5l
their collective power, both approaches seemed onry
to fuer rhe fìames of 13. Medicine prescribed by private doctors should be distributed fì'om
confi'onratio'. sig'ificantly, the sR represerrarives played
a readership rore in our local clinic, and if tl're clinic does not have it, the fàctory should
the movelnenr, ard eve' ¡nacle th.eåts agai'sr ,rrã,r"g.,r-r",rt
in ltr" peace- buy it from another pharmacist.
keepi'g chamber. Threats ofviolence agailst emproyeÃ
were nor'ecessarily 14. At times of stoppages because of insufficient material, pay must be
acted upon, however. Eve' though fi'orn Marcrr
o'ward the threat of fbrce issued at half the miuimurn wage.
had beconre a central ereme't in l"bo.-,'r"nagelre't
relations across the 15. After the birth of a chilcl, issue twenty-five rubles; after the death of
empire, actual violcnce against mallagerrelt was mini¡lal.a5
a child, give twenty-five rubles; for death of adults give seventy-five
Yet.factory marìagers feared for their lives. Tl-re same
day that ma'agemenr rubles.
posted the above colnprai'r, it dispatched
a leter ,o ,i-,. Moscow police ló. Every worker who has been in the factory at least one year must be
expressirg a "desire to establish a staff of porice
to defend the factory,, with given a wo-week vacation; every worke[ over two years or more
sixteen armecl gLrards. Three earlie, ,.quèrt, for guns
were nor satisfied.aó gets a month vacation with minimum pay.4e
The Provisional Gove¡nmert's slorv resporìse to events
did not rrelp
Guzhor's cause. A 17 June lerter frorn thå Mi'istry of
I'ternar fufairs to The variety, clarit¡ and force of demands demonstrate workers' increased
Prime Minisrer G.E. Lvov i'crucled rna'ageme nt,s
2i May that confìdence and organization. The need for a regular meeting place shows
the co'flict between workers and ,rra'agerient had 'otification
e'cred and work was back that the employees' top priority was the strengthening of their own organi-
to normal.aT The lerter fàilecl to n'r.r-rti,r,r that the dispute
was temporariry zation, and the special dernands raised in the interest of women illustrate
resolved a'd still under arbitration.as_I' sllarp contrast
to Guzhon manage_ workers' rvillingness to be more inclusive. Wrile revolutionary egalitarianism
me't's warnings of morr acdo^, ernployees'àe¡¡"'ds
exude a crear sense of was an important fàctor in this process, a practical consideration also drove
purpose. Eco'omic issues were sellt to arbitration,
but ou 19 June the fac_ snch demands: the prerevolutionary demographic trend totvard a rnore
tory committee submitted dernands on other issues:
diverse workforce continued, and by May 1917, the concerns of- 439 \ ¡orìlel'l
sirnply could not be ignorèd.50
l' create a perrna¡lent spabe for the rvorkers' commiftee and for Guzhon insisted on rnaintaining pay stratificatiòn, arguing that raising the
general fàctory rneetings, rectures, a'd other cuiturar -educatio*ar wages of unskilled workers undermined the very fbundâtions of procluctivity.
activities.
The workers' committee demanded a minimnm claily pay of 5.50 rubles for
2. Recognize the shift for seve'_hour worki'g day, but pay the'r
for the normal 'ight
unskilled fèmale workers andT .20 rubles fbr men. Guzhon argued that, "the
eight-hour clay.
level of pay rnust directly and inseparably corresponcl to the procluctivity of
3. Regularize salary paymerlrs in trre foilowi'g form:
llo later than tr-¡e the worker." Higher minimum pay was bad becausc "per diem rates lower
ttve'tieth of the month, give advances foiihe current
month, and productivity ... shop wages should be set at a level that would be conducive
no later than the eighth of the next month with complete
accounting for added cost_of_livinq bonuses.
for workers to switch to piece-rates to realize higher productivity on that
basis." Guzhon posited that "it is generally acknowledged that the guaran-
4' Bri'g in air ventilation for ail e.clãsed praces where there
is teecl mini¡nurn of daily pay should be at least one and one-half tirnes less than
production work.
rvhat a u,orker of a particular category and specialists would earn at a per-
5. Baths and steant rooms ft¡r both sexes.
piece job." Guzhon went on to assert that the fìxing of minimum workers'
6. Sr,rfficient terxperature in all shops and r.vashstands
cluring the pay had been an "anti-state and anti-democratic act because it creates a priv-
winter.
ileged class of people that is guaranteed its lrealls of existence at the expense
rnall shops there shourcr be a cafeteria or ar enclosecr rvarrn
7-'
prace. of other classes of tl-re populatiorl."5l
8. Make toilets as close as possible to the shops.
9. Ill all sho¡rs make a closet for rvorkers' clothes. Workers, however, were more concerned with economic equality than
l0' I'the sheet rnetar shop a'cl co'structior area, bring i'hot water with the logistics of running a profitable enterprise. Guzhon conrplained
that "having learned that the Factory Co¡lnrission satisfied almost all their
because'orv it is too fàr away a'cr inaccessible beca*use
' continuous nature of the dernands," rvorkers raisecl productivity for "th[ee or four clays," but produc-
of rvork.
I l. sick pa¡ whether job-reratecr or ror) tion later declined to 50 or ó0 percent of the normal rate. The factory corn-
be paid i' fuil fron the nrittee told managenreut that the decrease in productivity was "cornpletely
fìrst day of sickness ancl based on the 'rusr
average worker,s u,age. unclerstandable" and that the best wal' to increase productiviry would be to
12. For worllerl givi'g birth, they are to be released
for two uäeks raise rates so that workers could earn at least one and one-half tirnes the min-
befbre arcl ftrur weeks afrer birth but are ro be paicr
in fuil based on imurn. Guzhon includecl a detailed experlse report that clair-ned such
the average salarl'.
r.lelnancls would lead to the factory operating at a loss of six or seven hurrclred
thousand rubles a rnonth.s2
 R a, o httion ønd Cotunterrev 0 lil.ti¡n Ret,oløtion ønd Collcctive Actiort 53

The additional dema'ds pushed Guzhon over

rhe brink.
informed the Factory commissiou that he inte'decr
o' 20 Ju'e rre The Ascendancy of Bolshevism
to close the fàctory, a'd
castigated the commissio' on the wage dispute
and the rvorkers, dismissal of For the Bolsheviks, Guzhou's actions were just one exatnple of what they
managers under the threat of violence. That the
issue remainecl u'resolved
"urdermi'es the very.basis for healthy discipri'e, without considered capitalist economic sabotage aud, as the crisis deepened, thc
enterprise is cornpletely inconceivable ." He
r"l-,ilh op.."tirrg urgency of deciding which class would rule. Leniu lashed out in the pages of
accused the Co-misrion of co'_ "n
ducting naric propaga'cra against private incrustry.,, Th. Prøvd,ø at those who criticized the Bolsheviks for being in "too much of a
"syste
ðo,nmissio', hurry" to transfer power to the Soviets. He cited the Petrograd Soviet's res-
he co'cl*ded, had brought "complete åisorga'izatio',,
to the work of the olution that "the Guzhon works InanagemelÌt is clearly disorganizing Pro-
factor¡ a'd *rder such cìrcumst"n..r, n. .hig.à¡r;;, ;;;;;r;ry
the factory."53 Two days later the toa.cr oÌ dir..to., ro crose ducrion, deliberately trying to bring the works to a standstill." For that
irsu.J a factory reasolt, the resolution continued, "State power) left by the Socialist Revolu-
a'rourlceme rhat srared, "The fàctory has bee' brought ,.;;;;"
'r
plete disorga'izatio'" and appeared to the gouernme'r to l-rerp resorve
of com_ tionaries and Mensheviks in the hancls of the party of the Guzhons, the party
financial crisis. If the government crid'ot take
the of the counterrevolutionary capitalists who resort to lockouts, must tâke over
i¡'medi",. ,',""r'o*r, war.ed the management of the works ... aud provide operatir"rg funcls." Leuiu's
rnanagement, "On I July the factory will
close.,,5a
Guzhon u'orkers crid not accept the i'rpe'ding response to this resolution claimed that the "got'ernment, supported by the
crosure without a fight, Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, simply lbstrØcts the struggle
however. oll 28 Ju'e, the factory corrrnittee
reportecr to the Moscorv soviet
that three of their members rrad co'fro'ted rnà'agern.n, against economic dislocation," and he insisted that it was uot enough ftrr the
artenpt Soviet to demand money fbr one fàctory: "Just think what a madhouse this
to shut clorv' the factory. The director had orcrered-erectricity "uã.n-r*
curoff, but the is: the country is on the rocks, the people are on the verge of famine and dis-
f:actory committee fbund sufficient ra\4/ materials
ancr fuel and orcrered work
to contil.rue. workers' representatives fì-o¡' the fàctory aster, there is a shortage of coal and irou." Yet in the face of an impending
at ."
to i'rerve'e ro make sure rrre erectrical suppry would'not "rt.a-,he soviet disaster, Lenin asserted, Mir-rister Palchinskii had prohibited the Donets
u. .,ìi Soviet's inquiry of the r-r-rinirig crisis because "the Guzhous and the othcr cap-
I'the end, Guzhon's arrempt to close in. fuior.o* l4.t"t*.rt, "tr.rt
The secretary of the factory ìornmittee described
backrìrecr. italists, with the cooperationof the Palchinskiis, arè 'deliberately'(this word
defènse of the provisio'al Governrnerr i'petrograd
,t. ,p..i"i-ression of is used b), the Economic Department) tryir-rg to bring prbduction to a staud-
that decided the fàte of still. The government is on the,ir si.d,e....Is it not high tirre you gentlemen
the factory' "we exprai'ed that Guzho¡r had made
a rarge *", font, tt-,"t realized that the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks øs pørtieswillhave
there was a continuous expa'sio'of the fàctory
workfbrcle, a'd åt the same
tirne an exrre me drop. i' workers' pay.,'56 The to ans\Mer to the people ftlr the catastrophel"se
Ministe. ãi:f,àa., A.V. By midsummer the crisis in Russian industry was generalized. Between
Stepanov, told Russhoe srouo thattrre provisiorr"r
Go*"ì;;..ì ma ,.qrestered March and July, 5ó8 Russian factories closed. The inclustrialists' Torgouo-
the fàctory "because it is of exceptio'aily important
signifìca'ce for the metar Proncyshlønnøyø. grízetø. blamed the closures otl a shortage of raw materials
industry in the Moscow area."Si Ï.,e Áinuies f.o,'r lhe ,norv rrrat and fuel, "excessive" worker demands, too ferv orders, ancl declining prof-
several speakerc argued agai'st a'y concessiorìs -..rr,rg
{th.o¡sh ro the irorkers, the itability. As S.A. Smith has shown, the deepening of the ecouomic crisis coin-
decisive issne was that r00 p....r-tt of th" factory
productio'we't ro crefè'se cicled with a notable rise in "the tempo of class conflict." With profìts
orders.58 Thus, the provisional Governme't
came to trre aicr of Moscorv Met_
ahvorks employees not.out of sl,rnpatl-ry for clisappearing and workers becoming increasíngly combative, industrialists
their milita't crema'crs, bur became less rvilling to invest or take on new orders. Iu southern and central
because of the factory's i'rportan.. to trrå goverrlrlert,s
war aspiratio's. Russia, ir-rcluding Moscow, employers coordinated lockouts in an attempt to
why did the class co.flicr in trre Metarwã.ks .ace ahea.r
of .oìrflicts at fac_ clemoralize workers and to prove excessive u,Orkers' demancls rvere the root
tories in Moscorv and even petrograc' The speed
of e'e'ts ,ogg.rr, th", cause of rhe crisis. Petrograd industrialists belicvecl they had miscalculated in
workers' a'ger exceeded the levertf workers,
rn otl.r.i'ø.to.i.r. their earlier strategy of concessions and embarkecl on a much tougl-rer labor
sig'ifica'tly, Guzhon persistecr in upholcri'g a'rilita'cy
more i'tra.sige't
than other owuers, who had opted foì'" .o,-r.iri"ro.y
srraregy polic¡ resistir-rg u'age increases aud cutting back production. The goverlÌ-
approacrr í.
to diffuse labor disconter-rt. yei by micrsurnrne,,tr-,e ",-, "r,.n,p, ment supported this more confiontational approacl-r to labor. Under the fìrst
c.isis ¡,, nrrri*-,rrcrusrr1,
led other i'dustrialists ro reverse tack a'cr Coalition Government fbrn-red in May Menshevik Minister of Labor M.I.
adopt a rrard-rine stauce similar to
Guzho''s. while the co'fi'o'tatio. Skobelev promised social reforrns attd cornmitted hirnself to meeting the
ir the Moscow Metalworks rnay rrave clernands of workers aud confìscating the profits of industrialists, but by June
temporarily outpaced evellts in other fàctories
by several weeks, the escalat-
i'g class co'fio'tatior-r throughout nussia hacr becorne Skobelev sicled with miue owners to cllrtail rvorkers' demauds, which he
irreconcilabre and described aS "immodet'ate," and appealed to u,orkers to "sacrifice" iu the
more political.
name of "strettgthening the revolution and honoriug our ultimate ideals'"
Under pressure fiom industrialists, fittauciers, and the General Staff, the
 Rep oløtion ønd Coan terrep
Kerensky labor policy shifted furrher to the right: in August the Mi'istr),
of
Labor issued directives ro-currail rhe porver ãr tn. f"clo.y com'rittees
by
means of a ma'clate that affirmed that onry ernployers coulâ hire
a'd fire .ód
The employers' offènsive against the working class coincided with the rul-
ing classes' attempr to establish "order" in the wake of the
July days in pet-
rograd. o' 3 July four hu'dred thousa'd u,orkers and solcliers participated
in an armed demonstratio' u'der the Bolshevik sloga's of ..Dow' with the
Provisional Government" a'd "Arl power to the so'iets.', wrile Bolshevik
leaders feared a bid for power would be isolated in petrograd, rnany
local
party activists supported the extrelnist nrood. Loyal governmenr troops
fired
ou the demonstratior¡ arrested Bolshe'iks, a'd shut ãown their pr.rr.¿'
ou..
the few weeks, the possessi'g crasses ope'ly blamed the sóviets ftrr the
'exr
rvar defeats and inflatio', while the Minister of Foocl Supply, peshekhonov,
demanded a halt to "violent and criminal manifestatior.ì'"þinr, the la¡cl-
lords." The sRs and Mensheviks hacl helcl the upper ha'd in the o May coali-
tion, but i, the 24 July coalition they were reduced to jur-rior part'ers. The
liberal Kadets led the charge agairsr the revolution in ihe aftËrmath of
the
July Days, agreeing to participate in Kere'sky's govern'rert o'ly if General
I(ornilov's program for "rhe salvatio' of the cou'try" was aêceited a^d all
social refonns deferred until thè constituent Assembly w", .onu.rl.d.
The
antidemocratic thrust of the ultimatum became clear when elections to the
Assembly itself rvere suspe'decl after the Kadets recogr¡ized that they
stoocl
no chance of outflanking the socialists in a popular elãction.62
The liberals'declaration of class war shatterecl illusions in a ..compromise,,
between left and right as the summer crisis escalated. Generals achnitted
thar
the June offe'sive in Galicia was a "complete fàilnre', that had left fifty-six
thousands soldiers dead in just tl'rree weeks, a'd after the fall of Riga,
fears
spread that Petrograd would fàll.ó3 In Moscoq as in other cities. the
rvors-
eni'g food supply a'd rampa't inflation meant rhat workers' livi*g standards
contirued to deteriorate. carloads of grain to Moscow droppecl ñom 2,000
i' May to 1,052 i' Ju'e , and rher-r to just 883 i' July.6a I' early Aurorr, ..*_
tile magnate Riabushinksy macle a speech that inclucled the ipfamoìs rhrear
of lockouts acco'rpanied by "the bo'y ha'd of hu'ger,' to beat back the
workers' rnovelnenr.65 while the Mensrreviks co'ti'ueã to play both sides
of
the class divide, the sRs were splitti'g betwee'left ancl right. After the
July
Days, the lQdets had claimed that "Borshevism has died a suclde' cleath,"
bui
as Alexancler Rabinorvitch has argued, such an assertion .,failed
completely to
take accou't ofthe basic conce'ls a'd great potential power ofthe petrograd
nÌasses and the ellorlllous attracdon that a revolutionary political
and social
prograln like that of the Bolsheviks held fbr rhem."66
I' the Moscow Metalworks, the sRs benefìtecl trre in the first
rnorrths of the Re'olution. Bolshevik speakers ataT 'rost
Júy Moscorv con-rmit-
tee (MI() tneeting admitted that their influence in the city lagged behi¡d
that
in Petrograd. The represe'rarive fro'r the Rogozhskii aiitiict statecl that
while the situation wâs "extrerl-rely u'favorable,;' u,ith stroug u'ity (social
Democrats rvho favored unity, þs¡q,ssn the Bolsheviks ancl lViensheviks) a¡d
SR influence, though the party was "drivi'g ther-' fì-om the factories.,,
In
o hûion Rctuhttion ønd. Collective Action 55
Guzhon "the majority are Socialist Revolutionaries. The mood is not good;
there are often clashes." Nevertheless, the district represerìtative clairned that
among Guzhon workers "!ve can build a demonstration in two weeks."67
SR strength in the Moscou' Metalworks was based on their radicalisrn.
Workers united behincl the SR secretary's proposal for a more egalitarian
wage scale that gave "the possibility of subsistence not only for skilled work-
ers, but also for all ranks of workers."68 As workers' clemands became more
political, the appeal of Bolshevism became stronger. A Bolshevik interdistrict
meeting in May reported tl-rat their Moscow membership was ten thousand
with I,428 in the district.6e Two months later, at their Sixth Party Congress,
the Bolsheviks claimed a citywide membership of fifteen thousand, compared
to five thousand for the SRs and ftrur thousand fbr the Mensheviks.T0 In the
Moscow Metahvorks the SRs grew fi'om 30 to 35 in February to 180 in June,
while the Bolsheviks went from a small handful to about twenty, far below
their growth in the city and district.Tr
The SRs' participation in a Provisional Government that had failed to
acldress the land and war questiolìs, the deteriorating economic crisis, and
the growing split within their ranks all contributed to the party's decline.
One worker recalled that "the mass of workers in the fàctory were former
peasants who expected that the peasants rvould receive land after the revo-
lution. With the rule of Kerensky, they soon rvere convinced that they liad
been deceived."72 The Bolshevik cell secretary, however, later assertect that
the war issue was crucial in the strengthening of Bolshevisnr in the factrry.
After "I(erensky put fbrward the slogan 'War until Victor¡' SR influence
inside the factory began to weaken and the Bolshcviks' stature began to
rise."73 An SR member later also argued, "The SRs wele fbr the war, the Bol-
sheviks against; this attracted workers to their side."74 SR leaders spoke fbr
"War until Victory," at a factory meeting of fìvc thousand after Kerensky's
offensive began in late June. A Bolshevik district leader, Rosa Zemliachka,
responded, "Comrades! Many voices have rung out fbr continuing the war.
Therefore whoever wants war shoulcl imrnediately sign up as a volunteer ftrr
the front lines." After prolongecl silence, the SR leaders left the tribune iu
defeat.75 In the late suffrr-ner) Nikolai Bukharin spoke at another fiìâss l-rìeet-
ir-rg of several thousand.T6
The Bolsheviks attempted to correct their organizational rveakness by dis-
patching talented lnembers to the factory. One lnernber admitted that the sit-
uation had beer-r "difficult fbrr us because we did rìot have good agitators and
speakers ftrr the large rneetings."77 Another worker wrote that the contribu-
tion of the Bolshevik Mal'kov was decisive because "fi'om the first day of
rvork in the fàctory, Mal'kov agitated against the Provisional Government
and the conciliation of the SRs and Mensheviks. He energetically appealed
for workers to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and iu a short tin-re
he earned considerable respect alnollg the workers."78 Other SR, Bolshevik,
and nonparty workers attest to the influence of Mal'kov in the fàctor),.7e The
clistrict committee also sent in a wornan organizer rvho agitated effectively ftrr
revolutionary activity in the sheet metal sl'rop.80 Analyzing the reasons fbr the
Bolshevik ascenclancl, in the Metalworks, one SR rnernber wrote that despite
 Ret¡ o løti on md, Cotut t¿rrep o lation Revoløtion ønd Collective Action 57

their early advantage, the sRs "gave rveak leadership to its members, ancl gave
edly rvill be a success but there is hardly support for a demonstration. The
no information about the revolutiollary [rovelrìent)-no direction.,' Adcli-
attitude towards the soviet is unfavorable."sT
tionally "the factory cell, which as such, did not exist. This was very diffère¡t
The next few days provided a litrnus test for the contending socialist par-
fiom rhe work of the Bolsheviks ... some body was leading these people a'cl
ties. Workers in every factory, union, and soviet feverishly debated the Bol-
gave thern definite direcrives, even daily. The persiste,-rt pi.rror.
tf the gol_ shevik call fol strike action to condemn both the Mosçow State Cor-rference
sheviks," he concluded,,.was astoundinq.,,sr
ancl the Provisional Government. On I I August, a Moscow Metalworks gen-
while the Bolsheviks were far fiom Lonolithic, they were the exrrer.ìre eral meeting voted against the Moscow Conference and for a protest in the
i' the fàctories a'd were u'ired on rhe key political issLres of the day:
radicals
form of a strike or demonstration.ss Still controlled by Mensheviks and SRs,
against rhe rvar, against a comprornise rvith trre capitalists, and for soviet
the Moscorv Soviet voted 364 to 304 against the strike, yet the majority of
rule. Moreover, their party proviclecl their members with organizatio'al
sup- district soviets and trade unions supported strike action.se
port and political direction. The sRs, o' rhe other ha'd, ivere in a state of
The Bolsheviks won the argument ir-r the factories, and the 12 August
serious disarral,, movi'g fro.r politicar arnbiguity to fissure basecl o'sharp
strike was a profound political demonstration of opposition to the Provisional
interual diffèrences over each of the r.nain politicai quesrions. The SR fàctory
Government. Nikolai Sukhanov, a Menshevik participar-rt at the confèrence
colnmittee ¡rresident stated that the party was split at an August district
wrote, "This whole working-class army rvas fbllowing the Bolsl-reviks øgøinst
meeting, "rvith some factory members, including myself, on Ih. reft and
its own Soviett"eo Izuestiø, the organ of the Moscow Soviet, admitted that the
others on the right."82
Soviet had resolved "to ask the Moscow proletariat not to strike" but "the
workers' political senriments co'ti'ued to rìove to the left, but the Bol- attitude of the Moscow proletariat toward the conference is so hostile tl-rat
shevik cell was relatively weak co'rpared to other factories. In
July a'd late at night there was a meeting of the Central Trade Union, attended by
August, the factory's name did llor appear in a lor-rg list of woikplace resolu-
delegates of all the wards, representing 400,000 proletarians" which voted
tions that called ft¡r an end to tlie persecution of the Bolsheviks and for
the "almost unanimously" to go out.el The Bolshevik Sotsiøl-Dernol¿røt also
abolitio'of the death penalry a'd against the closure of the rvorkers, Dress.F3 reported that 400,000 workers in Moscow and Moscow Guberniia stl'uck,
By mid-septeml¡er the district 'sovier norecl that Metalworks was oire of ,
ftrrty-one unions supported the general strike, ancl 23,000 workers went out
s¡nall number of factories that did not have a ,.Bolshevik mood.,,84 Tumanov
in the Rogozhskii district, including 3,300 in Guzhon. The action, accord-
claimed that by septernber, the Bolshevik factory orga'izatio'rrad grown
to ing to the newspaper, showed "the revolutionary urood of the nrasses."e2 The
one hurdred members a.d had eclipsed the sRs i' itrer-rgth, but only
at the SR newspaper Trød. claimed that in Rogozhskii "the mood of the workers
end of the monrh dicl the decisive political meeting fävor ihe Bolsheviks,
with was very uncertain." The disuict soviet had issued a call for a strike but "part
ma'y youllg workers playing key roles.85 I' a city in which the party claimed
of the workers were for and part against a strike." As proof of this ambiva-
a menrbership of twenty thousand by the end of tire year,86 theii
factory-level lence, Trød. reported that in Guzhon "one clepartmellt, thell another, thelr
stre'gth ofjust a hundred workers suggesrs that the Bolsheviks hacl'ever the entire factory struck."e3 The metalworkers' uniou reported that in forry
fully recovered from the prerevolutionarv arrests.
factories, including other large plants, all rnembers struck. The Moscow Met-
The first sig'al of a shiìi fi'orn the sRs io Bolshevism came duri'rg rhe ge'-
alworks, by contrast, was one of two factories in which part of the workforce
eral strike o' l2 August agai'st the Moscow state co'fere'ce. Tñe confèr- did not participate in the action. A ferv metal factories did not participate at
ellce was alì atrenìpt to legitirnize the faltering provisional Government by
all.ea Thus, Bolshevik inf'luence throughout Moscorv factories overcame the
balancing the "consultative" voice of the confèrence betvveep the right and
combined SR and Menshevik efforts to block the political stoppage, but the
left- Denied entr)¡ to the conference, the Bolsheviks atter.ìlpted to organize
a Moscow Metalworks was or.ìe of the fèw plants in which the entire workforce
strike against it. The 8 August MI( minutes show that ..ptr., fi.om the fàc-
dicl not participate.
tories indicate the Bolsheviks were unconvincecl about their capacitv ro
over_ The Moscow State Conference not only fàilecl to briclge the grovvir-rg class
cor¡re Menshevik and SR support for the confererce. Many celis
clai'red that clivide; it dernonstrated that civil war u,as imrninent. Sukhanov wrote tlÌat the
rvorkers'inclination for strike acrion rvas favorable, but oiher cells reported
Bolshoi Theatre itself was divided in half, "on the right sat the bourgeoisie,
that the rnood was either ambiguous or'egative. Nogin and other more cau-
to the left clernocracy." Kerensky tl'rreatened to put dou,n any nevv attenpt
tious Bolsheviks argued agai'st the strike, craiming it woulcl be a success) against the government with "blood and iron." The liberal Miliukov had
but tl're MKvoted eighteen to six to agitate in the unions a¡d 'otdistrict soviets been driven frorn his post as Foreign Minister in April after his claim that
ft¡r a strike. The mood in Guzhon refìected that of manl, Moscow factories_
"Russia vvould fìght to the last drop of bloocl" brought tens of thor.rsands of
in the rniddle of the political specrrum, but rÌlovirg to the left i. the ideo- workers to tlÌe streets of Petrograd. Now he expressed the liberals'bitter con-
logical corlfrorltatiorl reverberating in every workplace : ,,Guzhon: The tempt for the popular revolutionary aspirations. He complained about the
lnasses' attitude in the factory is unfàr,orable. The nìoocl is getting
better: governmellt's "capitr,rlatiorì" on five fronts: its "Zimmerwaldist" foreign pol-
The worki'g masses have beg*' to syrnpathize rvith r-rs. The strike u'doubt-
icy, the "democratizatiorl" of the Arn-r¡ the "utopian" demands olworkers,
 58 luti on ønd Coan teyra, o httion
R ep o Revolution ønd. Collectipe Actcon
the "extrelne" denands of national minorities, ancl the ..clirect actio¡', of
peasants. Tl-re head of the armed fbrces, Kornilov, insinuated that a strong-
ûran was needed to save Russia because the army had been converted into a
"crazy mob trembling only for its orvn rife," and he rvamecl that the fàll of
Riga was immine't and then the road to petrogracr woulcl be ,.ope11.,, e5
I(ornilov's atternpted coup d'état in late August gave colìcrete form to the
threats iiom the right, but also strengthened the resolve of the left. Kor¡ilov
orclered a march on Petrogracl to destroy tl"re soviet and insrall himself as dic-
tator.e6 The Petrograd Soviet sent agitators to fiaternize rvith the aclva¡ci¡g
forces, and the atempred military coup dissolved without any fighting. Thã
threat fiom the right, however, encouraged the forrnation of-fortv thousa¡d
Red Guards to defend the revolution.eT Moreover, rrre conspiracy further
erocled confìdence in the Provisional Governnrent as l(erensly's machina-
tions with l(ornilov became public along rvith the cornplicity of sorle mem-
bers of the Kadet party.es
The atternpted bourgeois coup "profbundry stirrecl the surface ancl clepths
of Russia," wrote sukhanov. hr the days afterwarcls ,,Bolshevism began blos-
soming luxuria'tly a'd put forth deep roots throughout the .o.urt.y.ú, In fàc-
tories and working-class districts throughout Moscow the Bólsheviks put
fòrward resolutions to arnÌ rvorkers ancl soldiers, to disarm counterrevolu-
tionary military uuits, to arrest Tsarist generals and liberal leaders. to close the
state Duma, to expel fbreign govèr'me'ts rvho gave aid tp the cou'terrevo-
lutio', and to create a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat ancl peas-
antry that would proclaim a democratic republic and imr¡ediately give la¡cl to
the peasa'ts. Almost ni'ety thousa'd workers participated in mais meeri'gs
that endorsecl one or more of these de rnands.t00 The Moscow Metalworks was
one of many factories in which a general meeting passed a resolution fbr arm-
ing workers against the "Komilov-IGdet conspiracy."t0r According to the Bol-
shevik secretary, rhe f'ormation of the Red Guarcls met with rrroñn resisrance
from both Mensheviks and the sRs, who sent leading me mberJ like Spiri-
donova to speak at the factory. "These were extraorclinaiily difficult mome'ìrs
rvhenever we found out that the sRs were going to have strong orators speak;,,
ouce again the Bolshevik Moscow Committee ('sellt strong coulrades.'i02
By early Septe'rber, democratically elected soviers throughout Russia
s\4/urlg to the Bolsheviks. on 3l August the Bolsheviks won a rrìajority in the
Petrograd soviet. By I September,126 soviets had reqr-rested thc Soviet cen-
tral Executive Committee to take power. over the uext week soviets il-r
Moscow (5 september), I(iev, Kaza,, Bakr.r, a'cl saratov passed Borshe'ik
resolutions.r03 As iu the 1905 Revolution, the Bolsheviks acioptecl an ..open-
cloor" recLuitnrent strategy, believing that u,orkers, cxperie¡ce ill the scirool
of revolution Irìore than compensated. for ar.r1, lack of theoretical knorvl_
edge.l0a Tens of thor-rsands of the most radical lvorkers joined the Bolsheviks,
rnany of rvhotn, whett asked about their understancling olthe Bolsfievik pro-
gram olì their application, simply srated, "our prograrn is struggle rvith the
bourgeoisie."l0s By cornparison, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, with-j-ustification.
continuecl to accr¡sc the Mensheviks of aclvocating a progl-am ol .,conrpro-
mise" with the boLrrgeoisie.106
59
Economic discontent and a revival of labor militar"rcy contributed to a ris-
ing tide of strikes that involved over a million-and-a-half workers in the late
sumlner ancl early fäll.t07 In the Moscow Metalworks, however, the l2
,{ugust political strike was the only significant work stoppage, as workers
seemed content to let arbitration bodies resolve grievances-invariably in
their fävor. At tl-re end of May, management fired several cafeteria workers,
who nevertheless continued to show up for work. In Juue, an arbitrator
delayed a ruling on the grievance for three weeks, by which time manage-
rnent had been removed.los In July an arbitrator mandated a wage iucrease
fbr all workers and ruled that women should receive the same pay as men fbr
equivalent work instead of ì.5 percent less. Taking into accouut the decrease
in hours since March, the arbitrator also remindecl workers of their agree-
ment to reach 85 percent production.l0e,A'uother dispute erupted in August
in the sheet metal shop over wage categories, aucl a uuion rcpreserltative was
posted in the fàctory through september to resolve the issue.llo In early
October, metalworkers' ultion records show that the Bolshevik Mal'kov and
the SR Arapov represented five hundred r'vorkers' request for higher wage
categories and the union conflict commission cletermined that the grievance '
was justifiecl.lll On 12 October, an arbitration judge ruled that uniou fac-
tory guards were elÌtitled to the average rvage of an unskilled worker.l¡2
Thus, strikes were avoidecl ònly because workers rnanaged to braudish the
strength of the metalrvorkers' uniou to conrpel arbitrators to coucccle to
their economic demands.
The Bolshevik-dorninated metalworkers' ullion was a f-ocus of party Inet-n-
bers' activities in the late summer. By the middle ol Septernber the fàctory
had three thousand dues-paying metalworkers' uuiolt members.ll3 One
memoir clairned, "lJnder Mal'kov's leadership, tlre metalrvorkers' uniott
drerv in about a thousand people."lla The workfbrce's solidarity with other
workers, as indicated by contributions to strike funds, shows a patterlì coll-
sistent with the radicalization of Russian labor generally in l9L7 . On 22 July,
the factory conmittee voted fbr workers to coutribute a day's pay to the met-
alworkers' urlion strike fi.rnd.l15 The decisiot.l to contribute 18,237, the
largest Moscow contributiou of the year, to the fi.urd was made a day þsfþ¡s
the citywide delegates resolved to cteduct oneday's pay.ll6 A few weeks later,
the fàctory committee votecl to contribute alÌother day's wage per rvorker to
striking Moscow leather rvorkers.llT Thus, workers, whose own financial posi-
tion was deteriorating rapidly, gave material fbml to the theoretical abstrac-
tion of proletarian unity.
Despite their mutual animosity on larger political questions, the early
nationalization of the factory encouraged Bolsheviks and SRs to cooperate il't
the day-to-day operations. On 14 October, workers left the factory at teu iu
the morning for a processiou in honor of Illarion Astakhov. They rnarched to
the bridge rvhere he had been killecl, ancl then to the cemetery, vr4rere they
listenecl to speakers fì'om the Bolshevik, SR, and Unity parties.lls Both the SR
and Bolsl-revik leaclers claimed that in August aucl September the two orga-
nizations repeatedly concurred on issues couceruing tl"re control of produc-
tion and procuring of rau' materials.lle
 ó0 R¿puhttion ønd. Coønterrevnhttion
workers i'the Moscow Metalworks supported the october Revolutio',
as did rvorkers throughout Moscow Factory committee minutes show several
september and october collections for Red Guard units to defend the revo-
lution.r20 Significantly a partial list of Recl Guards shorvs that ftrrty-five
lìo¡-
party volunteers outnumbered the nine Bolsheviks and two SRs.r2r The
Bolshevik and district soviet leader, Ze'rliachka, requested three to four
hundred Red Guards_fr-om the factory, but because oithe shortage of guns
only one hundred and fifty workers volunteered. t22 At a2s octob"er general
meeting, according to the most believable account, Tumanov requestecl,
"Those who want to take up a'rs, step to the reft, those who do not. to the
right." "Right awa¡" o'e observer recalled, "three-quarters stepped to the
left and only one-quarter to the right.',123
The factory sRs apparently divided be rween the left, right, ancr a group in
_ By tl-re time guards had lrLrsteled the forces to wage au assault olÌ the nearby
the center thar wavered. The Left sR factory leader Arapov enjoyed enor-
mous aurhoriry ancl probably srvayed many rank-and-fiIè 5¡*.íz+-The SRs
expellecl another fàctory leader, I(uznetsov, because he l-rad helped
orsanize
the Red Guards, agai'st the directives of the party.r2s As the ,r-,ór..orri.rur-
tive sRs lost support to the Bolshe'iks, general political cliscussio^s became
increasi'gly hostile. o'e worker wrote that sorne sRs referreä to tl-re Bol-
shevik-dorninated workers' counòirs as "the, Soviet of workers, and Dogs,
Deputies" but that "every speaker against the workers, soviet was inet with_"
shouts_of indignation, irritation'and sharp criticism from groups of rvork-
ers."l26 other memoirs recalled boisterous meetings th.o.,gl"roujoctober
in
which the SR fàctory director weitsmar-r had oper-rly referrãd to the Bolshe-
viks as "swine," ancl other SRs denounced the Bolsheviks as ,,dictatorial
sons
of bitches."l27 '[he SR factory commitree president, Lebedev, later claimed
that he had sided with Revolution, but accordi'g to T,rma.,ori Lebedev had
repeatedly talked on the phone rvith the fàctory director weirsman and
the
Recl Guards becarne suspicious. They wanted to arrest Lebedev but this
was
problematic because "he was the elected president of the fàctory committee,',
so he was merely disarmed. Tumanov rvrote that he replaced Lebedev as
committee president on 28 october, afrer the Moscow bittle had begun.r28
The Bolshevik-dominated petrograd so'ier's Military Revolutìorary
committee launched an attack upon the provisional Government in the days
before the Second Congress ofSoviets. provocative actions by the sovenl_
ment and the right helped legitimatize the preernptive assault. Thro"ughout
october, the lGdet llewspaper Rech' repeatedly war'ecl against letti'g the
Bolsheviks "choose the rnoment for a declaration of civil ivar..r2e IGrensky
had already used fbrce agai'st the so'iets o' l9 october, orclering cossacks
to raid the I(aluga soviet and arrest its leaclers.r30 on 24 october.'the provi-
sional GovernrllelÌt orclered the arrest olthe petrogracl Military Revolution-
ary cornrnittee, bur the folloq,ing clay the cornrnittee arrested the lninisters
of the Provisional Government.l3t The soviet seizure of power hacl the suo_
port of the o'erwhelmiug nrajority of n orkers ancl soldieis. Throuehout fac-
tories in Russia dLrring september a'cl octotrer, the Bolsheviks al.euecl fòr
trarrsferrirrg power ro the soviets.rr2 Tlrey u,on this argulïìenr: soz ãf ozo at
the Congress of:Soviets arrived in petrogracl comuriited to supporting .,all
ót
R ey o lwtion. ønd. Co lle ctiv e A ction
power to the soviets."l33 As a leading contemporary oppollellt of Soviet
power, the Menshevik Martov, reluctantly admitted that "before us after all
is a victorious uprisir-rg of the proletariat-almost the entire proletariat sup-
ports Ler-rin and expects its social liberation frorn the uprising."l3a
Fierce fighting lasted fbr almost a week in Moscow.13! Lack of arms meallt
that the majoriry of Moscorv Metalworks workers remained passive supPort-
ers of the insurrection. During the battle, the factory cafeteria was packed as
the bakery continued to fèecl workers fì'om the factory and district.l36 Oue
factory Red Guard who fonght in the battle recounted frenzied, uuinter-
rupted activity in which he did rlot return home for eight days.r37 For Red
Guards protecting the fàctory, however, the u,eakttess of the coultterrevolu-
tionary units meant that October was, iu military terms) almost a llonevent.
cadet institnte, the enelny officers hacl alreadl, fled.l38
One of the more rernarkable changes in workers' attitudes cluring l9l7
was the fraternization betrveen Rr-rssian ancl German-speaking rvorkers. Trvo
years after many Moscorv Metalu,orks ernployees had participated in vicious
attacks against the Gennau-speaking citizer-rs of Moscon, Austrian prisoncrs'
of war at the factory regulally attended geueral rneetiltgs and pla¡,ed a Part itl
the workers' revolution. An, international agreernent olt I October freed all
prisoners of war, but management delayecl releasing the factory's 2ó0 prisor-r
laborers.l3e Arapov wrote that factory activists organizecl a "ttuity coltcertT'of
six hunclred workers, ¿nd that fifteen to nventy Austrians actively particiPated
in the workers' rrovemcrìt.la0 A,nother memoir claints that all eight Austrians
in the sheet rnetal shop fougl'rt on the barricacles and storrned the l(t'emliu,
ancl that at least one died in the fìghting.rar
Two characteristics clifferentiated tlie l9l7 Russiau Revolution from
other workers' rebellions of the twelttieth celìtury. First, in no society was
the level of class hatred more prol.rounced than in RLrssia. The late summer
crisis u'as not merely a consequerlce of a string of incompetent decisious on
the part of the Provisional Goventmeut. Rather, the escalation of class cou-
flict u'as the culmination of years of confrontation, war profiteering, brr-rtal
repression, and workers' rebellion that could only have ended in the force-
f-ul rule by one class over the other.ra2 The second distinguishing featr'rre of
I9l7 was that at the movement's decisive juncture, one political party rvith
significant influence in the workirlg class pr"rt forrvard an ullcolrìpronrising
stance against capitalisrn ancl for a workers' government. Socialists were the
dorninant political force in the factories fòr the previous dozen years and
through their accumulated influence tnauaged to set the pararneters of the
debate. While workers were synÌpathetic to socialism generall¡ it was only
in the politically charged atrnosphere of the late surìmer that they started to
distinguisl-r between diffèrer-rt party prograurs. The Bolsheviks' advocacy of
sovie t governÍnent provided a sensible solutior-r to the reality of unprece-
clented class war.
In the Moscovi, Metalrvorks the ascendancy of the extrelne left did not
conform to the depiction of an infàtlible party leading the masses later pop-
 Rey o lu,tion øud, Coø.n terrett o lu.tion
ularized by Stalinisur. Workers learnecl ftrr themselves through the course of
class confìict, in the process gaining a visceral sense of their owu collective
power. Yet revolutionary politics contributecl in tangible ways to this process.
Decimatecl by Okhrana arrests in the prerevolutionary period, the small fac-
tory-based Bolsl"revik group was inept and outuumbered by the SRs. More-
over, the SRs promoted a strateg), of clirect action, egalitarianism, áud
worker unity in the early months of the revolution that rvas hardly distin-
guishable from the Leninists. Bolshevik policy only became decisive when
the more fundamental political issue of state power came to the fore cluring
the late summer. The organizational weakness of the Leninists in the fàctory
was overcome by what Alexander Rabinowitch describes as "the relative
flexibility of the party."t43 The Bolsheviks clid uot just react to everlts:
instead the party provicled leadership for the novell-ìent. After sending in
several talented organizers, the Bolsheviks fought for-ancl won-the ideo-
logical argulnent fbr revolution ar-rd Soviet power) as they did arnong rvork-
ers tlrroughout the empire.
The Civil War Catastrophe and Personal Survival
The October Revolution did not rpsolve the class conflict in the Moscorv
Metalworks. In early l9I8 workers coutiuued to raise economic grievatrces iu
raucous factory meetings. The economic catastrophe of the Civil War, how-
ever) was uot conducive to protracted labor militancy and the collective egal-
itarianism of the revolution was eventually displaced by the desperate politics
ofpersonal survival.
The Bolsheviks gambled that satisfying the demands of the workiug class
and the peasantry ultimately hinged on tlre European revolutionary move-
rnent. As Lenin repeatedly argued after October, "If the peoples of Europe clo
not arise and crush imperialism, rve shall be crushed ... the capitalists of all
countries rvill stifle or.rr stmggle."rø This perspective was no pipe drearn. In
respouse to tl-re slaughter and deprivations of the war, the lnost profound social
mo\¡elrent in Europear-r history swept across the contineltt during the "recl
years" of 19l8-1919. Based on the Russian example, workers forrned soviets in
Gemany, Austria, Bulgaria, and even Irelaud, where rvorkers uroved to the
center of the lrish revolt against British domiuation. In Glasgorv's "Red Clyde"
shop stervards led a general strike in early 1919 and declared "We 'British Bol-
sheviks' have the Russian precedent to guide us, and we believe that in the crit-
ical hours of our revolution, our lallying cry rvill be: 'All Power to the Workers'
Comrnittees.''la5 British Prirne Minister Lloyd George recognized the in'rpli-
catior-rs of this revolt fiom below. "The whole olEurope is filled rvith the spirit
of revolution," he fi'etted. "There is a deep serlse r.ìot only 6f ¿it.ontent but of
anger and revolt amongst the rvorkingrnen against the prewar conditions. The
whole existing order in its political, social and econonric aspects is questioned
by the masses of the population fiom one end of Euro¡-re to the other."146
Workers' grievances were clirectecl at the board oft lnanàgemellt that hacl
been appointecl by the Provisioual Govet'urner-rt. Ou 24 November l9l7
RepoIutiott ønd. Collective Actimt 63
(old calendar) the factory cornmittee complained that minimuln wagc rates
had already been established in other factories but not in the Metalworks
because of "sabotage by the Kerensky government's board of tnanagemettt."
A general meeting resolved to send an appeal to the Soviets for a change of
managernent, with half of the new staff coming frorn the ranks olthe work-
ers.raT Olr 28 November 1917, workers put forward a wage dernand that
complained about incorrect wage payments "fbr the last ten years." Union
representatives, perhaps unsure ofhorv to respond, gave the grievance to "a
consulting lawyer."l48 While blaming lnanagelnent for wage rates, the factory
committee usurped control over almost every aspect of the factory. The
elected rvorkers'representatives dealt with general production issues, sent
delegates on assignment fbr raw rnaterials, and hired, fired, and disciplined
ernployees for various offènses. Tl-rey also received various appeals fiom work-
ers, rnade donations to various revolutionary causes) organized Red Guards
to defènd thefaetory, and took responsibility for rvorkers' provisious.rae
The board of directors attemptecl to resist the demise of its authority. The
Moscow Soviet resolved that workers' representatives had the right to check
rnalÌagement's sale of manufactured goods, but did not have tl're right to sell
products, which rer¡ained a managenent prerogative.l50 A weck later, thc
Moscow Soviet ordered the factory committee to stop distributing circr.rlars
to offìce personnel because they "rnay only be issued from maltagèmettt."l5l
Management also complained about the factory committee's "tactic of dis-
crediting management in the eyes of the oflìce ancl produciiou workers" by
not allorving rnalÌagemerìt to utilize one of tlÌe two factory autonrobilcs.l52
On 6 February l9I8 (new calendar hereaftet'), thc factory committee
responded to an appeal from the factory chauffer.rr, who conrplaincd that he
had been "fòrced to drive Weitsman's wifè around."l53
The committee again insisted on a miui¡lum uniou claily rate of thlee
rubles, but management refused. After the Courmissariat of Labor sided with
the factory committee, the committee then demanded auother 25 percent
raise in the minimum rate. Management again refused, notirrg that there had
not been a corresponding increase in production, but the cornmittee blarned
the drop on insufficient materials.l54 On 8 Febluary 1918, a fäctory general
meeting unanimously resolvecl that if the factory committee had not hearcl
fì'om the Cornmissariat of Labor by the morning of l2 Februar¡ the com-
mittee would assume full autliority over the plant.l55
This friction over workers' control raged tl'rroughor.rt Russia u,ell iuto
1918. As S.A. Smith has shown, the expansion olworkers'coutrol was a
lespollse to, rather than the cause of, industrial chaos, "which l-racl its roots
in the whole system of rvar capitalisrl." The discussions orì rvorkers' coutrol
centered on the division of labor betu.een factory conmittees aud mauage-
ment boards. In many fàctories vr.'orkers'control was the uortn itl early 19I8,
with official manage¡nerìt existing alongside the factory committee and witl-r
malÌagement orders subject to ratification of the factory comlnittee or its
5r'
control comnlission. I
By early 19l8 Moscorv workers'most urgent problern was the fbocl cri-
of the rail system.
sis. exacerbated by corìtir-ìì.lal blizzarcls and a breakdorvn
 Rep o lation ønd, Coøn ten'cy
By February 1918, whe'the Borsheviks moved the capital to Moscoq,, a
worker's daily ration dropped to 30ó calories a day-låss rhan a renth of
what was co'sidered necessary for a healthy diet.r37 I'March l9lg, the
plant had received ten thousand puds of potatoes and the factory comlnit_
tee vorved that supplies "must not freeze or rot.'158 General fàciory
meet_
ingsfocused o' provisio's were rreaviry amencled and boisterous. A láte
May
l9l8 session thar discussed the food provisions was marked by.,a stormy
ffrood." A few weeks later, oue worker criticized the proposed foocl-requi-
sitioning plan and proposed alleviating the fbocl crisis
-by
irnpleme¡ti¡g free
trade with the cou'tryside. workers "listened atte'dvely to ihe spe"kei.,
bot
rvhe' he called fbr the abolition of fixed prices and tbi free tr"åe. .o.,"s of
rvorkers calne alive with shouts of protest."rse
I'July l9lg, the factory
committee authorized a half:day wage deduction from all workers to help
feed the children of workers.lóo
Two mauagenÌetlt changes failed to halt the econorlic chaos in the fac-
tory. In March a temporary ¡.rìallagement teanÌ took over the aclministra_
tion.16l In ear'ly Ju'e 1918, the supìeme cou'cil of the Natio'al Econo'ry
(vesenkhø) resolved ro create a uew managemert board co'sisti'g
of two
workers fì'om production, orre representative fì-om the union, add three reu_
resentatives front wsenkhø.t62 Twci strikes in May and
July show that both
management tearns fàiled to halt sinrmering worker rurrest. In late May l9lB,
workers in rhe wire stretching shdp orga'ized a .i'e-day,strike to raise
the
wage rate by 130 percent. The metarworkers' u'io'resoivecl rot ro supporr
the action because strikes would lead to ,,the death of the working class at
the
present moment." Management threatened to fire workers u,ho did
not show
up ftrr work, but also granted a slight r.vage increase to end the conflict.ró3
workers in the steel fou'dry shop struck in late lLrly lglB nor several clays,
though factory committee minutes do not record the outcome.r6a
workers' dernands exceeded what the battered soviet state could ofÌèr.
The regirne inherited arì ecorìolny in shambles-due in no small part
to
deliberate sabotage by capitalists.r65 Moreover, by the summer of t9tg,
soviet Russia had shrunk to the size of the meclieval Moscovy state a'd had
lost almost all grain producing regions.¡66 In July lglg a metahvorkers,
rep-
resentative carefìrlly replied to lvorkers' reiterated wage grievances ..for
the
last ten years." He acknowleclgecl "rvorkers'demands ñ-oà tn. legal
poi't of
view.i'pri'ciple are jusr, especially fiom lg0z to July 1917, w:heir hiring
conditions were violated all the time." The uniol-r representative tolcl the
workers that it was possible to fincl "thousands" or,".o,-,gJoìng, uy ,r-r"n-
agement. "I poi'ted our to the workers that the lvorking ãl^rr, io r'ake
up
for thg losses that rvere done i' the past, took i'dustry irito its h"r.,ds, but is,
not deura'ding the dividi'g of indLrstry anlong everyolle, rvhich lvould spell
its death.'167
The factory committee, a'cl the Bolshevik cell attempted
'a'agelreut,
to deal rvith numeror-rs problerns dur.ing the civil war. The respo'sibilities
of tl-re fàctory co'rrittee) aud the party cell overìapped, and
'larlage'lert,
a high le'el of cooperatio' crraracterized their ivorË. Factory än,r.,itt"e
discr-rssions centered on workers' compensation, labor cliscipline
. and provi-
o lation Rcvolu.tion ønd. Collectipe Acnon ó5
sions.l68 Managernent meetings focused on wages and securing raw materi-
als for the factory but rvere also concernecl with finding provisions for the
workers. ]oint sessions of the management team and the factory courtnittee,
including Bolslieviks and SRs, discussed these issues.r6e Bolshevik factory
cell meetings discussed all issues related to the factory as well as larger polit-
ical issues.lTo
Theoretically, the factoly committee was the main institutiou for defend-
ing workers' interests, and was elected by general meetings. Froln the coln-
mittee's inception in March l9l7 to August 1918,224 factory committee
and general meetings were convened, with general meetings held about once
a rveek and comnrittee meetings three or four tilnes a rveek. Subcomrnittees
included commissions fbr provisions, sanitation, housing, educatiou, fiuances,
discipline, hiring and firing, and guarding the factory.rTr During the collapse
ofproduction in 1919, the committee rìet less frequendy.lT2 Operating under
the auspices of the metalworkers' union, it was expected to handle economic
grievances thror-rgh mecliation procedures rather than by strike action.li3 Fac-
torlr çe¡otui,tee resolutions were subordinate to the factory-wide ureetings,
regularly attended by five to eiglit hundrecl workers, that decided such urat-
tel's as tlìe firing of workers ancl managers) aid to families of cleceased work-
ers, holiday schedules, ancl contributions to various political caLlses.
A high level of sacrifice and discipline marked Bolshevik menrbership, but
the organization had neither the numerical nor the political strerlgth to corì-l-
bat the near-total economic collapse. Mean attendallce at tnectiugs was
twenry-rwo in 1920 and wenty-six in l92l.r7a After the dernobilization iu
1921, the cell reached forty members, but only cighteelr Ilembers worked in
the shops.l75 Meetings votecl on members' assigutlents, punishing reckless
behavior and attempts to circutnvent directives. Tlre party expelled oue
mernber for careerisrn after he had forged factory committee and party sig-
natures in order to erlter an econotnic institute . Another party member was
suspended fbr three months after serving iu a statc positior-r without the cou-
sent of the cell. A party court puuished at,other lletnber with two weeks'
forced labor because he had appeared at the factory drr-rnk. Members were
electecl as represeutatives to the district and cit1, soviets, and assigned by the
party to various govelnrnent posts. In May 1920, a nrcmber on assigut'ueut
for Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Røblerin) who had gone several
months without pay petitioned the cell for help because his family had been
reducecl to "the most pitiftrl existence." Party meetings during tl're Civil War
illustrate that a high standard of political couviction, rather tharì the lure of
material reward, clefined the party's membership in this periocl.lT6
This high level of political comrritulent extended beyond the ranks of
party rnembers. Tens of thousands of young Moscow workers voluuteered
fbr the Recl Arn-ry duling the nronths afier the October Revolution. On I5
Jarruary I9I8, the Council of People's Commissars (Soanørhnoøo) called on
all part¡ tracle union, soviet, and Red Guard orgauizatious to l-relp in the task
of building the "socialistArrny," ar-rd by the end ofApril 1918, tu,o hundred
thousand men and wornelÌ had volunteered.lTT By mid-Ma1, iu Moscow,
 R ett o luti on øn d Co u.n t urcv
more than fìfty-seven thousand people, mostly workers, had enlisted.lTs Two
hundred and fìfty workers fi'om the fàctory volunreered ir-r January l9lB,
nearly all betweeu the ages of fìfteen and thirry. One volunteer., who was six-
teell at the time, recalled, "thirty for us was very old."l7e In october 1919,
the factory Kornsomol organized auother detachrnent of nventy-fìve volun-
teers, includirìg fourteen-year-old Dasha ukhova, to fight on the southern
front against Denikin.ls0 volr,rnteers wrote proudly about their cornbat expe-
rience, including accoullts of Red Army units defènding the Jewish popul"-
tion in the Ukraine against the White rerror. lsl
while enthusiasm ftrr joining the Red Arrny illustrates the breadth of pop-
ular support for the Revolution, the absence of the most comrnitted revolu-
tionaries from the factories had a deleterious ef'fect on rhe rear guard
throughout the civil war era. By March l9l8 rlie city party r-nernbérship
stood at forty thousand but only six thousar-rd memlrers u,ere in the factories.
and less than half on the shop floor.r82 In April 1918, the factory Bolshevik
leader Tumanov cornplained that, "cells have fallen apart because many
comrades left ftrr the Red Guards.... Conrades call each othet saboteursl
party work has fallen."r83
The factory party organization conrinued to lose caclres to the fiont
thror-rghor-rt the civil war. In January 1919, the war Commissar infbrmed the
factory cell that Political commissar stroikov had died at the frorir. ,.on
behalf of the eutire steel division, i .*pr"r, our deepest grief about the irrev-
ocable loss of our dear comracte who perished with honor at his revolutionary
post and, to the end of his life, honorably defended the holy cornmunisr
idea.'184 The party responded ro a requesr fbr rwo more members fbr the
fi'ont in J.u'ly 1920 that "In view that our cell has bcen drained of ma'y peo-
ple, and cfue to starting up ollr factory, our cell finds itself already weak with
people." Having already "posted ten people from oJr cell to the Kafkaz front',
the cell resolved to assign only one more member to the southern fiont.l85
Fuel shortages also crippled the factory. The fìrel crisis in the summer of
l9l8 forcecl several shops to shut dorvn ft¡r six weeks.'s6 By l9l9 in Moscorv,
the fuel supply fell to a staggering 4 percenr olthe prervar level ancl by the
summer of 1920, ftrur hundred factories had closed-one thircl of all inclus-
trial enterprises in city.l87 calculated in rerms of l9l4 production fisures in
the Moscorv Metalworks, the respective perceurages were 40.3 peicent in
l9l7;27.2 percerlt i' lglB; 5.0 percent i' l9l9;2.0 percent in 1920; and
4.9 perceut it't 1921.t88 From sunìnler of l9l9 till June of 1920, uot a single
blast fumace operated in the largesr steel fàctory in the soviet capital; during
the next year, oul1, one small furnace rvorked.lse A party cliscussion in Febru-
ar\t r92l con-rplained that if fìrel lvere not obtained immediatelv. the eutire
factory woLrld have to be shut down.le0 one vvorker u..orr'rt-póssibly influ-
enced lry Gladkov's popular novel Cenøenr, rvl-rich imbues hnman attributes
to a factory-claims that a metalrvorkers' represeutative suggested closing the
plant. "I almosr got into a fìght with l-rim, but Grigorii lvar-rovich pogon-
chenkov hclcl n-re back. I felt ver),sorry ftrr the fàctory."rer
without food, many rvorkers chose to retunr to their villages. Tl-re factory
cornmittee acknou,ledged the problem in March lglS, rvhen many workers
o lruø on Revolwtion ønd. Collective Action 67
failed to appear after the Easter holida¡ and resolved to fire those wl-ro had
not returned fì'om their villages after fìve days.re2 Clearly frustrated with the
breakdown in factory discipline, management complained in July that "a
large number of workers are the peasant element that have not broken witlr
the countryside" and that "these elements are neither interested in the state
of the factory nor even its existence, are llot politically cottscious, are uudis-
ciplined, and are undesirable for the factory and for the more conscious
working lnasses at the fàctory."le3
While the Bolsheviks hacl hoped that the European-wide popular rrìove-
rnent would eventually corrìe to the aicl of the fìedging revolution, they also
had to deal with the irnmediate reality that the governments of Great Britain,
the United States, and a dozen other nations had come to the aid of their
adversaries. By the late surnmer of 19l 8 more tharì I 50,000 fore ign soldiers
were in Russia. hl I919,200,000 foreign troops provided crucial support to
the Whites' positions along the lÌorthem front, the Ukrainian and Caucasus.
In just six months of 1919, Alliecl arms shipments to the Whites includecl
hunclreds of thousands of rifles, a thousanct artillery pieces with millions of
shells, seven thousand machine guns) two hundrecl airplanes, ancl a hundred'
tanks.lea Most of this support came fì'om Great Britain and France, but U.S. i
Secretary of State Robert Lansing convinced Woodrow Wilson to secretly
funnel tens of millions of dollars to the White armies in an ef'fort to establisl-r
"a stable Russian govemment" through "a military dictatorship,"le5
In response to tlÌe foreign intervention and skirmishes with the White
arrnies, the Soviet government implemented War Comtnunistn in June
I918. War Communisrn entailed nationaliziug almost all econouric euter-
prises, centralizing econornic policy, eventually replacing uroney with
payments in natural wages) ancl making avariety of effìorts to raise procluc-
tion.le6Unable to solve the food crisis, the Soviet govertìnlellt also effectively
gave workers the right and respousibility to solve their food problerns tlìem-
selves. In May l9l8 the Moscow party ancl unions started organizing "fbod
exchange" detachments fi'on-r the factories that, in realitg quickly evolved
into food "requisitioning" detachments. Ie7
At a June l9l8 general meeting, the main spealcer reported that euelnies
of Soviet rule were not perrnitting graiu transit and that levolutiorrary
detachments ftlr requisitioning grain l-racl to be orgauized. Two weeks later,
a general nÌeeting elected a cletachrnent of one hundrect workers.le8 On l3
August 1918, Lenin signecl a decree that gave factory committees aud poor
peasants the right to organize food-requisitioning detachments.lee A ferv days
later, tl-re fàctory comrnittee issuecl Vasilii Gus'kov a certificate acknowledg-
ing his election as a representative of factory Food Detachment 4ó3 for trade
with peasants.2oo
'
While most workers participatecl in rorvdy fàctory rneetirlgs that discussed
food provisions, such discontent was l'rot politically charged-rvorkers were
far more concerned with an immeciiate response to desperate conditions.
The percentage of workers at general meetings in which food was the main
agenda item was higher than factory-rvide meetin gs in I9l7 . Eight hr-rndred
(of eleven hur-rclred) workers attended a ó May l919 rneeting on "the criti-
 ,.
l:'å;
68 Rep o ht tìon. øn d Coanterrep
cal flour sittration" rvhen the ration was reducecl to one
funt (about one
pound) per worker. The meeting also resolvecr to donate .*i."o.dìrr"ry
aid of
five hundred rubles to the farnily of every deceased worker. A few rveeks
later.
seven hundred workers attended a similar meeti¡g.201 Ma¡age,ne,rt
respo'ded to the food shortage by resolvi'g to create f*to.y ,.kitch1n gar-
den.D202 Theft of tl're potatoes led to a'August l9l9 "ge'eral
meeti'g reso-
lution to assign six men a day to g'ard trre supply, with no ratio's fbr those
rvho refused to stand guard.2o3
workplace democracy extended to the shop revel as rvorkers repeatecily
invoked their right to elect and instantry ..."11 th.i. represelltatives.
For
example, a combined rneetiug of the electrical and cable deþartments
recalled
a comrade sadov as a. essential worker. *we resolve that ihe attitude of the
factory coln¡littee is intolerable and demand an inrmediate response
... the
depart'rent reserves the rigl-rt to both elect ancl recall delegates sent to the
committee' as this is the principle o'which free electio's
6"r.¿."20+
Although workers packed meeti'gs rerated to foocr suppr¡ "rl o'ly about o'e
hundrecl workers cared enough to vote wrre' trre SRs wãn ,h. fá.ror),
.o--
nrittee elecrion in May 1919.205 In luly 1919, Røbkrin ituestigated the
situ_
ation after havi'g received a complaint fiorn three workers. ih. i,.,rp..ro,
fou'd several shops closed due to lack of fuer, a shortage ofskilled workers,
and dissatisfaction arisi'g fì'om the provision crisis. He ão'cluded
that work-
ers in the factory "live no worse tl"ian at other factories, bqt
some individuals
have a atritude towards Soviet power. They take adva'tage ofevery
'egative
opportu'ity
to spread rumors) to write denu'ciatio's, complai'tsl etc.', The
party cell was described as "quire weak" because ,.all the beit party
members
left the factory for different soviet i'stitutions and thè Recl Àrmy.,'Admit-
ting that "there ate llo quick ansrvers to many of the economic ancl political
questions ar-rd this disturbs the workers," he urged Røbkrinand the pàrty,,to
pay very serious attention to the Guzhon Factory.,, 20ó
subseque't meeti'gs convey the se'se of despair prevaili'g clurir-rg the
deteriorating siruarion in rhe srulmer of 1919. A gàneral ,n"eeti.,g ihree
weeks later called ft¡r the strengthening of work disc[rline ancl the
cornbar-
ing of bourgeois "slancler" against trre revolutior-r.20i An August joint meet-
ing of malìagelnel.ìt, the fàctory committee, represe'tativ., fro,i, wsenkhø.
ancl the metalwofkers' uttiott described the bleak situatiol.r
several rveeks later.
Factory procluction was "almost zero" and rnost workers hacl ¡rot returnecl
from the sLlrlrner holiday. of the six h.'dred workers who hacl returnecl,
one'fourth rnele needed for various non-production assignments fbr the
union. The rvorkers i' the bort shop rvere said to ,.do absolutely
ing" aud had'inety
not worked since the spring.2os 'oth-
Food provisio' problems persistecl thro*ghout the civil war, ancl the atti-
tude of workers ofte. depe'cled on the shoi-t-te'n ftrocl supply. In
the wi'-
ter of 1920, provisio's were extremely low a'd the ìvor.kers, mo.d
deterioratecl after the supply of potatoes had fi-oze' a'd romed.20e I'Jar.ruary
1920, Røblerlz responded fàvo.ably to ar appeal to aid the fàctory bakerg
which supplied bread for lnore than fifieen huirclrecl rvorkers, incluclipg huri-
dreds of rvorkers fì'orn neighbor.ing fàctories.2lo In Februarl, Ig20,the
uartv
o lation Revoløtioø ønd. Collectipe Action 69
called an urgent meeting to clarify "the potato situation."2llBecause of the
fuel shortage, sonre workers had collected peat moss and then receivecl flour
as a bonus. The party resolved that llour should not be bartered and could
only be distributed through the factory clerk as con-ìpensation fbr work.2l2
Even after the sustenance situation improved, food was still the main topic itt
many factory meetings. In Septernbe r l92l a general meeting again dis-
cussed "the question of potatoes."2l3
A chronic lack of heat, food shortages, and an unsanitary water supply
affectecl the workers' health. The winter of 1919-1920 brought a devastat-
ing typhoid epidemic. In November 1919, the Moscow Soviet passed mea-
sures to combat the "catastropl'ric situation" caused by the epidernic.2la
Registered absentees caused by illness peaked in Decernber 1919, with 4,208
workdays lost, figures similar to the generai trend in Moscow2r5 Before the
epidernic, about 8 percent of the Metalworks'workforce was listed as sick but
at the end of l9l9 and early 1920,a quarter of all en'rployees were eithel reg-
istered as having missed work because of illuess, or on sick leave.2ló During
the worst period of the typhoid epidemic, wrote one worker, "Tneuty-five
u,orkers died each day and carpenters could not keep up with the demalld fbr
coffius."2l7 "Almost all" the active l(ornsomol rnembership perished fì'om the
typhoid epidemic, according,to another accoullt, inch.rding two leadcrs of-the
,
factory committee.2ls The epidemic created a shor'tage of graveyard space,
but the factory cell asked the district party cornmittee (røihoru) to reli'ain
frorn building: a ceÍnetery near a workers' settlement becausc employees
feared that the "putrid smell of corpses" would r¡-lalce their children sick.2le
Even by the end of December l92l ,the epidemic hac{ lrot completely sub-
sicled, as factory managernent distributed a circular that eucouragecl rvorkers
to bathe in order to combat the most recent typhoid outbreak.22o MoreoveL,
sick workers were unlikely to lìnd comfort in the district hospital. In January
1920, Røbkrin reported that in the district hospital "the wards are colcl and
damp, the patients'sheets in the hospital are changed quite rarely and most
patients have parasites."22l
The workforce was also afflicted rvith influen za and cholera. During the
influenza epidernic in the winter of l9IB, a general fàctory rneeting resolved
to give extraordinary aid of fìr'e hundred rr.rbles to the farnilies of dead work-
ers. In July 19I8, the sanitation commissiou warued workers about the
cholera epidemic in Moscow and recotnmendecl boiling water before drink-
ing."' The increase of sick clays to 9 percent of the workf-orce iu the sutn-
mer of I92l shorvs the effect of another cholera epidemic.223 Only in the
latter months of I921, aÍÌer food ratious hacl been increased, dicl relative
health retunì to the fàctor1,, with less than 5 percent of the workforce reg-
istered as sick.22a
Workers' flight to the countr¡,sicle provides a useful gauge by rvhich to
lrìeasure the hardships they endured. Oue r,vorker recalled the winter of
19lB-1919 as "the gloomy days of cold and hunger.... Many lvorkers, fore-
seeing starvation, begar-r to disperse to their villages."225 Another accouttt
stated that the winter of 1919-1920 was even woÍse. and that "workers were
 :iñ
Rep o ht tion wt. d. Cot.tntcrrep
completely overtaken by starvation."226 Mauagement cornplained in early
1920 tl-rat, "office u'orkers, rvithout authorization, f,lecl the factory because of
sickness, death, s¡ç.>>227 conditions in the factory-illustrared 6y the pen-
chant of workers for votir-rg with their fèet-indicate that the sitgatio¡
regressed throughout l9I8 and 1919, reaching a low point in early 1920.
Factory employment clropped fion-r 2,805 ro 2,169 in lglg and while a
majority of those who left had joinecl the Red Arrny every monrh more
workers lefi than arrivecl, inclucling 220 rvorkers rvho did lìor rerurn from the
summer break in 19t8. The workforce fell to 1,082 workers in l9l9 and
again the largest drop was after the surrmer break, when sl3 workers failed
to return. Employrnent botton-red out in the first half of 1920, and by June
only 772 workers rernained on the books.
worker absenreeism also peaked during early 1920. About I 3 percent of the
workforce was absent during the lasr fòur months of 1919, 14 percent in
1920, and I1.7 percent in 1921. Absenteeism was parricnlarly hþh during
April (34 percenr in 1920,22 percent in t 92 l ) because workers slowty drifte ã
back to the factory after the Easter holiclay. on the Monday after'the Easter
break in 1920,305 rvorkers appeared for work but the maioritv of workers
(373) were absent.228 At the e'd gf April, fàcory nr"nág..ent fra'kly
acknowledged the cause ofabsenteeism and worker flight becauóe ..our facrory
does not issue provisions. This ft¡rces them to fìncl fbod outside the fàctor¡
traveling to other provinces and eaming extra money in dther enterprises.
Therefore, lnallagement rvill institLrte a bonus system for provisions.,,22e
The transitiol-t to tlatural wages proved essential for the f-urther operatioll
of the factory. hi l9I8 and l9l9 rvorkers in Moscow spent three-fourths of
their income on food, but hyperinflation rendered wages almosr worthless.
By late l9l8 almost halfof Moscow workers receivecl-wages in kind, ancl two
years later 93 percent of workers in the city received compensarion for rheir
labor in either fbocl or commodiries.230 in Januâry 1920 rlanagement asked
Wsenhhø for permission to clistribure bonuses in produce.23l
Tl-re Aplil directive to provide bonus pro'isions had an impact. I'June
1920 the tide of rvorker flight was Iìnally sremmed, as more rvorkers arrivecl
in the factory than left. Thus, .u",, n'rá., the direst circulnstances i¡ early
1920, workers l-rad some leverage in negotiating witl-r l-rlallagel1lent, pressur.
ing them ro pro'ide provisio's to alleviate ivorker fligh1. E,nployrne't
increased modestly (by 95) in rhe second half of 1920 and significantly in
l92l-from 867 to 1,459 producrion workers. The fàctory-issued rarioning
affrounts in I92I show a pattem of graclual increase, with rations fbr breacl
doubling between March and December.232
Workers remainecl fàirly apolitical in 1920 as securing ftrod clo¡ri¡ated
almost every aspecr of lifè. In May rwenry workers fì-orn one of the factory's
food detacl-rn-rents complained that the¡, 11¿¿ uot been paicl an average rvork_
ers' wage in eight rnonths. The detachrnent blamed this on the fàctory corn-
rnittee and cler-nandecl that tl're Central War-provisions Bureau pay particr-rlar
attention to the conrrnittee "because ),our families are doonrecl to die of
staLvatiorl."233 Some rvorkers also complained that, ..The r,r,orking class rvas
o lø.tion Revoløtioø ønrl Collective Actcon 7l
boss only in l9I8-1919."234 Distlict party reports fì'om March to Septem-
ber 1920, horvever, repeatedly reported that the mood of the workers in the
factory was "satisfactory." Reports noted "no open anti-Soviet agitation,"
with workers accepting resolutions to raise production. "In geueral, tl-re sit-
uatiorì is calln."235
While the absence of "open Soviet agitation" callnot be read as support
for the regime, a minority sectiorl of the rvorkforce colltinued to display a
sense of civic responsibility, as evidenced by the subbotnik movemerìt of early
1920. Party members were expected to participate in unpaid "voluntary"
Saturday labor (swbbotnile) that was, in fact, compulsory for party rnenbers
but l-rot for nonparty workers. Almost all the participants in Moscow during
the first six months of the campaign were party members, who were ordered
by tlre MK to participate in su.bbotnikl twice a morÌth.23ó During 1919,
Moscow metalworkers contributed a total of ouly 140 working clays to the
movement and the majority of participants were party members.237 The
party reprimanded members who had yet to participate or had participated
only once and resolved to expel members rvho hacl skipped subbotniki
twice.238 By December 1919, however, nonparty participants exceeded party
members thror.rghout Moscow, and in each of the first three rnonths of
I920, over nventy thousand rìonparty rvorkers volunteered.23e The volun-
tary movernent in Moscow peaked on May Day t9l0 when 425,000 work-
ers participated, ancl workers contributecl 4.5 million hours fbr the
rnonth.2a0 The Moscow Metalworks contributed one thòLlsand scven hun:
dred workdays (three hundred by communists) in early I920, most of whicli
came or-r the May Day søbbotnik.zal
The economic catastrophe was r-rot conducive to labor militancy. Workers
organizecl several shop-specific strikes in 1920, though the distinction
between a conscious strike with clearly articulatecl clemancls and employees'
sirnple refusal to work blurred during the Civil War. Factory records show six
one-day strikes in tl-re rolled metal sl-rop and a rveeklong stoppage in the
form-casting shop in 1920.242 A January I92l party discussion shows that
rvorkers simply refised to work, though it is questionable whether such
actions should be characterized as strikes since workers issued no clemands:
there was simply nothing to llegotiate. Lack of fuel meant production fèll
and "rvorkers refuse to work." With no mittens, boots, or q'ork clothes there
was a "collapse of discipline in the factory." One member suggested orga-
nizing a general lneetirìg "to clarily to workers that card playing in the fac-
torjv is not oenlitted."243
îhroughout Moscorv workers used factory tirle and materials to produce
items that tl'rey could sell in exchange fbr food. Such commodities included
stoves) lamps, candlesticks, locks, hatchets, and crowbars.24 An April l92l fac-
tory anuoullcernent complainecl: "It has been repeatedly noticed that in differ-
elÌt parts of the factory, during regular work hours, many u,orkers are occupied
with working fbr themselves, producing for their orvn neecls such iterns as plorvs,
harrow teeth, etc. Such unauthorized behavior is con-rpletely unacceptable."2as
The lnost widespread rnethod of ensuring survival was theft. In November
I9l7.the fàctor1, committee charged one of its members with stealing iron
 72
R n o lation ønd. Coøn terrett oløtion Revolution ønd Collectivc Action /ö
from his depart're't. "He explai'ed that he took the iro' before
the revolu_ The encl of the Civil War encouraged rising expectatious among workers.
tion-question not decided."2a6 Fro¡n the october Revolution until
August
l9l8' the factory discussed the issue of thefi on twe'ty-six separate occasions. In late 1920 and early l92l a strike wave over food provisions eruptecl in 77
percent of all medium and large enterprises in the Soviet lJniou.258 A Cheleø
stolen itenrs i'cluded cable, metal, guns, a'd flour from the fàctory
'ails,
bakery.2aT The factory commirtee
report on the May l92l strike rvave in Moscow reported that workers'
u'a'imoìsly resolvecr to fire a worker for political sentiments had actually improved despite widespread food ancl
having threate'ed a Red Guarcr a'cr for seili'g storen flour
trro*gh a soviet wage cornplaints. Earlier, workers hacl wavered on Soviet rule, but in early
court found him not guilty and orclered the fàclory to reinstall
hiri with back May the mood lvas considered satisfactory, with "no openly counterrevolu-
p^^y'tot In February l9lB, authorities arrested
rhree women fiom the factory tionary agitation." Flowever, "the attitude of workers toward the VKP(b)
for participating i'a'organized ring to sencl nails to their
vittage a,rd after an
investigation, the fàctory commitee voted fifteen to fburteeir [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] is unsatisfactory because of the
to send the low numbers in the Communist cells and the weakness of party work is such
womell to a revolutionary tribur.ral instead of merely firing them.2ae
ardent supporters of the workers' srare appare,-,tiy *.Ã judgecr
The most tlrat workers remain outsicle their sphere of influence .))zse Orle worker
the most account stated that "the factory did not work for almost the entire Íttonth
harshly. A factory cell meeting in Jr.r'e t9ä0 reporied the
subse- of May" and that the mood was boisterous.260 A.nother worker wrote that a
quent Peoples' court convictio' of a lo'g-stauáir',g p".ty "r.."rt "na
nember, who was general meeting dernancled better provisions with "uo difïerence between
sentenced to fìve years' irnprisonlnent for the theft and'sale
of two factory hot anct cold shops."26l Workers won this strike, and ratiouiug atnourlts
shelves' His colnrades deemed the sentence was too severe
for a skillecl rvorker were "leveled" during the summer of 1921.262 Factory recorcls also show
who would "better serve the socialist Republic ar a bench,,
than in prison.25' eighty workers struck frorn l9 to 25 October 192I.263 MI( reports inclicate
Th9ft a'd robbery accou'ted fbr morè than 90 percenr of alr crimes
. cor¡- that the weeklong strike in the forrn-casting departmerlt was raucous. Work-
mitted in Moscow during the civil war.2sr I' Måy r92r, a
ipeaker at the ers started to take iron for themselves aud, wheu Comrnunists seized it,
Fourth Congress of Trade Unions claimecl that workers ¡"á rroi.n
t alf of all "workers hissed at them. In general, workers renrained defiant."29a Des¡ritc
goods produced in the factories; their wages, he
significantry, covered repeated vociferous protests, rations actually ir¡proved over the course of
'oted
o'ly one -lìfth the cost of survivdl.252 A clistrict parry repert o' rhe factory i'
May 1920'oted that "strict ffieasures" hacl been tate' to combat 1921, resulting in a corresponding increase in the number of production
theft, vvorkers frorn 933 to I,412.26s
including changing the làctory committee.253 A party leader
ad¡nitted, ..every Wl'rile the regirne survived the Civil War, Soviet leaclers acknowleclgecl
possible abuse and theft can be observed in thè fàitory."
A jur.re 1920 dis_ that the working class had been transformecl by the dcsperate struggle fbr
cussio' o' the .ail shop calred for "stoppi'g the systematic the
ft of goods survival. Lenin wel-rt so far as to assert that the inclustrial working class "has
from the departme't," and a month råter, a pa_rty nreeti'g
discussecr the ceased to exist as a proletariat." For Lenin it was the "deplorable conditions"
theft of salt. I' December 1920 reporrs .on,pl"irr.â of .,.uiip.ople,,
factory at nighr, a'd the p".ry ...oìome'ded that two cell ,oè-ú..,
i' the that had driven workers to steal, to produce for thenrselves, aud to abandon
sho'ld the factories. Yet this "declassed" proletariat presented a major theoretical
be elected to stand gtard?sa A February r92r party ge'erar'reetirg'otecr
quanclary for Soviet leaders. As Alexander Shliapnikov argued at the Eleventh
that "the theft of nails" contin,,.j.zss'Ùorkers'memoirs also
systen-ratic
Party 6s¡gress in ),922, "Vladimir Il)'ich said yesterday that the proletariat
clescribe the lenient attitude rorvards theft prevale.t
cluri'g the civil war. as a class, in the Marxist sense) does not exist. Permit me to congratulate yor.r
"Not all the workers rvho brought iro' froÅ the factory rvíe evil thieves,,,
he rvrote. "Necessity cornpelled them to steal. They excliapged
on being the vanguard of a non-existing class."2ó6
these articles
with peasa'ts for bread a'd potatoes." A'otrrer accour-lt las also The I9l7 Revolution and the Civil War represellt a single contilìuous
sympa- upheaval. Within the factory, horvever, it is hard to imagine two more dis-
thetic: "The cause rvas hunqer-trrey excha'gecr iro, for peasa't
froao...... similar periods. In the first year of the revolutiou, workers in the Moscorv
we rvere forced to search trrem at the entra'ce.', Artholgh m"'y
worke.s Metalworks approximated the Marxist ideal of a united, irrepressible social
wele s:ry to the People's Court, ,,they wor-rlcl g.t .*o,l"r"t-"
d.,,zs6' force. Employees leamed through conflict with their em¡llo1,çr and grerv
By 192r, fi'es a'd the "shamir.lg" of workùs by posti'g rhei*arnes
fac-tory circulars had ernerged as thãprincipal ,rrethåis
o' confident of their collective power. They strengthened this unity by champi-
of ro cur- oning the cause of less privileged workers, and by supporting workers in
"ã.,r.,pti.,g
tail fàctory the ft, but these tech'iqu", *"rè equally inefÏèctive.
À4".,ig.'',.',, other factories. In the politically charged atmosphere of the late summer aud
in the rlail shop reprimandecl or fiucd sixteen different rvorkers
i¡r December early fall, the Bolsheviks in the Moscorv Metahvorks won the political argu-
l92r for attenrpd'g to steal nails fì'om the factor1,, inclucri'g three who rvere
caught tu'ice in several days. o'e worker rvas caugrrt rvith ment for a Soviet govemment, as they succeeded in doing throughout the
ãfìee. pou'crs of Russian ernpire.
ard was fì'ecl l0 perce't or rris sarar¡ but the ,-,.*t d"y he agai'
'ails
attempted to leave rvork with a cache of ten pouncls ancl rvas While labor militancy persisted into l9lB, the protracted and severe social
finecl 30 percenr and econornic clisintegration renclered any meaningful satisfaction of rvork-
of his monthlv salarr,.257
ers' grievances impossible. A desperate, inclividualistic, at.rd apolitical atmos-
 74 R ev o lwtior¿ øød, Cou.ntarreu oh,øton Ret¡ohúìoø ønrl Collective Action 75

phere permeated fàctory life. Conterrporary accourìts from the Moscorv 20. GAIìF, f. 7952, op. 3, d.275,1. 100. O.G. Ob"cdkov tnetnoir.
Metalworks contradict the defective historiographical representation of a 2r. GAfì.F, f. 7952, <>p. 3, d.271,1. 42. V.N. Ara¡rt>v tnemoir.
"strong state" rvielding its omnipote rìt power against the proletariat.26T Their 22. GAIìF, f. 7952, op.3, d.272,1. 15; d.273,1.9; 'J^.275,1.32.F 8. Golikov, P.N. I{inrrr¡rr¡r',
and S.S. Lcshkc¡r,tsev nrctltt¡irs.
flight to the countryside, their simple refusal ro work, the collapse of labor d 27l,ll.
23. GAIì.F, f. 7952, <tp.3, d. 301, l. 4; d. 256,1. 37; d'.274,1.96; d'.272,1. 68-69;
discipline, ancl the prevalence of rvidespreacl theft all suggest that workers fèlt 223-224; d. 273,1. 4I; d. 275, 1.22. Mcller, M.G. Ob"edkov recollcctit>ns; S.S.
less than terrified by the weakened socialist state. The July l9t9 Røbletin læshkovets, N.I. Igorov, LIa. Bredis, F.I. Karpukhin, P.V. Lavrent'ev tnemoirs.
report noted soberl)¡ that workers in the fàctory lived no worse tha¡ i¡ other ¿+- GARF, f. 7952,op.3,d.276,1. 15. I.F. T<>ptov tneuroir
factories but that shortage of party rnembers was very keenly felt. The most 25. GAI{F, i 7952,<'tp.3,d.271,1. 183. I.M. Belikrov ureurt¡ir.
26. GAIìF, f. 7952,op.3,d..275,1. 54. S.S. Leshkt>vtsev tnetnoir.
ardent believers in tlre revolution volunteered for the war effbrt, ancl the few
27- E.N. Btrrdzlral<rv, "O taktike bol'shevikov v marte-aprile I9l7 goda," Voprosy isturii, 4
cornmunists who remained had neither the resources nor the influence to (1956): 38-5ó; "Eshche o taktike bt¡l'shevikov v marte-aprelc 19I7 goda," Voprosy istoroii,
combat the multitucle of problerns. The rlajority of workers fled to the cou¡r- 8 (195ó): 109-I14.
tryside, while many of those who stayed in Moscorv perished through famine 28. Sotsiøl-Dernohrør, ì6 Mar:ch 19 I7.
and disease. A comprehensive social, political, and econonic catastrophe did 29. llGEA, f. 9597,<>p. l, d. 17,1. 9. M.I. Gil'berg fàctory history citing letter in I{GAMO to
M<¡scou'Soviet, 23 March 1917.
not augur well for rhe socialist vision of an egalitarian society. Moreover, war
30. Trø.d,22 M¿rch 1917.
colnmunisln hacl fiactured the relationship between rhe soviet regime and 3I. Trotsþ', History ¡J' Av55; øn Rev o hrtion, | : 242 -243.
an exhausted, demoralized working class. Was the revolution overl 32- I{GIAgM, f. 498, op. f , d. 303, L l- Factoly annou¡ìccrrlc¡rt,23 March 1917.
33. IìGIAgM, f. 498, op. I, cl. 303, l. l. Factory annour)ccrlÌcnt' 23 Matcll l9l7 '
34. I{GAMO, f. t8ó op. l, cl. 104, lI. 66-67 . Mànàgcnrcrrt lettcr, I May 1917.
35. Vpered., l0 May 1917.
36. llGAMO, f. 186 op. l, d.I04, lI. 66-73. Managemcnt lctter to v¿r'ious Provisionirl Gov-
I May 1917.
crnment offices,
37. RGIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d. 307,1. L Factory ànrrotrrìccn-rcr-ìt, l0 May 1917.
38. GAIìF, f. 7952,op. 3, d.271,1. 43. V.N. Aràpov ¡netlx)ir.
39. IìGAMO, f. 186, op. 3, d. 3, l. 17. Factory enrploytnctrt statistics; GAI{F, f. 7952,o¡t.3,
Notes
d.276, 1.4ó. P.I. T¿r¿sov rnetnoir; IìGAMO, fì 186, op. I, d. 104, l. ó0-ó1. Factory
ånnouncernent, 25 May 1917.
t. Trotskl', Tlte Hixory of the Ru.ssiøn Retolution, I: xvri.
40. I{GAMO, f. l8ó, op. I, d. 104, l. ó0-ó1. Factory ârìtìotrnccment) 25 May lpl/'
2. sn-rith, Rel Petrogrød; Revoløtion i*t tbe Føctories; l{abinowitch, The Bohhcpilu come to
Poweq Mandel, The Petrogrød worl¿ers ønd the Føtl of the old. Regim.e: hrm Febrøøry to the
4t. GARF, f. 7952, <tp.3, d. l9l, l. 4; RGAMO, f.2122, op. l, d. 248,1.92. Factory tliru-
to Prr¡visional Gclvemtnent, I June 1917.
ager letter
Jøly Døys,19.17; Kt>enker, Moscor Worh¿rs ønd. the lglT Repoløtitm.
+2. llGAMO, 1.2L22, op. t, d. 248,1.25. Guzht¡n lettcr to Chairmarr Moscow Fact<>ry Ct>n-
Jolrrr Marot, "Class Conflict, Political Competition ancl Social Tr¿nsfirmr¿tiq¡," Rwo¡.t.-
fèrence, 20 June 1917.
tionøry Rttssiø,7:2 (1994),offers the rnost thorough critique ofthc social hist6ric¿l inter-
pretatitln to date, positing that the deepening ec<¡n<lr¡ic crisis in lìussia is not sufÏcient to îJ. IìGAMO, f. t8ó, op. I, d. 104, 1.62-63. Arbitrator's lcttcr, rr. d.; Moscou'St>viet decision,
explain u4lv u'orkers tnoved t<¡u,¿rds a S<>r,ict solution. F{c argues that the Bolshevik polit-
26 M¡]l, 1917.
ical prt>grarl \\¡às an iDtegràl c()lltporìcltt r>fthe process.
44. IIGIAgM, f . 1076, op. I, d. 19,11.46-48; I{GAMO, f.2122 <>p.l, d.248,11. 98-99. Man-
agelncnt lctter to varior.ts Pt'ovisional Govcrntnent offìccs, 9 lune 19I7.
Och¿rhi istorii Moleopdu¡i otgønizøtsii I?SS, l8B3-1945 (Moscos., 1966),l:364.
( GAIìF, f. ó3, op. 33, r{. 1403, l. 45. Okhran¿ r.eport,9 45. K<rcnkcr ar-rc1 l{<rscnberg, Strihcs ønd Repoht'tion in Røsiø, 1917 (Princetort, 1989), 137-
Janr.rar.y 1917. t42.
6. Figcs,,4 Pa4tle\ Trøged.y, 307 -353.
7. GAllF, f. ó3, op. 33, d. 1403, l. 7l. Okhr¿na rcport, 28 Februar:1, 1917. lleports fì¡r Fcb-
46. GAllF, f. 7952, <t¡'t.3, d. 2f0, L 196-197. Factorl' rìran:lgerìrent to lreacl olMoscou'
policc, 8, 24, May,9 Jurre 19 17.
ruary lìevoltrtir¡n irrc filed in the t>¡ris fìrr l9I3 (33).
GAIìF, f . 7952, t>p. 3, t|. 272,1. l0; t1. 275,1. 54; t1. 272,1. ó4; d. 274,1. 24. F. I. Golikor,, 47. GAllF, f. 40ó, op. 2, d,. 204,1. 9. Ministcr of Intcrnal AfTiirs fì¡r City of Mosco*' to Prince
G.E. Lvov, 17 June 1917.
S. S. Lcshkovtscv; N.I. Igort>v; A.F. Kuznetsov nlenr<¡irs.
9.
GAIìF, f. ó3, o¡r. 3.3, d. 1403, l. 90; Miasnitskii srrrion rcp.rt, 28 Febr.uary I917. 48. GAI{F, f . 7952, oy't. 3, d. 2 10, 11. 208-2L7 . D()cuments t¡f the revolutic>n: ¿rbitr¿tion ses-
10. GAIìF, t.7952, op. 3, d. 274,1.61. N.G. Klrc1rov mcuroir.. sion,24 May 1917, Mr'¡scot,Sovict scssion, 26 May L917.
l. 49- GARF, f. 7952, <'tp.3, d. 210, ll. 254-255 and llGAMO, f. lBó, op. I, d 104, ll 74-75.
t G,{lì.F, t. 7952, op. 3, d. 257, l. 127. pN. Klimar.r<¡v recollccion.
12. l(GIAgM' f' 498, o¡-r. I, d. 305, l. Factory c.¡r'rirtec'rceri'rg, T Marcl't l9l7. The Ì9 June dem¿nd list continuecl rvith specific departtlent issues
l 50. IìGAMO, f. 18ó, op. 3, d. 3, l. 17.
13. Trotsk¡ Historr of the Rt¿ssiøn. Revoløtion,l: t53-205.
I4. GAIìF, f. ó3, op.33, d.1403, 11.54-90. Okhr.¿r.r¿ reporrs,2S Fctrruary l9ì2. 5t. llGAMO, f .2122, op. l, d. 248,11. 23-24. Guzhorr letter to Ch¿iruau Moscou'F¿ctt¡rv
Confèrerrce, 20 June 1917.
Ì 5. Koenker, Moscotv Worhers,99.
I ó. GAI{F, t. 7952, op. 3, d. 272,Il. 66-67 . N.I. lgorov r.nenroir.. 52. IìGAMO, f. 2122, op. l, c-1. 248,11. 23-27. Guzhon lcttcr t<¡ Cheiruran Moscou' Factory
C<rnfèrcrrce. 20 Iune 1917.
I7. ltGlAgM, f. 49B, o¡-r. t, d. 305, l. l. Fact.r.y c.'''irrce r.r.rccting,4 March ì912.
tB. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 271,1.43. V.N. Arapov r.r.rculriL. I{GAMO, f .2122, op. l, d. 248,11.23-27. Guzht¡n letter to Ch¿ritrrrirn Moscou' Factory
Ct>nfèrence, 20 Jnte 1917.
19. l
GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, ci. 2tl, l. Factorl, ¡eç1¡¡¿ on l)ulnir elecir>r-r, l4 Janu:rry lglZ 54. I(GAMO 2122, <tp. l, d.248,1. l7ó. Factory annourìccnlcnt) 22 JLrne 1917.
 76 Rett o httion nnd Clttatcn,e! 0 lutton Revolu.tion ønd Collective Actcon 77

55' RcAMo, f' 186, o¡r' l, cl. I04, 1 64-65.W<rrkers'coumittee letterto executrvc cor¡mir-
105. Tim McDaniel, Aøtocrøcy, Cøpitølism ønd Revoløt'ion in. Røssiø (ßerkele¡ l98B), 390.
tec M<¡scr¡u' Soviet, 28 Jute 1917.
56. GAllF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 271,1.46. V.N. Arapov lrrern<>iL.
l0ó. l,enin. Collected Worhs. 25: 234-241.
I07. K<renker and l{osenberg, Strihes ønd. Rnolwtion in Røssiø,268-275.
57. Russhoeslovq 30 Jr¡ne 1917.
I08. I{GIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d. ó33, ll. ó-7. Managemcnt lettcr 30 May, Arbitrator ruling, ó
58. K<rrn¿kovskii, Zøttocl,serp i Molot' IB\S-1932,g4
59' Prøvd'ø,l3J.ly(fune so),rgrT,citecrin tenin, coil¿ctedworhs,2s:r42-r4s. Iune 1917.
109. IìGIAgM, f. 1076, op. l, d. 19,1.97-99- Arbitrator rcport, ll July 1917.
ó0. Snrith, Rul Petrrgrød, ló8-f71, lg0.
ól Alexander lì.abinowitch, Preludt: to Rei,ohftion: The Petntgrød.
ll0. IìGAMO, f. 18ó, op. l,d. 137, L tó; d. 100, l. 4ó. Mctahv<¡rkels'reports, 1917.
Bohheyihs ønd. the Jfuty l9l7 llI. IIGAMO, f. lBó, op. I, d. 100 11.45-52. Dcmands dated ó October 1917.
Uprising (Rl<xttnin gron, 19 6g), 97 _ 17 6.
ó2. Trotsky, History of the Rt¿ssiøn Ret,oløtion,2: I t3_135.
ll2. I{GIAgM, f. 176, <lp.2, d..7,1. I. Metalvt>rkcls' confìict commission letter, l2 October
1917.
ó3. Tnrtsky, Historl, of the Røssiøn Retolation,2: l2l, I2g.
ó4. K<rerrkcr, Moscon, W¡rhers, 129.
ll3. TsMAlvt, Í.2562, t>p. l, d. 5, ll. ó. llogozhsko-Simonovskii S<>viet, l5 Septenrber 1917.
f f 4. GARF, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 273,1. 37 . P.N. I(ir.n¿n<>v mernoiL.
ó5. Trotsky, History of the Røss/øn Revoløtion,2: L6S
óó. llabirrorvirch, Thc Botshevilu Come to pon,er, Sl.
lf 5. I{GIAgM, f. 498, op. l, cl. 305, ll. l, 2. Factory cornn-tittee rrecting, 22 Jtrly 1917.
67. Rct¡olit¿tsiornoe dpizhenic ,- IIó. I{GAMO,f. l8ó,op. l,d.9ó, l.67;d. 133,ll.7-13. Metahvorkers'rept>rt,n.d.;Metal-
, iiøte rgIT gortø. Iiø.t\hii hrizis (Mosc<. v,I9s9), 106-
l12. MKmceting,T July 1917. ^\:ti s,orkers' report on contributions, January 1918.
ó8. GAllF, f .7952, o¡r. 3, d. 271,1.43. VN. Arapov merxrir.
lI7. ltGIAgM, f.498, op. I, cl. 305, ll. I,2. Factory cornmittec rnecting, n.d. August 1917.
69' Revolitttsionnoe tlvizhenie v Rossi v møc-iiine IglT godø. Iiun,shøiø
ll8. Sotsiøl-Demohrøt, 15 October 1917.
demons¡øts¿tø 119. GAIìF, Ì.7952, op. 3, d. 276,1.67. E.D. Turn¿nov rnemt¡ir. GAI{F, f. 7952,<tp.3, t1.271,
(Moscorv, I959), 38-40.
70' l. 33; V.N. Arapov memoir.
shestoi s"ezd ÃsDRp (ltot'shevikov). Avgrstø lgrzgodø(Mrscou.,
r95B), 5s, 325. I20. I{GIAgM, f. 498, op. I, d. 305, ll. 2-3. Factory couurittee meetings, Septenbcr through
71. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 276,1. 64. E.D. Tum¿nàv merrorr.
Novernber.
72. GAIì.F, f.7952, op. 3, d. 276,1. IS. LF. T<>prov rncn.roir.
73. GAIIF, f.7952, <p. 3, d. 274,1lr.94-5. S.S. Lcsl¡kovtse,r, r¡em<¡ir.
12l. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, d. 209,1.216.I{ed Gu¿rd d:rta in docur¡cnts on tlìc rcvolution, n.d.
74. GAI{F, f.7952, o¡r. 3, ci. 274,1. 62. G.N. Kudrov r.nernoiL.
l22.M.Akun¿ndV.Petr^tiv, 1917g. l,.Monhe(M<>sct>w, 1934), 14ó;GAIìF,t.7952,o¡r,2,ti,
276,1.71', E. D. Turnanor' r'ncmoir
75. GAllF, t.7952, op. 3, cl. 272,11.7l-2. N. Isorov ,rlem,ri..
7ó. GAI{F, f . 7952, r>p. 3, cl. 257, ll. S-g,. Klinra-n<¡v rcuriniscc¡rce.
I23. GAIIF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 276,1. 17.I.F. Toptov rìrclnoir.
77. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 265,1.2g. Kliur¿nt¡v r.cminisccncc.
f24. GARF, f . 7952,op. 3, d. 27 I, ll. 46-52. Memoir of V.N J ALa¡rov.
78. GAI{F, t.7952, op. 3, c1. 274,1.22. A.F. Kuznetsov men.r<>ir..
I25. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 263,1.52. Kochergin rccollcction.
126. G,A.I{F, Í.7952, op. 3, tl. 275,1. l0l. M.G. Ob"edkov mcnroir.
79 t.7952,.p. 3, d. 278,t. 43; d.274,|. 42,62,96. F.I. Karpukhin, pL.
9AlìF, Lavrcnt,er,, 127. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 274, 1.23; d.276,1. 188. A.F. Kuzuctsor,, E.l). 'fut¡atrov
G.N. Kudxx', and V.I. Lebeder, ¡.uemoirs.
mentr¡irs.
80. GAIìF, f . 7956, op. 3, d. 276,1. 16.I.F. T<rpt<>r, r.r.rcrì.ì()¡r..
81. GAtlF, t.7952,op. 3, d. 274,1.62. G.N. Kuclr<¡v r.uernoir.
I28. GAI{F, f .7952, op. 3, d. 374,1.95;276,11.75. V.I. Lcbcdcv anc{ E.D. Tuur¿rrov urc¡noirs.
129. Trusky, History of the Rassiøn Revoløtion, 3: 90.
82. cAllF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 268,l. gB. V.I. Lebeclcv recollccü>n.
130. Koerrkcr, Moscov Worhers, 330.
83. Sotsi øl- D entohr øt, J uly - Augusr I 9 I Z.
I 3l . Trotsk¡ Hisatrl of the Ru.ssiøn. Revolør.tion' 3: 240-275.
!1 T.MAM' f' 2562, op. l, d. 5, ll. ó. ì\ogozhsko-sirnonovskii soviet, l5 scpteurSer 19I7.
85. GAIìF 7952, <tp. Z, d.268,ll. 53-54. E.l). Tt¡m¿nov rec<¡llectír¡n.
132. Rwoliu.tsionøoe dtizhenie p Rossi v sentiøbre 1917 godø (Moscou', 196l); Revoliøtsionttoe
d.vizhenie p Rossi nøhwne ohtiøltr\hogo troorøzhennt¡ql tìlstøniiø. (l-24 ohtiøbriø I9l7 god.ø)
86. Ocherhi istorii Moúoyluti otgøttizøtsii I2SS,2:77.
(Moscow, ì9ó2).
87. Rcyol.itttsionnoø ¡h,iz.henie_y Rossi u ø.rtgaste l9l7 gottø. Røzgrom
hornilnshogo miøtezhø 133. Rabinou,itch, The Bohhevihs Come t0 P¡n'er,29l-292.
(Moscorv, 1959), 379 -BBs
134. Israel Gcltzer, Mørtop:APoliticølBitgrøph1 oføRu.siørt.SociølDetnocrøt(Lonclon, l9ó7),
88. Sotsiøl-Dewohrøt, I I A.ugust l9l Z.
172.
89. Koenker, Moscor Worhers, I24-I2g.
135. Estinratcs of the numbcr of l(cd Guards range fì'orn six thousanci (Koenker, Moscott, Worh-
90. Nicol¿i Sukhan<x,, The Rassiøø Repolu.tion (pr.incct<>n, lg}4),4g4. ers,338) to thirq, thousand. llex Wade, Red. Guørrls Wn hers' Militiøs iu thc Røssiøn. Rev-
91. Iztzestiø, I3 August l9IZ.
o h+ti o n (Stanf<>r d, 19 84 ), 29 6.
92. Sotsiøl-Demolzrøt, 17 August l9l 7.
93. Ti'ad, l3 Augrrst 1917. l3ó. GAI{F, t.7952, op. 2, d. 276,1.71. E.I). Tnman<¡r,r'trcrrroir.
t 37. GAIìF, f . 7952, op. 3, c{. 27 6, l. 19. I.F. Tirpttx' meutt¡ir.
?1 !{GAMO, f. IBó, op. l, d. 9ó, I. I10. Metalrv.r.kers,su*'ary of I2 Augtist strikc. 138. GAÌìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 276,11.73. E.D. Tuuranov nremoir.
95. Tlotsky, Hi¡tory of the Russiøn Reyohnion,2: i60_IgB.
139. IIGEA f.9597, op. l, d. t8, ll. 32-3. Gnzh<¡n fàctory historl'.
9ó. Rabirrrxvitch, The Bolsheviles Cowe to potyer,94_150.
140. GAIìF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 271,11.47-8. Arapov mcmoir.
97. Figes, A Pcojtle\ Tt,ø¿edy,452-455.
98. K<renker, Moscot¡t Wrhers, l3S. 14l. GAllF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 276,L 19.I.F. Toptov nlernoir'.
142. Libcral histt¡riarrs contilrne to ct¡nfìrse this elementarl, ¡-roint about 1917. F<-¡r e.raur¡rlc,
99. Sukhanov, Tbe R u:støn Revohttion, 522_528.
100. Kocnker, Moscorv Worlzerc, 250-251.
Malk Steinberg,in Voices of Revoløtion (Neu' Haven, 2001),56-57. glowingly depicts the
liberals as the "ill-rvious ch<licc filr ¡ror.ver" u'ho supposedly "bclieved in a socicty based tllt
l0l. Sotsiøl-Dcmohrøt, 7 Scptcrnber 19I7.
larv and proper clcmocratic pxrcedure." Stcinberg lirrgely ignoles the libcr¿ls' r.var profi-
ì02. GAI{F, t.7952, op. 3, cl. 27S,ll. Sg-g. S.S. Leshkt¡r,ers nrcrr()u..
I03. ïrny Clitf, Lcnin: All pon,cr to tbo Slpiets,3ì3_.3ì4. tecring, their: repeated efïì¡rts tr¡ th*,art popular clcctions, their enti-Semitisur, as rvell as
104. Lerrirr, Collectnd Wrhs, ll: 359.
their repeatec'l efÌìrrts t<¡ crush the rcvolutiorr.
143. It¡binowitc\, The Bohheli.hs Ctmce to Pouer, xxi.
7B Rn, o lation øn d Coørutett
144. E.H. Carr, Tlte Bokhevih Ravolution l9I7-1923, V¡løme Three (Neu,Y<rrk, 1953), l7-18.
145. Donny Gltrckstein, The Western Soviets Wn'hers'Coøncils Versøs Pørliøtnent |g15-1g20
(k>ndon, 1985), 85, 120-193.
146. lohn lìeese, 1ø Defence of Octoúør (Lr>ndon, lg97), 14.
147. ltMAM,t 176,<>p.2,d'.6,11.4-I5.Factorycomtnitteerreeting,7December;general
lìleeting, 8 Dccember l9l7 (ne$, calendar).
148. llGAMO, f. 18ó, op. l,d. 137,1. 18. Metalu,orkers'list of gricvanccs,23 Novernbcr 1917
(old calendar).
149. ltGIAgM, f. 498, op. l, d. 305; TsMAM,f. 176,.p. 2, d. 6; GAI{F, [.7952,op. 3, d. 2I5;
fàctory cornurittee t)tectiu gs.
150. Vpø,cd,24 l)cccmber (ó January) 1917.
l5l. GAIIF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 212,1.74. Mosc<¡r,r. Soviet tc¡ fàctory committee, 3ì Deccprber
l9l7 (olt{ calendar).
ì52. cAlìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 212,1.90. Manageurenr letter,20 Ianuari, lglg (old calentlar).
153. GAllF, f.7952,op.3,d.215,1.41. Facrorl,ç1¡111.¡1¡¡rcerìrecring,24January lglg (oldcal_
entlar).
154. IìGAMO' f.2122, op. l, d. 236,1.12-3. Suurmary of managerncnt u')eeting, l)ecelnber
19I7 (old calendar).
I55.GAIIF' t.7952, op.3, d. 215,L 42. Factory general ureeting, I February l9I8 (olti
calendar).
l5ó. Smitb, RÊd. Petrlgrø.d, 240-242.
157. Brtrcc Lincoln, Rerl Victory: A History of the Rulsiøn Ciyil Wør 1918.1921(Neg' Y<rrk,
t999), s9.
158. GAIìF, t-.7952, op. 3, cl. 2I5,1.69. Factor¡' ct>mr¡imee rneering, 12(25) March 19Ig.
159. GAI{F, 1 7952' op. 3, d. 215, l.,t0ì, I14. Factory geueral mectings,29 May, 14 June
I9 r8.
ló0. GAIIF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 215,1. 129. Factory committee r)ìectir;g, I I July 1918.
l6I. Kt¡r'nakovskü, Zøt,od .Serp i Molol lBB3-1952, x-xi.
162. GAIìF, 1.7952, op. 3, d. 212,1. I40; Moscou,Area Econonic C<¡murission lettcr, ó lune
19r8.
163. GAI(F, [.7952, op. 3, d. 212,1. 14]. Central metalu.orkers' meeting, 7 Junc 1918.
ló4. GAllF, 1.7952, op. 3, d. 215,1. 140. Factory courmittcc lncering, 24 July 1918.
l ó5. Snrith, R e d. Pctrogrøcl, l5l, 172, 180, 237, 238.
16ó. Lincoln, Red Victory, 187.
167. I{CAMO, f'. 186, op. l, d. f04. 1.99. l{eport <¡f Pavlov fìrr metalrvorkcrs'union,
t9r8.
168. TSMAM, f . 176, <'tp.2.d..99,11. t-13. Factory cornmittce nrcctings, I920.
f
ló9. TsMAM, 176, <>p.2, d.72,11. I-5. Factory mànagerrcnt rnectings, January-May 1920.
170. TsAODÀ4,f.429, op l. dd. 2-4. Factory pàrry meetings, l9l9-1921.
l7l. GAI{F' 1.7952, op. 3, d. 2l5,ll.3-70. Factory conrurittee meetings, Novcmber l9I7
tlrrough March t918.
172. TsMAM, l. 176, <>p.2, d.99. Factoiy cr>r.nr.nitee rrcerings, 1920.
173' tlGAMO, f. lBó, op. f , d. 9ó, l. 129. Moscou' metals't¡rkers' clelegate rìreering, 22 Octo-
ber 1917.
174. TsAODM , f . 429, op. l. dd. 3, 4. party ¡ìrccrings, 1920, 1921.
175. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 312,1.2. Firctory Civil War history.
ì76. TSAODM'f.429, op. l, cl. 3. ll. 3,8, 18,20. Gencral party rìrcctings, l7 Januarv, l4 Feb-
, ruarl',28 April' 12 May 1920. TsMAM, f. 176, op. 2,d. 102,1. ì22. Factory ànnorìrìce-
rncnr, 14 Fcbruary 1921.
177. Mark votr Hagen, Sohliet's in the Prolatøriøn Dictøtorship: 'I'lte Rad. Arwy øttd the Sovict
Sociølist Støte, 1917-1930 (Ithaca, Ny, 1990), 2t-22.
l78. Chase, Wtrhers, Socìety, ønd thc Sotiet Støte,32.
Ì79- GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 273,46. F.l. lGrpukhin mc¡loir. Thc mciur agc olthc parry
lllclllbcrstvlrorcurainetlinthefàctolyu,asthirrv-rhlcc. ISAODM, 1.429,op.1,d.5, 1.2.
Parq, r1.¡sr'ìlb.r.hip clata, Octobcl 192l.
I80. GAIIF, l.7952, op. 3, cl. 290, ó. Factory Kr>r.r.rsomol hisrory.
e t, oløtion Repoløtion. ønd. Collecthe Action
l8Ì. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, d. 275,1. ll7-13I. M.G. Ob"eclkov nlerì'x)ir; d 276,1 20-22;1.F.
Ti)ptov merroir.
182. Clrase, Wrhers, Socàety, ønd the Sottiet Støte,50.
183. TsAODM, f. 3, op. l, d.4, l. ló0. MKdisctrssion on Ì,'ork in t{og<>zhskii district,20 April
I9t8.
184. TsAODM, f.429, op. I, cl. 2, l. 2. Telcgran'r d¿ted 20 fanuary 1919.
185. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, tl. 3,1.32. Factory parrJ¡ rìlcctirìg) t0 July 1920.
18ó. GAllF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 2l2,ll. I77-18I. Managctncnt tnectit.tg, 12 July f918.
187. Clrase, Worhers, Sociely, øørl the Sottiet Støtc, 18-19.
188. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 200, l. 30.
189. GARF, f.7952,op. 3, <1. 3ll,ll. l-4. Factory Civil War histor¡r
190. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 4, l. 5. Par:ty mecting, S Fcbruary 192ì
l9l. GAI{F, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 273,1. L6. P. N. Klirnanov rremoir. Fyodor Gladkov, Cetnent
(Neu,York, 1989).
192. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, ct. 215,1.74. Factt>ry c<>tntlittee rrìeeting,8 (21) March 1918.
193. G,{l{F, n.7952, t4r. 3, d. 212,1. 164. Managetnent tnceting' 29 July 1918.
194. Linc<rln , Red Victory, I84-ì98.
195. D¿vid Fggglesong Awericø's Secret Wør Agøittst Bolshetism., 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill'
1995),87,104. From May to December ì919 alone, the U S. supplicd 5ló'000'000 in
an¡s and othel tr-ràtcriâls to thc White ¿rn.ries.
19ó. Alec Nove, ,4zr Econom.ic History of thc Lï.S.S.R. (Nerv Ytrrk' 1989),37-72.
197. Clrase, Worhers, Sociøty, ønd the Sotict Støte,22-23'
198. GAIìF, 1.7952,op. 3, d. 2I5, ll. ll0, l22.Ftct<try general meetings, S and 30 )rrrre 1918.
f99. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, d. 2L2,l.2.l,cnin rnenror¿nc{Lrrr, I3Atrgust 1918.
200. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 212,1.24. Factory c()rìlrllittcc meurr>rantluur,'24 August 19IB.
201. GAIIF, f.7952,op. 3,.d. 2I3,ll.73,8L Factory generaì ureetings, ó and 22 May 1919.
202. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, d. 213,1.76. Managemcnt rnccting' l5.May 1919.
203. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 2I3, l. lI3. Factorl' general nrcctitrg, I5 Augtrst I9l9
204. GAIìF, f. 7952, op. 3, cl. 213, I. 35. Electric¿l and c¿blc corìÌbincd sho¡rs tnecting, 5
March 1919.
205. GAI{F, f.7952,op. 3, cl. 213,1lr.87-93. Factory gencral rìrcetings' 24 Miry, 12 fune 1919.
This clectic-¡n and Sl{influence during thc Civil War arc c{iscussed in chapter 5.
206. TsMAM, F. 1474, op.7, d. 126,11.45-46.lìabkrin rcport' l2 |uly 1919.
:
207. GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, d. 213, l. lll. Factory gc,)eral meeting, I Augtrst 1919.
ll fuly 208. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 2 13, ll. I ló- ì 20. Cornbinccl màrÌagcrnent and nDion mcctirlg, 20
August 1919.
209. GAIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 257,11. 122. V. Malinin recollectiotl.
210. TsMÄM, f.2791, op. l, d. 4,1.74.ìì.abkrin rcport, l9 ,arrrtâr)¡ 1920.
2I l. TsAODM , f . 429, op. l, d. 3, l. ó. Party tleeting 14 February 1920'
2I2. TsAODM ,f. 429, op. l, d. 3,l. 47. Pirrt¡, ueetiug, 24 Novernber 1920.
213. TsÀ,lAM, f. 176,<>¡:t.2,tl. 102,1. 324. Factt>ry general rnccting, l5 Scptcmber 1921.
2I4. TsMAM, 1.2587, Op. I, d. 102, l. I. Mosc<¡w Sovict executive comutittee, I Noveurbcr
19t9.
215. TsMAM, f. 176, <>p.3, d. 50. Monthll, 1àctor'.v statistics; Chasc, Worhers, Socit:ty' øtt'd the
Soviet Støtø,308. Thc nuutber of dc¿ths pcr thousànd fioru l9lT t<t l92l werc: 23.7,
29.9, 45.6, 36.3,25.5.
2ló. GAIìF, t.7952,op.3,cl. 183,1.47. Monthlyfactot'ysttururaryofàbscntees.
2Ì7. GAllF, 1.7952, op. 3, d^ 273,1. 15. P.N. Klimanov mcuroir.
2I8. GARF, f.7952, op. 3, tl. 290, ó. Factt>r.v Komsouol history.
2 t9. TsAODM, t. 429, op. l, d. 3, 1. 47 . Part.v meeting, 24 November 920. 1
220. TsMAM, f .176,<tp.2,t1. 102,1.483. Factory ârlrlotlllcerì]erlt) 27 Decer¡ber 1921.
221. TsMAM, f.2791,op. l, d- 4, 1.74. lìogozhskt¡-Sirnonovsldi lìabkrin rcport, rar'ìuàry 1920.
222. GAI\F, f .7952, op. 3, d. 215,1.73,133. Factory cottrtnittee meetings, 8 (21) Marclt' l5
Iuly t918.
223. Itl¡tøiø Prøvdø,25 July l92l; GAIìF, f. 7952,<tp.3, d. 183, I. 47. Monthly fàctory stLnr-
mart' of absentees.
 80 Rev o ht ti ot¿ øn d Coønterrey o lation Revohttion øød. Collccthe Action Bì

??1 GARF, t.7952, op. 3, d. tB3,I. 47. Monthly fàcrory sumurar¡, of absenrees. 267. Aves, Wn"hers Agøinst Lcnin: Løbor Protest ønd. the Rolsherih Srøre; Vlaclirnil Brovkiu,
225. GAI\F, 1. 7952, op. 3, d. 257,1. 83. V Malinin r.ccoilecion.
Behind. thc Front Lines of the Ci'ttilWør: Politicøl Pørties ønd. Sociøl Movetnents in Rwssiø,
??9 9AtìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 290,1.7. Famory K<>rnscxlol history. I I I 8- I 922 (Princcton, 1994).
227 ' TsMAM, f' 176, <tp. 2, d. 2,1.5. Manageurent le tter
to metahvorkers, union, I I Decem-
ber 1920.
228. TsM,A"N,l, f. 176, op.2, d. S0;<1. 109. Factory stàtisrics, 1920,lg2l.

??? !AIìF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 72,1. I. Managenreut r¡eering, 29 A¡:tril 1920.

230. Chasc, Worhers, Society, ønd. the Soviet Siøte, 27, 37, A07 .
TsMAM, f- 176, <>¡:t.2, d.77,1. 2. Managemenr meeri,)g, n.d.
?11 January 1920.
]i? !AtìF, t.7952, op. 3, ct. 3l I, Il. l-13. Factory Civil War history.
233. TsMAM, f. 176, op.2, d. l0l, ll. 4-5. Food clerachment
n.,,rú.. g17 28 May
t920. 'reeting,
234. Chase, Workers, Socicty, ønd. the Souiet Støte,87.
235. TsAODM, f-.80,op. 1,d.359, ll.4,t3,14,2t,28,30,38,40,
l.proletarskii pàrrydis_
trict reports, March-Scpterlb cr 1920.
23ó. Clrase, Workers, Society ønd the Sopiet Støte,47.
237. cAl{F 7952, <tp. 3, d. 2BO, t. 57.
238 TsAoDM, f' 429, op. 3, d. 3,r. 4,9. party ge'rerar rneeti'rgs, 24
Jan.arg 2r February
t920.
239 . I(owutøtisticbeshi Th,ød, 9 Mav 1920.
240. l)crvar, Løhour Policy in the USSL, 19l7-1928 (L<>ntlon, t9Só),
ó1.
241. Krrrnakovskii, Zøtod,Serp i. Mohtt' IBBS-1932, l2I.
2-4?
TM M, t'. 176, <>p.2, d. B4,ll. 5-ó. Shop tlays u,t>rkccl, ì920.
243. TsAODM , f . 429, op. I, cl. 4,l,1. l-2. pariy gcneral ,r.,."ti.,g,
26 Jattuary 1921.
244. Chasc, Worhe rs, Society, ønd. the Stviet Støte,19,2,4.
?4! Isl4lM, f. 176,<-tp.2,d. t02,l.
246'-.'MNM,t.
t,73. Factory
"nn.r,-,,.,..,.,r.,.,.,
l8 April t921.
176, <>p.2, d. 6, r. g. Fact<>ry c.rnmi*ec 24 ñove,rrrcr rgrz (ol<t
calenclar). 'ceting,
247' GAIìF' f:!?!2' op' 3, d. 2l5,ll. l-r42. Fact<:ry cc¡¡nnrirree rreerings, November r9r7 r<>
.åugust lylð.
248 GA.ìF, t: 7952,op. 3, d. 2rs, |. BB,l2ó. Factory ct¡rrmi*cc
23 January (ord
calendar),5 July 19I8. 're*i'gs,
249. GAIìF, t.7952 <>p. 3, d. 2lS ll. 54, Sg. Fiìcor)¡ con.¡¡i6ee meetings 10, l4 (old calenclai)
Fcbruary 19I8.
250. TsAODM , t-. 429, op. l, d. 3,11. 22,26. part.v general ureetings,
9, 30 June 1920.
251. Clrase, Wrher5 Socie4,, ønd the Sopiet Støte,2ll
252_. wen¡ssitshii !'ezd' professionarltur¿h soi¡.tzov. stenogrøfi.cbesrzi
otchet (M<tsc<tw, 1922), rr9.
l, c1.. 3S9, l. 14. prolet¿rskii parry disrri* report, 23 í,hy 1920.
253. TSAODM, f. 80, op.
254.TsAODM,f.429,op. I,d.B, ll. 19,26,25,42_4g.partycellnl""tingr,
Z0May,30 lune,
7 Jl/ry, I Decernbcr 1920.
255. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d , l. ó. Factory ¡rartv gcneral rnceting, ló February 1921.
25ó. cAlìF, f.7952, op. 3, -4
ct. 275, l. 142; d. 274, l. 47. M.G. Ob',cclkov, pV. Lavr.ent,ev
ntelnoirs.
257 T'MAM, f' l7ó, o¡'r. 2, d.73,11.459-475; d. I02, 11. 440-480. Facory arr.6ur.rcc'er)rs,
l)ecer¡bcr l92l
258. Chase Worhers, Society, øntl the Soyiet Støte.49.
?5? 9AlìF, f. 393, op. la, t{. 36, ll.257-26g. M,scr¡*,Chek¿ sur.rr.nar.y, l-15 May ì921.
f.7952,op. 3, ct. 3tZ,|. tZ-3. Factor¡, Civil W¿r histor.1,.
?99 fAtlF,
261 . K<rrnak<rv skri, Zøvod ,Scrp i Moht' IBBS- tgL2, lll .

?62 G-{l{F, t.7952, op. 3, d. 3ll, ll. l-13. Factr>ry Civil Wirr histor1,.
2ó3. TsMAM, f. 176,<>pt.2,d. I09,1.29. October l92l statistics.
2ó4' TsAoDM' f 3, o¡r' 2, d- 46,1. r90. MK infirrmati<>r.r sun)mar\¡)
latc october 192r.
265 GAI{F' t.7952, op 3, cr, zr2,r. r2-r3. Factory civil war histiry. TsGIAgM,
r. 176, <.tp.
2, cI. 107. Monthlv empl<>yntenr statistics.
2óó. Lcrrin, collected. worhs,38: 6s; 82: r99,4rr . orlitmøtsøtii
s,'ezrl RI(p(lt) (Moscori,, r93ó),
I09.

a
J force reached only ó0 percent of its t9l2 level by 1926,though the metal
Crass CoNrT,rcr DURING Ttrn Nsw
EcoNoMrc Por-rcy
"The trnst adrninistr¿rtion c-lrive around in automobilbs, u4rile cuttins
costs is done
on the b¿cks ofu,orkers. Thcy trick and screvv th" peas"ntl
add this is u'h:rt is called tl.te sruych;hø..,,
Hamrher ancl Sickle represeutativc at ir tlistricr torkers'
- Congress, expressed the logic underlying tlìe new policy: "ottly att agree-
conference, April 1926
The ascendancy of the Stalinist systelì' is rooted in the qualitative char.rge in
worker-srare relario's during the New Economic policy (NEp). while inili-
tant strikes prolifèrated at the beginning of the era, by late NÊp they rvere
largely all evenr of the past. So secure were soviet leaclérs of their positio'
in
1928 that rhe regime embarked orì a program of clraco'ia. *"g..i,, to help
pay for rapid industrialization during the First Five-year pla-n-a srraregy
that_ hinged otr a speculative assessmellt that the forrnerly militant Soviet
working class had been transft¡rmed into a relatively docile social force. But
if thcir calculations were coruect, how had the staie
to tame the
most uuruly proletariat of the nventieth centr-rryl 'ra'aged
Historians rvorking within the narrow pararnerers of cold war-clriven
historiography have responded to this qLlestion by assertir-rg either o'er-
whelming state repression or voluntary working-ilass icle¡tlficatio¡ witl-r
stali'ism.l E.H. carr and R.w. Da'ies put fbrrwárd a. alter'ative. i'stitu-
tional argurnent, ernphasizing the "nneasy conrpromise " betweeu rrcl man-
agers and unions that helped avert industrial unrest.2 wliile the collrroversy
over the central il.rterpretive question in Soviet rvorking-class history
persists, the decline in workers' participatio' in strike actioirs is no
lo'gei.
disputable. Strikes shified fiom primarily o¡1¿urtu. clemands over \vage
increases i' early NEP to more defensi'e actio's (agair-rst wage cuts)
by its
conclusio'. work stoppages graclually became rnuch shorter. Ãrelv i'volved
more than a single fàctor¡ and often were limitecl to spccific departrnents.
The proportio' of rvorkers parricipati'g in work rtopp"g., clecli'ecl to
Notes for this section begin on page I l l.
Cløss Conflict 83
about 3 percent of the Soviet labor force during any single year betweeu
L925 and 1928.3
The fàctory's den-rographic and econornic recovery afier the Civil War
was similar to that of other high-priority rnetal plants in the city, but also
illustrative of the limits of industrial recovery. Moscow's industrial work-
industry expanded disproportionately with tl-re number of metalworkers
(40,000) approximately double that of 1918.4 The number of Hammer and
Sickle production workers increased from l,4l2 in l92l to 2,200 by the
endof 1922 and two years later exceeded (3,600) the total before the war.s
More rvorkers were added in 1925, but 1926 was the first year since the
Civil War in which the number of rvorkers declined, from 4,501 to 4,334.6
Several shops addecl a second shifì, and, at the end of NEP, the factory
ernployed 5,000 production workers.T The fàctory's production increases
were even more substantial, increasing fiom 4 percent of the prewar fìgure
in l92l to 74.5 percent in the 1925-1926 fiscal year, matching the prewar
level clr.rring 1926-1927, and exceecling it by B percent during the last year
of NEP.8
After seven devastating years of war, NEP was conceived initially as a tertl-
porary compromise that would permit private trade iu an attelnpt to restore
exchange relations between towu and coulltry. Leuiu, at the Tenth Party
ment with the peasantry can save the socialist revoluÉiou in l{ussia ullti{ the
revolution has occurred in other countries."e From the perspective oltlabor,
NEP rvas inherently contradictory. On the one hattd, the Soviet state lllall-
datecl that state enterprises "work without losses" aud wage increascs could
"only be the result of higher productivity."l0 Iìactory mallagers wer€ respoll-
sible to overseeing trusts, and in critical respects this profit and loss account-
ing system (khozrøschet) meant that they wel'e conlpellecl to oPerate under
terms sirnilar to private capitalist businesses.ll At the same time, however, the
Soviet state instituted legislation very different fronr that of its western coun-
terparts. The November 1922 Labor Code stipulated that wages would be
negotiatecl through collective agreements betwecn the trusts and unions in
which rvorkers would have a voice and the right to ratiô/ the contracts. The
Rates Conflict Conunissions (RIQ(), composed of mauagement and u'orkers
on an equal basis, u'ould handle llorÌcontract clisputes; work rvould be lim-
ited to eight hours (six hours ftrr youth); overtinÌe work woulcl be compen-
sated at 150 percent; and womell rvould receive sixteen weeks'paid
maternity leave.t2 Such legislation did not gLraralìtee its implementatiol't-
the fundamental tensiot.l betwcen the pursuit of economic efficiency and the
defense of rvorkers' rights and iuterests woulcl be revealed during the course
of the 1920s. Here we attempt to unravel the complexities of NEP labor pol-
itics by examining the transfbrmatiorl of workplace institutions and class
conf'lict.
 R ey o ht tion ø¡z d, Coøn t¿rret, o løtion. Cløss Conflict

Workplace fnternationalism conscious enough to take power into their orvn hands and smash the House

Soviet labor policy canltot be analyzecl in isolation fi'om its intemational

fof Parliament]l This is not correct." A second was concerlled about the
con- technicalities of an iusurrection: "Comrade speaker, please tell us, what kind
text. The Bolsheviks Ìroped, with some justification, that the
meager marer- of guns do the English rvorkers havel" A,nother rvorker asked, "Comracle
ial and technological resources available rvithin the borders of it
e ussR Tomsky, if Russian workers in the year '18 had such cliscipline as the English
would be a*grne'ted by a successfìrl workers, revolutio' i' Europe
and that workers, could rve have won the revolutionf "2l
the coming to.power of workers' governnìents vi,ourd relieve the
àeprivatio' Many notes expressed exasperation over the role of the British uade union
faci'g the Russian working class. But sever years of rvar and civil rvar
left leaders. One asked: "Comrade Tomsky, tell us, if the General Council leaders
soviet society devastated, i' rn'ch worse shape than in r917. Three
milrion betrayecl the workers, then why clicl the workers not take the verrnin-traitors
soldier-s had died in battle or fì'om wounds or clisease, and
another thirtee¡ out of the General Council and put workers in their placel" Another asked,
million civilia¡rs perished prematurely from fàrni'e oi.epidemic. Industrial
"Comrade speaker, please tell us why the English Cour-lcil were such corvards
p_roduction flom large-scale i'dustry fell to l3 percert
of the p.er""r le'el.13 and sent the rvorkers baék to work." One note suggested, "Comrade speaker,
Yet solidarity fclr intemational causes remained an inrportan,
,.rr., of Bol_ I think that English workers live u,ell in that they poorly support their strike'
shevik policy. The growth of communist parties throughout E.rope
'rassive They need our heart and resolve." Many workers were dumbstruck by the
and the Germa'revolt of 1923 ofÌèred the Revolutio'a glimrier of hopeì' General Couucil's refusal to accePt Soviet support. One worker wauted to
an otherwise desperate predicament
know: "Why did not they accept or.rr financial help and who are they in the
During the 1923 Germa' Revoh.rtio', womeu i. the factory lecl a
shor-t- Ge¡eral Council, and who elected thern, workers or English capitalistsf "22
lived campaig'to aid the chirdre'of German workers.la TherËafter,
factory The soliclarity campaigns also introduced a subvcrsive fàctor into th,e
leaders aftempted to build au ongoing international soliclarity
organizatio¡, worker-state dialogue by encouraging employees to ask comparative ques-
but the IuternationalAid Socieq; ftrr Revolutio¡ary Fighter,
lfr4O"frt¡ was in tions about Soviet society. One worker cornplained that rvhile the speaker
reality a paper i'stitution, with activities orga'ized by a hàndful
of party "talked beautifully and splendidly about these English leaders;" he neglected
menrbers. Mørtenouhø reporteci that rrooriga's regurariy tore
dorvn MopR to mention "our ragarnuffin Soviet leaders who àre worried about u,orkers
posrers ancl exl-ribits, and rhar the o'ly active r¡einb.ri
1of the supposedly there, but do not have the sane worries about our Soviet workers.l'23
1,550) were the leacfersi'several shops.t5 Two years rater, shop
readers com- Numerous qlrestiolls referred to comparative living standards. One u'orker
plai'ed rhar members had- paid their dues ancl that thË organization asked, "Comracle Tornsky you said that English workers live poorl¡ but we
remained "only on paper."l6'ot
do not see how llussian rvorkers can live on fiftry-fivc rubles," ar-rd asked why
The failure to build a'ongoing soridarity organizario', however,
did not British rvorkers "did not help revolutionary workers when they were huu-
accurately reflect workers'willingness to contriLute to international
car.rses. gry." A,¡other asked, "Comrade M.I. IGlinin, please tell us how it is possible
workers donated a remarkable 26,662 rubles i' supporr of the L926
British for six people to live at the fifth wage and skill grade when they receive ouly
ge'eral strike.lz Incidents involving resistance to ti-r. campaig' were
rare, fifty-six rubles, fifiy-three kopecksì"2a At a party meetillg' oue member
suggesting that contributions were voluntary.ts As the Unified -State politicaí
askecl, "Can you tell us, how is it on the one l-rand you put anarchists in jail,
Admi'istration (OGPU) reported i' regaid to solidarity rvith the British
while at the salne tin-re that our uuiol-t conducted protests against the execu-
general strike, "workers' syrnpathetic attitucle is expresied
in clecluctions tion of [American anarchists] Sacco aucl Vanzettil"25
often exceedi'g (at the initiati'e ofu,orkers themselves) ,orms establishecl
by Soviet serbacks in the intemational arena l-rad prof-ound ramifications
the All-Uniorl Cenrral Trade Union Council (VTsSÞS¡."re Thns,
despite dornestically. ln December 1926 the Politburo passed a "policy of agree-
i'credible poverry co'rpared witrr those workers that they u,ere supporti'g,
menr" resolution that called fbr cooperation with industrialized coutrtries,
i'ternationalism rel'ained a pou,erfirl cLrrrent i' proletarian ranks. believing that securing of credit fì'om abroad was a prerequisite ttrr future
I'arge mass ¡rreetings ol-r i¡lternatior-ral issues illistrate
the voluntary ¡arure economic growth. But many Westeru leaders rebuked the Soviet policy of
of^ the carnpaign. ce'tral comurittee ielini' spoke at rhe t'r,o seeking financial aid rvhile the Con-rintern simultaueously intervened in affairs
largest meeti'gs itt l92s a'd r92ó (2,200 'rember
ar"rcr 2,000 respectivery), rvrrich of other states. In ly'ray 1927, the British conservative governme nt cancelled
included reports on both the iuternational ancl internal ^soviet
situatio.. the Anglo-Soviet tracte agreemeltt, and uegotiations with France, Yugoslavia,
Thre e other 192ó i'rer'atio.al solidarity meeti'gs all
drerv crorvcls of 1,200 and Czechoslovakia were likewise soon halted.2ó Toru betweeu tl-re hope that
or more.20 Questions allcl_cor-nments tospeakers-cluring the British general
workers' revolutious would come to their aid and a more accommodating
strike co'vey the rvorkers' kee u'dersta'di'g of soliãaritg but
' also their approach that sought financial assistance from fbreign capitalists, the Soviet
utter incompre hension of the refbrr.nist logic of westel.r-r sócial denrocracy, regirne received neither.
which allorved the capitalist s)¡stem to ..,-,.,"i,-, it-ttâct. Several workers
cleariy A full decade after the soviets hacl assumed Power in 1917, the revollrtion
thougl-rt in revolutionary te nl'rs: one askecl Kalir-rin, ,.why rvere
not rvorkers rvas left to its owt-r internal resources to build "socialism in one couutry." This
 i
:-!

R ct, o løti ot¿ ønd. Coønterrey o løtion Cløss Conflict 87

isolatio' dampened workers' enrhusiasm for internatio'al solidarity contri-
Moscorv and district Soviets indicates that at least half the party's proposed
butio's, which came ro be viewed as simpry anorher tax imposed from above
canclidates were "against the communists."3T
on rank-a.rd-file members. After the murder of the Soviet ambassador i'
Productivity was not yet the clriving imperative in the party that it would
Warsaw in 1927, "the mood of workers in connection with international
become several years later. Thus, in June 1924, the party bureau stated that
relatio's" took a turn for the worse, a.d eve' some party members ,,had the rvork in many areas was being carried out poorly but that the work in the
become corvards."27 Fo¡ the more politicaily soprristicat.d *o.k..r, however, areas of production (and soviets) was "particularly bad."38 In a nail shop dis-
the soviet L]nion's isolation was not just a mere illcon'e'ience-the very
cussion held in the midst of a work stoppage, the speaker attributed the strike
hope of the revolution rested on the prospects of international socialisrn.
to "the lack of discipline of certain wavering conrrades and party disorganiza-
soviet leaders' exaggeratio's abour the stie'gth of the Europe workers,
tion in the shop."3e In September 1924, the party sided with employees'
movenÌent ultimately contributed to the demoralization of the wãrking
class. demands, resolving in a fàctory plenum that in conjr,rnction with the rise in ,i.l.¡'.t',..l
o'e worker challe'ged commissar of Labor schmidt's attenìpr to pur a pos- productivity, "it is necessary for u,age-rates not be lowered but inrprovecl."a0 .l
itive face on international events: "The results as you can see are bád.
Every_ Melnbers continuecl to clisplay a high level ol commirment. In January
thing is co'ring out badly. we are defèated everywhere and by everyoue. 1923, only tweuty oieighty party members were without assignments, yet
Obviously you are not ftrllowing events well enough."2s
the party bureau resolved to call a factory plenurn to distribute the work
rnore evenly. The following month, the cell expelled several rnembers for dis-
playing a "passive attitnde" and nonpayment of mernbership dues. After this
The Transformarion of the parry during NEp miui-purge, sixty members, candidates, and sympathizers participated in a
political education course.4l
The fàctory party organizatio' crra'gecl rroth qua'titatively'a.d quarita-
This high level of participation conrrasrs markeclly with the low party com-
tively during NEP. Frorn just 60 highly commitred members in r92r.
the mitrnent after the Lenin Levy-the rnass worker recruitment campaign that
parry grew to 240 three years larer, and to b9o by November
1926. This follorved in the rnonths after Lenin's death in January 1924. Several nronths
rapid growth reflected a partial liealing of the rift betweçn workers
and the afier the new membership can'rpaign, party leaders expressed conccL¡ls about
state that had developed duri'g the civil war. By 1927, rtowever,
rhe many of the raw recruits and they vowed to expel thè worst offì:nders'fbr
party's increasingly productivist and undemocratic policies macle it
difficult "ttoncorrrnunist behavior" that included failurc to attcud lueetiugs, uonpay-
to recruit workers, su¡! dropped to 60s.2s Me'rbership lnent of dues, and being so detachecl from the palty as to lrc unablc to lì¿ìlre
grew margi'ally i' 1928 ¡h1t 'rembership
by lowering the standards fbr those who joi'ed, by their shop organizer.az The purge was consistent rvith a party clirective to rid
allowing members ro sray on rhe mernbership list eve' if they íefused
to the cell of I2 percent of "worthless elernents."43
pay dues or attend meeti'gs, a.d rry refusi'g menlbers' ..quår,,
to leave Party leaders faced the dual task of attempting to integrarc raw lecluits
the party.30
whose attitudes mirrored those of the workers they were expected to disci-
During early NEP, the- party repeatecily lert its authority to ernproyees,
pline, and breakir-rg the sympathetic attitucles of long-standing mernbers
grievances. In March 1922, a nonrnember wanted to know ,iwhy
the cell clid who identified rvith the egalitarian ideals of the 1917. Even some parry
not pay more attelÌtion to the conflict in fonn-casting shop),,3t iwo mo¡ths
leaders rvere unentltusiastic about their role as shop-floor disciplinarians. In
later, parr1, leaclers sided rvith workers' cornprai'ts-ovei provisio' prices,
early 1924, a district party spokeslnan blamecl factory leaders who had
resolving that, "together with workers rve clemand fhll compe¡satiol
at rnar- knowr about a recent strike in the fàctory "but dicl nothing to head it
ket rates."32 I' JLure 1922, after rvorkers' co'rplai'ts of form-casti'g
shop ofï.'aa While economic "tailisrn" (supporting workers' grievances uncriti-
management rudeness, the party bureau rnandated that .,incorrect
activity by cally) was always a party concenl) the majority of the cell supportecl a strike
the administration should be stopped."3a I' response to a March
1923 co¡.t- action in April1924. A fäctory leacler scolcled nrembers in a closed session:
flict i' the repair shop, the party bureau agai' sided with workers, calli'g
for "Our task is to elirninate capitalism yet in such a difficulr year we have a
"clarification olt the distribution of fundifbr rvorkers, pay.u34 Even the fàc_
strike.... We rely on the organization to lead the masses, but ir-rsteacl it is the
tory director expressecl syrnpathy for trre eco'o'ric piigrrt of rvorkers. In
other way around."45
resporlse to a ce'tral cornmittee (TsI() questioli aboui wages,
he stated, Rank-and-file rvorkers noticed the shift in par:ty policy away fi'orn labor
"wages are too low fòr'recliu'r qualifìcatio'workers or offiõ perso,r'el
to advocacy. In September 1925, "after the lowering of wage-rates" in the
survive rolerably."35 similarly, tl-re party bureau ack'orvleclgecl that
the May rolled metal shop "workers began to exhi[rit a more careless attitude towards
1923 strike rvave had erupted o'er "an excessi'e increase i' work,orms,,
their obligations." hr this early phase of the procluctivist turn, part)¡ activists
that it considered "a nlistake."3ó The party also recourmendecl nonparty
acknowledged ger-reral "displcasure an-rorlg workers that the cell supportecl
rvorkers to the soviets) eveu if rhey were irostile ro regine policy.
Arg2z fac- this wage reduction" though the moocl of the workers "is not so hostile
tory comlt'tirree discussion on the part)/,s proposed list oi-canclidates to
the towarcls Soviet powet'and the part)/.')4ó Significantll', workers in t925 still

,.,:: i
.'jr':J
i.åÈ
 i

88
Rep o lation dn d Clu.Ttterreu 0 httron Cløss Corflict
expeffed the party to respond sympathetically to
,n.t. delna'ds a'cl were s*r- aclvantage in the shops, something that, he argued, "shoulcl not be a fàctor
p'ised by its rew wage-cutti'g polìcies that woulcr
srrortry beco're the in procluction."54 Some members increasingly viewed the party organizatiou
Party members repeatecily i'dulged i' econolnic ..tairisnr.,, 'o'n.
r' Ja''ary as a source of privilege and assumed that the tightening of discipline advo-
1926, the Norm setti'g Bureau (TñB) orde recr
piece ."t., in the bolt cated by management applied first and foremost to nonparty rvorkers. A bolt
shop' "workers became agitated and iega' sayi'g 'ew that they
rvere bei'g shop report admitted a certain "dissatisfaction of nonparty workers towards
srvi'dled," and the shop party bureau passed a ieso]utior-,
co'dem'i'g the the cell, mainly about making better work available to cell members,"55
TNB position as "ittcorrect" and calling for a discussio'
of the issue i' a By 1927, the formal tasks of party membership were clear, yet the party
general factory ple'um.az steer foundry irernbers
comprai'ed tÀat trre shop was hardly a smoothly operating productivist rnachine. In April, the rolled
m.allager repeatedly calne to rvork drunk and
shouted pì'ofanities ar workers. metal shop reported "cases of tailism and members falling subject to the
They brought the issue ro rhe uns¡,r¡p¿thetic factory
rvho respo'ded that "e'gineers like Tiàv are
d;.;;;, Stepa¡ov, mood of nonparty workers."5ó A November report claimed that the major-
difficurt to fìnd.,'At a'other ity carriecl out the party line in meetings, bLrt again noted "tailism" in plac-
meetiug, a menber complained "the director
o¡ly neecls us w¡en he rva'ts ing shop interests above those of the factory and complainecl that merlbers
to implement sorne caurpaign." He rvent o,, ,o
th"t, ;*;*Oministra_ encouraged nonparty members to raise questions about pay. Moreover, many
".i,.,.
tion acts as if it is the master a'd the parry and the
tracre u'ion remain ro trre
side."48 An architecturar shop nr.,r",b", ,i.r.d members had only a superfìcial grasp of the problems facir-rg the party; their
*i,h nonp".if *àrr.ers, se'ri_ r-rollparty counterparts rvere frequently stronger than party members in dis-
ments against his comrades in the fàctory committee
electio': ..I think cussions; ancl too many mernbers seemed to fee I "little responsilrility for tasks
workers were correct to have rejected certain comrades
in the,reelectio' to assigned to thern."57
the fàctory colnrlitre.e. because the factory committee
is crosery fused rvith The conversion of the factory party organization into an institutiorr that
the admiuistratioll.,' 4e
il-' The changi'g derìnitio' ofparty membership arso would impose economic concessions and discipline the nonparty rvorklòrce
t rerateóto the campaign confused and demoralized rnany members. In Scptember 1927, tlre repair
against the united oppositiou aná the
[, instill .,iron discipri.e.,, I', shop cell was in shambles. 'tThe ideological situation in our cell is lrad. "fhere
practice this ¡nea't attempting tò transform "tt.-þito
the me'rberrhÞ
-irra"
a passive are incidents of drunken communists. Workers torrnel'lt comnrunists and their
F. body that would dudfuily imprerne't the freque'tty
changini ce'tral co¡n- activiry but they remain silent. We have no group or individual agitation."
I

mittee directives. Diverge't opinion i'srropìeils

t i"", rir,äiiyìàìea while, Lamenting the dearth of discipline and political courmitrneut among party
invariably, parry-spollsored resolutio's carried
[' orr"ni,rourli. i,, o.tou., members, the shop leaders rebuked the actions of two recent recruits who
1926, rhe cooperative party leaclers repri¡ra¡cled
a member who l-racl voted in
L favor of the "regime eco'omy" but trien "entered the party but are against all our ideas arrd everything we desirc."58
f "i' the general op.,rrr.*ì,rg of the Before ascending Stalinisrn became strol-rg enough to extinguish opeu
cell he spoke against this rvork.')50 The same mã'th,
I the steer founctry cell opir-rion outside its ranks, many workers werc unwilling to exchauge fì'ee
expelled fìve members for faìling ro carry out parry
i decisions, fàili'g ro pay speech for membership in an organization they clid not respect. In June
d.ues' and drinking excessively, cãstigatin!
o,-r. of th.- ø. Çp."i.ary criti-
cizing the clecrees of soviet power uÃo,-rg-no'rparty 1928, the newspaper printed u'orkers' explauatious as to "Why We Are
I rvorkers.,,5l rJncrer grorv- Nonparty." One rvorker complained that the cell in his shop discussed only
I i'g pressure to police the workforc., .r,J-, the most loyal mernbers
! co'veyed mandated work and that "we do not walÌt to vote for what has been prede-
ì a sellse of anxiety as the close-k'it factory regime
I nioved away fio'r their terrnined." Another complained that "iustead of explaining things" party
orvn rank-and-file ideals of socialism. Onå wðrker
i
complainecl, Jco_r"d" members "woulcl rather curse you out," while yet another letter protested
I(alinin, please tell us, is the view frorn above o'e
of corlilete bJreaucratis'r that after losing argurnents il-ì the nail shop, the cell secretary resorted to
and not coustructi'g socialismf we are seeing
i fiorn below, .o,o- smearing his opponents for having "white-guard viels." Otre worker u,rote
plete bureaucratism but there is nothing *.ì"'r "atu.-pì"..,
cro because they are ail very
i
closely tied to each other. so we wilr eitier have that although "comlnunists are supposed to be litelate," a member held the
ì
¡ ro srarr over again buildi'g meetir-rg agenda upside dorvn "and the workers laugh."5e
socialism or erect barricades.,'s2
The shop-floor mernberslrip rvas iu s*ch a state Evidence suggests that the nerv breed of ardent party hacks came frotn
of co'fusion over its nerv among the n'rost politically backrvard workers. A fbrmer tnember, Kruglova,
roÌe drat the fàctory director u,as ft¡rcecr to adcrress
a closed factory party expressed the concems of many rvorkers repulscd by the dramatic decline ir-r
I rneeting at the end of 1926. "yl'ty rra'e spoke'our
rrere agaiust trre adrni.- the cell's membership standards: "Is the party a correctional institutionl Why
I
istration and, of course , I am,oblig_.a to .erpon.l
to this question,,, Stepa¡ov do they accept all kinds of garbage and keep those rvho do nasty thingsl Is
told them. "Two years ago discipli'. rn", å*tr"-ery
rveák. The factory a'cl this lvhat Lenin willedì" One letter stated that members were "supposed to
i
shop ad'-ri'ist'atio' rrave take' åppropriate rreasLlres
rvhich cause a certai' be the leadership of the working class, but unftrrtunately, the majority of the
I
dissatisfàctio' which rr.as y"t-áirsiþ"t"a."53 signifi;;;;ly,iõlou
noted rhat party 'or "lro
so'reti'res "r-rtilized ,r-,.i. p"r,y"áardsi, fòr their
tirne this is not tl-re case." Another rvorker protested that one metnber
'.rembers "sDorrts such nonsense that one is embarrassed for him." So strong was cor-
 90 Rey o húion øn
d Coan tcrrcy o løtion
rupdon a'd privilege alnollg party members that cluri'g a bolt shop recruit-
me't sessio', o'e worker explair-red: "I will not enter the Þarty because com-
nrurrists are embezzlers and ¡hisvs5."60 In July 192g, eighty-two .onparry
øl¿tiy those worke rs theoretically the closest to tl.re p"rÇn,.t
to dis.uss
party growrh and "self-criticisur', (sørnohritihø) but several speakers spoke
a.bout the party organization. i' u'flatteri'g terms. o'e speakår
cornplair-red
that lnembers were arrogant because they ,,do not take aclvice fro'r
'onparry
workers.... Parry rnembers have a bad comradely attitucle i' the shop."
À4a'y
former members complained they had been ,,burnt,,' and one warned nor-r-
party workers: "No, do not erìter) even if this is what yon want."óÌ
The 1928 sørnol¿ritihø carnpaig' co'stituted a preempti'e artempt by the
evolving bureaucracy to ma'ipulate rvorker grieva'ces ib, it, o*n-, purposes
and a tacit admissiou that the party was becorri'g discredited amo'g
nol.r-
qarty workers. I'April, the head of the central co'trol commissio',
v.p.
Zatonskii, candidly acknorvledged the ma'ipulative nat.re of the carnpaign
whe' he argued that it was necessary to "iomervhat release the pullêd-up
reins" a'cl to "let the workers have the possibility of.criticizing trsi, becausè
"it would be much better to do so llow,, than latei, when rvorkeT.s started tak_
ing action otl their oltt.ó2 The literal recorcl of rvorkers'comlllents ancl
the
i'creasirg coutempt for the partr illustratecl in a growi'g refusal to e'ter irs
ranks, attest to the fàilure of the campaign. Mør,tenouhøadnittecl
that the
"bad behavior of cerrai' comracles" contributed to rvorkers' ..u'healthy atti-
tude" toward the party. Among rvorkers there was a ..distrust of sørnol¿ritileø,,
aud a "clear anti-party mood resulting from inte'sificatio' of the
worki'g
day and the politics in the countrysids."oa
The party had become so cliscredited a'd clesperare ftrr members i' l92g
that ir repeatedly reftlsed to gra'r permissio' to melnbers who appried to
leave its ranks. Trvo members i. the repair shop requested expulsio.r,
but
both were "refused alrd remain in the party.',óa Fôur rollecl metai sh'p rlern_
bers refused ro pay their dues debt ancl l'demanded that they be
expeiled
from the parry."ó5 A shop mernber cleclared at his seco'cl appe"l to lea'e
'ailnot keep r.e i'
the party thar,"you rvill the parry by fþ¡çs.,:60 ico'struction
.,i'sread
¡-r"iry ,".."t"r¡
shop member's petition clairrred that the of explai'-
i'g thi'gs calls you a bastard a'd a parasite.i'óz A,' elåctrical sl-rop
requesting expulsion explained rhat "rny viervs are very diffèrent åncl 'rernber
I have
not paid me mbership d*es in a long time. I canuot and will not rvork i' the
party." At the same session, another member statecl, ..I have not paicl
mer.r.r-
bership dues fbr two years. Exper fi'om the party.'ós No.,payrnà,rt of dues
apparently becarne such a widespread 're exit strategy
i' the constructio' shop
that the party bureau suggested "cancelir.rg the debt', of five members u,ho
had rrot paid dues fbr three ro fòurteen moirths.óe In
]anuar1, 1929, the party
finally expelled two members in the rollecl rnetal shop u,ho had neitt-,eipaid
mernbership dues nor attended a single meeting in two
),ears.z0
The transfbrnration of the fàctory party e¡g"r-r¡zation was astouucling.
During rlre "open door" recruirmert strategy ár Dz+-tgz6, hu'dreds of
workers had e'terecl the party because trrey icle'tifìecl with its icleals,
but by
the end of NEP, the factory organization vvas forced to aclopt a ..closecl
cloor,,
9r
Cløss Conflict
strategy to prevent disgruntled members fiorn leaving. Nonparty workers iu
the factory clid not view the most hardened party loyalists as radical, but
ratlrer as "those who do nasty things," "enbezzlers and thieves," or, as the
Opposition characterized them, unpriucipled "bootlickers and informers."Tl
The party's L928 sørnokritikø campaigu ancl OGPU reports on the Inoocl
among workers across the Soviet Union prove that the fissure benveen Stal-
inism anc{ the working class was a general, rather than a local phenomeuon.T2
The Transformation of Union Organizations during NEP
Three positions dominated the trade uuiou discussion at the Tenth Party
Congress that convened during the Kronstadt rebellion in the spring of
I921. With far-nine raging throughout the Soviet Union and with the trans-
iu tatters, Trotsþ had converted Red Arrry units
portatior-r infrastructr,rre
into "battalions of labor" and achieved impressive results in reconstructing
the railways. But labor arrnies also iucorporatecl civilians and, as Isaac
Deutscher notes, Trotsky had turnecl a bitter necessity into an ideological
virtue, by advocating the "militarization of labor." The Workers' Opposition
justifiably noted that party ancl state apparatus had substituted its rule fbr that
of the proletariat cluring the Civil War and had "reduced alnrost to nil the
influence of the rvorking class associatious in the Sòvict state ." Tl'rcir remedy
for the frayed relationship between the state and working class callecl fbr
-lracle
"the conceutratiorÌ of industrial management in the hands of the
Unions." Lenin's middle position insisted that iu industrial policy, unious
shoulcl be subordinate to the parry and the r¡eeds of the workcrs' aud peas-
auts' state-but he acknowledged that this state hacl bcconre "bureaucrati-
cally def-ormed." Emphasizing persuasiou ovet' cocrcion in industrial
relations, Lenin argued that unions should have a degree of autonomy for a
"number of decades" to defend workers' ilÌtelests. Lelliu's moderate posi-
tion, attempting to balance the state and workers' interests in trade union
polic¡ rvon out) though it contained an implicit ambiguity regarding occa-
sions rvhen the interests of the state and workers collided.T3
This clual-role of the lnetalrvorkers' uniou mealìt that it could be an
irnportant instrument fbr containing workers' n'rilitancy, but it also was under
pressure to respor-rcl sympathetically to their grievances. The metahvorkers'
union advocated fb¡r a participatory membership and helped Promote the
usually boisterous fàctory-level meetings. In Marcl-r 1923, the uniotl com-
plained that delegates met irregularly and urged them to meet urore fi'e-
quently.Ta A report a year later shou'ecl tl-rat this directive achieved results, as
over the preceding six rnonths the clelegates ancl the fãctory committee held
eleven shop rneetings and r-rine geueral meetings. Throughout NEP, the del-
egates' sessions rvere the rnost volatile represelttative body because they werc
under the lnost direct pressure fìom rank-and-fìle tvorkers and were tlot
donrinated by the party. In 1924,two-tl'tírds of the ninety-six delegates rvere
nonparty workers.Ts Although uuiou meetiugs mittutes in early NEP convey
a sense of order,Tó a 1923 Røbocltøiø Moskvø rcport ol't otle utriotr sessiotr
 ""Ò

R¿poht tion ørzd Cotøúerrettohtn oru Cløss Conflict 93

shows that these were not tranquil proceedings and that rvorkers expected
sion made up of representatives of workers ancl managernelìt on the basis of
their representatives to respond to their grievalces: parity."8ó Weeldy sessions discussed collective ancl indiviclual statemer-rts fì"om
workers, including requests for work clothes, pay issues, conplaiuts over
The speaker fiorn the district rnet¿rlu'orkers' union is giving a report on the work unfair transfèrs, wage category appeals, and even requests to shorteu the
of the union fbr the year. He starts.w,ith a heap of fìgures.... The workers'arren- workday.sT For eighteen months cluring 1924 and 1925, the RKI( handled
tion weakens anci they begin quiet conversarions. At fìrst they talk quietly but then cases involvirrg an astounding 13,0ó8 workers. The commission sided with
it grorvs louder artd loucler.... Someone starts to shout. He is complaining th:rt 8,529 workers (ó5.0 percent) and against 3,9I8 (29.8ó percent), with the
they had to pressure mânagernent in orc'ler to get paicl on saturc.laF Ttrey talk
renraining cases, involving6TS rvorkers (5.14 percent), either uuresolved or
about potatoes and fìrewood. The man sitting next to me is screaming at tlie top
sent to higher arbitration.ss Thus, far from being a state institution deployed
of his lungs. But the speaker, fàr fiom being discourageci, tarkes a drink of w¿rter
and contiuues droning: twenty meetillgs, thirty sessions, :-urd eight confère¡ces. against the rvorking class, workers themselves vierved the union organization
workers âre not i'terested in this. Reports should be connected ro real lifè.z7 as an effèctive source of power in pressing their grievances.
The RKK enjoyed such prestige that it occasionally exceeded its formal
authority. In August 1926 a party member in the bolt shop was expelled For
Staffed rvith four full-time paid organizers by 1925, the factory commir-
"systematic nonpayment of dues," but appealecl to the RI(I( and was subse-
tee was the lnain union orgalt rvithin the factory, meeting with managernent
quently reinstated. A party leader took exception to this interfèreltce. "The
on a regular basis and brandishing its authority in defènse of rvorkers,
RI(K must support our decisions," he complaiued, "so that we call raise the
rights.zs During "the struggle against overtime hours" the comrnittee
rate of dues paylnent."tìe Rank-ancl-fìle influence on the RI(I(is illustratecl by
coerced managerllent to hire new workers, and a January 1926 factory
two factory cornmittee reports in 1925. The fìrst sulnlnary of'RIC( work
anlÌoultceffìent noted that without union sanction. ..overtirné work is not
issued in May cletailed 220 contlicts over the previous half-year iuvolvillg
pernritted."Te overtime hours reâched 36,279 extra hoursoin March 1925.
5,0óó workers. The RKI( had sided in favor of the rvorkers 46 perccnt of thc
but a year later monthly averages rvere o'e-sixth this amount.ll() Thus, rather
time and against rvorkers 5Ì percent of the time. A,revised report included an
than functionir-rg as a malìagemerit tool to extend work hor-rrs-as it did dur-
additional óó conflicts-all decicled in favor of the rvorkers. The uew total
ing the First-Five Year Plan-the fàctory commitree hacl fought to reduce
showed a slight majority (50.0ó percent) of the 5,463 workers affectecl
work hours. In August 1925, the commitree noted that rnany conflicts had
received favorable resoluti ons.e0
arisen over repeated violations of the Code of Law, including rlÌe transfèr ol
The astounding number of industrial clis¡rutes hancllcd by the RICG
u,orkers frorn higher to lower wage category positions without union con-
throughout the Soviet Union shorvs that workers' willingness to go through
sultation, and nonpayment fbr overrime and night work. It pleclged to force
official union channels to arbitrate their grievances accolults ftrr the relatively
the administratiorl to post the larvs i¡r all departments ancl ,.to iristruct shop
lorv number of strikes. As E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies have showu, over eight
directors and accounrauts thar infringer-nent of the Code of Law is imper-
thousand disputes involving over seven million workers were hanclled by
missible."si So porverful was rhe union organization in lgzs that the fàciory
RKIG in the last three fiscal years of NEP. They dealt with issues related to
director later wrote that trade uniou's deputies-rather than the managers-
the basic wage rates) the quality of and access to state -supplied communal
helcl real power in the shops.82
services, additions to wages) compensation for disnrissal, procedures for hir-
with the support of the factory commirtee, workers repeateclly denra¡cled ing and firing, aud protection of labor. Issues not resolved by the RI(IG were *i
and received shorr-rerm loans from the fàctor1,, particr.rlarly beft¡re holidays
sent to arbitral tribunal or conciliation courts.el þl'
vvhen they returned to the courltryside. In the late sulllffrel. of r923,delegaie
Sending issues to arbitration bodies apparently providecl management
dissatisfàctiou over loans forced the issue to a general lneeting of ahnost half
with a rreans of maneuvering around rvorkers' increased fì'ustrations. In July
of tlre rvorkforce.ss Røbochøiø Moshvø reported rhat in 1924, workers were
192ó, workers in the nail shop requested a month off for suru'ner holiday,
given credit, but again in the spring of l92S rvorkers besiegecl their factory
rvhich their counterparts in the h<¡t shops already enjoyed, but the adminis-
committee representatives on a daily basis with the same question: ,,when
tration refused. The uuion transferred the issue to the Guberniia work
will we receive creditl"sa Rank-ancl-file pressrlre fòr loans was so strong in the
inspector, rvho passecl the issue on to the People's Comrnissariat of Labor
spring of 1926 that factory commirree party rrembers broke cliscipline by
(Nørhornttwd). Tbe folloiving spring, workers' letters agair-r appealed to
supporting rvorkers' dema¡rds fbr 125 percent advances, even though the
Nørhornttotd.. The union newspaper Trwd. stded rvith the rvorkers, arguing
party hacl llandated only 100 percent.tì5
that it was "necessary to clccide this question quickly and satis$' the justifiecl
The RI(I( r,vas possibly nrore imporrant than the fàctory conrmittee in workers' demands which are supported by tl-re doctors' comlnissiotls."e2
ternts of providing social stabilir),. Ar.r RI(I( represenrarir,e explainecl that
Without a fàvorable resolution, the shop uniou leader and party nrember
repeated co¡rflicts between managemerlt and the factory committee could
clesclibed the rnood ir-r the shop as "defiant," ancl complaiued that workers
not be resolr'ed so that "it was llecessary to create an authoritative colnnris- no loneer trusted hirn.es In this incident the pro-worker metahvorkers' startce
 l ì
. :
¡ìr.ì
i
94 Rev o ht tion m ¡l Counterrat o httion
collided with the harsh realities of industrial polic¡ though again, workers
had expected a favorable respollse.
A level of clelnocracy persisted in the metalworkers' unioll that was
unimaginable a few years later. At a Mashinotrest (the trust overseeing the
factory) production conference in october I92ó, union representatives
raised complaints about poor organization of fàctories, expenditures, and
shortages of rarv materials. The workers' delegates repeatedly spoke beyoncl
their time lir-nit, but when trust speakers tried to go beyond their limit, del-
egates called out, "Enough!"e4 At a district union confererce, a Hamrner and
sickle representative argued: "Pay remains rhe same but life is more expen-
sive. The trust aclministration ch'ive around in automobiles, vvhile cuttiug
costs is done on the backs ofworkers. They trick and screw the peasants and
tl-ris is what is called the sm.ychkø." The OGPU reported rhar "rhe delegares,
attitude towards those who spoke in this manner rvas syrnpathetic, rvith
applause accompanying the speeches."es
open expression of such sentiments became less fì'equent during late NEp
but illustrates the paradox that beset developing Stalinism that'strived to be
a participatory systern. Given workers' hostile sentinrents towards the
regime's productivist directives, it.became increasingly clifficult to provide a
veneer of "support from below" for state policies when worliers wele allowecl
to choose their ow¡r delegates at,such conferences. workers hacl even more
confidence rvhen they issued cornplaints jn the fbrm ofanonymous notes,.like
this one passed to Tomsk¡ rhe chairma' of the All-union central rrade
Union Council, when he spoke at the factorv:
Please reluember the worcls of Ilyich Lenin. Why irre you lìot conclucting ¿r clea¡s-
ing of party of elemeuts who only take r,rp positions while not cloing what they are
snpposecl to do, but insteacl walk around the shops and give orders ancl shor-rt at
the lower clrrssl Tl.rey receive the eleventh wage and skill grarde u,hile our brothers
receives only the third. They tell us, just live and prepare fbr w:rr. I request you
read this out loud.96
By L926 party ¡1-¡s¡ì6ers dominated shop Lrnion positions, but the slight-
est suggestion of a split in the party's ranks could spark confidence aurong
nonparty workers. In January 1926,the parry leveled charges against a mem-
ber because "during tl're adoption of the collective agreernent" he had gone
"against the party and criticized communists in the presence of noncommu-
nists." Another speaker said that, "uncler the leadership of comrade Runge,
they buriecl the collective agreemeut in the shop" and the cell resolved to
transfer the troublemaker to anorher shift.eT In rhe fbnn-casting shop in
December 1927, a comrade shashkin agitated agai'sr the parry which he
claimed had go'e against the worke rs. He gai'ed support alrrollg a group of
party members, candidates, and uollparq/ workers and subrnitted ..a petition
from the masses." A party sessior-r subsequently cliscussecr Srrashkin's "sys-
telnatic anti-party behavior" including the accusatiolt that "rvhile servi¡g as
general shop meeting chairrnan, he had helpecl defèat the list of ca¡cliclates
f-or the shop bureau rvhich had been sr,rggested by the parry." shasl-rkin
Cløss Conflict 95
responded that he had not known about the party list and that two other
party members were responsible fbr the rneetir-rg's disruption because while
he was speaking "they tried to pull me down by the coat."e8
Workers became more critical of the vvork of the union in late NEP.
Repair shop rvorkers con-rplained that the factory committee had allowed an
"incorrect lou'ering of wage categories" in the collective agreement and
that the RI(I( had not decided enough issues in favor of workers. Several
speakers in the repair shop reportecl a recent drop in work cliscipline and
blarned this on party shop leaders who were "too busy talking."ee At a fac-
tory conference of six hundred in December 1926,the OGPU reported that
workers believed that the factory committee "did not defend workers' inter-
ests, agrees more with the administratior-r, and does not implement the res-
olutions of the delegates' rneetings."l00
Factory conmittee summaries in the last years of NEP stopped reporting
the actual numbers ofworkers affectecl in decisions handled by the RIC( but
open dissatisfaction suggests a change in favor of managemerÌt. From May to
September I928, the RKI(handlecl SIl confìicts:347 were rcsolved in fàvor
of the workers and 375 against, ivith 89 cases sent to arbitration. Signifi-
calltly, the report did not provide numbers on how rnany workers (of 3,99ó)
were affected b)' decisions.loì
Throughout NEP, workers continued to pay clucs and to appeal to tlÌe
union fcrr support. After 1922 union membership in the Soviet Uuion u'as
voluntary, but almost 90 percent of Soviet workers chose to join the unións
because ofsuch benefits as sickness insurauce, access to housing, and prior-
ity in hiring in case of layoffs.r02 Significantly, even in late NEP, production
remained a relatively minor issue iu union meetings, especially wheu com-
pared to its single-minded pursuit durirrg the First Five-Year Plan. l.-rom May
1926 to May 1927, productiou was broached ouly six times among 252
issues in forty factory committee meetings, only orrce iu delegates' l.rÌeetirìgs,
and once in general factory conferences.lO3 In January 1927,97 percent of
more than four thousancl workers u,ere rnembers of the union, indicating
tlrat despite their criticislns, the overrvhehning rnajority ofworkers were will-
ing to pay membership dues to receive union benefìts.lOa Three thousand
workers participated in the 1927 vote that elected 5l shop bureau members
including twellty-two r-rorÌparty rvorkers and three wofiÌen. The delegates
were under even less control of the part¡ electing 139 of 195 norlparty
workers as clelegates, including eleven wornen.l05
Delegates continued to press for wage increases on an egalitarian basis. In
Decenrber 1927, delegates resolvecl that, "the line must be taken to raise the
pa1'of the most poorly paid and lagging behincl workers, rvhile n-rostly pre-
servir-rg regular rvages in the fàctory."l0ó Pressurecl by factory delegates and
union representatives, the wage increase (excluding infìation) in 1927 of
over 20 percent for third ar-rd fourth rvage and skill grade workers was ten
tirnes that of the more highly skilled workers.l0T In negotiations between
nallage[ìent and the metalworkers' union, the union backtracked ol'r lrralÌy
issues and sent others to arbitration. For tlte 1927 wage scale, the ur-rion
wanted 5 oercent lllore than was of'fered bv the trust and wantecl to raisc
 96 lwtion ønd Coan t¿n n o lution
R cw
productiviry by only I perce't, versus rhe trust's dema'd of a ó.g percent
i'crease. The tr'st woll on the wage rate issue but, perhaps se'si'g the
volatility of rvorker grievances, asked for oriy a 2.s p..i.,-,t råise i' procluc-
ti'ity.l08 To reduce overall wage cosrs rvithout .*pli.itly loweri'g wages)
marlagement also sought to reclassifl, the wage and skill categories
of allnost
a thousa'cl employees. The lrnio' resisted, a'd the nei, classifìcatio'
resulted iu a net reduction for 327 rvorkers, ratl-rer than the 943 that ma¡-
agenìent had wanted. l()e
The retreat of the unions was gelleralizecl trrroughoLrt the soviet u'ion.
As carr ard Davies have argued, fiom lg2s ,.tl-re dãstiny of the worker.had
rested on the uneasy compromise" between wsenkhø and red managers
on
the o'e ha'd, eager to increase the efficie'cy ofi'clustry and to cut
down
costs, aud the trade uuious still concemed with "the iinmecliate material
interests and welfare of the u,orkers." yet, "as the drive fbr industrialization
became more intense, the trade u'lions fclught a losing battle; the neecls
of
industry rvere the pararnoul'rt consicleration.,' Trade union leaders such as
Tomsky "had been collteut to conduct an orclerly retreat) sáving what
he
could on the way."tto
Union activity in the Hamr'rer ancl Sickle Factory illustrates the clemise of
, I t,750,000 for the lowest level and 28,000,000 for the eighth wage and skill
this "uneasy compromise." workers repeatedly appealecl to d.reir union ft¡r
help a'd expected a fàvoral¡le response-By itr..,',a of NEP, rrorvever, work-
ers were acutely au,are rhat theii union organizations hacl conceded
consicl-
erable ground to rnanagement. Nevertheless, they continued to believe
that
they could compel their represenrarives to fìght o' their behalf. workers,
hope for reform witltin existing fàctory institutions rvas crucial to the traps-
forrnation oflabor relations ir-r NEp a'd helps to explain rvhy workers dicl
not
build new independent nerworks that courd have ihalle'g.a ,rr. harsh a'ti-
labor policies later i.troduced by the stare. Given thatlhe meralworkers,
u'io' had previously defended their interests ancl co'tinued to do so nomi-
nally even at the end of NEp, such hopes were quite rational.
Workers, Grievances and Strikes during NEp
The contours of labor conflict and manageÍneut's strengthened positio'
against the rvorkftrrce are reflected in trencls in rvorkers, l""g"r. Real u,ases
rose during early NEP to 1924-1925, and declinecl each
J,ear rhereafr"er.
Althougl-r wages constituted o'ly al¡out 23 percerlr of overall procluctio'
costs-the majority of expenclitrlres were fbr fixed capital costs such as raw
materials and fuel-it rvas the variable costs of prod.r.tìo,r that clirectly
pitted
rnanagernent against the workforce.ttt Mørtenovkøprirfted the average
wor.k_
ers'wages as a percenrage of prervar (r9r3-r9r4¡ ruutes fbr sevcrar
rä"rs a,-rd
incorporated inflation into its calculations. The average real u,age rose
fì.om
79.6,percent of the prewar rvage in rg2z-1924 to óz.g p"...ìrt i, 1924-
1925. A),ear later, rhe average wage hacl ircreasecl I0 peice't, though
the
fàctory ne\vspaper ack'owledged rrrat witrr i'flatio', it hacr ,ctu"lly dropped
ó percent. The average wage without inflation increased 14.6 óercent ln
97
Cløss Conflict
1927, suggesting a slight decrease in real wages. In the last year of NEP,
wages increased 6.2 percent-a real wage reduction of about 4 percent
accorcling to Mørrenovlzø,rhoogh the actual decrease was more substautial as
official figures underestimated the rate of inflation.Ì12
Strike activity began rather mocfestly h 1922. On ó June, 125 workers in
the bolt shop struck because they had uot received overtime pay for the sec-
ond half of May. The next day, ó5 rvorkers in the rolled metal shop stopped
work for a half-hour and demanded clarification on work norms.l13 The fac-
tory director reported that there was "a conflict with all production shops
(sirnultaneously) in November 1922 on the question of production tÌorms)
rvhich had been raised in connection with the pay increase." The dispute
ended in favor of rnanagement when the district metalworkers' uniou iuter-
vened and sanctiolìed the increased norms.l14
Complaints about fòod and delays in payment ofwages dorninated work-
ers' grievances during 1922 and 1923. May 1922 factory meeting dis-
cussed "the flour question," resolving to ^ dernancl fìrll compensation of flour
ftrr all workers at tlìe market rate.l15 So rampant was hyperinflation that a fàc-
tory arÌnouncen'ìent listecl monthly payments in million of rubles-
category worker.lió Moscow Soviet reports show that employees' ntost h'e-
quent grievance during the period of hyperinflation was concern over delays
in wage payments.ltT Occasionally work stoppages were avoided wheu man-
agement acquiescecl to employees' grievauces. For exàrnple, "worker dissat-
isfàction in the Hammer aud Sickle Factory (fbrmerly Guzhon) caused by
norìpayment of wages for Jauuary" was "liquidated by issuing their pay."l18
The GPU reported "a sharp deterioratiou of the situatiou in iuclustry"
throughout the Soviet Union rvith workers' complaiuts atrout "late paymeut
ofrvages" contirÌuing until the fall of 1923.ìle
An unprecedented strike fbr the six-hour clay illustrates early NEP labor
nrilitancy. On 22 February 1923, the fàctory comurittee, union representa-
tives, and managelnent discussed the irnplementation of a six-hour day, and
agreed to consider two categories of workers but rejected others, including
workers in the wire pulling shop. On 26 February, sixty u'ire pulling shop
employees struck after their petition for a six-hour day had been refused. On
I March, metalworkers' leaclers proposed that rvorkers return to rvork uuder
the old conditions because they could not support the demand for the six-
hour day and warned that they u'ould not object if mauagement fìred work-
ers and brought in replacernents.l20 Under this threat, workers met and
agreed to retum in unison at l:20 that aftentoon, thor,rgh tl-rey insisted that
the entire shop be taken back withoLrt victimizing "specific persons" aucl
demanded that officials and shop representatives discuss the possibility of
implementing the six-hour day.12l Even iu defèat, the strike shorvs a higl-r
level of workers' confidence ancl organizatiou, fueled in part by lising expec-
tations of economic recovery. They put ft¡rward ofTensive demands f-or a six-
hour da1,, convened nleetillgs in which they could determine tl-reir own
strategy, returned in unisor-t, aud organized collective defense against victim-
ization. Many u,orkers in 1923 had not ltrlgotten the strength aud tactics of
 98 løtion øn¡|. Cofu¡tterrett
R et, o o hl tion Cløss Conflict 99

collective actio' learned during the prerevolutio'ary years, and their high
By the spring of l924,labor dissatisfàction had again escalated. Tsel¿hovsh-
level of organization contrasted with that of later in NEp.
chinø characterizecl the strike movement as localized shop-based stoppages
Three shops struck in May 1923 agai'st an increase i'productio'
spilled over into other departments. The lowering of wage-rates and
norms. on the evening of 4 Ma¡ a delegates'nreeti'g conrplái'ed about increased vvork norms in metal fàctories met with "stroug dissatisfactiou."t2s
increased norms and elected four representatives to talÈ with Mashi.orrest.
This round of strikes started in the predominately female nail shop, where
Reports on 7 a'd 8 May noted wiclespread cor'plai'ts in the fàctory over
workers demanded higher wages aud lower productiou norms, and again
raising work norms. The union transferred the issue to the protection of
workers convened their own meeting. "strikers did not permit anyone fì'om
Labor o' 14 May, but the rolled metal a'cl ftr''-casti'g shops srruck the
the administration, the factory committee, the cell, or evell workers from
next day, spreading the action to the wire pulling shop. Several speakers at
other shops to enter their meeting." Ou the second day of the strike, with
a delegates'meeting on l5 May spoke in favor of iontinuineìhe strike
negotiations under way, the rnood in the nail shop was marked by "extreme
action, even seeki'g formal u'ion support for the sroppage-ag-ain indicat-
discontent." The stoppage ther-r spread to the wire pulling shop, and speak-
ing workers' high expectations of rhe u'io' i' early ñÈp. ott .. workers
ers in a stormy rneeting threatened to shut down the entire factory. Unrest
denounced the excessive norrn iucreases, but conceded that the Moscow
was becoming endemic in the factory. "Work stoppages in one shop, then
soviet had to resolve the dispute. A fäctory-rvide that afternoo' another, appear chronic," the report noted.ì2ó
fàiled to resolve rhe issue, and another report on lg'reeting
May irotecl that..Ital- Alrhough less political, this reneq'ed workplace militancy was retninisceut of
ian" strikes continuecl in two shops and warned that the workers' moocl was
the post-l,ena economic strikes with inclustrial expansiou encouragiug rising
such that, if the norms were not lowered the next morning, all,shops woulcl
expecrations and demands. Similarly, sectional divisions rvithin the u,orkfbrce
stop work. The report stated that the strike was launchedin solidárity with
also reernerged, particularly tsekhoushcbinø. Disagreements over the length ol
two other fàctories in the district that had gorle out over the ràising of pro-
holidays also led to ÍÌiction betweeu ex-peasallts aud urban workers. A Decen"r-
duction nornÌs. Tl-re strike-apparehtly e'ded in a compro'rise, raising norms
lcer 1922 "city and countryside" geueral n€eting led to "a victory for the vil-
from 3.6 to l0 pelcent.ì22
lagers." Workers received a weeklong break so that they could return to the
Mass workers' meerings also aitest to a rising tide of rvorker milita'cy dur-
countryside, rather than the three clays urbau workers prefèrred so as not to
i'g early NEt with reporrs repeatedly describing Ham'er and sickle meet- lose additional pay.t27 Several participants in an Octob:er 1924 factory parry
ings irr 1923 as "stormy" and nulnerous trrreats to stop work. on I August,
discussion on "raising the productivity of youth" were fi'ustrated by the skill
1,500 u'orke rs (of 2,352) attended a "quite srormy" mìeti'g during uno1h.,
level and work habits of younger workers. One speaker complainecl that "the
strike over lowerittg wage rates. Fifteen speakers denounced ihe reclictio¡s in
young have a careless attitude torvards rvork" atld another speaker blarned
a raucous session and some workers, according to the report, were in ,.an ine-
youllger workers because "machines ancl tools are broken every day."l28
briated state." The proceedi'gs turned particùiarly tul'ukuous when a
The Civil War era rift benveen the state and Hammer and Sickle rvorkers
Mashinotrest representative told rvorkers that the trust had explored the uos-
was partially healed by the early \gp econotnic recovery, substantial wage
sibility of closing tlre factory with the ainr of concentrating piocluction. The
increases, and the party's sympathetic position toward workers' colìcerlls.
workers votecl to ask the union to reexamine the wage ratès'and returnecl to
Workers' proclivity for strike actior-r did not colttinue throughout NEP: no
rvork the next cla¡ but "their lnood continuecl to be unsatisfàctory.', A week
more strikes were reported after the early 1924 unrest and only one for all of
later, several shops again struck, with the possibility of the e'tire factory halt-
1925. Given both the persistence of econornic grievances and the absence of
i'g rvork. A dispatch the following day reportecr a'other mass meeting: ,.Ar any evidence of state repressiou, this conspicuous intermission in labor
the time of printing the report, the meeting continues ancl is stonry."
activism can onl¡, be explained by the state's succcss in co-opting labor griev-
Another general meeting in August became unruly when managemenr pro-
auces through official union channels. By early 1925, workers' relative satis-
posed to pay parr ofrvorkers'rvages in state bo'ds. stoppages conti'ued i'
faction rvith the regime appears to have reached its apex, a sentimeut reflected
several shops until ló August.l23
in hundreds of workers joining the party membersl-rip. A party bureau rePort
In November 1923, rvorkers in nvo shops initiated another rouncl of fbr March 1925 stated that production ancl wages were going up and fbund
strikes over piecer'*,ork rates. A ì5 November delegates, meeting voted to
"the mood ofworkers satisfactor¡ the only dissatisfaction is with housiug."i2e
accept an I I percerlt raise in rates, but workers in the rollecl rnetal shop
Another report again clairned that the mood in the factory was still "suffi-
voted agair-rst the proposal and 504 employees srruck, joined by ts0 nail
ciently satisfactory" except with regard to the housiug shortage.Iso
shop rvorkers o' ó December. on l0 December, managelrert ihreatened
Complaints over housing persisted throughout NEP. On the sixth
to bring i' replacernents agaiusr rhe unsa'ctionecr strikers, but fìfìy-six anniversary of the revolution, the factory newspaper demanded "Give Work-
rolled metal u'orkers continued to strike. The strike collapsed befbre the
ers Housing.'l3l Ll early 1924, the first reports that workers were spertcling
holiday (22 Decer'ber) whe' rwenry skiilecl workers sigrecl arl agreelìÌellr
tl-re nights in the slrop appearecl.l32 The fàctory I'rad its otvn housing cooper-
to return to work.ì2a
ative whose 3ó0 rnembers helped to build apartr-ìlent con-rplexes near the 1àc-
 100
Rct, o h¿tion ønd Coønterra, o lution. Cløss Cottflict r0r
tory.Iaa In 1924, ó6 percent of the new housing in the
districr wellt to work- Implementing the new wage-rates was problematic for factory leaders.
ers, l0 percellt to demobilized soldiers, 5.s peicent
to un.nrployed perso's, Two hundred workers from several shops signed another petition to RKK
5 percent to office wlfer¡, and only 4 percenr ro members
of thé p"rry org"_ dernanding reestablishment of the old norms. On l7 June seveuty workers in
nizarion.l3a Despite this, i' August t9)+, eight hu'drecl
workers were rvith_ the rolled metal shop demanded an immediate reexamination of the wage-
out adequare housi'g.r35^Aul MI( r'eport on the facrory from
earry lplg rate. The strike lasted only an hour and a half, as the facfory comrnittee and
claimed that a shortage of'apartm.t-tti fb, seve' hundred
wo.k.rs and their administration intervened and, according to the OGPU, "satisfied the
families was "r€flecred i' the moocr of workers ancl in problems
menting_increasecl productivity.Ðr3ó By September
i' irrrpre_ dernands of the workers.ÐI44 The new factory directory Petr Stepanov, later
l9ås, this figure
irad wrote that enraged rolling mill workers marched to his office with their tongs
reached fìftee' hu'dred, though trre uiger-,cy of the
housing frout.,r-, g"u. and that managemerìt assistants had "gathered around to defènd their direc-
way to new concems with economic and shop-fìoor grieva¡[s.raz
The o'ly sig'ificant poritical criticism expressed ãuring
tor-they feared excesses."ì45 Rather than workers being intimidated by a
rhese years co'_ "sü'ong state," as depicted in the pre-archival Cold War historiography of the
cerrred rhe regime's rurar poricy. I'Aprir 1923, a
Mosior Soviet reporr Soviet working class, an increasingly unruly workforce threatened the rnost
noted "dissatisfaction" amoug ,.workérs with ties rvith
the countryside,, ardent state loyalists.
becauseof the rarge tax on the peasarts. rs' Arg24
factory p".ryr.po.t Yet factory leaclers provecl to be aclept "firefighters," straining themselves
reported^."a village mo9d" a'd complai'ts about liigher "g"ir-,
å*., i,' rhe coun- repeatedly to contain sirnmering discontent. Significantly, they were allowecl
tryside.l3e_several speakers in a r92t shop discussio-n
on parry work in trre tremendous flexibility in allocating wage increases, which ranged fi'on-r 0 to l2
cou'rrysicle stated trrat conditions i' thé corultrysicle
náa i-prou.d, but percent per department. In I925, n'ranagement respondecl favorably to shop-
conrplained about kr.rlaks, who were ..oppressing pão. p."r"rrrr.i,r+tr
based grievances: departments that reported the most problems (the forrn-'
The collective agreeme't i'June r9)s was t"t-,. nrri,o"lor
test fbr evolv_ casting and rolled metal shops) had received the highest wage increases iu the
ing stali'isn-r and indicated.that nìa'agemellr would begi'{r'preme'ti'g
a Decernber collective agfeetnent. Party leaders implemented rvage itrcreases
harder line against the workfòrce. It ãlso shows horv
the threat of unem- ,
"by carefully taking into consideration the mood and demauds of the rvot'k-
ployment became an increasi.gly
þowerfur weapon with rvhich rìanagement ers" and "disuibutir-rg the percentage of increase in particular shops."la6
could threaten the workforce. Two closecr ge'e.al party
sessions were In early 1926 Vesenhhø \aunched a "regitne of ecoiorny" campaigu to
clevoted to new I I perce't wage reductio's-the first new colrectrve agree- intensify the work process, Iower costs, and promote inclustrialization. Hav-
menr since 1923. party readers co'rprained that productio'
had droþped ing reached prewar levels of productiot'r, the carnpaiglÌ atten-¡Pted to obtain
after the wage cut, remi'ding membeis rhat it was
ir.i. ãurf iot.ìp tr,. a.- resources for the "new phase" of industrializatiorl to construct and re-equip
tory admi'istration i'rpleme't the new agreemeut in order
to strengther-r the factories. Theoretically, a reduction in costs would reduce prices to strerrgtheu
link betwee' rhe rorv' and counrry (sn+fchkø),A week rarer
an Mk speaker the "lirrk with the peasautry." Stalin and Kuibyshev drafted a 25 Aprll 1926
defended the wage cur, reporting omìr-rously that unemplo)/rlent
in Moscow appeal, "The Struggle for a Regime of Economy," that frankly adnritted an
had doubled to'inetrsix thousand in the preceding
five -o'ths, u,irh seven "extreme shortage of capital," which meant that further industrial expansion
thousand unemployed metalworkers. The eco'omic crisis
durini the latter woulcl have to "rely only on internal factors aud resources." As Carr and
part oF the NEP stre the posirio' of the state againsr tñe rvorking
'gthe'ecl Davies note, the regime of econotny was esselttially an atternpt "to cut costs
class' bur i' April 1925, ope' dissent rvas stiil very much a"rive in the party as by tl-re sirnple device of increasing the output of the worker while holding
at least four speakers co.demned the proposecr wage
recructio'.lal down his wage and depressing his work conditiou."taT Mørtemoul¿ø stated that
. '{ Jr-rrre 1925 parry bureau discussion å' problems i' the nair shop
that several lnembers "have rrad rerations iith tl,r. ad'ri.istratio'.,,'oted
the "regime econonÌy" strategy mearlt "we must complete the party and gov-
Real ernment directives to lower costs by 6 percent."l48 From a mallagernent per-
wages had bee' lorvered by about r r perce't, a'cì
trris was .,reflected in the spective , the carnpaign was a success. With a smaller workftrrce, productivity
nood of the rvorkers. currently we have protests i'the ra'ks
agai'st the increased IB percent rvhile rvages werìt up only I0 percent, less than the rate
wage-rate ." workers ir,dr"-.ig!:{metal shop sig'ecl
a creclarart' for a wage'ew of inflation.l4e With the threat of unemployment loomiltg, lrallagelnent
increase a'd se't it to the RI(K. Factory party lèaders
co'rplai'ed that clirected their cost-cutting efforts against the highest paid workers. The
Leni' Levy recr*its, rather tha' .urtuili,.,g such actio's) were ..taili'grna'y OGPU claimed tl-rat rvages fbr skillecl rvorkers in the Hammer and Sickle Fac-
the
masses," and resolved to pay Inore attention to
this .,intolerable situatio..', tory declinecf by 35 percent ancl characterized eff'orts to lorver the pay of
Nevertheless' the leaders berieved trrat, rvith the exception
of trre for,.,-,-."rr- skilled rvorkers in the metal industry as being of a "mass chat'acter." Such
ing ancl rolled metal shops, rhe rvorkers, moocl was åtisfactory.ra2
A report wage reductions resultecl in some u,orkers believing that the "regime of ecou-
sent to the ce'tral committee also condemnecl Le'in
Levy recruits, ,.tail_ omy was being carriecl ollt at their expetÌse."150
isrn," a'cl rvarned that the reactior-r to tl-re rvage cut in
the rollecl metal shop Workers repeatedly complainecl about managerial efforts to raise produc-
"nearly took the fbrm of a stl-ike.'143
tion, though they ofter-r perceivecl shop-floor tensions as misuuderstanclings.
 r02 h.tion
R et, o øn d Counterrep oh.ttiou Cløss Conflict r03

During a shop cell cliscussion ro reduce defèctive ourpur (brøk) i,late it to trausfer workers.
1926, Management's strengthened position allowed
a member argued that the admi'istration displayecl -uìa attitude rowarcls Because of the stagnant market for bolts auct uails, fifteen workers were reas-
" and suggestecl
productiorl." Another lnember argued tl-rat ,,pay is low"
Ínan_ signed to other shops in early 1926. "Workers categorically refused the traus-
agement increase wage rates becanse ,,then rvorkers will pay à'täntion ancl fer and threatened to leave the factor¡" but uo strike action was reported.16l
not be in such a hurry'" One member characterized the administration,s
role A shortage of materials in the coustructiort shop led management to reduce
in production as "coullterrevolutionar),.,, After venting these grievances,
the the number of u,orkers and transfer some to other work.ló2 In August sixty
cell resolved ro "srre'grhe' rhe st..,ggi" agai'st hrr¡r.írct In
Ãpril 1927, tlte rvorkers in the rolled metal shop subrnitted a petition to the RI(K because
repailshop cell reported incidents of "engineers, rude attitude
àwards work- their transfer had led to a wage reduction liom 145 rubles to 95. A fèw weeks
ers." This was attributed to a "lack of experience and knowledge
of rvorkers, later, seventy-fìve workers in the same shop appealed to the RKII asking
psycholog¡" nhich rrreaut that bosses "absolutely do'ot f,'orv how
to them to raise their wage and skill grade.ró3
approach them which creares hostility on the part of'-the workers.,rs2
A Lg27 The tlueat of unemployrnent became an importallt \Meapon for the state-
party report noted an "abnor['lal" relatio'ship in some shops
betrveen the lnanagenent offensive against the working class. Oflìcial unemployment fig-
administratio' and shop union representatives. .,It is clear,', clainred
the ures show that 1I3,898 Moscow workers were registerecl as unemployed in
report' "that the aclministration does rìot ulìclerstand these organizatio¡s."r53
July 1925, but that the nurnber steadily increased to 223,549 three years
Factory malÌagemel'ìt atternpted to stre'gthe' its positioñ by
ftrme'ti'g later.lóa Unlike unemployment in the West, however, Soviet NEP unetn-
divisions amorÌg workers. I'January r926,7lte ocpü ..porr.á
stro'g cris- ployment increased simultaneously with a growth in overall employnreut, as
satisfacdon over the lowering of rolli'g mill workers'piece iates.,some
rolling the rnass rural-to-urban migration outpaced industrial expausiou.tó5 In early
mill workers rvere paid about 2s0 rubles a morth, while the remai'i'g
rvork- 1926, the lack of raw rnaterials and fr,rel in the rnetal indLlstry in Moscorv
ers in the shop averaged eighty rubles.l5a subseque'try,
rolli'g mill operators spurred fears of layoffs. The OGPU reported that an'rong metalworkers in
in the fourth rnill s¡-rbmitted a petiiion for a pay raise because ãf their
clifficult Moscow, there were "observecl all kinds of runrot's concerniug the reductiott
work, but nìarìagenrent sr.rggested that to impleurent this raise, they
lower t¡e of the workforce.... Naturally workers express dissatisfàction aud blame the
pay of.emaini^g workers-a suggestio' rhat met with
"objecti,ons L' the part factory administration and trusts for mistnauagenìent."ióó A few months
of the workers." Management then a''ou'ced that the ,áli,rg mill
operators later, the factory colnrnittee was llot inf-orrned aboút the layoff of four
would alternare locatio.rs with the goal of leveling wages, uit tnis
also rner painters in one department ancl even the shop cell complainecl that the "shop
with "sharp dissatisfaction on the part of workers.'irs5 -
adrninistration is not coordinating with us and is playing with workers and
one ploy in manage ment's "divicre a'd conquer,' strategy was to punish
members of the bureau cell.'ió7 An architectural shop party rnember cotn-
y^"I\..: who raised grieva'ces or rvho faired to meet prod.icrior quoras. In plained about the strength of the shop manager) who exhibited a "bad atti-
1925, the party had responded to clissident activity in the fòrrn-casting
a'd tude torvards workers, and ... threatens to fire them. Workers have to subrnit
rolled nreral shops by allocati'g extraorcli'ary raises. By the erd
of 1926, to him in everything.Dló8 In August, the rnain speaker iu a maintenauce shop
the factory party leadership reversecl trris strategy a'd pu'ished resisting
party meeting asserted that the position of the Central Committee was "in
tl"pt. Apparently because of material shorrages, workers i' the fourth mill general cor[ect)" but expressed fears of growing uuetlployment and warnecl,
of the rollecl metal shop did not fulfill their quotas, and r'anageme'r lorv-
"lifè would be more difficult with lower pay:)t6e In November several more
ered their p"y by 3l percent.ì5ó rn october, tlie oGpu ..por,"ã
that rvork- pairlters were again laicl offlvithor.rt notifying the union. One member argued
ers in the fburth r-nill complained that, u¡rcler the collectivË
agree¡re¡t, rheir fhat the "achninistration of the shop has a bad attitude towards tlte trade
pay woulcl nor increase and would instead fàll relative
to that-of other rvork_ union representatives.'170 In April 1927, Trwd, reportecl widespread discon-
ers.l57 In Dece'rber sevellty workers in the fburth urill exprersJ
dirr"tir- tent in the nail shop over layofß. The market fbr nails had been depleted, but
with ma'agernerr's refusal ro pay for idre'ess, a.å petitio'ed the
?:llg"
zu(K. A fèw days later, rhe ocpu again reported rvorkers'complai'ts
the trust only recognized the problem'w,hen the warehouse was full. "Yott are

fourth mill because tl-rey had receìvèd lSorubles rvhile other Åills receivecl
i' the in a position to plan production," workers cornplained, "but because of your
'planning'u'orkers are thrown on the street."lTl While fear of being let go
I70 ro 190 rubles.rss
curbed workers' willingness to speak openll', layofß had the opposite effèct
Tl-rough con.rplex rvage scales rvitrr variatio's betrveen ancr withi'
shops among those already fired. At a May 1927 rally of unemployed in Moscorv,
prornoted the reemerge'ce of *el¿hovshchinø, workers, representatives
speakers claimed "the Communist party has established its dictatorship over
t..tt:t:q parochial shop i'teresrs. A Novcmber l92s clelegates' resol'rior,
the rvorking class and over the entire couutr¡" altd that soviet power was
with I33 fbr a'd o.ly seve'agair.rst, cailecr fbr tl"re leveling of wages, raisi'g
"nothing but a systenr for the deceit and exploitation ofrvorkers."l72
them in so'ne shops rvhile abstaining ir-r tl-rose clepartmints rhit
receivecl The Soviet govenlrrent's "rationalization of production" campaign, inau-
overrrme conrpe'satio'.r5e Iu rg27 ar¡d agai' i' tg2g factory
clelegates gnrated in the spring of L927, was very sirnilar to the 192ó "regitne of ecou-
agai'pressured ma'agement ft¡r more equalizatio' i. the rvaqe
rates.160 olìry." It was arlother attelnpt to cut costs and raise production by increased
 a\ .l
l:
i

104
Rø, o løtion øttd, Coantterret¡ o h¿tion Cløss Conflict r05

use of machinery and trausport rvithin works, a higher

divisio' of labor, a'd been sanctioned as they were rnerely following the lead of party members.
rationalized utilizatio' of fuer. At a time of rnouirti'g unernproymer.ìt,
the Union members suggested transfèrring workers, as mandated by the collec-
plan raised concerrs amorg workers. The chairman ol
vrrrnkiø, kuibyshev, tive agreement, but the workers refused the transfer, returniug to work at
fra'kly ad'ritted, "Rationarizatio' of production inevitably u.ing, about
a 2:30. Party leaders noted that, "uttfortunately, the leaclers of this stoPpage
reductio'ir rhe amou.rt of labor po*èr required to p.oduce the same
out- appear to be party members Zhirov and Koptev" and issued reprimands, but
put. otherwise it would not be rationalizatión.', unliËe the ..regime
of eco'_ none of the members who participated in the action were expelled. They also
omy," the rationalizatior_r plan actually succeeded in holding"dowll
cosrs. reported that ó0 to 65 percent of the strikers had "ties with the village" but
According rc wsenhhø, these fèil by more than 6 percerr duñng
the 1927- noted "llo petty-bourgeois speeches."l79
1928 fiscal year. This success was based o'a r3.s percerìr incrãase
i'pro- During the next shop cell meeting, several members challenged their lead-
ductivity.rT3 The i.tensification of rhe rabor process, real wage
reductiàns, ers. One member protested against the notion of party metnbers acting as
and the exploitarion of the soviet worker r".i. no lo'ger
,"ripo.".y srrate- strikebreakers. "To work was impossible. If workers got Llp and parry rnem-
gies to ameliorate an immediate crisis, but he'ceforth
became integrar corn- bers rvorked, this would not do," he asserted. Moreover, the same member
ponents of the Stalinist industrialization srraregy.
argued, "inclividual comrades should not be blamecl. The fàctory bureau
workers co'ti'ually raised grievances over wages a'd llorms
during late clecision is incorrect." Another member arguecl that there were "many stop-
NEP. In early 1926 conflicts arose "every *or',ih over the piece
ratè.,r2+ pages" in the shop, indicating that short strikes over specific issues were
After a November 1926 strike i. the foim-casti'g shop, a party bureau
irever reported to the fàctory party leaders, tnuch less to the MI(180
member assertecl that among workers in rhe crepartr-,-r.rrr, .;rír.rË
is a co¡sta'r Official union chauuels-rather than state repressiort-ended these dis-
mood favori'g a' Itaria' strike." A fèw weeks later, tire bolt shop
mood putes. Significantly, an oppositiouist, whom the state would brand as "coutl-
"was nor completely of trre piece rate.Ðt75 Roiled meìal shop terrevolutiouary" a few months later, was one of thc leaders of the second
meetings i'April a'dlr:l.ttv- !1c¡use
May r92T ioted strained relations with rna'ageme't strike and was not expelled, rnuch less arrested. Archival research on strikes
because of the wage rate.t76 A later report from the shop
det"ct-J iro a.ti- has uncovered little eviclenèe of arrests of striking workers.tsÌ Mass arrests of
soviet nrood among workers, bdt notecr that trrey ,aiserr m"ny questio's
dissidents, particularly Trotskyists, began only itl the second half of 1927-
about pay and the clelay in lowering cousurler prices.tzT
after the denise of widespread strike activitl'' Incleecl, during mid-NEP the
Two short strikes in the wirrer of 1926-r9i7 involved small nu'rbers
of Soviet Union incarcerated very ferv of its citizens. The entire Soviet prisorl
workers, were isolated to a single shop, and lasted onl1,a fèw
hours. On l5 population was no higher than I50,000, rvith a tiny tniuority irnprisoned for
November 192ó, se'e'ty casters ancl cutters in the forrn-casting
shop orga- political offenses.ls2 Union intervention and the letter of the collective agree-
nized a two-and-a-half l-rour "Iralian" strike after m".,"g.n.ni
rutêcl tÀey lrents were instrumental in resolving strikes. Aggregate data from Eighth
yo¡ld have to pay ftrr brøl¿. workers, claiming that hacr no Congress of Trade Unions in December 1928 show tlìat more than one-third
right to pe'alize them under the collective agreemeut,'-raì-rageme'r
rralted rvork at z:30 of labor conflicts during 1926,1927 , and the first half of 1928 were settlecl
in the mor'i'g. comrnunists in trre shop "took littre part in stoppi'g
trre in arbitration in favor ofworkers, less than one-third in fävor ofmanagement,
strike and adopted a passive stallce except ior the cell secretary,
the J.ion rep- and the remainder had compromise results.rs3 lìecently published OGPU
resentative, a'd one party worker." Trre RKK rrartecr the
stoppage by sidirìg strmmaries from 1922 to 1928 include reports on over three thousand
with the rvorkers and ordered mauagerne't ,,to cha'ge a.,rrpor"iity
trre pay- strikes, but mention only six inciclents in rvhich authorities arrested striking
meur system back to the old method.'r7s Backecl byiire *ord
orat. collec_ l,r,orkers, ancl only fir'e other strikes ir-r rvhich they used or threatel.ìed to use
tive agreement, workers successfìrlly resisted ,ralìageme't attenlpts
to force force.lsa Strikes er-rded by union iutervention and clarification (often on the
er-r'rployees ro pay for k øh.
side of the rvorkers), management satisf ing some or all of the workers'
A January 7927 strike oste'sibly developecl over a lack of heat
i' the shop, clernands, the dispute being sent to arbitration, all sicles agreeing to revisit the
but i' reality centered on wâge distributioìr. workers insisted
o, cornpe.sa- disputed issues, or, in some cases) mallagelnent fìring workers or threatelling
tion l'or work performed duri'g the rrolicray, bur ma'agement argued
trrat to close the fäctory.l85
they clid not have rhe mo'e¡ arcl that pay ivoulcl be diltributed
teerlth of the mo'th. At mid-mo'ri.g oi the fourtee'th,
o"n the fif: In both Hammer and Sickle strikes in the winter of 1926-1927, u'orket's
some thirty-fìve understood the details of the collective agreement. In the first strike, they
workers (inclLrdi'g party staìed that they could not work because
'rer'bers) realized that management hacl gorte beyond the bounds of tl-re contract al"rd
of i'adcquarc heat. The oppositionist Zhiro' a'd another rvorker wce.t to the believed with justificatiou that the povverful lìKI(rvould side with them. The
fàctory oflìce to explai' the situatio'. The fàctory commirree presiderr
and second strike was ill-conceived iu terms of the collective agreement. In both
another col.nnrittee r,ember then enterecl the shop ancl askecl
nånparty *ork_ strikes, party members either passively or actively sllpported the actions aucl
ers if it was possible ro u'ork. The idle *orkeÀ poi'tecr
to a group trr^t party participation gave the stoppages an umbrella of legitimacy. In both
i'clucled party a'd saicr, "Just like them,'; rrea'i'g thatictio' hacl
're'rbers strikes union reDresentatives understood that their task was to resolve the

r06 Rep o lation ønd. Coøn terrev
issue as quickly as possitrle, but they were not rnerely maragelnent
dupes: all
concerned recognized the importance of the collective aqreement.
The
scrutiny devoted to the official investigation of the strike revJals rhe serious-
ness with which tl-re party viewed strike action. party members
were llever-
theless caught i' the co'rradicory role of t.yi,rg to be both loyal
party
members ar-rd shop-floor leaders at a time when state policy was rnovi'g
more decisively against the interest of labor.
To facilitate the irnplementatio. of wage cuts, collective agreemenrs were
lo'ger ope'ly disc*ssed i' large mass meetiugs. 'll-re seve'Ih rrade union
'o
congress in December 1926 called for keepir-rg workers ,,informecl,, about
the negotiations between trusrs a'cl u'io's while the u'ited oppositio'
advocated that "collective agreeme'ts shall be made after real and
ficti-
tious discussions at workers' meetir.rgs."l86 In November 1927 one'ot worker
respo'ded to Tomsky's accusatio's against the British tracle unio.l bureau-
cracy by aski'g, "comrade Tornsky,, tell us rvh¡ ir-r finalizi'g the
new collec-
tive agreement, Hamrner and Sickle Factorl, workers did nát know about
it
and why was it not discussed in the gener.al meetingl,'rsz
The Decisive Year: 1928 ¡ offensive actions during early NEP when the working class, rather than the
The fi'al year of NEP was poterìtially the'rost explosive,. I' the counrryside,
tlre specter of fàrnine retur'ed after the back-to-back poor harvest s in l9z7
and 1928.In early 1928, under the pretext that "kllaks,, were hoardi'g
grain and with a shortage of courn-rodities to offer,i'retu'r. the resime
returned to a policy ofgrain requisitio'i'g similar ro war comrnu'isrn. Bi
the
surnrner) peasarts had revolted in ls0 different villages, slaughtered
cattle,
and beat and murdered local offìcials. The crisis in theior-rntryJde resou¡ded
i' the cities as shortages led to the rei'troductio' of rationing. ny Mag food
riots were reported in many cities, i'cludi'g Moscow. As Michal Riema'
has
argued, the crisis was much deeper than a temporary phenomenon-it
was
the result of deep structural problems of the fina'cially strapped soviet
sys-
tem, of a society that lacked inter'al resources fb,r induiirial expa'sio'
beyo'cl restoration to the prervar level.rt.r By the encl of NEp, the breakdow'
of outclated industrial machinery ar-rd equipment hacl become epcle¡ric. After
production fèll dramatically in the rast rwo morths of 1927,I(uibyshe'
described tl-re economic situation as "clisastrous.', The ,rror.
rural
policy was matched i. rhe facrories as parry leaders embarked "gjr.rsive
o"ria risky solu-
tion lry nrardati'g firrther sacrifices. Near the e'cl of 1927 vesercl¿hø and.
vrsSPS issued a directive "on overcoming Low producrio'
e.oras,, ro
raise i'tensity of work, to lorver qualifications of workers, arcl to io, ,""g.r.
This re'erved ofïènsive against the worki^g class did ,-,oi go u'challe'g1cl;
strikes broke out ir several large factories includi'g the Þutilo' works
in
(uow renamed) Leningrad, and the Hammer ancl Sickle Factory.tse
Top secret 1928 reports i'clude h''dreds of pages of lists of prorests
across the country. By the fàll of Ì928, as Vlaclimir-Brovkin conclucles. ..The
temperature of frustratio' at the fàctories a'd pla'ts rose, reacll, to
boil
:
l
o httion Cløss Conflict t07
over.'leO Recently published monthly OGPU reports confit'm this assess-
ment. Wrile the OGPU reported "anti-Soviet" worker sentiments through-
out NEP, by 1928 workers' grievances had beconre more political aucl brazeu
during labor conflicts, with openly anti-party speeches and workers shouting
down party loyalists-widespreacl u,ot'king-class allger rìot seell since l92l-
1922. By the sumrner, the deteriorating food supply strengthened workers'
receptiveness to oppositionist and anarchist agitation. The OGPU also
reported repeated disturbances of unernployed rvorkers at labor exchauges
throughout the Soviet lJnion. By September, workers' factory meeting
speeches expressed strong dissatisfaction against the policies ofthe party and
food cooperatives. The next rnonth the mood of workers in the majority of
enterprises with supply difficulties worsened, rvhile oppositionists stepped up
their agitation as the collective agreelrent car"r"rpaign began.lel
The two short economic strikes at the Halììmer and Sickle in early l92B
indicate workers' increased fì'ustration rvith party and managemellt tactics.
Workers struck on February ó and again on March 15 against the lowering
of wages by 20 percent. These, the last Lwo known stoppages in the fact-ory,
follorv the general trend of strikes at the end of NEP and coutrast with tl're
state, was on the offensive. Reports elservhere reflect this pattern of contin-
ued low-level participation in strike activity. Stoppages lasting nrore thal'l a
day rvere rare: the overwhelming majority lasted a fèw hours, aud some.only
fìfteen minutes. Aggregate strike data fron L926 and 1927 also shorv iso-
latecl, short stoppages rvith very fèw participallts.le2
The first strike in the bolt shop shook the ¡'rarty organization. The cell
secretary rernincled members that in the event of a conflict, it was uecessary
to go through the proper channels. One lnember challenged this notion,
charging that the "factory cornmittee is to blame fbr the strike because they
had failed to pay attention to workers' petitions over the preceding five
months."le3 A detailed report on the stoppage and the nrood of vtorkers
shou's that sixty press operators stopped lvork ftrr one ancl a half l-rours
because ol dissatisfàction ove r picce rates. Afìcr the director's assistatrt
explained to them that the rates rvould be taken up as dre top priority in the
f-orthcorning collective agreenÌent, all the press operators returuecl to rvork.
The party organized a commission to investigate tlìe strike and called a
meeting for l8 February. Three days before the meeting, maltagelreltt
decided to disrniss one of the strike leaders, Stepanov, under the preterlse
that he had ref-usecl transfer to anothef press. A member olthe commission
suggestecl postponing Stepanov's disurissal "because the workers could
interpret it as a reprisal against one of the leaders of the conf'lict." The
adrninistration refised, and Stepanov received his disn-rissal pay on the day
of the rneeting. Sixty people, but only ten of eighty cotntnunists, attended
the extraorclinary shop ureetiug.
Workers u4ro spoke r.r¡r placecl all the blame ft,r the stoppage on the fìrctor1, corn-
mittee and ¡rdlrrinistration. A c¿ncliclirte party rnember justified the stopp:-rge :rncl
 i

:
a
/?
*
l

l0B R epoht tiou øn ¡l Coøntcrrct,ohltion Cløss Conflict r09

threatetlecl to repeat the strike if the mi-rny deficiencies in

the shop rvere not elim- anotlìer delegates'meetiug focused on the management's lowering of wage
inated (vcr.rtilzrtion, etc.). Workers listene ci to speeches by the
clirector a¡cl cell sec- categories ancl the twenty-three point collective agreement, which aPpar-
retary br-tt u'ithout approval. I u,rote the c-lrafiresolution with
three rnain
l. Admittir-rg the iucorrect p;rth that u,orkers chose to resolve the co'flict.points: 2. A
ently was preseuted in a confused nanner. One delegate asked the speaker to
thorough invesdgation of the RKK mernber's behavior tovvarcls sirnply state the wage rates and the percentage difference with the previous
workers, com-
plaints. 3. A reexamination of the per_itern rate. rate. A,nother asked, "Why are the wage and skill gr4des being imrnediately
This resolution dicl_'otreceive a single ..fbr,'vote. Mauy workers lowered by three categories, when Moroz said at the factory conference that
spoke up a'cl
said that the resolution judgecr workers' behavior i'correctry.
Maìry of thenr they r'vould only be lowered by trvo, but we see ninth lowered to sixth, eighth
stressed that Stepirnov's dismissal is the fàctory organizations'
arìswer to the jrrsti- to fifth, and seventh to fourth categoryl" Only eight of the thirry questiolls
fìed demands of the workers. The shop cell secret:rry erncl rhe referred to the general collective agreement; the remainder concerued trade,
union represe¡tari'e
who chaired the meeting clid not help change the irroocl of the shop, or even individual issues, illustrating the cornplexity of the collective
lneeti¡g by their
speeches and even n-racle it u,orse. Sorne of the workers
¿lttemptecl to put to a vote agreefilent, but also the retreat ou the part of workers. Three workers rvere
the question of u'hether the clislnissal of Stepanov vvas correct
l¡ut rve succeeded i' concerned about staff reductious, and one asked, "If a worker was ill for three
avoicling the vote.l9
nÌonths but his sickness was the fault of the factor¡ not his, rvould he be
3Ì The state-loyalist orchesrrated sessio' ma'aged ro l.ììaintain cortror
firedl" Another delegate's questiol-r shorvs the individual rather than collec-
of the tive concern of mauy workers: "If they lo'ivered the wage and skill grade of a
fèstering hostility. Tho_ugh workers atte'ptãd to resist nìanage'rellr's
cris- worker and he did not \vant to work at this rate but wallted to leave the fac-
rnissal of o'e of the strike leaders, they sirnply dicl not have
rhe ão'fìde'ce ro tory, would they give him flvo $'eeks' Paylut'tz
take over the meeti'g a'd resist victimizatio' as they had i'
early NEp. The Party rnembers' econornic "tailism" continued throughout 1928. In Feb-
regime became more adept at isolating ancl neutralizing strike
actio¡, a¡d it ruary, a party bureau speaker warned against further pay reductions in the
rvas partially successfttl at
Prevelrting inter-factory and inlra.fàctory soliclarity bolt shop, where repeated incidents "prove that the øhtip are weak." Cotn-
By 1928, the state offensive hacl not attainecl the effèctiveness it rvould
later plaints about lorvering thé wage and skill grades of hundreds of workers u'ere
acquire in preernpti'g srike acrior.r, but it had succeeded i'
shifti'g the col_ noted, "even among party ffietnbers" and the ltext month party leaders
lective agreelÌìents in favor of the state.
vowed "to liquidate doubts aud wavering of certain comrades" on questiolìs
widespread disco'tent over wage recluctio's resurfàcecl i'a March
dele- related to the Fifteenth Congress, grain procuremerlt, and the "tailisln" on
ga es' meedng. A representative f'rom the electrical shop,
Torkunov, tnrned the collective agreement.letl In May, workers in the rolled metal slrop peti-
to factory director Stepa'ov a'cl said, "you should ,.,n"Áb.. that
rvhe' you tioned the RKK for a l0 percent wage iucrease. The RI(I( refused but the
paid us poorly, rve worked poorly a'd e'gi'es were damaged
every clay.,, The director, fàctory committee, and cell all backed dowu aucl offered a 5 percent
director branded this statement '(connterrevolutionary,' th. issue topped increase. Workers remained unsatisfiecl, threatening to strike in three days if
the age'da at the "i-,d
electrical shop meeting. Torkrurov
'ext. attempted to they did not receive l0 percent, but a stoppag€ was avertecl. At the next
explai' his behavior i' the delegates' meeri'g to his shop nlates. He
stated bureau lneeting, the speaker depictecl the lrehavior of party rnembers in the
"when the wage a.d skill grades go c{ou,n, thé workers gèt co'rpletely
over- rolled rnetal shop as "disgraceful" and called for a "closed session of the
rvorked a'd everyo'e will work as rvell chasing aftãr rubres. Besides, I
'otthe whole shop.', Th=e entire cell to clarifli whether mistakes had been made in carrying out the col-
spoke for myself a'd not for speaker asserted, lective agreement."lee In November, several bolt shop metnbers rejected the
"Torkuuov clid'ot speak just f.r hirnserf,, but for the'ext entirË srrop.,, several parq¡ line in the departtneut atìd other meurbers reportedly "rvavered."200
par.ty loyalists challenged this point, and the shop meeting,
war)/ of the impli_ The leader of a srnall revolt iu the steel fbundry shop in Decentber 1927 ,
cations of such all opelì challenge to the aclnriuìstration,-ultimately
passed a Shashkin, sparked another protest in August 1928. The conflict arose tllere
resolr-rtion that "resolutely protests against such speeches"
ancl sent copy of because "some workers u,ere dissatisfìed rvith the strengther-ring of disci-
the declaratiou to the director.ìe5 While the resolution contraclictecl "
workers, pline." A group of workers "attempted to incite a bacl relationship between
sentime uts, it also shows ernployees' increasingly silent flustrations
a¡cl their party and nonparty" aud "spoke against the party and Soviet goverllmetlt."
lack of collecive resolve to chailenge the loyalìsis. A lg2l
MI( report The shop cell resolved to expel Shashkin, rvhom the cell admitted, enjoyed
nunle rous si'rilar cases of "direct acts of viole'ce" 'otecl
or threats åf uior.,l.. "authority amolìg nonparty workers."20l At an August delegates' lncetil'lg,
against foremell, technical personnel ancl clirectors, which it
characterized as several representatives spoke against lrìanagers in their shops. A rolled metal
"a terrorist atrnosphere in the factories and plants."rqo
shop delegate argued, "The aclministratiou in the shop has a very bad atti-
Individual threats, rather rhan collective intimidation as in l9lz, indicate
tucle toward tl-re clelegates aud sometimes sweats at tlÌem. This simply canllot
the weak'ess of tire rvorkers' positio' as party fì,rctio'aries u,erÉ
able to be allowed." ,{ representative from the bolt shop said, "There were tillles
control clelegates' rneeti'gs, a'cr repeatedlypasiecl resolutio's against
u,ork- when our shop manager was callecl to the Lrnion office where he was tolÌgue-
ers' i'terests. Thirty rvrirte. queitio.s posed to thã speaker at ." Thus, some workers
'raterial lashed. Since that time, he has r-rot beeu an obstacle
 rs

Repolwtion øn d Coø.ntcrrepolwtion Cløss Conflict llt

conrinued to believe the union still exerted co'siderable leverage
over rran- non-oppositionist workers throughout the city distributed and posted teus of
agemenr. A'ail shop delegate reported a co'flict with the shop iranager, but
thousands of their leaf'lets.212
noted that "we explained to him the rights of delegates ì-epreseptatives
"nd Opposition strength in the factor)' reached its zenith in the fall. A party
and siuce then there was no problern."2¡2
report claimed that six Trotskyists and unnamed supporters "spoke very g1-¡st-
Workers expressed increased frustration vvith their tracle u¡io¡ represenra-
getically in the collective agreernent carnpaigt-t under one slogan: raise work-
tives. Bolt shop dissatisfactio' over wage scales for the new
seconcl shift led €rs'pay."2ì3 In November, Mørtenouleø complained that Bakanov "still tries to
to several atterxpts ro stop work.203 Fire brigade members blamed rhe
factory fill other workers' heads rvith Trotskyist ideas."214 In the steel foundry shop,
comrnittee for ignoring their concems and wanted to know ..why we
receive oppositionists argued for wage increases and a party loyalist adrnitted, "The
Iower pay tha' other workers."2,4 o'e brigade worke*oggerí.d
that the authority of Lebedev quickly increased. Iu the first shift there was a large
"factory committee, has lost or has ahlost l,rst its authoritliímong rvorkers
in regards to-the wage-rate poricy. Tha'ks to this, the'rass of workers'i.ter- group of oppositionists."2rs Trwd. reported that, "Itt the Flammer and Sickle
est is weak."205 Ma'y speakers i' a septernber'air shop
Factory, Trotskyists called for supporting workers in other factories who have
meeti'g criticizecl the raised demands for wage increases."2ió Sr-rpport for the Opposition included
work of the RKI! the fàctory committee, ancl the ,,i,-,zuftìcie,r.i"es,'
in the col- the union bureau chairrnan of the ftrrm-casting shop and a factory cotnl¡ittee
lective agreelnent) particularly in "raisi'g the pay of lower workers.,,
Numer- mernber. The United Opposition activity expanded in the fàctory to the point
ous "nrisdeeds" of the RKI( caused "ma'y t"otkaat to suffer," accorcli'g
to at rvhich "recently the opposition group have developed their work up to cre-
one worker, while another speaker asserted that ,,lnembers of
the factory ating cells" and even called their owll meeting in late Decenber.2l7
committee and representatives fàll in line rvith the administration
and are Trotskyist agitation over bread-and-bLltter issues gave other workers cotl-
afÌaid to sta'd firm a'd defe'd workers'iurerests.,'se'eral bolt shop
speakers fidence during the collective agreetrrellt campaign. A report to the Centrâl
raised similar criticisms about the "foot draggiug', of the RI(K
ar-rd com_ Committee complained that "counterrevolutiouary elements" were "not
plai'ecl about rhe low piece rareb.206 ln ociouei, a speaker in
the ftrrm- alrvays given a rebuff by the party." Trotskyists agitated for wage increases
casting shop attributed flaggi'g support for'the fàctory cornmittee
to ..the, and against an increase in production. The cable sþop uuanimously agreed to
large of declarations fronì rhe workers, more tharl half-ofwhich rvere
'umber
decided agai'st rheln." Moreover, employees' productioir suggestio's the oppositior.lists' resolution to raise pay, "while leaders who were present
were were stubbornly silent." The steal fbundry also accepted an oppositioriist
lÌot carried out. "This says that the factory commirtee does ,rãT alrvays
co'- resolution to raise pay by 5 percent. The GPU reported that evett party
sider the opinions of workers and therefore they are not active.,2,z
In the melnbers in the F{amrner and Sickle Factory spoke "against the part}¡ line"
steel foundrl', one rvorker complai'ed that "foocr prices are goir-rg
up a'd pay
is not, it has become difficult for workers ro live .,, A'other during the collective agreement discussions. Hard-line state loyalists had to
pär.í.j rhar, ,,ir-r resort to heavy-handed rneasures, aucl the resolutious were rejected only after
1926 we re-'egotiated the collective agreeme't a¡rd wË worked
ress but
received more" and proposed that tl-re ;'factory committee "repeated clarification of the question.'218 A December delegates' meeting
should devote gives an insight into the role of Stalinist supporters and shows that their
serious attentiorl to this i' the agreeme't." other'r,orkers criti-
cized the RKK,'oting that 'egotiating
the rnajority of cà'flicts rvere decided in fàvor of assertiol'rs did r-rot go unchallengecl:
mallagenent.2's similarly, six speakers i' a November l92B
ftrrnr-casti'g Comrade Kochin: (repair shop) ... Is it correct to r¿rise the c¡uestion of raising payì
shop meeting criticized rhe work of the RI(K a'd factory co'rmitree.2'e
The expellecl u'ited oppositio'led the most orga'izecl challe'ge
I think it lvoulcl be incorrect. We should incre¿rse productivity and tl.rus we will
to trre lower the costs of production. Our comrades who ¿rre f'ortner oppositior-rist now
Stali'ist secrio' of the party i' 192g, clespite the iapid escalation of
srare call f'or raising vl,ages. They seek every possible way to disrupt our collective
repression. Oppositionists operated rvith afearless abandon
relniniscent of agreelnent...
revolutionary activity in the late Tsarist period. The secret police
convictions
tn 1928-1929 exceeded rhe cor.nbi'ed tãtal fbr the six previous years, a'd Comracie Chernyshev (fbrrn-casting shop): On the cluestion of ptr¡ Comr¿rde
the Kochin is nor correcr thrt in the f'onn-casting ¿urd rolled rnetal shops that this rvas
1.930 total (208,069) exceeded that for lg22-lgzg.2ì,,Trotrkyirts
esrir¡are proposecl by ftrrrner oppositionists. In our shop this question w¿ts put ftrrwarcl
that state ftrrces arrested or deportecr at least eight thousa'cr ípporters
by because there are large discrepancies between shops on n'age ancl skill grades. It is
1928.2rt Yet oppositionists agitìtecr succe ssfìrlly ãrourd ..o,.,o,.,-,i.
polit- this very disparity that workers suggested rrcljusting ...219
ical issues and created strong orga'izatio's in the Dorbass, ",rd
I'a'ovo_vozne _

se'sk, Tula, l)nepropetrovsk, Saratov, a'd ma'y ukrainian cities. I'Moscorv,

Many workers' complaints ftrcusecl on supplies aud rclations with the
Trotskyist supporrers put fbrwarcl resolutio's for free elections to
the sovi- countryside. The year before, three-fburtl'rs of the u'orkers had holdings in
ets' agairrst the søncol¿r'itikø canpaign, for the resci'cling of the
cleportatio' countryside, though "recently, it can be noted that tvorkers are breaking ties
of oppositiorists, ftrr collective agrîemert rvage i'creales, arcl suppo.ti,rg
striking u'orkers. Trotskyist supporr ir.r Moscou, was so rvidespread
with tl-re village" and had moved their fàmilies to the ,ity.t"' One worker
ti-,"t ,r,"rry arqued that while "horse drivers fèed breacl to the horses, workers clo not
 tL2 R n o lati on ttnd C|Lt nterrep
have enough.-221 Private notes to speakers reveal vvidespread rank-and-file
party disconteut. Thirty of thirty-three questions to the speaker at an August
party plenum concerned eìther provisions or relations with the peasantry.
one member agreed with the speaker's claim that kulaks had clisrupted grain
collection the precedingyear, but then stated, "The governlnent was also at
fault because they dict not prepare goods in time. To make such nistakes is
inexcusable." Two mernbers asserred that the grain supply was so depleted
that peasants were mixing bread with adclitives such as fur, and complained
that while the speaker "talked a lot about supplying bread to the cities," the
state neglected to make provisions for "supplying poor peasanrs with bread.
where u,ould the poor peasanrs fìnd seven rubles for one pud of flourì They
are now in a situation like 19l9." Another mernber suggested that,,.poor
peasants in the village are dissatisfied with soviet rule." one member wanted
to knorv "why has the volost committee lÌot taken measuresf The poor peas-
allts are hungry." Three questioned the speaker on soviet grain exports, one
member asked how much was exported in the previous )¡ear) and another
wanted to know: "Hor- much grain will be exported in 19291,, A,ri inquisi-
tive me mber âsked, "You said that grain was not exported last year,, but then
where did all the grain gol" one member insisted it was "lìecessary ro srop
feedir-rg the horses with grain." A.nother note requested that the åpeaker "Tell
us whether or not there will be bread, reserves in case of neecl." Two months
later, party mel-nbers complained about bread lines. "Who and what," asked
one member, "caused the food shortagel" Another note asked, in refèrence
to the grain collection campaign, if "grain will be taken forcibly fiom the
peasants lgain."222
GPU summaries froln around the soviet union affìrr¡r workers' syrnpathy
with the plight of the peasanrry during the crisis of late ¡gp.zza Two ques-
tions fi'om Ha¡lrner and sickle rvorkers were provocative enough to reach
the central conrmittee information department. "Tell us comrade," askecl
one rvorker, "what is tl"re danger of organizing a peasant uuiou, and will it be
organized?" Another worker flom the factory wanted to knorv if ,,there u,ill
be equality for everyone livir-rg in the Soviet Union and if so, when)"22a Sev-
eral anonymous rlotes passcd to Central Committee mernber Mikoyan in
March conveyed extrerne hostility torvards tl-re regime. "Peasallts sholrt: the
king is a plunderer!" one notecl. "But even workers have no life." Another
rvorker objected to the regime's definition of the term 'kulak.'
comrade speaker, ¿rt every rneeting all u,e he¿rr fiom yor.r is th¿rt the vilhge has
kul¿rks. It see ltls to me th¿rt Soviet pou,er has e xisted r-rot jnst fbr ten dirys bnt fbr
tctl yeårs, cverytl-ring has been equalizecl, but even if a peastrnt has one horsc, one
co\á, or several sheep then you cor-rsicler him a kulak. If you exirrnine the villergers
¿ruci then estim¿lte ,vour possessions, the fìgures rvill show u,ho is the kul¿'rk lrasecl
or-r possessions.225
Such hostile private notes again shorv l-row the tl-rreat of r-rnernployrnent
afïècted rvorke rs'be havior. Mørtenouleø acknorn leclged that some wo[kers "are
afiaid to utter a word" because the¡r þsl¡sr.4 that "if you say sorîethillg, they
0 lxtti1n Cløss Conflict tI3
will shorv you the gate" while other workers were "apathetic about every-
thìng." While some rvorkers had become more political in their statemeuts, firr
rnany others the threat of unemployment, political apathy, and individual
ratlìer than collective solutions acted as barriers to collective solidariry. Thc
newspaper challenged the assertion that anyone could be fired for expressing
tlreir opinion and urged nonparty rvorkers to particiPate in the sørnoleràtikø
campaign because they have "a lot to say about undisciplir-red tnembers."22ó
Workers failed to overconÌe the divisions within the workforce that weak-
ened their resistauce. Whereas early NEP tselehovshch'inø was partially over-
come as stoppages spread to other shops, all fbur of the four late NEP strikes
included or-rly part of the workforce iu one shop-fiom strike reports this was
the norm throughout the Soviet Union. Similarly, a raucous factory com-
mittee election in the rolled rnetal shop was split along generational lines,
with older male workers placir-rg particular blanre for problems in the shop ou
women.22z Such generational divisions also surfàced at fàctory production
conferences, with overwhelmingly older male participants and with less than
3 percent of young rvorkers participating.22s
Speakers at a December union lneeting challenged the form aud coutent
of the collective agreement. Party loyalists held the line and pusl-red tl-rrough
the agreernent by "repeated clarification" of questions. One dissiclent argued
that the campaign was conducted "too hurriedly," while another complained,
"rvorkers do uot understand the new plan of remutteratiolt." Several rvorkers
addressed the underlying issue, one complaining that production savings
were "being taken out of workers' pockets."22e The party reprimanded two
members for breaking party discipline during a production lneetillg, oue of
whorn had cornplained: "They squeeze and oppress us, ancl suck our blood
dry.'230 Such were the sentiments of oLltspoken pa[ty me¡rþers, theoretically
those most sympathetic to the regime's aspiratious.
Late I928 recalls the crisis of the sumrìer of l9l5: a rapidly deteriorating
political ancl economic etnergeucy that suddenly callecl into question tl-ìe
regime's ability to rule; rampaut f'ood shortages witl-r unruly unemployed on
the streets; rvidespreacl discontent in the armecl forces; aud the reernergence
olan "us against theln" ynentølité amoltgst a signifìcant Section of the rvork-
ing class-rvith revolutionaries playing a catalytic role iu sparking protests.
But the retum to workers'activism in l9l5 took place within the larger con-
text of a long-term trend torvards rnilitancy and activism only briefly inter-
rLlpted by the vvar, whereas the 1928 crisis occnrred within tl're fi'amervork of
a gelÌeralized retreat, with many rvorkers continuing to look for reform
rvithin existing rvorkplace ir-rstitutions. Moreover in l92B there was no inci-
dent similar to the Lena nìassacre) the proroguing of the Dutna, or evetl olÌe
significant strike in the capital that might have reverberated as a "call to
actiol-t" alrtotlg wider groups of rvorkers. That ernerging Stalinism uratraged
to weatlÌer the stonn has tended to obscure what is now discernible: a nar-
ro\4/ gap beñveen rviclespread working-class reselìtment aud open revolt.
The demise of workers' rnilitancy is the ceutral issue of early Soviet labor
l-ristory. More than a decade after the opening of the archives of the former
Soviet Uniou, llo olte today could possibly echo the "speculative" revisionist
 Lt4 Rev o løtiot t. øn d Countcrrep
al'gumerlt that Stalinism rvas able to clraw on significant rvorking-class sup-
port. Similarly, we now know that state repression cluring NEP was in no way
comparable to the regular okhrana roundups of shop floor rnilitants during
late Tsarism-a period when the rvorkers' lnoveüìeut was olt the upswing,
despite arrests. To be sure, when rolling mill workers lnarched to the direc-
tor's office rvith their tongs they u,ere hardly intimidated by the early Soviet
regime. The opening of the archives allows us to move beyond the Cold War
mythology that rested on funclamentally flarved misunderstandings of how
the early Soviet system fultctionecl. Workers were neither terrorized by the
early Soviet state llor irnpressed rvith evolving Stalinism.
Workers'rvords and actious show that the decline in strike action can only
be explained rvith reference to the transformation olworkplace institurions
and workers' collective loss of confidence. At the beginning of the era, work-
ers knocked the state on its heels and aggressively articulated their demands
in boisterous mass meerings. They convened their owrl rneetillgs in which
they could determine their own srraregy and organized collective defense
against victirnization. Early NEP strikes were uor simply driven fi.or¡t below-
parry and union organizations championed the cause of labor. Moreover, in
order to contain rank-and-file anger and preveut work stoppages, favorable
collective agreelnellts, and RKK decisions had to.reflect sympathy with work-
e[s' concen'ìs. This "uneasy contpromise," as first noted by Carr and Dãvies,
accounts for the cessatiotl of strike activity during NEP. Yet the truce
between rvorkers and state graclually e roded, as the state's increasingly pro-
ductivist labor policy becalne less tolerant of party and uniorl lnembers rvho
did not confbnn to rl-re state's objectives. Factory n'ìallagelnent also benefited
p indirectly fì'om the economic crisis ol late ÑEp beiaLrse rnauy workers
became increasingly defènsive and sougl'rt individual .rather than collective
solutions to their problems. The threat of unernploynent) as in many soci-
p
eties, helped shift the balance in favor of management.
By the end of NEP, discontent reverberated in the factory. Workers no
longer wauted to join the party rnany discontent members wanted to leave,
F
and grievances that had been almost exclusively economic became more
politically charged. Such sentiments reflectecl the srare's fàilure to deliver on
F its egalitarian promises and the decision by the stalinist leadership to make
$ rvorkers pay fòr industrializariolt ancl silence dissent. Horvever, a gap devel-
oped benveen rvorkers' increasingly hosrile atritudes towarcls the party and
þ state and their own confidence to take actiou. State loyalists rnanaged to
control meetings, victimize clissidents, and use the threat of ur.remployrnent
to discipline the workfbrce. Nevertheless, the history of the Russian rvorking
$
class in fìrst third of the century rn as marked by volatile shifts in working-class
F
moods, with festering hostility ofien escalating to revolt-the regirne's rri-
Ë urnph over the rvorking class was not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, the
state and its loyalists rvere fàr fì'om invincible. To be sure, the Stalinist u.ìove-
ment aspired to or-r'rr.ripoteuce, but it .rvas burclened with deep cracks in its
$
ranks and, paradoxically, benefìtecl fiom the fàilure to implemenr ,,irol-t
uuity." Even nonparty workers repeatedly looked to party dissenters for leacl-
I ership and change within the existing fàctory systenl. This hope ftrr refbrm
I
I
i
Ìi
t
o ht tion Cløss Conflìct It5
explains the fàilure of workers to build new independent networks to chal-
lenge the increasingly antilabor state policy. Given that workplace iustitutions
had earlier responded s)¡mpathetically to their concerns) workers' expecta-
tions that they could pressure thel¡ to do so again were quite logical.
Notes
l. Fo¡ exanrple, Á,ndrerv P<>spielovskl', in "strikcs l)trring the NEP," Revofutionøt'y Rttssiø,
10, I ( 1997) notes tl'rat ¿fier 1922 reports ofworkcr i¡rrests \r¡ere rarc but àsserts th¿t it is
"likely that leacling shop-floor organizers u,ere auestecl in tlre gencral roundups <lf'anti-
Soviet' elements" such as SRs and Mensheviks. Willianl Chase, in Worhers, Society, ønd the
Soviet Støte,299, takcs a diarnetrically opposed vierv, assertitrg that workers were irnprcssed
with St¿linis¡n such that by 1928-1929 "the party ancl rvorkcrs, especially urtran tvorkcrs,
refìrrged the olcl alliance of l9I7- 1918."
2. C¿rr and Davies, Foøntløtions of ø Plønned' Econowy, l: 544 '
3. Pospielovsk¡ "Strikes Durirrg the NEP."
À
Chase, Worhers, Society, øød the Souiet Støte, 105, 107 , 312.
5. TsMAM, t. 176, op. 2, d.. 107. Ernpl<ryment statistics.
6. TsAODM, f. 429, <>p. l, d.. 62,1. 3ó. Party report, u.cl. Se¡rternber 1927.
7. Mørtenothø, 3 Jantary l))Ç.
8. GAIìF, f. 7952, ctp.3, d. 200, l. 30. Pr<>duction lìgurcs fiom 19l3 t<'¡ 1932.
9. Desiøtyi s'ezrl RI(P(ú) (Moscorv, 1963) 404.
I0. Dewar, Ltiltor Policy in thc USSR, 2l t. Although NEP is oftcn ¿ss<¡ciated with privatc cap-
italism, at the height of NEP only 18.8 perce¡lt ()f wàgc carlìcrs wcre empl<ryed in the ¡rri-
vate scctor. Isa¿c Deutsche¡ Souiet Trøde Unìoøs (Lontlon,1950),67 '
Lcrvis Siegelbaunt, Souiet Støte ønd. Society Beartecn Revoløtiotts, I9l8-1929 (Canrbriclgc,
1992). l0l.
t2. Dewar, Løltor Policy irt' the USSR,228-234.
13. Il.W. Davies ¿nd S.G. Whcatcroft chapter "Population," iu Thc Economic Trønsformøtion
of the Soviet tJnion, t9I3-).945 (Cambr:itlge, 1994) ccls lì.W. Davies, S.G. Wheatcroft, and
Mark Harrison, ó2-ó3.
14. TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. l74,ll. 29-30. Combined rvotltert's ancl delegatcs' ureetirtg, ó
l)ecember t923 ancl s.onlen's general mecting, n.d. l)ecclnbel 1923.
I5. Mørtenoph ø, 2 I November 1925.
Ió. Mørtenotthø, 23 December ì927.
t7. TsMAM, [. 176,t'tp. d. 5ó8, 1.94. Factory cotuuittee report, April 192ó through April
1927.
t8. For exanrple, Mørtenopl¿ø dcnouncetl one metrbet in the bolt shop u4ro lrad reftrsecl to
give a da1,'s wage in supp()rt t>f the ßritish general strike, lrut at the request of the party
bnt'eau, lre agrced ttl acklrou4edgc lris "errtlt'" in the fàcttlr¡' llewspàper' Mørtettot'ltø' 12
Jrne 1926, TsAODM, f . 429, <tp. l, d. 49, ll. 33-34. A bolt sht>1'r pàrt)¡ brtreatt rleeting,
26Jily 1926.
I9. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7, d. 54,1. I I7. OGPU infirrtl¿tion sur-rìr'nàr')/' 9-12 May 1926-
20. 'fsMAM, f. 176, <>p.2, t|.403,L 24; tl.545, Il. 5, ó, 9, I I. Factory general meetings, 25
Marclr 1925, 7 May 1926,6 July, 17 August 1926, 14 September 192ó.
zL. TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. 403,l. 24; d. 545, ll. 5, 6, 9, I I . Fact<>ry genclal rreetings, 2 5
M¿rclr 1925, 7 ltlay lÇ/6,6 Jvly,17 AugLrst 192ó, 14 Septerlbcr 1926
22 TsMAM, f. 176, <-tp. 2, tl. 403,1. 24; d.545, ll. 5, ó, 9, 1ì. Factcxy ge neral n-rectings, 25
Merch 1925, 7 May 1926,6 Jttly, 17 August 192ó, 14 Septembcl I92ó.
 IIó Rø, o lation ønd Cottnterret, o løtion Cløss Coøflict tt7

24. lslODM,f. 429, op. I, d. 56, L Só. parry ¡rlenum, ó Novcurbcr t927.
?1 TsMAM,f. ó2. Hiro¿ki Knromiya, Stølin's lt¡.t|.østriøl Revolwtion, Politics øøcl. Worhers, 1928-1932 (Can
176,<.tp.2,! 401,1.24;d,.54S-, ll.S,ó,9, ll.Factor.ygeneral r.neetings,25
Merch 1925, 7 May 1926, 6 Jul5,, 17 August 192ó, ì4 September -191ó. bridge, 1988), 36.
25. TsAoDM,f.429,op. l,d.bó, l.só.partt,plcnum,óNovcmberlg2T.Nicohsaccr>a'd 63. Mørtenovhø, 12 October 1928.
Bart<¡lt¡nreo va¡rzetti u'ere anat'chists arrester{ fìrr rotrbery 64. TsAODM, f.429,<tp.l, d.87, 1.8. l(cpairsht4r party bttreau trreetit.tg, l8 January 1928.
and rnurdcr in South Rraintrce, ó5. TsAODM, f . 429, o¡'t. l, d. 86, ll. 56, I I l. l{trlled metal sht>p parr¡' mectings, l7 October,
M¿ssachusetts duling the "l{cd Scarc" <)t rg2o.They lvere
ct>nvictetl basetl .n superficial 2ó Novcrnber ì928.
evidence and cxecuted in 1927. The Sacco-vanzctti defènsc
nr()\,clner)t attrùctcd àttentior.r 66. TsAODM, f.429, <-tp.I, d. 85, l. 8. Nail shop perty meeting, 14 Marclt 1928.
art¡rrrrd the worrd. see James Green, The worrd of the
worher (charnpaign, lgg0), 67. TsAODM, f.429,<>p. 1,d.87,1. ó7. Constructiou shop parry meeting, 14 May 1928.
ll3-1t4.
¿o. Reinran, The Birth of Støtinism, l0-I2. ó8. TsAODM, f.429,op.1, d. 90, 11.67,80. Elcctrical shop par'ry bureau meetiugs, n.cl. 1928.
27. 69. TsAODM, f. 429, <'tp.l, d. 87, l. 80. Construction sht>p party bureàu rncetil-lg' n.t-l. 1928.
fsAODM, f. 429, <>¡t. l, d. 67,1. 20. N¿il shop party rcporr, l4 Septernber 1922. 70. TsAODM, f. 429, <>p. I, d. 103, l. 12. Iìollcd metal sh<>p party bureau rrecting, 2 Janr-rary
28. TsAODM, f. 429, <tp. l, d. Só, l. 13. Factory par.ty meeting,
23 May 1927. 1929.
29. Mørtenovhø, 7 Novcmber 1922.
30. Mørtènol,l¿ø.,7N.ve'rber l92B,2l January 1930;TsAODM,f.42g,.p. 71. I(GASPI f . 17, op. 85, d. 237,1. 55. MK inft¡rt¡atiou stttnurary, May 1927.
Party secrctar:y report on the lìrst fìvc-yeal pran,27 February
ì,ci. l2g,l.Z. 72. Madinrir Rrtrvkirr, Røxiø After Lett'itt': Pol,i.tics, Cøltøre, øød' Society, 192) -1929 (New Yotk,
1933. The fàctor-1, ¡¿1a,5p¿- 1998), 185-f86. Sovcrsheøno Sel¿r¿tno: Løltiønhø-Stølin! 0 þlhzhenii v strøne (1922-1934
per did not i'cludc rne.rbership fìgLrres o' 7 Novembc.
lgzg but o\¡er flvo i""rs 1"t", rr.) (Moscorv, 2002) Editors: A.N. Sakharov, G.N. Scrostianov, V.S. Khristofìrrov, V.K.
clainred 128 rv<>rkers had enterecr trre party in rg2g. A 1933 rep.rt states trrat mérnbcrship Vinograclov, T. Vihavainen, M. Kivinen, A. Gctt¡ T. Martin, L. Viola, L.P Kol<ldnikova.
incrcascd to a¡lproximately 200.
Vol. ó:31,34-41,44-45,75-79,102-113,142-147,162-169,196-199'207'213,237-
ll lsAgDM,f.429, op. l, d. Z, l. 8. O¡ren parq, rneering, 1 Marctt 1922. 238, 258-267, 508-5 I 5, 563-57 r, ó08-ó18.
1? lsAODM,f.429,op t,q.ó, 1.8. par.ryparq, bu.e"u cliscusii,>n,4May t922.
/ 4. Deutsclrcr, Soviet Trød.e Unions, 33-7 4.
1l IsAODM;:f.429,op. t, d. ó, ll. 14_t5. 5,,r.",, rnc*i'gs, L9,24June t922. /+- TsMAM, f. 176, t>p. 2, d. l7l,l. 7. Metahvorkers' unit>n instructi()n, March 1923.
IslODM, f. 429, op. l, d. t},l. 2(). party bìrreau necing, 7 Marcl.t 1923.
il35' TsMAM, ,
75. RG,q.MO, f. 186, op. l, cì.950, 1.27. Factory conrurittee rcport to generàl meeting, l4
f' 176, <>p' 2, d. rzz,l. 2. suncy response fi<>rir'fact<>r'y direct<¡r t9 TsK, n.cr
t923. March 1924.
36. TsAODM, f.429,<.tp. 76. rìGAMO, i. 186, op. l, tI.744.,11. l-69; d. 950, ll. l-ó2 Union rnecting rninutcs, 1923,
d. 10, l. 38. Party bureau nrecting, 19 Mali 1923.
37. -1,
IìGAMO, f. ì8ó, op. I, t924.
dr 950, l. l8; Fäctory committee mcetiltg,2ó Novcrubcr
1923. 77. Røltochøiø Moshvø, 3 Novcurber 1923.
38. TsAODM, f.429,<tp. I,d. 15, l.27.Party burc¿ìu rnccrirìg,6Juie
lÞ2+. 78. TsM-{M, f . 176, <>p. 2, tI. 344,1 .1. Factory c<>tnmittee report, Jarluâr}' 1925.
l, d
39. TsAODM, f. 429, <>p. 241. 47. Nail shop party meering, 12 Aprrl 1924.
7q TsMAM, f. 176, <'tp.2, d. 129,1. 57. Factory ànn()unccment,12 Janvry 1926.
40. TsAODM, f. 429, op. q t5,1. 57. Factory p¿rry rneerirìg, ì0 Se¡iternber ì924.
4t. TsAODM, f. 429, <.tp. I, 80. TsMAM, f. 176,<tp. d. 568, l. 33. Factorl' comtnittee report, May 192ó.
l, d. 10, ll. 12, 13, 34. Part1, bureau rncetings, 3l
Ianuarl,, ó Feb_
ruary, 17 April 1923. 81. TsMAM, f. 176,<>p.2,d.402,l.4l. Factoryconrt¡iftee rrlccting, I5August 1925.
42. TsAODM, f.429,op. 82. Stratrs, Føctory ønd Comtnønity in Stølin\ Røssiø,248.
. 15, l. 39. Parri, l.¡urc¿u r¡eetirìg, 5 August 1924.
+5. TsAODM, f.429,<>p. 83. I{GAMO, f. 19, op. l, d. 62,11. 215,238.I\epolts to Moscow Sovict, ó and 29 Se¡rtern-
17,1. 46. Party general nleerijtg ninutes, 3 l)ccembcr 1924.
44. TsAODM, f. 80, op. l, d | 37, l. 8. lìogozhsko-Simonovskii ber 1923.
party conference, 3 januar¡, 84. Røltochøiø Mosleuø, ó Aprìl 1925.
45. TSAODM,t.429, o¡r. l, d. 85. TsAODM, 1.429,<tp.l, d. 41, 1.28, Party bnreau meetiug,2l April 1926.
lB. Cl<rsed party nlcuing, 16 April 1924.
4ó. TsAODM , t'. 429, op. l, tl 8ó. GAI{F, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 255,11. 5l-52. l)irnitriev recollection.
l. 58. l\>llect rnetal shop pârty rnceting, 2b
1925.
Scptember 87. IìGAMO, f. 186, op. l, ct. 950, ll. 63-99. Factory l\KK nrcetings, 1924.
47. TsAODM,f. 429, op. l, d. 49, l. 13. ßolt slrop bureau meeting, 26 88. TsMAM, f. l8ó, op. 2, d.216,11.5-ó; c1. 220,11. 15,16; fìrctory cornrnittee reports, 1924,
Janu.ary 1926. t925.
48. TsAODM, f. 429, op. t, d. 49, ll . 87, I 18. Stcel fìrundry shop par.ty rneerings, 22 Sep_ 89. TsAODM, f. 429, op. t, ct. 48, l. 45. Bolt shop p¿r't), bttt'eart tnceting, ló Atrgust 192ó.
tember; 4 October Ì92ó.
49. TSAODM,f. 429,op. l, d 90. TsMAM, f. 176, tlp. 2, d. 254,11. 45-47. Factory corllmittcc reports, 1925.
12. Arclritcctural shop par:ty urccting 16
50. TsAODM,f.429, op. t, cl. lvl¡, 1926. 91. Carr arrd l)avies, Founrløtions of ø Plønned Economl,,l: ó00-ó01. Tlie figurcs fì>r 1925-1926
19. Factory ctxr¡rerative part¡, brrreau ulccti¡lg, 20 Octo_
'are 2,426 disputes involviug 3.2 million u,orkers; l<>r 1926-1927:3,155 disputcs involving
ber 1926.
5ì. fsAODMl t. 429, o¡t. l,49,l. I12. Stcel firLrntlry sl.rop 2.4ó rnillion rvorkers; 1927-1928 2,óól disputes involvil-rg l B7 million rvorkers.
¡rarr¡, r)recing, 4 October 192ó. 92. Tt'url,29 Jtty 1926,I0 Aprll 1927.
52. f . 176,t'tp.2, d. 545,1. B. Factory
JSMAM, ger.reral nceting , S Jtiy l9ZO.
53. rsAoDM' f ' 429, <>p' l, d. 40, l. 140. croseà fàctory 93. TsAODM,f.429,op.ì,d.ó7, ll. lB-19.ßoltshoppart)¡bureaudiscussion, 14Septer-r-r-
¡rarty rreetirrg, g De ce'r'cr r92ó. ber 1927.
54.
IsAqDM, f. 429, <tp. l, d. 40, l. 140. Closccl tàct,r.y party ,recrirg, B Dcccmber 192ó. 94. TsAODM, f. 3, o¡r. 7, d. 56,1. 4ó. MK infbnìrati()r-r strrìlrrlàry,23-26 October 192ó.
fsAODM, 429, o¡t. l, d. 48, l. 94.
55. f. party rep()rr on ùolt cell,
¡ru.,l D2O. 95. TsAODM, f-. 3, op. 7,11.54,1. 83. OGPU infìrnlation slrr'ì1n1âry) l-3 A¡rril I92ó.
5ó. jsA9P^4, f.429,op. t,d 1, IZ. Iìolled rietal sho¡r pàr.ry rep()rt, I Aprit t927.
!?, 9ó. TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. 545,1. 10. Factory gcueral urcetiug, 12 Augtrst 192ó.
fsAODM, f. 429, t>¡t. l, d. 62, Il. t 0- I I _ part1, rgpl;¡¡, 5.¡rtcmþer. I 927.
57.
58. TsAODM, f . 429, <:¡.t. l, d. 20, l. S. ltepair.shop 97. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 51, l. 3. Iìollccl rnetal shop parq, nreetirlg, 14 Januarv 192ó.
¡iarty meerirìg, I2 Sc¡rtcmbcr. I927. 98. TsAODM,f.429,o¡r. I,d. 68,1.27,54-55. Stecl fìrunclrysho¡rpartyr)ìeetingsanclclosec-l
59. Mørtr:novlzø, 30 Junc 1928.
ó0. Mørtcnoiltn,7 N<¡veurbcr lg27,Z0 party rreeting 20, 2l December 1927.
June, l9 February, ó Scptenrber I92g.
ót. TsMAM, f. 176,o¡t.2, d.810, l. Zg. Norrparry øhtit,t¡.teeting,29 99. TsMAM, f. 176, <>p.2, t1.785,11. l3-18. Iìepair shop treetings, October ¿nd Nt>r'ember
Jttly 192g. t928.
t00. TsAODM, f-. 3,o¡r. 7,d.56,1. f 20. OGPU infìrrmatit¡n slunrìrary, ll-13 Decetnber 192ó.

It8 Rev o løtion øn d Counterrep o lution
l0l. TsMAM, t. 429, <tp. I, d. 8 12, L 66-67 . Fact.ry comurinee rcporr, seprenìb er 1928.
102. Deutschcr, SovictTrød'e Unions,l22- That unir>n urcmbership was voluntary is illustr¿ted
by27.4 pet'ccntof Sovietç'orkerswhochoscr.rotto join unionsin Ig3l. Hoflìnan,
ø.nt Metropolis, 194.
103. Mørteunhø, l0 May 1927.
104. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 62,1.36. Factory part¡' rcporr, Scprcr.nber 1927.
I05. I\GAMO, f. 18ó, op. L, d..2394, l. 128. Factory comurirtce clcctir¡n suurmar¡,, 4 May
t927.
I06. TsMAM, f . 176, <tp. 2, d. 693,1. 28. Dclegatcs' meeting, B l)ccember 1927.
I07.ln 1923,92 ¡rercent of tlic rvorkfirrcc fèll betrveen tl-re ì.2 ¿nci 2.4-coefficient \\,¿rgc range.
Mørtcøovhø,7 N<¡vcmber 1925,7 Nr¡vcmbe r 1926, 12 Fcbrurrry, 2ó October 1928.
l0B. TsMAM, f. 176, <>p.2, d'.718,11. l-3. Metalwr>rkers' infbnnation bulletins, Deceurbcr
t927.
109. TsMAM, f. 17 6, op. 2, d. 812, 11. 66-67. Factory conrrnitee reporr 1928.
I 10. Carr arrd Davies, Foønd.øtions of ø Plønned Econorny, l: 544.
I I l. TsMAM, f . L7 6, <:,p. 2, d. 2I0,1. I ì ó. Productir>n progr.aur sratisrics t<¡r 1926-1927
ll2- Mørtenu,hø, 7 November 1925,7 Nc¡vernber 1926,12 February 1928,26 ocrober 1928.
On infìation ancl decline in r-cal lr,¿gcs ín 1927 and 1928 see lleiman, The Birth of Stølin-
ism,37,38,54.
I13. IIGAMO, f. 19, op. l. d. 2I, 11.249-250.ltep<>rts ro Moscow Soviet, ó, 7 Junë 1922.
l14. TsMAM, f. 176, <'tp.2, d. 133,1.5. Survey rcsponsc fi.rn fàctt>r-y director t<> TsIÇ n.d.
1923.
I15. TsAODM,f . 429, op. I, cl. ó, l. 8. Party b¡.rreat¡ discr¡ssir.tt,4 Ma\t 1922.
^
I Ió. TsMAM, L L76, <'tp. 2, d. 102,1. ó35. Factory anrì()turccr.rìcnr, I April 1922.
I17. I{GAMO, f. l7ó, op. l, d. 21,\L 244, E3,85, l5ó, 209,245,250. lÌep.rt ro Mosct¡rv
Scrvict, I I Jvne 1922 and orher 1922 re¡ror:ts.
I I8. IIGAMO, fì I9, op. l, d,. 62,1. 21. lkport ro Moscrx,r' Soviet, 26 lanuarv 1923.
I 19. Brovkin, Ru.ssiø After Lenin,174-175.
I20. TsMAM, f.176,<tp.2,d. 175,1. l. I{GAMO, i. 19, op. 1,d,.62,lr1.46,56.58, c-lirector r.cg-
istr¿ti<ln fìrrm ftl' strike to Mashinotrest, 2ó February 1923, ltcport t<l Moscorv Soviet,
February 1923.
l2l. TsMAM d. 137, ll. 7,9-16,24.Wire ¡rullirrg shop rìreeting, I March 1923.
l22. RGAMO, f. 19, op. d. 62,11. l I5-129; IìMAM, f. t7ó, op. 2, d. t6g,ll. l -2. lìcports
1,
t<¡ Moscou. Soviet, May 1923. Delegates' meering, 15 May 1923.
123. IìGAMO, f. 19, o¡r. 1,d.62,11. 187-l94.llepor:ts r<¡ Moscorv Soviet, August 1923.
124. I{GAMO, f. 19, t>p. l,d. 62,11.284-287,300, 302, 306,317.Iteports to Moscorv Soviet,
Noverrbcr, l)ece¡nt'¡er 1923.
t25. llGAMO, f. óó, op. 22, d.87,1. 45. Ilcport ro Mosco\\,Stx,iet, April 1924.
f 26. IìGAMO, f. óó, op. 22, d. 87,1. 45. lìe¡rort ro Moscorv Sovict, April 1924.
127. Tt'ørL,4 Jat't¡art, 1923.
I28. TsKhI)Mo f . l, o¡r. 23, d. 260,ll. 48-49. Kr¡nrs<¡urol gcneral meeting, 3 ocober 1924.
129. TsAODM, f . 429, op. l, d. 27, l. 29. Par.ty bureau report, 24 Mar-ch 1925.
130. ÌìGASPI f. 17,<>p. Ió, d. 5ó3, l. 251. Frctory Parrv surn.rarl, rcp.rr firr March ro May
1925. lune I926.
l3l. Nøshø gøzetø, 7 N<>vcnber 1923.
132. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, cl. 17, l. I. Factory general ¡rar.ty r)rcerirìg, 2Jamary 1924.
I33. TsMAM, f . 176, op. 2, d. 254,1. 50. Factory p¿rq, sunlrr?ìr)¡, Se¡rtember 1924.
I34. TsMAM, t. 17ó, op. 2, d. 405,1. 5. Dclcgates' mcering, 29 l¿nuar\, 1925.
t35.TsAODM,f.429,.p. l,cl. 15, 1.40. F¿cror\¡¡rarryburcaur'eeting, 12August 1924.
136. IIGASPI f. I7, o¡r. ló, c{. 5ó3, 11.229-230. Factory p¿rty rcport fìrr À4ay thlor.rgh Dcccur-
tct 1924, Jauualy 1925.
I37. TsAODM,f .429, op. l, d. 27,1.85. Fa*or\¡ ¡rarry burcau meering, 22 Septenrþer. 1925.
138. I{GAMO, f. 19, 1 1,1.62,1. lO7.l{c¡rolr ro Moscos,Sr¡r,iet,23 A¡rril 1923.
Ì 39. IìGASPI f. 17, r4r. ì ó, d. 5ó3, 11.229-230. Fac()r)¡ p¿rry reporr, May through l)ccer.nbcr
1924.
ì40. TsAODM,f.429,.¡r. l, d. 34, I. 10. F.r'r,casri'g sho¡r ur.rion rìlectíng, I July I92S.
ì
Cløss Confict I19
I4l.TsAODM, f.429,<>p. t,d.28, 11.25'26. Closeclpartygeneralrneetings,S' I5April 1925'
142. TsAODM, 429, <'tp. 1, d. 27,11. 48-49. Party bureau rrlccting' 5 June 1925'
f.
P¿øs- I43. IìGASPI f. 17,d. ró, d. 563, 11. 183, 195. Partl' burcau tneeting, 5 June 1925'
144. Sovershenno Sel¿retno: Løbiønhø-StøIiny o polozhenü 7, strøn7 Sevostianov, Sakharav, et al.
eds. Vol. 3, part l: 359, 378-379 .
145. Straus, Føctory ønd. Concruu'nity irt Stølin\ Røssiø,247 .
146. TsAODM , f . 429, op. l, d. 27 ,L L27 . Combined fàctory ancl shop bureaus par ty rìlcctjng,
I
Decernber 1925.
I47. Carr and Davies, Foøndøtions of ø Plønned' Econonay l:357-362-
148. Mørtenoil¿ø, 15 Marcb 1926.
149. Mørtenovhø, 7 November I92ó; GAllF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 200' l. 30'
150. Sopersbengo Sehretno: Løbiønl¿ø-StøIiny o polozbenii't, strñ'n4 Sevostianov, Sakhar:av, et al.
ecls. Vol. 4, Part I: 526.
l5l. TsAODM, f- 429, op. l, d. 73,l.25-26. Forrn-cirsring slrop ¡rarty lreetirlg, ìó Decerlber
t926.
. ì 52. TsAODM , r. 429, op. l, d. 69,11. 20-22.Iìc¡llccl mct¿l shop partl' ruceting, 2 Aprtl 1927 .
153. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, d. 62, l. I 8. Pat'ty report, Se¡rtcrnber 1927.
154. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7,d.54,ì. 3. OGPU infirrmation sltrììrrìàr)¡' I |anuary 1926'
155. TsAODM, f. 3, o¡r. 7,d.54,1. 29. OGPU infìrrnration surntììirry' February 192ó'
l5ó. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7,d.54,1. 5ó. oGPU infirrmation sunlr'r]àr)¡, t0-13 March 1926.
157. TsAODM, f . 3, op. 7, d,. 56,1. 40. OGPU inf<>fl-llation sun)mar)¡) 23-26 Octobet 1926.
ì58. TSAODM, f. 3, op. 7, d.56,11. 12ó, 135. OGPU infi¡r'nrrrtion sutnmaries, l)cceurbcr
1926.
159. TsMAM, f. 176,ttp.2,d.4O5,l- 31. Delcgates' mceting,2ó Novcnrbcr 1925'
160. Mørtenovl¿ø, 12 Februarl,, 2ó October 1928.
Ió1. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7, d'. 54,1. 2ó. OGPU infìr'nati.n sr,urtìrary, Fcbruary I92ó'
1ó2. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7,tl.54,1. 71. OGPU infìI.uration sunr¡l1â.ry, 28-31 March 1926.
ló3. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 7, cl. 55, ll. ó7, 88. OGPU infìrrmati<>n summar1,, 24-27 August, B-I0
September 192ó.
ló4. Chase, Worhers, Society, ønd' the Soúet Støte, 139 '
165. E.H. Carr, Sociølisw iø One Coøntry,2 rols. (lonclort, 1973) I:363'
Ió6. TSAODM, f. 3, op. 7, d. 54,1. 22, OGPU inft¡rnratic¡n surì'unàry, January-Fcbrtrar¡, 1926.
tó7. Ts.AODM ,f .429,op. l, d. 48; l. 3. Architectttral sho¡r party bnreau meeting,9 Júy 1926'
ló8.TSAODM,Í.429,op. I,d.48,1. 12.Architectttr¿l slìoPpârtyneeting' 16Jtiy1926'
ló9. TSAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 55, l. óó; Mair.¡ren¿nce sho¡r party rìreeting, l8 August 1926.
I70. TsAODM , F. 429, op. l, d. 48,11. 20-22. Archirectural sþop party meeting, I l)ecember
t926.
l7l . Tt'ød, 20 Apri| 1927 -
172. Rrovkin, Røssiø Aftcr Lcttirt, 184-
173. C¿rr and Davies, Foøn'd'øtiorts of ø Plønned Ecort'ont1', l: 362-370.
f 74. TsMAM, f. 176, op. 2, d. 544,1. 8. Factory comurittce mectit.tg 3 M¿r'ch 1926'
175. TsAODM ,f .42g,op. I, d. 40, ll. I30, 140. Factory trulcau nreetirrg 19 Nt>vembcr, closcd
gencral ¡rarq' rllceting B Deccr¡ber 1926.
I7ó. TsMAM, l. 17ó, o¡r. 2, d. 699,1. 3. llolled urctal sho¡-r r'ìreetings' 14 Aplil, 14 May, 1927 '
177. T'sAODM, f . 429, <>¡t. l, tl. 52, l. 17. I{ollccl mctal shop slunnary firr January 192ó t<> April
t927.
l7B. TSAODM,f.42g,op. I, d. 62, ll. l3-15. Fact()ry party rcport, scptcnll>er 1927; t. 3, op.
7,d.53,1. 149,MKsulì1tl1àIy20Novemtrer 1926;d'.56,l.74, MKsunrmary, l0-l2
Nrrvernbcr 1926. Sopershenøo Sehrctno: Lu,hiønkø-Støliny o p0lozhenii I strø.n'ø, Scvtlstianor',
Sakharav, et al. eds. Vrl. 4, Pirrt 2: 832.
I79. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, d. 62,]|1.40-41; tl. 57, Il. lI7-118. Factory report, septellbcr
1927; Factory party bureau rrcetirlg,9 Fcbruary 1927.
180. tsAoDM,f.429,op. l,d.55,11.21-22. Form-castingshopcell rrcetirìg, IóFcbruary
1927.
IB l. Brovkin's archir,¿l stud), of the Soviet Union fìom I92 I to 1929 (Rtt'ssiø After Lanitt', 173-
l89) inclucles otlll' ¡11'.t refèrenccs t() state ¡lrlests <lfstrikels'
.rii]insii:$
 120 Ret¡oløtion w¡.d, Counterreyoløtt on 12l
Cløss Cofilict
lS2 Vadir¡ l{ogoviD' Vløst'i oqPlzitsil (Moscow, 1993) 10. Tl'rese figurcs àre co¡sisrent \virh l, d. 40, l. f 19. Party bureau meeting' 22 Ocrober 1926
205. TSAODM,f.42g,op.
ohshchesnn Mevnü iøl: sisternø isprøttitcruo tru.dovyhh røgeriø r,
sssã, sprøvochnih (M<tsc<tw, 20ó.TsM,tM, f. 176,<tp.2,d.792,11.24-25.Bolt¿ndnailslrcpunionmeetiugs,2ó,28Sep-
1998), 17, rvhiclr states therc u,cre 200,000 prisoners in the micic{ìc of 1927.
Arch Getty tember I928.
and Oleg N¿ttlllt¡v fì>und records that prove th¿t thc arrnual nulnber
of GpU, OGpU, ar¿ 207. TsMAM, f. 176, <tp. 2, 'J, 790,1. ìó' Form-casting shop meeting, 2 October 1928'
NKVI) c<¡nvictions fì'or¡ 1922 192ó
t<'t u,er-e krw: ó,003; 4,794; 12,42s; rc,bls; tz,to+. 208. TsMAlvl, t. l7ó, o¡r. 2, d.789,11.72,73. Stecl firundly slx>p unign mecting, 2 oct<)l¡er
The Roød to Terror (New Haven, 1999), 5gg.
1928.
I83. Carr anc{ Davies, Foøndøtions of the pløn¡ted Econowy, l:603. 209. TsMAM, f - L76, t>p. 2, d.789,1. 87. Steel fìrundry shop unioD nreeting, l5 octt¡ber 1928'
lB4' Sovershen'no Sel¿rctno:
Løbiønhø-Støliny o polozhenü v strø?rc) Sevostiangri Sakìrarav, et al.
210. Arclr Getry and Oleg Naumov, Tlte Roød to Terror,588.
cds. Vol. I: 274,77t,890, 933, 9SZ _9SB; yol. 4: 129, 56B_564,
B4t, Bi3;Vrl. S: 557. 2I I . Victor Serge and Natalia T r<ttsky, Tbe Life øttd. Deøth of Leon Trotshy (I.;ttndon, 1975 ), l58.
L85' Sovershenno Scl¿retno: Løbiønhø-Støtiry o pohtzheøü'p strø.n.e) Scr<rstialror,, 53, Aprtl
Sakhar.,rv, et al. 2 t2. Is¿belle l,o,rguet, "L'Opposition de gauche en 1928-29 ," Cøhiers I'eon Trotshy,
eds.vrl. r: 89-90, 96-r2r,r2s-r63, l6ó-r88, 204-206,22r 247,25;-25s,269_27g, r994.
300-305, 307 -47r, 47 5-47 6, 486, 49 r-867,88ó-892, g)g -grr, 93i_g36,
952_960;y<.tr. 213. TsAODM,t.42g, op. l, d. 129, l. 8. Palty report on the First Five-Year Plan, 27 Febru-
2:22-26,40-43,57-60,72-76,98-gB,ttB_tI7,t}g_t48, lól-tó5, l9S_t98, zt}-223,
ary 1933.
253-259,282-283,3tó 3lg, Vrt. 3: 3ó_38, 49_56, t2}_t2t, t37_140,177-t|t,
tg4- 214. Mørtenovhø, ló Novenrber 1928.
198,226-232,249-255,285-294,3r0-322,357-36t,375-382,408_4tá,+Zz_+zs,
+ss_ 215. TSAODM,f.42g, op. t, d. 105, l. 50. steel fbunclry shop palty buteau ureeting, lanuary
458, 468-476, 497-503,5Ìó-533, 568-573,593-ó08, ó5r ós5, óó5-ó8r,
707_7r2, 1929.
726-742;y<>t. 4: 24-30,47_62_90_96, tI7_t97, t6g_t75, tgt_20;, î:,0_23s,264-270, 2L6. Tru'd.,18 December 1928.
308-3r2,323-336,372-377,392-404,44s-452,468-483,526-ß3:,553-57t,622_629,
2t7. TsAODM, f. 42g, op. I, d. 104, ll. 54-55. I\cpair sht>¡r Pàrty nlccting, Fetrrr.rary 1929.
646-665'705-710,731-747,803-8tl, BB2-847,906-912,938-9sa;y<>r.s:22-27,s0-
TsAODM, f . 429, op. f , d. I05, l' 7ó. Party bttreatt rcport, 9 )irnuary 1929'
60, 126-135, r59-L74,234-243,263-273,309-3r5, 335-340, 357-áæ,380_39r,4r5_
2lB. RGASPI f. 17, op. 32, cl. 183, l. 3. TsKInfìrrDrati<¡n cle¡rarttìeut bullctin,23 Se¡rtcrrtber
42r, 444-450, 485-492,5r1-518, 557-564,585-58ó,592-593, 6rr-612, 637-638,
1928. Sot,ershenno Sehretno: Løbiønhø-Stølirty o polozhntii v strø'n¿, So'ostianov, Sakharav,
646-647,655-667;Yot.6:Zt,Z4-4I,74_80,102,t05_1t3, t42_t47,Ió2_ló8,
t96_t9g, et al. eds. Vol. ó: 565, ó14.
207-2r0,237 -239,258-265,323-327,378-382,420-425,460-466:508_5rs,563_570,
2lg. TsMAM, f . 176, <.tp. 2, d.7\0,ll. 30-32. Dclegates', rìrccting, l3 Dcccmtrcr 1928.
ó08-6t8. : 220. TsAODM,f.42g, op. I' d. 62,l.36 Fact<>ry party rcp()rt' Janr'rrrly 1927'
l8ó. Carr arrd l)iivics, Fowndøtions of n plønned Economt, l: 560,562.
22t. GAI{F, f. 1235,op. 140, cl. i107, l. 62. VTslKinfì)flìrati()n su[rÌrì]àry, 2l'Scptcnrbcr 1928.
187. TsAODM,f. 429, op. l, d. Só, l. 5d. party plenum, ó Noveirber
l88. lteinran,
1922. 222.-rsÃoDw,f.429, op. l, d. 77,11. ß,49-50. Party nrilctirtgs, l5 AugLrst, l0 c)ctober
The Birth of Støliøism.
1928.
189. Ileirrran, Tbe Birth of Stølini*n, Sl-g4.
223. Brovkin, Røssiø After Lcnin, lB5.
190. Rr<>vkirr, Ru.ssiø AJIer Lenin,lg5-Ig6.
ló. MI( infirnrratiolr surìr111ùry, sttrÌurcr I92ó.
224. IìGASPI f . 17, <.tp. 85, d. 67,11. t4,
19l. Sot'ershenøo Selerehto: Lubiøtú¿ø-Støliøy o polozltenii p stt,ønc, Sev)sti¿¡o\,, Sakharav, et al. 225.TsMAM, f. 176,t>p.2,d.779,l.39.Factorygencral mcctirrg,2l March l92B'
eds. v.l. 6:31,34-4t,,44-4s,7s-79, r02-1r3, r42-r47, r62-169,196 rgg,207-2r3, 226. Mørtenotl¿ø, ó Septenrber 1928.
237 -238, 258_267, 508_5 I 5, s63-57 t, ó08_ót 8.
227.-]sMAM,f. 176,t>p.2,d..795,11.22,29-SL.Ikrlled nrctal sho¡r Drecting,2 Oct<¡ber 1928.
192. l{GAsPI, f. 17,op. 85,d.3tr,|.4,7.srrikcst:rtistics f\r1926,rg27.il.59,94.strikc
228. iløbochøiøgøzetø,30 À4arch 1929. Of the 2,500 attcndccs at a M¿rch I929 protl'rction
sltmmaries firr Fcbr uary and Malch 1928. The Febmary Hammer ¿nd
Sickle strike wàs one cpnfèrence, only eiglrty rvere characterizetl as "yortth" autl only sc\¡en werc \\¡()lìÌen.
of seven in Moscou' a¡rd tu'enty-ts,o aroulrd the Soviet Union, yct tlìe c()mbinecl
total of 229. Mørtenothø,7 January l))Ç-
strikcrs u'as only 3,15ó. The March strikc rvas one of fìfteeri, ,itrt
6,728 partrcipants. 230. TsAODM,f. 429, op. l, d. 84, l. 19. .Architectur¿l sbop party meeting, 27 Dccember
Givcll th¿t onc strike in Leningrat{ hacl fi¡ur tlrtlrsancl
¡rartici¡rants, the 6ther strikes coulti 1928.
h¿ve invt¡lvetl no lì1ore than sevcral hunclred rvorkers each. Thc
826 strikes in I92ó involv-
ing 10r,572 t'<¡rkers, ()r an â\¡cràge of r 23 pcr sto¡rpage, i.urd 905 strikes in
1927 i¡vql'ccl
80,784 u'tlr:kers) ()r an a\¡crage of 89 rvorkcrs pcr stoppagc. OGPU
strike st¿tistics fìrr the
last quartcr ol 1927, fòr rrrose sropi)agcs r:eporting.lata, srrou,trrat qnly
5 ofs0 strikcs
acr<>ss tile natit>u lastecl lr()rc tlìan a day, and that the
majrlrity (33) lasteá lcss t¡¿u a tlav.
193. TsAODM,[.429, op. 1,1 84, l. l0l. Bolt sho¡.r party'reering,
15 February I92g.
194.T'AODM,f.429,op. l,d.84, ll.t35-I3g.Sccieipartyrep()rrbyl\.Novi', l8February
1928.
l95 TsMAM, f- 176, <'t¡t.2, d zg7, rl. 3-4. Elcctrical srr.¡r 2g March r92g.
196. ßr<rvkin, Røssiø After Lenin, lB7. 'rceti'g,
197. TSMAM, f. 176, <tp,2. d.7BO,l. 10. Dclegates' meering, I March
t92g.
198. TsAoDM tI.74,11. 7o-7r, ro0-r02. Fact.ry partv burÃ,r rreeti'g,
23 M¿rch r92g.
199 TsAoDM d.75,1. 50; cl. 81, l. 17. pir.ty bureau ureering, rs May r92g,
parw fàctory
c<¡ullirtee fì.¿ction nreeting, ll
May 1928.
200 TsAoDM , f. 429, <4r. l, d. 84,r. 40. Bolt sho¡'r parq' .recting, 14 Nove'rber
r92g.
20l rsAoDM,f.429,op. I,cl.85,r.rró.steer fìiunrtry¡rarty'reetir.rg,rgAugustlg2g.
202. TsMAM, f . 176, <>p.2, d .780,1. 18. Delcgirtes, ureeting, 23
Augirst I92Bl
203. TsAODM , f-. 429, <p. l, d. 84,1. 40. Bolt shop part¡, r.neeting, 14
Novcrnber 192g.
204. TsMAM, I' 176, o¡'. 2, tl. 79r,1. r4. Fi'e b.igacii uni.' n.t..,i,.,g,
9 se¡rterr-rbcr r92g.

4 the approach remained progressive and flexible until the crisis of late NEP
EvsnrDny Lrrn UNDER
DpvsLoPrNG Srer,rNrsM
"Ofier-r because of our inal-riliry to concluct ¿r seusiblc cliscussion, they lelve
belieying [in God] efen more strongly."
report on antireligious u,ork irrnorrg_wornen, March l927
-Party
The October Revolution had promised funclanrental changes not only in the
realrn of politics but also in everyday hfè (byt). The harsh realities imposed by
the Civil War had relegated the hopes of a more egalitarian society to the
future, yet as the economic recovery extended into 1923, Bolshevik leaders
welcomed a renewed dialogue on "cultural work." Trotsky \Mrote a series of
articles on "Problems of Everyday Life" that inauguratecl a wide-rangrng
public discussion.r
The creation of a new culture and the transformation of everyday li[e were
viewed not as independent tasks to be carried out separately from econornic
and political work. As Marxists the Bolsheviks believed that the icleas, habits,
and accumulated knowledge of a society were based on its class uature.
Whereas the rulers of class societies had utilized culture to their own benefit,
the crucial task of the Cultural Revolution rvould be to raise the "cultural
level of the rrasses," to change "the conditions of life, the rnetl'rods of rvork,
ancl the ever:yday habits ola great nation, of a wl-role family of nations." Tech-
nological advances would be central to this voluntary anc{ collective progress.
Continual inrprovement in the process of productior.r rvoulcl raise the cultural
level of Soviet citizens ancl in tunr rvould erlcourage fìrrther technological
progress and l-relp overcome the cultural backwardness inherited fiom the
Tsarist era. As Trotsky arguecl in 1926, "Improvecl technology ancl morals
lvill aclvance r.rs along the road to a social order olcivilizecl co-operators, that
is, to socialist culture." Yet the long-terrn objective of constructing a classless
society that rvould transft¡rm everyday life and encl the oppression of rvomen,
popular fàith in the supematural, and raulpaut alcoholisnr uecessitated both
time and resoul'ces: "The lack of the necessary good things in life still sets its
Notes for this section begin on page 150
Et;eryrløy Life Uød'er Developing Stølinisw
t23
mark heavily oll our lifè and our norals, and will colltinue to do so for a
number of years," Trotsky acknowledged.2
With the state as employer, issues related to everyday life were inextrica-
bly linked to industrial strategy. Much of the regime's efforts to tralìsform úit
focused on the role of women, religion, ar-rd alcoholism. 4.t the factory level,
*n.n þurty leaclers begã¡ to adopt "extretnist solutiol-ts" that served the
interests oi the regimJrather than those of ordinary Soviet citizens'3 The
clrive for productivity sa\M the state unclertake aggressive intervelrtion in
almost .u.ry
"rp..t
of workers' daily lives. Increasingly, Stali¡ist loyalists at
the factory levei viewed attempts to arneliorate the plight of workingwolnelì)
continued tolerance of Orthoclox work holiclays, and rampant alcoholism as
impediments to the drive for industrialization. Here we examine these three
crúcial aspects of byt duringNpP in the Hammer a'd Sickle Factory.
Women and NBP
Early Soviet laws placed the regime at the forefiont of progressive legislatiorl
for women's .qoii,y. Li l9I Z Soviet legislation mandatecl that womcn had
full legal ancl political rights and u¡restricted freedom of divorce . Wotnen
received sixteen u,eeks' pãid ,-,-t"t"tt-tity leave, aucl iri 1920 the Soviet Union
was the only nation in the rvorld to gualalltee womell the right to free abor'-
tion on demand.a
The Bolsheviks hacl no illusions that progressive laws alone woulcl suffice
to end women's oppressioll, and the goals of the Comtnunist Party and its
women's sectio'. ihe Zhe.otdel, were antbitious. As We'dy Goldnra' has
argued, the tasks of the Zhenotdel were twofold: to train worletl cadres ancl
to "rransform the very nature of daily lifè (byt)." Wometl's liberation céuLd
only be achievecl on the basis of their full participation in public life, and in
practical terms this rìeaut arrenÌpring to fi'ee wontell up fòr such participation
ty shifting the clomestic l¡urden from the inclividual home to comtnultal
Iaundries, clining halls, and day care cellters. By purging personal relation-
ships of ail fornri of economic dependence' the Bolsheviks believecl, the racl-
icai transformation of claily life for both- women aucl men would leacl to the
gradual "withering alt'ay" of the farnily."
- while historians have prodr-rced a wide range of general works on Soviet
gender issues, l1o Systematic analysis of rvomell's experiences in the fàctories
ãuring NEP has yet been putrlished. Studies influenced by postn'rodernism
haue ihoser', to focus oll the regime's latlguage ancl symbols, with rninirnal
attentiott to workingu,omen's own experiences aud activism.6 This nrethod is
at odds with the approach of Con-rmunist wome¡ activists themselves, who
emphasized proving oneself through action, rather than through t'hetoric, a
practice that^became knowu as "agitation by the deec{."7 What were the prac-
tical activities of "agitatio¡ Lly the cleecl" i¡trocluced by advocates of wotneu's
liberatio¡, how did this change over time, a¡d horv did workipgwomell
themselves respond to these ef-fortsì
 124
R et, o h.t tion øn d Co unterrevo httion.
The sharp fluctuations in female production
and Sickle Factory reflected dramatìc
emplol,ment in the Hammer pressure helped ro ensure fävorable resolutions olahnost all the cases involv-
charges in social co'ditio's a'd state eight hundrecl wometl in the winter of 1923-1924'Le
irig"Srrãl-,
industrial policy. Tl.re shortage of male
metãlworke* dr.idi;;iar had led .,"git"tion by the deed" brought positive results for women's work
to an i'crease of wome' workers, such that
by Novernbe rigl;,there were in the Hanimer ancl Sickle Factory Aclditionall¡ both the party and fäctory
456 wome'' The economic collapse adversery
affected womell, a.cr by Feb- committee prioritized wonìen's work rvhile encouragiqg fèmale represelÌta-
ruary 1920 only 7r women workecr in
trre faétory. v., *o-.,r'i^Lr" propo.-
tio'ately overrepresented duri'g the fàctory's tio. a'd paiticipation. The party bureau discussio' on the factory comlnit-
recovery in early NEP, with 226 womenco'stituti'g
economic a'cr demographic tee slate in ¡uty 1923 noted the neecl for rvomen's representation in its work,
fbrce at the end
to p.r..nt-of the work- a suggestion rhar was subsequently acred upon.20 By the end of 1924, the
By the spring of t9ZS,-¡00 w*n1ng"g"a
production work'e "r.t?-r1.] in party bureau reported that of 282 wolrretl in the factorl', sixteen were rnem-
but unemploy.,r.'rt ãuring latter NEp affected
disproportionately a'd th. facìory emproyed womer.r ters'a,rd candidates, forty were actively participating in the campaign to liq-
responsibilities
ã1d.. *,on,.,r wilh more a,'ily uidate illiteracy, ten were involved in a political circle, and forty-five took au
ancl less time for politiial ¿ç¡iyi5¡n.ro
Tlre unity betrvee' womer ard me' duri'g active part in party work.2t Sirnilarly, the factory committee's April 1924
the revorutio nary érøn of pl"n for speciâc aieas of activity prioritized women's issues and inclucled
r9l7 did survive the civ'war. A*empti'g to regai'
'or
fidence of womer was no sirnple task,
trre tr*st and cou_ ieorganiriìrg the delegates'rneetiugs so that they took place twice a month,
but bãth the"pa..y urerar- larrn.hing lit.t".y school for wotnetl, involving womell in a factory training
rvorkers' union acted.on issues òf partrcular:o^n:e,rn ",rJirr. "
to womerì) eve, cr.ri'g school to raise ttreir skill level, and expancling the kindergarten.22
the carastrophe. In trre dismar winter of
r9r9-r920, tr-,. f"rty lssig,red The district Zhenotdel also acted as a catalyst, argui¡g f'or regular
additio'al nrale merrrber to help because ,,trre "n
orgarizer was overroadecr with women's general and delegates' meetings. A Collmuuist Illterllational the'
work."rr Women,s i1y¡^wer! gjven high p.iiity-ã,l ,Þ"."
agenda eight times in 1920 and {92L,.*.i..,dì,-,g meering sis on women's work setlt to the factory organizer claimecl sevctr lruudrcd
thar arose duri'g rourine busi'ess.12 ÂR"i
".
oriier pertinå't àis.urrions thousa¡rd workingwomen participatecl in the movelllellt-illustrating that
itr. öiuil w"., ,i. ìr,.ål*o.L".r, early NEP was the heyclay of women's liberation activity in fàctolies thlough-
*nion rvar'ed that the new ecodomic conditio's
fina'cing sriìre erìrerprises "crear. .onaiiior*
i' private industry and self_ out the Soviet Union.23 At an October 1924 meeting) one of the fìrst worlell
women's labor in certai' brauches" a'd
d;^;; äiÇr"..-.n, or delegates accepted, on behalfofher cotnrades) a set ofbooks clonatecl by the
for greater exproitatio' of worne'. party cell, ancl noted the party's critical role iu ef'forts to fully involve rvork-
The u'io' claimed that systematic work
over the previous half year had ing*o*.n in public lifè. "A year ago we werc elected c{elcgates," she
begun to pay off, but also called for frrrther
measures,'i..luaing ,io.e female reãalled. "Sorre olus were totally illiterate and thc otlrers were semi-literate.
represe*ario' o' urion bodies and trrat incrustriar
paid unio' members a'd 2s0 women
.,r,.õ;ì;".;-ì;irh three During the year of our delegac¡ the RKP(b) cell, and factory committee
shourd have a p"iJ;;;;;organizer.,3
In March l92z,the metalworkers' u'io'again helpeJ us become rnore politically conscious aud active, and these books will
i'sti,,c,.a r.f..ì.,ìtarives ro help us to become evell rrlore clear about everythiug'"2a
exteltcl their work arnons wômen tn rc"i-,í,. ,,-^::..^:^l-,. "r'":e¡'
the a,rnrral Inrernational Women's Day (B March) meetings provicled a
ti o nar s ec re
would co'sist of",,fèmale
",, {
r"., TT ilöTl; liii, i:i'.iliä::Ë.'..,iä
iI ïü'ìî:; ft¡cus for this activity. A week before the 1922 holiday, the wortetl's orga-
factor y representatives ancr fàctory
The con-rbi.atio. ofwomen's rá'k-a'd-file
committees.ra ¡izer announced that the fàctory would oPen a kiudergarteu for tweuty-fir'e
by the party a'd uuion reactivared wornen's
pressure ard trre special efforts children and that wolllen coulcl leave work an hor,rr early.25 T'rvo days later,
work. The rvo¡'e',i ãrg",rir..,, the women'S organizer and a delegation of fìve wornen appeared at a Party
Nove¡"nber 1922 report shou,s that women,s
bureau ¡reeti¡g aucl again demanded, unsuccessfully, release for the entire
eight rvome''s m"eti,rgs was rorv wage a'cr
ductio' rvorkers ea'recr srigrrtly lesJtha,r Je
r-tiilï:ili;: ;ää::Í,å:i: day.2ó On Inteinatio¡al Womeu's Day 1923, wolnen left work fli'o hours
clucdo'workers,
thircr of ine grades for pro_ , íly.r, The ever-rt the ftrllowi¡g year also attractecl male etnployees, as the
br-rt the p"ity i..rrur..r
womer in three depa*me'rs fiom the ',-r",rug.,nent
to advance eigrrty-one celebration of "women rvorkers and rvorkers" clrew eight hundred people,
,..onä ,o ,¡.-,rriJ^;;;'grade.15 tl-rree tirnes the number of fernale ernployees.2s
wome' aclvocates addressed other issues of .orr.".r,
tory a"onrlcerneut i' october rg22 noted,that
to fèmare workers. A fàc_ Women'S voluutary participation iu such meetings proves that they
rvonre, had the rigrrt ro take believed this activity was itlportant. Attendauce at the twice-monthly regu-
ofïtwo hours a day to fèed their babies.ró r,-,Jory
lqza, the faciori.onr.ir- lar meetings varied between I00 ald 120 (of 216). Autumu meetings to
tee recourmended renrovi'g the cli'ic
rv.meu,s croctor after reÉeivi'g a' elect rvomen delegates and district soviet representatives brought out lB0
appeal fì'o'r u'omer who had comprai'ecr
about his ,.bacr attitucre torvarcrs his and 200 womell respectitely.2e Two 1924 rì]eetings that elected wolnell
obligatio's." 17 I' Novem ber r92à,eight
wome' represe'tatives resolved to union representatives and delegates each drew 190 participants, with the
ask the RI(K to give a report at tl-re
next fàctc
i
i'votvi'g *o'".î i eacked bv trre rr'o",nil'nÏï:T:-" October meeting ending with a call "Long live the Colnmunist Party and
îï:hA. t: Soviet ¡ulsl'30 Ío be sure, the party did not counter pose memberslrip
 126
Rep o løtion øn d Coøn t27
terretut h¿tion Eueryd.øy Life Under Dneloping Stølinism
recruitrnent to trris "agitatior by the
creed.', wolne, lnembers used trris
ro promore party poricies a'd recruir rvomen-by work women's orgauizer fell ill in August 1924, trvo male meurbers were assigued
May o"f-rlzs tt.,i.ty to help and the factory party bureau subsequeutly resolved to ask the district
worrell had joined rhe factorv cell.3l
Large of workir',!.o,',r.,r co'siste'tly attended Zhenotdel for support.a0 Again in March 1925,party leaders expressed cou-
'u*bers
i'gs because the sessio's p.ouid.d a'arena.in which
womeu,s nleet_ cerns that "because of Comrade Potapova's sickness, the work among
trrey courd ope'ly air women is carried out poorly" and passed a resolutioll assigning another
their grievances a'd .r",".r ,'r."rores ro
resolve issues ;¡;p;;i corlcern
them. In February 1924,wotnen from to member to help with the work.al
the bort rrrop irru.Jã,iär .o,r,pt"i,.,t
about heavy lifti'g co'ditions. The ,.rri,r' The promotion of fernale organizers also had an unexpected detrirnental
passed á resorutio' to take r.rp the
issLre with both trre protectio' impact on women's political activisrn. The talented Potapova was assigned to
of Labor a'd nlaragement.32 At a'other
sion, a woma' co.'plained abour ,,rhe ses_ the district cornmittee of the party in May 1925 atd the following month the
cafeteria ãirecto.,s uiìtii,
intimidation, a'd fìring ofwairresses" ancl party bureau acknowledged that in youth a¡d won1etl's u,ork "we have a feel-
rhe "r,irua.,
."rolr;-;; bring
the attentio' of the party organizatio'. it to ilg of certain weaknesses."42 Iu an Ar.rgust ge¡eral Party nÌeetil-lg, the new
wol'e''reering
fi.om-differe't shops repeat_ organizer, Sidorova, admitted that the work was couducted irregularly and
edly issued compraints abouilack
of rvork crothes ancr the ...,ì'g, resolved
to take action by pressuring either the p"r,y blamed the failures on the sumlner break and on the low literacy level arnong
unø,i.r;\4#;";lesenrario' wolnetl in the factory-a comlnon theme for problems itt wometl'S work in
and with rhe u'io''s ". expected a
sympathetic poliå¡ wome'
tlre factory comrnirree. In-Novembe , p)+,the fàir heari'g o' late NEP, but an excuse that the previous orgauizcrs had not reliccl on.a3 Sim-
support fi'om a
women,s ;;g";;i"". receivecr ilarly, speakers at delegate meetings during 1925 began to express thcir owr.r
factory commirree rneerirg after cornprairr,
plies and the need for repairs in ;b";; poor sup- frustrations that the lorv level of women's litcracy made it "difficult or e\fell
the kinder'garten.34
wonren also raised grievances in the popul". impossible to agree with them orl sorrre issues atrcl draw theur iuto work''?aa
press. Røbocbøiø
-¡"a Mosr¿pø Yet even with the support of thc press, the Zhenotdel, the urctaltvorkers'
reported that yard crew women,conrplai'àd
ìh"t their ø*Á",-, sexualry union, and the party, woûìen fàced rnany obstacles. For cxample , the passage
harassed rhem a'cr accused him
rebuked him. wrrire trre majority
of impori,rÀ ..,ììr"rin;'äffihose wrro of progressive Soviet legislation, like that which allowed for ftrur months'
or*o-.,, ã.rpír.d ,h;f.,?;r;;" a few who paid naternity leave, did not necessaril¡, mcau that the laws were irnple-
played up to him had been rewarded
,"¡rr, auor¡,ir,o, i,r.l"á-¡,u i.",-,rf.., to
lighter work. womerr argued that he rured mented at the fàctory level. A Lg24letter signed by "rvVclrker Nadia," entitled
over women ,,rike a rord i' his cas-
tte" and rhat he'eedecr ro be ,,rei'ed in."ss "Need to Fix tl're Mistake" iudicates that issttes related to child rearing
grievances agai'st their manag er
B;i; ;ildì;;äarso
aired became more importallt to wolnetl as they started fàrnilies. "Women rvork-
in Røbochøiø Moskìø.They accused him
miscalculati'g their hours of ers' life is not easy," Nadia noted.
duii'gpo*.. f"ilore whe' their machines had
"
been idle' A conflict arose whenihe'ma'ager,-unaware
of the power fàilure, Unskilled, trapped in a lorv r.r'age and skill gracie, they barely earu enough to eat'
accused the wo¡ren of
-organizing
a' "Itallani' ,it-do*u ,,¡r.., ã rrnich the Widows who :rre weighecl dou'n by their fànlilies livc p:rrticulirrly poorly. 'Ihat is
worìel] respo'ded, "what kind of Irarians are wer Fascists or somethingf ,, why it is diffìcLrlt to be quiet n'hen there is strch 'st¿rte-sernctiotled' robbing of
The rvome' co'rplai'ed that they h"d
u;; received their fulr rvages and the workers, ¿rs in ... c¿ses iuvolving \\¡Omctt workers fì'om Our fàctorg 'Hamlner anc-l
reporter suggested that.the factory cour'rittee
ard party teach ,fi. ø.._"n Sickle': Panka Chernysheva was giveu one n.ronth ofl bef'ore giving birth, Luda
"a lessor-t once and for all.r,3ó from the yarcl shop also a rnouth, ancl othcrs too. Ilut \4¡olnen workers talk of cases
The short-terrl success of wor¡en's in rvl.rich oue u¡:ìs given only a fèw clirys ofïbefbrc lrirth and herc is wl.ry. I)uring
work restecr in part o' trre organizer,s
ì]}-..]
ef'forts, rale'rs, a'd health. In March her clinic ¿rppoilltl-nent, the rvom¿n cloctor told her how she u,as reprimandeci f-or
I92i, the*o,oË,rt org;;i;; asked to
be relieved' The ol'saliz¡r, Arakova, cårnprained rwo monrhs letting one of the u,omen ofïwork.... The insurance ofïìce retr.rses to pay f-or the
'erv
tlre previo*s organizer later that fqurth mor.rths. This is r.rot only ¿.r violation of the lau, but also a loss of he¿llth. The
had reti *"ny a"À.i*cies, especialry
supplies fbr tlie rursery. Due to Arako'a,s
concerni.g food insurance oflìce sl-roulcl catch up. They shoulcl h¿rve seen a long tirne irgo fron-r the
abse'ce, arguecr olle party leacrer,
the rvome''s activity had taken ,,r.,-, meclic¿rl release statements how matertlity le¿rtes:lre being unfàirly cut. They
ø. a¡r. worse and that another nreln- should have p:rid attentiot-r to this a long tinre ago.+à
be r hacl bee' assig'êd to help.32"
I" i""*rt ìn 24, Arakovareportecr mocresr
succèsses, i'cluding a literacy circle
a'cl åid ro rro'',.n rvith
chilclre', but Attempts to overcolne male prejudices presentecl womeu rvorkers witl-r
cor'plai'ed about the lorv job crassificati,ons
assig'ed to wome'. srre elÌormous difficulties. Duriug the uew rnarriage code discussion in 1925, the
revealed plans to i'vorve me'i'worneu,s
work a'cr îo create r.ruing.i._ All-Union Central Executive Cou-unittee of Soviet (VTsII() invited popr"rlar
cle. Arako'a argr.recl that her^t"rk, "
,"qoired a fìrll-ti"r;;.;;;;"er
- ancl resporlses to the proposed legislation.46 Mørtenothø,however, printed only
requested cornpensariotl fourth .""g" .","gory:s ,l åiig.*a
"l :h:
the fàctory comnittee decicrecr ,ra a male worker's letter that complainecl of having to give up one-third of his
to pay he."^t trre seve'th-le'el rate..3e Hou,_
e'er, lu'akova recluesred a leave aiter giving tvage for child support. "We need to have a law so that wolnell do not chauge
birtrr in F.b;r;.;.';;hen the rnen like gloves. They shoulcl settle on a certaiu man aud togetlrer create a
 t28
R ø¡ o lation, øt¿d Counterrev o løti on 129
Etterldøy Li.fe Un'd'cr Dneloping Stølinism
strollg and harmorious fàmily rife.-a7 yet
solne mare party ¡ne'rbers were
explicitly syrnpathedc to rrornen's plight. her "drunkenness and prorniscuous behavior"; when she refused to attend
For example,'";il;ì in the bolt
shop reported on his¡ece*t vi'age slre was expelled for being a "demoralized eletnent."56 In February 1926,the
u"ätio,l, in rvhich he claimed to have rvit_
ramparlr arcohorism.among reacri'g rvomen's group organized several meetings among houseu,ives, but tl'reir
'essed party lnembers. He arso elected representatives had yet to do anything, remaining merely "on paper,"
"rhe very bad sitLratio' with rvonrin a'J
return to work ..the day after giving
crrildbirth,, i' *niJ ,n.y had'otecr
to ar-rd, accordingto Mørtenovkø"rlte women's section is disorganized."sz The
birth.,,a8
activity continueJin rc"r92i,bur rvas most outspoken women criticized factory leaders' lack of concern for their
^ Y3*']lr
By May' Mørtenopr¿ø claimed ttri.ty
beset by serious obsracles. grievarrces. At a general party meeting in April 1926, a female member criti-
party mernbers, eleven l(omso- cized the party faction of the factory committee because the committee pro-
mol men'rbers, fbrty-fìve participâting ''on,.nin study groups, rwenry-five in a
sewing school, and trrirtee' invoìved vided "insufficient leadership in women's work."58 Two speakers at a fäctory
bee'hampered, accordi'g to the
í' u,rio' *ã*. Þoiir¡car activity had conference in Novembe r 1926 rebuked the rnain speaker for not having men-
t the majority of the wornelr
had large families or were widows,".,i.t., "."ose tioned women's work.se At another factory-wide meeting, the wotnen's orga-
tion a'd pay levers, ancr were burcrened
*... .or-,..,-,tratecr in íh. rt*.rt quarifica_
nizer complained abor-rt the low pay of women in the bolt shop.60
*i*, r,.uuy pr",yrr."i *o.k. rn. factory The factory committee soon followed the party's retreat olì wolnen's
employed "very fèrv your.rg womer)
allcr the otdei wome,-, ,"itn in.
of a few still have creep-seated rerigious exceptio' issues. The change in committee priorities can be gauged by its reports. For
iilusiors and odf*;"äi."r."* rr,.
Zhenotdel organizer in, the U"lt ,i"p the first half of 1923, the seconcl area of activity mentioned after the organi-
.å,lplainecl, *W.omen,s work in the
shop has been impossibje_to expand zational section was women's work, noting worneu's representation on the
U"*lr. ever)¡ worìa¡ is extremely busy factory comrnittee, monthly general and delegate meetiugs, a political edu-
with home obligatio's." In rhe same
disc'ssion, a mare n-r.n u", i.gued trrat
less priority be given ro wornell's cation circle, and the fäctory nursery. Sigr,ificantlg it dicl not mentiou raisiug
issues: ,,It is compretely imþossibre
bureau to concluct work amor-rg fbr the productivity.óI In contrast, factory comtnittee reports for April 192ó to April
*o,r.u ú".uur" it is overloadecr.,,50 whire 1927 included regr,rlar sections on organization, fìnances, youth, Protection
the party started to backtrack,in.
unio,,
l92s factory protection.of Lábor ..f",:i co'tinuecl o'
to clefe'd rvomen. A
..co'dirip,*-àiì"o.r. of Labor, cultural work, and proc{uctiou conferences aud sessions, but not a
women and adolesce.ts" notecr that amorìg single section on womeu.ó2 Thus, by 1927, both the party and union vierved
ìhe regar norms for rvome' workers workingwomen primarily fiom a productivist pcrspeciive, with their specific
were in effèct i'the bort srrop,.ancr p..rr"ã
'or with chirdre'.in manage¡rer.;;r;k. a*ion.sr concerns either sharply de-prioritized or fbrgotten altogether.
women the.third_y;g. .lr.go.y routinery received
term adva'ces o' their paychecks.s2 short- Responding sympathetically to wornell's cortcertts had provided the basis
.úo..ou.., tr-rrougrrout rg25, rvome'
from the sho¡rs repeatedþ p.ese,rt.g of ur-rity between womell workers and the proletarian state during early NEP.
*"g., rLill gracle, a'd other grievances
. j1="" meed'gs, ro_ lúi.n ffi ü;;ä;.äi,. I.".i g
With the serious obstacles faced by wome n's aclvocates iu the austere condi-
if.î,å:ï,:
r ne parrys de-ernphasis orì *'olre''s
.increasi'gly issues coincidèa *ia¡ managelnent,s
uu n tions olearly Soviet rule, even a minor shifì in state policy away fì'otn a cort-
productivist nritment to women's work and toward a nÌorc procluctivist ethos increased
1,-, ñou"o,¡. r r92s,tr-re
aspirarions.
stepanov, stated that wome' rvorkers factory crire*or, the growir-rg sense of isolation and frustration altloltg wonlelt activists:
were not profìtable ancr .ot neecred
because they' qrçrr ress productive.
Moreov.r, sr"p"nou comprai'ed, wo,,ìeu Cell, Hel¡r!
had to be give' four rnånths for
chilcrbir;;incr bË.ause
ofte' had ro reave early.sa The crireltårl, .onna"nce orL.,.i"rit¿.¿i'g trrey The u'omen's deleg¿ìtes' meetings u,ere well atterìdcc{. Non, their enthusi¿rsm has
would go unpunished reflectecl tl-re prodrctivist ,rar such comme'rs been crushecl. Little attention is clevotec'l to thenr. Everpr4rere they tum ftrr help
shift in state polic¡r ¿¡1¿ tlrey are tumecl clown. For example, women busiec1 tlremselves ¿rnc'l solicitetl many
saged the "regiure of eco'o'y" thai woLrrcr be ma'crated a fèw montrrs 0.._
rater. a¡lpeals in order to secure ¿r doctor f'or women lrut nothing came of it. So now the
Partl' lç¿4srr expectecr the 2henotd.r
,o rvorkingrvorne, ro par- delegates say, "Wlut is the use of goingl It just wears your fèet out. Nothing will
ticipate ir rhe "regi're of economy" "'r.our"ge
c.,ì"J'commitree mber,.,r.tiukhi'a corne of it auyway." lt is the cell's dury to turlì tlreir attention to this ancl help
irnplored wo'ren to "fìghr agai,rsi
*r".k";;ìn rhe rarionar'reeco'oury.,, yet i' lr¡omen rvorkers.
their own meetiugs, Zhènotãel leaclers
rvidespreacl resisrance to rhe
ratio'alizatio' ca'rpaig' amorlg worre' "a,-,ìiir"a lt¡rbkor¿r [u,orker-correspondent] Lucl¿ró3
rvorkers. Artiukrrina uoted ,.¡nis_
takes" in irs iurplernerlr",ill, i'"ctucring
ttr"ì".ir¡o.,, ro cLrr back o. work Subsiclies for day care aud the fàctory kindergarten were of paramoul.lt
clothes for rvomen a'cr o' ki',de.g"rteri
.nl nu.r".i.s. particurarly harmfìrl,
in lrer opi'ion, was the clecision Io r.n-,ou.-nursery importance to wornen, as expressed at a fäctory coufereuce in October 1925.
agreemeltts between managelrìent
firncri'g from colrective "The most important question for women workers," one female delegate
and rvorkers. 55
The parq"s retreat oll wot.ìlen's issues argued, "is to quickly expand the kir-rclergarten aud cla1, 6".. nursery. Mauy
lecl to clouble stanclarcls a'd i'activ-
ity' Irr october r92s the party bureau applications have been subrnitted, but still rìo roor¡ has been n-rade to place
sur.'mo'ecr a fènrale nre'r¡er to exprai' them." The other lìft1, q,6¡l.n were reluctant to speak in such a large tneet-
 i
I .

130
R et, oløtion øn d Counten ey o lan on Ererfi.øy Lif¿ U*der Dewhpitry Stølinism l3t
(l
'"tg ,27.0 a*e'dees), but the sublnìssio¡r of i'e (of sixty-four) to the
speaker that directly co'ce'red women,s comings and seemed to attach some importance to tl're increased average age
'otes
issr-res suggests that wórki'gwome'
were colìcerned about their deteriorati'g of tlre female workfòrce. She claimed that there were thirty-r-rine øht'iu but
position. Two'otes asked about
w31en's sewi'g club, and on. noted that they hact no representation on the factory cotntnittee, that their
1!e raisi'g the skiil rever of.wome'. representation and ties within the shop cells were weak, aud that the three pre-
six of the nores raised issue s ".ruo.""rJJ
us, why are 'inewe assessed.six "uou.
it ùinde.la.te,r nu,i..y. ..r.r vious meetings were poorly attended, with an average attendance of just sev-
rubles per child fori"y .;t;';; ",rJ
i'quired. "I have three childreu, have ir" wo,'an enty. She fi.rrther charged that, "One of the main causes for this weakuess is
nurt"ra, and I am i'the thirdrevel that little interest is devoted to women's work by fàctory organizatious."T2
wage and skill grade. I do not have
the means to pay.,,ó4
The day care issue was again a focus at The party's reversal on women's issues coiucided with the economic crisis
the Intérnatio'ar women,s l)ay i'
1926. Four hu.crred,torkeà atteucrecl of late NEP, which particularly affected womell. ln 1926, for the fìrst year
trr. g;rh.ring, which i'cruded a lectnre
on abortioll, a filtn, and a report o' thJnursery. ..Ma'y since the Civil War, the number of workers declined by ló5 with the uutnber
spoke up about the nlrrsery report," women workers of women decreasing from 284 to 254.73 Moreover' ouly a handful of
Mørtenovr¿ø."po.t.¿.ä, F;;;;;; readers,
h,oy.u.:.,. app^are'ttv ignored-such women advanced to skilled positions during this period. By May 1927,four
concerrr. i;;^ü'"*h-'i,ií,"ü,tenovr¿ø
claimed that fifiy children were i'rhe wo¡rìen had transferred to skilled positions, and three worìen had enrolled in
fa*ory kinclergarten bot ná*t.ag.a
"conditiotrs are exrremely. u'sa'itary.',uu-i a technical course. Ten months later, howeverT two of the women had
,p."k.i .,"on".t
.,i;,
meeting.in 1928 protested that "trre chirdren,s ", " awfur a.t.g"r.
siruatio'is
dropped out of the course. In March I928, one wonatì assertecl in the fàc-
the small quarters.'ó7 because of tory newspaper that, "We criticize the factory colnnrittee aud mauagelletlt
women vierved their represe'tatio', for good reason. When a rrachine on which a wotnatl could rvork fiees up,
a'd the soridarity with men o' rhe they put a marl there." The result was that "the question of advancing
factory colnmittee rvho súpport.a trr.r",
as very importarit. one woman
argued at a factorv general cotfèrence womerf to more skilled s,ork is still stuck iu the mucl'" In June 1928,
i,r lu,re 1926 thatif it hact nor been
for the effbrts of o,ìe represe-'tative, Møytønoyhø responded to women's complaints that only thrce women had
"we ,"om"n woulcl norv still be in the advanced to skilled positions in the rolled metal sl'rop. "Let us see how they
third wage a.d ski' gracle "6s At factor
y gene rar co'fère'ce rn llay rg27,
"
a female speaker criticized the factory shorv for themselves, and then raise the question of broader advancement for
.á,r,nitt.. for its
failure to take up womenr" the nervspaper suggested.Ta
women's issues and trreir underrepresåntation: ,,we
have 320 rvome, in trre On the rare occasions in late NEP in which the party adclressed wonten's
factor¡ but there are no womell freecr fiom
work obligat¡on, or, ah. factory issues, the discussions were clorninated by procluctivist concerns. A party pro-
committee. They work a lot, but little
anendon ïs devotecl to them.,, A posal for factory connrittee activiry focused on production, organizatioual
female me¡',er cornprained in p".tf
À..ting that the cet haJ..forgorrer-r work, and finances, aud macle uo mention ofwomen's rvork.Ts In April 1928,
"
abour rvomeu's work. If it co'ti'u.,
Éur,À.r, t-he probre m, *iiir., be liqui_
dared." Another noted similarry that,h. ;;i".,o.y party leaders mandated that the bolt shop cell should "turn particular attetl-
commirree pays littre atten_ tion to working rvith women and drawiug them into the social-production
tiou to worren's rvork. RepresÉntatives
,.. u.r1, bad at co¡rclucting clarifying lifè of the shop." Several weeks later, wheu a bureau member complained of
åf
ffi:;n:;ïj[,î',*nr, ."o,,,.,, ", inãu,t,i"l workers.,,a inñ¿ ,p."t.ì "insufficient participation of womcn in the production comtnission," a

ig'orance"f ;;,".,,ä,ääìi:ilii';i:':i:':rîff lvolnalt speaker connterecl that t'in the shops there is insufficient attentiot't to
'ï".""ff :ï:åius,ressa,rcr the womeu's work," with no fèrnale represelltatioll oll the shop union
onrinouslg Mørteno.u høalso bega' to
branle fenlåle .,',ptoy.., themserves
for tlre problems with the,vo,n.''ía.r-,;;;. bureaus.Tó Another fèmale member chastised thc rnaiu speaker in a nail shop
rory llewspaper argued that it.rvas
o'7 Nove'r ber r926,the fac_ discussion ft¡r not l-raving mentioned wolÌÌen) despite the fàct that therel,vere
"i'rpossibre a ,"y ,r-,"rr¡'i..î,-r, things
about rvomeu's work. First blan-re rt"iiã-i. sixty-trve worten in the shop.77þ'notlter outspoken fèmale critic placed the
assignecr ro wome, workers
themselves ftrr trieir i'acdvity. blarne on male members, ancl cited "incidents in which Cotnmuuists clicl not
" rn. ..ti.l. ,..rggested thar trre seco'dary fàult
lay with "the wol¡e''s co'ri,ission," defend party wolnelt who rvere cor-npletely ittttocettt, and by doing so utlder-
*lrl.lr t,l,ras llot t ."n .'ough.,, mir-recl theln in fiont of nonparty wonteu."78
The productivist approach to ,vo,Iár', ".ir*observarion
nork elicitecl the telling
that "rhe u'orst thi'g is that questio's A,n incident a few da1,s later illustrates the clairn about male party melrì-
ìùou, productio', rvhich would l¡ers. Dronnikov accusecl Beleberdina of slandering him by asserting he had
involve wo'lerì' rra'e ìlot bee' åised,;'
trrat there rvere either blockecl her transfer to another shop after sl-rc had refusecl his advances two
rro slrop or "nã-ru,'r"nred
'reeti'gs 'reeti'gs
o,rry á,rc. a year.To At a party rneeti'g,
trre lnonths earlier. One speaker asserted that "it is in-rpossible to call Beleberdina
\4ronlen's organizer argued that tèrv wolrerl enterecl the party, because
their low level of literaiv.zl of an exemplary member because she does rlot Pay dues" and another adcled
that "uot or-rly cloes she not pay her dttes, bttt she completely refuses to
.By 1927, the partyiras .on',p.ilecr to acknorvredge co'ti'uar problems attend the war circle." The shop cell voted to repritnand Beleberdina for her
wlth wome''s rvork. I'Februar¡ the
orga'izer,s report admittecr sìrort_
'rany "slander" of Dronnikov.T9
 r32 R ett o lu.tion ønd. Cou,nterret, olation Ever1d.ry Life Under Da,eh¡ping Stølirtism t33
The prornotion of eveu a fèw wome' incitecl r.ese'tmert alnong
some and requested advance notice in the future. The promotion of a rvoman fionr
skilled male workers. A rolled shop worker cornplai'ecr thar rvomen
'retar the Red Army to a skilled position caused reserìtrrent in the cable shop. One
had bee. assigned to operare rnachines aìrd proposed .ärneasures should be delegate complained that, "We have woman workers rvho have been in the
take' to remove them." The reelection of cÉubikov, a former Trotskyist,
as shop ten to fifteen years and who cannot get onto a machille." Another del-
u'io' representati'e in the rolled shop suggests that there was a gen_
'retal advancement. egate stated that the administration took into account her family situatiot-t,
erational split on atdtudes to wo¡llen,s A fàctory committee
represe'tative argued that the disgr Lr'tlemellt was due to age
but "for others in neecl, they do not take this into cousideratiou."ss
diiferences a'd Such accusations illustrate the teudency for sectional divisions to be
rnale workerò' reserrtment of chubikov's bold stand in
Ãvor of womer,s strengtl'rened as rvorking-class activism declined. The continued weakening
equaliqr A woma' speaker notecr that "orcrer nachinists
do s'pport of class solidarity dnring the crisis of I928-rvhen the state was moviug ou
womeu; the skilled workers have no pity o' us. o'ly chubikov 'ot
defe'ds us.,, the offèr'rsive-rvould prove costly for the Soviet u,orkers. Just as male rvork-
one rvorker adrnitted that though maie workers crii'k, ,.they do not
make ers blamed female workers, women also started to blame other workers,
such mistakes as women rvho reaily nress thi'gs up." Trre
shop reerected including this female Red fumy veteran) fbr their own deteriorating posi-
chubikov as representative by a vote of twenty-severl to rwenty,
i'dicating tion. Stalin and other party leaders tolerated open anti-Semitism in the
that you'ger male workers cast tlìeir votes for him in spite
of thÉ'co'rprai'ts party's campaign to defeat the United Opposition, and only afier the expul-
from their elders.so
sior-rs did the factory cell begin to confì'ont such prejudices, with the fìrst
Rising u'employrnent in late NEp exacerbatecr these divisions
betrvee. factory discussion on auti-Semitism organizecl arnoug worrtel]. As with many
male arrd female rvorkers. In May r92s, the party bureau reported
twelve women's rneetings in late NEP, it was colnposccl almost entirely of housc-
thousa'd u'employed workers in the district, iircludi'g *.',y-fiu.
hu'dred rvives, with only fifteen workers alllong the ì50 participants. The womeu
u'rou me.rbers and rwo hundred Red Arnry u.t..".,r. Hiri'g
þractices rnan_ complained that "Jervs have all the good positiousr" "shun heavy work,"
dated tirat top priority be give r'o the Red Á.o'y u.t.."ns,drilåwed
by unio' and "get new apartments without waiting iu liue ." The speaker couutered
'
¡¡s¡nþç¡5-¿ policy that negatively affecteá wómen.sr By Decembe r r92v, that there were very fèw Jervs in the district, th4t they constituted 8 percent
the. rrurnber of registered Moscow r.rnemplol,ed reached,
177,476, with the of the governlnent apparatus, that |ervs received only 3 percent of new
majoriry (51 percer-rt) women.82
housing, and that in mauy places such as Klrarkov, inctustry relied ahlost
The desperatio' that accornpaniecr i'creasi'g uremproyme't
aud under- exclusively or-r Jewish labor.se
ernployme't clrove u,orking-class women to proititution au.ing
NEp.s3 In a' Women u,orkers expressed similarly hostile sentinìents against peasant
articled entitled "The path ro prostitutíon,,, Mizrtenoyl¿i clained
that laborers. During a discussion otì women's unemployment in May 1928, the
tee'agers and childre'as young as te' had engaged i' .,outrageous
ior" u'til two o'clock in the morni'g i' a cooperative near thJfàctory.
behav- union representative attributed the rise in rvomeu's uuenrploytnellt to a
The massive influx olarrivals frorn the countryside. One laid-off rvoman with
"outrage" ir-r this case seems to have co'sisted only ofplayi'g rnusic,
singing, eight years' experience reported that she had been promised a work guar-
danci'g, maki'g noise, a'd shouti'g, but the i.toit io a sensationarized
antee, but that rvhen she had gorle to the Labor Exchange, they rvould not
linki'g of such behavior with paid sex made some sense for a regirne increas-
ingly u'able to offer rnarerial solurio's ro wiclespread desperaío'.sa enrol her. The focus of the meetiug, horvevcr, u,as agaiust the newly arriv-
tio's to speakers indicate rhat prostirution was becomi'g a realiiy i' eues- ing peasant laborers. The 14ó worrrelt in attendance attributed the rise of
rvorking-class life cluring late NEp. At a February l92B
unemployrnent to the "influx of the peasant populatiolr," and passed a res-
rneeti,rg"on crime ancl olution "to stop registering the unemployed arriving from the village excePt
hooliga'isnr' fbur questio's refèrrecr to prostitutio', aud orr. Ihdl.,-,ged
the fbr seasonal rvorkers."e0
speaker's assertion that prostitutio' had cleclined by
zs percent: ,,Go to rhe Women also noticed the party's change in priorities, its clouble starlclards,
city ce'ter a'd then say that there is less.,'85 At *on-,*,s neeti'g
1928, a speaker remarked tlrat because of stafï" reductions ..we
i' May and the clampdorvn on democracy. Only eight u,omen (out ol 199 nerv
ìrave trre rnenrbers) joinecl the party in the recruitment drive in late 1927 and early
appearaltce of prostitutio¡.,,tió
wolne''s delegate a'd ge'eral 1928, pror-¡pting the speaker at a general part1, ¡n..r'ttg to comlnelÌt that
___ in l92B shorv obvious tensions. "lvork ir-r this area needs to be strengthetted."el At a rvotnen delegates' dis-
'-reeti'gs
wolnen expressed nulrìerous grieva'ces ãt ,nron a,r,s ge'eral rneeti'g of cussion on tl-re recruitment campaigu, the fìrst speaker argued that working-
o'e hu.dred i' october They argued " that there- \^/ere
enough wolnell "do not go into the party because Communists themselves do t.lot
^1928.
wo''en accepted into the factory 'orcommit_
tecl-rnical school, that the factory
tee paid little attention to their collcems) that unskilled rvome¡ attract them but cliscourage thenl."e2 A note in a May 1927 party nleetil.lg
u,Lre receiv- complained that although a member had sexually assaulted a \\¡olran and l-rad
ing lower pay tha' me' fbr the sanre *,ork, a'd that tl-rey were
uncler- taken bribes, he "rernains ur-rpunished and was transferred to better position.
rep.ese'ted o' the committee.sT at a May delegates, rneeti'g,
co'rpìai'ecl that she had not bee' informecl aboui the latest st#f
a speaker I think that one shoulcl be punished nlore severel¡ then there u'ill be
reduction order."e3 Another party lneeting note in August 1928 asked, "Why has ICta-
 t34 r35
R att o hüion øød, Coøzttcrrn o httion Etteryrtøy Life Ilød'er Detteloqing Stølinism
shev still rlot beelÌ renroved fì'om rvork a'd se'r to jail
for kiiling a wo'a'. able, but the demonstration was large enough to be the main theme of the
During his vacatio', he got dru'k and srrot a woman. Trre
cell k'orvs about article. On International Women's Day 1927 and 1928, Hammer and Sickle
it, but is silent.... He continues to thrive ancr laugh at workers-kick
him women boldly ridiculed the hypocrisy of official rhetoric in the face of factory
out!"e4 A June l92B Mørtenoukøretter again compìained
that the director,s leaders' actual retreat on wonÌen's issues.
attitude tou,ard womel-ì was that they weie ,,manure,, and
that it rvould be The sharp colttrast between the priorities of rvorkirrgwomeu and fàctory
better if they simply reft the factory.es In a'orher articre
entitled ..why we are lnanagelnent in the male-dominated uretal industry during late NEP illus-
Nonparry" three women from the bolt shop rvrote that they refused
the party "beca*se our tongues are u4rore," and positecr io,-riy-rhor.
to enter tr"t. ih. evolution of a productivist state policy and the decline of egali-
*t-,o tarianism. During the l9L7 Revolution, a united working-class movement
swallow half their tougues beforerrand are nìet with
ope' charnpionecl the coucerus of women. After the Civil War, Bolshevistn re-
. Themost co'spicuous result of the cha'ged perspeËtive "rms.i,eu
in late NEP was that female
on womeu,s work mainácl committed to wonen'S etnancipation and the overcoming of male
sirnpiy stoppecr going to the monthly prejudice. Rather thau emphasiziug "the destruction of the family," horv-
meetings a'd housewives with .workers
more rime attended inrt"ãd. on z March àu.r, ,t"t. policy at the factory level prornoted the more pragrnatic orgarri-
1928, Mørtenovl¿ø claimed thirty-five øhtiv arnong 325 rvomen
tory', bnt then notecl that atte'dance at the fèrur prececlirg
i' the fàc_ zarion of women around issues that specifically affected them, while factory
mass meetings hacl party and union leaders promotecl rMomen's activisrn and responded syrrrpa-
draw' a' average of r r0 housewives a'cr oury tån *or,,.î", rvorkers.
cle claimed that only trre party rook wor'en's work
The arti- ihetically to their concerns. Significar-rtl1', the majority of Hammer and Sickle
tory cornmitree a'd management did
seriously and that the fàc- womerì actively participated iu rneetings ir-r which their grievances were
dubious that the acldressed. By rnid-NEP, however, party leaders ât the factory level perceivecl
party domi'ated both the committee 'ot-a "rr..rionrti$ive'
a'cr marlagemelìt.s7
women delegates discussed the failure to involve working
Ju'e 192g, the special emphasis otÌ womell's issues as an obstacle to the pursuit of their
*o,rr.', i¡r various main priority. Pressured from above to meet production quotas, rnanage-
acdvities. one speaker_ack'ou,ledgecr that the *work
ership, a'd is our faulr" a'd argued rhar "the work is
has-bypassecl our leacl- me.rt ànd the party apparatus started to vieu/ the fèmale workforce strictly
adjusti'g ro womell's workroacr aìld it
o.jar-,iz"d ivithour in productivist terms apd, therefore) as a proþlem. In response, working
be reorga'ãed. During trre women simply stopped attending tneetings.
'eecrs _to.,Not
year, the work was left to its orvn devices.',es
newspaper larne'ted several u,eeks later, '.we read i.
lorig ago,', tì-re f.actory To be srue, the state change in policy entailed a fhndameutal break with
oui,-rã*rp"p.r. that i' the Marxist position of promoting women's liberation. The abolition of the
mass women's meerings 200 participated, a'd we
used to take priåe in this." Zhenotdel in 1930 ,r-rarked the end of the proletarian women's ntovemettt.l03
At a May 1928 women's rneeti'g, eigrrty-e¡1s wome' signeå up
membership but just trve'ty-o'e were workers.ee
for club That Stalinism clropped even the PretelÌce of wotnen's emancipatiou is no
Judgecr b"y."orkilrg*on,.r, longer disputable, but an exclusive focus ou the dccline obscures the prole-
themselves, the party's "agitatio' by trre deecr,,, earliei
was now deemed a fàilure.
co,rsiderecr a success) tariãn state's efforts to raise the position of workingwomell. What makes this
movelnenr all the more impressive is that it took place itr a society devastated
^ c)ne clear sig' of the i.creasi^g disafÌèction amo'g wo'ììe, was the unof_
ficial protest they orga'ized duri'g trre fàctory's Inteinatio'al
by seven years of rvar and foreign intervention. Hatltner ancl Sickle womell
wone',s Day were among the seven hundred thousand active participants in this remark-
in 1928. Trvo days before the eve't, a rolred metal srrop
unio'rneeti'g able movement that reuraius largely hidden fror-n history.
focused ou the role of women in procluction ancl contrasteå
theirpositio' in
the soviet union with that of rvonren in capitalist countries,
butìvome' i'
the department issuecl a declar.ation that ..rvomelt,s pay, in
the shop is very Orthodox Belief
bad" ancl the meeti'g resolvecl "to bri'g trris to the atie'tion
of the r.epre-
selltative and the fàctory, cornrnittee.',tixr 1¡" fàctory_rvicle
eve¡t of 520 Orthodox belief rernains a relatively unexplored topic fbr historians olSoviet
workers listened to a urare.s.peaker, IGrpukhin, amempt
to preserìt worrell,s labor-a peculiar ornission given that vt orkers' belief in the supernatural
work in a- positive light.ì0t In a re'rarkable shorv Lf d.h",r.",
horvever, rernaiued So strong, rvith religious ceretlouial practices cor-rtil-ruing arnong
Mørtenovl¿ø rcported that thc fbrnrer factory committee
member, Shirakova, the urbau population well into the 1920s.ì0a Conservative historians of reli-
and a candidate Karpo'a, gatherecr a group ofwonen from the bolt
'ember, gion during the Soviet period have attempted to drar'v a straight liue from the
shop ancl orga'ized a boisterous proresr ar the eveirt. Supposeclry .,as crr*llk
relatively lax approach irnrnediately following l9I7 to the repressive regime
as old shoemakers," they burst i'to the cerebratio'
cturing the Áain speecrr of high stalinisrn.IOs More recent scholarship emphasizes the ineffèctiveness
"srvearing like horse clrivers," ancl were ftrrcibly ..,.,-,ouèd.
shirako'a had of state antireligious work.toó
organizecl a si'rilar protest of rvorkingrvonle . ar tlte
1927 celebration a'd the For rhe Bolsheviks the battle against religion was l-tot an isolated objective,
factory newspaper warned that, "This is the correct path for proretarian
'ot dr,rring but one compolìent in a more comprehetlsive campaign to ilnprove b)'t and
wouler.'102 whether rhe wome' rvere dru'k the þ.otest iå question_ to raise the cultural, political, and education level of Soviet citizens. As Marx-
 t36
Everydøy Life Under Dcveloping Stølinism r37
ists' they asserted that u'der
Tsarism the ruli's .,r.""" ;.,"
perpetuarecr uot¡ lor.v
Perpetuated both ow leuels ^,:_^"-^-----
'ä: had quite consciously valuables and a resolution in support of the confiscations passed "almost
to stirte popurar
r off ri1ire,".,,.,.,.¡
ever s o r
teraly l'¿ ä? ff
^^,,9"tJ"sses : il Ji",i:iìì::å1i
*rt]:,,.ñil;';emserves.
"r:ï: The ådvent or sociarism
unanimously.'lle The low turnout as compared with other fäctory-rvide
rvould e¡rd the nrvriad sociar meetings in earl), NEP indicates that rvorkers were less concerued with the
its
"rro.iå¿ *ith ,ronr.¡.,.,t,i1',"rri"i,r, sucrr as church relics than rvith religious practices. Five members from the fàctory
,1'"':.1:lïî'Jffi iiä::::"r''^"-""îi'ils.-i.i,-,",,ì'úaì.r-thesuper_ participated in the confiscations. One participant recalled:
ËF#*ï.í,.i"_:*iiiiil'ifi ;.ifl
:fi;å'#'fi :1.,";n*il[: I had alre acly entered the party in 1920. I would have enterecl earlie r, in I9I8, but
my wifè was religior.rs ¿urd she slvore at me : "Bolshevik." In l9l9 she died of pneu-
;':;:å'#:h:îläjiËiÏiËliJhi::'"':::,ï:;'J¡r;ig;t1i11;*; monia. I joined in 1920. The cell rvas srnall u,ith no more than twenty members.
lrt 1922 I married a second time . Her fìrst husband worked in our fàctory but he
1","3,*u',öil"^"rîiilH;'.:;m,î,,i;î jïl;ï,'"-ï,"å,:,,"jäf :
drrction; deliverits conti'ual diecl in I918.... In l92L thc district comrnittee called fbr fìve people to rvithdr¿rrv
i,"ú".-"ìì,, in *o.L..rir",",åi"r ,ell
-Hi:î:l g;X:Xli,!. iÀ"iffi i*, u,"r r¡,.",
u.ìi. i being valuables from churches. Gus'kor', Timofèev, nvo others (rvhose n¿mes I cannot
remember), and rnyself u,ent. Cornmunists were surnr¡oned flom all the fàctories
d.,ti y -n-tJir.a n
fc,r this activity.. . . We we re de layecl till seven o'clock. A lot of people gathere d irnd
menrio'i.o,,,i,.luJf.,',::i:,,r..ffi
assert that, '.The wori<e.r, .,ï"åï::ïi:å,î",*.i.å',ff tlrey svvore at us. We took seventee n pød; oÍ silver ancl one large ciiirrnond.l20
t. ,rl"ìnîr"p"rt) vr'ere religiou5.,,ìr,B
of the Workers' primary religious concern was their religior,rs holidays. Workers
iËlï;:i:
we re a ti m e i:'
li:|ì if:; ;[ *',x* ï "'',,r' " N.,"-väi u,, d p.
",",,, in the rolled metal shop (ó50 people) ancl nail shop (250 people) subrnitted
r. .. äl,JiT::iiiåä
io r ar c o h o . " r a joint statement to the fàctory cornmittee in December 1923 with a dernand
*n".|.:l1inu,t a. job,.on religious
Jources duri'g the ¡evoludor
1,1r".î.*
r,oiiã"yr,,.,..",,u;i, i.::,ïJ"i :1,ï for a Christmas holiday based on the old-style calendar, while other shops
.
ctoxy or the church. The
."ufi:;;usry ornit me'riorr of orrrro_
4
asked for the break basecl on the new calenclar.l2l The factory committee
o'ly ;";';ifèä::'i;:,ï:T:iIî,::: deferred the issue to a delegate meeting, which subsequently resolved that
meeting resorurio¡r thar associarecr
crerics;;'.:,iri.i:rî:r_f.¿år?r.r,".rï
"
individual shops should decide ihe date of the Christmas holiday. The rolled
;i:'H:, Ï î:liffi "t' "n n'o uìri,"'*. åi','.. uo u,-s;oi,i-.,','ä"..r.i,,,, metal and nail departments opted for the old-style calendar, rvhile other
shops chose the new calendar. Four hundred workers attencled the rolled
¡.s,,ç'h.. ,,,,r ,,;,;:ï:i;
everì a Bolshevik orgar.-
i,iï:'å,,å:lo.,i, ,,
into tîe n;, ;;,; of.trre
metal shop meeting (the same nunber in attendance at the fàctory-wide ses-
the Eas ter rsr z
ackn owr.o*.¿ ..,".ìl,liË":iil:îj.,?,ïî:,î3,;¡ sion on confiscatiorls) ancl two hundred rvorkers were presellt rvhen the bolt
k.Tzer
breã shop optecl for the old-style calenclar.l22 Workers could also extend their reli-
T'e factory continued to honor gious holidays by working Saturdays before the holidays, and several shops
religious horiáays after the
olution' A ge'eral fàctory october Rev_
nreeti'g on íg-D...,'ber votecl fbr resolutions to do so.t23
"red prese'r" of hirlfa a"yt p"y,ã,ra',tr u'a'imousry resorved a
ã.,o.y crosecr from 2iDecernber Rank-ancl-fìle worker pressure for the Christmas holiday in 1923 forced a
to B January'rr3 in February
factory for Masrenits"
iti'g;;h. ä:,o.y .on.,n.,i.ree vored to crose frank discussion about religion in the party organization. The controversy
tsnå*,ùJl'""i"ä rhe revealed rampant confirsion on the issue and no clear policy. Several speakers
clorvn rbr rhree rveeks ror rater the factory shut
the È"rã.îäiàTr.,,-'ronrrrs
i,,-iéi;;; merely noted that religion was a "\,ery serious" matter) but one member
again resolved to close
tn. a.to.f ro,I'rliJ,p^rrer holiclay.risñä, meering ignitecl a controversy rvhen he stated that alnrost all members had icons in
chaprer rwo, mar)/ workers..,"ììrJ¿'ä As rve sarv i'
*i.onn,rrride fè¡r the holiday, rvitrr their homes. The next speaker took issue with this assertion. "When Com-
over half the workft¡rce.abse.nr ;r",ìã"r'ì*r
cause,' after the r919 rade Lavrenov says that ahnost all of us have icons at home, this, comrades,
break. Two years larer, ,,in Easter
view just will not do," he responded. "If vr.e, the advanced guard, are still under
again ctosed'for,Easter "f,*ã.t.iJ
r.,r,eek, rrro.g;-r";;Ji:::t:ir::::l;?; this drr.rg, then I thir-rk rve have an insufficient ruìclerstanding of V.I. Lenin's
tlrne to conrpensare f.or rhe
¡or, ,¡n[.,iå oì,.i"g early *î¿"ï""ï legacy." Another speaker argued that meml¡ers rvith icons in their homes
contiltued to. be clisplayed NEp, moreover, icons
in st ops.n, should read Cornrade Trotsky because "he shols the way to fight religion."
'trr exceptior ro such le'ie'cy came iu trre s.p1-iug He suggested organizing a "burning of the gocls" and urged a consultatiou
Botsrreviks berievecr that.the of tg22.Le'i'a'cr the
o.i'"àà-'cÀììì¡q', päriq, ;6ä; with the party cerÌter about resolving the question. Tl're discussion shorvs that
f i l::'.'ïJ :,','"llïl',,ï"j'ïl'::":l 1 I
;;ïä
i' ,' * a u.i n g,t
higrrer
"'#".
"o r I e 2 2 party cells, even in the socialist capital, were left to their orvn devices on the
issue. A Comrade Voronin called fbr restraint:
i. ;,. . ¡ u.. i, ;;,,; ii' ;ii: il #1," ;: l,T;Lfi
;;il î
.lammer and sickre workers ::l l.:lfiii*1i The cluestion of religion is very serious. The point:rlrout burning is not ncu,-this
"r,.';;;';;."ring or.r the seizure of-churcrr wrrs clone in ancient tirnes. I think rve should not set too hot ¿rnd talk about
 ìÈ
û þty^J
r38
Eueryd.øy Life Und'er Devclopirtg Stølinisw t39

*.,",,.**i;;;;;;..;;,;;.;;;;;,";;;i#:;:;:^u,"^::;,::;::
level of cle'elopment of'the workerr.
ri¡r ,ì¿""r"pme't rras arready begrur, ancr sluggish, with only two general meetings aud no distribution of antireligious
thus, religion wil gracrualry reave workers,r,*ãr-ì"lir,*,i,irr.ïii"i."ri,n..,r- propaganda.t3a In rhe repair shop in fanuary 1925, rhe Godless o_rganizer
In Sep-
þf."a.a to strengthen antireligious activity among party mernbers.l3s
The admission rhat "armost all" experienced i.rnber 1925 úte factory ltewspaper chastised the Godless because a cross aud
party mel'bers hacr icons i'
their homes was certai'ly at odds witliTrotsky,s icon l-rad hung openly in the warehouse.Ì3ó In March 1926, the nail shop
assertion a few months ear_
lier that "religious.ess among the
Russian worki'g crasses practically party bureau álso characterized the Godless work as weak.l37 A few weeks
does
not exist."l25 The T.s¡1¡¡1 Ler.y a fèrv months
ratcr further strengthened reri_ i",.i bolt shop report claimecl ó0 Godless members but "t'lo leadersl-rip."I38
gious belief withi' the party's ra'ks. "
A year later, thé fäctory llevvspaper complained that "the Godless are asleep"
fn. È"lrfr."*;lä.iì,.di.Ti.u.r, in ,t.
hope that dreir co'victìons would t",.,
.i"ng., bur in the pattern shop because Nikitin "gathers youllg and old workers" to read
tio's on open worship-lirnits to which ,-np".,y rhe party placed resrric_ aloud from the Gospel.r3e In May 1927,the Goclless claimed that the group
workers were subject.
Yetin 1924 the party co'ti'uecl to avoid 'ot tqz+,
religious issues. In ¡ecemue. had 296 rnembers but party speakers admitted the group's ineffectuality in
a party leader adrnitted that,.
"ofte' party members do not k'ow rrow to combating the influence of priests and sectarians.lao During the Christmas
approach nonparty worke.rs about relijious q.uestions.,,12ó season o{lgZZ-lgZ8, Mørtenovl¿ø noted that, "New religious sects have
Sig'ifica'tly, reli_
gious. practice rarely resulted in
expuisio'; the appeared" in the disuict, and accused the r-rail shop Goclless of being partic-
party co'ti'ued to tolerate
mernbers who in the ,uj"rn"rur"r. rir. ularly lackadaisical in cornbating the new phenomeuon.lal In the fbrrn-cast-
member who had
'erieved ó"rt ;;;;a'ded o'e ing shop, the Godless failed to organize a si¡gle general meeting in three
re tur¡red to rris vi'age,
of the Apostls5."r2z Trre party
'îe't to crrurch a'd read,the book
täå."t.d srrifti'g months and generally did "nothin8.l'142
religion
wrro had u.i,""ii"à.rì.
amo'g irs members: a four-year "rro
member The Godlèss dicl organize solne successful events. On the Saturday befble
.ìp.ì1.ä'fo, n
j1s,in church reapplied, and the shop bur."o si'rpry decicred"to ..find"..r_ Easrer in 1928, thirteer-r hundred workers and their fàn-rilies had attended alr
". our
his leanir-rgs at the curren¡ ¡l¡1s.,,128 aptireligious evening in tl-re club with films, daucing, gallles, aucl discussions
Party expulsions for rerigious lrelief
were invariabry comrrined with other continuing until 7 a.m. The llewsPaper couspicuottsly omittecl absentee fig-
offences. A' u'usuar ircidãnt .o,r..rn.J" ures for thi following Monday; yet 3 percent of the workforce failecl to sholv
n,.nru., l¡r.å'ar*ãï¡,., expul_
sion for "goi'g to church ard s'orti'g
cocai'e.,, The accusJ àiã not a.,ry up for work on Tuesday, which shorved tl-rat "religious traditious have a
the charges, and the bureau_report.dl strong hold on the rnincls of the workers."la3
"i"rt "v considers trris his perso'al
business''l2e The party expe'ed
¡nember fo'ot The Godless rvere particularly co¡ceruecl about the hold of religious rnys-
payi'g his party
dues for rwelve nr"rlï:.p:1.,", ".rorÁ..
p".ty ,r.,."ti,rgr, fo. uo-t breaking ticisnr among wolnen. ln 1925 the factory yoLrth group organized â "Kom-
qu:rg,;.
with his religious co'vi*io's, ancr foi bei'g
nrarried in a church.r30 while somol Christntas" itl the club and included a lecture on "ttatural history" in
p*y. e'ty. iri tn. rhopr, ì ;ã, which "every woulan worker and worker's wife can ask questiolrs tl-rat inter-
l.i:::: lî'l 1 3f
ror party members. wre' the party ¡."¿.¡ä, *..'.' ää*n.a.,pon
i'-for'red o.e ,,'.*u", olÀi, .*purrior.,, est thern and they rvill have them auswered.'144 The Godless "often fbrget
he pulled our arì ico'. "we, .h"nk
i .;;;rì;;pìay i,r trre
vo,, iårar. No'" about their families. Wolnen, houservives, ir-r particular) are not drawn iuto
ope' because for the last rwo years I have not been prayi'g the way I shoulcr. social work." The article implored the Godless to "break tl're rvifè fi'om this
I .sed to bring out ,o,r-,. pr"yi,rg, a'd rhe'put it away darkness and brir"rg her to the club for au eveuiug of speeches, develop her by
"'-l:ï,,d"a requesr
Another member submitted âgair1.,,r3r
the reading of boáks and journals, atld make hcr your cotnrade'"145
to'relãase him fi.onr the party ,,because
he ca''orovercome trre religious r"ooà ìn-ni,
fàmiry'*z The party srraregy The effectiveness of such club lectures is questionable. A rePort ou the
of g.adual atheisdc tra'sfornìadon fa'ed
tè,r a'otrrer'rember: Goclless work in the sheet metal shop in March 1927 (whiclt probably
unclerestimated religious belief) claimed that two hr.rndred workers in the
The bureau notifìecr ,er ma'y times shop rvere nonbelievers, 90 rvere "fanatical believers," and 150 were "\4'aver-
to ¿rppe¿ìr before the bureau,
but she
auswerecì,
"Go to hell, I,m tirecl of you." CoÅra.{e rc.rgf.""
lr* 1r.""-a cancli.late ipg; on the issue. Nonbelievers, "particularly rvomen," were reluctant to
member fbr tr'rrec ye:rrs but .loes not
go to meeüngs a.cr c-roes nor pay rnember_ paiticipate in Goclless lectures aud r.vhen tliey did go, a Party leader aclmit-
ship dues' she is re ligious. with strorg
want to be a member
b"e lie fi;. ile has irlreacly
sai¿ tl.,ai slre cloes iecl, ,,often because of our inability to couclnct a sensible cliscLrssiotr, they
a.1$ùsins her into th. po.ry.r,rrorf'ùftir... 'or leave believing Iin Gocl] even more strongly."laó This persisteuce of strong
iïl ",.
olution to expel fì-om thc parry.t33 n r_
religious belief in the Factory is cousisteut rvith fìgures ft¡r Moscovv where
The Union of Godless, the Soviet atheist religious practice remained strong. The number of religious births and
or
fìrnãrals actually increasecl fr'om 1925 to 1928, rvhile the uumber of civil
fecti ve pape r org", J"ìi o,r,
May 1925, the Godless claimed
.
repc atecr 1,
r ;;;;"Tï;äï]îï-,,:;::ål :ï: marriages declined slightly'
Ia7
32s'r"";b;;s but the reporr admittecr that With religious practice, as witl'r mauy issues ir-r late NEP, a double stanclard
weak leadership in the shops
rhe ,"ã.t ."..1"rr, ;d;;;;tic. a'd prevailed betu,een party leaclers aud the rank-and-fìle members' A note to the
'racle
 r40
R etr o h¿tion øt¿ ¡l Coøn terr¿p oløtion Etcrydø! Life Und.er Develol:irry Støliøisrn t4l
lnain speaker at a May l92g meeting comprai'ed: ,.you
pline^and antireligious propaga'da,ã'cr
spoke of party disci- Factory policy on religion during the early years of the revolution was
you touchecr'rostly upo'trre ra'k-
and-file mernbers, but you faired to-mention markecl by leniency and tolerance. Workers ctecicled their own holiday sched-
certain factory bureau members ule and openly rvorshiped in the shops. A.ntireligious rvork was practically
who show an exarnple of ho' to cerebrate
Easter rituals by maki'g Easter nonexistent as the Union of Godless had little influence. Moreover' the
bread, like Pritama¡ov. )'14¡l
Although party and state policy fbcusecl majority of party members held religious beließ and did not consicler their
nìore_amenrion o' productivity belief in the supernatural to contradict their own commitment to socialism.
and fàctorv readers became reìs toierant
of ,nuttipreìeË;;;iru horicrays, Given a choice between the productivist ethos and their religious beliefì dur-
workers co'ti'uec{ to observe their o'",r
schedules rvitrr or without state sallc_
tion' A 1927 MK reporr ing Christmas I928, q,orkers opted for the latter. Thereafter, Stalinisrn
or work discipri'e and the ,,.ugfi.ir,h absen- became less tolerant of religious values that challenged the industrialization
teeism i'
Moscow asserted that the threË ¡nain causes
for rnissed work rvere
vodka, church horicrays, and exc'rsio's drive, a¡d abando¡ed the pretence that workers' opinions lnattered.
to the countryside- ii," r".rory *",
singled out for O"Ur.:ï.::l because of religious
holidal,s, *itf, t*i.. as rnarly
abse'tees on old christuas and five
ti¡nes as many on Masle'itsa.rae
The t928 campaign to require work o' Alcoholism, Fighting, and Hooliganism
the cîristm", t"riã"y was a rit-
mus test of the relative stre'gth of the state,s
increasi'gry p.ãã."r.tiuirt .,t,o, No issue illustrates the ft'ustrations of the state's social engineering efforts
orthodox berief. Diff..",.t departme't resorutio's
'is-à-vis
party's uneve"ess: its i'fìuerce rvas siniply illustrate the more than the persistence of alcohol abuse aud l-rooliganisrn. Alcoholisrn was
llot yet ,,."ng-.;rgh i' alr rampant during the prerevolutionary years and lnanagelnellt tried to clisci-
shops ro intirnidate oppositio'.to parry-5pi¡sorecr resor'tio,îs. rhe
of speakers i' the majority plinã employees by fining rhem one ruble for fighting or appearing at the fàc-
shop spoke i,r aío. of worki'g on christmas,
speakers challe'ged'airtrre bur rwo iory in aclrunken state.l57 Such rnethods of social control were ineffèctive.
resólution. ode speaker against the hoiiday
used anti-serniric terms:,"lh.t are work "On payday," one worker wrote) "wives often stood guard at the gate to grab
taking away our holidays such as chribt- the wages and to keep them fiorir going to the tavern."Is8 Because of a pro-
rnas a'd New year, but the
Jews g.t to bJl.b.aie their
tio'for christmas work faired, wlth'inetee'i'favor, rr.rii"yr.'Jihe resolu_ hibitioir ou hard liquor, "workers diat-tk ditferent substitutes, such as purified
tt i.ty-'nï. alai'st, a'd denatured alcohol atld varrish' Every da1' rve stayed in the evening as if for
twe'ty-three absre'rio's, a resurt indicative (\!ron:len
of the dlscrep",r.v üJ"".e' rhe overtime work, but in realiry we played carcl games."lse aud men
majority ofloyal speakers and rank-and-fìle
rvorkers' silent sentiments.rs0 The clrank wine together in the Shops," wrote olle woman. "Almost evelyotìe
speaker in the mainrenalÌce shop
stated thar wolne, in the bort shop hacr and at lunch. They srnuggled it in their clothes and
already agreed ro work on Chiistmas drank in the morning
u,rio,, l;;;;, arguecl, pockets. Only after the revolution dicl all this stop."IóO
"w'omen workers arways u,ercome poritiu. "r.,d ",roth.,
qualified resolutior-r to work
i,rltlì;;r.;'il;';häi p"rr.a Alcoholism clid not miraculously halt after the October Revolution' nor
o'ry if:othershops clicr so.l5l In severar other" rvas it limited to rank-and-file workers. In early 1918, the fàctory colnmittee
shops, party a'd union loyarists'prevailecr.
In rhe cabre shop meedrg, for leaders Tumanov and Dimitriev created a scatrdal rvhen they got illto a
example, only tlvelve of fìfþ-five votecl
against working q¡1 eþ¡is¡¡11¿s.rs2 with factory Red Guarcls. The factory comrnittee
The 1928 srare campaig,r to *o.k irl.oLrgh drunken confroutation
christmas was a fairr_rre. organized a trial that fbund Tumatlov itlllocent l¡ut Dimitriev guilty, and he
Because.of tlre crisparities beirvee'shops,
decide the issue. A fàctory allrìoullcemc't
delegates met o' l4 December to was throrvn off the comtlittee.lól
o. r7 December l92g rnanclatecr Early soviet prohibition on alcohol production gave way to pragmatic
that in accordance rvitrrthe crelegates'meeti'g,
the christ'ras horiday would financial concerns. The Soviet govemmellt prohibitect the sale of stroug alco-
start or1 22 December't53 Moreover, because
the Russia' o.rtrol* church hol in Decernber l9l9 blrt cotlsunìption fell during the Civil War due to the
did not adopt the uerv cale'cla., ,r'r"rry rvorkers
were abse't o' the old calen_ grain shortage rather than state policy. During NEP, prohibition proved inef:
dar Christmas. For example, seue,rty-two
rvorkers were absent from the bolt
shop, nve'ty-six rvithoui just cause.rsa Trris pressure iectual: fully one-third of rural households distillecl alcohol, and prosecutions
fì-o'r belorv rvas appar_ strained the court systelll. Prohibition ended graclually, as the strength ofper-
ently replicated in other Moscow fàctories.
Respo'crir-rg ro .reu diffèrent rnissible alcohol steaclily increased. State alcohol production becatle au
suggestio'st' on rhe holiday issue, the
Moscow city certrar rrade u'io. important source of Soviet revellue) accountiug for 12 percent of state
coLrncil backtracked a'd crecrarecr Decernber 24thîo 29th a t-,Jia"r,rr 4
note to a speaker i'earry r929 incricates incorne by the late I920s.tó2
the dupliciq' of
that rvorkers i'trre crisrricr recog_ Alcoholism in the fàctory followed this general treucl, declining aucl then
unio'poricy: "wry crid the u'io's
'ized
ers should work or christmas--rvhicri of coul-se we "gi,","'ih",
*"a,- i¡creasing u,ith the grain sr.rpply. Civil War sources rarely meution alcoholism
ceutral orgalls of the lttrion aud aclministration
dicr not-wrrile trre arld contrast markedly with eviclence fì'om NEP. In December I924,
institutions did ,ot workl Røbochø,i,ø Moshvø reportecl that unexcused absences iucreased signifìcantly
They ca"ot agitate agai'st it a'd at tr-,.
,",t. ti're celebrate."lsó after payday beca¡se of drunkertness. Iu the rolled metal shop, the al'erage
 t42
Ret, o løtion øttd. Coønterrn olution r43
Eueryd.øy Life Undcr Developing Stølin'ism
nunÌber of absences due to ill.ess a.cr other
causes was sixty-five, but after
receiving pav, the average was eigrrtv-seven.163 women's work in May 1926 estimated that 30 percent of wotneu drank.lT3
Bt ó.,;ú;;ìöü p"rry r."a- In May 1928,a parry bureau speaker noted "receutly a noticeable drunken-
ers addressed "the struggle wirh ãrui*enness
in tire factory,, a¡d polnted out ness amollg women."I74 The bolt shop cell reprimanded a female member
that on the eighth, a'd te'th of the mo'th, seve' hu'dred workers
were absent without 'i.th,
just cause.lóa because "she carrte to work drunk and had to be removed from the shop for
â wnlle. " "
Th" Le'i' Levy appare'tly i'creased the number of arcoholic members.
- August Women mernbers with drinking problems faced double standards. The
In 1924, the party bueau ancl factory colnmittee
resolved that, .,If a parqr s¡t.¡¡.d one mernber who had pe¡¡ed three articles for Mørtenoahø,
courrade appears in the factory in a'inebriaied
state, then iÀe q,restron,viil
be brought befbre the generai meeti'g including two on women's issues and oue agaiust religion, before Christmas
of workers.,,ío; a¡-r. mai'speaker in
a September r92s factory party meetiig
claimed ,,"r,r-,. pr.r.iì time this is
it 1925.176 The shop bureau noted that "she is a good worker, but she
the mosr imporrant questio'." He nãted that drinks" and specifìecl "she rvill keep herself in check." A candidate, she was
party
attending rneeti'gs and were ofie' intoxicated
;.;il;,
were ,or elevated to full membership but within a rnonth rnale members complainecl
while at work. Nor rvas trris a that, "She does not carry out the rvork of distributing literature in the shop,
bureau -."r u.rr ;
rank-and - fi le phe'omenon, because',ev€'
factory drunk' The i' th. and is often absent and drinks." The shop bureau resolved to remove her
subsequently resolved to take "pp"."..a
,(extreme
sures'"1óó In october1e^e!ng
1,92.6,thep".ry
mea- frorn the distribution assignment. Three mouths later she was expelled
five memb.., fo. rìot.ur.yir-rg
""p.tt.d
out work' not paying their dues, aná hatituaily because "her driukiug activity was clemoralizing nonparty workers."l77
showi'g up ø. work ..in an Drunkenness, fighting, and hooliganism took place ir-r matry arenas in and
inebriatecl state.' ló7
around the factory. In March 1922,the party bureau discussed the bellavior
. As with religior-rs. belief, partyexpulsions f-or alcoholis'r were
alwavs com'i'ed rvith other oftèJces.ïhe parry..t ir;;'b;rr]à.^ almost of one member involved in "all incident in the theatre." The rneeting min-'
ber in the bolt shop fbr -.n,-
of dueì andrrabitually drirîing on pay-
utes do not describe the details of the incicle nt, but the bureau resolved to
'onpaymeirt
The party o'ly reprimancfed seve' older immediately remove the strong clrinks sold at the theatre buffet.ì78 Trvo
1"v't.un
drunkenness ar rvork.róe Trre na''shop bureau -".nt.., for repeated, ,months later, a party meeting resolved to pressure tþe factory cotnntittee "to
ber, seme'ov, four times because ofïru'ke'ness.
,;;";;;;;",rilo"r. n.,.-_ take measures to stop outrages in the theatre.'Ìze Atlother arelta of rowdiness
After three years of ca'_ was tlre factory cafeteria. Møt'tenouhø claimed, "In our cafeterias there aie
didate mernbership, rhe bureau conclucred
rhar ,,he p.o,.,-,iJ ío ,tr"rgt t.,-,
out, but he is not getti'g ary better." semenov rows and scandals almost every day" and referrecl to the cal'lteen as "the
argued that he ..crrinks hooligans' den." Iu adclition to fìstfights, the newspaper complained that
because of his wife," but ihe party expered
hirn fbr ffi,iïã.u,rr."nn.r, some rvorkers, "particularly when they need a driuk," would sell their lunch
and no'paymenr of party crues. ''ie^ nail shop
cell ,rì...ty ..pìimanded tickets to "derelicts."lso
anorher member after.it received a police report
on his ..vioíatio' of pubric The focal point of hooliganism was the fàctory club. Ironically, the fac-
order in an irtoxicared srare," ev^en tho*gh
ire hacr u".., .*p.ii.ã earlier for
drunkenness and nonpayms¡¡ 6f dues.rzri tory's fìrst rlewspaper, Nøshøgøzøtø (Our Newspaper), had called for the cre-
only the most o*trageous drunken behavior red to ation of the club because "in their free time wolkers are drawu to the pub
u'ity Day witl-r the Red Arrn¡ "comrade Ivanov (cable expulsio.. 1927, on I' ancl sometimes even to church." A fàctory club would help "to raise cultural-
briated state." lvauov supposeclly rvalkecl
shop) rvas i'e- i'a' eclucational work.'ìi'll In February 1924, a corrrbined rneeting of party and
up to a solclier ancl taunted him:
"You're o'ly makirg o'e and a half rurrlesi That delegates discussed measures fbr combating hooliganism in the club. One
is nothi'gt i *our¿ not representative suggested enlisting the Komsotnol to prevent club disorders,
serve.i'the ar'ry if I rvere ),ou." other rvorkers
told him that this was ..not but ar-rother speaker counterecl that it was "llot possible to restore order in
permissible talk" and after rumors of trre
incicrent spread, Iva'ov *"s u.ougtrt
befbre a.general party meeti'g a'd expellecl.IZl the club through the l(ornsomol because tl-re hooligans are armed rvith guns
Another member was arrd lrand weapons."I82 In January 1925, Røbochøiø Moslevø reportecl that
expelled before tl-re e'tire factory orga'izåtion
because pr."ì"us o*t_ the hooligans had the upper hand against those who triecl to restore order in
burst whe' Lerin's sister spoke at tÀ'e fàctory:
'.In the "rni,
factory cell ple'u'r the club, including repeated incidents of hooligans beating up club oflìcials
cluri'g Maria uliauova's report o' trre seve'th pre¡rum
of the Moscow coln_ and factory committee members. Calling the militia by telephone was inef:
mittee and the related report o. the Moscor¡,
co'tror comrnissior¡ rre, in a fective because "either the rnilitian-reu are busy, or if only oue persou shorvs
drunker"r.state, bega'shoutirg at her,'Erough
talk!, ... a.rpit. ii-,. fact that up, he will likely be unable to cleal with it." Moreover, warnecl the nervspa-
M-aria ulianova l-rad spoken ft¡r
trrai te' to fifiee' rninutes. Because
of tliis outburst he rvås removecl'ofì.om
'rore per, the "hooligans, sensing that the club administration catlnot hanclle them,
the meeting.,,l22
Alcoholis'r \vas rot limitecr ro mare ernproy!ç5. are gettir-rg rnore brazeu.'183 By November 1925, Mørtenoulaørepotled that
Increasecr alcoholisrn the fàctory club "rarely had a night without a fìght or a scarlclal.'I84 Itl
anollg fèmalc procluctìon workers appears to ha'e
coir-rcicrecl *,itrr the Decen-rber 1926, the factory newspaper called on the l(omsomol to help
demoralizatio' ancr collapse of r"on-,.,-,', r,r,ork.
A bolt shop reporr o' defelld the club fì'om hooliealls.ls5
 144
Rø,oløtion.
Eueryrlry Life Under Developing Stølinism t45
Expecti'g the youth orga'izatio'
to stem roudi'ess i' the club
ìematic' A I(omsomoteadãr was prob_ satisfàction, this time in the rolled metal shop (514 rvorkers) becar,rse of the f'ol-
".ku"r;;ã;;; iri.king and hoori ga'ism an.ro'g
about half the me'rbership, but.lilü;; Iowing. A worker in the rolled metal shop, Vavilor', in an inebriatecl state, badly
rr was norhing serious. He also beat Baranov from the rolled met,ll shop, who was sent to the hospit:rl uncon-
claimed that the Konrsonior h."q
;1ì.1
club, five for the factory, and five ;lard u'its of five persors for the scious. ln response to this, workers saic'l: "Why was a worker such as Vavilov irgain
Ieader later adnritted Ko-ro-or
ø. tnî surrounding area.rsó The same acceptecl back at rvork afier he hacl alreacly been firecl fiom the fàctory ft¡r [rrau4-
p"**irvãa hooriganiîm bìictaim"a ing and fightingl" Vavilov'q'as arre sted.l9ó
had helped to rehabilitare mary iorn,.. trrey
youìr, u"naits.rsT A.norhe r f926
tory Komsomol reoort noteá ..unh."í,Çphenonrerra; fac_
include d drunkenness and
hoorigani"rì. üirr. MK reportei
iñ",1n." Ifworkers were outraged by the tnttrder of oue of their cotnrades, tl-rey also
"g"i,,
,rì",".ir. factory defended their right to brawl on the shop floor. Dismissal fbr fighting alone
Komsomol secrerary hr1"::rf
group'" The group's activities
""i,itd p^,ii.ip"t.a in formi'g a hooliga' was such a rare occurrence that rvhen managenetÌt fired en-rployees, their col-
åJ.u.rr."rrn.rs
incrudeä
passers- by. ,, The arrest a'cr a'necr assaults on leagues often challenged it. Several men iu the mechanical shop were fired for
of
$ :Ol ,.^...ory
ical nine-nronth fierrt for control
Jnaed a. bitte r, apparently apolit_
of the liomsonrol organi zatiottin
fìghting and the shop party bureau supported the firings, but "amoug work-
tory.rtu In March lg2z, rhr,r.rv the fac_ ers there began a movemellt to have the firings overturned." Several rank-and-
rco,rrá,r",ii'1."a., reported, ,.Ir
there have bee' i'cicrerrts of is rrue rhar file party members "took the lead of the rvorkers' rrovement and insisted on
dru'ken'."'"ìrå'rr""liga'is'r, but in
ge'eral the
masses are healthy.,'l9o subnitting a petition to have the workers reiustated."IeT
Komso'rol guards' fàilure to co¡nbat Parry members participated in shop floor brawls. Repeated shouting and
to attempt more stri.gerìt measurcs. rowcriness i' trre crub lecr authorities fighting between two repair shop men'rbers, accorditlg to shop party tnemt'rers,
Iu Septern ber rg26, fàctory leaders created "a nervous rnood iu the shop and lowered tl-re cell in the eyes of the
orga'ized a srrow triaf agai'st .igrrt
hooliga's, i'cl'di'g óne Ko'rsomor
member' Accordine ,1 workers."les In May 1925, a factory party leader reported ou "uuhealthy
gu. mir,itiãma', they hacr arrived to querr a distur_ phenomena" arnong members, a¡rd ranked fighting behind theft, but ahead of
bance at the club bit the rroorigr"
became enraged, bear a'd g."ð'b.d
ãr;uì,iu...¿ ,¡," n.,¡riri"]-îîi. nootig",r, absenteeisrn ar-rd economic tailism.iee In December 1925, a fight betweeu
itt. Àiììri" by their rrrroars, pushed their
backs to the ferce and wh'Jpur.rrìirg party members in the rolled metal shop erupted after they dousecl each other
a Red Army derachmenr arrived
rh;*d,
..beat
,rr. ,n-ir-iti"ri;o.,ry with water. "A Cou-lmunist is not like Christ, who turned the other cheek; so
triar "ft..
aiaãotno.ìties resrore order. The
mately sentenced the accused ulti_ instead he hit ,A.nulevich on the forehead with a tuug, wouuding him and
to serve from four to eightee' months
prison'reÌ Show trials' however, i¡r sending him to the clinic. It is not good for older workers to practice hooli-
aiJ distdrbancès i'the club. In
March 1928, the factory culturál "ãr'.ìa l.eader
.o,rn¡rrìon
ganisrn; just the opposite," argued Mørtenovl¿ø. "They shoulcl set an exatnple
administratio'r arguecl, ..The way rhe for olrr youth.'2oo
co'du*s ,h. ,t.oggi. *iir-,'nooïganis'r
necessary to adopt the most is too soft and it is The few party reprimands aud expulsions fbr violent behavior agaitrst
severe tneasLrres.Dre2
Brawling o' rhe shop floor *"r women prolrably underestimate the number oftassaults on fernale employees.
repeatedly issued fàctory-wide "h";-f¡;;ue'r occurrerce. Ma'ageme'r Irr May 1925,the factory party bureau reprimauded-but did not expel-a
alìts'names in a futile attempt ",',r.,ou',.*nts that i'cluded the combat_ nrernber for drunkenness aud beating his wifè.20i Mørtercopl¿ø accusecl trvo
to emlrarrass theln. ..Shaming,,
rta"u"g.;rrt issued o'ly o'e repri'ra'd of
social control started rnodestly. as a methocl workers of regularly beating up wollell, particularly on payday.202 Another
1923, i'dicati'g that the fighi
tu q-,,.r?i"ìïas rarher vicior-rs.re.3
i' article demanded that the party should expel a wifè-beating candidate mem-
ber lg2í,lraragemerìr ..pii,r,",-,dåd Decern_ ber.203 A party report for 1927 noted that one of the insufficient areas oF
wounding another rvorker with
*å.k.. i,-,.the steer founcrry'.r shop fbr party rvor:k was among wolnell and cited ltellrbers' "non-communist behav-
"
¿ 5¡ou.1.runln February
reprirna'ded a worker-in the rvire 192g, mairagement ior, including drunkenness anct u'ifte beating.Ð204 Mørtenottleø also repolted
puri;g shop ,.fo. pu'chi'g the technical
corrrrol u'orker in rhe face .,,r*
An u,rur,,il ,,iiL. in April l92i illustrates one gruesome incident in which Plekhanova, described as a "good worker,"
shop-floor disorder but also
,t..r".us-,h^' "' ' the started a relationship with a married employee and became the victim of his
activis¡n a'd the relative
rveakness of the state cluring
.",1y NE-n "ri"o.L",. enraged peasant lvifè. The wife hearcl gossip abor.rt the relationship, sold thc
fàmily's belongings, travelled to Moscow, and threw acid in Plekhanova's
o' 24 Aprir there rv:.rs ¿r strike because of the fò,owirg: face, blinding her.2os
repair shop rrit anotrrer worker o' 7 Aprir a u,orker in rrre A February 1928 fàctory cliscussion on hooliganism indicates the level of
over the rr.l.i-¿,, a bottre.
r'ounclec{ u'orker dieci a'd A fèw cl:rys rater the lawlessness and disorder in the clistrict. Seventy-three questiot-rs to the
rhe militi¿ ,n. ki'er.
appeirrecl at the fàctory ancr
his presence"...rììi
on z+ aprithe :rgirin speaker, a member of the district militia, sLlggest a deterioratit.rg situation and
ers' workers rerurrecl to work
l*..J ,*ong inclignatio, a'rong.w,or.k_
oirry irficr ,rr.ìi.à.y corn,nittee frustration over the authorities' inability to curb tl-re problerns. One worker
pursne rrrc rn¿ìrre r. Tr.re next ¡rrornisecr to regalry
cr,ry, 25 ap.', .gni' markea by strong rvo¡ker clis_ wanted to knorv "why clo rve have such a strorlg development of hooligan-
",oì ism in the USSR, and rvhy rvas it less developed uncler Tsaristnl" Auother
 146
Rat¡ o latiul ønd. Coanterret¡o
løtion Et øryd.øy Life Under Dweloping Stølinisw t47
q/orker askecr: "conrrade,
why do we have such crisorders
republicì I notice drat at twerve in the Russia' outbursts rather than the fisticufß with the militia. FIe was expelled for non-
otlock at'ight it is i.rpossible to
street." o'e'ote claimecr,,a'i'crease walk the payment of membership dues, drunkeuness, rioting, and "using obscenity in
cooperative.,, Many notes recoll.rmenclecl
of theft in the lines at the district
his anti-Communist speech in the meeting, addressing VTsIK, the Central
severe m eas ures, s uch Cornmittee, the Central Contr'ol Committee, and all Soviet power."2lo
were useress. one worker
ni gr,.. fi ,,;;:',r;
", comprained Ë,:äifl
:j' ::ö:::ïï
îilî, H:: In the second half of 1928, Mørtenouleø starting pushing a "class struggle"
that a article saicr t'at a
hooliga' was sertenced to jail t;;,;ry 'ewspaper line on the issues of hooliganism and discipline, albeit inverted against the
än. n-,o,rtl-,, wh'e otrrers suggestecr
"Bear rhe hooligans"'and ¿why aátil workers and for the state's productivist interest. Andrea Groziosi aptly dubs
,,Why irr. m'itia srroorì,, Arother rvorker
asked, don'r we have trooiigá" irì"ì, i,, this campaign Stalinism's "anti-worker workeristn," in which workers were
the militia for i'competetce, and ,h. ;;;¡,;M"ru ,i.,", btamed
several suggested that the depictecl in Soviet newspapers as loafbrs, self-seekers, thieves, drunkards,
"sinrply afraid of trre-_hoorigáur;; Ã,*À.r militia were absentees, etc. The regime blar¡ed workers for what it claimed was a "decline
worker asked why it was that
a'ã r.nir" nglm r,-, rhe-crub, ancr you in labor discipline" for industry failing to complete its plan. So vicious was
;iiîrt|[î i:il::fights gã to trre mili- this unprecedented rhetorical assault against the Soviet working class that the
oth è r, r,i s. j,i
".;i;,;,.T "::ï." iÌ:h,iÍ. ï, il åi'
"rå
"con.,."d.',-plaker, do',t
uh,ï1.:i: Menshevik émigré press assumed that a capitalist class l'rad gained a control
of Soviet industry.2l I
;:i'JîÏ':1ìJ'l,li.t-oift i'a, "'"1ni',ugg.,.a'
¡e banned vodka altogether we would A fèw weeks after the show trial of club hooligar-rs, Mørtenopþ.ø lecl rvith a
much faster),2'o g.t'ro socialism headline charging that "Drunkerìness ancl Hooliganisrn Undelmine the
I'creased alcoho,ism a'd hooliga'iu, Gains of October." The article clairned that drunkenness in the shops had
appears to rrave beeu ge'erarized
throtrghout late NEp Soviet,..i.fr,. increased, again calling fbr stricter measures such as shorv trials.2t2 By 1928,
members
îïb 27
fou'd "aparh¡ dis'rusio|;;;, ardsurveyof Moscoiv.Komsomol raising productivity ancl discipline were inextricably linked with propaganda
youth a'd Komsomol leaders.,The crec"de,rt-"0,ìioi"r,, anorg
repori clài¡'ed a ..growrh in against hooliganism on the shop floor. Au articlc cntitled "More Watchful-
tions of malaise such.as^drunt.nn.riìàoriganisrn, ma'ifesta_, ness in Production, Everyone for Work Discipline'l called fòr a iesolute strug-
a¡d suicide. ,)2o7
unitect opposition.pratfo'm .";pl;;;;; ;r*i'nry g.ãwi'g TI)e gle against absentees, hooligans, drinkers, ancl wreckers in production.
sumprio' of atcoholic.S:: ...^.1r.., thãt the co'- "These enelnies of our production are enemies of Soviet construction aud
while leading to an "iucrease "*"u
fø;'il.
budger,,
---'" careless";;;il;".l:rs
of abse.teeis'r, the working class as a r.l,hole," the uewspaper charged, admitting that even
accj-de1 ts, fìres, fì ghts, i nj uri es, etc-,'zix
*o.r.,i*rnip) waste, "menbers of the party drink and 1ìght at the factory."213
Declining party moraíe during late The "anti-worker" campaign rvas a tacit aclmission by evolving Stalinism
NEp contributed ro alcohol-i'duced
outbursrs against,n..::giT_..
tní.,y p,äi..
utterances of other mernbers appliecl
of members reporri'g o' rhe
that the voluntary and participatory transformation ot'bythad been a failure.
d..n'ort Henceforth state loyalists would pursue a rnore strident cultural trausfbrma-
cidecl wirh party rovaris,
to political remarks and coi'_
.l
ôpfàs,io'isr tion olsociety that placed the blame on workers fbr the regime's own failures.
¡nember iufbrnred the party l.p.^": activities. A candidate
The "Cultural Revolution" (in practice a "Cultur¿rl Counterrevolutiou") sub-
tr,. ¿ o.n, iioì.; ilï
1
using unpri'table a'd obsce'e
of the behavio
¿u.
s",, :;:
I ":t; arso
words.,, TrrJinformer
#,:';,îi î åyå:
ff ï:i:ï
ordinated all aspects of Soviet culture to the procluctivist needs of Soviet
industry. Mørtenoukø noted that
party fo. ."r..rirt ...ã.,r, and =ü.claiurecr rhat
l:,:19:'].,.*Í.the
rarrecr to attair rris eoal of becomi'g
chargecl that because 'rern_
he The fc¡x trot w¿-rs banned. Now in tlre birllroorn, in public at youth parties, the ftrx
a srrop forema', he [ilamecr
the next nreeti'g, tie accused n-,.-i",-ii..î".,t.d', tl-re party. At
trot is danced unc-ler the guise of a waltz. Wl-rel'r olle \4,¿rtches the c'lancers, olÌe sees
a'd received a reprimand.'"n a.roti.'.
i,trte søruor¿ritikøfashiot-t what an aroused state they get into. It seems to me th¿rt we call expect nodring liom
starting brawls but he was .,restorecl
r'rìi-'..: r*, irirlãó"ä."î.p."r.a¡, such a waltz but clepravity. That is u,hy such u,altzes should be fbrtridden ¿Ìt our p:ìr-
to his pc
nizatioi,",'at."a"'u',io,,.;H.ilä,nä#:,r".iï:Jl,i'älÏï#",'iå:ru:r,,ï ties. Parties àre not f'or debaucherr,. but fbr the cultural rest of our vouth.2l4
on the.question of state louns
in
'il"* "-,ìä-commu'isr,r.,"n,r.., srarrecr a Workers had become less interested in politics, choosing to participate in
,i-;"älif ilïi.i:ï:i:î,ï,:äîîï,J.'"",,,iîä:;äT'"ï..rir*:T other activities during the crisis of late NEP. Wl-rile a majority of the work-
"Here is your party rnember-h.
ir -ì.,rrl he can'ot eve' rvork.,, force-between one thousancl and sixteen hundred workers-regularly
man suggesred that he go A ft¡re_ attended the twice-montl-rly factory general rneetings aftelrvork in 1922,in
ho're, but rre refusecr, r*...i"g
"r'air"^p".ty "na
,','ar.; H. iJ.,en, rvith the ,i.,ili,i" 1927 oriy nine hundred employees attended the largest rneeting of year,
*:iït J,ï -ïï,ï:îf:'sible ".,ã
gu".d,, even though the workforce had doubled over the preceding five years.2l5
o f th e *:,.,.,. y iï. #;ì:å1i ;::iïï :ï:J']fi Jï:,H:il*l,.: Lorv attendance at meetings continuecl in the First Five-Year Plan, br-rt three
"î.:i i,ru thousand workers regularly attended the factory club soccer matches.2ló Sim-
 t48 149
R ep olution ønd, Coønterrev ohttìon Everyrløy Life tJnder Døv ehtpirtg Stølirtisnc

ilarly, from April to the end of 1927, a'

vast majority of who¡rr were
astounding 4g,5ró workers-rhe female ernployees. Women recogpized the political retreat a¡d repeatedly
youth-paid to see fihns-i' the factory crub.2lZ complaineà aird protested, but rêsistance by increasingly isolated working-
some workers recogni",ed the party's double sta.dards
i' its social e'gi- *o^.n-" numerically weak minority-was ineffectual, especially because
neeri'g ef'forts' At a May r.92g generar party rneeti.g, a nore
to the speaÈer marÌagernellt successfully played on fears of uuemployment'
asked: "why was vasil'ev i' the bort ,irop ,rot .*p.ll.dl
He is often see'
clru'k a'd he rvas arrested by the miritia.i,2rs Nonp".ty .,"orL",., Mãre problelnatic for the regirne's industrializatiqn ef-forts was workers'
were arso continuing attacl-lment to Orthodox religiosiry, because the state's social con-
fully aware of the e.rolment of dru'ks in the party. A speaker
of rro'party øhtiv in 1928 suggested giving nerv members
at the r'eeti'g trol strategy rvas aimed at a majority of the workf'orce. The Marxist position
bation, but dri'kers even longei.2ie Repair irop i'e briated
six rno'ths, pro- in the eariy years of the revolution uuderstood prevaleut belief in the super-
member.s incruded natural as a reflection of Russia's ecouomic backwardness and low cultural
the orga'izer a'd a "completely demoralized'i older
member namecl ukhov, level. Most workers, inclucling parry i¡embers, maiutait"ted religious beließ'
who Ïad "beat up a rvorker" but did
mand.220 I' respo'se 'orlparty 'ot receive even a repri- but did not perceive religior-r as inconsistent with building socialisrn. During
to why workers were joi'i'g the parry o,'€ corl- late NEp, paì-ty, *nion, aircl manageme't aclopted a rnore rhetorically strident
tributor suggested that the organization shoulá'ot have-been'more selective
srrategy that broke witl-r the previous perspective of encouragirlg a gradual
about those it allowed to bear arms because .,p".ty members
chase each other around wi¡þ ¡svglyç¡r.,rzzr
get clrunk and transformation over decacles. Party leaders sought, but failed to witt, au
endorsement of work on religious holidays, setting the stage for more cou-
Various attemprs to curb arcoholis'r duri'g NEp rvere
^ i'effective. Argzg frontational, arm-twisting approaches to anti reli gious work'
factory circular to colnbat careless'ess i'cluded a commarrcl to ..not
let Various tlleasures to curb rampant alcohol abuse and hooliganisnr were
intoxicated rvorkers operate machi'ery."222 unable ao
."n u"i also unsuccessful, particularly as authorities viewecl dri¡kir-rg as a questio¡ of
factory leaders apparently tried to shiri the burcle' onro "ìcohorisrn,
*o.l..siwives. on willpower rather ihan as a medical or social problern. Moreover, despite
the eleve'th a''iversary of the october, Revolution, á housewives,
wornen workers' co'rì¡nerroration pledged to ..co'duct
aud Stalìn's claims that state production of alcohol would decrease, the state
a resolute struggle relied on this revenue. Workers' comlÌ1ents in l92B suggest that the Soviet
with alcoholism.D223 The atterùpt io initill amo'g the,workforce
a. essen- regime had not only failed to curb problerns such as hooliganism, but also
tially Protesta't work ethic with a red veteer prõved probrematic
because thãt the situatiou had deteriorated, indicative of the iruch deeper social cri-
most workers did not share the stare's producìivist
Mo..ou.., sis. With the working class in rerreat) however, the crisis fostered inclividual
many workers were acutely aware of thè duplicity "siiratio's.
of fàctory party leacrers, despair and alcohol abuse by tnany workers-including \l/omell'
whose behavior did not up to the 'sta'crards
'easure 'rorår
ãemanded of 'ih. Bolrl-r.uik credo of leading by exanple and maintaining high moral
rallk-and-fi le workers.
standards was gradually reduced to ma¡clating f¡orn positions of power.
The Bolsheviks believed that the political and economic
rra¡sfbrmation of
soviet society rvould usrrer i' a ridicar arteratiou of workers, Many rvorkers were arvare of the factory leaclcrs' duplicity, and they com-
daily rives. plained about party bosses abusing wornell) partaking in religious cere-
workers would be actively invorved rot orìry in cha'gi'g
tr-re p.o..s, of pro- monies, and running around drunk with revolvers. Despite the potentially
duction but in their owlÌ personar tra'sforÁatio.. By the end
of NEP, how- subversive worker respolÌse, state intervention in workers' daily lives not only
ever, the lo'g-ter'r materialist perspective to overcome
inherira'ce of rsarisnr was crroppeà i' fàvor of a more coercive
the cultural col-ttinued to push forward, but also acceleratecl' While sol¡e workers
approach. resented state policy a¡cl startecl to clraw more politically chargecl conclusious
Disputes over womelì's issues, orthoclox rerigious belief,
a'cl hooliganism against the regirne, the majority ofrvorkers were u,ithclrarving from the polit-
did'ot take place ir a vacuu'l-state loyalistsì'trre fàctory abandonecr ear_
lier tolerant a'd egalirarian strategies on culturar issues ú.."rrr. iãl realm. Cleavages betrveell lvorket's',r,ere reiufbrced, especially as unenr-
rnandated that all aspecrs of soviet society were ro
stalinisrn ploy'rent escalateà, a.d the resentment of state policy o' everyday politics
be suborcri'ated to the àid-r-tot necessarily translate into anti-regime setrtiments. Male employees
regime's prod uctivist aspirations.
blamed wonìell fbr problems; womell blamed in-rnigrating peasant workers;
Yet the state of-fensive agai'st the worki'g class dicl
.ot push fèrrwarcl o' and Orthodox workers blarnecl Jews. The depoliticization aud accompanyilrg
all fronts simultaneously: the uoltø-føce onrvã,n.n,s riberation
prefigurecr the demoralization exacerbated exclusive tendcncies amolìg the workforce, ulti-
more coercive approach to antireligious r.vork that vi.as
defèirecl"until the r-r-rately strengthening the position of the state for pursuing its anti-working
First Five-Year Plan. L-r the early r9i0s,\\/onÌel1 participatecl
i¡ activities that class lrolicies.
were promoted from above by the rvorkersi ,t"t"- and that
genui'ery
addressecl their grieva'ces. working-crass wor-'e' judgecl
trris mo'Jr¡eur
by its rhetoric but with the sa¡le yardstick as Soviet
aclvocates ofrvo're',s 'ror
lib-
eratio'-by, the success of the "agitatio'by the cleecl.', The exclusive
srress
on proclucdvity e'tailed a cle-ernphasis ori issues of particular
corcer' ro
 I50
R ev o lu.tion øn d. Cou.nterrep olutcon E¡,erydøy Life Und'er Deveht¡tittg Stølinism l5l
Notes 40. TSAODM, F.429, op. l, cl. 15, ll. 4, 40. Party bttreatt tneetiugs, 5 February, 12 August
t924.
I. Eliz¿beth Wor>d,Thc Bøbø
yyd. tby Cowrøde(Bl<xnringtr>n, L9g7), lg4_1g5. 41. TsAODM, f. 429, <'tp. 1,,.1. 27,1. 31. Party bttreatt meeting, Ió March 1925.
2' Le<rn Trotsk¡ "culture and s.cialisr'" in pribtems'of
Et,erydøy Life (Nerv y<rrk, ì923). 42. TsAODM,f.429,<>p.l,d.27,ll.43,50.Partyburcautneetings,5May'9Junel925'
3. l{eirrran, Thc Birth of Støtinisne,llg.
43- TsAODM, f . 429, <lp.l, d. 28, l. 33. Party gencral meeting, 2ó August 1925.
4. Tony.ClifÌ,. Cløss Strorggle øn.d Wonen,s Liberøtion(krnclon,
l9g4), 139-140. 44. TsMAM, f. 176, <'tp. 2, d. 432,1. 33. Wtlncn's delegate rìlecting, 27 M¿rclt 1925.
5' wendy G.lcl'ran, wr*en, the støte, ørd.
nrr,rtoi¡ii, souitt Fønity poricy øn¿ sociøt Lifc, 45. TsMAM, Í. 176, <'tp. 2, d. 178,1. I factory cot¡tliftee collectiorl, n d. 1924.
19I7-1956 (Cambridge,
- 1993), chapter. l 46. Golclrrrarr, Wo wen' th e St øt e ørt d' R au løti o rt', 2 1 4 -246.
6' F<rr e-xanrple, sec wr>.c', Bøhø ønd.
ìh, cot rodr.ar-nr choi chatterj ee, cerabrøtinø wotøen: 47. Mørtenovhø, 28 Decerlrber 1925.
Genrter, Festivøt Cu.*øre, ønd. Bobhcpih
ldeotogy, lito
lssg füìii;;;;,";ö.:;'- 48. TsAODM, f .429, <>p. I, d. 34, l. 8ó. Bolt shop party tneetiltg, 19 August 1925.
"The Zhen.tder ancr rrre n"rílí"ìr. l".ry,, i, Histoirl 49. Mørtenovhø,I May 1925.
' ?;;'Ha¡'ds11, irsse rrr: 2 (1976):
50. TsAODM, t.429, op. l, d. 34, l. 78. Rolt shop partl' ureeting, 24lune 1925
T:mM, f. l7ó, op. 2, d. lO7. Empl<:ymenr
8.
statisrics. 5t. TsMAM, f. t76, op. 2, d.255,1. 22. Factory Protectioll <>f Labor report' October: 1924'
9. Mø.t,tenophrL, I May 1925. 52. Mørtenop h ø, 7 Novernber I 925.
10. TsAODM, f. 429, <-tp. l, d.. 57,l. ll. party
bureau urcerir.rg, l February 1927. Ry 1927, TsMAM, f . 176, <>p. 2, c1. 432,11. 3l -39. Wtruretl's delegatc rneetings 1925.
rìre¿r'r age arì()llg 234 fenare p*rdtrctir>n
're u,<>rkerc,"", tìrrtg í;th .u.,ty í*.nry 54. Mørtenothø, 7 N<>vember I925.
unrJg¡ ¡þç age .f tu,e.ty_*w¡ ancl l0ó
1t,:::Iî,]r.: $¡o'en"r,.,.,.rr,
()ver fòrty years olci., 55. W<x>d,, The Bøbø øn.d' the Comrød'e, 2ll.
lt. f. 429, <>p. t, d. 4, t. +9. iarty nl."ting,
t2.
Ï+9Py, B öeccmbcr 1920. 5ó. TsAODM, f . 429, <>p. l,
t7.24,1. 54. Bolt shop party ureeting, 8 October 1925.
lr1-9?Y, t'. 429, op. t, dd. 3, 4. pariy gener:al,í."ri,l gr, t920, rg 2t.
13. **,f-
57. Mørtenot hø, 25 February 192ó.
176, <>p- 2, d. 126,ll. 9- l l. ùet¿rrv.,rt
..ri-if;"ri, .' rv.rk ar,'ong $,orì)en, n.o. 58. TsAODM, f .429, <tç't. l, d. 41, l. 28. General p.ìrty nlceting) 2l Ãptr| 1926'
59. TsMAM, f. l7ó, op. 2,d.545,11. 38-39. Factoty cotrfèrencc, 2ó Novernber 192ó
tn f' 176, op. 2, d. 17r,ll. B-9. Mosco*,.ret¿l*,.rkers,plan
ó0. TsMAM, f . 176, <-tp. 2, d. 545,1. 29. Factory coufèrcttce, I October 192ó.
lfft' .f w.rk fìrrApril-Jure
,t 6r. TsMAM, f . 17 6, t:p. 2, t1. 17l, Il. 2l-22. Factr>r1, cr¡mnlittee rcport ftrr January to Jttrle
t, t2-14. W<rnre.,s.rganizer.rcporr orì ,u,,,.,,",,,,, rv.rk iu fàct.rg 1923.
$ìi#r.î ,ß2: 24
62. TsMAM, f. l7ó, op. 2, c1. 5ó8, ll. 30-95 Factory ctrmr'¡rittce reports I92ó ¿nd.1927.
f.
l9 ITMAM, 176,<>p. r., 1 7-r,1. 5.'Factor.y anrìouncemcnr) t7 ect<.tl:er 1922. 63. Mørtenot leø, ì4 Januar)' 192ó.
l1 jtyAy, ft'. 176,op.2, I !9t,1. lO. ractiryc,,,,ln,,.r." mcering, 28 Jvty t923. 64. TsMAÀ,I, f . 176, <>p. 2, d. 403,11 l - l 3. Factory c<rtrfèreuce, 22 Oct<>ber 1927 '
l: Iry+y, 176, op.2, d. t2',l. 8. Wrmcnt à"ì"g",. urectíng, 20 Novcrnber 1923.
t9. T'MAM,f.t76,<.t¡.t.2,d.2t6,l.S.nXfstatisticliìrr¡",,u"rytJMa.cht9-+-.w,r,,.,.npo, 65. Mørtenott ø, 30 March 1926.
l¿

66. M ør ten op ø, 7 M¿r cl't 19 28

l¿
ticipated in .'e-third -f disputes afIècting 2,441 u,.rkers. Tlr. figur., a., nut t ..rt a.r*n 67. TsMAlvl, Í. 176, <>p. 2, d.784,1. 28. Wonren's dcle gate lìtcctiÍlg rlìirìutes' I June 1928 '
decisi.'s (fìrr a.d agaínst) by gencrer bLít 92.0 p.r..n,
6na z,zoo afïècted enrployees) ó8. TsMAM, t. 176, <>p. 2, cl. 545,1. 21. Factory gencral cotrfèrcrrcc, I I JLrne 1926.
rvcre dccidcd in the fàr,r.¡r of thc wt>rkem.
69. TsAODM, f.429, <>p. f , d. 80, ll. l6-L7. Factory getrcral cotrfèrencc, 12 May 1927; closetl
20. TsAODM , f. 429. ou. l, d. 50 party bureau rneeting, 24 July 1923.
10, I party rnecting, 18 Mty 1927 -
?: ÏLg?y:f-12s,.,p. r, a. ro, r. r
p.,.i"'..ç^,.fb..._r, er 1e24. 70. Mørtenovhø, 7 Novenrber Ì92ó.
?? IsMAM,f. 176,op.2,7.?!6.,l-l 7t. TSAODM, f . 429, <>p. f , d. 5ó, l. 3ó. Closed pùrq/ gcrìcràl tncetitrg, 19 Octt>ber 1927'
23. T.MAM,f. .9,aO.f"I,.,,.y..)rìlnìrtcemc*ing,
176,<tp.2,d,. 174,1-ì5.Zhen<¡Jei
ttAprit1924.
-*uia.tin.rfìrr*..'ren,su'rk,n.cl. 1923; 72. TsAODM, f . 429, op. I, d. 57,1. I l. Parq' bureau urectitrg, I Fcbruary 1927.
Cornnrurrist Irrtcrnàtionàl thcsis <xr rvorncu,s
rvoli, n.d. 1923. 73. TsAODM, f. 429, <>p. l, d. 62,1. 3ó. P¿r'tv report, Septctnber 1927.
t76, <tp. 2,_d.
?1 ]ryly,T ?5_6,
i. ó. Wornenis g",,"irr n .",ing, 14 October
192+. 74. Mørteno'r,laø,1M:ry 1927,7 Malch 1928' 30 Junc 1928.
?: I+9pM, f.r'. 42s, op. r, d. z, i. L ra.ry _"";;,1
Marctt 1e22. 75. TsAoDM' f.429,<tp l, cl óI, ll' 17-21' Part)' fàction olfàctor¡' coururittec plarl, lttue
?9 JsAODM, 429,op. l, cl._ó, l. a. paLry t u..*,,Ìrr"_ting, 3 Marclt 1922. t927.
27' TSMAM' f' 176, t>p' 2, cI' 256,1 22. Itl.nt.r,'.nJ.,nì
ti rm fàctor.¡, c<>rnurittce ch¿irr.n¿n ancr 76. TsAODM, f. 429, t't¡'t. L, d. 75,|it. 42,33. Party btrrcatr rrrectir'ìgs) 24 April, 8 May 1928'
parr)¡ sccrcr¿Ìry, n.d. 1924. 77. TsAODM, 1.429,oçl. 1,t1.74,1. l0ó. Party bttreatt tleetiug, 23 March 1928.
28. . 176,
<>¡:t. 2, d,. 256,1. 3. Wrxre'
29.
lry+M,
TsMAM,
f
a'c.l rvorkers nrccrrrg, g March 1924. 78. TsAODM, {. 429, op. l, d. 73,1. ó1. Maintenauce sho¡'r rnccting' 14 February ì927
f. 176,<>p.2,d l!:,,,16:3.1 ._Delegiucrn.f
g.n.rrt u,<¡men,smeetings, 1923. 79. TsAODM, f.429, <tp. I, d. 70, l. 29. lle¡rair shop ¡rarty burean ureetiug, 20 Fcbrtrary
30. TsMAM, f. 176,ctp.2,d.256,ll. 3_4. W<rnrcî,,,*.,iÌrgr,25
Fcbruary, 14 Octobcr t924. 1927.
3t. Mørtenotlzø, I May 1925.
80. TsMAM, f. 176,<>p.2,d.795,11.22,29-31.l{trllecl metal shop nrecting,2 October 1928'
c¿. fsMAM, | 176, op. 2, d. 256,1. 3-. W<rmcn,s nrceting,
25 Febnrary 1924. 81. TsAODM, f.429,<>p. 1,d.27,1.45. Parw bureau trrecting, t3 May ì.925-
f. 176, <>¡t. 2, d.. 256,ll. I _30. Wr>nren,s
34.
IryAM, Lneiiings, tlZ+. 82. IìGASPI f. I7, op. 85, cl. l5I,l. 137. MKintì)t'n1àtiorl srÌrì'rnlaly December 1927.
176,op.2,d.246,ll.l0,30.Fact.ry..,,'n,ir,."rneeti'g,4Novem'er1924.
TtYAYlf: 83. Goldrnan, Womøø, The Støte ønd. Revolatiort, ll8-122.
35. Røhochøiø Moslu¡ø, l0 June 1923.
84. Mørteøovleø, l8 Febluary 1927.
36. Røhochøiø Moshvø, B January 1925.
85. TsMAM, f'. 17ó, op. 2, d.779,11. 30-33. Fact<xy gcneral rnecting,9 February l92B'
37. t>p l' a io' u 3I' 3ó' 5ó' Pat q' btrrcaLt 20 Ma.ch, B May, 8ó. TsM-AM, f. 176, op. 2, d. 810, ll. 5I-52. Wrtncn's tneetir.rg, l3 May 1928.
Tf;roru'lY;r'r-9' 'rcctirrgs, 87. TsMAM, f .176,op.2, c{.810, 1.22. Wtxlen's rllectirlg) 7 Octobcr 1928.
38. . 429, <'tpt. I, d,l S, I. 2. party bur.eau mccing, I 5
I19?M1 BB. TsMAM, f. 176, <>p. 2, t1.784,1. 27. Wtrmen's delcgate rìrccting' l8 May 1928.
f

39. f' lanuary 1924.

176,<>¡t' 2 d.2s8, il. 2,4. Fact<x'v..u',niü.. r.ep.rt fìrr 89. lu[ ør tenov It ø, 7 | amary 1928.
s¡rring a.tl sr'r)rcr
$yfl' 90. TsMAM, f. 176,<>¡:>.2, c{.8ì0, ll.5f -52. Wtrtncrt's rllectirlg, I3 À'{ay i928.
 t52 htti on
R ev o øn ¡l Coan terret¡ o lwtion Ettørydøy Life Uader Develoltin'g Stølinisw t53
9ì. TsAODM, f . 429, <>p. I, d.77,L 22. perty general r.nceting
,4 April I92g.
92. GMAM, f. 176, <>p. 2, rJ. Zg4,l. 20. W.mcn's delegate mceri'g;
134. Mørtenolhø,1 May 1925.
ì0 Fe'ruary 192g. t 35. TsAODM , f. 429, op. l, d. 38,1. 26. Iìepair shop Party burealr nreetittg, 28 JanLrary 1925.
93. TsAODM, !'. 429, <>p. d 5ó, ll. 12-13. party gencral nreeting,
l, 28 M.ay l9i7. I3ó. Marten<>vka, 5 Septcn-rber 1925.
94. TsAODM, f- 429, op. l, d.77,1. 50. parry geneial meeting, lã
August 192g. I37. TsAODM, f. 429, op. I, d. 49, 1. 49. Nail shop pår't)¡ bureau tlccting, I M¿rclt 192ó.
95. Mørtanophø, 30 Jr¡ne 1928.
I38. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 48, l. 35. Bolt shop pàrty tnccting, 30 March 192ó.
96. Mørtenoyhø. 30 lune 1928.
I39 . Mørtenophø,26 M'arch L927 .
97. Mørtenoyhn, 7 March 1928.
I40. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 57,l.79. General pàrty tneeting, 27 }une 1927.
98. TSMAM, f. 176, o¡t. 2, d- 784,1. 2g. W<rmcn's delcgate mecring, g
99. Mørtenopl¿ø, 5 fuly 1928.
Junc 192g. l4l. M¿rtcnovka,T January 1928.
142. Martenovka, 5 October 1928.
199 I'MAM' f- 176, <'tp 2, d' 790,1. 6. rìollccr metal srr.p u'iorr me*iug, ó March r92g. 143. Mørtenouhø, 15 May 1928.
i9l TSMAM, f. t76,<>p.2, d.784,1. tS. W<lnen's nìcering,8 M¿rch l9ãg. 144. Mørtenovhø, 19 l)ecember 1925.
I02. Mørteno'thø,24 March L928.
145. Mørtetu¡vhø, 14 lrprrl 1927
l03 lUch¿rd Stites, The Wimoen's Liberøtion Mouement in Russiø: Feminism, Nihitism, ønd. Bol- .

14ó. TsAODM , f . 429, op. ì, d. 68,1. 2. Sheet n-retal shop party rnceting) 3 March 1927 .
sh a, is yn (P rincctt>n, 197 B ), 3 44.
147. Husbarrd, God.less Comwønists,72,Iì5. Births witlxrut religious ceremorly droppcd 3.5
104. /ohn crrrriss, Thø Røssiøn chørch ønrl the sopiet støte,
l9r7-r9s0 (ßoston, lgs3),222, perccnt) hlrrerals almost B pcrcct]t.
slìows th¿t in 1928 tlle Mosc<>w l{egistry of}ìce recorcicd that S7.8
percent <>f births h¿d 148. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 77,1.33. Ge¡reral ¡rar:ty tneeting, 9 li{.ay 1928'
religious ceremonies.
105' Dinritry Pospickx'skg A Historl of Mørxi.x-Leniøist Atheism
I49. IìG,q,SPI f. 17, op. 85, d. l5I,ll.77-80. MKinfbrmation surrllrary) u'inter 1927.
ønd. Soviot Antireltgøons poli- 150. TsMAM, f. I7ó, op. 2,d.792,1. 33. Nail shop urrion ureeting lI Deccrnber 1928. "Jetr'
cics,3 vols. (Lond<>n, ì9BZ).
ish" holidirys probabll' nleant "rcr't.llutionary" holid:r1's.
Ì 06' Glennys Ycxrng, Powcr ønd' the Søcred ìn Rnolationøry Røssiø: Relþioøs
løge(university Park, pA, 1997); Danicl peús, storwingtb¿ Heø.r,ens:
Actittists in the Vil- l5I. TsMAM, Í.176,<'>p.2,d.784,1.9. Maintenance shop uuit>n mectitlg,7 L)ecerlber 1928.
Th¿ sot,ict Leøgøe t¡f 152. TsMAM, f. 176,op.2,d.795,1.28. C¿blc shop uuiott rneeting, I3 Decenrber 1928.
the Militønt Godless (rtbaca, Ny, l99g); wilriam ß. Husban
d,, ,,Godress camnu,rlústs,,: Athe- f 53. TsMAM, f. 176,<>¡:t.2,t1.578,1. ll. Factoryann()urìccment, 17 Decenrbcr 1928.
isrø ønd Societj' iø Soviet Røssiø, 19I7-1952 (De Ielb, Illinois;
2000). 154. TsAODM , f .429, op. l, d. 84, l. 48. ßolt shop pâr't)' tìreetirrg, n.<1. lanuary Ì929.
107. Husbantl, Godless Comm.ønists_ 69-ll. I
155. Røbochøiø øøzetø., l4 l)ecember 1928.
Ì 08. c,qRF, f . 7952, op. 3, cl. 27S,ll. 12, 53., 301. P.V. Lazrcut:v, S.S. Leshkovtseq
d.
l5ó. TsAODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 332, l. 43. District rcp()r't on cttltttral w<>rk, e'atly L929.
S.S. Ger¿sirtt¡r' r'ncr¡oirs.
157. TsIAM f. 498, op. l, d. 24I,1. 14. Factory atruouuceuretit, 12 August 19Il.
109. TsIAM f. 498, op. l, d.. Z4l,j. óg. List of fàcror¡, holidays firr
19l t. f 58. GAIIF, f.7952, op. 3, d. 275,1. 12. PV. Lavrent'ev urctrtoir.
I 10. GAI{F, f. 7952, op. 3, d. 275,l. 12. p.V Lavrent'ev rnem<>ir.
159. GAI(F, f.7952, op. 3, cl. 273,1.38. F.L Karpukhin urcur<)ir.
l l l. GAIìF, f.7952, o¡r. 3, cl. ZlS,l. 53. Gener¿l fàctor1, r¡sering, 9 Febr.uary lglg
(old cal_ ló0. GAI\F, f . 7952, op. 3, d. 275,l. 235. E.I. ß<¡rovina nlt: rì()ir'.
cndar).
Ió1. TsMÂM, F. 176, <>p.2,1. 6, 1.40. Factory cot¡nrittee rìlccting; 29 January 19l8 (olcl
I12. GAIì.F, f.7952, <4r. 3, d. 275,1. 83. S.S. Leshkovtscv mcmoir.
calcr-rdar).
I l3' TsMAM, 1. l7ó, op. 2, d,' 6,r1. ìó-r z, cAr{F, f. 7gs2, op. 3, d.
2l s. Gencral antr fàctr>ry 162. Stephcrr Whìte, Røssiø Goes Dry, Alcohol, Støte ønd' Socicty (Canbri,Jge, 1996),17-22.
. c<lrnmittce lnccti¡tgs, lZ, l9 ì)ecernlrer (old calendar).
163. Røltochøiø Moshvø, ì2 Decembcr 1924.
l14' GAIIF' t' 7952, op. 3-,^cl._215, Ir. 54, g3 fàct.ry co'rnritree .neerings, 22Fcbruary (7
ló4. TsAODM, f. 429, op. I, d. 27,1.96. Party bureau rìrccti,rg) Ì 3 October 1925.
March), 5 (18) April, 19lB.
ló5. TsAODM, f. 429, op. l, d. 17, 1. 30. Gcneral party ruccting, 2 I August 1924.
I15. GAIìF, t.7952, o¡r. 3, d. 2I3,1. 60. Factory gencral rneeting, B A¡rril
t919. lóó.TsAODÀ4,f.429,op. I,d.27,1.80. Geueral pàrtynrccting) l5Septenrber1925.
TSMAM, f. 17 6, op. 2, d. lO2, l. ì42. Fàcrort announcemenr, 30 March
I ló lg2 l Ió7. TsAODM,f.429,op. l,d.49,1. ll2. Steelfìrunclrysho¡rpartl'nleeting,4October 192ó.
rsMAM' f ' 176, o¡t. 2, d. r22, r. 38. noiled rnctal shop mecri;g, lg octobcr
I lz 1922. tó8. TsAODM, f. 429, op. l, cl. 34,1.93, cì. 40, l. 37. Bolt shop party meetittg, Ió Septelnbcr
ll8. Ctrrtiss, Tþe Rassiøn Cbørch,l0ó-128.
I925; Party bureau mceting, l6 Fcbruary 192ó.
I{GAMO, f. 19, op. I, d. 2t, l. 29S. l{eport ro M()sco$,Sc¡,ict, I April
I l? L922. ló9. TsAODM,f . 429, op. l, d. 5I, l. 35. lk-¡llect met¿l sho¡r party bureau, T Septcmber I92ó.
l20 GAIìF, t' 7952, op. 3, d. 274,11. 45-47. G.N. KLrclrov memoir. The confìsc¿ti<;ns
\\¡ere u.ì 170. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 67,11.36-39. Nail shop pàr'ty mecting) 4 February,2 l)eccur-
t922.
ber 1927.
12l llGAMo f. 19, op. 62,d. 62,1. 3r0. Iìepor.t r. Mosc<¡rv soviet ì4 December 1923.
l22 TsMAM,f. 176,t|.2, l. ló8, rI. 13-27- slro¡r meeti'gs, r2-14 Dccembcr ì923. l7l. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 56,1.39. Gencral party nreeting, 19 Octobcr 1927
t72. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 80,1.37. Gencral party r)ìecting, 8 September I927.
123. TsMAM, n. i76,.¡,. 2, d.24g,ll.20,27, Zà. Shop mecriugs,
April, Decc'rber 1924. l73. TsAODM , f . 429, o¡r. I, ti. 48,1.94. Bolt shop rÒport ()Iì lvt>tueu's rvork, l unc 192ó
124. TSAODM,f . 429, op. l, d. 17,ll.3-4. Gencral paity nlcering,
ó Febr.uary 1924. Ì74. TsAODM, f . 429, op. 1, c-1. 75,1. 42. Parry bureau ureetiug, B May 1928.
125. Trotsk1,, Problcms of Erteryd.øy Lift,33. 175. TsÂODM,f.429, op. l, cl. 48,1.87. Bolt sho¡r cell ureetiug l8 Decembcr I926.
l2ó. TsAODM,f'. 429, o¡r. I, d. ló, l. 14. parrl, reporr) l)ecembcr 1924.
176. Mørtenovhø,5 Scptember; 19 Deccmber 1925;25 Fcbruitry 1926.
]?1 ïsAODM,f. 429, op. l, d. !9tl 68 Stecl fìrunclry pàrr)¡ bureâu meeting, t7 Ma\t 1926. ì77. TsAODM , f . 429, op. l, d. 34,11. 44,54, ó4. Architcctur:al shop pàrty mectings' l4 Sep-
l2B.TsAODM,f.429,.p. l, d.48, I. S. Architectui¿i s'<rp p"r.ty n.,".tin[,30 November ternber; 8, 2l October 1925.
t926.
178. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, d. ó, 1.3. Party but'eau tleeting,30 À'Iarch 1922.
J?? IsAODM,f.429,op. t, cl. 27,1.62.
parri, þ¡¡¡¿",, meerirrg, 25July t925.
179. TsAODM , f. 429, op. l, cl. 7,1.22. Party general lneeting, 3l May' 1922.
119 lsAoDM,t.429'op. ì'ci.sI,l.ó4.rì<rilccjmctal sh.,pnilecting, i4Jann.ry1926. 180. Mørtenophø, 5 Scptcmber Ì925.
t3l.TsAODM,f.429,op.],d 40,l.g7.Factor.ypàrr),burcàur.neerìng, lóFebruarylg2ó.
132. TsAODM,f. 429, op. l, d. 48,1. 49. Rolt sh<p par.ty meetir.rg,
IBI. Nøsbøgøzelø, 7 Novemtrer 1923.
9 Ocrobcr 192ó I82. TsMA-lv{, f. 17ó, op. 2, tl.249,1. 5. Cor¡binec{ pàrty ànd clclcgate lnectir'ìg, 7 February
133. ISAODM,f.429,op. l, cl. 34,1.49. ßolt shop parr), rrecri'g,20
Septe'rber 1925. 1924.
 I

154 Rettoløtiort øtul. Conntcrret olution

183. Røhocbøiø Mosl¿ttø, l5 January 1925.

184. Mørtenophø,2I Novcmber 1925.
185. Mørtenovhø, 14 Dcccmber 1926.
I8ó. TsKhDMO f. I, o¡r. 5, d. 13, I. 13. Komsomt¡l TsKdiscussion on hooliganisur, n.d. 192ó.
187- TsKhDMO f. l, op. 23, d. 515, ll.2l-23. K.'rs.'rol TsK discussion, n.cl. 1926.
188. TsAoDM,t.429, op. l, cI.40, l. 108. Parry b.reau meqing, 14 scptember 192ó.
f
189. ltcAsPI 17,<>p- 85, d. 66, ll. B0-82. MKinfìrrrnati<>r'ì s.rl*àr)/) s¡rri'g I92ó.
J
190. TsAODM, f. 429, op. ì, cl. 57,1. 36. Party bureau meeting, lS M¿rcl.t 1927.
l9l. Mørtenoul¿ø, l5 September 192ó.
192. T'MAM, f. 176, <tp.2, d. 814,1. 29. cultural commissi.n mccrir'ìg, I t March 192g.
I93. TsMAM, f. 176, <tp. 2, d. 160,ll. 83, l-170. Facrory announcements, 1923.
194. TsMAM, f 176, <tp. 2, d. 270,1. 301. Factory ànnounccurcrr, 2 Dece'rber I92s.
l95.TsMAM, f. 176,<'tp.2,d.578,1. l8l. Fact.ryarìnornccrìte'r, l0Fcbruary I92g.
.
C¿rer,vsrs FoR DrssnNr
I9ó. IìGAMO f. óó op. 22, d.87,1. 45. I{cport to Moscou, Sr¡viet on the nrc¡<¡d of r,vc¡rkers
peàsànts, April 1924.
ancl Opp osition Grroøps ñ'nd, Teru d'encces
197. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 62,1. 15. Partl, rcpl¡¡¡, September: 1927.
198. TsAODM, Í. 429, ()p. l, d. 38, l. ó. l{epair shop peìrry ¡ìrccring, I7 Aug'st 1925.
199. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 4f , l. 30. Party general neering, 12 May 1926.
200. Mørtnutvhø, 28 Decenrber 1925.
201. TsAODM, f. 429, op. I, d. 27,1. 47. par.ty btrrcau n.ìcering, 26 May 1925.
202. Mørtenophø,29 Jant:ary 1926.
203. Mørt¿noyhø, 5 Septcmbcr Ì925. ...I.lrelrootlickersarrdirrf.ormersirrthepartyhâvetaketlover.''
204. TsAODM,t. 429, op. l, cl. 56,1. 34. parry.burcau reporr, Octobcr 1922.
205. Mørteillt /aø, 5 Scpten-rber 1925. ancl Sickle Opposition leafìet' May 1927
20ó TsMAM, t'. 176,op- 2, d'.77g,11. 30-33. Fack)ry ge'eral nreeting, 9 Fcbruary 192g.' -Hammer
207. ßrt>r,kin, Røssiø AJIer Lenin, I22. Fronl
208. The Pl¿tfìrnn r>fthe oppositir>n, septenrber 1927,in Leor.r Trt>tsk1,, Tie chøttengc of the The Hammer a¡d Sickle Factory was a hotbed of dlsside¡rt activity'
opposition group and tendency
Left Opp ositi on ( I 926- I 92 7 ) ( Ncrv Y<rrk, 1980 ), 3 I 3, 339. lglT until the end of NEP, r,irtually every ,

209. TsAoDM,1 429'.p. I, d. 67,11.5s, ó5. Nail slr<>p bureau rnecri'gs, october 1927. ro wilÌ workers' support in the factory. The strellgth of this oppo-
sitio' current was roored i' tËé .uents of t9l7-the ullprececlented
"tt.rnpt.d
2 10. TsAoDM , f . 429, op. l, d. 73,l. 2L-22. Form-casring shop pa'ty rrcetings, g, l0 octo- freedom
bcr 1927. the revolntion' As the largest met-
and f'lowering of political pluralism during
2 I l. Andre¿ Graziosi, "stalin's .Aurti-u,orker 'w<rrkcrism,"' Internøtionøl Ret iety of sociøl His- all obvious ideological bat-
tory 40 (1995).
ing f"äoty in the Sãviet capital, it was also
"tr"o.t of the working class' Indeed'
212. Mørtcnotthø, I October I92ó. ;i.gr;;rã for thåse who champiorìed the cause
believed that
213. Mørtcnotthø, 2 I Septernber 1928. for"n'r"ny workers, tl-re revoluiion 17øt dissent-they not only
we see' expected Soviet rep-
214. Mø.rtenophø,7 Febrvxy 1928. they had the right to raise grievances but, as shall
215. TsMAM, f . 176, <tp. 2, d. 403; d. 545; d. 692; d. B2I. Fact<>ry, gcncrâl 1925, resËntatives and institr.ltions to respond favorably to theit demands'
192ó, Factory ct.lntmirree re¡rort, Febmary 1929. 're*ings, tall-
2ló. Hofï'ìrran, Peøsønt Mentrytolis, 163. Frequently dissident artempts to gain supPort rested ol'ì al'ticulatil'ìg
demands' rather than ol-t
217. ^lsMAM, [. 176, <tp. 2, d. 814,1.10. Factory conrrlrittee rep()rt on club r.v6rk, Septe¡5er gible, åncl sornetimes quite parochial, economic
down to the
1928. Mørtøtot¡l¿ø, 3l December 1926. advancing more gelleral ideological policies.l Localism extencled
factory aid everishop level, aid ofte' depe'decl uPon the skill a'cl
2IB. TsAODM,I.429, op. l, ci. 77,1.33. P:rrty gencral nrecring,9 May 192g. persis-

ter-rce Lf a si'gle activist. I. this selìse, orgallized

219. TsM,A,M, f. l7ó, op. 2, d. Bl0, l. 78. Nonpartl, aktiv ureeting, 29 Scptenrber. 192g. opposition activity was \¡ery
220. TsAODM,f.429,o¡r. l, d. 69,L 43.Ile¡rair shop pàrr¡, ¡¡1s.t¡r, ó Septcmber 1927. cluring the Tsarist period' In the
similar to the-catalytic role of revolutionaries
221 . Mørtu¿t¡t¡l¿ø, 30 Jr::lte 1928.
222. TsMAM, f . 17 6, <'ty't. 2, d,. 57 6, 1. I 3. Factorl, arlr.r()ultccl)tent 7 July 1928. nost fà\,orable circumstances) these individuals played a fàr more signifìcant
223. TsMAM, t. 176, t>p- 2, d. 824,I2. W<nren's mecring, n.c{. Noveurber 192g. roie than tl-reir small nulllbers might suggest'
TliestudyofsuclroPpositiong'o.'p'haslorrgfascirratedSclÌo-lars,arrdfor
whether or
good reason. Horv autLàrities treared organizecl oppositioll, and
lnuch about early
iot *o.k..s responded to clissident calls for change, says
pro-
claim to sPeak for a
soviet socieq¡ and tlÌe legitimacy of the Bolsheviks'
letarian stare. soLrrce p.obl.r1]r have, until recently, lirnited the iuvestigation
ofdissidentgrouPs,ho*..,"..SclrolarsoftlreSRsandMelìshevikslravehad
while
to rely on p;blematic é'rigré sources or offìcial Soviet Press acco*llts,
studiËs on opposirion within the Bolshevik Party have focusecl o' individual

Notes for this section begin on page 181'

 *

r5ó
Revolution ønd Coantet rcvolutton Opp osition Grou'ps ønd. Tettdencøes 157

leaders. Even the classic works by carr, corre', Daniels, a'd Deutscher crear Prøvd.ø. They also challenged the growing bureaucratic regime rvithitr the
o'ly superficially with discussion a'cr activity at the g.assroots
revel. The his_ Bolsheviks and criticized party leaders fbr neglecting the economic interests
tory of dissent at tl-ìe local level relnains relatively uñexplored.2
ofworkers.s This appeal reflected the seutiments ofparty and nouparty work-
Here rve trace va
ers that appearecl repeatedly in dissident groupings in the factory: bread-and-
Factoryduring,n..i:",äi:T,iäiå':ä:i"ï.ï,i:'å,Tï'J,ffi :ii'i",i'J
butter agitation to improve workers' living stanclards and antibureaucratic
three interrelated themes. First, to wrrat extent were
opposition groups abre rule. Unfiortunatel¡ party records provide no insight into dre nature of the
to collne* with workers' persisre'r grieva'ces ancr whai
ias the dîpth of this political discussions arouud the Workers' Opposition, but the absence of post-
supportl Secoud, rvhat was the state respollse to disside¡ce
at the local levell Congress resolutions denouncing the teldency contrasts rnarkedly with tl-re
Third, given that e'olvi.g stali'isrn strived to be a participator
ypoliticar sys- treatnìent of later opposition groups in the factorl'.e
tern' how did the lo*g-rerm trajectory of stifli'g opposition
relationship berrvee' rhe co¡'r.u'ist'party analhåisection
uo'iås tt. The underground and extretnely small Workers' Group ancl Workers'
"n¿.t
that it claimed to represent-the working classl
of soviet society Truth both appear to have issuecl propaganda in the fàctory. The head of
GPU, Feliks Dzerzl'rinskii, complained to the Politburo that many party
rnernbers sympathized with the group and refìrsed to inftrrm on their activi-
ties.rO A May 1923 Central Committee circular refèrred to agitatiou "in a
Miscellaneous Groups and Tendencies
series of large enterprises in Moscow," and during the August strike wave the
A variety of dissident orgar.rizatio's a'd re'de nl'o hundred-menber Workers' Group vied for political leadership of the
vied for the support of movel-nent. Haurmer and Sickle strike reports clo not explicitly uame the
'cies
Hammer and sickle emproyees. Duri'g the urrra-cremo.r",i.
p.rioi berween Workers' Group,ll but given that the group was a direct ofBhoot of the pre -
the February Revolutio'a'd the Left-sRs' arremprecl
coup d,étãt i' July of vious Workers' Opposition and operated clanclestinel¡ the organization likely
1918, no'-Bolshevik orga'izario's'disse'ri'atecl their
iaå, .uen were conducted agitation in the largest metal fàctory in Moscow. Workers'Truth
e'couraged to do so. Thus, for exampre, when a'anar.chist "nãa May ge'-
asked also defended the economic interests of workers and criticizecl the bureau-
eral meeting to aid the newspaper'Anørlehiiø, rvorkers
;;;J;;;""ffibure cratic rule of the party apparatus from a tnore extreme position, argLring that
one thousand rubles to the newspaper.3
I' early 1918, Bukharin's "revolutio'ary war" strategy receivecr wide by 1922 the revolution hacl been defeated ancl that â "technical intelli-
port i'
the fàctory. with.German troops oicupyi'g mol
sup_ gentsia" had usurped power.i2 Iu November 1922 the GPU reported that
of trre ukraine, the the fäctory committee had received copies of their jourtral.13 The party sec-
Bolsheviks split i'to Bukharin ruppo.ì..r, u¿ú...i-rt, ('The
to L"rrr,r', p.ace pro- retary at the tirne named two Workers' Truth stlpporters but assertecl,
posal' a'd advocates of rrotsky's neither-war-l-ror-pea€e
position. The fledg_ counterrevolutionary group could not establish ties witl-r the working masses
ling Soviet goverlìnetlt surrendered enorrrìons territory
to the Germa's with ancl was quickly arrested by the GPU."t4
the Brest-Litovsk treaty of March l9rg. At trre Fourtú
c".,g.or ;rsoviers, Right SR and Menshevik presence in the fàctory rvas weak or uonexisteut.
the.Left sRs votecl agai'st ratifying the treaty and then
withdrew fi.om sov- The Mensheviks spoke at Astakhov's rnelnorial clemoustration in October
narknom, e nding the socialist coalition gou.i',,.,-r.rrt.a
Rather than drarvi'g a IglT,bttthe only subsequent colttetnporary evideuce shows that the factory
wedge betu'eeu Bolsheviks ancr Lefi sRs, however,
the ,.separate peace,, with cell unanimously endorsed the canclidacy of alt cx-Menshevik in 1920.15 Fac-
Germa.y raisecl the ire of factory party nrernbers. The
ãirtri.i a'd ma^y tory general meeting resolutior-rs in the months after the October Revolution
other areas of Moscow were reft-coì'mu'ist stro'grrolcrs agai'st ally
pronrise rvith Germalty. prøvd.ø described tl-,e ,nooã ....rãLur.
cour- show complete unauitnity against Right SRs and Mensheviks. One such
",
fhl."5 Tl-ìe Bolshevik r.r-".rou put forrvarcl ,h" I.ft-.on-,munist
1',a .¡..._ motion denounced a 3 December "detnotìstration of white guards with the
the factorl' com'ritteè: "we, trie Moscorv proletariat,
resolution i' parties of the Right Socialist Revolutiouarics and Mensheviks." When the
,"ill not u ,.p"- Constituent Assembly prepared to collvelle a month later, shop delegates
"...pa
but an open partisan war" ancr even ricricuíed tl-r. tr.uty
úy cailing
:ate..peace
for' "a separate war." The motion carried by a vote resolved "to rebuflto all coLulter revolutíonary infì'ingements olt our revolu-
of thirteen ao ara.,"r-r, ,ug- tion and conquests," proclairnir-rg supPort for the Soviets aud "Long live the
gesting diflèrences anìong Bolsl-reviks rather than
a split between the LSRs unity between Bolsheviks and Left Socialist Revolutionaries!"Ió
and Bolsheviks' The tlext general r-neeting passecl
a unanillous resolutio' to
inrrnecliately orgauize partisa' Recl Ai'y cletachments
ftrr the fro't,
de'randed the shutdown of alr rrourgeoisi.r.*rp"p..r,
a'd cailecr ft¡r an The Left Socialist Revolutionaries
immediate search of coLrnterrevolutionãry suspects.o
workers' oppositio' caprured tné tà.tà.y party orgauizatio'
_ ^lr:
1921 .7 The sy'dicalist ter-rcrenqn positecr that procrr-rcers
r' earry The Left SRs sr.rpported Soviet power ancl collaborated with the Bolsheviks
soviet ecoromy through the tracle u'ions, a'cl ope'ly
súoLrrcr rna'age the in the months afier the October Revolution. A Decernber l9l7 ger-reral
stated their proqran.ì ln meeting voted to contribute olte thousatlcl lLrbles to the Left SR nelvspaper.
 I58
I:y..y_.ly.l!::.f":::l"cown_terrwotatitn¡. Opp 0siti07t Gr ou'ps wttl Ten¡lencies
Appare'tly the Bolsheviks
clid not holcl grudges agairrst
rvavered durirg trre,october
n"u"r uiioìi.'i r",. ñou.,íu;àä,
,_r-;;; ;;; Party of LSR Internatioualist
ree meetirg resolvedin commir_ Only in Struggle Can You Win your Rights
favot or,,.oÁfi.L'trust,,
of the factory commirtee, I.ebedev, fbr the ø.,".. õnpresìdent
election to the Moscorv.s.oviet
i"rrì, two abste¡tio¡s.rz The first The 28 March Igl8 general Rogozhsko-simonovskii meeting of the parry of tsR
"rfy Internationalists listenecl to the report try a party member about the speech in thc
Bolsheviks a'd rwo Sry.r:slr"rn"rr..',rr.'ö.,ober Revoruriol.r retu'led three
,io.o.u general rneeting of u'orkers in the ftrnner Guzhon Factory by a rnember of the
regularly o' alt issues,,lro ""rly, ;;d, SRi.:ders spoke ãdministratio¡, Krasnov. From the tribune of the general meeting he clefènded the
This Ieft unity was in oart.a
..î;;i:
"airs..rporrr. ; the political siruatio'. Ìe
",rã
to^the and-soviet activity actions of the aclmi¡istration and the communist cell ir-r regards to the workers.
fi.om the Krasnov argued that it is not necessary f'or the fàctory to retain more thau ó00 peo-
:i:||;Ji',Ïli åi. :f:".a 1.
"ä',a*" ä popur". suppo* u.."u,.
or *," ple, while rhe rest, 1,700 i¡ nurnber, because of lack of work at the f.rctory, must
go to tlt. Lal¡or Exchange ancl fbllo'*' all its rules. If they refirse to go to the Labor
il:Ë"":.'"l:r';1ïï¡¿Tr*:ï;",ffiJå::i':li,';ui"a:":*r Éx.hang. ¿rr rhe entl of fbur days, the rvorkers would sever all ties with the fàctory,
d e u'."'i, oiìn. r.rü
th irrespecãue of tl-reir malìy years of u'ork at the fàctory. All c{rafi eligible rvorkers
o,ì, õü'.-,fi i: .:,iil
a n

a"firrli,J ö;* of the power :il" : ä:î*Ji::

.
indicative of rhe""broaan"*, r, lïf *,o,,id b. imrnediately processed.... The parry of the tSR Internationalists has
agai'st the weaknes, of its'foe's.;;,i'ii of rhe revorution al$,ays strugglecl ¿rncl will continue to struggle fbr the complete lieedom of labor,
ü'."r.w votirlg districts
^îåî'"oî..*r,.r
that disti'_ fbr the socieliz¡rtion of land, tbr socialize d fìrctories rrnd f'or genuine Soviet pou'er,
i,iiff |,y":îåïl r'.'ï, t.ft , .,ìo t,e il i ;ü, tn. r.n 3n n, -
lieely elected by working people.... The genertrl tneeting expels Krasnov fì'om the
party and absolves itself of any responsibiliry for his actions. We clern¿rncl irnmedi-
à"stt,r.tion of lrrbor serfdom, of bincling workers to u'ork. Dor'vn with coer-
ï,ffi ï,*:t,t*Í.::,i!ii:i:,,";!rj:ï:iî,iî:i,åi,å:î:trïfl "t.
cion! Dou,n with turncoats! Long live fieecloln of l¿rbor!
con,,i,o",,iÄ,:;i;,u*åi".:,1,,l,1::::.'lrîöl;Ulmi*.,,,*iÈ
poi't for the foes t"uoruit;;,ä'"';".o*.,.. of their 28 March t9l827
Bolsheviks ordered "rii,. weakness. The
a si'gle gu",,ãi;;;;åi,-'
rhe meed'g, a'cl Red
forcibly dispersed ,,.,',"-Í
p;. c.t;,i;;,i,"ärr",ruty dêrnonstration. Guards Worker grievances escalated during the coutinLred econotnic collapse. Yet
" a popular
parties that purported Those even as late,as 9 May 19I8, cooperation between theIeft SRs ancl Bolqhe-
,o por. u ,.n"", .îîi,.rge
"r.ra"i.-air.a ro viks evidently continuecl. A general factory tneetiug elected four Bolsheviks
ËJ'::ffff : il ï:Ï.t t I 8 because, "t,l,"i'ii-.,.,n.v *.À un"ur.îo n or,i - and two LSRs to the soviets "without clebate."28 However, rvorkers' fèster-
.;if jì;T,i":Tr"Ë:ii;.1i:T"ff iji_',Ì.,i:["Jil,ff k;;;;;"d,*we ing grievances, combined with the intransigence of the national Lefi SR
ïí: fàctorv r¡reeqings, tne reft lnsïffii:rïi...
I' ge'erar leãership contributed to a rapid breakdown of trust betweetl the LSRs and
^ the Borshe'iks'ìn
trom ,,ro*r,n*uisrrabre the Bolsheviks. A wild factory rneeti¡g (probaþly i¡ Ju¡e) included LSR
takiñg'a rr"ø-ìi,* irnce
againsr perceived rhrears
the revolurior o a:0.:.îï1,ïl;.Éäi."ring ro leaders Spiridonova ancl Steinberg, and Bukharin for the Bolsheviks. "The
resolved ro ,.disarm rhe
bourgeoisie and theirhangers_on,,
Jra to SRs critiiized the Bolsheviks in every possible way" aud when Bukharin
the food crises by ..a searcl.r ..the SRs made noise, whistled, horvled like wolves, and did uot let
"ll.ui"t.
u,ø,, i*.ì,"..',, spoke,
;lil,,îä: îî:' .T1.,ã, "r
HJ ",.
J,ñ' ;, r-#; ì ; ì,., p ea ce, liim finish his speech," wrote one Bolshevik. The Bolsheviks shut dorvn the
worki'g peopre ,ilil ?:u:tt"t:ttl lorlarchists, ""a p*J*" *,.,o ooor"r, meeting aud "the next time Lebedev came to us ftrr permissiou to organize
",ro
"r,r,"*"r,.",s."i,;,iå:J:iïiJiHTìi,,iiTl$;:;,;lii:,:::,Ul*i
Left sRs on trre factory
a meeting, we refused."29
This account says much about the LSRs'ability to fan the flames of eco-
co',nittee
coraborated witrr the Borsheviks
virtually every r55us trr"r áæ.r.J'*r.,.à.r;it"es: on nomic discontent, ancl may have contributed to the group's overinf'lated view
fbod, housi.g, wages, rrre
r""aiqgì' äo:*::.the ràctor¡ hiri'g of their iufluence. Left SR agitation was similar to the prerevolutiouary "cat-
iï".,if;,u. lilåîl'"',1''a a'd fir- alytic" role of revolutionaries rather than to the more general I9l7 Bolshe-
yi,t_*;i;;il#:";iï'J:.9',",.,:"îl,l'n;li:1.,:f
rogether *fl _-3[.,:i:i: vil support fbr Soviet power. Spiriclonova, an advocate of the failed Left SR
rather trra' creati'g .irt
u.tr"..u th. coup cl;état, may have misread workers' economic grievances as political sup-
narional level. Tlie factory jn," Ai"i¿.J t*o parties, as it crid o' t'e pori for her parqr On S luly, a clay before the Left SR uprisi.g, the factory
with ttre Borsheviks ro rr1, frä
¡6 resorve committee reiectecl an LSR proposal to hold auother rneeting in the fàctor¡
"".'.rr"jiåt[irtii,lT'hi:îil'ff: bur stated thar, .,if they desire, they may hold a rneeting outside the fàc-
tory."30 The factory LSRs twice tried to organize meetings before the revolt
fi!"t'i-'iii:[ffi':îiïì',::;ît*Jiîeworkerracri."ri,,,aithu.,gr,
tho usan cr prod Lrcti o'
jï:tjÍ:,i"î,:y: boi1v.r. dispersed by the Recl Guards, accordi¡g to olìe worker accouttt.3l
redu*io. in trre sfiri'g .;;;ì;it;; :iäl,iiJff
m pr ovees *o.k;. i,,
e
small staff The Lefi sR,s attempted coup d'érar started or-r ó July t9l8 wherÌ two
ro dre fa*ory Left sR sorit:
members, follorving iustructiol'ts issued by their central cotnnittee, ass¿ssi-
 ::i
I
i l

ló0 Rep o hÈion øtt d Coønterrep o httion

llated tlÌe Germatl ambassador.32 Tl-re next clay Lenin sent a

telegram that ,,all the Civil War as personal sunival supplanted revolutionary agendas. Speak-
district soviet and rvorkers' organizations are instructed to imrnecliatelv
send ers at the next general rneeting urged workers to take the election more seri-
ì

out as mary arrnecl detac_hme'ts as possible, at least partially

composed of ously, one of whom argued, "I agree with the suggestio¡ made by comrade .,
workers, in order to catch the dispeisi'g mutineers." He
orderecl u'its to Pavlov in his report, that the election be conductecl consciously and not with
;

seize the railway statiolìs and not to release suspects

until triple confirmatior.r hooligan-like notes as in the previous elections."a3
that they_had participated i' the revolt. The Left sR fraction of. the
'ot The Left SR electoral success derivecl in part from the persisteuce of ì

Moscorv Soviet issued a statemerlt against the rebellion but

also claimed ..the democracy in the factory elections. The spring 19l9 factory committee elec-
declarations of the ce'rral authorities about protting a'd
rebelri'g agai'st tion was through a secret ballot. On 30 March lg2l, after the factory cour-
Soviet power do not correspond to reality.,, ^fn.y
mittee distributed election bulletins,555 of 1,200 workers participated in the
..Armed
l
struggle against the soviets is pe'nissible" a'å "îmowledged,
urged their members to election that again was conducted by secret ballot-despite Bolshevik objec-
'ot
fight fbr positions in rhe soviers.33 .

_ o'ly a mi'ority of Left sRs from the factory participated i' the revort. A
fàctory Bolshevik wrore rhar he hacl workecl rvith Left
SRs i' the Moscow
soviet but thar the uprisi'g hacl shanerecr trre trust betwee'
the two parties.
tions. Several SRs were elected, with Kudrov receiving ì.56 votes, second
onlytothe33BvotesreceivedbyaBolshevikwlrohadheadedafoodr.equi-
sitioning detachment.aa
In May l92l,the cheka claimed that the sR Maximalists' (a 1907 left
ì

He clai'red that Hal'mer a'd Sickre LSRs ,,actively participarecl

i' trre upris_
i'g but in the fàctory their preparatory work waé not ,-roìi...r.,,3a splitfronrtlreSRs)irrfluencewas..quitewidespread,,rr,ithfivetlrousand
Allother ,nembers, thirty thousand sympathizers, two journals, ancl several newspa-
menroir noted o'ly o'e T-sR participa't in tl-re rebeilion
a'cr,,that ..Red pers. In Moscow, the Cheka reported that the LSRs, auarchists, aud Men- :'

Guards fiom the factory disarmed tlle sRs i' their crub.,,35
A Recr Guarcl iheviks were active iu several work stoppages. Altl,ough these groups agitated'
deployed to pre\¡err any rebelrioLrs u'its fì'om crossing the
bridge over the o\¡er econortic grievances during the tumultuous first few months of 1921,
Iauza River claimed to have stoppecr a group of Left
sñs wrrclprítestecr rhat ,,open sig¡ifìcairt coullterrevolutionary agitatio¡ was llot observed."as A i

they were "'or agains*h..:,.,"9]-ï,]pn, *" oìrly agai'st Lenin ancl Trotsky ....na thãrough stLrdy of thé early l92I ecotlomic strike wave iu Moscow has :

a'd their dictatorial ways."3ó witli the czech

",=
legioìrs i' ope' cå'flict u.,ith shown that alihougtr LSRS, Mensheviks, and anarähists played a role, their I

soviet forces and allied troops in Murna¡rsk ancl iladivostoT,

the Bolsheviks influence and the political aspect of the movelnent have been exaggerated by
regarded the uprisi'g as an opell declaration of war.3z state
repressi,o'agai,rst both Western andsoviet historians.aó Lefi SR influetlce in the Hammer aud
fàctory IfRs peaked after a member'rurcrered Borshevik
cåntral commir- sickle Factory was exceptional rarher rhan the norrn in Moscow. Worker
tee menrber uritskii and wou'ded Le'i'o'30 August
t9lg. The fàctory memoirs mention that the LSRs co¡tinued to hold "great sway" because
Bolshevik chair¡na' wrote fhat the arrests i'cruded ..irany,, clry by the mobilizatiolt."
f".to.f co'rmit_ "the party and tracle-unio¡ øl¿titt were blcd
tee LSRs.38 o'e LSR member larer wrore rhat after
the óheka released him AnotÉerworker recalled their role in the May l92l strike, recounting that
it burned "all SR literature."3e
they had advocatecl "petty-bourgeois leveli¡g" of wages.4z In the spri¡g of
The revolt or.rly remporariry ended Lefi sR activity. Even
attempted a military coup a'cr repeareclly engagecr ir
trrough they hacr I9il, the factory \\¡as one of several metal fàctories in which a Bolshevik-
terrorisrn, soviet clominated factory committee was replaced by SR syrnpathizers and the fàc-
authorities rreared the organizatio' lenientiy. Litñ. fàll of l9lg, the Sixth tory elected tto SRt to the soviets.ad
cpngL.ï of so'iets gra'ted arnlìesry to those pre'iously arrested and
LSRs LeftSRactir,itycorrtinuedirlI922.Orr4Januaryl922l,400wor.kers(of
who did advocare overthrowi'g trre So'iet regi're operated semi-regaily
'ot the civil war.a' severi 2,500) participated i¡ a mass soviet electiorl meetillg that started at 7:50 p.m.
throughout mo'ths afierlheir abortecl coup cr,état and ended iust before rnich-right. Despite the recorded assertion that workers
o'ly a' estilnated trvo hu'dred LSRs were i' priso', of wrrom thirty-four
"u¡a¡imously" elected ten Bolsheviks to the city and district soviets, the
were released in Iune 1920.4r
length of the meeting, the high attendance , a¡d the continued strength of
_ Throughout the ci'il war, the Left sRs col-ltinued to fan trre f'rames of thJfactory LSRs suggest that this was a boisterous gathering'ae
labor disco.te't, altho^u_gh workers' political se'tirne'ts became
markecily By l9i2,l-row.uet', Soviet authorities had growu increasingly intoleralÌt of
less political. I' May ì9r9 the LSRs capturecl the
fàctory cornmirree.a2 yer tlre Left SRs. The trial of the SRs in the spring of 1922 was accornpaniecl by
this elecroral victory was harcily a ringirig endorserne',
ø,. ,r-,"i, fulicy. The tlre regime,s campaign to discreclit them. In February 1922, the GPU
six ca'didates received o'ly te' to seveirry-six votes each
because workers ftrrry-seven prominent SRs and altnouttced that they fàcecl chalges of
simpll' did care enough to vote) ard co'sequentry the metalu,orkers, "r..rt.á
'ot the electio' becanse conspiring against Soviet porver.50 The party cell resolutiou on the campaign
union
'ullifìed those electecl lrad received a calleà foigathering support signatures from workers. On 23 May 1922, a
iqr The u'io' reported that the r'eeti'g r,r,as markecl'ot 'rajor_
by drunke'ness ancl general factory meeting resolved that "workers of the Guzhon factory coll-
i'cluded a candidate rvho was a fòrrner uiember of the extreme
right unio' side, that the party of tl"re SRs, having killed our leaders, brought onto then-
of Russia' People. The election re'eals wor.kers, aporiticar attituães just as
duri'e selves shame and tl-rat the upcorning trial shor"rld punish them severely
 ]

.,åñ,:$$.ï,i

t62 Ió3
R øp o løtion. øød Coanterreu o hûion Oppositiurt. Groøps øød Tend en ct'es

they deserve" a'd calred for five elected shop deregates to be present ilÌ rhe clescribe the meetingwith Kalinin aS "\,ery storm¡" rvith workers repeatedly
court throughout the trial.sI
aski¡g questions about "immecliate and concrete help."ó0 Official figures
, Tfe
they
fact91'
i'vited
party bureau \4/as corcerned enougrr about LSR srrengrrì rhat clainrãd ì resounding victory ol97 .5 percellt fbr the Bolsheviks in Rogozh-
rrotsky to address a ge'erar ,ne.ti'rgls2 v., *r*, i-tsky
spoke sko-Sinronovskii district.ól Horvever, a report noted that nail ancl repair shops
to the mass meering of thirtee' hundrecr on 25 May
rg22, many workers voted to amend the all-Bolshevik lists of Iìve candidates to the city and dis-
expressed corce' over rhe fate of the Left
sRs. A ;.p";;" ãe Moscow trict Soviets, substituting an SR ancl Worker's Opposition leader Shliapnikov
Soviet noted no "counterrevolutio'" agitatio',
bot rn"ny questions about
"rvhy are rhose arresred bei'g herd so lã'gr,'saîr,"r, for the proposed slate tã the Moscow Soviet and several SRs for the district
pracrice of lenierrt rreatment to prevail
*"lt"ir.*p..t"a tn. Soviet list.óã The OGPU reported that although the factory electecl five com-
"nJLSn,
.o,riinu.J. ,fì* op.nty munists to the Moscow Soviet, flvo (of seven) shops elected SR sympathiz-
in factory rneeti'gs. o' l9 Ju'é, the fàctory comlnittee passed a resorutio' ers sovier.ó3 once again, the agitation role ol the LSRs is
to the district
to mobilize fbr the cremonsrratio' the rext day whe'
sR committee member Kudrov argLred agai'st
thË trial opened. Left evident as they gave concrete expression a¡cl confìdeuce to workers' bread-
the motion because ..the and-butter grievances. The Bolsheviks were so ratded that they couveued a
majority of the commirtee is- no'pãrty but the
denro'srrarion is politicar. closecl party meeting that addressed specific lrlolletary assistance for the fäc-
Therefore this shourcr be trre busi'Lss åf ,h" fu..o.y
fäctory-rvide meeting passed a resolutio' to mobirize
ceil.'¡+ The same cray, a to.y', .'ork.rs a'd ãiscossed the NEP perspective because sot'e metnbers
fbr the cremonsrradon disagreed rvith the party's ecououric strategy.r'a
with normal wage-rates paicl to participants.5s
Even afier the trial, the LSRs co'iinued to chalre'ge
rn. r,eft sRs continued to gaiD support in t['re fàctory in1923. A 30 August
tai'ted soviet elections and stil voiced their grievan..î
trre Bolsheviks i' I923 factory general meeting elected a fàctory comlnittee consisting of five
tneedngs. Again in 1922, the LSR Kuclrov
ir-, ,",r.ous fàctory communists) one llollparty, and one LSR. The tradition of secret ballot
was elected to the factory corn- remainecl intact but "after checking the vote, lìoise was raised with cries of
mittee'56 The Bolshevik leader Kalinin'aclclressed,a
on 4 December 1922, which ftrcused o'rhe poiiti.,
packecl general r,eeting 'they swindled tts!"'ó5 During the December Soviet electiot-ts, both the Men-
of rhã Left sRs. The sheviks and SRs clistributed leaflets in several cities that called for a boycott
meeti'g minures show that one LSR rhember accusecr
tt gotrrr.uilrîr^,; of the elections aud the OGPU reported that tl-re Hamrher and Sickle Factory
allowing them fì'eedom of the press or the right
r" ,"..i. "r"ri.,ïrt"t.¿ tr,"t was one of several enterprises in Moscow rvhere "auti-Soviet agitation" was
they would exrend.such rigrlts as long *th. boLrrgeoisie ,tiü.*irtr,,
yer 'or
carried out.óó
had "submited ro proietaria' ruË.,,", A'otrrer rãn sn rp."k-er "nd
'ot
that the.group was prepared to build a l-ìew International .,'i'
craimecr Alg24 parry reporr clairned that LSRs were active in only one shop and
the working class." H^e
the i'terests of their i'flueirce was described as insig.ifica't.ó7 Three years later, five or six
SRs continued to work i¡ the fàctor:y but dicl ¡ot orga¡ize undergrouncl
charged the party with rravi'g done
,also^
l¡on9r rhe memorl' of th.e factory e,'rproye. il"riãr 'othi'g to
nrr"Ërö'i"to *u, ¡-,. opposition activity. Several SRs attempted to enter the party' "but whetl the
lìrst Moscow worker to die duri'g th. F.b.,r".y
l9l7 re'olutio'. A Bolshe - Opposition fTroiskyists] spoke up, they again stepped back'"- SR speeches
vik respo'cled that the nerv club would be
after Astakrrov. .fhe min_ wåre descriticl as having been ol "a completely businesslike character with
utes record the electio'of Borshevik srates 'amed
but do'ot recor.d the taily.5z the exception of particular incidents." This included a speech bv Kudrov
Accordi.g to the Borshevik cell secretary, Fra'kel,
the packJ ge'erar against the economic policy of the overseeing trust-Mashinotrest. However,
tneetiug startecl irlauspiciously for the Bolsheviks
it was "impossible to deray the'eeriug."'flre first
because Kalinin arrivecl ancl tñe SRs rarely spoke in meetings ancl "most of time they are quiet."r's
stei'berg. "Jusr rvhe' he begar-r to sfeak, comracre
speaker,r", ,t. Left sR At least threè forrner SRs eveutually joi¡ed the Cornmunist Party but did
automobile. Steinberg stopped his speèch and
I(arini' arrived i' a' so on an individual basis at diffèrept tirnes. Their memoirs convey a sense of
clemagogi."ffy ,"ia, ;Hcre are pricle ar-rd syprpathy torvard their ftrrnrer orga¡izatio¡, suggesti¡g a less thau
youl' comm unist leaclers, arrivi ng in automobil
es, la¡! ¡ ;";s ènthusiastic eudorsetnent of the Stalinist party-the only civic associatiou for
stei'berg also l'e'rio'ed thã difficult housing situatio',
provisio's a'cl rvork clothes, a'd that "workers
the shortage of career advaucemellt in the factory.óe In 1930, the Comrnunist Party rejectecl
ive badry trvo other former SRs-one a f-ormer MoscOw Soviet represeutative-
dying of hunger. All of rhis," he charged,,,is rrre
faurt of "',à-p.oì"n,, "."
trre Borsr-reviks.,, because they gave ambiguous answers about collectivization and "the liqui-
Fra'kel adrnitted thar..Stei.berg r.eceiv-ecl applause
but craimed that IGIiri' clation of the kulaks as a class."70
carriecl the meeti.g, affirrning trrat "yes, ru.
å.. the governnreut) \\¡e crrive ir For six years after 1917, the Left SRs ir-r the Harnmer ancl sickle Factory
cars-it rvould be a bad govenrrrìenr trrat cricr,.,otão
recalled the history of the sRs duri'g r917,
that.,, Then Kali'i' ,..p..r.r-r,.ã a left pole fbr various a'd su'dry ecouomic grìevances. Tl'ris
i'clucri'g their p.on,ir., of rancr voice of opposition was unusually strong for Moscorv and helped shape the
aud pea.ce, which onll' the Bolshevits na¿ dálivered.
rcspond, he u,as rvhistled dou,n arcl the meeting,
ùlie' Steinb..g tri"ato extraorclina¡y spectacle of popular politics that reached its zenith in 1922,
accorcling to Fr.ankel, ended
in a success fbr the B.lsheviks.se otrrer, ,-r-,o.é [r.ri"u"blã, rvhen benveen a tlìousarld ár-rá sixteen hundrecl workers (ó0 to 75 percent of
worker accoullrs the rvorkforce) regr.rlarll,packed fàctory general lÌleetings.Tl such opposition
 164 ló5
Revo lu.tion ønd, Coønterrett ohttion Opp osition Groøps ønd' Tettd'øncies

could lìot be ig'ored, as aurhoriries respo'crecl with a strat-

conrbinatio'of eco: replied that the industrial Lrnrest was symPtotì1atic of a failed econotnic
nomic concessions and political repression. planning. He also argued that the_ increasingly
Yet arrests were only a mi'or factor in the cremise
.gy tt-r"t lacked coordinatecl
degree of dis-
of the Left sRs, ma.y bureaucratic rule witl'rin the pa.ty haã caused an extraordinary
of whom continued to work in the factor), and lnade no effort parry nernbers signed a declaration
to orgallze conrent in the ranks. Forry-six prorninent
u'dergrou.d activitg as they had i.r the inuch more repressive prerevolu- iu terms almost ide¡tical to Trotsky's, but
criticizi¡g the official leaäe.shìp
tionary period. Despite the Left sRs' attempted military statement. Despite the for-
àup cr'état in rgl g the central committee ,efused to distribute the
and repeated terrorist activities, state security forces to allow a
incarceråted o¡ly several mal ban on facrions, widespread suspicion forcecl the leaclership
hundred Left SRs.72 The overwhermi'g majority of Left Course".appeared in Rlqes of Prøvd'ø
sRs who remained public discussion. Trotsky's "Nev¿ the
i.r the soviet union either e'tered i'toiervice for the
regime o, g"u. up pol- i,r early Dece'rber a.d å short-lived public debate followed i' the rveeks
itics. Thousa'ds joi'ed the communist parry such
thatïy 192lfo'rer sRs beftrre the Thirteenth Party Confèrence in January 1924'7e
a'd Me'sheviks co'stituted o'e-fourth of the active highei caclres.T3
Oflcially the Trotskyisi Opposition recei'ed 40 perce't of the 'ote
iu
Lackinf
a clear political strat€gy, they rost their authority deliberate
ar-rd f,,r.por. re'de'cies Moscow, but rece'tly reieased-archival eviclence shows widespread
withi' rhe communist party r.rsurped their rolå u, ,t-,. *g^,-,ized ", dissident capturecl the
falsification ofvores, suggesting that the oppositionists probably
voice fè¡r workers' grievarrces. sessiou, Pre-
Moscow party organir""tLn. At a la December 1923 Politburo
being an "organ ftrr the dissemirration of
obrazherxkii'a.cosed Prøyd,øof
untruth" because the party's main newspaper had omitted opposition rcso-
The 1923 Trotsþist Opposition lutions from "twenty-ro,rrtr twenty-fiveworkers' cells." At the large
Shracler

plant, the Opposition resolution was adopted but party leaders took "every
The Bolsheviks hacl cultivated a rich tracritio' of delnocracy 'measure,, contrary resolution" was
a.d rhe resrora_ toürr.rra that "within two or three days a
tion of intra-parry denrocraric norms was central to the l9)3 district party conference, where the
dispure. From At a Rogozhsko-Simo'ovskii
its inception i' 1903, rnembers co'ri'*ousry debated "àopt.d.to the opposition lost by a-vote of l2l
a wide of theo- Hanrmer and sickle Factory was locatecl,
retical and tactical questiors.za Moshe Lewin describes "";Ëry
as "an authentic party of the urba'masses?
Bolshevir- in igú to 90.s1 Given the purty ,..r.t"ries' heavy-handed methods of controlling
meetings, as describecl ty Preobrazhe'skii in the Politburo,
a regal cremocratic party ,naae up these results
of people fi'om diverse social strata a'd heterogelleous icreorolicar supPort in the district at the
hori- likely uiráeresrimare the irotskyist Oppositio'
zons."75 Democratic norms corti'ued throughout
the civil waiand eve' factory level.
wherr tlre regirne was at its weakest. I'earry lg2r, prøudøprinted in the
the prat- working-class support for the Trotskyist opposition was formidable
form of the workers' oppositio' before ti',. f] nir, l"rty to Trotskyists adrnit strollg
ðo,-,g..ss.zó The Hammer *d si.tt. Factory. Accounts hostile the
co'gress passecl a resolurio' prohirriti'g organized g."úpi,rgsìi, the l(omso-
,r-,. p".ry, supporr fbr the opposition. According to the factory history of
but, as rece.tly released docurne'rs on politburo discussiånsin with
this ban was implemented as a temporary measure when
r92z prove, *ài, tf,. youth oiga.,ization's ,.tttt"t¡ Gudkin, sided "Trotskyism"
so'iet power was on sy'dìcalis'T .'82 .ê,'other worker memoir notes that in the steel
the verç of collapse. 'the 1923 àiscussio,r cenrered o' when_'ot if_to
restore full democrac¡,witþin the party.77
fooniry shop, th."e taler-rted Trotskyists "evet-I received the suPport of some
",'rdi'yooihfol
of our'cornmuuists." Two nights of formal discussion in the factory
club
Before october 1922, tbe politburo ancr central co'rrnittee Kali'i' fbr the Ce.tral Cornmit-
me'ts that led to the formation of the Trotskyist oppositiou
crisagree- i'cluded such promi'.r'ra ,.prãr.ntati'es as
remai'ecr ree alÌd l(osior and Preobrazhenskii for the opposition.
The meetings startecl
beyond rhe purview of ordinary party t .rt aì the Trverfirr party after work and lasted gntil ¡rid¡ight the first night a¡rd until one iu the tlor¡-
corrgress i'April of 19)3,Leon Trotsky's 'remb.rr, to acknorvlectge that
starure anlong factory activists was irrg ,f-t. next night.s3 One meml¡er stated that "rve have
secord o.ly to Leni.'s. The greeting fiorn the uonparty almost half the cell that u'as
Hamrner and sickle i',"oo, factory lhe rebuff was not very strong as
worker Luchkov, like such stateme'ts at thè có'gress, i'clucred the for the Trotskyists, which is a lot
'ra'y Trotsky!" aro'g wirh at the meeting, twenty-three of sixty votecl
slogan "Lo'g Live com¡ade the mo"re .óor.,",or-, ..Loug captured tl're fäctory cell'
for. * ."ork"rrî ..11."u'í The Oppositiou may have
given pr:eobrazhe'skii's .o,rniË'r, i' the Politburo sessiot-t o'
Live our dear vladirnir Iryich Le'in!'7s A year earrie r, Trotsky l4 December:
was o'e of sev-
eral central co'rmittee mernbers who had spoke* ;yoo, .on-rr^cles, know the truth: where'er I speak at a meeti.g, a resolutiou
."r,.ol, factory'reer-
ings against the LSRs. ",
on ttty rePolt was adoptecl ahnost always'"85
Tlre strike rvaves irr the sunrrner ancl fàll of 1923, i' rvhich rveeks.
the Ham¡ner Túe aitive life span of the Trotskyist opposirion was only.several
and sickle Factory was i'volvecl, affected ma'y i'crusrriar received a tl1ere three
ce'ters i'trre The clissident grolrp was active only in Moscou, and
soviet union a'd co'trib'tecl to the ft¡r¡nario'oithe Trotskyist iu lanuary 1924.86 The Co'-
opposition. delegates to Tñe thìrtee'th Party Confèreuce
Feliks Dzerzhi.skii, head ol the Gpu, askecl the politburo deviation f1om
to aenå'a tnat fèrence characterrzed tlie Oppoiitiotl as "a petty-bor-rrgeois
party n.re'rbers inft¡', on orhers who hacl sLrpportecl :'politically annihilate alìyone rvho naì<es
Leninism', and vowed to
at.l
the strikcs. Trotsky
 166
Retohttiou ønd, Countcrr¿poløtion r67
Opp osition Groups ønd Ter¡'d'cnøes

attempt o' the unity of the party ranks."87 After

the confere'ce, however, inism at the factory level in early NEP, all contributed to an atmosphere in
Trotsky's status within the faitory re'rairecr reratively*rr.À"Çã.
His role in which dissidents could speak h'eely about issues of concern to mally workers.
the civil war was acknorvleclgecr at a ge'erar
meeti'j o., t1.,. àîh The renewed campaign against Trotskyism in late 1924 becatne a safèguarcl
of the Red Arm1,il1 F:blL::f ,,Longive our valiant ",r,.,iu..ro.y
Red Arnry and its leader, against dissent at the local level and signaled that if parry leaclers had their
comrade L.D. Trotsky!"8s Trotsky;s probreras o¡Everyaøy
in the factor¡ a'd ar August 1924 party ple'u'r
i',;f;;^rstil sord wa¡ such openness would not last.
resolvecr to consult .,con-
rade L.D. Trotsky,, on a productio,i qr-,esdq,r.'ru
In the autumrl 0f rg^2^4, the poriticar corÌtroversy begar
a'erv rvith the The United Opposition
appearance of Lessons of october, i'which
Trotsky ¿ere"ãe¿ Àimsett"gai,rst
allegatio's that he continued to harbor Menshevik
views. uncler the pro- Tlre years 1926 and 1927 witnessed the most acrimonious fàctional infight-
heacli'g of "Trotskyism or Lenin ìsmr,, prøyd.øa'cr
'ocative
pers stressed Trotsky's previous association
other newspa_ i¡g. "At r"ro time before or after," commelìts Robert Vipcent Daniels, "did
with the Mensheviks.e0 No'e of Opposition attacks on those in porver assunÌe so bitter a tone or go so fàr
these. articles exprai'ed why governrrerìt
presses hacr repeatecrry reissued
Trotsky's 190ó seminar essay Resarts ønd. pr^spects,and toward outright denunciation of the Communist leadership for betraying
Zinoviev later acrmit_ the ideals of the revolution." Conversely, in the course of the battle for party
ted that the party leadership had fàbricated
th^e mytrr or*r.otrtyism.,,eì The supremacy, the ruling Stalin-Bukhari¡ block portrayed the Trotsky-Zinoviev-
transfo.rration of pa1!y- norrrs i' just olle yea[
rvas substa'tial. ,,In Nove¡'- Kamenev side as "the petty-bourgeois oppositiou," used the GPU to break
ber and Decernber 1923 some
of cah' a'cr rationar argumenr up their meetings, and tolerated anti-Semitism.e5
"pp."r",-,..
had bee' mai'tai'ed," with co'riicting opi'ions expressecr i' the press, The interim between the decline of the Trotskyist Opposition and the
notes E'H' Carr. But a year.ìater, "the sJe public ma'iièstatio'
oi'the strug- appearance of the United Opposition (or Bolsl-rcvik-Leninists) ir-r the spring
gle a boili'g rorre.r of denu'ciario' in which
]ala¡
could be heard."e2
adverse uoi.. *"r, o,
'o ì of 1926 saw a strengthening of the party machine agairrst all manifèstatiorts
The aggressive anti-Trotsky ca'rpaign in fa-ory of dissent. The Central Ccimmittee appointed a lìew MI( secretary, N.A.
cells j'crudecr resoru- Uglanov, with a mandate to weed out all United Opposition support'eó The
tio's calli'g fbr "iro' uniry" i' the ràr-rkI. A,fter trre Le'i.
Levy i' the spri'g party also replaced the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii district secretary, an Oppo-
of 1924,.the factory parry.nlenlbership more tha'
doubrea 1,o z+o n-,.n,- sition sympathizer, with a hard-line Central Cot¡mittce supporter who,
bers) a'd cells were formed i'eacrr of the
six 1".g. ,hopr.u: srrtp *,,, passed according to one account, "devotecl particular attentiou to the fàctory."e7
emphasizi'g trre neecr .,ro ellcl the discussion with
'esolutio's
party unity." Ljnfortu'ately, cell l'i'utes record o'ly
the airn of The campaign against Trotskyisrn included a fàctory general meeting of six
resolurions,'ot the actual vore taily or the tra.scripl
the text olsuccessful hundred and fifty ott "Leuin, the party and a year of work without Ilyich"
aìrorssio'. yet that contrasted prerevolutionary Bolshevism with Trotsky's associatiou with
ever as late as November rg24, ceil readers could "r,n.
circunrvert p"..y nr"r-r- the Mensheviks.es Significantly any sign of neutrality met with a harsh
clates' In a meeti'g of forty pe opre i' trre
bolt srrop, the 6."k;; Ip.n, .o.. rebuke. When a member failed to carry the Central Committee line in a dis-
time reirerati'g the positions orthe Trotskyists
than ,..po.,ing o,ipositions cussion "on Trotskyisnt" at a gubemiia confèreuce the f'ollowing factory
of the Thirtee nth co'gress. He sum'rarized the
oppositioí,, plenuln publicly denounced the represeutative.ee Moreover, the former party
that the central co'r¡nittee and trre crtire party "..or"tio,.,
apparatus were acti'g leaders lrecame persTnø. n7n gyø.tø. as party loyalists rernoved their portraits
bureaucratically', their,argurnent fbr ope' party
democracl,, aud trreir eco- liorn the fäctory club.roo
strategy' i'clucri'g trre positiori thai it *", ,.,"..rr"ri
'ornic to offer cheap Tlre immecliate context for tl're revival of formal clissident activity irt 1926
products to the courrryside. After presenti'g
a criticar sy'opsis of rrotsky,s rvas the intra-party dispute over agrarian policy. Disagreenents led to a split
New coørse and Tbe Lessons oJ'october, the
speaker the' finisr-recr
a cail with in the Politburo, iu which Zinoviev and I(anenev stressed the necessity of
against fàctio'al (i.e., dissenti'g) lvork a'å
positecr tt,^t tl-," oppositio' nìore state planning and the urgellcy of curbing the power of rvealtl-ry peas-
reflected "the pressure.-o.f tne
¡ei*_borugeois rnood,, i' tn. p".-ty. Sig'ifi_
cantly, the cellspeaker fèlt obrþaréd ants. These positions were rernarkably similar to those advanced by the 1923
to piese'rt the positio'ortné Trotskyist Opposition, ancl they joined with tl-re Trotskyists to form the
tion ancl Trotsky's writiugs, -a m^rkËd contrast from oppori-
the rnethocl of United Opposition in early 1926.t01
denunciation in the follorving years.ea
Rank-a'd-file supporr f-oJ trre Trotskyist oppositio' The rise in anti-Sernitism during late NEP played an important role in the
e'ough to force a public debate of the iisues. At reast
i' the fàctory rvas party faction fight. On 4 March lg2ó, Trotsky complainecl to Bukharin that
twer-rty-three of sixty anti-Semitic agitation against the Opposition coutinued with in'rpunity in fàc-
l-¡rembers voted fbr the-Trotskyist oppositio',
a le'el of support consistent tory cells ancl noted that Jewish palty metlbers were reluctalìt to l'eport
rvith its base ilr Moscorv. wicLespreacr rvorki'g-crass
'rass
deeply rooted traclirion of part¡, cr",r-rocå.y,
crisco'teut, the attacks because they were afì'aid "the¡' rvould be kicked out iustead of the
ancr trre relative u,eakness of star_ Black Hundred gaugsters." Trotsky later rvrote that he hacl pressed Bukharin
 Opposition Groø'ps ønd' Ten¡lønøes 169

on. <sysre
ma,'.
Bukharin agreed "*'
;;; ;il ;;;;;;;; ;;;;; ;;;;;i':|,;;,.*t : party activity.lOe Many subsequent Mørtenopl¿ø articles ou cornbatiug anti-
to conduct a'ùrvestigatio' o' party anti-semitic
the oppositio', bur accordi'g to_Trotiy,
attacks on Semitism during the First Five-Year Plan inclicate that toleration of Russian
w.s tbiuiaáe,, ,o ao ro-uy srarir.r02
In early 1926,the Kornsornor c.utr"i commimee nationalisln was short-lived and coincided with the factional fìght with the
p"rr.J"..rorution to United Opposition.Iro
co'rbat "a recenr st.engthe'ing of a'ti-se'rìrism
youth;; admit_ Reports on the moocl of workers in the Rogozhsko-Simonovskii clistrict itl
ted, "Arn anti-sernitic. rnood hãd penetrated_ "-oirg
the vLI(sM "r-,d
[trre 1(omsonror] 1926 show that the Ur-rited Opposition gained suPPort alnong a differer"rt
ralrks in a prollourlced character." i(omsomol
leaders blarnecl the rise of a'ti-
semitis¡n ou ecorornic difficurties, i'clucring Iayer of workers. Significantly, party leaders considered such sympathies
i'creasecr un.n piãy,r"nt, and
a rise i'anti-semitic_agitation by counterrevãrutionaries "backward" comparecl with their orvn auti-Semitic supporters.
ancr mo'archists. By
tlre summer of 1926, trre MK iirformation
summary included a regurar sec-
tion o¡r anti-semitis_m that expressecr co'cer' A,mong a consiclerable portion of the rnost backu,ard Pàrt of the working masses
that ,,recentry there ca' be
observed the grorvth of an a'ti-semitic mood rhere is considerable sympathy fbrr the slogans of the Opposition. They h..rve take n
that is founá reverberating
amol-rg clifferent groups of communists" ,,comrades,-arte'rpts up the sloga¡s of the oppositio¡: about equaliry about exploitation, that dre
ancl to
explain dif.erences based on acrimony 'otecr Opposition is fbr the poor but the Central Committee is agair"rst. There is a mood
among the nationalities.,, I' october, among workers fbr the Opposition; this mood hrrs to be srnashed.... Sotne places
Komsomol leaders acknowrecrged a 'istro'g
deveroprnent of arti-sernitism,, have t¿ken up the slogans f'or Zinoviev about equality, about exploitation, that we
amollg Moscow workers.t03 Auti-semitic g-rafrti
i,, ,rr"ny factories do not have socialisln, etc. Sotne s:ry that Zinoviev stancis ft,r the poor but the
and.in.the Bogatl,r .:b?..i rvorks, ,ro,.,p"ì-,y rvorkers "ppe"r"d
callecl for Stalin ancl Central Comlnittee are f'or the rich.lll
Bukharin to trample.the "yicrs." speakers
i'cell meetirrg, ,""aa a'ti_
Semitic argLrmellts. "The oppositiãnists-Trotsky,
Zi'oviev a'd "penry
Kaure'ev- The summer a¡d fall of 1926 marked the zenith of U¡ited Opposition
are all Jews. We need to finìsh them
off,,, suggested one typical rant.r04 support in the Hammer and Sickle Factory. Even before the declared forma-
Party fàctorv readers toleratecr anti-senitiîñr
¿".¡"g ,rrËä.ìiòrìal.tìght. A tion of the United Opposition in April 1926,Ivan Zhirov, the most outspo-
rank-and-file member a^rgued in a\,eeting:
"we ca' say quite frankly whar is ke¡ oppositionist, ope¡ly criticized party leade rs. In a meeti¡g of three
at the root ofall the differences. we workäs
r,vho are píri',',.-ù.., co'sicrer
this root to be based on the nationalist traclition, lrundred workers in March, Zbirov argued for "ntore dernocracy and leader-
rvhile other clifferences ship from belorv" while suggesting that the bread shortage was "the fault of
are- merely part of the superstr¡1ç¡s¡s.rl05
only o'e issue of À4øt tenoul¿ø the rnicldlernen bosses and kulaks." In May he accusecl the MK of being
addressed the issue of a'tisemirisnr,
ack'owleáging tt-,"t unti_i.mitic sro_
"isolated from the rnasses."l12 The following mouth, he received 126 votes
galls were "writte' only on the bathroom *"ì1, -bot also on the
'ot by workers but
walls a'd read not or-rry fàctor.y in a factory committee election, just lì{ty votes shy of electoral victorylÌ3
arso by visitors,,
party and Komsomol members to i'itiate "n.r ",.,.àrr."ged
the Support fbr Zhirov a¡d the United Oppositio¡ grew over the next several
a carnpaig'.I,ó Had the fàctory rnonths. Other r-nembers started to voice criticism of the offìcial line or qual-
party organizatiott (nr-rmbering more tlran
sever hu'dred with the l(omso- ifiecl support for the Opposition at the shop level. For example, a sheet metal
mol) maintained a fìrm positi,o' agairst anti-Semitisrn,
rrre ;lo;;,r, rvould shop member stated that, thougl-r he did uot eudorse the Oppositiott, it was
have lreen covered up immediately.
ñot once cruring Dáø or isíì aia p^rry nevertheless true that "at the preselÌt the poor live in the worst conditions."
leaders at the fàctory orga'ize a
single ge o. p"î.y ,',""ti,rf put tbrrvard Another complained that "our Opposition leaders gave tell years of service to
o'e agenda item, uor give even one speccr-, 'eral
o' the i'crease of anti_semitis¡rr.
Members were reprima'ded or expelled the party," and that "we shoulcl fight them on the level of ideas," rvhile a
fbr such of-fe'ses ,ro,-r- third mernber stated that "the Opposition was correct otr certain questions
paymelÌt of dues, and hooligan beÀavior, "l-rìolìr-,
l¡ut there was llot",one
rilnand or expulsion fèrr anti-Sernidsm.lb7
recor-decl rep- a¡d gave a push to our party to correct these issues."Ì14 Ill December I92ó,
Not u'til five uronths.after Mørtenouhø asserted that the Opposition hacl no supPorters in the fàctory,
expursio' of the unitecl oppositio', i'
April. 1928, was the questio' of-the but a skeptical worker challenged the reporter. "Whetl the rneeting discus-
a'ti-se'ritism ope'ly addressed i' a ge'erar
meeting of the factory cell- A leading member sions open," he revealed, "\,oices are in-rnrediatcly hearcl calling out: 'Zhirov,
admittecl that the Godless Zhirov, let Zhirov speak!'A¡d for these calls he is k¡ow¡ to every worker."ì15
"someiimes provokecr anti-semitis'r,';,rrguecr,
a'd admimed "a'ri-Semitic infl ne'ces rvitrrin the feõi;
"Jews are jr"
rike us,,, The next month a clistrict party rePort adrnittecl, "In the Hatnrner and Sickle
party ;r. ;;;;rg.,, Trre Factory there are diffèrent discussions alllollg llotlparty rvorkers that
factory party expeiled its first member. for
anti-se'ritism-r[-re f.ilowi'g Zinoviev and Trotsky are correct iu rvanting to raise pay. This is particularly
mollth't0ll Havi'g etlcouraged extreme
party rule's later beca¡ne corcemecl after
i' the fàctio.al
'ationalism str'ggle, noticeable because of the renegotiating of the collective agreemettt.'lló
the unitecl opposition expulsions
that such se'ti're'ts hacr gai'ed too much'-ror-nellt.ul. The advances and retreats by tl-re United Opposition, however, caltsed
By AugLrst r92g, confusion in their ranks, r'r,ho sometimes identifiecl thentselves as Opposition
Stali, called ftrr extrerne pe'alties, i'clucring
execlltlolls, for a'ti-se'ritic supportel's and otl'rer times denied conuectious. Ou one occasiou, orl l0
 I
I

170

Opp osition G' oøps øn d. Tend.en ct es t7r

anct Naumov worked
,T::1.:"1: ?.!^,^?1r,", âr cross_n,, ",.^.^
Although it is impossible to clirectly conlìect ir-rcreasingly hostile worker
Ieading cell me¡irber ..,;;r.j'rh;,'ä,ì,^"to"tt up with procluctivity, and$
notes to party representatives rvith Opposition propaganda, many rvorkers'
::îï;,yï:Ji,if ..o*.ää,u1äffi anonymous questions echoed the Opposition's politics. Thus, the following
'Ï:':ìi,î,,,lii:*,¿.1lîi:2";$
'vith tl.re opposition." L'r.t.rpo,rJ";'r'h.";,,*ks,
zhirov".il;;
question, raised during a cell meeting, was of such concern to local party offi-
or rhe wage issue, *,rrË
opp.r¡;;;;, rrorvever;; cials that it was included in the MK information surnmary: "Cau you say
remains.o....r.,l3, correc and. whether or not drere will be economic equality for everybody living in the

å*: rri"ïffi î:iü

rhe tactical.o].L:^tl"d',"I
:T;ïïî
am'ot
:îß,* i*¡xffi
añ
*
oppositionist."rrz 1 iå
Soviet country; and if so, whenf"l2O In factory-wide union meetings as well,
some workers who expressed their dissatisfàction over wages started to raise
questions about the relative prosperity of Central Comrnittee mernbers. On 7
weighed rninor, ho,"eveq when
November 1925, Mørteruovhøprinted real wages in terms of l9t3-1914 rubles,
i' the revi"r*;-.r':"r,i1i;-:t[Jffii,f;..11à'iti"'ì'""s
-òpi
Jar o r th e u"i,."a
;ï#, "',i*ä:Tiiçy g;: ïtr ä'jr *::
ordered,hJ "c;r^,,*.,co_n.'
indicating that they hacl risen to 92 percent of the prewar rate.l2l However, in
J:uly 1926, after Kalinin clairnecl that uretalworkers' real wages were 20 percent
;:ìiiår,ïi,iri:1îl unirã r".ty ä. re,nai' in the greater than the pre\4/ar rate, a u,orker argued that the statemerlt was "totally
rer orrhousa,,o, o,l.1t
eve
' after ,n.
oolï]T t^;,!åää [i ,, ,n. slaugrr_ untrue ... either you have not been to the market recently or you have a lot of
;ffi ;iiï*Ji_i:,îï:î::ff îi;,ffi
or,n._o..f
N'A' ugranov' reportecr o¡.r the i,ri".nrtionrr
;;.",;;",;
Lí:f ilff nlorìey." In September 1926 Tomsky spoke on the British general strike and
received rnarry hostile questior-rs about rvages and working conditions, includ-
rreer'g of sever hundred. e*. nå,.r'..lnor.a u*iÃåJ",
"ïr'rË,,.*, factory ing one that asked, "Cornrade Tomsk¡ please tell us how n.ruch you ealll a year:
åi ,¡. chinese twelve thousal-rcl rubles, or a little lrore or a little lessl Please clariSr."l22
å:,"."l^ï,',î'åil:J!'ä-,"ïä:il*l;f î;r,ycompro-
To,n.ð;,;;;;ffi
."d g:. *";k.. ;ïä'.:ri),#,Ji| J,f,Xii,n
rhe canro,r
Rather than international issues, however, Oppositionist agitation was
similar to other ctissident groups as the organized sentiment for rvorkers'
[;_ ;n :l
,.å:ïïîi.?,1:',ïîi:,:,'"î';l;*Ï:*,""ai,ìä,î.i'ì,"î*."ìtr,tr,. economic grievances and agair-rst bureaucratic rule and privileges. Zhirov
stated in aMay 1927 factory party meeting: "Ifwe listen to workers, they say
us why i
",r,.
the soviets
cñi n., ng""ì.,,_,
9
wrre' Le'i'
ä
ai...try ¿.,ì"r",räåo'rn,, in
;;. il':.? :,ï,ïä::å|å :'Í:x,;;iï
that lifè in l9I3 \4¡as better tlìan now." He then argued that in 1913,9 per.
cent of the factory stafÏhad been office workers while the fìgLrre fbr 1927 was
Internationalì" Because the Second co'gress
r¡. oóp.r¡*"*rrro u.., labeled oÊthe nearly l2 percent.l23 Thus, the growth of the bureaucracy was l-rot an aber-
as rrairors, I(hristia'
ration; it existed even at the factory level and affected workers'wages. In cou-
,, ::,,iil:,ff:'lJi.,n.,r*,.;ffi;:;il;1ir,,"n.."r,ocausedbewirde'nenr trast to their aggressive championing of local grievances, intemational issues

:'îff ffi i,ff t'Ji#:Hïri:'f

äffii;:"I"iilÏ,:*ffi 1îi
¡our notes
hardly fìgured in their day-to-day propaganda. Only a fèw cursory cornmerlts
about the Chinese Revolution ancl the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Commit-
Rakovsk¡ one askins;;If ;; ;"'':::j .of clarifìcation
refèrred ro
is tee appear in the United Opposition speeches. The factory oppositionists
the' why crid FranceT.:llit hopecl to develop ¿rpl",""iii ,*'r.rli,h Fr.,r.. emphasizecl economic inequality, bureaucratic privilege, and the lack of

,"1#:.;..,Xfii,.-,'åffi ;'#TìätrH'ig;]î,.,_,,,,,s,sec_ democrac¡ as this Hammer ancl Sickle leaflet illustrates:

p r7"'..iöffi iåüä:X j]l,] H::ï :î.tlt j "',:t I'ri-iä;;,, agai's r Cornraclesl Our conntry is in a diflìcult situadon. The bourgeoisie has cleciciecl to
strangle Soviet rule. In our p:rrty the situ:rtion is even rnore diflìcult. The bureau-
3,:ïi"ï,*îíJåÍ-^y:.'"î.,r'îi,'ioå#::il:il,:,ï:Í1i:l,IÌ,:i3,,1 cratic vieu' is that everything is fìne. The bootlickers ancl inf'ormers in the party
o n + r,,, i "'il ;d' ;ï",,n: ¿ïjl;ä:: jil,,,,:?ff
working crass musr
ln our ranks" alld u'arned
d
r":]ï,^trt'.n J; ï1,ï,åä
i,r.i"u,ì by oLrr e'emies ro sow divisiors
Jiru tt have taken over. That is the sonrce f-or unirnimiry on all questions, which is cou-
trary to Marxism at our society's level of ineqr.rirliry.
Everything healtl.ry in the ptrrty h:rs been stranglecl. Try to counter the speaker-
against "rpia,
trors. ro ugra'ov rorg,ï:1ñat yet writre, bosses anc.l you tÌre tìnished. NEPmen all knou' more about rvhat is going on in the
"n'Jp.ovocateurs.,, ques_
yre whip up rrre war rrysteria
attack ou tlre oppositiotl "¡r;;il;J
yrrl.rr,t-,rr.ãnir"usiastic. ,,rf rrrere fbr a' TsK ancl MK than us, orclinary party rnembers. Thcy have clecidecl to attach us to
vou rvit be in the rear, wrrire,rr" the Trust, more exactl¡ to remove those u,ith the spark. Norkin, the presic-lent of
gested oue rvorker.
t".t." *irì u. ,rr.,ì;;;'il;.Jrt,,,
is a war, all of
the RET Trust, that guy who likes to go to parties, he rvill te¿rch us hou, to u,ork!
A'other t"l¿ rr¡*^ìö.."ur. ,,,g_
crac¡ all rhe workers' o¡tl-," gro'th of rhe bureau_ Krupskal,a, Zinoviev, Trotsky anc-l other f-orces are perishing ancl h¿rve Lreeu
o'e posited, "T^e oopositiou
"nth,oi"rm "rr""iïåärai'g trre regi're has cooled.,, hounded. Why clid cornr'¿rde Lenin wolk with thern oper.rly and ¿rllou, tlrem to
tr rl*ri,lrr'åccurre'ce. speak fì'eel1'f Let Tiotsky and St¿rlin or the fàmous theoretici:rn Uglirnov speirk art
kettle rhat ro b"j venred n-"," i,,*'ri- It is Iike srearlr i, a
'eccls ,r-¡.,".,,,, our p¿ìrty rneeting. We rvill see which of them is right. Norv rte are to vote b¿rsed
only on theil lvord. Lenin taught uot to trust just u,ortls.
 :.:...,i'::iì

:,Ë].,

-
r72

;
".;;. ; ;, ; ;,;.;,;, ;;;";; ;*; ;;;Íi; ä ;;T-^ï;,::,::::
Rey o httion øn d Cou.nterrev o htil,on Op p os iti o n C'r o u.p s øn d Ten d. en c æs 173

afiaic.l to speak the uuth. L'r the clistrict commitree Zinoviev from the Central Committee on the charge tl-rat he l'rad spoken
¿r certain kircl of
eutrenchetl' They fèel â great sense of rvell-being. ¡reople are before nonparty rnembers, a meurber pointed out that the party itself had dis-
ln tt. rvror.o*ì Co--itt..
everything up through his higl.rness the secretary
should be checkec.l tributed the tickets fbr the event. He further questioned, "Why expel Comrade
wise we lvill :.rll perish fiom thiir bureaucrlric,
rotten lifèsryle .
- -.. out. other- Trotsþ fi'om the Central Committee when he did not speak an1'where)'I3l
comrades! we irre a group of communists Despite the intimidation carnpaign, the United Opposition launched a
vvho h¿rve deciiteci to write t\À/enty
such letters. There is no orher way our. We
can be silent ,o fo,rg.iìrn flurry of activity. On 3 September, the United Opposition submitted The Pløt-
Jbrno ofthe Oppositi,on to the Politburo and although banned, the platfbrm was
The parochial rature of the leafret implies
that_trre fàctory u'crerground oper_ secretly distributed widely among members. Mucl-r of The PløtJ'orrn appealed
ated i.depenclentry of an organized ie'rer.
This was directly to workers by calling for wage increases, improved housing, ulìetn-
characreri_
",-,'.r;;o;;;
d.velopi'g Staliniim at trre fàctory lever that fbcused o' its sociar
ploymeut benefits equal to an average workers' wage and an industrialization
Íi:"-lt_.f as a nlauage'rert
frnctrorì strategy that would theoretically benefit the working class.i32 Oppositiortists
to-or to discipli'e trre parry ancl workforce.
Free_
clom of speech had been stifrecr because ,.bootrickers organized hundreds of underground rneetings. Trotsky attencled three or fbur
arcr i'fbrmers i' the
party have taken over.,, meetings a day and as matly as twenty thousand people in Moscow and
Factory leaclers introduced new methods
of hunriliation ancl intimiclation Leningrad participated in illegal gatherings held irt workers' apartmettts.l33
to try to break the opposition. Mørtenovl¿øricliculed The GPU and party loyalists infiltrated these meetings, including a party nÌem-
a'd clowrs'I2ã I' May 1927, zhiro'r,r,as abre ,o the dissiclents as fieaks ber from the Hamrner and Sickle Factory sellt to "expose" meurbers. He
,p.uk rvitrrout
interruption, but the party secretary summariz_ecl "1."grr-' clairned that "Trotskyists asked me to leave aud I was forcibly pushed out the
tl-re discussio¡ by challe'g_
i'g party members to play a more aitive rore. He suggested ,,f;;lr¿. door and down the stairs."l34 A district report on the urtderground activity
arre'lprs
by the oppositiorl to drag the party into
a clebate rvill 6e mpt with a' evell shows that Srnilga spoke to a meeting of lorty or lìfty workers aud that "teu
more determined rebuff on the part of ail
paity lnembers.,,l2u nt tn. people in this meeting were fi'orn the Hammer ancl Sickle Factory."l35 The MK
meetiug, factory party leaders fbr the fìrst
time described the dissicle'ts, activ- 'r.*ì .recorded mally apartmellt meetings ir"r late Octobet, and early Noven-rber. On
ities as crimi'al. one oppositio'isr respo'a.a, 27 October,IS0 people gathered in an apartment and "the meeting was led
"it.
with the party. They srrould nor be exiìecr to sorovki priso'.,,
ôp¡*-rì'".i",., iäi by Trotsk¡ who talked about Stalin's Thermiclor politics, Party supPressioir)
attenlpted to speak he was met rvitrr srrouts
when Zrrivov
of .,dowu!,, and the and Stalinist whistling." Several nights later 125 people met in altother apart-
passed a resolutio' in fàvor of ,.iro' 'reeti'g ment and Trotsþ predictecl, "We will leave h'otl tl-re party with blood."l3ó
ullity.,'t2z t,, ,uUr.l,r",r, _..rìrìrr,
sitionists wel'e repeatedly-interrupteA r"ith
shouts of *Down!,,, "O-;
.,Enough!,,, These illegal gatherings gave Opposition supporters confìdence. At a
"You lie!," and laughter. Moreovèr, the party tàctorf closed meeting of 3I0 mer¡bers on 28 October, the oppositionist Chubikov
b;;;;; ¿i,.,
i.o..t",.,..
wirh curre.r direcrives" about "a d"t"rniin"å
struggie *itr, tn. lJt ocoppo_ managed to reacl part of lænin's Testameut, clespite being interrupted at
sitio'ists," summo'ed. the'r to.appear at a party least ten times by talrnts and whistles. He concluded: "They are still hiding
bureau sessio'. Bureau read_
ers poiltecl out "the danger of faitional
wtrk and the i'correctness of their this document from us. They hid Lenin's Testameut. (shouts of 'Not True ')
views towards parry policy', ancl suggested
that they .,ope¡lf à,r," fln. I arn a real Leninist. ('Down,' noise, whistles.)" Ishchenko from the All-
between themselvcs ancl the Opposit-iãn."Iz¡ " Union Central Trades Council arguecl that Prøpd'ø had ridiculecl the Oppo-
such pressr-rre ractics w-.re pirtly successfìrr. sition for being afraid of the kulaks, but that now Prøad'ø itself was calling for
I' August r9r7, Naurnov
re'ou'ced his ties to the opposirioir, r-rotiug i' his speãch befor.e'trre
a forceful srrûggle with the rich peasants. He raised the issr-re of internal
factory party orgari zation tirìt i' the .o',,.i, e'tire clemocracy, and amid lvhistling and catcalls defìantly claimed the mantle of
of the ìnte'rational siruatio.,
tlre dissident activity was counrerrcvolurionary.r2e Bolshevism fbr the Opposition: "If the politics olthe parry are not right, we
rov recantecl his ties with tl-re opposition
In Octob ;1;;;\van Zbi_ will fight against it ... ('cnough,' ttoise, wl-ristles.) We rvill not bow on bent
because, ,.after I was sunlno'ed to
the cell bureau and comrade suilov kept knees. We are Bolsheviks."l3T
afier me I rearizecr rhat I rvas mis-
taken'' Like many oppositionists, Zhiråv caved , On l8 November 1927,429 workers, inclucling 129 nonparty workers,
in u'cr...rro.,rou, pressrlre
a'd infbr'.red on his ftrrrner.comrades. fb give l-ris attended the opeu expulsion meeting. Hecklers repeatedly interrupted
co'fèssio'...d.rr.., h.
adt.nitted, "I received opposition .lu.un.,",rti Berezhanskii, who finished his disjointed speech on party democracy with
fionl ch ubikov.,,ì 30 *Well, I anr done." ("You talk, you talk," laughter.) But tl're stenographer did
Parry.meetings repeatedly passecl resolurions
^ that co'clemned the United
Opposition and called fbr "iron unit1,,' rlot record laughter when Bakanor', the only other speaker identified as a Bol-
¡¡1 the part1, ranks, a tactic to flush
oLrt
dissicleum a'd e'sure rhar membel-s fèlr shevik-Leninist, spoke.
i' line. eue.y resorution p"sse.r ,"ittr
l'-ìol'e tha' two agai'st ancl o'e or two absientio's. oniy once
'o
a'othe'pa'ty're 'ores
mber defe'cr the oppositio'. Durir.rg
clid Allou, rne to sr¿ìre the platform of the Bolshcvik-L,eninists. The speirker slanc-lerecl
tt-,. ."n-,p"ig,r to expel the O¡rposition. In 1ìve tÌ1irlutes I cannot state everything but I will srry th:ìt $dlel't

174 R ep o h¿tion øn d. Coøntørreu
I received the platftrnn that I becanre ¿r Bolshevik-Leninist. It is a slancler to say
that the ¡rlatfbrrn is base d on Menslre visnr.. . . Now on rhe slogâns tbr the OctoSe r
demonstration. l)inarno workers wànted slogans such as: I. carry out the Testa-
rnentof Lenin.2.Fire to the right: againsttl-re NEPmen, kulaks¿rncl blrre¿lucrats.
Wrat in these slogaus is not Lenirrist¡ The fàctory committee took ¿ru,¿ry these slo-
gans. They said, "This talk is against st:rlin, you cannot do it." Also, workers i¡ the
Liberation of Labor Factory wanteci to listen to Trotsky, they collectecl 450 signa-
tures ('they u,ere collected by tricker¡' 'you lie') but the guberniia clepartrnent of
the union canceled it. Trotsky did not organize this; it was the masses that u,¿r¡ted
to hear him. (noise) We are not Mensheviks-all workers u'ill see this. Give thern
our platfirrm. Agirirtst Uglanov's d¿rrkness and for Lenin's light. We will fìeht with
our bodies and our blood. (noise) 138
To what exteut did such arguments resolìate among other workersl oppo-
sition support in several other factories illustrates the narrou, gap benveen
potential success of the dissidents carrying a vore and the slightly smaller
group in the Flanrr-ner and sickle. Although a year earlier members chanted
for zhirov, the group of five oppositionists could not win wicler bpe'sup-
port. In workplaces where their nurnbers were stronger, such as the Libera-
tion of Labor and Dinamo factories, the opposition coulcl win victories
agair-rst the leadership. Citywide resolutions atrest to the fear thåt pervacled i¡
the parry. A summer 1926 vote to condernn the unitecl opposition received
only twenty-trvo against and fifty-three abstentions in all of Moscow.l3e In
May ancl June L927, oppositionists spoke up in thirty-seven workers' cells ir-r
Moscorv. Yet only fourteen cells in the entire city raised "no" votes or absten-
tions to "conclernn the organizational activity of comrade Zinoviev,,, and
only one factory had lnore than a single "uo" vote. In the cliscussion of the
third ple'um of the MK, fifty-three cells with 132 speakers spoke for the
opposition but only rwelve cells (not the Hanrmel and Sickle) registered
"yes" votes for Opposition resolutions.laO
In the monrhs leacling up to rhe expulsio', virtually no party member
echoed support for the Opposition in the general r-neetings. The stenographer
repeatedly recorded applause for speeches to drive the oppositionists fì-om the
party ancl noted noise, laughing, ancl calls of ,.enough,, rvhenever opposi-
tionists spoke. The general resolurion put forward to expel the united oppo-
sition for ('counterrevolutionary activity," which includecl a promise for the
seven-hour da1', carried with only two votes against it and one abster-rtion. The
individual expr.rlsion resolutions likewise received overwheln-ring sr.rpport. A
list of charges against Chubikov included distributing illegal literature a¡d
attending arìtiparty meetings and the 7 November demonstratiou as an oppo-
sitionist, similar charges were leveled against Berezhanskii, but the charges
against Bakanov rvere basecl exclusively on what he hacl jusr saicl in the rneet-
ing. The resolutior.r to expel him noted, "The statement in the plenr,rnr that
he rvill fight rvith his blood and body against the darkr.ress of Uglanov apd fgr
Leninist light, shorvs that he still participates ir-r fàctional rvork."tal
Anonymous notes to the speaker, Mezhlauk, indicate a sharp divergence
betweetr overu4relming electoral results ancl actual mernbership sentinrènt, a
phenotneuou explairred by the orchestrated ir-rtimidation carnpaign and the
'
o løtion Opposition Groups øu'd Tt:nd'enct'es t75
complete collapse of democracy u'ithin the party. Significantl¡ all but one of
the seventeen written notes show either total confusion over the proceedings,
corlcern over the treatmellt of the dissidents, or hostility toward the Stalin-
ists. Three questions requested clarification on various issues. One worker
wanted to know how the seven-hour workday coulcl be adqpted rvithout lorv-
ering wages. Another asked fbr clarification of Mezhlauk's invectives against
the Opposition. "You say that Comrade Trotsky does not want the dictator-
ship of proletariat but the dictatorship of Trotsky, but why is Kame¡ev a
strikebreakerl" A member raised the issue of the Chinese Revolution and
wanted to know "what plot u,as discovered that was allegedly concealed by
the parryl" Four questions expressed general collcern about the treatment of
oppositionists. Oue worker wanted to know wl-ry the oppositionists were
considered traitors: "Afier all," he ilquired, "are they not also fbr the
improvement of the working classl" Another asked, "IGmenev, Zinoviev and
Preobrazhenskii rvere your comrades, why do you now pour dirt on thetnl"
Factory members apparently were aware that leading party mernbers had
hurled debris at Trotsky during his speech when he was expelled fiorn the
Central Committee because otle questioll asked: "Who threw the galosh at
Trotskyl" Another member wanted to know if oppositionists had beer-r
arrested during the October auniversary demonstration.la2
, Seven notes indicate that rhembers wanted a hearing for the C)pposition'
One asked why the MK had not published their platforrn. Two tlotes pro-
posed immediately giving them the platform to speak; onè poittted out tl-ìat
that there were nonparty members in the hall. "Allow theln to l-rear the
Opposition," the writer urged, and auother proposed: "Give a hearirlg to the
Opposition not fïom the press but here in the meeting so that we call uncler-
stand a little better." Four notes addressed questions about the expulsions
and the participation of the Opposition in the upcoming Party Congress.
One note sirnply asked if they could participate in the Congress, and auother
suggested that expulsion u'ould sirnply drive Zinoviev and Trotsky utlder-
ground. furother llote questioned the rationale for expelling them before the
Congress, rvhich was "in a few weeks." One wOrker commeuted on ful]lors
in the factory about a demonstration against the expulsion of the Oppositiort
ancl also asked if it was "legal to expel them before the Congressl"ra3
Two of the questions expressed ge¡eral a¡ger a¡d disgust towarcls Mezh-
lauk. One llember questioned the speakers' own creclentials, recalling the
hunger during the Civil War, "Comrade Mezhlauk, did you uot work for the
Central Provisions Administration in 19201" A¡rother nlember issued a threat
to the Central Committee, claiming it had "conducted its educational cam-
paign against the opposition poorly" by resorting to using "rhetoric." He
further argued that, "the Central Con-rnrittee is used to shouting "workers,
tvorkers, etc. Your careerisnr will lead to the destruction of the rvorkers. So
watch out. There u,ill come an hour when the rvorkers u'ill start to por-rnd
both the Opposition ancl the Central Col¡ntittee."Ì44
Various reports shorv that the United Opposition gained consicÌerable
support amollg youtll in the fàctory and district, suggestillg that the All-
Union I(omsomol vote (304,875 for expulsion, 1,6ó5 against, and 2,334
 l

u{:..'t:

176
R n, o lø.tioz¿ øn d Coant terrey o lution Opposition Groøps øød Teød.ert'cies t77
abstai'ing) was arso based on fear and i'timidatio'
rather the rnembers, sen_ complained that the Opposition coutinued to gain a hearing even among
trrì€nrs. The Kornsomol reported trrat
trre oppositio' did receive sin_ party members. "We need to strengtheu discipline in the party and strengtheu
gle vore i'the e'tire Rogåzhsko-si,tÃurtii 'ot there awere
cristrict;i;;;
"ma'y notes with <remands fè¡r the speaker work in clari$ring to tlte workers the divisive activities of the Opposition,
to clarify certai' points, while their attempts to undermine the clictatorship of the proletariat''Ì53
attempting to justifl, the views ofthe
i)pposirion,,, i*r"ai,rg-råe'ree, rhar
"unre-servedly approved the activities This dissident activity was short-lived, however, and o1'er the uext mo¡th
r"o.k ortrr. offåJiiorr.,, More- twenty-five hundred oppositionists sigr-red declarations renouncing their ties
over, "ill the ceils there are groups of ",rå
l(ornsomor members who do not speak
up and do not vote fbr the oppósition, witl-r the Ur-ritecl Opposition.lsa The Flamtler and Sickle recantations share
bur outsicre the meetings, when tark-
ing with f iends, rhey reaso'ii the foríowi'g many of the attributes of forced coufessions found repeatedly during the rule
lvay: ,Horv cau rve believe that
Zinoviev a'd Trotsky, the best stude'ts of high stalinisn'r in the thirties: evidence of intimidation and riclicule, self-
ol,',-rin, want to create some kincl criticism, and informing on other party rnernbers. Naumov denied formal ties
of second bourgeois party-alìd betray the
working crassl,,, A to the with the Opposition and claimed that his votes fbr their motions were tnerely
speaker ar a Hammer and sickle
-..,i,',g posited, ,,Leni' in his'ote
said that starin was a cook who rvourdï.,ry Testament a coincideuce although he admitted cornrnittiug a "trentendous tnistake" in
should llot trust the leadership of stalin.
prepar. rt;.t ;irl.,
a'd we slowing down the work of the Komsornol. Zhirov confèssed that he was also
Is the current situatio' not such a
spicy dishf so how car we rìor rrusr at fault for making "unhealthy criticisnrs" and vowed that in the future he
Lenin about leavi'g s,;il;; his post of
Ge'eral secrerary of the party)rÌas A clistrict would face problerns beft¡re the party and the working class in a more coll-
p".,y ,"p"o*;;;ä an urder_ sidered way.l55 His confèssion included informing otl auother oppositionist,
grou'd meeting of seve'ry o'25 october
in rvhiih .à",.,r";o.,ry in arten- and reveals the pressure and humiliation of iclentificatiou as an Oppositior-r-
da'ce were youth. T!:_sgeaker was T'otsky....
After speaki'g he left ro go ro ist. "Tlrey laughed at me in the newspaper Mørtenophø," he recalled,
another group."t4ó MI( ieaders recordecr
,ir. ,.,",r.,., of all Komsomol mem- "booted lne out of the bureau, they do not give me partywork" aud "look
bers who spoke syrnpathetically fo.the
òppositio', includi'g two i' the at nre like the devil." Zl-tirov encted his statement with an appeal that it not
Hammer a.d Sickle Facrory *ho ."ara
expelled.raT A speaker at the expursiòn ',o, ",.,.,or_,g
the hard supporters later be used "in order to tormeni rne" and pleclged: "I told you the truth but if
meeting stJted that (r"i#;i;;;:
sitionists in the district participãted in I missed something or misspoke, jLrst ask me aud I will correct it if you want
the z November de'ronsrratio' u'der
sloga's hostile,o 5,¡11.r+a Iir his recantario'le*er, and if the party neecls me to. Otherwise rerìove ureurbers like me." Despite
I.F. Naumov acrmitted their prostration beftlre the party, however, ttott,here in either Naulnov's or
"the spreadi'g of a.regative mood a'ro'g
the youth a'cr workers created a
lot of activiry ft¡r the Oppositio¡.,'t+,.) o Zhirov's letters are there explicit rejections of tl-re Opposition platfbrrm.lsó
,\ minority oflno'party workers expressed.sorne What was the level of support for the Opposition in the Hammer and
sy'rpathy for the Oppo_ Sickle Factoryì The interim between the decline of the Trotskyist Oppositiotl
sirion, though rrre overwhermi'g majárity
Jio ,.,or.ur. Jñái;;;,tend the
meeting' A report ou the moorof-'onpárty and the emergence of the United Opposition is significant because the Stal-
rvorke., ao*".i, the expursion
of Trotsky and Zinovievr,ecorded tt-rut inist layer of the party was successful in stigmatizing organized dissident
n",. i"ttern shop rvorkers ope'ly crit-
icized the proceecri'gs. "* was n...rr",'y activity and driving a wedge between hard-core oppositionists and their
instead of the expulsio's," they p.o,.r,.i.
å explain tà the *ort iirg rnasses potential sLrpporters. Altogether, the party expelled five United Opposition
"we do ltot trllst ,rr. ,.r.rrrp"p..r, strpporters, inclucling tlrose who had earlier recatlted.lsT The evidence shorvs
and represe'tatives *om the opposition
ueeclecr to be give' a heari'g. It,rvas
incorre* to exper rrqts\y. wry^aia th"y ,-,ãt that there was widespread but passive and epherneral support for the Oppo-
ret him ñrto the nreeiingst,,rs'
while the more politicariy co'sciou, *t.k.., sition in 1926 ín the party and amot-tg l-lot-ìparty workers. The sixteen of ser'-
were against the exp*rsio's, e¡tee¡ hostile notes to the speakers indicates that in 1927 the overwhelming
only r29 rorlparry rvorkers a'd less than
I(omsornol me'rbership even bothered
Àarf *;.;;;i'.ii"r.y
"fthe expursio'meeti'g.r5l majority of party members supportecl neitl-rer sicle, though ntauy uretttbers,
to "na
During the 1927 coilective agree¡''e.r "ttencr and possibly the rnajorit¡ opposecl the expulsions. A year later, as we sau' iu
ca'rpaig. thaitb'orved the expul_
sro,ts, Mørtenouhø craimed th"r chapter three, the expelled oppositionists led resistallce to the collective
ã-,e opporìrio', concrucred poriticar agitatio'
in the shops. The reporrs i'dicate that ir-,eir.Á¿,r,, agreernellt and held shop-level meetings.
,,.,"t *ith lonriã".rrrr. ,op_
port, though the "wide-net" campaìgn probabry
e*t.n.r.¿ioì",r.,,ny non-
oppositior-rists who were simply a!"irist
.h. ',"rg".urs. on 25 Novenrber, The Trade lJnion OPPosition
Møt"tenovleø claimecl oppositionistr-h"d
rt".t"cl irgu'reuts in se.,r.ial shops
and disturl¡ed procructio'.r52 Two
*,..k, ì"r.., simirar reporrs comprai'ecr Within weeks aftel the defèat of the Ur-rited Opposition at Fifteenth Party
that in the repair shop "the oppositio'
Jirtu.b, procluction work. This Congress in December 1927, the pro-NEP coalition of Btrkharin and Stalin
should be stoppecr. Irr trre tut.r.Ë, ø.
"*",,pt., i' reacrrirg rhe colrective
agreeme't, rve should safeguarcr u'cristurbedu,ork.,, that had ruled the Soviet Uniou f-or three years quickly started to uuravel.
A'othãr p".ry toy"rirt Tlre slrarp clrop in grain collections in late 1927 led the regime to resort to
 *,:ñ,.j/*'u:':
178 R et, o lu tioø øn d. Counttrrev ohttion.
"extraordiuary nteasures" for requisitioning. Personally traveling to Siberia
and the Urals in January 1928 to oversee collections, Stalin accused local
leaders of incompetertce and cowarclice. Dif-ferer-rces over agrarian policies
were initially conducted within the fì'amework of continuing NEP, but as
Staiin and his supporters moved towarcl a rtore aggressive agricultural policy,
they claimed that Bukharin and the NEP advocares cor-rsrirured a "right devi-
atiou" that represented the main danger to the party. The cliscussions were
largely confined to the upper sections of the party and, as Stephen Cohen
rìotes) were conducted not with "candid political langr-rage but in the discreet
idiorn of oblique polemics" and only in nid-1929, after the conflict, were rhe
antagonists identified in the Soviet press.t58
By tlre alrtunìn of 1928, the Stalin supporters' campaign against Bukharin
extended to the trade unions that were accused of "obstructing procluctiv-
ity." Tomsky ancl the leadership of nrany tracle unions resisted the new move
for an industrial drive that they claimecl woulcl victimize the working class
and transform the unions into "houses of cletention." The super-indr.rstrial-
ization program provoked widespread resistance fì'om trade union'leaders
who recognized that their function, if the Stalinists got their way, would be
to maxirnize productivity and to cease defènding workers in any way. ì5e
The accusations against the trade union leaderg began to filtër down to
the factory level in October 1928. Like tlte 1923 Trotskyists Opposition,
Moscow was again the only cenrer of opposition activity although this time
it rvas largely au "apparatus affair" with little involvement of the rank-and-file
parry membership.160 After Stalin supporrers easily gained control of the
Moscow Comrnittee, they initiated a campaign against the so-called "right
wing" of the party. In a general factory meetirìg on l0 October ar leasr one
speaker countered the charges against the right as "mere gossip."lól During
the discussions befbre the Eigth All-Union Congress of Trade Unions a few
rveeks later, however,'the battle ragcd in print. I(oru.sowol'sl¿øiø prøud.ø
attacked the trade union apparatus for failing to "dral the rnasses" into the
pre-Congress discussion.t62 Trad., ar the tinÌe still controlled by the trade
unionists, corulterecl the charge.163 The issue of selÊcriticism obscured the
debate, but the subtext of the discussion centered on whether or nor ro
transfclrm the unions into productivity organs.
Delegates fi'om tl're fàctory sided u,ith the trade union opposition when
the battle reached a clirnax at the Decenber 1928 Congress. In a discussion
arnong the Moscow fi'action, a minolitlr fbught against the I(aganovich's
candidacy; though only ninety-trvo of 5ó0 clelegates, inclucling rwo fr-orn the
factory, votecl against hirn.lóa During the Congress, Prøltdø posited that an
apolitical approach toward trade union work was "intolelable.'ló5 T(ozelev
fì'on'r the Hammer and Sickle fàctory gave rlìe most vocifelous speech for the
Oppositiorr, openly challenging the Prøpd.ø article and criticizing l(otnso-
øool'shøiø pr,øud.ø fbr trying to discreclit tl-re trade-turiolt l-novenent. After
reacling part of the article he then commented, "Comrades, I think this is a
slander of the trade-uuion movenleltt. 'Ihe Soviet Union trade-union ûtove-
ment does llot cleserve such slandel fion-r our friends, even in the manner of
selfìcriticism." (applause.)lóó A rveek later, Trwd. singlecl out I(ozelev as a dis-
Opposition GroøPs ønd Tendeøcrcs
t79
siclent ringleader who had committed "a serious political mistake" ftrr his
remarks. Th. ,'r.,"tp"per called him a "model bureaucrat" and demancled
that he unclerstand and accept his mistake.ló7 Party leaders also accused
I(ozelev of calling I(ottrsoruoi'sl¿øiø prøvd,ø "a Menshevik newspaper."ló8
Kozelev's bold comrnelìts-unthinkable even a year or two later-and the
Stalinist response illustrate the shift in political discourse as well as tl'ìe lìaiveté
amol1g the Bukharin section of the party. The days of open and honest party
discussion already had ended with the expulsion of the United Oppositiott'
The trade union leaders gained considerable support among Hamrler and
Sickle Factory party leaders. A combined bureau and Control Comn-rission
session o¡ ll Jã¡uary 1929 focused on Kozelev's speech, self-criticism, and
the question of whether rnembers had a right to question Politburo deci-
sions. Several bureau members sicled with the Oppositiou. Kozelev accused
another member of lying in his report on congress aud then took up the
issue of party democracy. "Can we discuss the candidaturel Cau we ask the
Politburã to reconsider its decisionl We can. Comrade Tornsky, in his own
way, decided that the introduction of comrade Kaganovich meatÌt distrust
foi the party fraction..." The bureau passed a resolution coudemning
I(ozelovis behavior at tlte Congress, but three of those present voted against
the resolution and oue abstained, indicating consiclerable Opposition supPort
among factorY leaders'lóe
Thã trade uÍìionists were unwilling and probabli' uuable to rally rank-
and-file support to their cause. During the discussion in the bureau' Kozelev,
boasted, "i am ou the Ce'tral Comrnittee of the rnetalworkers' uttion."t70
But by 1928, when the stalin section of the party moved against them,
union leaclers who had collaborated in the retreat over the preceding years
were in no position to oflèr resistauce. Isolated from rauk-atld-file workers,
Stalinist loyalists easily defeated the last organized political grouping in the
factory. They vor,ved to "purge the trade ulìiolls of trade uniotlism" and an
exten;ive .,cieansing," headed by L. Kaganovich, ensued at all levels of the
unions.lTl while the trade u[ion leaders ancl aclvocates of NEP put up
much less of a public fìght than the Unitecl Opposition, their defeat had sig-
¡ificant ramifications. Eulogizing Peter the Great who "feverishly bLrilt mills
and fàctories to supply the army and strengthen the country's clefèuses,"
Stalin macle it clear that this tlew state iuterventiouist policy fìrst and ftrre-
rnost sig¡aled an attack op the Soviet peasalltry, who would have to pay a
"tribute" to fund industrializatior-r. By elirninating the trade uuiort opposi-
tion and the last vestiges of legal defense fbr r,vorkers in the factories, horv-
ever) the regime also prepared the groundwork fbr a protracted assault ou
Soviet laboi uncler rhe new Stalinist slogau: Tracle Unions-Face Toward
productiou.IT2 In practice this meant that both the peasantry and working
class tvould pay foi the industrialization drive. Moreover' as personal loyalty
to Stalin hit fiequently changing policies became the prerequisite for
"nà
career advancenellr ãncl survival within the party apparatus) policy differ-
ences would l'rencefb¡rth be couducted within Parameters that had more in
colrulol-t with medieval court irltrigues tl"ran r,r'ith the public debates of the
earlier Soviet society.
 180 t8t
Oppositioø Groøps ønd Tend'encces
Manyoppo,i.ione;;;;;;;;-;:.n*,,,:,,*,n.riÏi,,^::;:;:ï::;
during the decade after the revolutior-r. Trre sRs, that they could challenge the state offènsive had all but vanished' Personal
the lgrg Left conurr*'ist survival-always a trend within the workplace-had eclipsed the politics of
oppositio', the workers'oppositio', the Trotskyis,
opporlrø", the u'ited collective action.
oppositio', the rrade unioÀisrs of rrie Bukh"ri"
oppårrrøìi, eve' rhe
minuscule workers' Truth and workers' Group "i-,a
the factory. The variety of opposition ,uppo* "rr i"i".J r"rr. support in
was exceptional, uot because
the workers' senrime'rs in thË fàctory
these political groups competed foi the
-¿; exrraordinar¡ but because alr of
loyalty of *oiL..r-i; äJii;JJ
metal factory in Moscow The catarytic rore
of ;pp"ri;;,, ;ga,rizatio's i,r
the.l920s was very similar to that i' trre prerevollìio,ra.y
p.,íJ, smail but Notes
groups were abte ,o prouid" a voice for
m,r.h 1".g.. g.oop,
i;hXî-.i:red
J6hn Hatch, "Lab<¡r and Pc¡litics in NEP Russia: Wtrrkcrs, Trade Unions, and thc Cotl-
The degeneration ofpolitics at the fàctory rrtrnist party in Moscou., 192l-1926" (Ph.D. Disscttation, Universiry of C¿lifbmia at
level rnirrored that at the higl"rer
of the party. rt 1922,Left sR menrbers affiriated-with Irvi¡e, 1985). Hatch also shorvs that sectionaì and regiotral difÌèrences characterized oppo-
¡cfel9ns.
had tried to orga'ize a rlilitary coup d'étar,
ì g.oup tl-,rt sition activity in Moscou'.
had assassinat.a soui.t leaders,
and had bon-rbed government officËs spoke Vladinrir ßrovkin, Tbe Menshet ihs Aftcr Octolter, Soci.ølist Opposition ønd thc Rise oJ the Bol-
openly at fàctory g.,r.."r n ..t- shcpil¿ Dietøtorshlp (Ithaca, 1987); The Menshetti,hs: From the Rnoløtion of I9I7 to the Sec-
ings and rnanaged to ele.ct *o,y,',p"rrrizers to trre cristrict soíi... r^ 1923, ond. wtrld. wør,Le<'tpctld HaiDrson, ed. (chicago, 1973); olivcr l{adkey, The sicl¿le ørtd'¿r
party sentime't ancr established cremocratic
llorns fbrced a pubric rreari'g of the Haørner (Net' York, f963); E.H. Càt-t, The Interrcgnøm (London, ì9ó0); Stephen
the ideas of the totskyist opposition i'
pri't CctbeÎr, Bøhhørin ønd the Botshepih Revoløtion: A Politicøl Biogrøphy, l98B-'1938 (Neu'
a.d ar f".rd-i;u.l discus_
sio's' Authorities recog'rized ih.e potentialþ exprosive Y<rrk, 1973); l(obert Daniels, The Conscàence of the Revoltr.tion: Cotnwunist Opposition in
situation trrat opposi_
tio' activity could creare, ancr used i'cràasiiigry represriu. Sopiet Russiø (Cambritlge, MA, 19óI); Isa¿c l)e¡tscher, The Prophet Unørmed: Trotslcy,

courrer dissiderrt influence. If therd were ,.irregilåritiås" -è"r,,.., to 192 I' I 929 (L<>ndon, 1959).
iri rnr- lr)zz lgz+ GARF, f. 7952, <'tp. 3, d.215' l. 97. Factory general rìrecting, 25 May l9I8 (nerv
elections, the 1927 vote was by conrpariso'
a sham aird useless as an indica- calendar).
tor of nrember opi'io'. -îhe 1926-1927 carrpaignagai'st Danicls, The Conscience of the Retroltttion, T0-91 .
the u'ited oppo- ^
l9l8
sition was^marked by fi'aucrulentelectio' aggregates Ronald Korvalski, Tbe Bolshevih Pørt1 in Conflict: The Left Cunm.uni¡t Opposition of
in which mernbers could (Pittsburgh, l99l), 149.
r-rot vore freely, the toreratio' of atrti-semit-ism,
arcl the e'cr of open discLrs_ 6. GAllF, f. 7952,<tp.3, d. 2r5,ll. 55-5ó. Facrory coÍnrrirtee nreetirrg and gcucral mcetitrg,
sion as fe,ar and reprisals against dissicrents
lrecame the party'orm.'Members, 12 (25), l3 (2ó) February, 1918.
charrrs of support fòr Zhirov in 1926 ard
rrre to the speakers during the 7. Hatclr, "Labor a¡rcl Pt>litics in NEP lÌussia," 274.
iilustrate .r-'. 'pr"i¡,"rd discrep_
expulsio' of tl're u'ited oppositiort in 1927 'ores 8. L)aniels, The Conscicnce of the Revoløtittø, I I8- I 53.
ancy berwee' rhe overwhel'ri'g stalinist vore 9. TsAODM, f . 429 , op. f , dd., 3, 4. Party mectings, 1920, l92l .
ancr the rank-a'd-fìle nrem_
bers'beließ' By 1928, the firsiwave of mass political arr€srs 10. Deutscher, The Prophøt Unørwed., 108.
,hg:jiid serr several t t. I{GAMO, f. 19, o¡r. 1,d.62,11. lt5-I29, 187-198. I{cports tc¡ M<>scorv Soviet, ì923'
expellecl parry members ro rhe Gulags.
t2. Daniels, Conscience of the Rmoløtiori, I58-ló1, 204,210.
while the end of party cremoc.acy caused lidesp..a.r 13. I\GAMO, f. 19, op. I, d. 21, l. 14; lB Noverlber 1922 r'cpt>rr to Moscorv Soviet'
anger and disgust
amorìg a sig'ifìcant section of party mernbers t4. GAIìF, f. 7952, t'tp. 3, d. 312,1. ó0. Frankel on fäctory cluring Civil War.
and a smaller'ririe.. of
party workers' such senrirne'rs were episodic. 'o.- t5. GAIìF, f. 7952,op.3,d.213,1. 294. General fàctory par'ry ureeting, ló Augr-rst 1920, fìonr
The majority non docuntellts of the revt>lutit>tr collectic¡n.
party workers had rvithclrarvn i'rveariìress "rf.riy "rareal'r.
or apathy d.o,r., rh.
As the cliverge'ce berween rhe parry a'd iriii."r tó. GAIIF, f. 7952, <-tp. 3, d. 215, ll. ll, 27. Factt>r'y cornmittee ancl general r.t]ceting, 2
laboi rviáenecr duriig NÈ1, work- Decc¡r6er 1917 ancl 3 Janr-rary 19I8 clelegate meeting (dates fiorn old calendar). Thc lat-
ers becarne less interested in staie rhetoric.
whereas ou.. t,ooo"*àìt..r..g_ tcr mceting u'as during tlic holiday brcak.
ularly packed raucons factory'reetings at GAIìF, i 7952,t>p.3, d. 2I5, l. ll. Factory generiìl rnceting, 5 Deceurber 1917, fàctory
the begi''i'g of NEp, the ge'erar T7
factory meeti'gs that discusied the Iinitecr cornmittce tneetiug, 29 Novembcr (oltl calcnt-lar).
oppositio' crrerv 650, 300, 900, t8. GAI{F, f'. 7952, ttp. 3, d.275,1. ó2. S.S. I-eshkt¡vtsev urcrlrt¡ir.
arre'clees, ever rhough the workfbrce
Tq!9-q had crourrrecr fiom 1922 to 19. GAIìIì, f. 7952,<'tp.3, d. 215, ll. l-I41. Factory corì1Ilìittee antl general urectiugs, Novcrn-
1,927't73.E-ve' the oper party expursion
rneeti'g o' lg No'ember 1927 ber l9l7 to Ju\' 1928.
clrerv onl¡, 129 nonparty workers.rTa
20. Oliver H. ì{adkeg Russiø Goes to the Polh, Tlte Election to the ALI-Røssiøn Cotlstcttt'ent
This retreat fì'onr poritics by the ove rwher'ri'g Assewbly, 1917(lthaca, NY, t989), 103' l14
of workers is
crucial fbr turdersra'ding asce '-rajoriry
ndi'g Stari.is'r. Delpite'si-í.',..i,rf 2t. llt>y Meclvetlcq Tl¡e Octolter Ret,ohttion (Netv Y<>rk, 1985 ), I I l. In Pctrograd the LSI{ r'otc
te't' by late NEP the relative rtr.t.rgth of
discon_ rvasló.2 perccrlt, llsR0.5 percent; iu K¿z¿n the LSllvote u,¿s 18.9 perc€rlt, IlSl(2.I pet'-
the'asce't ruli'g class versus that centl in thc Baltic flect, the LSIì.vote n'¿s 2ó.9 perccnt, the llSll ll.9 pclccut'
of the proletariat ir.r the class confrlct fàvorecr
the Sralinists. workers, belief
 t82
Rep o lati on øn d Coønterrau lution 183
oÆy:i!::r"G":::-e:y:LT::*:"::::::
22' Edu'ard Actrxr, "The rler,.ruti.n a'c1 its Hist<>ria
ns,, i^ criticør compøn,ivl, t0 the
Revoløtion' I914-1921,-Edwarci Acton, vlaclinrir Rrrssirrn 63. Sot,ershenno Sehretno: Lahiønhø-Støliny o polozhenü t) stl'ø'?tq Ser'ostian<>v, Sakharav, ct al.
cherniaev, ¿nd wiliiaur lk>senberg, ccls. 455. The Sl{ Maximalists unìted rvith the [Slìs in Scpten-rber 1922 (Y<>1.2:
erls. \ft>I. l:
(Bloomingtr>n, 1997), lO.
23' E'''' carr, The Bolshevik^Itwrr.tior 19r7-1923, 3 439). This probably ex¡rlains why an unclatcd 1922 soviet clection list clainrs that the Slì
xrrs. (Nerv y<rr.k, rgBS) l:r r7_r23. Maxinr¿lists (rather than the LSIù) nominated four of their menbers in the fàctory.
24' GAIìF, t' 7952, op' 3, tl. 2rs, r. s3. c"n.."l ,r,..ing 9 Fcbruary rgtg (ortt
25 - GAI{F f.7952, op. 3, tr. 2rs. r-r42. calendar). TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. lIó, l. 10.
F".to.f ."nr,,tr... ancr ge'crar r.needrgs, Nc¡ver.n_ 64. GAI(F, f. 7952, <>p. 3, d.275 l. I33. M.G. Ob"edkov mentoir.
ber 1917 to luly l9lg.
26. t^t91yO, f. ì 8ó, op. 3, d. 3, l. lB. Factory ó5. ttGAMO, f. 19, op. 1,d.62,1. 210. I{eport to Moscow Soviet, 30 August 1923.
employnrenr statistics.
27. f. 7925, op. B, d,.212,1. t25. f^SliInt..r",i.,r*li" 66. Sowrshenno Sehrebøo: Lu.biønhø-Støliny o polozhenü't, rtt fl.nq Sevostiant>v, Sakharaq et al.
9+]s,
28. GAI*, f. 7952,op.3,d,.215,1- 7t. Fact.ry
leaflet, 28 M¿rch 1918. eds.V<¡l. l,Part2: 959. TheOGPUleportdoesnotspecifytlìàtitwasthcl,Slìs¿sthose
general urecting, g May lglg (neu,cale',ar).
29. carrying out the "ànti-Soviet agitatiorr" iu the Flamtner ¿nd Sickle Factory though, givcn
30.
9+$, | 7925, <>p. B, d. 27s, t. 2s; p.y. nän.,u ,l,"n,,ur. their historl, in thc fàctory and thc ¿bsence ofMcnsheviks, this w¿s probab\' thc case'
3t.
9+$, f. 7952, t'tp. 3, d. 215,1. 126. Factory..r,.,.,,l.,i*. rncetir.rg, 5 luly l9Ig. 67 IIGASPI, f. 17, op. ló, d. 563, l. 230. TsAODM,f.429, op. I' d. ló, l. 2. Factory party
f.
9AltF, 7952, <tp. A, d,. 275,1. I t5. M.c. ób,,.dkov m.,¡<>i.. rcport January 1925.
32. Carr, The Bohhopih Revoløtion, l:
164.
ó8. TsAODM, f. 429, <tp.l, d. 62,1. 40. Party report' r'Ld. lanvaty 1927.
T:AODM' 3, op' l, d. 33' lr. r-3. Lcnin tcicg'arn TJury t9lB.
JÓ. f'
Oblast Sovicr Exccrrrivc Ct:
LSrtfì.acti.,.f Mr¡sc.*, 69. GAI{F,f.7952,t>p.3,c1.273,11.5I-I05, d.274,11.54'91,92-95. Mcmc¡irsofl(<rchergin,
g+lìI, r 7 s s 2, op i, Krrdrov, ¿nd Lebeclev.
dtä
:'ìl i:ï';i:::*i.',,î¿,'lÌ: J,1,I".* 70. Røbocbøiø Moshvø,19 Februarl' L930; Mørtenot /¿ø, Il November 1930.
35.
36.
9+ll, tl 7952, <tp. g,
A, d,. 275,1. I15. M.c. Ob,,e.tk.ru r¡emoir.
7t. TsMAM, f. 176,<'tp.2,d. l2l. General meetings, ì922.
37.
9AtE1. 7952, op. d,. 272,1. 2g. F.E. Gc¡likov r.ncmorr. 72. Tlre GPU annu.aì report tix 1924 n()tes àrrests of 52 Left Sl{ urembers. Nicholas Werth,
Carr, Thc Bokhnih Rø,oløtion, I : lóS_ tó9.
38. fl 7952, <tp. 3, d,. 226,1. 122. E.D. Tuur¿n<>v "Tlre St¿te Against Its Peoplc" in The Bløch Booh of Commønisw (Canbridgc' MA, 1999)'
39.
lAllF, nrc¡r.roir.. f35. OGPU rcpolrs ro Stalin in 1925 indicate a similirr nunrber, h¡pct'sl¡enno Seþretno:
9At{F, l. 7952, op. B, tI. 274,11. 7O_71. G.N. Kudrov merì.ìo¡r. Lubiønhø-Stølirty o ptolozhenü v stt øne ( 1922-1934m). Eclitçrs: A.N. Sakharov, G.N. Sevos-
40. Carr, The Bohheyih Revohttion, l:170-179.
4t. chrìstoplrer lìea t1, From Tsør to soviets, ihe Russiøil pe.oltrc tianov, V.S. Khristofìrrt>v, V.I(. Vinogrador', T. Vihavaincrl, M. I(ivincn, A. Getty, T. Martin,
(Ncrv Yrrrk, 1996), 207.
ønd. their Revûrøtion, rgrz- Ig2l L. Viola, L.P. Kolodnikova. Vtl. 3, pârt l: 133, 191,244.418, Part 2:5I3,589,663.
Á1
Vladinrir Br<rvkin, Bebind the Front Lirie The Pl¡tfbrnr of tlre Oppositibn, Septenrber 1927,in L.eon Trotsky, Tlce Chøllenge of the
tf the cit il wør: politicøl pørties øn¡l sociøl ìroue- Left Opp ositiott. ( I 92 6 - I 927 ), 35 L
ments in Røssiø, l9lg_1922 (princeton,
iOe+¡, lZl.
43. 7952,op.3,d.2t8,11 87 %:.f..t.í1,g",.,.r01 74. Clilf, Lønin: Bøild.ing the Pørty.
9+lT,! 24May,t2Ju'ê 1919. Mr¡she Len,in, Tbe Møhing of the Soviet Slstern (Lor-rdt>n, I985), 199.
f
44. GAIIF' 79s2, <>p' B' d,. zr2,l. g. 'reerirgs,
History .,r:tiri,.r.f au.i,rg ..." civir w¿1r, nrinurcs
75.
30 March lg2 L --"'..Þ the rri,rrulcs fi-orì.r 76. Prørd.ø. 25 Januar:y 1921.
GAITF' f' 393, op la, ti. 3ó, il.2s7-2sg. Moscr¡u, chcka infbin¿rion 77. The Snøgle for Pott,er: Rt¿ssi'ø itt )923,Ytlentina Vilkova, ed- (Amherst, Nerv Yt>rk, I99ó),
s'mrrariès, Ma¡, 264-28t.
4ó. Sir¡on Pir¿ni "Class Clashcs u,ith parq,: p,¡¡,¡., 78. Dveøøtl.tsøtyi l'ezd RI{:P (h) (Moscor'r,, 1962), 497 .
in M<>scqu, 5elvce¡ the Civil War.ancl thc 79. Carr, Tlte lTtterrt)gwúm,257-370; l)eutscher, The Prophet Unørrned,75-163.
Nerv Economic policy',_in Historicøl Møtcriølism,y<tl.
47. II: 2,2003. 80. The Stn,rglefor P¿l¡¿¡; Vilkova, ed.,264-28L
c^ltF, f.79s2,rp. .3, d. 2zs,t. t32, d,.276,1;,. i'a; a.
arz, l. 12. M,c. Ob,,ectkov Dre ur_ 8Ì. TsAODM, f. 80, op. l, d. 137, l. 3. l{ogozhsko-Siuronovskii par:ty confèrcnce, 3 January
oir; Iakovlcv recollection.
48. Harch, "Labor ¿ncl polirics in NEp ltussia,,,
74, gl.
1924.
82. GAIIF, f- 7952,op.3, d. 280, I. 31. History t¡f Kornsorr<¡l in Hamrncr and Sickle Factory.
1? TrMAy, f. t76, <tp. 2, d,. I2t,l. l. Soviet elccti.r, tt,.n,, 4 Jut¡¿r\,
50. Carr, 1922. 83. GAIìF, f. 7952, op. 3, t|. 266,1. l2; d. 275,1. 150. Terenin recollection, M.G. Ob'edkov
Tl.te Bolsbcpil¿ Repofution, l:lg|
51. TsAODM,f.42g,o¡r. l,cl. 7,ll. lg_20,23. Factt>rvgcner.al mell'lou'.
rneering 23Ma¡, 1922,¡tarty 84. GAIìF, f. 7952,<'tp. 3,d.279,11. 2ló. Martinov recollection.
gcrreral rneetiug,14 J::lrte 1922.
85. Tbe Stntgle Jbr Power, V rlkt:,va, cd., 27 4.
:1 Irlg?M,f.429,op. l, cl. ó, L-t2 .Factory p:rrri, brrre.tr mcering, 22 May 1922. 8ó. I)arriels, Tlte Conscience of the Revoløtiott,233.
!1 SAMO, f. 19, o¡r. l, d. 21, l. 2ó2. Report,,, l¡,rr..,ru Soviet,25 May 1922. 87. Tonv Clifl, Trotúy: Fighting the Rising Stølirtist Børeøøtøcy (kndon, l99l),47 .

:1 ItyAM, ff.. 176,

176, <>p. 2,
l. !?0,1. 4. Factory ..,,rì,,ì,,." nrceting, t9 lute 1922.
op. 2, d; r2r,l. 9. Factor.i g"n.,:;r nr."ring 88. TsM,C.M, f . 176 op.2. d.247,1. 3. Gener¿l rneeting l2 Febluary 1922.
:t I'Y1y,
5ó. T.MAM, l. t76,o¡.>.2, d. t21,11.2,2,22.'õ,;n*,il , 19 Jttte 1922. 89. TsAODM, f . 429, <'t¡'t. I, tl. 17,1. 39, General rnceting, ó August 1924; TsMAM, f. 17ó'
n.,."ti,.,g, 26 May 1922, fàcrory corn_ op. 2, d. 344,1.36. Sutrmary of books and jor'rtnals sold,8 October 1925.
mrrrcc repor.r, S Mt¡, 1922, ge'cral urccti'g,
4l)eccnrbcr 1922. 90 Prøt,d'ø,30 Novcmber,9,20 December 1924 Røltochøiø Moshvø26 Noveurber, 2, 3
57. T'MAM, f. 176, <tp.2, d. ttl,l.2l-22. Gil.,c.ai ,.nceting,
4 t)ecember 1922. l(cAMO, l)eccnrber 1924; Molodli' Len'inets,27 ,28, 29 November, 3 Deccrnber, 1924.
t: 62,llcports ro Moscorv Sovict, 1922.
l?-,--.tP^ !.,d 9r Leon Trotsky, Tbe Permønent Rø,oløtion (Nerv York, 1969); Tbø Stølinist School of FølsiJi'
:: I
!+lE, 7952, o¡r. 3, d. 3t2 |.57-sB. r-r¿nkct recoljection. cøtion (Ne'"v Y<rrk, I9ó2), 89-99.
??
ó0 1+lT, r.7952, o¡r. 3, ci. 312 U. 57_SB. Franket rect>llcction. 92. E.H. Carr, Sociølism in OTre Clantr!, 1924-192ó,2 r'ols. (Lorrdort, 1959),2:23-4.
t.7952, op. 3, cl. 27S,L IB3. M,G. O'iedk.v
Slll{F, d.276, l. t8B. p M. 93. Mørtcnovhø, 7 November, 1927.
Iakovlcv ment<¡ir. 're.r.ir.;
6r. Hatcl.r, "Labor ¿nrl Politics in NEp llLrssia,,, 94. TsAODM, f. 429, op.l, tl.24,11. I-90. Shop cell rncctings' 1924.
ì08.
o¿. I{GAMO, f .19, <>p- I, cl. 2I l. 43. l{e¡r.rt t<> 95. l)aniels, The Conscience of the Reuohttiott,2T3-321.
Mt¡sc.*,Srx,iet,29 Noveurber 1922 96. ClifÌ, Trotshy: Fightìtry the Rising Stølinist Bu'rcøøcrøcv, 85.
97. GAIì.F, f. 7952,op.3. '-1.279,11. 2I7. Martov rect¡llectiou.
 184
Rev o ht tion ønd. Cou.ntet rev o lution Opp ositiort. Groups øød. Tendencæs r85

?! J,MAM, t. 176, op. 2, d,. 408,1. 19. General rnccting, l S January 192S. 137. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, d. 56,11.4L-2. Closetl palty rneeting 28 October 1927 -
99. TsAO_DM, f . 429,,rp. 1., I
17. Factor.y parr; plcnum, I I Februar:y 1925.
TsAODM,t.429, op. l, c-1. 5ó, l. 59. Open party trreetiug, l8 Novcrlber 1927.
100. cAllF, t.7952, op. 3, cl. l_?g:
_
138.
278,1.282. p¿rshi[ mc,n<,ir.
I0L Dctrtschcr, Prophct lJnørmed, 223_270. 139. I{GASPl, f. L7,ctp.85, cl. ó7, l. 27. MKinftlrrration sLllìll¡cr1', sumtrler ì.926.
l02 Leon Trotsk¡ Thø chøtteøge,f the Trureyist opposition, 140. RGASPI, f . 17, op. 85, d. 237 ,ll. 63, 69,7Ì. MK infì>rr¡ation surìlnrar)¡, sumt¡er 1927
r.g2ó-1922(Ncrv yrrrk, r9s0),44_ ì41. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. 5ó, ll. ó0-1. Pirrty mecting, l8 November 1927.
ó Leon.Trotsky, "The'nid.r and ,Aurti-scrnit i",,,
zz Fcbruary lògz , ¡n Thi New lnter_ '1927.
nøtìonø|, May 1941. 142. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, d. 56,1.62. Party rnccting, lB Novembcr
103' TsKhDMo, f' l' .p, 22, d' s64,il. 2-4,85;TsK 143. TsAODM,l.429, op. l, d. 56,1.62. Party mecting, lB Nc-¡vernbcr 1927.
K.¡rs.ur<>l criscussit>n ¿nd res.rurion t>n 144. TsAODM, f . 429, op. l, d. 56, l. 62. Party rneeting, l8 Novernl¡cr 1927.
antì-Sernitisn, M<¡scou. reports to TsK Konrsol¡ol,
2g October 192ó. 145. TsKhDMO, f. ì, op. 23,d.662,11.99-100. Kornsomol infofl¡ation sumtl-ìàry) 3 Decern-
t04' IIGASPI' f
L7,<'tp- Bs' d' óó, r.62;t1.67 n.2z,solz,oo,gg.
MKinfirr'râri.n su''arres,
May through early October 192ó. ber 1927.
105. ìIGASPI, f. 17, <'tp. Bs,l.. 67, r. ó0. MK 14ó. TsAODM, F. 80, t'rp. l, d- 276,1. 12. lÌogozhsko-simonovskii palty summar)¡, 25 October
infìr'rari<¡, surr'rar.y, su'rmer 1926. 1927.
106. Mørtenoul¿ø,7 Jr,ly 1927 .
107' TsAoDM, f ' 429, op. I, dd. 40, 5ó, 80. I47. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 85, d.222,1. I59. TsI( infì¡rmation department surlìn]àry of opposi-
H:.nrrer a.d Sicklc Facr.ry gcreral party a'cl tion activity i¡r the Moscou' K<rtnsotlol, fall 1927.
btrrc¿u discussions ancl reports, 1926_1927.
148. TsAODM,f.429, op- I, d. 5ó, l. 59. Party rneetiug, 18 Noveml¡er 1927.
l9l TSAODMrf.429,<-tp.t,!7r,il.t9,3ó.parq,plcrrurns,4April,23Mayt928.
109. l(einrarr, Thc Birth of Stølinismi.. 57. 149. 'fsAoDM , f. 429 r.>p. l, d.. 74,1. 16. I.F. Naunlov recanr¿rion lctrer,27 l)cccmbcr 1927.
ll0. À,Íørteunthø,29 Mtch,!.lVyl t!20127 I50. T5AODM, f. 80, o¡r. l, d.276,1. 17. l{ogozhsko-simonovskii p¿ìrty sruììrìrar),) 25 October
January,t.3 April 1930; 3 )anuary 1932. 1927.
] li |ìGASPI,
l. t7, <>p.85, c{. 62, l. 23-a. MK írfìrr,.,.,í,i.,n ,r-,n,,.,.,", y,
n.d. 1926. l5l. TsAODM , f . 429, op. ì, tl. 56,1.57. Party ueeting, I8 November 1927.
I]? Isl{oDM f., r. 429,.rp. 1,, d. _nJ,.l -ì-8,-30. Factory party mectings, 3 March, S May 1926. 752. Mørtenovl¿ø, 25 Novemtrer 1927.
I l3 lsMAM, lZó, op. 2, d. 4St, |. 2O_2t.F*.t.,r¡,'in1¿."ncc, t4 Junc 1926. 153.. Mørtønovhø, l0 Decenrber, 1927.
114. TsAODM , f. 429, op. l, d. SO,l. gl_g2. Sheet rnetal .lrnp
¡i".ty',l.,". ti,ng,-Zl Sqptcmber ì54. Deutsclrcr, The Prolthet Unørrued,389.
l15. Mørtenovl¿ø, 12 Dccentber 1926. 155. TsAODM , tt. 429, op. l, d. 74,11. 16-18. Naumov ancl Zhirov recàntàtions, 27 Deceurber
I16. TsAODM, f. 80, op. | , d. 224.1. 1927,2Januarv 1928.
I Plolctarckii tlistrict party ..p.rr,,
¡.nu.ry 1922. l5ó. TSAODM,t.429, op. l, d. 74, ll. ló-18. Naun]ov ¿nd Zhirov rccurtati()ns, 27 l)ecernber
I 17. TsAODM, t. 429,op. t, cl. 40, Il l2l-2, 162. General pàrry meerings, ló Octôbcr, 29
Decem[-¡cr 192ó.
I18. TsMAM, f. 176, o¡:>. 2, d 692,11.9, 15. Flctory gencral meetings,
ttr rf"iåili]Ylí'i;, d. 24, tt. 37, 42,78.List oÊ individuals cxpe.lled rì,r oppositi<,,,
October 1927.
l0 February and 7 àc:jrviry,1927.
I19. TsMAM, f. 176, <-tp. 2, tI. 821, l. 3; d. 692,11.6, ì 58. Colren, Bnhhøriu, 277.
tS-Ió. General meerings, l0 Febr_uary I 59. Cohen. Bøhhørin. 296-301.
1927.
120. RGASPI, [. 17 , <-tp. BS, d. 67,1. I ó. MK Ió0. Daniels, Conscicøce of the Rnoløtion,322-348.
infò''¿ti.¡r surn'r¿ r¡,, ,.d. t926. Iól. TsMAM, f . 17 6, <>p. 2, c7. 779, | - 27 . Ftct<try meetiug' I 0 October 1928.
l2L Mørtenovhø,7 Novenrber 1925.
,rt 176, <tp. 2, d,. 4SS,ll. 8, I t. Fact<>ry gcneral
162. I(omsornol\høiø prøt,d'ø, ó, I I, 14, 29 Noveu.rber, 9 Dccernber 1928.
rnectings, ó July antl t4 Septcm- 163. Trød.,I0, 13,21 Novenrber- 1928.
I:Y}Y¿.t ll
op. t, d. 80, t. 2t. Cl<xec{ gcneral parry neering, LB
tó4. TsAODM,f.429, op. l, cl. 92,\L 8-9. Factory party bure¿u and c()¡rrrol cornrnission,
l?J Tr19DM,f.429,
124. IIGASPI,
May 1927. January 1929.
f. lZ, <p.85, tl.237,l. SS. MKinfìrirnatro, sur.ìr'ìary,
Ma.v 1927. 165. Prøttd.ø.12 Decembcr, 1928.
125. Mørtmouhø, 23 l)ecember 1926; ll November
1927. 166. Trurl, I5 l)eccmber, 1928.
l?9 lsAODM, f. 429, <-tp. ],q !0,t. 2t. Opcn ¡rar.ty ureeting, 26 Ma¡, t927. 167. Trød^21 Deccmbcr. 1928.
l?i lr+gDM, f . 429, op. t, d.. 80, ll. 24_S. Opå,, p.r.y rìreering, B Jvr"re 1927.
l28. TsAODÀ4, f.429,<>p. I, d. 5ó, 1.27; dd. 'SO, 168. XVI l(onferattsüø VI(P(!t), øprel' 1929godø. Stenogrøficheshii otchet (Mt'tsc<'tu,,1962),783.
Party mcetings, 1922.
aO. f,"rq, burean rep6rr, Scptember 1927; Ió9. T5AODM, f. 429, op. l, ci. 92, ll. 8- l l. Bnrcau and contrc¡l commission rrcetirìg, l l Jàn-
uaLy 1929.
] ?? flctsPf , [. t7, d. 2B7,l. ZS. MK infìr.rnarron sr.u.rìrnary, August
<-tp. BS,
1922. 170. TsAoDM,t.429, op. t, d. 92,1. 10. Bureau ancl c<>nrrt¡l comnrission nrceting, II Janu-
130' TsAoDM, f" 429,op. r, c1. 74,r. rg.Ivan
Zhiroi, recànrirrion) 29 December. 1927 wit1t ¿ ary 1929.
note th¿t hc wr.()tc an earlier ver.sion in Octobcr.
1927. l7I. Hirr¡aki I(trronriya, Stølin\ In.d.østyiøl Repoløtion: l'olitics ønd Worhrs, 1928-1932 (Can-
lll ïAIDM ,1.429, op. t, d. 80, t. 28. Close<t general parry mceting, 29 May 1927.
bridge, 1988) 27-49.
'
132 The Pløtftn'ø¿ *'¿s lcss c.uvincìng on l,.r* t,,
¡r.i fir. a p()gr¿rìr that called the regi're,s
posecl iDdLrstrial expansion of 4 to 9 ,.pessinlistic." ¡rr.- i 172. Cohen. Buhhørin. 312-314.
¡rerccnt
the opposition cloculncnt misjudgeJ the ecct¡ìnulated
As Michar l{cirn¿' ñ", o.gu.,r, 173. TsMAM, f . 176,<'tp.2,d.692. Gc¡rcr¿l fàctory rneetings,1926; d. 82I' l. 3, Factor¡' c1¡¡1-
*.ealt¡ .f bctter ofïsecti.r.rs of t^e mittee repolt, February 1929.
po¡rrrluitiorr. chøilenge of the l-eft oppositiort,
rg2ó-27,30t-3g4. rtcir.nan, The Birth of støt_ 174. TsAODM,f.429,o¡r. 1,t1. 56,1.57. Party nreeting, 18 Novernber 1927.
r¡¡isrn, 30.
york, t930),
J 11 !.:1" Trotsky, My Life (Nev, 53 r _2.
]i1 9AY, 1.7952, t>¡r. 3, cl. 275,1.26. S.S. i_cshkovts.v rnenlorr.
135' TsAoDM, f 80, .p r, d.27(t,1. I2. rtcrgozhsko-sjr.r-r.rr<¡vskii
parq, surrnrär)¡, 24 oct.ber
t927.
l36 TsAoDM, f 3,.p 8, c'.92, ,-44-s. MKìrfì>"ati.r'ì s.lllrìary, N.veurber 1927.
 --
,

St ø linist Co antet'rçp o løti ott. r87

nal was the threat of hunger and the state's control over the food supply. The
dire privation caused by collectivization strengthened the regitne's position
over a rvorkforce that lacked the confidence to resist a comprehensive state
offensive. As in the era of the Civil War, the pursuit of individualist rather
than collective solutions characterized workers' behavior.
Unlike the Civil War, however, the hardships irnposecl on workers calll-tot
be attributecl to foreign invaders or mercellaty armies: the drastic decliue in
living standards was instead a direct consequellce of state policy. The eco-
Trrn Srer,rNrsr CouNTERREVoLUTToN nomic debates during NEP had ceutered on which sectious of the economy
to develop and how to pay for the expausiou, but by the First Five-Year Plan
Pro d.øctio n pro d.øction's Søhl the Stalinist leadership had implemented a strategy of rapid inctustrialization
for that the entire peasalìtry and working class rvould pay for. As Alec Nove
noted, *1933 was the culminatiou of the most precipitous peacetirne decline
in living standards known in recorcled history," a regression that entailed
"mass lnisery and hunger."l
The primary function of Stalinisn-r was to rnake possible the accumulation
of capital for expanding production at the expense of the cultural ancl tlate-
"The soviet goverllmertt cloes not knou, lrow rial needs of the populace. The very centerpiece of Marx's critique of capi-
to fìnisl-r ofîthe u,orkdrs.,,
talism rvas that it demanded the couversion of the greatest possible portion
cliscussiohs in proletarskii district,
-Workers' May I93I of surplus value extracted fiom the labor of working people back into the
The cha'ges introduced i'factory lifè LrncreÈ production process. "Accumulation for the sake of accumulatiou, production
the First Fi'e-year plar,were eas_
ily as tra'sfb'nari'e as those that írad rre.,-, for the sake of production: this was the formula in which classical ecouomics
b.ought about duri'g the uprreaval
of 1917, though in many ways rrrey represented expressed the historical mission of the bourgeoisie iu period of its dornina-
the antitrresis of the earlier
pr'ocess' These chanqer *.r'._ì,rpot.a
uy trre state for its own disti'ct, pro-
tion," he insisted.2 In the classic application of Marx's framework to the
ducdvist i'reresrs took direct aim political ecouomy of the Soviet Union itself, Tony Clifïdemonstrated that by
institutions of tl-ie revorution
tha_trominally had'ùdefencrecl workers at"i,i-r. the advent of the First Five-Year Plan all the central features of capitalism
the e'd of NEp. Betrvee' 1929 and
1932, factory leaders succeeded i,, dr"maticali; were present in a state no longer committed to socialism: the drive to accu-
p"I qr ñ;_r*;;."kä, *"r., ,o rnulate capital, a ruling class that controlled the means of production for its
i'dLrstrial expansion, forced politicar diisent
u,raäg.åu,nc, a'd corn-
pelled ernployees ro work ro'ger o\vn purposes, and the mass exploitatiou of the rvorking class whose surplus-
n',o.. often. yet p,=".;rdy;..ause rhe
state's rapid i'd'strialization stiategy ",nd labor made industrialization possible.3
rvas i''ately detrime'tal to the
interesrs of workers, the regime faiÈi materiar The NEP trajectory arvay from worke rs' collective assertion ancl tovt ards
to incLrlcate the ,vorkforce ,"i., ir, p.o_
ductivist values. Ultirnately, the stare's inabilif individual solutiot-ts accelerated cluring the First Five-Year Plan. The collapse
ro builcl institutio'al srrucrures
fbr its progran-r ar rrre faciory l.u-.I .on",p.ileà of soliclarity allowed factory lnanagement to implement dracouiall wage
..gi,-,-," royalists ro ad<-rpr rnore
coercive as substitLrtes for voruntary political reductions. For median income workers (fourth and fìfth wage and skill
''.'easufes conviction.
The cha'ges in fàcrory lifè describecr iJ this chapter would gracles), wages increased by only 2 percent at the encl of 1928, and the next
u'rfathomable, ho'ever, without a cregree beer.r ha'e fiscal year the average monthly \Mage was lorvered from 102 to 98 rubles a
oir"bo. support. career a'cr mare-
rial i'ce'ri'es became significant inäntives fo,. ,t"i. month.a From 1930 to 1931, the average daily income increased about 2.8
roy"tirtr-o,r-ìhe shop
floor, bur a small minoriq' of workers g.,-rn.ty percent. A much larger increase in the last year of the Plan shows that, with-
identified with the stare,s
goals and believed that.stari'ism
represJrted rhe com¡nu'ist ideal. Trre most out inflation) wages had approximately cloubled during the Plan.5 Given
significa't a*ribure of loyalists ir-, the *o.kpiace, fourfold infìation, however, workers' real iucotne declined by half, a figure
ho'ever, was not their serf:
image as defenclers of commnrrism, consistent with several studies on real wages during the period.ó
but ratirer their social function ancl their
striki'g isolatio' t}o'"
brorvbeating, irnposi'g:tr:_ï:rkplace laio¡rv Stali'ists ..ro.r"J io ,t.,"n.,i,.,g,
fines, a'd autrrorities.occasionaily
trart or problematic workers to irtinidate arresti'g recarci- Peasant Moscow
the overwhelming or
those who held out fiom_ icrentifyitrg
*ilh the regime,s goari. 'rajority
uliimately, A massive influx of f-ormer peasants provided the labor resources necessary fþ¡
ho'ever, rhe most por'verful ro.irí .rr"gin";.ing
*""po,, i' the stalinlsr al.se- the rapicl expansion of the working class in Moscow and throughout the
Nores for this section begin on page2I7.
 i..,'ti:: ::::: rl. ìÀ¿ì-

r88 Rev o løtion øil. d Counterrep o httion St ø lin is t Co anterran lu.ti on 189

Soviet unio'. Tl-re ind-ustrial rvorking class i' Moscow armost tripled, from party rnembers who have uot handed over their surplus."le The prevalence
186,500 in 1928 to 433,900 in 1932,7 a rare of growth that sun
expansion of the Soviet rvorking class, whicl-r doubÈd fì'orl slightly
assed rhe of "petty-bourgeois" sentimeuts alnollg metalworkers considered to be in
over three the vanguard of the class coexisted awkwardly with the regime's strident
millio' ro about six millio'.8 such a rural-ro-urba' populatioñt.ai-,sfer would
class rhetoric.
have been impossible without direct, coercive state intèrve¡tio¡,
which drove Metalworkers were) after all, expected to be in the foreli"o¡t of the "class
peasants from their holdings into the industrial cenrers.e
war" against suspected kulaks, participating in factory brigades sent to the
Pushi'g peasalits irto the cities was less proble'ratic than getting them
to countryside to expropriate procluce and assist in the collectivizatior-r drive.
ide'tify with the state's productivist valuei, however. As Mãshe Lewi'
has Several "revisionist" historians have characterizecl this campaign as "volun-
argued, the attenrpt to impleme't the regime's grandiose plans
resulted in tary," with working-class participation ostensibly demonstrating popular sup-
a prolo'ged "social crisis" throughout soviet ro.i.ty. partìcularly
trouble- port for Stalinism.20 In fact, as the campaign in the Flamtner and Sickle
solne for the state planners was the attelnpt to .,telestope" rapicl
inclustrial_ fàctory proves, workers participated only uuder the threat ofarrest, and eveu
izatio, with arriving semiliterate pìur"nt, who had the skilr in its early stages workefs were less than enthusiastic. A detachmetlt report
level nor rhe 'ewly 'either by low
i'centive to-adapt quickly tò fä.tory lifè. u'irnpressecl
fì'om Sredne-Volzhskii Oblast in 1929 suggested serious problerns. The Tar-
rvages a'd barrack life, forrner peasallrs moved fì-om job
," ;ou i' search tar population initially evinced a "cool" attitude toward factory workers,
of better conditions. The societal chaos causecl by ,inpreceãented
turnover wreakecl particular havoc i' i'dustry. As Lewin has suggested,
rabor though members claimed that this changed after they had fìxed some
machìnes ancl helped tire kollehozwith the harvest. The report noted irregu-
"The mighty dictatorial govem',ent found itseli, as a result of its i¡rperuous
larities with "class" implications: an instructor "froln the center" had
activity duri'g those early years of accelerared i'dustrializatio', piesidi'g
irnposed exorbitant grain demands not only on middle peasalìts (sered'ni'hi)
over a 'quicksand' society.rlo
but also orl poor peasalìts, and factory observers suggested a mol'e even-
The Han"rmer and sickle Factory workforce tripred in size dufi'g
the handed approach "to preserve the støycbhø, not in words, but in realit¡
First Five-Year Pla', from fìve thousa'd to fifieen'thousand production,
between peasant and rvorker."2l
employees.rr The of arriùals r¡,ere eirher poo,. ä. ,'iaJr.-
'rajority Such misgivilìgs amorìg those rvorkers expectecl to implement state Policy
income peasallts whose entry en'ew
masse into the rvorkfbrce iesulted i¡ a clra-
in the countryside were mild compared to the open dissent that rvould surfàce
matic decline in skill level and schoori'g. rn 1927, u'skilled laborers
in the years that folloived during the collectivizationdrive. In December 1930,
accou'ted ftrr o'ly 45 perce.t of the workiorce, but rúi, figu.. rose
annu- the party cornmittee sent six "shameful deserters" to trial for desertirg their
ally to reach 79 percent by r930. si'rirarly, in 1927,30.7!erce.t
of nerv kolhhozposts.22 The court apparer-rtly let them off lightly: the next spring four
empJoyees e'tering the factory had fbur anà half or ,ro.. y."r,
of'schooling, more workers again fled during the spring sorving, including three who had
but by I930, this figure had clroppecl to rT perce't.r-2 officiar figures
shorv been sent to trial several tnonths earlier.23 In the largest metal fàctory in tl-re
that the largest increase in factory laborers was fì-om poo, p.rrãrrts
rather Soviet capital, the level of 'voluntary' support fbr the regime 's collectivization
than "kulaks." By 1930, 69 perce't of workers i' the faËtory were chil-
'ew drive was such that several workers apparently fàvored their chances in the Stal-
dren of either poor or middle peasants.t3
inist court systenì rather than a return to their duties in the countryside.
Peasa't values clashed repeatedly with the state's productivist
ethos and Peasant-workers u'ere not a passive section of the rvorking class. During
its agraria' policies. As late as July rg2g,60 pe rceut of u,orkers
i' o'e rarge late NEP, otl¿hod,nihi' (seasonal workers) were proportionally rnore likely to
shop still had ties ro rrre co*'tryside.la I' ì930, 39 perce't
of strike than urban industrial r",orkers.2a Uninitiated in the norms of Stalinist
workers ow'ed land and eve-ll amoug party 'onparty
thê rancr orvnership
're'rbers fig- discourse, the new arrivals made statelnents that were often rnore openly
ure was high:32 perceut of l(omsomor members, ancr 20 perceur tbr þarty seditious than those of urbau laborers. Thus, iu l93l, a group of Haurmer
members.ls strong rural ties influenced ,n,orkers''..rporrr., to the
regime,s and Sickle othhod.nilei commeuted on the Manchurian conflict: "Enough
war against the peasantry. A' electrical shop discussion noted
that workers deceiving of the Orthodox! We u,ork year-rounci for nothing. If there is a
rvith ties ro the courrryside "are nor cornplètely l-,."tr,-,, politically
ancl co'- war, the rear will not be reliable ancl the sa¡îe goes for the Recl Army, just like
sider only their orv'interests."ìó A February 1930 pàrty discussio'o'
tl're old army when u,e served faithfully while holding back our reseut-
"eli'ri'ating the kulaks as a crass" noted that rvorkers (incluáing parry lnem-
ment.,,25 Similarly, the OGPU reportecl rhat olle recent arrival was less than
bers), "particularly those with ties to the village,,' complai'ed
a"bàot th" col- concerned about the threat ofwar: "I would rather have a war because I aur
Iectivization drive.lT Afier bread ratior.ri'g was ir-rtioducecl, r.olling
n-riil tired of this regime. There is l1o meat; there is no bread; there is nothing.
operators were reporrecl to "look towards the party rvith hostilitl"
anã they There are lines ft¡r everything. It is too bad I was stripped bare in the village
are against collectivization oFthe village economy.,;18 sirnilar.l¡
i,i the .ep"ir because I would leave and go there to live."2ó
shop, *the is tied to the peasa'try. we have p".ty i-,-r.,-,-,bers who
While fàr fiom passive , forrrer peasants helcl values that frequently c¡"t¡.fl
say:'There 'rajority
they seize the grai'ard here they take the iest'.... we still have
with those of rlany older urban workers. A,n experienced worker cornplained

r90 h,ttion
Røt, o øn d. Coøøterrep
to a Rabkrin investigator that "young rvorkers break out oftheir harness; they
should be lrarnessed back. Tliis is because mally peasanr elements are not
used to work discipline."2T o'e experienced worker argued that ,,rnany
workers have ties with the village ancl are more interested in their personal
household. They view the factory as a source of reverìue.',2s That unskilled
poor peasallts viewecl the factory as merely a short-terln source of reve¡ue is
not surprisiug: evelì the lowest wage scales represented an increase in i¡corne
compared to the deprivations in the countryside.2e
The hardships of barrack life outweighed the shorr-renn material benefits
realized from working in the factory, and worker-peasants voted with their
feet by the tens of thousands. The head of the MI( L. Kaganovich, reported
that the sanitary and water supply situation "toclay threatens us with a very
large danger ard I consider the question of water fbr Moscow the most
extreme and burning issus."3() Sanitation problenrs in the city's barracks in
the rvinter of l93I-1932 led to a Moscow soviet campaign to conduct ..rhe
struggle with infectious sickness in the city of Moscow,', focusing on unsau-
itary conditions in ciq' dormitories and barracks.3l Because of theìhortage of
adequate housing fbr the Hammer and Sickle Factory, ',workers say that the
tempo of industrial construction does not correspond to the tempo of hous-
ing co'struction."32 Additional\r, whereas dpartlnent complexes ior the most
privileged workers were located acljacent to the factory, many of rhe new bar-,
racks rvere located in the far easrem edge of Mos.o* ó. beylnd the city lirn-
its, rnaking it difficult and time-consuming to ger to work.33 Moreover, there
was a "do-ir-yourself" aspect to the housing policy. A shop rneeting resolu-
tion "on the bad conclitions in the dornritories', requested materials fbr
repairing the barracks, while workels pledged to do the repairs ,.on clays of
rest and during their free hours."34 Another worker complained that the
"bad lifè in dre barracks affects the work effort. it is clamp ar-rd children
shout, and this does allow rest after healy physical labor.ì'35 Atternpting
to relieve parry leaders 'otof any culpability for provision shortages in the bar-
racks, Mørtenoulzø reported "A Thousand workers Livins ir-r Barracks
Demancl Better Supplies."3ó Despite the collective agreementThat promisecl
heatecl barracks for the winrer, workers cornplainecl about having io heat in
tlre fall of 1932.37
If winters were difficult) summer's warmth offered little relief; the rvooden
barracks around the city rvere firetraps. Moscorv in l93l was a sprawling
shantytorvn rather than a nrodern metropolis, with ó2 percelìt of- housin[
made of wood, and 8ó percent of housing consisting of one- ol. two-srory
dwellings.3s o' 8 August 1932, an MK speaker responded to the ,,n-ìany
questior-rs about fires that took place in the last several days in Moscorv.,, The
fìres darnaged four lrarracks llext to the oil and Gas Factory, and all of the
barracks in tl-re Ball Bearing Factory adjacent to the Harnmer and Sickle Fac-
tory. The speaker blarned extreme heat, ch'y weather, and rvind, but assel.ted
"kulak elements naturally cor-rld utilize the sitr.ration ftrr spreacling fires.,'3e
Mørtenovh,ø also emphasized a supposed "class" angle to bar.rack fires, claim-
ing that they "rvere not llatrlrâl disasters" but rvere startecl ..by the ha¡cl of
class enernies in older to tear at our triumplÌant socialist constructio¡." Wi¡cl
I
oløtioø
St ølinist Co ønt err ev o løti on
direction probably saved the housing of thousands of workers, as the factory
,r.*rp"p.i noted a "criminally relaxed attitude towards fire preparatiou,"
with a lack of water ancl fire extinguishers.aO
Wretched barrack conditions contributed to astrononÌical labor turllover.
Throughout Soviet industry turnover exceeded 100 percent a year from
1929 to lg33.4r In the relatively privileged Hammer and Sickle Factor¡ the
turnover percentage was only margitrally better than the national average)
peaking ui 94 p.t..t-tt in tl-re lg29-1930 fiscal year ar-rd dropping to about 80
þ....r-ri over the next two years.42 Some state loyalists wrote off the high
iu.nou., as a negative collsequence of failing to follow Stalin's directives lor
industrial success. One such s[tpporter argued, "If we correctly chose our
workforce according to his directives, thell they would not run away fì'om us.
Workers that we pick up from the street could care less about procluction."43
But a Rabkrin iuspector assertecl that the "principal cause of turuover is the
shortage of living space." The presence of two thousand workers without
permanent living space fieqr.rently led to "incidents of spending the night in
ihe shops.',aa Managernent promised new hor-rsing in early 1932, but "there
are no dorrnitories, and no place for rvorkers to live. They began to build
thern only when the rvorkers arrived."a5 Røbochøiøgøzetøalso asserted that
the housing crisis caused seveu hundred uew arrivals to quickly depart. "Why
do they stop in the factory fbr a'week or two aud then leavel Because the
housing situatio¡ for workers livi¡g i¡ the barracks is extremely ft¡ul."a6
The tens of thousands of former peasants who entered the gates of the
Ëlammer and Sickle Factory brought with them values and work habits anti-
thetical to the state's prodr-rctivity drive. h'r failing to provide them with ade-
quate food or housing, fàctory lnalÌagenìellt undermined its owu productivist
,rruny workers left after several rveeks. Labor turnover severely ham-
"ìr-r-r,
pered Soviet productiviry and tl're state respollded with increasiugly severe
,l-r."rrrr., airned at binding workers to their employers, all of rvhich proved
ineffectual.az One of the few recourses soviet workers maintained was to sell
the labor-power as they-rather than the state-deemed appropriate. But as
the process of accumulatiou becarne paramount in labor relatious, paradoxi-
cally the Soviet proletariat diverged fì'om the image of the "gravedigger of
tl-re rulitrg class" forecast by Marx and Engels. Far from Promotillg cohesi't'e-
ness andìnity among the only social fbrce that could have collectively chal-
lenged the regime, rapid industrialization led to utlprecedeuted labor
turnover that amplifìed the divisions within the working class.
Shock Work and Socialist Competition
The socialist colnpetitiol-t and shock work campaigus were the twin pillars of
the state's drive to raise productivity, lorver costs, and tighten labor discipline'
Socialist colnperirioll entailed contractual production challenges between fàc-
tories, shops, lvork brigades, or individuals while shock workers were those
who consiitentllr exceeded their procluction norrìs) usually by "voluutarily"
worki¡e extra hours.a8 Scholarship based or-r linritecl official sources tends to
 :f1:
!

192 t93
Ret ohttit¡n øntl Coanterret,oløtion St ø Linist C o ønter rev o løtioø

exaggerare arlcl rorralìticize the participatio' of preclorninantly young

work- not been brought to life."5a By December, factot'1' party leaders acknowl-
ers in the n'ìoven-lent.4e
edged, "Workers do not enter into shock work because they are afì'aid it lvill
The state-orchestrated push lì'o'r above bega' i' April lg2g. A Mørtenopleø
lower pa1,." Moreover, "party rnembers ar-rd candidates provide poor leader-
headline stared that shock brÌgades ernboclied ,,the Model colnmunist,\ttitucle
ship in these campaigns."55
Towardswork" a.d proposed to "strike at selÊseeking a'cl undiscipli'ed
This reluctance to join the sl'rock worker movement tn 1929 is consisteut
Productior. Greetings to the Avant-garde of Socialist competitió'r-50
with reports from around the Soviet lJnion, which i¡dicate that older,
Another issue spelled out the purpose orthe campaig' i' u'mistatable terms, skilled workers led the resistauce. In tire nearby AMO factor¡ hostility
towarcls the shock rvorkers was so great that the plant's party conlnittee had
There must be no place itt our ranks ftrr lotrfèrs, :rbsentee workers, malingerers
a'c.l to stop publicizing participants' names to protect them from attacks from
self:seekers.... Let's organize ¿rud concluct a cornpetition uncler
a resolute strr'rggle r'l'ith unexcttsecl trbsences, .lrunkenness,
these sloga¡s: ftrr other wòrkers.56 Mørtenouleø repeatedly exaggerated the number of Harn-
slackness al-rcl self:scek-
ing; fbr better qualiry of u'ork; fòr uncluesrioning firlfillment of procluction mer and Sickle workers involved in shock brigades, yet even the official fig-
fbr lowerir.rg the costs of proc.luction; ftrr r:rising the productivity of work;
tasks; ure (3ó8 of more thar-r 8,000 workers) rtear the end of 1929 illustrates the
fòr 100 fàilure of the campaign ancl stlggests that firrner trteasures were needed to
pe rcent cornpletio' of
in our firctory! Who will.f e proctuctior.r prograrn. . . . Lorg live socialist compe titio. cor.npel participation.sT
be firstlsl
Tlre movemeut startect itt earnest at the end o[ 1929, rvhen the Komsomol
and parry leaders pushed for I00 percent membership participation in shock
. such exhortarions produced few resurts. In the lirst arrar.rged comperition,
three hundled and rwenty workers in the ft¡rm-casting deparúnent .hàlle¡geá work. Yet even after the campaign was initiated, the party criticized the bolt
three hundred rvorkers in the constrLrctiorì shop to shop cell, where only 20 percent of commu¡ists and l0 percent of l(omso-
conlpetiti;n,, rnol mernbers participated.5s In the eyes of state loyalists, neutrality implied
for the higher productio' no'ns. yet shock brþacles"-,,ro.i"lirt
collapsed because ,,the
yourìg enthusiasrs smashed against the colcl rn all of inãifferènce resistance. In an article entitled "Who is Not With Us is Against IJs," tech-
by the shop's nical personnel in the steel founclry shop challenged other departnìent spe-
ylion a'd party orga'izatio's.... Harli'g barely hacr ti're rg fb.,-,.,, rh.
brigade fell apart u'der the prevaili'g r.rnfavorable siruatiol-r.', o'e cialists to declare themselves shock workers.se The threat of party purges
shock supported the increasingly strident propagancta for increased productivity in
worker claimed that although they enrered work ,,as they laro,r¡¿ a bloody
tle," rhe brigades fèll apart after several weeks because ofa shortage ofeffec-
bat- late 1929 and early 1930.ó0 Mørtenovle,ø argued that one "Wro Refuses to
tive tools. After'rore than ûvo months of intensive propagancla, Help Competition is an Enemy of the Working Class," and focused attelìtiotì
ùøwenorkø on a single shop leader during the mini-purge. Askecl about the clevelopment
cornplained that the majority of shops were still in ihe plã''i'g
stages, ridi- of competition in his shop, he respouded, "We have worked through this
culing shop leaders for having "No Ti¡rre to Think abour co,nrleririon.,,52
The early phase ofshock work question in the cell and union bureau and we explained it to the masses. But
rvirh both active p"rriu. ,ioo-floor
'rer I rnyself do not compete."ól
resistance. Hopes of financial rervards herped e'tice "na
rhe few particìpa'ts.
cornpetitio's berween brigades in the r.ollecl rnetal shop and siÅilar dèpart_ Several thousaud workers cleclared themselves shock workers in early
ments in Dneprostoi and Ural factories offèrecl "several teus of thousa¡rds 1930, giving the impression that the combination of party threats and mate-
of rial incentives succeeded, at last, in expanding the state-orchestrated initia-
rubles" for the u,il-urers. Mørtenoul¿øannonllcecl 5,000-ruble bonuses
for the tive. During the first three months, the uumber of shock workers rose fì'om
best workers and ofTèred to se'cr t\4/enty-two workers to shock
gresses. Yet workers in the cable shop complai'ed that
worker con_ 891 to 3,452 workers. official lìgures reveal rhe large but limited pool of
if they ellterecl social_ workers that could be threateued ancl cajoled by the party machine. In April
ist competition "all of us would be overstrained" ancl criticizecl tl-re
just I I I more workers joinecl the shock brigacles.ó2 Ahnost two months later,
a'ti-alcohol aspect of the ca'rpaign: "what do rhey make rvine fbr ilnot to
drinkf " By septe'rber, co'rpetitio' in the .o,rrt.u.tio,., srrop was reported only arrother I37 had joined the movement.ó3 Mauagertent distributed
to bonuses to particular shops, brigades, and individuals. On the whole, how-
exist "only on paper." one participant conlplainecl tl-rat othår
workers --rry to ever, brigade and personal compensation were tliuimal, and often recipier-rts
criticize and discredit us shock workers," ancl another larnentecl that ,.every-
were pressured to hand over their bonuses to other political causes. Career
where there is s'ickeri'g a'd jokes about the shock brigad es.,, Mørtenotleø
advancetnent, rather than immecliate monetary rewards, was more significant
assertecl that "class aliens" were responsible for unclermini.g
the brigacles' fol an-rbitious workers. In early January 1930, Mørtenovhø stated that only
ef-forts, lrut then castigated the party celrs, shop union burãaus,
technical the best shock rvorkers would represent the soviets, shop comnrittees, aud
stafl, and ad'rinistratio' for their lackadaisical iuppo.t fbr shock workers.
factorl, coumittees.óa
"Hooliga' i'cide'ts" and "open sabotage" agairsi tl-re brigacles i'cluclecl
The productivity drive signaled the e¡d of the factory co¡mittee as a
physical threats against shock workers.s3 Iu November, ,.the rÃolLrtion
about dernocratic proletarian institution ar-rcl the destrr.rctiou of the last selrrblauce
socialist corlpetition benveen shops exists onl1, e11 paper. In practice,
this has of workers' co¡trol. Factory co¡lr-¡rittees had outlived the Soviets ancl had
 I

Stø lin ist Co u n terrep o I atiot t. 195

given rvorkers some conrrol over the process of procluction throughour NEp.
time.72 Almost a year later, a factory represelltative at an oblast uniou nreet-
By early 1930, the exrremely relluous lasr link with lglz in thè workolace
ing reported on the disorganization in the brigades ancl complained, "We
was uncererroniously severed. In early March, the editors of Zø indwstriøl-
callnot continue in this way any longer. What kind of workers would those be
izøtsäa and rrød. held meetings in the Harnmer and sickle and other fàcto-
who worked year round without a day ofQ The fellows are offended.... We
ries in support of exclusively shock-rvorker fàctory colnmimees.6s Thirteen
are still poorly prepared. We are swinrming."73
years (almost to the day) after rhe fàctory commitree v/as created to defend
The next phase of the movernent rvas launched in the second half of 1930
workers' interests, it was formally transforrned into its opposite: a manage-
and continued into 1931, when rationing bonuses drew workers into the
ment tool for raising productiviq,, working longer hours, ànd lowering coits.
brigades in large numbers. Econornic necessity rather tlìalÌ rvorker enthusi-
In the spring of 1930 shock rvorkers replaced 80 percent of facto¡y commir-
asrn drove the expansion of the movement. As Donald Filtzer has argued, it
tees nationally and 5l percent in Moscow.óó
was "the existence of clire scarcity that gave the shock work system its
The nurnerical expansion of shock rvork in early I930 provicled an illusion
- force."74 Ration books played an integral role in the extensive expansion of
of success. In sorne shops "shock r¡'orkers work rvorse thán non-shock work-
shock work, as fbod provecl superior to either propaganda or terror in fur-
ers," including rwo brigades in the bolt shop that fulfìlled only 45 and 63
thering the state's attempts at social engineering. "What rvork we have done
percent of their production norms.ó7 The proble m rvas serious enough to
against absenteeisrn," boasted a Halnmer and Sickle leader to the l(ornsomol
compel Møt,tenovhø to rail repeatedly against the appearance of ,.false shock
leadership about his group's efftrrts to discipline workers: "If oue is absent a
workers." By the end of March, five hundred of six hundred rvorkers in the
single day without just cause, the shock worker book is taken away for three
bolt shop sr.rpposedly participatecl in the campaign, br-rt some workels ..do
months. If one misses nvo days in a row then the title of shock rvorker ancl
not even know what competition is." A ferv u,eeks later, shock workers in the
the book are taken away for six months. On the book cover we stamp 'fälse
bolt and rolled metal shops "shamecl" the entire factor)¡ because shock rvork
shock worker."'7' Mø.rtenovhø warned tl'rat shock worker cards had been
existed "orily on paper." Tl-re nightshift in the bolt shop ir-rcludedulg0 com-
issr-red only for those who fulfilled their procluction norms ar-rd participated in
munists ancl 130 Komsornol members but "hou, many of them participate in
political work. In October 1930, rolled metal shop woçkers complained that
competitionl Nobody knows.', On May Da1,, the ,-r.*rp"pà, called for
they had converted themselves to shock work, but had not received their
"unmaskiug" clozens of false shock rvorkers who *er. of disrupting bonuses as had been promised at the factory couference.Tó After repeated,
"..ur.d
the industrial-financial plan by their drturkenness and absenteeism.6s I¡ june-, frantic demands that rvorkers fulfill the production quota for March l93I,
an øhtiv group investigating problen-rs in the factory claimecl rhat ,.even up to
Mørtenoukø screamed that "April did Not Start with a Shock" and com-
this tine almost r-robody knows their rights and obligations, especially the
plained that not a single shop had completed its allocated output on the first
rvorkers who recently arrived."ó9
day of the new month.zT By June 1931, the absurdly exaggerated percerÌtage
"shock work is popular amollg workers," the NI(vD was fbrcecl to
of slrock workers had dropped slighdy from 83.9 to 78.9 percent, and the
acknorvledge. In the 'otnearby Dinamo fàctor¡ workers had corlplained that party bureau blamecl the decrease on "weak leadership."Ts By September
"socialist courpetition is exploitatiolì," aud in the Raiz factory workers sug-
1931, eleven (of thirteen) thousand rvorkers were supposedly ir-rvolvecl in
gested it was "necessary to start by fèeding rvorkers and then clevelop iuclui-
shock work, but Rabkrin condemned an "impersonal approach to this activ-
try." In tl-re Hammer and sickle bolt department the I(ornsomol brigade ity" and criticized the party, union, and managenlent.ze
reportedly collapsed altogether. In the architectural shop no shock brigades
State oflìcials searched ftrr scapegoats to blame fbr the many problems
ever fbrmed, ostensibly because of "a manifestation of self:seeking attituáe try
within the movernent. In March l93l, Røbochø,iø'tø.zetñ, accused the factory
communists towarcl work." "Tailist" coml.nunists in the fòrm-casting shop
committee and Kolnsomol of "opportunism" in the socialist competition
sided rvith their co-rn orkels who refused the administrariorì's clemancllo Iiq-
because over two thousand socialist competition agreements existed "only ou
uidate a blockage in the pouring process, while the shop,s I(omsomol cell was
paper," and it proposed that the leaders be brought befbre a revolutionary
reportedly on "the brink of collapse."70 In Ma¡ Mørtenovleø reported ..the
production tribunal.s0 In June 1931, district party leaders admitted that
death of shock ternpo" in lnill number two along r,vith incideirts of party
socialist competition and shock work fì'eqr.rently existed "ouly on paper" aud
members ridiculing yourlg shock rvorkers. A skillecl rvorker mockecl u ,ìlo.i
cited the steel wire shop in the Hammer and Sickle as an example. However,
rvorker who l-rad loaned the state llloney ancl then neeclcd overtinìe work:
the discussion also citecl the "heroic" work of sorne comtnunists and l(oll-
"Yoll've conìe to eam some extra, eh? Yor-r sigued up for a 1,sO0-ruble boncl
solnol mernbers in meeting rìornrs in the fàctory.8r While the party was able
and now you have nothing to eat)"7ì
to exhort members to exert thernselves for short bursts at the end of extra
Ë,ven anrong thc more ardent supporters of the movement, the exte¡sive
production quarters, such rnethocls coulcl not be sustained.
and incessanr overtinle led to demoralizarion. The fèw functioning brisacles
B)' the surnrner of 1931, shock work expanded to rnost of the n'orkficrce,
irr tlre su¡nmer of 1929 worked twelve- ancl tl-rirteen-hour clays jÍongïl,n
but with provision shortages the distribution of incentives suffèred. In
holidays, but by Septernber they had nor received their promised
'acatio' August l93I, the l(omsomol Central Committee reported problerns issuing
 196 Rep o ltt tion øn d, Coønt¿rrep
extra pay for exemplary shock workers, with rnany factories failing ro issue
bonuses for three to five months. In the Harnmer and sickle Factory, rnall-
agement distributed only single ruble bonuses ancl one shop adcled an
amendment to the collective agreemeut, blaming the shop administration fòr
underproduction.s2 The next monrh, Rabkrin agaiu reported that many
workers in the hot shops clid nor receive their bonus rewards.s3
Two years after its i'ceptio', the shock worker was stiil
''-'ovement
plagued with problen-rs. In Jr.ure 1931, Mørtenovl¿ø acknowledged the neecl
to have "better supplies to encoul-age the shock tempo.,,84 Two months
later the OGPU reported that the shortage of nrear fi¡stered indignation
amorlg a group of workers in the rolled metal shop: "Our organizations only
knor", how to demand that we participate in shock work and socialist com-
petitior-r, but they have no interest in horv well the workers eat. The r¡,ife
spends the rvhole day on line but she rerurns home empty-handed because
there is no rnear in the ZRK fclosecl workers' cooperative]."s5 A Rabkrin
inspector complained that planning brigades "are nearly non-functior-rir-rg."
In September of stalinism's "third and decisive year" of the plan, one wórker
informed the inspector of the widespread notiou.rhat "it is impossible to
raise discipline."só
Supply shortages mearr that privileges had to be rçadjusted i' rate 193t.
"The existing opinion that shock worker Qooks are added supply cards is,fiur-
danrentally incorrect," Mørtenovhøexplained. A nerv, special card,rvas issued
for produce and goods, and this "prefère'tial supply is fbr our best shock
workers." The strict conditions for the new cards included a three-month ful-
fìllment of production obligations, volunrary public rvork, ancl perfèct atren-
dance. One of the "best soldiers for socialism" proudly declaredr..I always
receive a calcl for the best shock work."s7
only a small rninority of rvorkers ever qualified for the econornic privi-
leges of the selective group of "best shock workers." Mørtenoyl¿øanuounced
that these workers would no longer lÌave to stand i¡r line at the factory
store, and that one-quarter of all goods in short supply would be set aside
fbr ther¡. Filìy new apartlnents with showers and ovens were earmarked for
the best shock workers, and custom-made coats and suits were also exclu-
sively preserved for this exemplary sectiorl of tl-le rvorkforce. In Ju.'e 1932,
15,000 rubles rvere distributed ro rhe nvo lrest shock brigades in the elec-
trical shop, and to brigades in rnill nulnber one ir.l the rolled metal shop.ss
Of five hundred rvorkers in the food cooperative, only twenry-two were
considered "the best shock workers," and only four party members partici-
pated in competition.se Similarly, in rhe summ er of 1932, only twenry-seven
Kornsomol melnbers in the first mill of the rolled n'retal shop received best
shock worker cards but none in three other mills. Møt tenopl¿ø cornplained
that weak shop clisciplilìe was "the fàult of the Komsomol rnembe rs" u,ho
needed "to pay n.ìore attention to loafèrs."e0 Even the few rvho fulfìlled tl-reir
quotas n.ere unenth r-lsiastic:
At thc beginniltg of the nroutlt, c¿rrcls u,ere issuetl antl tlrcy rve nt to the ZN( irncl
receivecl c¿lnuecl gooc-ls anc'l ln:urufàctLrred items, but :-rfier th¿rt tl-re1r fb¡go¡ 'rbol-,t
ohûion St ø lin ist C ou.n'terr e? o h,tti on t97
their shock worker obligations. The best shock workers enjoy enormous advltt-
tages. They receive advùnt¿lges iu consumer items, trips to health resorts, living
quarters) rest hornes, and fìnally, they are in the leading rauks ilt education. It is
harcl to englnerate all these rights. These rights correspond to the euormous
responsibilities of shock workers in the shop.9l
Material and career incenrives substituted for political conviction amollg a
small milieu of exemplary rvorkers, but limited eutry into the new clique pro-
duced a phenomeuon of "best shock worker entl''" The party expelled two
"opportunist" members who repeatedly spoke up against the distribution of
goàãr to the best shock rvorkers and agitated in a cell meetir-lg against the
bot'tot p"y system.e2 A factory guard apprehended a communist for stealing
fisl-r intended for the best shock workers.e3 Only 20 Percent of new housing
in Moscow had gas, including "the house of shock workers" for elite Harn-
mer and Sickle workers.ea One worker complained that "shock workers are
great, but why should they be given apartmentsì Many of our cotlmunists
live in n'ransions while others live in barracks full of holes. Maybe we could
take a room from each of these tnausions for those fì'om the barracks with-
out apartlllents."95
The illusion of support for shock work in the Hatnmer ancl Sickle Factory
diffèrect little fron'r that in other'factories throughout the Soviet Union. At
the 1932 Kor¡somol Cougress, speakers repeatedll' applauded the enthusi-
.asm of young workers who were in the forefront
of the lllovel11ent' Yet even
alnong these select delegates, supposedly the most ardent base for Stalinisur,
support was suspect. Nine delegates sent a lettel' to Prøpd,ø and lzvestiiø that
ridiculed the proceedings:
We arrived here fiorn the fàctories and mills, but our fàmilies are going hungry
rhere. Yes, hungry aud going without clothes. Our tm:ìtetlrish politicians have
brought the cour-rtry extreme impoverishment. "Workers' Ínaterial situltion is get-
ti¡g better." Yes, better lvith dry bread and \\,ùter ¿ìncl sometimes cabbage. You trre
all par,rsites, parasites \ ¡orse thân Tsarist bureirucr¿tts atìcl self:seekers. This is the
state you have brought the rvorker. We are hungry :rud caunot'¡'ork ttlltil u'e are
given bread, rneat, housiug, and clothes. In ottr factory there is a breakclo'*'n-
ónly S5 percelìr fuliìlln.rent of rhe plan. We say that in the rlext month there will
not be even that much. We will not u,ork-u'e c¿u'urot stand by our beuches hut't-
gry ancl cold. We refirse to work.
Nine People.e6
The Bureaucratic Leviathan and the Illusion of Worker Support
The nun-rerical expansion of the party was reurarkable dr-rring the First Five-
Year Plan as membership triplecl to twellty-olle hundred at the encl of 1932'e7
Figures for the I(omsomol are eveu more impressive. By July I931, youth
and l(ornsomol rvere almost sytlonylnous, rvith 3,983 of 4]32 yor-rng vi'ork-
ers holding membership.es These fìgures bestorv sotle credibility to the
notioll of broad-based labor support for Stalinisrn.
*'.
198 tiott
Rct' oht øn. tl Cou.nterrep o løtion
The mernlrer:ship numbers are deceptive, however. The annual number of
workers joining the party fiom 1929 to 1932 (136,265, 1,525, and 706
respectively) shows that the rift betrveen rvorkers and the party colttit-tued in
1929 and 1930, but that a significanr change occurrecl in 193I. The rnass
recruitment during the 1931 Soviet election campaign was later cdstigated
because it allorved in "many alien elernents."ee During the elections, lvorkers
merely signed stateiTtelìts) such as "I join the parry" "I join the Komsomol,"
aud "I join the uniolt" that led to mere "paper growth.'I00 According to olle
memoir, the lnass recruitment from l93l to 1933 led to the purge of "a
large number of alien elements."l0l
No evidence indicates that employees suddenly became impressed with
the very state strategy whose rnost palpable result rvas a sharp deterioration
in living standards, but the mass recruitmenr does illustrate a qualitative
change in workers' attitlldes and their accommodation to the fàctory
regime. Employees recognized the educational and mollerary advantages
involved in joining the only civic organization in the fàctory offering career
advancernent. The number of workers promoted from the bench into stãte
positior-rs was substantial-660,000 fiom l93I to I933, or berween l0 and
l5 percent of'the industrial working class..I02 SignifìcantlS in an effbrt to
build a loyal party apparatus, the party tended ro promote membefs u,ith
no memory of party disputes during the, Revolution, Civil War, or even
NEP. In October 1930, the factory parry secrerar), Gaidul' was promoted
to heacl the røihow. and his post irì the fàctor), rvas fìlled by 2S-year-old
Filatov.t03 By early 1932,half of all Moscow secreraries had been members
only sirrce l92B.to4
Corruption, incompetence, aud lethargy persisted in the factory party
organization. Five general party meerings in the first half-year of the Plan
drerv only 290, 441,280,428 and 228 parricipanrs, oLÍi of berrveen seven
hundred and eight hundred melnbers.l05 Due to "weak party leadership" in
the architectural shop, "the questions of socialist comperition, growth of
production, and cleansing the party, rvere alnrost not touched on at all."l0ó
Irr December 1929, the fàctory party colnnittee had to replace the entire
leadership in the shop because of "a lack of developmenr of self-criticism,
squabbling amollg leaders, shoppism, self-seeking and a tailist moocl.'107 In
late 1929, bolt shop party leaclers acknowledgecl tl-rat ivork discipline hacl
fallen and that even party members "drink and have a bad attitude towards
social responsibilities." A fèmale party leader complained that "little attention
is devoted to worren's work," vvhile another mernber complained of rampant
alcoholisrn, noting that rvorkers "bring rvine into the shop." One member
lamented, "comrades, we talk a lot, but rve do very little."t08
Chronic problems in the factoly party organization conrinuecl in 1930. In
the steel foLrnclry shop, only two of the nine bureau members regularly
atterldecl their meetings, the shop cell clisplayed little discipline, and members
conrplained: "Not to drink is inrpossible." Moreover, "the nonpartt, øletiv
display an r-urhealthy attitude towards the cell. They say that in the shop self:
criticism is suppressecl.Dl0e In March, the Control Cornr¡ission criticizecl the
railrvay shop work because "party ancl profèssional organizations are
ant err eP o løti
t99
St ølinist Co on
lys¿þ."Ì10 In the ZRI( I(ornsornol tnembers ricliculed their cell secretary:
"Do not even bother asking Esin; he will not do anything'"lll
The no-holds-barred reiruitment strategy of 1931, like the Leni. Lery
seven years earlier, exacerbated party proble¡rs. A party leacler asse¡ted tl-rat
..the main cause for not completìng the production program was, along rvith
a whole number ofprodr,rctiou bluuders, the inabiliry of
part¡ adrlinistration,
and trade union organi zationin the shops to mobilize the working masses'"Ì12
By August 1931, ; Rabkin inspector described "a rnassive breach" of parry
discipline and complained that "the party orgauization has done notlling
to
dues,
strengther-r disciplirie." Problems ir-rcluded l'lolÌpayment of mernbership
fighting cluring work, sleeping during night work, not atterlding Party meet-
in"gs, a thJughtless attitude towards party obligatious'l13
-R.porß
"ãa show that even with fifteen full-time orgauizers, the factory party
organization in 1932 rvas in a state of disarray. By |une, the parry claimed
3.117 members arld candidates orga'ized into fifty-eight cells, with fiftee.
paid full-time orgauizers trying to keep the apparatus operating' A report tac-
itly ack'owledged the paper narure of the membership when the pro'rotiou
ani scatterin g71 *t tli ,t the shops left the ranks thin, a retnarkable admis-
siol given tltat seven thousaud Party ànd l(omsolnol members were suppos-
edly-ready to fill the void. A lnember complained that "we have uo
clarification about work alnong mbrnbers and candidates oI1 questions of the
day" and a disorganization of the shop øl¿tiu. In aclditión to tnembers not
understanding the clecisior-rs of the plenutn, l-re admitted the "occurrences of
an antiparty [oo¿."ir+ One member who was singled out in May became
indignánt at the selectively applied double staudard, and stated that he "catl-
not and will not accept any assignments."lls I¡ July, a ftrrrn-casting shop
member asserred, "In general we now have uo political leadership in the
shop" and a member inlhe steel founclry shop warned, "our work now has
tor;lly hahed.',rró Factory parry leaders condemuecl the party work in August
as "tåta[y unsatisfäctory," since it had allorvecl the allotted time
for six hun-
clrecl canáidare membeis to merely lapse.li7 In the second mill
of the rolled
.,the cell completely collapsed." This rvas supposedly the fàult of
metal shop,
the leaderl: "Orlov is the iell secretary. He does nothing."Ils In November
the party expelled fìve recl lïìanagers fbr "repeated collective drir-rking ar-rd
appéaring at work in an inebriated state."lìe Notes to the new party secretary
,ilã* tnul authorities had rernoved a¡d possibly arrested a layer of factory
caclres in 1932. One note askecl, "Tell us courrade l(ul'kov, rvhy
do we have
such awf-ul suppressiorl of self-criticism in the districtl All the øhtip were
removed so dá.s that meatl that all those commuuists were scouudrelsl"l20
Such purges became endemic to the Stalir-rist systen-ì) whiclr coulcl not
overcome the structural problerns of rapid industrialization with a rvorkforce
overwhelmingly resentd of state policy. Fifteen years earlier, a l-ranclful of tal-
ented Bolshcviks hacl been atrle to carry the argunretrt agairrst a cotnpromisc
with capitalistl, for striking against the Provisional Goverument' f¿rr armecl
ctefenseof the revolutiolt, a¡cl fbr Soviet power. Bolshevisrn rvas able to do
so
because the revolutional'y strategy collllectecl with workers' political aspira-
tions. In 1932. a ftrll-tirr-re staff of party functionaries could tlot push sevet.t
 ,l^'aV\
200 Ra,oht tion, ønd Cowu.terrevoluiion
thousand party, candidare, and Kornsolnol members to iclentifl, with its aims.
Their f-unclamental probleln was that the tnovelnent they atternpted to leacl
was directly antithetical to rvorkers' interests.
Stalinist Campaigns: Stare Bonds
shock work, socialist competidon, and sencling workers to the coul.rtryside to
fbrce peasants iuto collective fanns were all state-initiated coercive calnpaigns
to extract surplus for industrializatior-r. State Bonds was another coercive
campaign to accumulate capital. The pressure tactics used to extract a
month's pay from almost every enìployee shou, that the loans had rnore in
colrìlrìoll with Mafia extortioll than with revolutionary élan.
In 1928, the parry initiated rhe first of many "loans fbr industrializario¡,,,
in which a nonth's wage was exchanged for a bond note. Mørtenopl¿ø
depicted deparrments that raced ahead in procuring the loans as planes or
trains, and shops tliat laggecl behind as tortoises or snails. workers who
refused to participate could expect to see their names ol-r ,.the black boarcl,,,
while the best saw their names on the "red board" because ..the best shóulcl
be known by the entire fäctory, and the rest should measure thefnselves
against therì1." The stick, horvever, played a more prominent role than the
carrot and there was l1o room for neutraliry as party members were expectecl
to pressure nonparticipants. "These workers do not understand that the loan
increases the ternpo of construction," which meant that ,.it is the task of
every rvorker not only to sign up fbr the bond, but to also sign up less-con-
scious workers for a month's wage.,'12l
Workers ltever received retums on these bonds, r,r,hich were effèctively an
additional 8 percent wage cur. rn 1929, a black ¡narket for the boncls devel-
oped and Mørtenovhø accusecl workers of'selling their holdings. party leacl-
ers placed their notes in storage in an atternpt to give .onfid.,l.. to the
loa's. one member nissed the political significance of the campaign rvhen
he claimed that he had "signed up for the loan specifically ill oicler ro save
up fbr a suit," and the factory newspapel' respondecr, ¿'Nothing can be
expected from such turncoats-they should be relentlessly hounclecl or,rr of
tlre party."r22
By 1929, the bo'd campaign beca're tied to larger political causes, such
as the borcler conflict wirh Cliina. Shock brigades often signecl together in
response to political campaigns or to denounce those who abstained, br.rt
larger contributions of several rnouths' pay were almost always signecl incli-
vidually.l23 strpng-ann tactics fìrst focused on the thousancls of pãrty mern-
bers. The repair shop cell expelled a member fbr his refirsal to colitribute a¡cl
failure to pay his rnembership dues.l2a Another member in the sarne shop was
expelled for refusing to sign up ftrr the loan, supposedly telling anorher mem-
ber that "work uncler the Tsar paicl better." ancl "beftrre, the ñner hacl a l¡et-
ter attitude tou,ards his worker." He asserted, "Tlre TsI(resolution does not
apply to ure. I signed up fbr whar I could afÌìrrd.'r25 The party expelled
auother member in l93l f¿)r "categoricalllr ¡sfu5¡t1g,' ro sign q¡ for the loan,
..,-à
St øliøist Co ønter rev o lut'ion 20r
speaking out "against the high tempo of building socialisrn, and exhibitir-rg
the worst ki¡d of right opportunism in Practice." Members who had not
signed up were singled out for "hiding in the bushes." Only after tnembers
were pressurecl ir-rto signing up \l/ere nonparty workers cajoled. Mørtenopleø
described several "deserters" against the loan, oue of wholn was against
socialist competitiol-t attd "all measures of the party and Soviet state." ÉIe was
supposedly heard sayi¡g with clenched teeth, "You masters, f-uck you. All you
know is begging and asking ftrr money."l2ó
Shop percentages of contributions for 1930 demonstrate the dynamic of
the movement. At the beginning of the campaign Mørtenotthøprintedthe
names of seveuty-one workers rvho collectively contributed fifteen thou-
sand rubles. Only a month later, afier the party had brought pressure otl its
own members, clid the quantitative reports start to apPear in the nerT.spaPer.
By July, 53.8 percent ofworkers had contributed to ó4 percenr ofthe goal.
After two more weeks of incessant propaganda, ó8 percent of the workforce
hacl contributed 82 percent ofthe goal, but only the electrical shop attained
100 percent. In some large departments the majority of workers had yet to
contribute. Mørtenovl¿øthen pressured the factory committee to send shock
brigades into fìve lagging departments in order to harangue nollpartici-
pants. Three weeks later, all but trvo shops had reached 100 percent. Thus,
il-r. p".ty campaign first targetcld its own rnetnbers, a srnall rninority of
rvhoin made extraordinary contributious. Only after two mollths of arm-
twisting tactics, in which the rnost outspoken critics were singled out, was
the goal achieved.t2T
Political redemption was offered for those who were willing to acknowleclge
past errors. In early lg2},aTrotsþist supPorter claimed the bonds were being
irsed "to feed the bureaucrats and pay for the Tsal'ist debt.'128 However, he
later contributed fìve hundred rubles to the can,paign aud was pictured otl the
front page of the factory newspaper. In an article entitled "Rebuff the Whin-
ers thè Bolshevik Way," a female rvorker wrote) "on 13 June in the pages of
Mørtenovhø it rvas written that my speaking out played into tlle hands of the
class enemy. I acted incorrectly aud now I understand this.'l2e
Shop union meetings repeatedly raumed tl-rror,rgh motions in favor of tl-re
bo¡ds with limitecl resisrance . The boldest dissiclents spoke for the silent
majority, but they also lackecl the cohesio¡ to challe¡ge the state calnpaign.
At the beginning of the second year of the loans, a party leader complained
about "right opportunist waverittg" among members on tlle boud issue.l30
After all shops matched or exceeded their goals in 1930, the factoly rlews-
paper ricliculecl au "o¡rportuuist kulak" wl-ro had claimed that "nobody
tvould sign up for it" aud another worker who claimed that "ouly fools vote
ftrr the loan."l3l
Reports show continued but rveakened resistance to the bond campaign in
lg3L District party leaders Iroted "iucidetlts of tailism" amol1g workers,
party and l(omsolnol members in the loan ca¡rpaign ir-r the Hammer and
Sickle Factory.l32 The next day, the fãctory llewsPaper called on the ur-rion to
"get busy" against a particular worker who had agitated against the loaus,
claiming "he is always against whatever carnpaign is initiated iu the shop."133
 St øli,n às t C o øntet r ev o lation 203

A week later a Party rneeting acknowledged it had

conducted rveak rvork
realizi.g the state loa's.l3a A previously-expelled menrber i' per shop; agitation brigacles vvere sent "ittto battle" in fourteen departmeuts;
conducted ,.arti_ a¡d an "evening for victors" rvas orgauizecl at the factory cluþ.i40 Juclged on
soviet" agitation during the bond campaign by suggesting
i,r shop meeti.g its own terms-rying its success with that of socialist competitiou-the cul-
that the parry was "'or making t1.,. io,,i-rt.y betiãr "
but-worse.,, A fàctory tural cornnrission's propagar"rda for the Cultural Revolution was a failure.
guard revealed the rature of the campaign wh_en
he comprained that .,you Shop-floor cultural campaigns gained little resotrance amolìg rvorkers or
fbrcibly make guards subscribe ,o .¡.,. io"ir.rr3;
I(omsomol members, the supposed champions of the Cultural Revolution.lal
The annual bo'd drive displayed alr the attributes
of other Stari'ist carn- In Septembe r 1929 , several party speakers called for show trials of l(orr-rsornol
paig's. Bureaucratically orga.izecl Íìom above, the
loans relied on a ti'y but leading members because they "have a careless attitude towards the campaigu
hardened group ofstate loyalists to sig' up for
extraordinary cåntributions, agaiust illiteracy." Moreover, because of "tnany disorders" in the youth-dom-
then proceeded to hara'gue other p".ty r".mbers
u'der rheih.eat of expur- inated club, "workers do not rest) but get irritable'"\42 I¡ October 1929,
sion, and finally to cajole nonparty workers. Mørtenopkø
devoted less attention party leaders complained that Komsomol members were not participating in
to the sixth campaig. in 1932 and the fa*ory agai'
met its goals, suggestiug union work, were against the coutinuous rvorkweek (five days on) then one
that the practice had co'critioned workers and wãrn
do*r, .Ãirtu'r... off), and were more interested in dancing than in production issues.ì43 Iu
September 1930, Mørtenouhø adrnitted: "nobody in our factory rvould deny
thãt we have breaks in the lines of the cultural fiottt," and described this
The Cultural Counterrevolution breach as of "a chronic character." A Febrr.rary 1932 atticle argued that "Red
In a. surleal attelnpt to de flect atteutiolì fì'om its assault Corners Have Tumed ir-rto Sleepir-rg Quarters." Or-re shop leader adrnitted,
stalinis'r revived rhe "crass rvar" rheroric of the civil
on the rvorking class, "We do coucluct work, but very rarely."l4 Eveu simple tasks proved too
war. s;..i"i emþhasis rnuch of a nuisance, and by the end of the sumlner, wall llewspaPers had not
was aimed at thc "culturar Front" and much
of this prop"g"rrã" was targeted been put up in the shops for more thau a mottth.la5
at specialists' bureaucrats, kulaks, ancl the clergy.13ó
ff1. Cilru."l Ãevolutiotr Tl-re antireligious carnpaign was no llore successful than the explicitly pro-
in the workplace i'voked military metaþl-rors, such ,.Into Battle
turet'" Møvtenovhø called for 50 p.r..,ri of alí worke6
as fòr cul- ductivist aspect of the Cultural Revolution. In early 1929,the party fiaction
." ,ruÇ:;;¡ fu¡ bat- of Goclless reported that the n-rajority of rnembers still displayed a careless ,

tle preparatio'r" ro provide sufïìcìent cacrres for procruction.

Tí,r. ..*rp"p.. attitude torvarcl antireligious propaganda.l4ó Befiore Easter 1929, Mørten-
also explained that "the first duty of the best
industrial shock workers is for orhø charged: "Priests Agitate but the Godless are Silent." The uewspaper
every shock worke rto be a soldier in the cultur al
tory would not just participate in this battle:
arnty.,,r3z Mcireover, the fac_ noted that only fifteen Godless were active and complai¡ed that only forry
rubles of the six-four thousand-ruble cultural budget were declicated to God-
less work.raz In the construction shop discussion ou religion and collec-
The Hammer ancl Sickle Firctory is the
tivization "we have nÌany comllunists who take a beating in questions with
Leading Detachment on the Front of the Culrural
Revolution t.ìotìparty workers."l48 Party leaders had to carry the work of the alìti-Easter
"' what tasks in the culturd-political u,ork stancl beftrre our fìlctoryl The fìrst ¿r'cl caurpaign in 1930 because "iu the shop cells the Godless are not popular."l4e
rnain task: rrll cr.rlt'rar-politic¿rl work shourd
be sr.rbject ro:ìrì even g..n* cregree to Despite more striclent antireligious rhetoric, mauy members continued to
the fìrlfillment of the lìnancial i'clustrial plan of
tie fìrctory. au i6r,r,sln¿,n.t1.,- live a double lifè. At the encl of 1930, a report noted that ¡vo-thirds of
ods-olcl and neu'-must be utilizecr in Àobilizi'g workers
in the completion of Hanrnrer and Sickle workers' marriages took place in the church.t50 Mørten-
the industrial fìnanci¿rl plan. 138
ophø retnarked that a leacling llember of the cultural comrnission "is not a
bad colnmunist in prodr.rction, bttt at hotlìe he has hr.rug au icon rvith a lamp
Thus, tl-re cultural Revoluriou was primariry geared
towarcr raisi'g procruc- in the left conÌer oFthe roorn." The nervspaper asked, "How cau he cotlduct
tivity. The cultural commissior of thê Lys'vei-,rki .h"lr.,rgecr
the rt.ñrn-,", the antileligious Easter carnpaigul"lãl
sickle and several other factories i^ earry 1929 and.x[lainecr ^,.,a
work would- be iutegrated into socialist co'rpetitio'.
hol .urturrr Work schedule changes aimed at increasiug productivity rvere perhaps the
expected to include shop placards such as red
cukural work was most disruptive char-rge to workers' lives. The trausition to a colltilluous
boards ftrr overachievers and u,orkrveek along with expanded night shifts, met with resentlÌìellt and resis-
black boards fbr underachi.u..r, criagra'rs rvith obrigations
and f....,rt rìl- tance. In the repair shop, the coutinuous workweek uoted "matly objections
fillment, production evenir-rg galas agãinst absenteeisil
free film tickets fbr shock worters, aircr show
,n"rt., rervards of fi'om rvorkers," particularly among Komsomol Inembers.Ì52 A report on
",-,.1
trials orga'izecl for ihose guilty party rvork during the First Five-Year Plan noted u,orker opposition to abol-
of rvaste in production.ì3e
ishing surnmer holidays aud "evett llore considerable resistance" to the con-
The cultr"rral commission atte'rptecr to irnprerne't
trrese activities i' 1929. tinuous rvorkrveek.ls3 The chairmar-r of the VTsSPS (Gar-rsrnan) admitted the
Red co.rers provicled criagrarns sirowing tulfiilment
of the production nran problems at a fàctory cultural commissiol-t meetil'ìg:
 204 R ø, o lu.ti on. øn d. Cou.n terrev
Now the class struggle is particr.rlarly rìoticeùble. We h¡ve cl:rra rhar Mensl.revik
newsPapers trre sprezrding rllmors that Soviet power is clepriving workers of their
holidays. DifTèrent secrs âre also speaking agaiust dre nonstop rvorkr.r,eek. up to
now we have not given a clear idea to u¡orkers about tlre ,-ro,lrtop prodr.rction.rSa
workers conrplained about the implementation of extendect shift work pre-
cisely because they did have a clear idea of the implications of ..contilluous
procluction." Trvo Komsomol rnembers agitated against shift rvork because
"night is for sleep, not work" and attempted to organize an illegal nìeetirlg
at the factory. Mør,tenovl¿ø accused the agitators of fonr-ring a ,,righr oppor-
tunist bloc with counterrevolutionary Trotskyists."l5s Komsomol members
in the form-casting shop organized sin-rilar resisrance and rvere labelecl as
"Those who Act i' tl're Interests of the class Enerr-ry" because they also
allegedly argued against collectivization and socialist comperirion.tso [.o1-
tural commission speaker admitted that after the implenielìrariou of night
work, "workers have a bad attitude towards our party and governm.rl,.'irsz
The state succeeded in fbrcing large nurlbers of workers to appear for night
rvork, bnt fàiled to get them to adapt ro rhe new conditions. A party leaáer
la¡rented about rhe night shift in February 1930 that ,.people stand ãround
doing nothing, saying that there is nothing to do. In the electrical shoÞ thev
reacl newspapers. In the rolled metal shop one inebriated person ^rvalks
around the furnaces in circles."ls
Mørtenouleø connected the continuous workrveek with the campaigu
against religion, calling ftrr an encl to church holidays and for only the rev-
olutionary days off-. The new schedule ended the rcgular saturday and sun-
day break a'd appears to have caused widespread rese'trrrènt. one worker
argued that "it is Sunday that is dear to us, not so¡ne kind of wednesday.
This is just rnocking religion. of course, I'm nor talkiug about
'ryself.
l-roliday for rne is when I have molÌey in my pocket ancl I ar' relaxing.,, A
female worker argued that "it rvould be bad if we clo not have sundays off
because everyoue is in a holiday rnoocl.... Generally, I do not see anything
good about it." Another worker complained that the shortened break meant
he woulcl not have timeto retunl to his village.tse Duringthe transition to
the continuous rvorkrveek, cultural cornmission speakers implied that
tarians were rvinnir-rg the cultural battle. One leacler arguecl that ,,the sec-
tariatrs are awake but our leaclership organizations are asleep.',r6(t Røbochø,iø
gø.zetø' claimed that fewer Hammer and Sickle wor-kers rvere absent than
usual on old Christrnas, and tl'rat rnany employees had attendecl antireligious
everrings on the sixth and seventh of January.lól Horvever, Mørtenovleø
reported nìâny u¡1s¡çused absences cluring old Chr.istmas, inclucling fifiy-
three in the sreel fbLrndry shop.162
More strident antireligious propagauda in tlre spring of 1930 stressecl the
connectiorr with productivity: "on Easter Days: Not one Absentee! The
struggle against Religion is the struggle fòr the Five-year plan!" Before the
holida¡ "class aliens" spread rumors that the May Da1, celebratiou rvould
be celebrated on the sixth through tenth of May to coincide with Easter.tó3
such "rumors" reflected rvorkers' reselltlrìent) u,hich was spellecl out in
ohttion ist C o ønt et' r ev o løti ott'
205
St ølin
clear terms in a uote to a speaker at an ullspecifìed factory in the district in
early l93l:
Comracles, thank yor.r all very nruch f'or everything. I hope the devil takes yott'
Everything you say is a lie. Once a mouth you giye rotte¡r spoiled Potåtoes' lrut uot
.r'.,r'roop-få, the fàrnilies. If we could have only one day like befbre-everytl.ring
one neede.l usecl to be available . But now you only knolv horv to rob the peâsants'
bre¿rk clow¡ churches, ancl pr.rt all good people in jail. You bastarcls' you are
¿rll ban-
¡ot give resr ro the living or the cleacl. I request that you re ad this.
dits.. . . You clo
You only rvrite how bacl it is abroad arrd how good it is here. Yolt coure at night
like bandits and take away fãther and child. You totally ruined all the peasants,
broke all the churches, ancl lie all the time .ló4
The anti-Easter campaign was more successful. Church-influenced
l93l
holidays were '(particularly strong among workers with ties to the village"
and, Mørtenoahø stggested a broad carnpaign that "explains the counterrev-
olutionary esselìce of religion and specifically the Easter holiday." An exem-
plary shock brigade, in an article entitled "Against Easter-For Shock
b.mpo," declared that they rvould not be late, would not clriuk, and rvoulcl
*ork a shock tenrpo, and called otl others to do the same. Workers \vere
"t
implored ro "Tear thi Spider-Web of Religious Lies. Let's Offèr a Bolshevik
Shock Ternpo of Work in An'srver to the Priests' Holiday. Let's Greet the
Preachers' Holiday Fully Armed. Not a Single Absentee or Lateness During
Easter Days." Arm-twisting and tl-rreats, rather than propagauda, ensured a,
successful campaign. Only sixty-nitle "loafers" failed to aPpear ftrr work on
Easter 1931, a¡d the newspaper callecl for a more stringent fbrm of punish-
nìent than simply printing their names: "Send those who Unclermine the
Industrial-Financial Plan to çoot¡.r:ló5
 Antireligious work was no diffèrent from other asPects of a Cultural Rev-
olution that was inextricably aimed at raising productivity. The state's victory
in compelling employees to work through Easter by uo meaus represetlted a
triumpir ovei religious beließ, particularly as the fàctory was inundatecl rvith
,..arli arrivals frorn the countryside. Mørten'otthø was particularll'coucerned
rvith wotlen and the thousands of ft¡rmer peasal.ìts' because they "are the raw
sec- r¡aterial rvhich is especially vulnerable to the influence of preachers ancl sec-
taria' prosel),tizers.l, The factory newspaper asserted that, "Filth, low cul-
ture, Jrunkenness, and hooliganism provide fertile soil for religion in the
barracks."lóó Though state loyalists were largely successful ir-r expelling reli-
gious practice fi'om the fàctory or driving it undergrouud, giver-r the plesence
áf thoirsands of former peasants, religious belief was likely stronger at the end
of the First Five-Year Plan than it had been at its inception'
The systematic casting of suspicion upon specialists ar-rd engitleers was
another corr.rmot-t subterfuge of the Cultural Revolution. The Shakhry affair
in the Donbass coalfields had dramatically alterecl the status of engineers in
the Soviet IJ¡io¡ and was a turning point in state it-rdustrial policy. The trial
of engineers fbr "wrecking" ushered iu a state ofïènsive against previor'rsly
priviteged groups in all spheres of lifè.1ó7 Yet eveu half a year later, specialists
in tl-re Hammer aud Sickle Factory seemed oblivious to the abrupt shift in
 207
206 R au luti on øn d C o ønte rr ep o lø.ti on St ø linist Co u nt er r ø' o løtio ø

political winds, and continued to challenge party directives. In september of this sabotage"' according to party secretary Gaidul" "is
to disrupt our
1928, the enginee ring collective passed a resolution against the proposal for production progratn."l8l
engineering
the seven-hour workday. 168 The mosi significant result of the campaign was a shatrered
percent) were over the age
The plant's engineering corps becarne the scapegoats fbr repeated delays corps. In 1926,thirty-seven of fifty engineers (74
of fifty'r82 In
in the fàctory's reconstruction ín 1929. The disagreements betweell rnan- ;i;;qy, includi'g.ightee,r t*pt'it''ttd e-'gineers over theoneagehu.dred e'gi-
agelrent and technical personnel took on a political character because some ð.pi.-f., tlat]nalnin repàrted that fifty-two out of experience' "Matty
of the factory engir-reers rvere loyal to the party's recently defearecl Bukharin ,-r..r, technical p.rro,t,'ti hacl less than two years of
problems
section of the party.l6e In May, Ttwd.initiated the campaign against the ,r.* .r-tgirr..rs try,'; reported Rabkrin, but rampant productiou
"nd
eugineers because "techuical personnel were llot interestecl i¡ eco¡omic occurred because the engineers had "no u'deìstanài'g how to work'"183
work.'Ì70 In June, the factory party comrnittee passecl a resolution tl-ìat ,,con- 'ewCultlral Revolutio' emphasized raisi'g productivity
The state-sponsored
siclers the tempo of planning rhe reconsrruction of the fàctory extremely a'd had little to do with culture except i' a destiuctive sense' Workers largely
attack o'r engi-
slow and cloes not correspond to tl're partlr clirective about the clevelopment ,gilJ rhe srare's frenzied procluctivist propaganda and th9
of heavy inclustrl'." Rather than reconstruction in its present location, many .,breaks i' t^he lines of ¿re cultural fì'ont." The rnore coercive
riers, leading ro
engineers favored relocating the factory fbr technical ancl logistic reaso¡s.l7l u,.'.i,.tigioo,"canrpaignscauseddeepreserrtmentbecausetheyrepresentedan
values'
Party leaders rvere in no mood to rlegoriare, leveling 6izarre, politically assa,,lt ã,t workerì' religious holidays and cultural
chargecl accusatiolls against the engineers. In July, authorities characterized
the argument for rebuilding the factorl, elservhere as of ,.a rvre cking chârac-
ter.l'172 sirnilarl¡ the røihorn considered talk of crosing trre factoìy to be Dissent, Resistance, and Repression
based on "insufficient consideration on the palt of some and outright wreck-
took place dur-
ing on the part of others." Parry le aders called for "a halt to all discussion A profound shift in public discourse aud workers' resistatlce
corltinued to sPeak
about the possibility of closing the fàctory. Accelerate the completion of its ir",i tf-," First Five-year Plan.lsa Although some workers
reconstruction."lT3 Various delays persisteä into the fall and the party control state polic¡ stalinist loyalists largely succeeded. at
stifling open
ãJt
commission placed the blame on "the lnassive deficiencies in the rvork of the diseri."g"inrt
Similarly, althóugh some employees organized small-scale
resistance
was no lònger a sig'ificant part-of class co'f1ict'
technical bureau."l74 tã state polic¡ ,*ik.
".rú', rather than collective solutions
The blaming of functionaries for rlle srructural proble'rs of rapid indus- urrd *oÅ.r, iurned increasi'gly to ir-rdividual
trialization became another conrlloll staple of the Stalinist project. In Feb- to their deteriorating economic situation'
ruary 1930, the OGPU arrested "satel', Mattis, and others" for their "active Linriteddatairrdicatesthatthemostvulnerableandthen-rostdesperate
the stif-fest resis-
participation in counterrevolutionary wrecking." The factory party secrerary, soviet workers-women in the textile industry-mouuted
strikes actually increased
Gaidul', posired that there was rhe possibility of rvrecking by all of the engi- tance to the srate offensive. The number of textile
neering-technical workers.lTs Another patty report nalned engineers fi'; sixty-six itt1929 to ninery- two in 1930, though the largestsuggesting stopPage
Babadzhan arrd ritov, and mentioned "others."t76 Møt,renoahø. retroactively and lasted only thirry ntinutes,
involved only six hundred -o.klrs
of the late NEP trend. The largest textile strike in
blarned the factory fires in 1925,1926, and l92B ou similar "wrecking."tzz eatly L932
a conrinuatior-r
That the fàctory leadership had sLrpposedly allowed tl-re head engineer ro involvedlesstharrsixhurrdreclworkers-largerstrikesinlvanovooblasttex-
rather than the rule'
conclnct counterrevolutionary sabotage fbr a decacle did not go unnoticed. tile mills later in 1932 and 1933 were the exceptioll
one party llernber touched on this sore point: "This person was busy vvreck- widespreacl discontent did not leacl to a [rationwide
rlovemellt against state-
an important study on
ing ftrr ten years but we did not see it.'l7tl while publicly attacking the engi- imposàd deprivations. As Elena Osokir-ra, author of
argues). "For the most
neers, the factory parry committee admitted that the specialists' pay rvas souiet food distributio' cluring the prewar period,
rather aclaptecl sur-
lower than that in other factories: to remain competiti\¡e rvith other enter- part, people did not deal with tñese pioblems openly' but
prises, they resolved to raise the pay oFengi.eers by 2l percent.tTe A fèw uit'ui ttt"i.gies to fit tl-re conditiolls'"ltl5
grievances. Iu
rveeks after arresting "wrecking" engineers, the party colnmittee rewarded corriplatts atrout the food shortages clominated workers'
shop who askecl,
mallagernent and the surviving engineers with a resolution to build nerv February lg2g, tíe party ridiculed a Ãember in tl-re railu'ay
this-fuck of you-if m¿]v]fe to stand
housing for them.l80 significantl¡ workers'anger playecl no role in the cam- "What kind of Sovie't po*'., is all .has
NEP, the party hacl
paign against specialists, nor do they appear to have been the slightesr bit i' line f-or six hours f* a loaf of breacll"Isó Dr-rri'g early
1930'
interestecl in the proceedings. only 145 party members atrencled the cliscus- suppolted workers' grievances over.fb¡od supplies' but in August
sion "about the arrest of chief engineer Mattis." Tire meeting ol ,.corlmu- Mørtenoyhø r",-, ,.ii., of articles about "counterrevolutionary Provoca-
nists rvith ties with the village" appears to have been organized as an omirlo¡s "
tion,' involving complaints about shortages.Ì87 Factory cooperative
supplies
Ig30, the fàctory was prornised 350 tons
warning fbr mernbers r,vith doubts about the party platform. "The l¡ain aim wcre chronic"iy rnoit. In october
¡

,l
..i
êl$i¡:,.
 208
Rcv o h¿tion øn d Coønt¿rrey o ht tion St ø lin ist C o øøterrep o løti t¡n 209

of potatoes, but received orúy 2rs.tss Mørtenoukø and.

trre cooperative Workers' complaints about the food shortages continued ir-r 1932. One
bu'eau blamed specurators for the shortages, organized
raicls in a'cr arou'd r,vorker told a Rabkrin inspector that "the supply is frequently interrupted
the factor¡ a'd se¡rt "more trra' twe't!-five wreckers,,
to triar.rse In an and workers often do uot get breacl." Another rvorker noted that this con-
attempt to alleviate the shortages, the fàctory zRK
became the first closed tributed to the instability of the workforce: "We have deficiencies iu wot'kers'
Moscow cooperative, limiting access to workers and
their families.re' In supplies and recently this l'ras also strongly influenced the rvorkforce
August l93l' workers had to wait in ri'e for ft¡ur
or five hours for vegeta- turnover."2o4 The factory was not equipped to feed the almost fifteen thou-
bles.lel In order to win "the str.uggle with lilÌes,,,
tn. ra.to.y ,tores ope'ed sancl workers employed. In May, party leaclers dernanded that the ZRK take
at7 a'm' and closed at r r p.m.re2 The ZRKparty fi'actio'
uoied ro orga'ize urgent measures to alleviate the "catastrophic" vegetable supply.205 In )uue,
a "competition" between se^ctions to liquidaie
riires, but r.* ¿"v, rater, the the par'ry committee asserted that the sharp deterioration in the quality of
party condelnnecl the ZRK for the rveak fbod " next
supply.ie3 The lno'th, the lunches contributed to the factory operating at a loss. "Extreme dissatisfac-
oGPU still reported cooperati'e ri'es for'rilk, bread, meat,
a'd sausages.iea tion" with the supply situation was collnected with an increase iu uuexcused
Archival sources show that authorities throughout
trre soviet rJ'ion were absentees, drinking, and theft, renderiug it diflìcult to "mobilize rvorkers aud
inundated rvith thousangr that protested agai'st the lo'g hours office staff for the completion of the plan in quantity and qualitl'."20ó By
spent sta.di'g in line, the 9l:Op."ts
difriculties invoivecl in puri*hasing food, a'd the August the food supply had again worsened.2o7 A tlote to a speaker in Sep-
abysmal quality of rhe food served in rvorkers,
cafeterias.les ternber asked, "Why is the produce industry developing so badly that every-
supply a'd sanitation proble'rs also plagued trre factory
cafeterias. A. one only gets two fønts of bread)'zotl A December rePort to Nikita
April l93l parry report fou'd that all seven cafererias
and si* buffets,(with I(hrushchev stated that naltagelltelÌt rvas given more control over supplies
the exceptio' of management's) were in a' u'sa'itary
state. o'ry cold fbr workers.2oe
lunches were available,.except i' tire ma'agemeut
cafeteria.Ìeó I'August, the Factory leaders were less lenient with grievances that had more explicit
factory u'as short five hundred l*'ches aä"y an.r
rvorkers .,expresbed open political overtolles. More than a year after the tnass expulsious, Trotskf i5¡5
a'cl hidde'dissatisfàctio'._Lately lu'ch portions are
goi'g dorinl, and ,.rhè con¡inued to vvin party support iìr the factory. In February L929,Kozlov and
quality is deteriorating so that even on nieat "*.".
days, groirra i, lrlr"ri,,.à Churchin argued in a repair shop meeting that life for'the workers was get-
with cereal.'lez
ting worse every year, with less help for the unernployed, with womerl driven
Party leaders blamed lower-revel fiurctio'aries
for the fbod crisis. In March to prostitution, and with men resorting to thievery. .Pr Mørtenoykøheadline
1931, the Politburo wrote that ir "considers it shamefur
for the Moscow claimed that "The Trotskyists Attempt to Disturb the Party and Working
organizatio' that every rno'rh no less trra' re' thousa'd
pia, Class in the Construction of Socialism," and shops passed resolutions
and office workers'bread is falling inro rhe ha'crs "rworkers,
of spe.-i"rá.iìrr"nks to clenouncing the Trotskyists.2I0 In Februar¡ the party bureau auuounced
the delìciencies of the trade ancr critribution apparat*s ((counterrevoh.rtionary Trot-
in Moscow.',re' yet ir preparations fbr cleansing the cells of overtly
was^the.stalinist policy of incrustriarization at ary
cosr, rather thar"r speculators skyists" in conjunction with the carnpaign to exile Trotsky fiom the Soviet
or.foreig'aggressio', rhar cleared the fbod rho.t"g.r.
tn ¡uty-ilat, tne Ijuion.2lÌ The persistence of "a Trotsk)'ist mood in the shop" led party lead-
Politburo resol'ed ro exporr a. acrded six nriilio' pwÃ
of grailtlo,r, th. ,-,.," ers to charge the cell secretary with not giving oppositionists "a strong
harvest by 2 August.Iee Eve' from a productivisip..rp".îiu.
the foricy was enough rebuff-.'212
counterproductive once nourishment was reduced
beyond a ilinimum In the spring of 1929, the party expelled three members for Trotskyist
threshold. As o'e rvorker i' the rollecr metal shop complai'ecr: ,our
is rvork syrnpathies.2l3 Au anoul'mous llote in a Rogozhsko-Simonovskii district
diflìcult' Such rvork requires good foocr, but we are kept
carnor satisfy. It is impossibre to fulfilr the fi'ancial
o' salt fish, rvhich party conference related that "Trotskyists write in their leaflets that rvorkers
productio' fìon *h.., fì'om many factories were selft to jail for speaking in meetitrgs" aud asked, "Is
you can barely d¡¿g yourself arou,-,¿.>20t) this truel"2ra Wiclespread political arrests in1929 suggest that it was true.2l5
The MI( claimed that the fbocr situatio' i. trre fàctory
hacr irnprovecr Repression meant that Trotskyism ir-r Moscow persisted only as a symbol
slightly in the seconcl half of I93 r . In the third quarrer,
Hamme. si.kl. i
of resistance rather than as an organized activist currellt with a preseuce in
workers suppgsedll' received ó2r carories for lu'Ëh,
ürÁ rso gr"n-,,",-,¿
l
of ,-,-,."t, the fäctories. In late 1930, the party expelled a member ir-r the Harnrner aud
150 grams of fish, l5 grarns of fàt, ancf 48 grarns
of cereal, anã this rvas larer i
Sickle Factory for leading the resistance to night shift work. The "kulak agi-
raised to a toral of 790 calories, incrementeã
to 200, Z0O,20,and ó0 grams tator" Belkin asserted unabashedly in a rneetiug that "Trotsky and his asso-
respectively.20l Yet cluri'g this sa¡,e periocl
the oGpu ..porråa ciates are honest revolutionaries.'21ó MI( leader L. IQganovich admitted it-r
infestatio'a'd a urerrsil shortage that forced workers to a cockroach
eat witrr their. early 1932 that in Moscovv there were still "elemeuts that clearly sympatl-rize
lìauds.202 By the e'd of t93r the ocpu
arso reported ..a sharp deteriora- with'frotskyism.'217 Workers at the huge Glukhova textile mill carried por-
tio'" of foocl a'd rvorker crissatisfàctio','oti'g thãt thirty *orke.s absolutely traits of Lenin and Trotsky at their May Day 1932 celebratiot-t.2Ì8 Ten days
refused to take lunch because it was so bad.203
later, the OGPU reported that leaflets clistributed at the same fàctory in the
 211
2t0 R ev o lø ti on øn d, C o ant err ø¡ o hùi o n St ø lin ist C o ønt er reP o lation

Nogin district called on workers to fbllorv the example of Ivanovo-Vozhne- discipline offenders by publishing their names in the factory newspaPer;
transferriug them to otirer work, shift, or \À/age-categories; o¡ fiting
and
skii, Tver', ancl I(ev by striking against hunger, and concluded with the
show that
words "Long Live Comrade Trotsky!"2Ie expelling Jr.m from tl-re union.227 Reports on the few tribunals
of several workers for "careless atti-
Denuuciations of various oppositionists led to confusion, and occasionally ;h:y Àr;d a'd lowered the wage-category
tude towards work,, a.d forl[orving a furnace to stand idle. The
party leaders' disingenuous assertions brought unintended credibility to factory
Trotskyists and Bukl-rarinists. Thus in July l93t tl-re parry secrerary ,.,.}rp"p., accused the rolled rnetal shop leadership of displayi'g "right
announced at a factory conference that an average fourteen-kopeck raise (in oppo.tor-rirrll in practice" because it fàiled to hold tribunals to curb absen-
reality a wage reduction, given rampant inflation) supposedly rebuffed "the tËeìsm. A ferv weèks later Mørtenouhø applauded the work
of the tribunals in
the repair shop and form-casting shops for punishing workers who
were
Trotskyists and right opportunists' slancler that the party is not bettering the
material condition of the workers." During the party cleansing in early 1930, absent during Christmas.228
the cor-
leaclers castigated a party shop union bureau mernber who had providecl a The entry of thousands of fornler Peasants into the workforce and
productio' trials a.
technically accurate) but politically incorrect, resporlse to the qLrestion of the ..sfondi,rg drop i' labor discipline rendere<l systematic
such as
current role of the uniou: "to lower the wage-rate.'220 In Septenrber 1929 a imiossibfir-rdËrtaking. Some of the discipli'ary practices continu-ed,
May 1932'
member pointed out in a shop cell meeting that since "now you do not lowerrng wage categoães, but were euftrrced by management' In
leadi'g miuor revolt agai'st wage and
know rvho is the right tendency and who is the left. That is why there is fear *o p"rf,, ,nã''bers were expelled for a

of speaking Lrp at rreetings.')22t Alnrost three years later, another party n-lem- skill grade reductions ftrr poor quality:
ber reiterated this therne: "In old times life rvas berter. We do not understánd
what is right, what is left. In general they are good people."222 AliertlrecommtrnistFrolov'sdemagogicsuggestiorrduringthesøbb'otnihatthe
soyhhoz(Reutovo), workers ancl adrninistratiou were sep¿uated
into c'litfcr-
Wild charges against dissenters helped Stalinism gain fìrm control over all factory
ent brigacles. After the ,rbbotni.hthere .o as a clri'ki'g bo*t. The majority of the cell
meetings by early 1929. Even as late as 1928, workers ,rnade open thr'eats to actively
burearimembers, the shop comrnittee fiirction, and shop aclministration
fàctory nanagement in clelegates' meetiugsì but a fèw montlls later, only state Frolov lut {b1var! the slogan "be¡r the
participated.... Alier the årinking bour,
loyalists spoke. Only 7 outof 178 spoke at a delegates'rneering in lanuary ac¡ninistratio'!" ancl began beatiirg the fbrema. Strekalov. Frolov shouted, "Here
1929-meetings that rank-and-file militants had controllecl a fèrv years earlier. is your 35 percentl Her"e are yo.,iZ.5O rubles!" This was the
amouut by *4rich
A ferv weeks later at a factory confèrence, jLrst I I r',,orkers spoke h'orn the Frolov's wàges were reduced i'o, poot quality of work'22e
floor.223 Stifling open dissent certainly did not mean support for regime policy
stal-
as workers contilÌued to hand party leaders hostile anonynous questions. A Another coercive and short-livecl attempt to raise cliscipline was "the
1931, urged "Hammer ancl Sickle
speaker from the Moscow Soviet was asked, "Wþ are there lines for producef " inist Raid." In December Mørtenophø
Workers, Tomorrow Join the Stalinist Raid!" The next day,
A.nother worker asked, "FIou, rnuch does it cost to operate the Soviet state Prøvd'ø alnd
entered cliffèrent shops at eight in the morning
apparatus and hou, much did it cost to operate the Tsarist state apparatus)'224 Mørtenoyhøshock brigades
veriS'Stalin's six conditions for productivity
Management brandished all array of disciplinary measures aimed at raising and expected the øhtil to help
productivity. Fines against rvorkers were aimed at clarnping down on poor ;;..r;: but the factory '.-rpup.. admitted that there were marry "desert-
ers.', Iú the wire-pulliÅg shop only twenty-five appeared, in the
cable shop
attendance. Disciplinary fìnes and propaganda focusecl ou absenteeisrn,
which constituted more than half (1,733 of 3,168) of the breaches of clisci- thirty, in the elecirical Ihop ie,r, "T tl i' the repair shop just five' Yet' after
claimed two thousancl workers par-
pline in the second year of the Plan. Next in priority rvere of-fenses fbr dam- ,"p.åâa cajoli'g, the factoì'y newspaper
aging equipment (458), refusing work assignrnents (335), and shou,ing up tiËipated ,hr1 *,o clays later, thåir ranks had increased to five thousancl'23o

late or leaving early (272).225 In the second year of the Plan less than I per-
"íd
i4any *o.ker, r.ro.a.ã to theft ir-r orcler to survive' In May 1930'
the
participated
'ret-
in
cent (0.84 percent) of the workforce was absent rvithout jnsr cause, and only alrnorkers'union reported that the entire drivers'section had
recorded I38
slightly more ir.r October 1930 (0.8ó). Afier former peasallts enrerecl rhe fac- theft.23i From August l93l to 5 November, mauagement
thefts totali'g 4,tã8 rubles. O're worker was sentencecl to three
years ar-rcl
tory en masse) the number of absentees rose precipitously. One shop meet-
ing noted "a 'colossal number of unexcused absences" and resolved to anorher to ft,ur years for stealing clothes and selling them in the market.
ernployees col-ltin-
implement the Novernber 1932 '|sIK decree to fire rvorkers who did not Mørtemovhø complained that despite repeated wartlings,
show up ancl to confiscate their apartments.22ó ued to steal rnetais and other iterns from the fàctory'232
in the
Revolutionaly Prodr.rction Tribunals, a short-lived phenornenon of late Although strikes were no longer the dominant method of resistance
1930, were allother atteurpt to instill rvork discipline. Fellorv workers judged class co'fl-ict, rvorkers repeatedly engaged i' small-scale actiol-ls a.d party
breaches ofdiscipline such as unexcused absences, worker transieuce, and dis- ner¡bers conrinued to p,.rh the boundaries of party discipline. In April
ruptiorl of production. Three to fìve shock workers, "the most advanced |g2g,threepartymembersledapetitionofworkersintlrewire-pullirrg
soldiers for the Five-Year Plan," oversaw the sessions. and had the riqht to cl"p"rtr-¡1e,'rt against the uew rates specilìect i¡ collective agreenÌent' Wolkers
 2t2 R ep o lu.tion øn d. Counterrep olct non St ølitt ist C oøn ter r cv o løtion 2t3
organized ar inpromptu meetil'rg to discuss what action to
take. ..Egorov neers and technicians.23T For those exceptional rvorkers rvilling to play by
knew that workers lva'ted to organize a rneeti'g about the per
itern rates but the rules of the game and tolerate barrack life, horrific work conditions' and
he did_not warn auyore about it a'cr refused ãutright to work
at the low wages, such training offered a career path to a skilled position in the
rate. His is the first rame on the petitio' about the conf'lict.D233 'erv
The party prestigious metal industry.
reprima.ded Egorov, who was denied full parry membership, while pime'ov
The labor shortage affbrded workers a degree of leverage in various dis-
acknorvledged that he had been .,railisr .,,i2+'¡1-r, third
memter, slavi', rvas putes. In the summer of 1930, groups of workers demanded that if "the fac-
later brought befbre the control commission fbr "hounding
th. admi'istra- tory committee does not give us cigarettes, then give us our final payment."
tion," agitati'g agai'st extra work to arneliorate darnages cãused by
a' acci_ Mørtenopl¿ø called for other workers to "rebuff the self-seeking mood," and
dent in the shop, and "spreading rumors about the añest
Minevri'."23s That two workers were appare'tly arrested helps
of Babazha'and retorted, "some of the comrades do ltot even stnoke." In April 1931, the
to explain factory newspaper agair"r criticized the "self-seeking mood" of several rvork-
why no strikes occurred duri'g the First Éive-year pla'. The rules
of i'dus- ers in the form-casting shop ftrr demanding credit fbr three hours of over-
trial actio' had clra'ged considerably si'ce the short-lived str.ikes
lier, though the party was still relatively lenie'r rvith party mernbers
a year ear- time work. Fifty workers in the ZRK signed a petition demanding wage
wiili'g leveling in August 1931 . Mørtenovleø charged the department leader with
to admit their "mistakes,, in unblic.
The relatively privileged positio' of rrrerarworkers i' the soviet "right opportunistic practices" because he hacl adrnitted, "We have eco-
probably contributed to the cessario' orstrike activity.
capital nomic leveling, depersonalizatiou, aud turnover) and we can do nothing
As rationi'g spreacr about it.'238 The Trotskyist Bi'wlleten' Oppozi'tsii reported another dispute
throughout Moscow in the fall of 1929,u,orke rs receivecl better
rations tha' about overtin-re in the summer of 1932. Because of the shortage of skilled
rvhite-collar workers, including nvice as much meat. soviet
keenly arvare of the implicatio's of pote'tial workers' rebellio.s
leaclers were labor, some u'orkers, especially commuuists, often worked ten to twelve
in Moscow hours a day, but during the provision crisis of August 1932,250 workers
and læ'i'grad, and instituted prophylactic n'easures, to prevent
trrém. Dur- refused extra overtime.239
irrg the cleteriorati'g crisis of 1932, Moscorv received extraordi'ary.
plies, followed closely by Le'i'gracl. within relatively
sup- Challenging party superiors could eucl otte's political .career. In September
better off Moscow, 1931, the party removecl a shop bureau member after he had argued in a cell
heavy industry workers rvere
farticurarry priviregecr, witrr ratio' cards meeting that "we will not fulfill the industrial financial plan." Mørtenovhø
stamped fll¡ice a month. As Elena osokina notes, .,the politburo
oversarv the suggested that he accept his mistake, which was ir-rdicative of a "right opPor-
provisioning of Moscow and Leningracl and lowerecl the ¡orms
of industrial tunist mood in our ranks."240 The sarne tnouth, a repair shop leader corn-
w.orkers in the capital cities only as a last resort, after cutting
the ratio.s for plained of lack of support from the factory leadership. The entire repair shop
all other groups of the populario'." This is lìor to suggest trrat
nretarwork- cell had to appear before the factory bureau and the accused was forced to
ers received large rario's-by 1933 workers in the ãpital
receivecl o'ly save his political career by aclmitting his nistake:
thirty-five to forty grams of rneat a day-i'suffìcie't ftr lieavy ma'ual
labor.
But_even with meager rations, workers in trre capitar hacl
real ádu"rrt"g., o.r..
workers elsewhere -23ó To engage in srrikes In his spcech in a repair shop o¡'ren rneeting of the cell, Strel'chik, the cell secre-
the obvious risk of rosi'g
such privilcges. ",-rt"il"d t¿try) ¡tccused the leaclership of the party of opportunism. The bure¿tt consiclers
thar comr¿rde Strel'chik cornrnitted a deep politic:rl mistake ancl breach of party dis-
Metalworkers hacl other.rerative adva'tages. Rapicr i'crustrial
expa'sio' cipline by appealing ro the nonparty masses against the leadership with an Lrn\r¡ar-
led to what Ke¡rreth straus has describecl as in ,,i'r,ertecl"
labor market, o'e rantecl accusation in an open meeting. The bureau of party committee considers
characterized by chronic labor shortages rather than unemployment.
This rhe clairn by Strel'chik abor-rt the lack of help fiom the party comtnittee to be
shortage ope'ed up u'precedented opportu'ities ftrr previousry totally incorrect and unsubstarÌtiated. The bure¿u demands that Strel'chik imme-
,rnd"rr.p-
resented sections of the working class-il.rclucling *o-.,-,, diately admit his political mistake.24l
you,-,j., rvorkers,.
and former peasaurs. Fro'r o'ly 35ó workers tnigzg (o pe,-.enti,
the 1,95r
wome' cor-rstituted almost a qLlarrer of the workfbrce i' 1g33, though
they During the clampdowt-t orì disser-rt, Mørtønovhø focused its attention ou
contirrued to be employed i' ress skillecr positions. By 1932,20
perce,rt of the more outspokeu critics. Whereas two years earlier the fàctory lle\vsPaper
workers recruited to the fàctory pra' calire fi'o,rr peasa'rt b".kg.å.,nds
and had countered rumors about rvorkers being fìrecl for speaking against state
by 1933. almosr half (4ó perce'r) of the workfoice ,r., u.,.r.î
the age of' polic¡ by 1930 such open agitation was no louger tolerated. Nestorov defì-
trventy three. Though the overwhel'ri'g rnajor-ity of new peasant
arrivals antly stated, "I rvill not let l(omsomol members rule me ." Party menrbers
quickly flecl the factor¡ tho*sa'ds of the recruirs e't"rèd the fàctor1,,s petitiOned to have him removed fbr "coul-tterrevolutiouary" agitation aucl
various schools ancl trai'ing prograrns. By 'ew
I931, l,z3B u,orkers were stucry- slander, ancl f-or disrupting the "Bolshevik tetrrpo" of work. Daily he
ing to i'crease their skill level, 2,ó5g ree'agers rvere e'roilecl i' factoiy
protested that although he was ftlrmerly a Bolshevik, "I see ttorv that vvith
vocational schools, a'cl over ó13 workers \\¡ere st'clyir.rg
to beco're euei_ Soviet power everything is for tlre rvorkers' ouly on paper.... So do tlot u'ait
2t4 Rcp olntioø ønd Cou.ntcrrev olutioø
all the way to the encl of the Five-Year Plan. You need to take care of your-
self fìrst; the state is rich so it will take care of itself. Why do we ueecl com-
petition¡ What is the Five-Year Plan loan fsù'242 Five months later Nestorov
had still not relented: "Why so much work for such poor payf Let them raise
it, then we will really work." Mørtenopleø accused Nestorov of being a "class
alien" who spoke "difêrently fiom our workers'language." Yet this was pre-
cisely the proletarian language that had been forged during the revolution-
ary era) a discourse that Stalinism no longer tolerated. The newspaper
suggested that shop organizations "need to pay more attelÌtion to Nestorov
and carefully rvatch horv he works."243
Even rvith increased presellce fì'om state agents) sone workers colìtinued
to voice defiance. In December 1930, the Komsomol gave a "Sharp Rebuff
to the I(ulak's Sidekick Volkov" because he hacl spoken against the kolkhoz
movelreut in a meeting. He u,as warned to acknowledge his rnistake, "but he
stubbomly insisted on his conclusions and tried to supporr them with better
arguments." In response, the factory newspaper suggested that the Komso-
mol cell "should busy itself with Volkov's political eclucation."24 In May
1931, the OGPU reported workers'cliscussions in the district about how
"the Soviet governnìerlt cloes not knorv how to finish ofTthe rvorkers." îhey
complainecl that after lowering the wage rare, increasirrg productiol'tttorfits,
ancl raising the prices of all goods, "worke¡s have been left with l1o room to
breathe." Maleev, fiom the fbrrn-casting shop stated, "Mikoyan said in one
meetilÌg that real rvorkers' pay would go up because of the lower prices in the
cooperati\¡e. But what do we really see ì Just the opposite."2a5
By 1931, the OGPU was strong enough ro record rhe names of individu-
als rvho made utterances against the sysrem. In the rolled metal shop, Stepan
and Kiselev complained that "Our newspapers lie about.,how bad life is
abroad. Workers there go to work in clean clothes, but here we go to work
in rvorn out shoes. Workers live better under capitalism." In the steel founclry
Kartsev asserted: "They promise a lot, but do nof give anything. The Central
Committee resolutions are only prornises."24ó A rvire -pulling shop member
noted many utteraltces "against the regirrre ancl the party," rvhich one worker
lrad described as "good-fbr-lÌothings."247 -fhe threat ofwar ancl insurrection
met with ir"rdiffèrence and even seclition amorlg some rvorkers. The party
accused a youllg electriciar"r of having a "clearly coullterrevolutionary atti-
tude" because he statecl, "this regime is not ours. It is the regirne of invaders.
If there were an insurrection, nobody rvoulcl defencl it."2a8
Workels noticed the increased presellce of state operatives in their rar-rks.
In the nearby AMO Factory, an engineer explainecl, "Eve ryone understancls
that in every department and shop its secret agents work, and that all con-
versatiolls are knowr. Otherv,ise they would not know a damn thing."2ae 6,
a district party meetillg, the Hammer and Sickle Factory represenrative spoke
about an individual member rvho hacl "slandered tlre party line, rvhich
reflccts the capitalist elements in the party.'250 A Mørtenovleø røbleor,inves-
tigating problems in the summer of 1932, approacl-red a group of workers
during lunch. "I stood near these comrades and waited to see ilthey were
going to talk. There was no conversatioll."2sl
lÀ-.
St ø I ini s t C oanter r cv o løtio n 2t5
Stalinist loyalists were largely successful at shutting down open dissent.
Cell secretaries were expected to curb open opposition to party dircctives
and any tolerauce was a sigt't of political opportunism. The steel foundry cell
displayed a "conciliatory attitude" towards anti-Soviet moocts because a
rnember rnade a speech against the kolhhoz lnovement. A "drastic change"
was needed in the cell because "a slowdown and unwillinglless to lead the
struggle against class alien elemeuts is a manifèstation of right oPportullism
in practice."2s2
Official falsifìcation olinforrnation, combined rvith the suppressiot-t of dis-
Sent, increasecl the proliferation of underground rutnors among workers.
Rather than believing that their deterioratiÍlg situation rvould continue to
decline, many workers believed cataclysrnic events were on the horizon. In
May 1931, the OGPU stated that some rvorkers in the district talked about
how life hacl becorne "unbearable." Since workers believed that "it has
become impossible to live," they drerv the conclusion that "the crash of the
Five-Year Plan is gradually cotning." Other rvorkers in the district claimed
that "the commuuists have acconrplished rvhat they lvanted" ancl that though
ihere were goods, "tvorkers have tro nteans to pay for thetn." This meant that
workers "have to be satisfìed with bread, but even that will eltcl soon'"
A¡rother woman was alleged to have spread rumors in the Hanrmer and
Sickle Factory food cooperative tliat "mauy factories are already on strike, but
you are still working.D253 The OGPU recorded fhe assesilneut of one worker
in the clistrict who clairred, "I have many party acquaintances who openly say
that the end is near, that the party is completely split. Such leaders as
Bukharin ancl Rykov see that evelything is turning out badlS that people
were just being tortured for thirteen yeals. What is there left for us to doì We
just observe what is happening at the top."2sa
It was wishful thinking to believe that some other force would come to the
aicl of a battered working class whose collective will to fìght had been
destroyed. By Se ptembe r 1932, the factory newspaper had already begun the
campaign fbr the next step: "We are Moving to the Front of the Second Five-
Year Plan!"255 A note to the speaker at a factory meeting asked: "Will there
be three Five-Year Plansì Tl-re first one is not eveu done and the second has
already started."256 Other anonyrrtous ttotes to speakers, alor-rg with ubiqui-
tous antiparty graffìti, illllstrate the profouttcl popular resentment against the
state by the end of the First Five-Year Plan. .A.n enraged Kaganovich wanted
to know how it was possible that oper-rly anti-soviet slogans prolifèrated on
school walls, including "Dowu with soviet power" and the letters in a "Sickle
ancl Hammer" sigtt transforlned to read "Death and Hunger.'257 Hostile
anollymous notes to fàctory party leaders continued the next year. Oue uote
u'arned the party comnrittee secretary, "if you do not change it r'vill be bad
for you." The factory director Stepanov reported to the OGPU that he
repeatedly received similar notes threatening to kill him.258
Factory leaclers successfully drove open dissent undergrouud cluring tl-re
First Five-Year Plan and eliminatecl organized resistance. The state strategy
for crLrshing dissent focused ol1 the uìore outspoken critics of its policies,
labeling any forrn ol dissent in the same ternÌs as it had the Opposition.
 2t7
2r6 R a, o løti on ørt d Co uru rerrev o løøon St øl in ist Co ønt err øv o løti o tt

tvays workers had not yer col.t'tpletely submitted to those who

rulecl over
Sorne yoturger workers and peasants, less accustomed to the Stalinist rules of
them, but also artesr tó the tack of collective cottfide'ce with
wliich they
disconrse, expressed open hostility to the regime's policies, and auouytnous
confronted their nerv rulers. The turn to strategies of individual
survival
rìotes to speakers show that these brazen workers spoke fbr a wider milieu.
drained of its vital-
The state rvas also successful at prevelltiug strikes, although some workers became rhe norm for a divided rvorkforce that had been
contirìued to organize smaller actions, particularly when labor shortages gave ity and cohesiol-l.
the
them leverage. unlike the tenrporary workers' retreats earlier in the century' by 1932
rulecl had become firmly e'trenched and
In one seuse, party leaders aud their loyal shop floor aclvocates could be relationship betwêe' .rrl"rs
no return to "'d
workers' Drilitancy. The dull drone of ulìil'lter-
satisfied with tl-reir accomplishments during tl-re First Five-Year Plan. They there would be
more sac-
oversaw a process in which wages were driven down by more than fifty per- rupted productivity drives and the seemingly enclless demancts for
.ifi^ce and austeriry were llot ephemeral phenolnena, but
now comprised the
cent; in which the average workweek was extencled by at least an extra twenty
basic features of ihe Stalinist iytt.-. The Revolutio'ary
era' during which
hours per rnonth; and in which a rnonth's wages were handed back to the
power, had
state in the fonn of a "loan." And they managecl to accornplish all of this workers l-rad repeatedly and confidently asserted their collective
rvhile sharply curtailing open dissent against the Stalir-rist system, let alone now come to a decisive end.
provoking overt rebellion. Under their direction, the ullions-which at least
nominally had retained their integrity as institutions of basic working-class
defènse as late as the end of NEP-had been transfbrmed into adjuncts in
malìagement's drive for increased productivity. Similarl¡ the partl', which
had previously represented, in some sense, the vangr.rard of the Soviet work-
ers' rnovement, wâs also transftrrmecl into an effective instrument for over-
seeing the extraction of surplr.rs value for production's sake. Notes
While repression was a factor in this prqcess-particularly in the rnargin-
alization of political oppositionists and in the persecution of engineers, lower-
l. Aiec Ntrvc, .z{ø Econuwie History of the US'SR (Neu' Y<rrk, l9B9)' 199
2. I(arl M'arx, Cøpitøl(l,oudon, I976) l:742'
level functionaries, and speculators-terror was rlot Staliuisrn's primar¡ or 3. Tony Cltlï, Stàæ CøpitøIism àn Røssiø(Lo'do', 1974). What dr.ve tlìe pr.ccss.f
acctt-

eveu nlost effìcient, tool for disciplining the workforce. Nor u/as state propa- uss\ clifT arguecl, wàs n()t cornpetiti<ln bctween private capitalists
r¡ulation in the
engaged in cornmorlity pr.oduction, but a nation-state seeking
to compete militalily in the
ganda particularly effective on its orvn: it was unproductive at best and at
*.ílã In J<>seph stalin's fa'rous l93l attack on thc critics of rapid i'dustrialization'
times counterproductive, because workers were astute enougl-r to discenr the "r".r".
lìcwrote,..orrefèaturetlftl-relristt>ry<¡foldl{rrssia\À,asthecontinualbeatingsshesuf}èred
profbund discrepancy between offìcial rhetoric ancl their deteriorating stau- defèats, he warned,."We arc fifty
because of her backrvar¿ness." Ttr av6icl, ñlture military
dard of living. Eviclence in the Hammer and Sickle Factory suggests that or a hunclred ycars behind the ¿dvalrccd coturtries. we tnust make gclod this distance in tcn
t>r u,e slrall gtr trnder''' J<lseplr Stalirr, Collectad. Worås
(Moscow,
rather thalì propaganda or terror) Stalinism relied more heavily upon the years. Either rve do it,
weaporl of hunger-on its control over food distribution-and on its success t951) I3:40-41.
4. Mørtettuvhø, ó February 1929; GARF f ' 7952, t>p 3, d' 198'
l' l Production and rvags
in enlisting a loyal minority to police the shop floor on behalf of the state.
ñrnds, 1928- 1929 and 1929' 1930'
Yet Stalinism was much better at destroyir-rg than at building up social
5. Mørienot,hø, ó L)eccrnber 1928,24 July 193t, 5 March 1932'
institutions. Neither propaganda nor coercive social engineering strategies' 9 I , fòr à Summafy of scholarll'
6. See Filtzer, Soviet Worhers ønd. Stølinist In.d'østriølizøtioø,
could overcome the deep structnral problerns accompanying rapid industri- estil¡àtes t>n real rvages during thc First Five-Year Plan'

alization or the inherent contradictions involved in pushing materially- 7. Htrffrnan, Peñ'sø'nt Metrl|olis, 222'
g. builcling and transport
deprived employees to work longcr hours for less pay. Scapegoating, Filtzer; sot,iet worhcrs øfud støli.nist lnrtøstriølizøtiort,45. Including
laborers, the rv<>rking class expandeti fì-tllr ¿bout 4 ó to ovcr l0 million u'orkers'
self-incrirnination, and chronic, intermitte nt prlrges wer€ symptoms of the g. Il. w. Iildøstriølizøtion of souiet Rttsiø: Th¿ socàølist offenshe, Tbe collcc-
Davies, Tht
regime's rveakness, not its strength. Harsher fileasul'es were implemerlted as ti.ttizøtion tf soliet Agri.cr.thøre, t929-30 (Lonclon, 1980); Moshe
L'ctvin, Røssiøn Peøsøtt'ts

substitutes for voluntary conviction, but even Revolutionary Production Tri- ønd'sopietPoper:øStød'yofCollectipizøtiott'(l'ondon,1968);LynneYi<):a'PeøsøntReltek
bunals, Stalinist Raicls, managemerlt fines, and the strategic use of f-ood as a ønder Stølin (Oxfòrd' 1996)
weapon of coercion did not trausft¡rm rvorkers into docile productive uuits. 10. Moslre Letvin, The Møhbtg of the Soviet Systew (Ncu'York' 1985)'221-257 '

ll. Mørtenovl¿ø, 3 Janttary 1929,2 January 1933'

Rather than being passive recipients fòr Stalinism's rhetoric, rnany work-
ers saw through the regirne's self-sen'ing and inverted "class war" propa-
ganda. They recognized that state policy u,as ftrrcing them to pay f-or rapid
industrialization, even if the regirre did not knou, horv to "fìuish ofï" the
rvorking class. Occasional public utterances and tlre inclignation expressed in
the private notes handecl to speake rs at fàctory meetillgs shorv that it.t some
GAIìF, f.7952,op. 3, cl. 2l4,Il' l-6' Factoly statistics, l93l'
12.
L3. Zø indøstriølizøtsiitt, 12 Jtnuaty 1932'
14. TsAODM,f.429,<tp. f ,á. lOO, l.Sl.Wirep.lli'gsh.çrpartybnreartrcp.rt,3Jtrly1929'
15. GAI{F, t.7952,op.3, d. 214'll'l-6' Factoly statistics' l93l'
ló. TsAODM,f.42g,op. l,cl. l07,t'98'Electric¿lshoppartymcetiug' 4l,lprll1929'
l7.TsAoDM,I.42g,op.l,cl.I09,l.rl.Partyc<rtrlrlrittcetrreetitrg,llFclrruary1930.
 ;.-ì..:ì

l ,

2t8 Ret, oløtion ønd Coønterrcvoløtion. St ølin ist C o unter rep o løti oø z19

18. TsAoDM, t. 429, op. t, d. r03, l. 31. l{ollcd metal shop party bureau ureering,24 April Eviclence in the H¿¡r.unet ¿nd Sicklc Factory suggcsts that thc thre¿t of the pàrt)¡ pìlrge
1929. played a rolc in forcing party mcrnbers to join the ll-ìoverìlelìt.
Ì9. TsAODM,Í.429,<>p.l,d. I04, 11.87-sS.Repeirshopparq,rneeting, lóNovcrnber. 1929. 6I. Mørtenovhø,21 January I930.
20. Lynne Yi<>la, The Bcst sons of the Føtherlønd (New y<rrk, 1987). ln worhers, society, øøtl the 62. GAIìF 5469,<.tp.14,d. r93, 11.243,323. Met¿lrvorkers',infìrnnari<>nsumrnaries,2l May,
Souiet Støtr,302, Williarn Chasc ¿sselts "That rlany urb¿n rvorkers supp<>rted a sçluti<¡n t<r 20 July 1930.
rural c¡ttcstiou is clcar fiom their activc iuvolvenrent in the movernc¡t qfthe 25,000ers', 63. Mørtenophø, 25 fture 1930.
and clainls 70,000 "volunteered." 64- Mørtenorhø,8 January, 20 May, 2,25 June 1930.
21. TsM,tM, f. 176,<tp.2,d'.8L9,11.8-9. l\eport by Hamurer ¿nd sickre u,orkers brigadc, 65. Røbochøiø Moshvø,4 March 1930.
1929. ó6. Kuronriya, Stølin\ Inrløstriøl Revoløtion, 196.
22. TsAODM,f. 429, o¡r. I, d. f 09, I. 230. parrv bureau mceri.g, l6 Deccrnber 1930. 67. Røbochøiø gøzetø, 27 Fcbruary 1930.
23. TsAoDM, f. 429, op. l, c{. Il3, l. 41. Party bureau and shop secreraries neering, 13 68. Mørtenovhø,2I, 28 March,9 April, I May 1930.
March l93l. 69. Trød.,4 June 1930.
24. IIGASPI, f . 17 , op. 85, d. 3I l, l. 7. TsK infi¡rmation c{epartmcnt surnul¿r y on srrikes c'lur- 70. GAIìF f. 37 4, <:tp. 27, d. 19 62, ll. 36-97 . NKVD sunulary, early 19 30.
ing NEP ln 1926,44,240 othhod.nlÉlparticipntet{ in 2ó4 strikes (of 82ó natiqnally) a¡d the 71. Mørtenothø,20 May 1930.
ncxt )¡càr 29,069 othhodnzál participated in 334 (of905) strikcs. 72. Mørteøo'ttl¿ø, 2l Scpteurbcr 1929.
25. TsAODM, f. 80, o¡r. I, d. 398, l. L72. OGPU c{isrricr report, n.cl. November l93l . 73. GARF f.5469,op. 14, d. ó0, ll. 30-3f . Mosct>rv Oblast Metalu't>rkers' rìlccting, 19 August
26. TsAODM, f. 80, t4'r. l, d. 398, l. 75. OGPU distrìcr report, 22 August 193ì. r930.
27. TsMAM, f. 1289, t>p. l, d. 326,1. lt.
Rrbkrin rcpor-r,9 Septcnrber 1931. 74. Filrzer in Sopiet Worhers ønd. Stølinist Itdøstriølizøtion,96.
28. TsMAM, t. 176,<'tp.2, d. 830, l. 12. Producrit)rl strggcsrions, 1929. 75. TsKI1DMO, f. l, op. 3, d. 85, l. 63. K<¡msomt>l Ce¡rtral Cr>mmittcc discussiou, l5 Attgttst
29. Novc, r4zr Econowic Histury of the U.S.S.R., 199. I931.
JU. I{GASPI, f. 8 l, o¡r. 3, d. 20,11. 70-85. MK re¡rort by L. Kaganovich, 1931.
76. Mørteøothø,3 Septernber 193I,4 October 1930.
cr. I{GASPI,f.L7,<>p.20,d.291,1. 133.Secr-et¿riatMKmecting,2December1931.. 77. Mørtenovleø, Marcl-r; 3 April I931.
ö2. GAIìF f. 5469, op. 15, d. 57, 1. 42-4S. Metalnprkers' surìlràry 6n reerccriorr r<, s.,vrcrs, 78. TSAODM, f.429 t>p.l, d. ll3, ll. IIì-112. Party plcnuur ancl party ølzti'rt r"neetìn9,23
I January 1931. June 1931.
33. Stratrs, Føctory ønd Cowmø.ni.ty in Stølin\ Røssiø,216. 79. TsMAM, f. 1289, op. l, d. 326,11'.5L-52.llabkrin report,9 Septernber l93l:
34. TsMAM, f . 17 6, <>p. 2, d,. 835, 1. 1 0. Constr'drir>n of n*v sh<>¡rs'reeting, 20 Mry 19 32. 80. Røltoehøiøgøzetø, 15 March 1931.
öJ. T.MAM' f. l7ó, o¡r. 2, d- B34, ll. 56-57.Iìecc>nstrucion brigade nreetirig, 29 March Bl. TsAODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 38ó, l. 13, 14. I(t>gozhsko-Simt¡novskii bttreau tneetiug, S June
1932, 193 I.
36. Mørtenovhø, 2ó Septcmber 1932. 82. TsKhDMO, fì I, op. 3, d. 85, 11. 49,56,57. ßureau of TsK Kornsornol discussi<>n, 22
37. Trud' l0 Scptembcr 193I. August 1931.
38. IìGASPI, f. 8 l, op. 3, d. 20,1. 70. MK reporr by L. K¿rgànovich, n.cl. I931. 83. TsÀ44M, L 1289, op. I, d. 326,11.52-53.Iìabla'in report, 9 Septcrnber l93l'
39. TsAODM, t. 4, op. 2,. d. 6,11. 95, 96. MGK mceting, 8 AugLrst 1932. 84. Mørteøovhø,30 Junc 1931.
40. Mørtenot hø, l0 Augrrst 1932. 85. TsAODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 398, l. 75. OGPU clistrict stturtrrary, 27 August 1931.
4t. Flltzer, Soviet Worhers øntl Stø linist In d.ustriølizøtion, 52. 8ó. TsMAM, f. 1289, op. l, d. 32ó, ll. 85-8ó. l{abkrin report 9 Septernber 1931.
À1
Korn<>kovskii, Zøvod.'Serp i Molot,' 230. 87 . Mørtenoil¿ø, 30 Novembcr 1931,12 October 1932.
43. TsMAM, f. 176,<>p.2,d.834,1.9. C.'structi<.¡¡l <¡f .e*,sh.psrnecti'g, 20Jtty L932. 88. Mørteøovhø,2ó l)ccetlber t931, I5 March,2 )une,6 August 1932.
44. TsMAM, l. 1289, op. I, d. 326,1.26.Iì.¡lrkrin reporr, 9 Sc¡rreurber 1931. 89. TsAODM, f.429, <tp. I, d. I17, l. 18. Party cornmittce and shop secretaries plenttm,4
45. TsMAM, f. l7ó, op. 2, d.834,1. 10. Corrstru*iorr oÊnerv sl.r<>ps nreering, 20 Jvl1, 1932.
June 1932.
46. Røhochøiø gøzetø, 2 Septenrbcr 193 l. 90. Mørteøorlzø, 20 September I932.
47. Fiftzer, Sovìet Worhcrs ønd. Stølinist Inrlas*iølizøtion,I I 2- I Ì S, 236-246. 91. Mørtenot,hø, 14 Se¡rten-rbcr I932.
48. F iltzer, Soû c t Wt¡ rh er s øn d St ø liøist I n dus tri ø liz øti on, 7 0
.
92. Mørtenovhø,8 January 1932.
49. In Støli.nI In'¡lnstriøl Repoløtiozr, 3ló, Hiroaki l(urouriya argues th¿t Stalinis¡¡'s '.ciass u,¿r 93. T5AODM, t.429,t>p.l,c{. ll6, l.ó3. Factorycontr()l corì'ì,lrissiortnreeting,Augtlst 1932.
ideology of the irrclustri¿lization drivc creàted à basis fì¡r the survival of the r.esilre.', 94. I{GASPI, t. 81, op. 3,d.20,1. 85. MK report by L. Kaganovich, n.tl. 1931.
50. Mørtøtovhn, 20 April 1929. 95. TsAODM, f-. 3, op. 49, d. 15, l. l l5. MK infìrrtuation sullìDìàr)¡) 19 Septcnrber 1932.
51. Mørtcnotleø, 9 A¡lril 1929. 96. TsKlrDMO, f. I, op. 23, d- 1008, l. 37. l-cttcr sc:ntto Prrfid.ø'and' Izvestiø, dated 8 Jr-rr-re
52. Mørtenottlzø,30 April,20 May, ó, B June,7 Novcmbcr 1929. 1932.
Mørtenottl¿ø,8 lanr¿ìry 1930, 30 April, ì8 June,2l Septcmbcr, 2b Nover¡bcr. 1929. 97. T5AODM, f.429,<>p.I,d. 129, l.7.Party sccrctar\¡report()n\¡()rkdr-rringFirstFive-Year
54. TsMAM' f .176, <>p.2, d.8L3,ll. 44; cLrltural cor¡missio¡r rncering, n.cr. Novenrber Pl¿n, 27 Februar), 1933.
1929. 98. Mørtert'ovltø, 24 Iú\, 1931.
55. TsAODM, f,429,op. I, c{. 100, l. 34. Bolt shop party'reerir.ìg)'.d. l)cce'rber 1929. 99.TsAoDM, f.429,<tp |,d l29,l 77'Party' secretaryreportonu'<>rkcluringFirstFivc-
5ó. Kttr<rtrri¡,a, Stn lin \ [ rxdtustt,iøl Ret løtiort, l 28 - l 3 5.
o
Year Plan, 27 Febluary 1933.
57. Mørtcnottl¿ø, 25 Nt¡vcmber I929. 100. GAI{F f . 7952, op. 3, cl. 267,11. n-l2. Filatov recollection of fàctory u'ork clttring First
58. TsAODM, f .429,<>¡:t. I, d. 94, l. 7I. Partv plcnurn,2l L)ccenrber 1929. Fivc-Ye¿r Plan-
59. Mørtenophø, I7 Felrluary I930. I0L GAI{F, f.7952,op. 3, cl. 279,1.221. M¿rtov rcct>llectit¡r.t.
ó0. Ktrrorni¡,a, stølin\ Indøstrìøl Rct,olation, 23ó, notes rhc lare 1929
¡tarty ancl u¡i6¡ 102. Filtzeq Sopiet Worhers ønd Stølinist lndtt'striølizøtion, 48.
resoluti<¡n t() pì-t¡:ge the firctt¡ries ol"class alicl'rs" bec¿use oftlìc rcsistance t() slt()ck \\()rk. 103. Mørteu¡vhø, 12 October 1930.
 220 R cp o lø ti on øn d C o ønterrev o htti on St ø lini st C o ønt en' ep o luti on 221

f04. I\GASPI,f.8ì,.p. 3,1.d.147,1. llf. L. Kaganovichspcech,23Ja'uary 1932. 148. TsAODM, f . 429, <>p.1, cl. 104, l. 58. Construction slrop Pàrty rììecting, 3 Jtlly 1929 '
105. TsMAM, f. 176,<tp.2, d. 819, l. 51. l{c¡rort on w<¡rk ir.r clutr, April 1929. 149. Mørtenophø, 17 April 1930.
106. TsAODM, f. 429, op. I, d. 93,l. 69. Part¡, c1.¡1¡'t-t;a,"e mccring, 2l Jvrrc 1929- I50. Hnsbantl, God,les Cornvnønists, ll5.
107. TsAODM,f' 429, op. ì, d. 100, ll. 20-21. Architcct¡.¡re shop cell rnecrirìg,4 Dece¡rber I5l - Mørtønovl¿ø, 30 Aprrl 1929 .

1929. I52. TsAODM,f.429, op. I, ct. 104, ll. l-2,31. l(epair shop party mcetings' 5 August, 17
108' TsAODM, f . 429, op. l, d. 100, l. 33. Rolt shop rneeting, n.d. l)ecembcr 1929 (trnclatec{). Octobcr 1929.
109. Mørtenopþø, ll
Febmary 1930. 153. TsAoDM, f ' 429, op l' d' 129,1' 32' Parq' 5sçtt¡ttt rcport tllr work cltrring First Five-
ll0. TsAoDM, f.429, op. I, d. Il0, l. s. Fàct()ry c(xìtror comrnissic-¡¡ rneering;25 M¿rc¡ Year Plan, 27 Febrvary 1933.
1930. 154. TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. 819, l. 3l; Cultural Comr¡ission mceting 14 Sc¡rtembcr 1929.
llI. Mørtenoil¿ø, l3 August 1931. 155. Mørtenovhø, 3 Nt>vembcr 1930.
I t2. TsAoDM, f. 429 op. l, d. Iì3, l. 98. party cornmimec and pirrry øhtitt neeting, 13 May 156. Mørtenophø, 4,10, 1 3, 25 November 1930.
r931. l5Z. TsMAM, f. 176,<'tp.2, d. 819, l. 44. Cultural courn]ission ureetirlg) n.d. November 1929.
I13. TsMAM, f . 1289, op. l, d. 326,1.26.lì¿bkrin rcp()rt, 9 Scptember 1931. 158. TSAODM . f.429, op. l, d. lII, l. 9. Party meeting of fìrreuren ¿nd courtnttnist adminis-
I Ì4. TsAoDM, f. 4, t4'r. 2, d. 26,11. 3l -óó. MKG discussi<¡n on Harnmer antl sicklc Fàcrorv trators, 22 February 1930.
organizàti()n, 7 June 1932. 159. Mørtenophø,29 Septenber L929 .
15. TsAODM, f. 429, t't¡:t. l, d. I ló, ll. 12. party cornmirtee .reeti'g, 3l May l9Z2 160. TsMAM, f. l7ó, op. 2, d. 819, l. 3I. Cultural Ct¡ururission r.neetiug, 14 September 1929.
16. Mørtenovhø, 14July 1932. 16l. Røltochøiøgøzetø, 19 Febrr.rary 1930.
t7. 'tsAODM, f. 429, <>p. l, d. I I6, l. ó8. patry bureau meering, 3l August 1932. 162. Mørunovhø, 20 Febrnary L929.
l l8. TsAoDM, f. 3, op. 49, d. r5, l. I t3. MK infìrrmati.n sl''rary, scptemtrer 1932. 163. Mørtenothø,L2,17 April 1930.
I19. TsAoDM, f'. 429, op. l, cl. I ló, l. 12 t. P¿Ìrry cornmirree nìecting, 29 Novenrbcr,1932. 164. TsAODM, f. 80, op. l, d. 398,1. 37- OGPU district report on electir¡ns t() S(^/iets, turspec-
120. TsAODM, f 3, op. 49, d. 37 ,1, 78. MK surnrnar)r ()n closccl party rneering, l3 Ì)eccurbcr ilìcd fàctor¡ 4 February 1931.
1933. 165. Mørtenothø,l,7,10, I3 ApLil I931.
l2l. Mørtenovþø, 1I,20 JLurc I93 l . 166. Mørtenopl¿ø, 15 Novenrber 1931, I May 1932'
122. Mørtenothø, 17 July,3l August 1929. ló7. Kuronriya, Stølàn\ lndøstriøl Revoløtior't, 15.
I23. Mørtenophø, 7 Septernber 1929. Ió8. TsMAM, f. L76, L>¡:>.2, d.783,1. ll4. Engineering collective rnceting, 2l september
124. TsAoDM, f- 429,<>p.1, d. 104, l. 3L ttcpiir shop party nìc*irg, 5 Ausrst 1929. I928.
125. TsAODM, f. 429, <>¡t. t, cl. 104, 11.76-77.Iìepair slì.p p".ry ,rr.iiing, iöct<¡ber 1929. ló9. Straus, Føctory øntl. Comncønity in StølinI Røssiø,46.
126. Mørtenovl¿ ø, 8, 2l June, 7 Scpternbcr I 929. 170. Trød., l0 May 1929.
127 . Mørtenot hø, 22 June; 22, 25 Jtly l, 5, B, 23 August 1930. t7l. TsAODM, f. 3, op. ll, d.763,1. 4. MK infì>rmation on rcconstrurctio¡r of the H¿t¡tlter
;
128. TsAODM ,f. 429, op. l, d. 129, L 8. Partl' 5sc¡s¡rrt repor t ou uork cluring First Five-year ¿nd Sickle Factgrl', March-November 1929. Party comrnittee tesolution,8 June 1929.
PIan,27 Febluary 1933. 172. TsAODM, f. 3, op. 11,ó..763,11. 12-14. GIPI{OMEZ letter' 23 luly 1929.
129. Mørtetu¡yhø,7 Febrtaty, 12, l9 Junc l93L 173. TSAODM, f. 3, op. 11,d.763,1. 27. MKinfìrn¡làtio¡l on feconstructi()n of thc Hat¡Drcr
130. TsAoDM , f - 429, op. l, d. 94, l. 24. parry co'mirrce rne.ti.g, 27 septcmber 1929. and Sicldc Factolg J:r/,y 1929.
I3l. Mørtenovhø,28J:.:Jry, I August 1930. 174. TSAODM,f.429, op. I, cl. 94,1.62. C<¡nrrr¡l coullission mecting, 30 Novernber 1930.
132. TsAODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 38ó, l. 23. I{ogozhsko-Simt¡novskii par.r¡, þ1,r".., nìeering, 24 Ì75. TsAODM, f. 429, op. I, d. 109, I. 5f . Parry secrctary report on counterrevoltttionary
fune 1931. activit),of thc chief engineer Mattis, 3 February 1930.
133. Mørtenophø, 25 June l93l . 176. TSAODM, f. 429, op. l, d. 129,1. 22. Party secretary report ()n work during First Fii'c-
I34. TsAoDM, f. 429,<>p.I, d. ll3, 1.30. party c<¡r'n'lirtec antl øhtiv nrirures, 3 lu\' I93L Ycar Plan,27 February 1933.
135. Mørtetaoyhø, l0luly ì931. 177. Mørtenovhø, 4 M¿rch 1930.
l3ó. Shcila Fitzpatrick in 'Cultural llevolutio¡r as Class War' in Cø.ln¿røl Rettolatiott..iu Røssiø. 178. TsAODM , t. 429, op. I, cl. t I I, l. 7. Meeting of communist fìrremen and nranage rs, 22
t92B-193 I. Febluary 1930.
137. Mørtenotil¿ø) 5 Seprerìbcr 1930, f 0 March l93l. 179. TsAODM,f.42g, op. l, d. 94, l. 8. Party courtlittec nleeting' ló Augtrst 1929'
138. Mørtcnophø, 14 April t93 I . 180. TSAODM,f.429,op. l, d. I09, l. 59. Pafty committec resoluti<xr, l2 March 1930'
f 39. TsMAM, f. 176, <>p. 2, d. 823, ll. 16-18. Challenge tì-om L1,s,r,cnski fàcories' cultur¿l IBl.TsAODM,f.42g,op. l,cl. lìl,l.7. MeetiDgofcr>rr.¡munistfì¡rcmenandmauagers' l9
ccrrnrnissions to Hanrnrer and Sickle ¿nd othcr fàctorics, earl,v 1929. . Febluary 1930.
I40. TsMAM, t. 176, <tp. 2, d. B23,ll. l9-2O; C¡.rlt'ral c.u'.r.rissi.', l0 Ju'e 1929. l82. TsMAM, f. 17ó, op. 2, d. 462,1. ó8. Enginecring collectivc treeting' n'd May I92ó'
l4I. Fitzpatrick in 'Cr.rltt¡ral l{cvclluti<¡n as Class Wirr,'25, iìsscl'ts:r positive respollse t1t St¿li¡- 183. TsMAM, f. 1289, op. l, cl. 32ó, ll. Il-ló. l{abkrin report' 9 September l93l'
ist lhctoric, particLrlarly atnong Komsomol nernbers s,hom she dcscribes ¿s ,,entlrusiasts of l84. This profbun<l change in public "cliscourse" has gone courpletely unrloticed by advt>cates
Cultur¿l llev<¡lutiolt. " ¡f t¡e lingtristic (or postulrderrr) acaclemic fàd. For exarlple, scc Hoflìnan's Peãsã'nt
142. TsMAM, f. Ì7ó, o¡r. 2, ci. 8t9, ll. 42. Cultur¿l cornrlission meetings, 24 Septcmlrer, n.rl. Metrop o ks and P ay nc's St ølin's R øi h'o ø¡1.
Novcnrbcr I929. lB5. Elcn¿ Ostikina, Oør Døily Breød.: Sociølist Disn'ibøtion øød tbe Art of Sørúvøl in Stølirt's
143. TsAoDM,t. 429, op. i, d. t04, ll. l-2. l(epair sho¡r pârry ìz octotrcr 1929. Røssiø, I 9 2 7 - I 941 (Arn.rcxk, Nerv Ytrlk, 1999 ), 53, 9 2-9 3.
'c"tirg,
144. Mørtcnot'hø, 27 Sc¡rtember- 1930, l3 Fcbruarl,, 20 Jvl¡, 1932. 186- Mørtenopþø, 28 Febrr.rary 1929.
145- TsAoDM, f. 3, o¡r. 49, d. 15, L l ll.
MKinfì)nr'ìàri()¡r slÌrl1uì¿r\¡, l9 sc¡rtember 1932. 187. Mørtenovl¿ø, t, 8, tI, 14, August , 1930.
146. TsAODM,f.429,.p. l,cl.92,l.Bg-90. p?ìrryburca. ureui'g,26M¡rclt1929- I88. TSAODM,f.42g,op. l, cl. 109, l. ló0. Party cotrruittec meetitìg; 8 October 1930'
I47 . Mørtenotltø, 30 Aprll 1929. lB9. Mørteu¡pl¿ø, I October: 1930.
 222 z¿ô
Rep o løtion ønd Coønterrn o løtion St ø linist C o ønt err ev o løti o n

190. R øbochøiø gøzetø, I 6 February 193 I. 230. M ørtenovl¿ø, 20, 22, 23, 24 Decernber I 93 l'
l9l. TsAODM, f. 4, o¡r. l, d. 5, l. l4Z. MGK discussion, 3l AugLrst 1931. 23I. GAIìF 5469, <>p.14, d. 193, 11.230-231. Metahvorkers' infirrnration sttt1ltnarl"
7 May
192. Røltochøiø gøzetø, 30 August l93l _
1930. ì

193. TsAoDM, f. 429, op. t, ct. ì 14, l. 8.; cl. il3, r. Ió7. party ZììK fiaction rre*ing, 2g
232. Mørtcnot hø, 2 Fctrruarl', ló August 1932'
August 1931. Parry bureau lncering,3l AugLrst 1931. 233. TsAODM ,[' 429,op. 1, cl' 106,1' 23' Wire pulling shop cell meetiug'
9 April 1929
194. TsAoDM, f. 80, op. t, d. 398, ll. lr0, rl3. oGpu cristrict rcp.rts septc'rber r931.
234.TsAoDM,t.42g,op.t,a.rc6,l.23.Wirepullingslr<l¡lcelllìleetil]g'9Aprtll^929 lii
195. Lervis Siegelbaum ¿ncl lurdrei Sokolov, Stølinisø øs ø Wø1t of Life (Neu, Flaverr, 2000),
Zg. 235. TSAODM, f. 42g, op. I, d. 94,lI. 47-48. Control comtnission
ureefing, 5 Noveurbcr
l9ó. TsAODM,t.429, op. l, d. llï,l.74. parry c()rnmirree, 23 April I93I. t929.
197. TsAoDM, f. 80, op. l, d. 398, l. 9r. ocpu disrri* st¡uu'ar1i r scptcnrtrcr 193r.
23ó. Osokina, Oør Døity Breød, 39,62-63,77,91'
198. RGASPI, f. 17, <'tp.3, d,.817,1. 3. politbur.o mcering, 25 March l9à1. - 125'
237. Strairs, Føctory ønd' Corntøønity iø Støliø\ Røssiø, 65, 7 4, 7 7, I 17
199. RGASPI, f. 17, op. Ió2, d. I0, l. l0ó. politburo nrcering, 5
July I931. 238. Mørtenophø,23 August 1930, l0 Aprit 1931, 14 August l93l'
200. TsAODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 398, l. 25. OGPU clistricr reporr,22August 1931.
239 . Bialløten' Oppozitsü, Septenber 1932 '
201. I{GASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 148, ll. lll,
rOs. Kaganovicrr rep()rr on Mosc6ç, fì>ocl suppl¡ 240. Mørterutil¿ø, 27 Se¡'rtembcr 193l'
January 1932. 241. TSAODM , t. 42g, op. I, d. l L3, ll. 85-8ó. Party bureau courbined
rvith bnreau ol repair
202. TsAoDM, f 80, op. I, d. 398, l. rzr. ocpu clistrict rep.rt lare Novernber 1931. shop tneetirlg 14 Septcnrbcr l93l'
IIGASPI' 1ì 17, op. 20, d.349,1. 4ó. District Party bureau cr¡nrnlirree rneering, 2 l)ecem- 242- Mørtenovhø, 19 N<>vember 1930.
trcr 1931. 243. Mørtenovhø, 12 A¡rril 1931.
203. T'AODM, f. 80, op. I, d. 398, l. lB9. OGPU disrrict rep.rt, g December 1931. 244. Mørtew¡phø,2I December 1930.
204. TsMAM, f. 176' <>¡t 2, d. 834,11. 31, 39. ctnstructi.n .f srr.ps urcerings, 2r May, 245. TSAODM, f. 80, op. l, d. 398,11. 47-48. OGPU tlistrict report on
political ur<xrd ol$'<xk-
2O July 1932. 'e*,
els, ló May I93I.
205' TsAODM,f.429, op. I' d. Il7,ll. ll-L2. Party ctluurittcc and cell secrcr¿ries ¡reerir.rg, 246. TsAODM,f. 80, op. I, ct. 398, l. 73' OGPU distr:ict report, 2ó August
l93I'
ló May 1932. 247. TsAODM, f. 3,op. 49, d. 15, l.lII
MKrep<)rt' 19 September L932'
20ó'TsAODM,f.429,op. l,d. ll7, l. ls.Partyct>r'trmitteeanc{cell sccrer¿ricsmccting,4lu¡c l
248. TsAODM,f.42g,op. l, d- lfó' l39' Party buleatr trinutes' 8
April 1932
1932. 193I.
249. TsAoDM, f. 80' op. l, Cl' 398, l. r72. OGPU district rep<rrt late N<lverrrl¡er
207. Mørtenot¡hø,6 August 1932. 250.TSAODM,t-.80,op. 1,d.425,1.27: FilatovrcporttoProletarskiiclistrictparty'February
208TsAoDM, f. 3, op. 49, tl. ló, I. 3. MK i¡rfi¡rnrarit' su'r'rar¡,, 7 septcmber 1932.
209. TsAoDM, f. 3, op. 49, d'. 23,I59. MK report ro Krrrushchev 2o-zs Dccemder 1932.
210. Mørtenot¡hø,28 Feúmry 1929.
zst.rft3jt, * *, n ø, v
Jtty 19 32.
252. Mørtett'ovhø,3 Marcb 1932.
2l J. TsAODM, f. 429, op. l, d. 92,1. 65-66. par.ty ¡rlcnum, 27 February ).929. 253. TsAODM, f. 80, op. l, tt. 398, 1.47-48. OGPU district t'eport on
political mt>od t>f u'ork-
212. TsAoDM,f-429,op. I, cl. 92,11.92-9\,pa'ryple'u'r, l3 March ré29. rtepairshop leaci- eLs ló May 1931.
N<lverrrber 1931. The
ers dcfènclcd their secrerary against trre accusati.ns. TsAODM, f.429,<>p. t,
a. to+, lt. s+ 254. TsAoDM, f. 80, op. l, Ct. 398, |' L72; }GPU district rep<rrt late
55. l{cpair: shop parry closed pler-rum, 27 M¿rch 1929. repolt did not specify the fàctory
213. Mørtenovhø,13 ApÅl 1929. 255. Mørtenophø, 23 September 1932.
2t4' TsAoDM, f. 80, op. l, d.332,1- 2. Note to speaker at a distritt parry c6nfcre¡ce, earry 25ó. Ts,{ODM, f. 3, o¡r. 49, d.- 16,1. 7. MK surr-rrnar¡ 7 October 1932'
1929. 257. TSAODM, f. 4, op. 2, d. 3' Plenr'ul MGK' l3 May 1932'
215. Getty ¿nd Nauuror', The Roød to Terror,588. The nunrber of Secret policc ar.rcsts fôr 1933.
258. TsAODM, f. 3' op. 49, d'. 37,1, 78' Ck>sed party rreeting I 3 Dccer¡bcr
"coltnterrevolutiuìâl')¡ crimes" appr<rximately d<¡ubletl fì'on-r 1928 t<'¡ 1929 ¿ncl thc num-
ber <lfarrcsts fì>r "¿nti-soviet agitati<>r.r" u,ent from 0 to 51,89ó.
216. Møt,tenotthø,3, ll Novembcr 1930.
217. I{GASPI, f. Bl, op. 3, ct. 148, l. I33. L. I(aganovicl.r report,
January 1932.
218. Alcksanclra Chtt¡¡¿kova's tncr¡oirs in Sørnizdøt: Voices tf the Soviet Op7tositiozi, Geor.ge
Saunders, ecl. (Nel, Yrrrk, 1974), l9l.
219. TsAODM, f. 3, o¡r.49, d. lS, l. t4t. OGPU infìrrnraticxr stur)rrery. Septembcr 1932.
220. Mør ten otth ø, 24 J ú¡, 19 3 I, Z I January I 9 30.
22l.TsAoDM,f.429,op. I,d. 106, 1.67. wirepullingsho¡rpar:tyr.rccri'g,4scprcrìrbcr
1929.
222.TsAODM,f.429, op. l, d. lt6, l. f 39. parry bureau'ri'utes, g April 1932.
223 TsMAM, f . 176, <tp.2, d. 82l,ll. a0, 3l. Infì>nn¿tion on re-elecrion t<i S<>r,iets. Delegates'
rltceting, I5 January, general c<>nfèrence,9 February 1929.
224. -îsAoDM, t. 429, oP. l, d. 100, l. 30. Architecrur¿l shop cell r.necring, 14 February 1929.
225. GAIìF, f .7952, op. 3, d. 198, l. t0; d.2OZ,l.lB. Factorv sraristics.
226 TsMAM, f. l7ó, op.2, cl.835, 1.2. Construction olnelv sho¡rs meering,2ó Nsvc¡rbcr.
1932.
227 Mørtntorhø, 25 Sc¡rtember I930.
228 Møt,te,ot¡l¿øt 29 Scptenlber, B October, ll No'eurbcr 1930, 13, 19
January l93l
229 TSAODM, f. 429, o¡t. ì, d. I tó, ll. 7-8. par.q, lrureau rnccring,25 May 1932.
 225
Cottcløsion

their
workers, experience in the factories was the clecisive fäctor in shaping
other employees, their eniployer' aud their society'
perceptiolì of themselves,
To be sure, events outside the workplace also inf'luenced their' view of the
world, yet time after time in each of the rising waves of revolt, workers began
to.*pi-r"rir. their cornmo' interests against their e'rployer. When they we't
on thå offe'sive, rhe numerous and overlappi'g divisions within the
rvork-
force tendecl to be weakened and workers ofien displayed a strong sellse ol
class soliclarity with workers in other fàctories. conversel¡ when workers
resur-
rerreated from ulified action, latent divisions within tl're workforce
through
CoNcr,usroN faced, allowing malìagement to regain the upper hand, fbrce cor-r-

cessions, isolate strikes, and victimize leaders'

Rev oløtiyn "p
ersØs C oøn terrev o løtion The temporal clelimiters to the volatile shifts in Moscow Metalworks
workers, .oñfid.r-,.. are clear. Demoralized a'd passive after the
1905 Revo-
was reborn iu the rvake of popular indignation in
lutior-r, the labor lnoverïìent
nìassacre as workers repeatedly struck for
aftermath of the Lena Goldiìelds
role"
both economic a¡cl political reasous. Revolutionaries played a "catalytic
in the moveneDt that grew in intensity during two waves of unrest separated
by a significant retreat at the beginning of the war. Divisions
between young
The Colcl War shaped the framing olthe history of the Russian Revolutior-r otã workers, male a'cl fèmale rvorkers, and between shops rvere strellgth-
in the latter half of the twentieth century. Tl-re protagonists put fe¡rward "Å¿ as management easily defeated the first wartime strike. continued war
ened
inteÍpretatiorls that actually sharecl much common ground. Both schools losses, declinñrg real wages, ancl the shattered hopes for political reforms
promoted the notion that Stalinisrn was a natural and inevitable oqtcome of ih. p.o.og-"ui'rg of tñe Duma, all weake'ed the a'cl cotlserv-
"fte, 'ationalist
workers startcd to
1917, both schools identifìed socialism with Stalinism, and both schools arive senrimenrs that briefly dominated in the fàctories.
viewed the u.orking class as a social ftrrce easily manipulated by rhe state. within the workfbrce by championing the
overcome the sectional interests
Both schools also utilized the privilege of non-archival access to make "spec- grievances of young and female workers. Their awareness oi the growing
ulative" arguments to explain the demise of working-class militancy. While ãh"rr' between the interests of labor a'd capital drove the movernelìt fbrr-
and sys-
historians of European and United States labor have painstakingly attempted ward. Repeated rouncls of okhrana arrests-l'lÌuch more widespread
to reconstruct and explain the n-ìany advances and retreats of workers' move- rematic tÈan the fbw arrests of strikers during NgP-proved futile in the face
ments, Soviet labor history continues to lag far behind because of the ideo- ganizedworkers' lnovemetlt. Indeed, as the work-
of a resurgent and well-or
logical baggage of the Cold War. To be sure, fifteen years after the archives the of class conflict' repressiou only
ers, move-ment quickly leJrned lessons
of the fbrmer Soviet Union opened their doors, not a single archival-driven fostered better organization to avoid victimizatiou'
study has been produced to support either of the Cold War inrerprerariolts. The graclual evolution of workers' confideuce and solidarity accelerated
insti-
Yet marry of the central tenets of tl-re two state-spol'tsored interpretatiolls are after the February Revolution. By direct action) workers irnmediately
created a factory committee to
still invoked to explain the rise and rule of Stalinism-early Soviet repression tuted the eigl-rt-liour clay, fired managers,
over wages) women's
and worker identifìcation with Stalinism. represent th"emselves, ald raisecl diverse dernauds
Workers in the Hamrner and Sickle Factory were neither terrorized by the irsu.s, the rights of the fàctory committee, and coutrol of productiou.
In the
early Soviet state llor impressed rvith Stalinism's agenda and propagancla. Marxist sense of a rvorking class conscious of its collective strength, l9l7
Events in tl-re largest metal fàctory in Moscow closely nirrored the contours of power in the twentieth centLrry. As political
marked tl-re zenith of proleiariall
questious came to thå fore i¡ the late sullìlner, the cliffere¡ces betwee¡
the Russian ancl Soviet working-class militancl,, and provide insights it-ìto the the
dynamic of thç movenrent. Class confìict and workers' changing perception of practice' By August, Russia had moved to
socialist programs were clarifiecl in
their own power are central to explaining why the most unruly proletariat of the edge or"civit war) as the ruling classes gave collcrete expressiol-t for their
utter Jontempt fbr the revolutionary aspiratio's of the lorver classes by
the ceutut'y cafite to tolerate the asceridancy of a political and economic sysreln sup-
that ultinrately proved antagonistic to theil interests. Cerrainll,, øll contempo- porring l(orn-ilov's atten-rpted military coup. workers also recognized that the
rary protagonists of the class conflict in the revolutionary era-socialists, the revolurion could only ."a uy the forceful rule by one class over the other.
The Bolsheviks rvo' ine poliiicat argurnerìts for the l2 Ar'rgust ger-reral
Okl-rrana, ulanagement associations, Tsarist govemmelÌt officials, the Provi- strike
sional GovenÌrleltt) the early Soviet govenìmeut, dissident groups, and the agair-rst the Provisiopal Goverutnent, fclr arming workers to defènd the revo-
Stalinist regirne-recognized the potentiirl po\\/er of the working class. liio', ancl fbr all political power to be tra'sferrecl to the soviets.

Notes for this section can be found on page 229.

226 R ev o løtion ønd. Cou,nterrev løtion
o
The l9I7
Revolution ancl the Civil War detennined who would rule Russ-
ian society. Within the factor¡,, however, the first year of the revolution was
marked by proletarian collective action) whereas a desperate and apolitical
individualisrn pervacled factory life during the Civil War. Workers' behavior
during this period shows that rather than being terrorized, they were almost
completely unfazecl by a state that had virtually ceased to exist. The social,
political, and econornic breakdorvn, and the isolation of the revolution not
only created a rift between workers and state, but also shaped the social con-
ditions that allorved Stalinism to evolve.
Evidence fiom the Hammer ancl Sickle Factorl, shows that clespite the
hardships of factory life in the afterrnath of seve n years of war, the fìssure
between the battered Soviet state and the working class rvas actually nar-
rowed cluring early NEP. Workers repeatedly turned to their representatives
ol1 the factory committee and other union institutions to raise their griev-
ances. They also participated in lnass meetings, they repeatedly went on
strike as shop-specifìc stoppages spitled over into other departments, and
they realistically expected support Êrom the party and union. By 1924, the
state and class negotiated a ternporary trulce in which union contracts ancl
arbitration boclies substituted fbr direct actioll to meet employee coucerns.
Hur-rdreds of workers joined the party because they identifìed rvith its'social-
ist goals. Similarly,, tl-re rnajority of fèmalç production employees partici-
pated in women's activities because they expected and received a favorable
response to their concerns.
This temporary truce betrveen the state and rvorking class derailed the
resurgent rvorking-class militancy of early NEP. The early Soviet participatory
institutions differed markedly fi'om those of both the Tsarist ar-rd Stalinist
eras. It was workers' trust and involvement in workplace institutions tl'rat
gave the factory regime au essential degree of legitimacy.
The Stalinist project of national economic development, combined with
the deep social crisis of late NEP, eroclecl this accorcl. Workers continued to
raise grievances and complaints, but the tl-rreat of unernployment and a lack
of confidence in their owrr collective power placed them on the defensive. As
shop-level meeting minutes shorv, overlapping sectional diffèrences within
the workforce were strengthened by the late NEP crisis. Divisions betleen
rnale and female workers, bervveelt newly arrivir-rg fbrmer peasants and urban
workers, between older and youllger workers, and between shops were all
reinforced. In rnany ways, the late NEP working class retreat clisplayed attrib-
utes that were the nlrm.in Europe and the United States when labor was on
the defènsive: employers used the cudgel of uuemployn.ìent to wrest conces-
sions from the, unions; union leaders backtracked and tried to secure nhat-
ever small victorics possible; disgruntled workers voiced increasing clis-
pleasure, started to blarne other workers as solidarity rveakened, and yet
remaiued lo1,¿1 ,o their uniou that offered them a degree of protection. Tl-re
difference, of course, 14/as that the Soviet state was both the employer ancl
leader of the ul.rior-rs and had colne to po\r/er based on a victorious workers'
revolution. The contraclictory role of unions could not possibly have lastecl
when the state of-fensive against the working class escalated.
Repression was not a factor in the demise ofworkers' rnilitancy from 1925
to 1927. Authorities clid not arlest a single striking worker at the Hammer
and Sickle Factory, nor did they even expel an Oppositionist from the parry
for leading one stopPage. The Cold War mythology of state ageuts arresting
large numbers of striking workers and sending them to the Gulags does t'tot
coirespond to what is norv known about Soviet industrial relations. Signifi-
cantly, several late NEP strikes show that the letter of collective agreements'
rather than repression, was decisive in resolving disputes.
Yet the strikes were also lirnited to a small uumber of rvorkers in individ-
ual shops ancl illustrate how far solidarity aud workers' confidence had slipped
in just several years. In early NEP, striking workers elected rePresentatives to
avoid victimizafion,controlled delegate meetings, attended boisterous mass
meetings, and repeatedly wo¡ pay increases. By 1928, state loyalists firmly
controlled all meetings, avoided open discussion of collective agreenÌents'
frred strike leaders, and repeatedly cut rvages. fuchival sources also prove
widespread working class cliscontent against a regime that had lost much of
authority to rule and was beset with profbuncl fissures in its own ranks. That
Stalinisln managed to survive 1928 has obscured the narrow gap between
seething working-class allger aud open revolt.
By the end of NEP' the 1àctorlr committee and other union bodies had lost
moch of their authority. The party was evell rlore cliscreclited. Insteacl of
workers eutering the party en rlasse, the overrvhelmin$ rnajority of workers
refused to join because they recognized the demise of party democracg and
the profound contradiction betlveen state propagaucla and policy.'l'he party
.r".Èdo*n against dissent was cortnected to the intensifìc¿tion of the labor
process ancl the reduction of workers' living standards, but during NEP did
not extend to noltParty rvorkers. Party leaders reverted to padding member-
ship figures by lorvering the standards for the felv who wanted to join ar"rd by
refbsiug members' requests to leave. Significantly, however, workers contin-
ued to place hopes of reftrrm rvithin existing fàctory institutions. Given that
these institutions had previously responded sympatlìetically to their concerns)
such expectations for ref-orm \l¡ere quite rational.
The Stalinist production drive during the First Five-Year Plan halved
wages attd clestroyed the extremely weak renl'ìallts of rvorkers' cotrtrol. The
fàciory committee that hacl been created during the revolution to defend
workers was transformed into an institution to lengtheu work hours, iucrease
procluctivity, and drive dowu u,ages. The less fì'equent labor actions entailed
a fu¡clamental shift arvay fiom strike action as individual rather thall collec-
tive solutions clominatecl workers' behavior. Urllike the ternporary lull in
years of reaction frorn 1908 to 19I I, holvel'er, the tlerv dowutttru iu u'orker
activism would be more permanellt: the proletarialt ll-ìovefitellt that lastcd fclr
almost a third of the century in for.rr distinct rvaves of tnilitancy had reached
the end of the revolutionary epocl-r. Unable to gain voluntary support f-or its
program through inverted class rhetoric, ûìatìagenìent coerciot1 rested ou
io.iul p..sore by a milieu of harclened state loyalists to bull;' other rvorkers
a¡cl Lrtilizecl its co¡trol over food as its most efïective weapoll to discipline the
workforce. Rather than tl-re logical cuhriuation of 1917, the victory of Stal-
228 Rey o h.tti on øn d Coanterret, o httion Con cløsioø 229

inism represented a veritable couut€n'evolution in which the drive for accu- and had the potential to do so to Stalinisrn. The defeat of tl-re working class
n'rulation triumphed over human need. was rlot predetermined, but instead was clecidecl in the working-class move-
Severing the extremely tenuous collnectiotl with the revolution, however, ments of Europe and the mills and factories of the Soviet Union itself. IGrl
simultaneously undermined the Stalinist project itself. The state sought-but Marx ancl Frederick Engels were correct-even trÌore so in regard to periocls
did not receive-a popular mandate for its policies. The structural problems of mass social upheaval. The history of the Russian Revolution is tl-re history
of rapid industrialization could not be solved because peasant-workers clid of class struggle.
not adapt easily to industrial life and because the very nature ofthe project
was antithetical to workers' irlterests. Although a small minority of uprvardly
mobile rvorkers identified with Stalinism, the overwhelming majority of
workers were denied the benefits of career advancement, "best shock
brigades," and other productivist enticements. Workers who I'rad paid ftrr the
industrialization drive reseuted the state for repeatedly cuttir-rg their wages,
forcing them into working longer hours, ancl depriving rhem of their reli- Notes
gious holidays.By I931, workers in the capital's Proletarskii clistrict talked
about how the regime did not knorv how to "finish off the workers." Far l. Jefliey Rossman, "Wtrrker ltesist¿nce Uucler Stalin: Class end Geltder itr the lv¿lrt¡r'o
Inciustri¿l l{egior-r, 1928-1932" (Ph.D. Disscrtation, University of Califbrnia at Berkelel',
from being an all-powerful rnachine pulverizing Soviet society, even party
1997).
loyalists expressed disillusionment and believed profound changes rvére 2 Orlantlo Figes, á Peoplel Trøgedy, 824.
imminent. Flowever, a sense that some external force from above would 5 Victor Sergc, Mem.oirs of ø Revoløtionøry (London, l9ó7), xvi-xvii
lead tl-ris change illustrates that rvorkers' confidence in their collective power
was a distant memory. ;
We now know that the parameters of ploletarian resistance to Stalinisrn
ranged frorr open revolt in lvanovo,l to simmering, but fiactured, discontent
in the Harnmer and Sickle Factory. While metah,vorkers' grievances and
hatred towards their new bosses escalated, their relatively privileged position
in the highest-priority industry and the enormous risks involved in strike
action rnilitated against the kind of unity that u,oulcl have been rlecessary ro
any credible challenge to the regirne.
One of the rnost prominent historians of the Russian Revolution, Orlando
Figes, views the entire revolutionary era as a great tragedy and laments, "The
ghosts of the Russian Revolutior"r have not been put to rest."2 The voices of
these "ghosts" in the factories can fìnally be heard. Workers participared in
the socialist experiment and developed their own conception of an egalitar-
ian, classless society that was completely at odds rvith both private capitalism
and ascending Stalinism. Yet the dorninant scholarly perspective of counecr-
ing the dots fr orn l9l7 to brutal Stalinist repression was not an invention oF
the Cold War, nor of the acacler.ny alone. Victor Serge, perhaps the Russian
Revolution's nlost ullconÌpromising intellectual, challenged this assertion
over sixry years ago:

It is oficn s¿ricl tl-rat "the germ of all Stalinisrn w¿rs in Bolshevisrn at its inception."
Well, I hirve no objection. Only, Bolshevisrn also containecl rnany other germs-rr
nrass of other germs-and those u,ho livecl through the enthusi¿rsm of the fìrst
years of the iìrst victorior.rs revolutior.r or.rght not to fc,rget it. To judge the living
man by the dcath gerrns u'hich the ar-rto¡rsy reve¿rls in ar corpse-ancl u4rich he rnay
have carriecl in him since his lrirrh-is this very scnsiblel3

The Russian working class rvas neither victim nor parvn, easily rnarripr-rlated
fion above, but a social ftrrce that drove Tsarism ancl capitalisrl fi'orn porver
 231

Colnmunist Palty (in Harlrrer and Sickle Filtzer, D., 5, 195

Factory), 83-95, 99 - | 14, 124- 139, fìring ofrvorkers, I3, 20, 29,48,65,72,
t42, t43, 145-t49, I55-159, 16r- 93, 105, l2ó, 145, Ì58
t8t, t97 204, 206-208, 210-2|6, fìxrd reqLrisiticrning, 64, 67, 7 4
226-229. S¿¿ ølso Bolsheviks ¿nd fìxrd suppl¡ 5, 15, 54, 63-7 1, 7 3, 97, 106,
RSDWP I07, rr0,112, rl3, r2ó,158, 16l,
Cc¡nstituti<>n¿l Delrocriìts (Kadets), 30, t87, l9t, 195, t96;207-209,215,
45, 54, 58,60 216,227
corìtinuolrs workweek 203, 204, 226 France, 67, 85
Crrlttrral lìevolution, 8n. 7 , 122, 147 ,202,
207 G
INonx Gcrnan¡,,27,62
D G<rldnrau, W.,123
Davies, l{. W.,4,82,93,9ó, l0l Grcat ßritain, 62, 67, 85
Dirrarn<r Electric Factory, 24,32,44, 174 Gtrzlr<rn, I. P., 5,9-18, 20,22,24-36,
Dzerzhinskii, F., 157 50-53

B H
education ofworkers, , 125-127, 130, lror>liganisnr, 122, 123, I 32, 14 I - 149,
1905 llevolution, ll,
13, 15-18,24,26, I8, 21, 24,
Mcrscon' olganizati<tr-r,
87
t92, t99,205,211
28, 30, 34-36, 45, 46, 58, 225 I3ó, I88, t97, tg&, 203, 212
32, 33, 44, 47, 56, 57, 58, l5ó-
e galitarianisrn, 47 , 48, 51, 55. 62,74,87 , housing, ó5,95,98, I00, 133, I58, Ìó2,
r57
95, ll4, L48,228 t7 3, 190, l9l, 197, 205, 2-6, 2r3
A . St. Petersburg (Petroglad)
eight-lrotrr rvorkcla¡ 15-17 ,47, 50
organization, 10, 2I, 3d, 54, 58
abortion,123, 130 engineers, 88, 102, 205-207 ,2L6 I
absentceism, 25, 69, 70, 139, 140, 145, , See ølso Conrnrunist Party and

t92, 194, 195, 202, 204, 205, IISD\¡t¡P industlializ¿tion,' t0, 12, 13, 17 3, 77 8,
209 - F
brrnuscs, 9, 13, 69, 7 O, 192, 19 3, 195-197 I79, t8ó- I88, 19 L, 194, 199, 200,
2tl hrøh (detècti,e output), 102, 104 48,60,64,70- 206,208,216,217t't.
alctrlrolisrr.r, 88, 98, 122, 123, 132, 136,
fàctory comrnittec, ó, 45, 3
ßukhar:in, N., 55, l5ó, I59, ló7, ló8, 72,93,95, t36, r37, r57,162,195, infècti<¡us cliseases, 69,74, 190
l4t-t49, 168, t92, 198, 205,2O9,
t77-t80,206 225,227 Internatic¡rral Wr¡men's Day, 44, 125, I30,
2tl r34, r35
All-Uni<u Cc¡rtral Coturcil and alcoholisr.n, hooliganism, 14I-
<¡f Trade
Unions (VTsSPS), 84, I0ó, 203 c L44 Iva¡r<rvt¡Vrznesensk, I 10, 207 ,210,228
ancl control ofproduction, 52, ó3,
anarchists,85, 107, ì5ó, tól catèteria(of fàctory), 50, 59, ó1, t26, 143,
anti-Genran riots r>f 19 15, 29 -31, 35, 6l 92
208 T
ancl clections, com¡rosition t>f, 4ó,
anti-Scmitisnl, 77, 133, 136, L40, 167- Carr, E. H.,4,82,93,9ó, I0l July Days, 54
ró9, r80 55, ó0, ó5, ó8, ó9, 8ó, 88,95,
Central Comn-rittcc r¡f Communist Party,
ànti-Sovict'¿ttitudes, 68, 71, 107, I58, 5, 18,2t,84,8ó, r00, II2,t2B,t64-
llt, lr3, t24, r25, I30, 15ó,
t58-ró3, 169,193,194 K
ló3, I83n. 66,215 169, t7t,173, r75,2t4
¿ncl fò<¡d supplics, ó4-ó7 Kagan<rvich, L., 178, 179, L90, 209, 215
20-26,30-32,
àrrests ofworkers, 17, lB, Civil War, 62-74, 83, 84, 8ó, 9t, 99, ló0,
ancl hiring and firing, 48,54,65, lialinin, M.,84, 85, 88, ló2, ìó3, Ió5,
3s,36,46,54,56, 62,72, r05, tt0, t6r,164, t66, t75, r87, L98,202,
Ì14, ll5n.l, ì19n. I44, I45,148, 225,226
72, t03 t7l
ancl Prt¡vision¿l Gt>vernurent, 53-54 Kerensky,,,{., 54, 55, 57, 58, ó0, ó3
t8t, tó0-tó2, t64, 175, t80, 225, \-lrrl, l.) / ) tö/, ¿t/t1. ó
and shock work, 193-19ó I(lrrushchev, N., 209
227 Cohen, S., I
and strikes,99, lOf, lO4, LO7 Konrstjrnol (VLKSM),8, 128, 139, 143,
collective .åqreernents) 83, 92, 95, 100-
and *'agcs, 50, 51, ó3, ó5,95, 109, t44, 146, t65, ló8, 175-179, 188,
B I02, r04-ill, Iì3, Ir4, r28,t69,
176, 177, 190, 19ó, ztr, 227
rt0 t93-20t, 203, 204, 213, 214.
Blacl<Hundrctis, 31, ló7 antl u'ornen's issues, 124-125, 129- 2,4
K<rtkin, S.,
ct>llectivization of agriculture, 2, Bn. 7,
Bolshei,iks, 16, 43, 44, 53, 54, 58, 60, 62, t32, t34 kulaks,Ió3, 169,173,174, l88-190, 201,
r87, r88, t89, 200, 203, 204
64,67,73,84, 122, r23, r35,136, arrd rvork bours, 47 , 92, 97 202,209,2r4
Cornnrissal'iat of L¿bor (Narkomtrud), ó3,
t48,r49, r55, I5ó, r58, tó0, ló4, and u.orkers' appeals to,47,92,
8ó,93
225 t37,213,226 L
Moscorv Metell<llks organization,
Comrnunist Party (gcr-reral) B3, 88, 90, 9I,
Febrr-rary l{evolutir>n, 44-47
93,9ó, t0t, rr4,r22-r23, r55,158, Labor Exchange, 107, 159
Ió. l8-2 I, 25, 26, 44, 46, 47, Figes, O., L5,228
164, t65, t67, t74, 177, t80, 209. Sce labor turrrovcr ancl fìight, 69,70,74, lB8-
52, 55-62, 64-66, 73, I 3ó- Ì 38, fines, 9, 15, 25, 36,72, 126, 14ó, 18ó,
ø/.ça Bolshrviks ancl IISDWP 19 r,209,213
t5ó-Ió3 2t0,2t6 laterrcss,25,205
 ¿J¿ 233
tnfl.ex
layoflb of u<>rkers, 17,95, 103, l Sg Orthocirrx bdief ,27,29,31, 122, l2g, U
lrna Smith, S., 53, ó3
Goldficlds Massacrc, lB-24, 85,36, 135- t43, t48, t49, 189, 203_205,
swychhø,82, 94, 100, I89 uremploytnent, 100, l0l, I03' Ì04, I07'
99 , rr3, 225 207,228 st:ci¿list c()nìpctition, 19 I- I98, 2OO-204 u3-1 14, 124, 132, I33, 149, Ió8,
Lerrin, V L,2,9-12, t6, lB, S3, Sg, ó1, ovcrtime tvork, 97, 102, 126, l4l, I94, St. Petersburg (Petrograd, Leningrad), I0' 173,209,2r2,226
62, 67, 73,83, 89, 9t, 94, 136, 137, 213 ìI, ì4, 15, 17, 19-26, 3r, 33, 44, 45' Unitecl Opposition,88,9f , 104-10ó' 133'
r5ó, ló0, 174-t67,
52-54, 57, 58, 60, l0ó, I20rt. 192, r40, L46, t67-r77, r80,227
t70, t77,173,t74, t76
P t73,212 United States, 67
Lcnirr hv1,,87, 100, I3B, 142,166, Igg,
209 ¡reasant-rrrigran ts,4, 12, SS, 67,99, 13ï, Socialist llevolutionaries (SIìs), I, Ió-36'
t49, t87 -t9 r, 205, 2t0, 2t2, 216, 33-36, 44, 46, 47 , 54-60, 62, 65,68' w
Lervin, M., 188
9, 17,22, 53, 54 226,228 Il5n. l, I5ó-Ió4, 180' 183n. ó3
l<rckcrurs, u,agcs,6, 12, I3, I5, 23,27,33,36,39rt.
peàsarìtry, 2, 4, Bn. 7, lI, 14, 16, 45, 54, S¡riridonova, M., f 59, IóI
107, 42n. 2I8, 48, 51, 64, 65, 67, 70,
58, 62, 67, 72, 82, 83,9 l, 94, 100, Stalin, I. V, 8n. I, l0l, 133, 149 167,
'
M 169, r7l-174, 176, L9l
72, 83, 85-88, 92-104,
l0ì, 106, tr2, t36, r45, 162, 167, Ì0ó-lI I, ì15, Il8nn. 107, ll2, 124-128,
May Da¡ 18-21,24,24,85,7t, L26, tg4, r73, t79, r89, 200, 205 Stalinisrn, 3-6, 82, 89, 91, 94, I00' I I3'
204,209 It4, 135, l4l, 147, 148, 156, 172, t30, l4l, l58, ló1,162,170'173,
piece r¿res, 27, 51, 88, 102, 104, l0Z, l l0
Marx, Karl, 187, 19 l, 229 175,176, l8ó-188,
177, 180, 18ó-189, 196, 197, 202,
p<rstnr<rdernisnr , 3-4, l2g, 221 ì90, 200, 21r, 213, 2r4, 216, 2r7 n. 3
Marxism, 3, 4, 6, 7, BS, 44, 7 3, I22, L3S, Plavcla, 9, L9, 25, 53, tS6, lS7, 164-166, 210, 214, 21 6, 224, 226 -229
t49 , t7 1, 225 2ll, 2ló War C<rtnnrunisn, 66, 67 ,74
t73, 178, t97,211 Stalinist llaid,
War Industries Comnrittee, 178
Menslreviks, 7, 16, 25, 45, 47, 61, I lS, Pre<rbrazhcnskii, E. .A., 165, l7S Stepanov, P. (director olHarnmet' atld
r,\,()men, 6, 30, 39n. I97,44,50, 5I' 59'
r47, 155, t57, lót, 163, 164, 166, plis<rrrcrs of r.r.ar, 28,29,61 Sickle Factory),88, l0f, 108' 128'
167,t74, ì79, lBt, r83,204 65, 72, 83, 84, 99, t I 3, 122-136, 149,
pn>fits, I l, lB, 28, 3ó, 42n. 217, SI-SZ, 134,2r5
rnetalu,r>rkers' uni(xt, 25, 57, Sg,64-()6, r98,209, 2r5,225,226.
61,77n. t42,88, t2B Straus, K., 5, 212
68, 7 t, 83, 88, 91_97, r00, 103, t24, ¿ntl alcoholisrn, I4l-143, 148
Pn¡r,isional Government, 49, 45, 47 -50, strikes (in the Mc¡sct>w Metahvt>rks,
l7- arrd tlay carc, 125, 130,125' 129,
t27 , 160, t7t, t79, r99, ztt, 226, 52, 54-58, 60-65, 67, 68, 7 0,',' 7 g, 224, Hammer and Sickle Factory), 13,
r30
227.
See øho rradc unit¡lrs zzJ 27, 3l-35, 44-46, 48, 56, 57, 59, 64,
¿ntl harassment and abuse <lf, Ì3'
Moscorv Ct¡mr¡irtec of C<¡nrnunist party
ilostitution, I32, I52, 20g 65, 7 l, 73, 86, 87, 97 -l0l, I03-I09,
(MK),54, 56,7t,73,100, t05, l0B, 48, L26, L34, r45
prrrgcs, 87, l7g, lg3, l9B, D;, 216 ll3,126,144
tl, f3-19' 2l' and Orthodox religious beliefl 139'
140, 144, | 67 -17 t, 17 3_I7 6, t78, Putilt>v Factory, Sn. t6, 15,2ó strikes (general),7n. 5, 10,
140,205
190,208,209 23-35, 44, 45, 56, 57, 59, 82, 93, 106,
and re¡rresentation, 95, 124-132
Moscow Society olFactory and Mill Ou,n- R l0B, ll3, l14, II5n l,lB9,207,
and skill level, 13' 124,125' 127-
ers (MSFMO), 9, t7, 20, 24, 25, 22, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218¡. 24
llabinos,itch,,{., 54 I, 133
32,35 søb botnihi (Cornrnunist Saturdays), 7
Conflict Cornrnissi(n (l{KI() 83,92- 23,26, 33, 34, 36' 207
arrd strikes,
Mcrsc<ru. Sovjct,46-49, SZ, 57,63, 69,92, lì¿rtcs 2rl number of, I3, 33, 34,51,124,
98, 100, l3ó, l58, 160, t62,t63, 95,t00-t05, I08-l t0, II4, 124
t90, 210 rcvisionists, 2, 3, I13, 189 t34,212
T work lrours, ó, lt, I3, 15-17,22,27'47'
lleci Army', 65, 66, 68, 7 O, 9 l, 156, 166,
189 tlreft, 30, 68, 7 1, 72, 7 4, 145, 146, 209, 50, 59, 62, 71, 83, 92, 97, 124- 126,
N 2tl 17 4, 17 5, r9t, 19 4, 203, 204, 206,
I{ed Guar-cls, 58, 60, ó1, 63,65,66,72,
natiorralisnr, 12, 14, 19-3I, ì33, l3ó, 140, r4l, l5B-t60 tradc trlritxs, 25, 57, 65, 72, 84, 85, 91, 213,216,225,227,228
158, tó3, 167-169,t80 regirne of econornl', l0l, 103, Ì04, l2g I05, I0ó. S¿¿ ø/¡tr mctahr'<irkcrs' rtnit>u W<l'kers' ârìd Peàsàtìts' Inspect<.lratc
Nicolas II, Tsar, ló, 17,27,29,81,32, lleiu.rarr, M.,4,5, lB4n. 132 Tr¿dc Urrion Oppttsition, 177-180. Set: øko (Iì.atrkrin), ó5, ó8, ó9' 74,190,19l,
35,44 ITSDWP (ll.r.rssian Social l)e¡locr¿tic Work- ßukh¿rin I95, I9ó, r99,207,209
niglrtshift rvork ,27 , 28, 47, S0 crs' PàrrJ/), l3-Ió, I8, 20, 21, 24. Sec Trotskl', L. D., ì0, lI,3Bn. 62,91,122, ç'orktì>rcc of Moscow Metalrvtlrks (Hun-
NKVD, 129n.182,194 ø/s¿ ßolsheviks aud Cornnrunist party r23,156, 160, ló2, 165-169,17r, me r ¿nd Sicklc FactorY)
173-176,210 age ct>rnp<lsition c>f, 12,26
o s Trotsk),ist C)pposition (1923), I05, Ì07' shops, l2
October l{ci,olution, 60-ó2 u0, t I I, r32, 137, r38, 163-167, gcnder, Ì3, 26, 33-34, 5l' 124'
søutohritihø (self:criticisrn), 90, I46, 17g,
OGPU (Unifiec{ State Political Aclurinístr¿- 178, I80 2tl
r79 , r9B, t99 Trotsk¡,i5¡s, 107, l I0' II l, 20Ì, 204, 2O9, I3I'
tion), 84, 91, 95, t0t-103, tll-t07, size of, 12,70,73,83, 188
scas<rrrai rvorkcrs (othhodnihi), I89, 2Ign.
120n. 182, L63,170, t89, 196, 20ó, 2lo,2rs skilled, 12, 26,47,48,5I' ó8' 188
¿+ loyalty), 12, I5, l8'
tsehhovsbchirtø (shop r,rnskillccl, 12, 13, 26, 47, 48, 51,
208,209,2r4,215 Scrge, V., 228 27, 44, 49, 102, l l3, 225, 226 l8B
Oklrrarra, 9, 12-14, lB-20, 24, 27, 28, 30, sc\/cn-lìour u'orkcla1,, 17 4, 17 5 TsIK (Central Excctttive Committee <>f l, 27'36, 43, 46, 47, 52, 56'
World W¿r
32,33,34, 36,44, 45,46, 62, tt4 slrock rvor-k, Igi - l9Z, 200, 202, 205, 210, Soviet governm cnr), 127 , 147 2lO 6r,62
2t t,228 '
Workers' Group, 157' ì80
sholr. trials, I44, 147, 202, 203 Wrrrkers' Oppttsiti<ln, 9I

.:Àùì.
zÐ1

Workers' Truth, 157, 180

World War I, l0-12, 19,21,25-86

Y
yourh 12, t9, 25, 28, 30, 33, 36, 56, 65,
99, Il3, 83, 12ln. 228, I2Z -129, tg2,
r39,144-148, tó5, ró8, 175,176,
190, 19 2, r94, r97, 203, 2t2, 2r4,
216,225, 226. see ølsa Komsomol

Z
Zinoviev, G., 166-1 69, 17 l, t7 3- t7 6
Zubatov, S. and police uni()nisn, l3-ló,

ZlìK (Cbsed Workers' Cooperative), l9ó,

t99,208,209,2r3