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PRACTICE OF LAW

CAYETANO V MONSOD

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.


Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Law student practice rule

A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the
Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before
any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.
 shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
 Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by
the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

CONTINUING REQUIREMENT
Possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant
admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession

CONTINGENT FEE

A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding
but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties
is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation
prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees in consideration of the risk that the
lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails

ATTORNEY’S FEE
It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial
control. A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in
administering impartial justice between the parties. When he takes his oath, he submits himself to the
authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.

In the case of Rosario, Jr. v. De Guzman,9 the Court clarified a similar issue and discussed the two
concepts of attorney’s fees – that is, ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is
awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. 10
Although both concepts are similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as further explained
below:

The attorney’s fees which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly speaking,
an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s professional
services. However, the two concepts have many things in common that a treatment of the subject is
necessary. The award that the court may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s fee is
an indemnity for damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause in
court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances authorized by law.
On the other hand, the attorney’s fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the
latter’s services. The losing party against whom damages by way of attorney’s fees may be assessed is not
bound by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing party with his lawyer.
The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however, be taken into account by the court in
fixing the amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.

The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his
judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his lawyer may, however, agree that whatever
attorney’s fee as an element of damages the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his
compensation or as part thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing
party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.

The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to
their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a lawyer. As a client may not
be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be
not held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights without
the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the
rules governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable in one as in the other.11

Disbarment

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. x x x
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney

Disbarment should not be imposed where a lesser penalty may accomplish the desired goal of disciplining
an erring lawyer. In the present case, however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions show that he
lacks the degree of morality required of him as a member of the legal profession, thus warranting the
penalty of disbarment. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes (sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct)
is disbarred for his gross misbehavior, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character
is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law

GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION


1. DECEIT
2. MALPRACTICE
3. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT
4. CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
5. VIOLATION OF LAWYER’S OATH
6. WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE TO ANY LAWFUL ORDER OF THE COURT
7. APPEARING AS LAWYER FOR A PARTY WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY

REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the
Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to
demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in
the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment,
the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement.

DISQUALIFICATION AND INHIBITION OF JUDGES


Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court encapsulates the rules on the disqualification and the inhibition
of judicial officials. Thus:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above

Compulsory disqualification assumes that a judge cannot actively or impartially sit on a case for the
reasons stated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules. It has been said that the rationale
for the rule on the compulsory disqualification of a judge or judicial officer is predicated on the long-
standing precept that no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent,
disinterested or impartial. Judges should not handle cases in which they might be perceived, rightly or
wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the people's
faith and confidence in our courts, which are essential to the effective administration of
justice.40chanrobleslaw

On the other hand, the aspect of voluntary inhibition, as stated in the second paragraph, involves the use
of discretion. Undoubtedly, it partakes of voluntariness and is a matter of conscience that is addressed
primarily to the judge's sense of fairness and justice.
This discretion is an acknowledgment of the fact that judges are in a better position to determine the
issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the litigants in their courtrooms. 42 The
decision on whether he should inhibit himself, however, must be based on his rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him.

JURISDICTION OVER JUDGES


ART VIII Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

NOTARIAL LAW

"Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver’s
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance,
police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID, Barangay certification, Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior
citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman’s book,
alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID,
certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

Notarial register – permanently bound book with numbered pages containing chronological record of
notarial acts performed by the notary public.

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