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47.

Moncado v People’s Court; G.R. No. L-824; 14 Jan 1948; 80 Phil 01

FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros Oriental,
after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court of First
Instance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice of receipt of
appealed case and the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by the postmaster
but the same was not claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff, ordered defendants to
vacate the land and to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of PHP 18 as damages, plus costs.
Defendant’s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get notice from post office was due to
ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff’s motion for default.

CFI denied defendant’s motion on June 19, 1940.

ISSUE: Was defendant’s failure to get notice valid and excusable?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant’s are not entitled to a service of copy of
the motion that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of default, in
which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9, Rules of Court).
Second, failure to get notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants. Indeed, a notice, is
deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from first notice of postmaster
(Rule 27, Section 8, Rules of Court).

Appealed order affirmed.


48.

Stonehill v Diokno; G.R. No. L-19550; 19 Jun 1967; 20 SCRA 383

FACTS:

Respondent judges on different dates issued a total of 42 search warrants against the petitioners and/or
the companies of which they were officers, directing any peace officers to search the persons of the
petitioners and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take
possession of “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)” as “the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense,” or “used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,” which is
described in the applications adverted to above as “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.”

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioners may assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures of
documents, papers and other items in their offices in their individual capacity.

RULING:

NO. Corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. The right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity.
49.

Lopez v Comm of Customs; G.R. No. L-27968; 03 Dec 1975; 68 SCRA 320

FACTS:

Petitioner Tomas Velasco was not inside their rented hotel room when a team of agents raided their
room and seized documents and papers. They were allowed entry inside said room by a woman who
appeared to be petitioner’s wife but turned out to be a manicurist.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was consent to allow the warrantless search and seizure of Velasco’s rented hotel
room.

RULING:

YES. Where, at the time the government agents entered and searched the hotel room then being rented
by petitioner, a woman who appeared to be the wife of petitioner was inside the room, and, upon being
informed of the purpose of the search, invited the petitioners to enter and search the room and even
voluntarily gave the documents and things requested by the officers, even if the said woman, who could
be aptly described as the wrong person, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, was not the wife of
petitioner, but a mere manicurist by occupation, the officers of the law could not be blamed if they
acted on the appearances. There was a person inside who for all indications was ready to accede to their
request. Even common courtesy alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to why
she was there. Under said circumstances, there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with the need
for a search warrant.

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.


50.

People v Damaso; G.R. No. 93516; 12 Aug 1992; 212 SCRA 457

FACTS:

A PC officer and some companions went to the house rented by accused-appellant where they were
allowed entry into the house by the house help. upon entering, they saw radio sets, pamphlets, Xerox
copiers and a computer machine. They asked and were granted permission to look around by the
persons inside the house. In one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-
14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, among others. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the
headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was the lessee of the house and
owned the items confiscated therefrom.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a search on a house without the owner’s presence is valid.

RULING:

NO. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot
be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to
do so in his or her behalf.

Decision appealed from is REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED.


51.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) January 18, 1991

Facts:

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if
she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard
operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took
sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to
inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was
inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of
the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search
and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is
not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
was AFFIRMED.
52.

Valmonte v de Villa; G.R. No. 83988; 29 Sep 1989; 178 SCRA 211

FACTS:

The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated on January 20, 1987 pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintain peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. The NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not checkpoints are illegal as they violate the people’s right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

RULING:

NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but it is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

Petition is DISMISSED.
53.

People v Codilla; G.R Nos. 100720-23; 30 Jun 1993; 224 SCRA 104

FACTS:

Four separate complaints for rape were instituted against the accused-appellants. All three were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and were meted with the sentence of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify each of their victims.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant Putulin may still challenge the validity of his warrantless arrest and detention.

RULING:

NO. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. This issue is being raised for the first time by appellant before this Court.
He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Hence, any
irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial.

Assailed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to the civil indemnity.


54.

Malaloan v CA; G.R. No. 104879; 06 May 1994; 232 SCRA 249

FACTS:

Members of the CAPCOM, armed with a search warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan
City in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 perpetrated in Quezon City, proceeded to the
site where a labor seminar was then taking place. Firearms, explosive materials and subversive
documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners, all EILER Instructors,
were indicted.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the issuance of search warrants and/or warrants of arrest is subject to jurisdictional
restrictions.

RULING:

NO. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein
it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and
where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful substitutes in
the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.

Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
55.

Ilano v CA; G.R. No. 109560; 26 May 1995; 244 SCRA 346

FACTS:

The PNP-NARCOM, NCR applied for a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City to
search petitioner’s house and parlor in Quezon City. After personally examining the applicant and his
witness, the presiding judge issued the search warrants.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a court may validly issue a search warrant for a place outside its jurisdiction.

RULING:

YES. While the trial court which has territorial jurisdiction over the place has primary authority to issue
search warrants therefor, any court of competent jurisdiction when necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place, may issue a search warrant covering a
place outside its territorial jurisdiction.

Petition for review is DENIED.


56.

People v Sy Juco; G.R. No. 41957; 28 Aug 1937; 64 Phil 667

FACTS:

An agent and representative of the Bureau of Internal Revenue alleged that fraudulent books, letters
and papers or records were being kept in the building occupied by the defendant. After the complainant
made his affidavit, the judge issued the questioned warrant commanding the peace officers to search
said building. Among the items seized was an art metal filing cabinet claimed by petitioner-appellant to
be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and seizure were valid.

RULING:

NO. The affidavit did not state that the books, documents or records referred to therein are being used
or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government. It assumes that the
entire building is occupied by the defendant against whom the warrant was exclusively issued when the
only ground upon which such assumption is based on is a mere hearsay and when in fact part thereof
was occupied by the appellant. The search warrant did not ask that the things belonging to the appellant
and to others also be searched. The warrant has gone beyond what had been applied for, and the
agents who executed it performed acts not authorized by the warrant. The search warrant was
unreasonable, it being evident that its purpose was solely to fish for evidence or search for it by
exploration. Search warrants have not been designed for such purpose.

Appealed judgment is REVERSED and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet seized by the internal
revenue agents be IMMEDIATELY RETURNED UNOPENED.
57.

Alvarez v Court of First Instance; G.R. No. 45358; 29 Jan 1937; 64 Phil 331

FACTS:

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to
respondent Judge an affidavit alleging that petitioner kept in his house books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his
own personal knowledge of the facts. Upon the affidavit in question, respondent judge issued the
warrant, ordering the search of petitioner’s house as well as the seizure of the books and documents
mentioned.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

RULING:

NO. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made. Therefore, the search warrant in
question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. The warrant
issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal
knowledge of the facts.

Search warrant and seizure and the orders of the respondent court authorizing the retention of the
books and documents are declared ILLEGAL and are SET ASIDE. Presiding Judge is ordered to direct the
IMMEDIATE RETURN to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents.
58.

Burgos v Chief of Staff; G.R. No. L-64261; 26 Dec 1984; 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:

Respondent judge issued two search warrants under which the business addresses of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner, publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were
seized. The issuance was upon application of an intelligence officer and the joint affidavit of two
members of the team which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrant.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue.

RULING:

NO. Mere generalization will not suffice. The broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally
insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint
affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango. The Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified.

Search warrants issued by respondent judge are declared NULL and VOID and are accordingly SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
articles seized thereunder are ordered RELEASED to petitioners.
59.

Corro v Lising; G.R. No. L-69899; 15 Jul 1985; 137 SCRA 541

FACTS:

Respondent judge issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of printed copies of
Philippine Times; manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times; newspaper
dummies of the Philippine Times; subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,
banners; typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video
machines and tapes which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing
the crime of inciting to sedition.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

RULING:

NO An application for search warrant must state with particularity the alleged subversive materials
published or intended to be published by the petitioner publisher and editor of the Philippine Times.
Mere generalization will not suffice. The statements of private respondents Col. Castillo and Lt. Ignacio
in their affidavits are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

Prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is GRANTED and all
properties seized thereunder are ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Respondent officers are ordered to
RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises.
60.

Prudente v Dayrit; G.R. No. 82870; 14 Dec 1989; 180 SCRA 69

FACTS:

An application was filed for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner for violation of PD 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.), specifically listing all the weapons and ammunitions believed to be
in the latter’s possession. Satisfied with his examination of the witness, respondent judge issued the
assailed search warrant which was enforced the following day.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. The applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which
became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only
through information from other sources or persons. Respondent judge did not examine the witness “in
the form of searching questions and answers.” The questions asked were leading as they called for a
simple “yes” or “no” answer.

Petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders as well as the assailed search warrant are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
61.

Asian Surety & Insurance, Inc. v Herrera; G.R. No. L-25232; 20 Dec 1973; 54 SCRA 312

FACTS:

Respondent judge, upon the sworn application of an NBI agent supported by the deposition of his
witness, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed case for estafa, falsification,
insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against petitioner, a corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines. Armed with the said warrant, NBI agents conducted the searched and seized two
(2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. The search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses, in contravention of the
explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: “no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense.”

Petition is GRANTED. Search warrant is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are ordered to RETURN
IMMEDIATELY all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder.
62.

Castro v Pabalan; G.R. No. L-28642; 30 Apr 1976; 70 SCRA 477

FACTS:

Upon application before the respondent court, a search warrant was issued against the petitioners. The
said warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and
premises of petitioners. No specific offense had been alleged. The particular description of the things to
be seized was not averred, neither the premises to be searched.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid.

RULING:

NO. The basic procedural requisite that a search warrant “shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense,” was not complied where in an application for a search warrant
reference was made to “an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband.” The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes.
Necessarily then more than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband.

Writ of certiorari is GRANTED.


63.

People v Dichoso; G.R. Nos. 101216-18; 14 Jun 1993; 223 SCRA 174

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued on the house of the accused spouses after the judge was satisfied that
there existed probable cause to believe that the spouses were keeping, selling and using an
undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana. Accused were arrested, charged and convicted.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest warrant issued is a general warrant.

RULING:

NO. The Dangerous Drugs Act is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into “prohibited” and “regulated” drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses
which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search
warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Appealed decision of the lower court is MODIFIED.


64.

20th Century Fox Film Corporation v CA; G.R. Nos. L-76649-51; 19 Aug 1988; 162 SCRA 655

FACTS:

The National Bureau of Investigation conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets complained
by petitioners to be violating Presidential Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property).
Subsequently, three search warrants were issued and executed against the video outlets owned by
private respondents. However, the lower court issued an order lifting the said search warrants.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrants were valid.

RULING:

NO. That lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court of an alleged master ape for purposes of
comparison with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from
respondents, there was no way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of
the complainant. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
65.

COLUMBIA PICTURES INC. v CA

237 SCRA 367 (1994)

Facts:

 07 April 1998: NBI filed with the RTC of Pasig 3 applications for SW against private respondent
(Tube Video Enterprises – Edward C. Cham; Blooming Rose Tape Center – Ma. Jajorie T. Uy;
Video Channel – Lydia Nabong) charging them with violations of Sec. 56 of PD 49 (Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property) as amended by PD 1988.
 RTC Judge Austria consolidated the 3 applications and conducted a joint hearing where she
made a personal examination of the applicant (NBI Agent Reyes) and his witnesses.
 Finding just and probable cause, Judge Austria issued the search warrants.
 Private Respondents filed their “Motion to Quash” the SW citing as grounds that there was no
probable cause; the films in question are not protected by PD 1988 in that they were never
registered in the National Library as a condition precedent to the availment of the protection;
the Motion Picture Association of America have not proven nor established their ownership
over the films; etc.
 Judge Austria reversed her former stand initially finding probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrants and ordered their quashal:
o Private complainants uncertain of their ownership over the titles;
o Complainants did not comply with the requirement that master tapes should be
presented during the application for search warrants;
o Complainants failed to comply with the deposit and registration requirements of PD 49
as amended by PD 1988.
 Judge Austria also ordered the return of the items seized by virtue of the warrants.
 CA affirmed the quashal of the SWs.

Issue: WON the SWs were issued with probable cause.

Ruling:

NO.

BASIC REQUIREMENT for the validity of search warrants (in cases of this nature) is the presentation of
the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films are supposed to have been
copied (20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655).

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to
determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant. According to the CA, in which the SC concurs:

It is not correct to say that "the basic fact" to be proven to establish probable cause in the instant cases
is not the "unauthorized transfer" of a motion picture that has been recorded but the "sale, lease, or
distribution of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films."

In applying for the search warrants the NBI charged violation of the entire provisions of Section 56 of
P.D. No. 49 as amended by P.D.No.1988. This included not only the sale, lease or distribution of pirated
tapes but also the transfer or causing to be transferred of any sound recording or motion picture or
other audio visual work.

But even assuming, as appellants argue, that only the sale, lease, or distribution of pirated video tapes is
involved, the fact remains that there is need to establish probable cause that the tapes being sold,
leased or distributed are pirated tapes, hence the issue reverts back to the question of whether there
was unauthorized transfer, directly or indirectly, of a sound recording or motion picture or other audio
visual work that has been recorded.

Petitions denied.
66.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 111267; 20 Sep 1996; 262 SCRA 219

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued pursuant to information received that private respondent violated
Presidential Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property). The trial court granted private
petitioner’ motion to quash said search warrant for being a general warrant, applying the 20th Century
Fox decision. The quashal was affirmed by the respondent Court.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the 20th Century Fox decision is applicable to the motion to quash the search warrant.

RULING:

NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal
of the search warrant. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
67.

Placer v Villanueva; G.R. Nos. L-60349-62; 29 Dec 1983; 126 SCRA 463

FACTS:

The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed several informations, all of which were certified to
by the respective investigating fiscals. Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued
an order setting the hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of
issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent judge issued orders
requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial
review of the finding of probable cause by petitioners.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the findings of the investigating fiscal obligate the judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

RULING:

NO. There is no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But such certification does not bind
the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.

Petition is DISMISSED.
68.

Lim vs Felix G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991

Facts:

At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of
Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely
Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a
lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder
and frustrated murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor
C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.) The RTC of Masbate concluded that a
probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the court
ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.

The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent
Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati was filed by petitioners and
granted by the SC.

On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the accused
including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge said:

“In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was
committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which was affirmed upon review by the
Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate informations for
murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law
have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and
there is no visible defect on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s
certification in each information xxx”

Issue:

Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

Held:

No.
The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires “x x x probable cause
to be personally determined by the Judge x x x”, not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed
by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal
determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had
nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the
transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the
respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
69.

People v Inting; G.R. No. 88919; 25 Jul 1990; 187 SCRA 788

FACTS:

A permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, filed a complaint with the Commission on Elections against the
OIC-Mayor for allegedly transferring her to a very remote barangay without prior permission or
clearance from the COMELEC. Finding a prima facie case, the Provincial Election Supervisor filed with the
respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of Section 261, Paragraph (h), Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor. The respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC-Mayor
and fixed the bail at five thousand pesos. However, the trial court set aside the warrant on the ground
that the Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Provincial Election Supervisor may determine probable cause.

RULING:

NO. The determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or
Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this
determination.

Petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent trial court’s
order is REINSTATED and respondent court is ORDERED to PROCEED hearing the case with deliberate
speed until its termination.
70.

People v Delgado; G.R. Nos. 93419-32; 18 Sep 1990; 189 SCRA 715

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City
against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. After conducting a
preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie case, informations were filed against private
respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City. The respondent court issued an order directing
the COMELEC to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases and to submit his report and the Toledo City INP
to hold in abeyance the service of the warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation
report.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the judge alone makes the determination of probable cause in electoral cases.

RULING:

YES. When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation
of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the
proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent
disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a
reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court. The
records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must be submitted by the
COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the
same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Petition is DISMISSED.
71. Yawa. Hahaha. Okay, seryoso na…

Soliven v Makasiar; G.R. No. 82585; 14 Nov 1988; 167 SCRA 393

FACTS:
Respondent judge issued a warrant against petitioner Beltran pursuant to the filing of a complaint-
affidavit against them by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the constitutional rights of petitioner Beltran were violated when respondent RTC Judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause.

RULING:
NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. The judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.

Petitions are DISMISSED.


72.

Allado v Diokno; G.R. No. 113630; 05 May 1994; 232 SCRA 192

FACTS:

In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security
guard, petitioners have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by respondent
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). The Panel of Prosecutors issued a resolution finding a prima
facie case against them. The information was filed before respondent judge. and ordered arrested
without bail by respondent judge wo issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was sufficient finding of probable cause.

RULING:

NO. Respondent judge did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and
is witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the
prosecutors that probable cause existed.

Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET
ASIDE and respondent judge is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against petitioners.
73.

Cruz v People; G.R. No. 110436; 27 Jun 1994; 233 SCRA 439

FACTS:

Two informations involving the same set of facts were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner,
the first for violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended, and the second for estafa through falsification
of public documents. The two cases were consolidated and later remanded to the Office of the
Ombudsman for reinvestigation.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the warrant of arrest was invalid because the determination of probable cause was
made by the provincial prosecutor.

RULING:

NO. In a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not tasked to
review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the
judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in
determining probable cause.

The resolutions appealed from are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.


74.

Mantaring v Roman; AM No. RTJ-93-964; 28 Feb 1996; 254 SCRA 158

FACTS:

Respondent judge issued against a certain Joel Gamo and complainant’s son a search warrant which
resulted in the seizure of a home-made gun, a hand grenade, five live ammunitions for caliber 38 and
three live ammunitions for 12-gauge shotgun. Because the firearms and ammunition had been found in
the house owned by complainant and his son, respondent judge concluded there was probable cause to
include the two in the information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and accordingly
ordered their arrest.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest was proper.

RULING:

NO. It was improper for respondent judge to have issued the warrants of arrest against complainant and
his son without any finding that it was necessary to place them in immediate custody in order to prevent
a frustration of justice. In issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge
must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching
questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Respondent judge is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that commission of similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely. All other charges are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
75.

Silva v Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 891756; 21 Oct 1991; 203 SCRA 140

FACTS:

Pursuant to the filing of an “Application for Search Warrant” and “Deposition of Witness,” respondent
judge issued a search warrant directing police officers to search the room of petitioners’ son for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended. In the course of the search, the serving officers also
seized money belonging to petitioner Antonieta.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. The judge must, before issuing a search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by
examining the complainant and witnesses through searching questions and answers. Respondent judge
failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.

Petition is GRANTED. Search warrant is declared NULL and VOID.


76.

Mata v Bayona; G.R. No. L-50720; 26 Mar 1984; 128 SCRA 388

FACTS:

Respondent judge issued a search warrant against petitioner after an information was filed accusing the
latter under Presidential Decree 810, as amended by Presidential Decree 1306. During the hearing of the
case, petitioner discovered that the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same were not attached to the records.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. The failure of respondent judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record thus rendered the search warrant invalid.

The writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the assailed orders are REVERSED.
77.

Ledesma v CA; G.R. No. 113216; 05 Sep 1997; 278 SCRA 656

FACTS:

A complaint for libel was filed against petitioner. Finding “sufficient legal and factual basis,” an
information for libel was filed against petitioner. The Justice Secretary reversed the investigating
prosecutor, directing the latter to withdraw the information. In obedience to the directive, a Motion to
Withdraw Information was filed which the trial judge denied.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not it is the prosecutor who determines the existence of probable cause during preliminary
investigations.

RULING:

YES. The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is judicially recognized as an
executive function and is made by the prosecutor. The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is
to free a respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself
in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed upon in
a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose.
Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of unnecessary expense
and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless
charges.

The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Motion to Withdraw the Information filed before
the trial court is GRANTED.
78.

Morano v Vivo; G.R. No. L-22196; 30 Jun 1967; 20 SCRA 562

FACTS:

A Chinese citizen and her son were permitted into the Philippines under a temporary visitor’s visa for
two (2) months, but managed to stay in the country for thirty (30) years after obtaining several
extensions. The Commissioner of Immigration ordered them to leave the country with a warning that
upon their failure to comply, a warrant of arrest will be issued against them.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Commissioner of Immigration may validly issue warrants of arrest.

RULING:

YES. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a
step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action,
not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order
of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation. The
determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crime; nor is
the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may constitute a crime
under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom
it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law with the policy of Congress is purely accidental, and,
though supported by the same facts, a criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are
separate and independent. In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3),
Article III of the Constitution aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a
judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.


79.

Board of Commissioners, CID v de la Rosa; G.R. Nos. 95122-23; 31 May 1991; 197 SCRA 853

FACTS:

The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all
cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of
respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry admitting
respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.

RULING:

NO. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole
purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of
the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that
the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.


80.

Harvey v Santiago; G.R. No. L-82544; 28 Jun 1988; 162 SCRA 840

FACTS:

Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman and Adriaa van den Elshout were among the twenty-two
suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by
Commission on Immigration and Deportation agents. Seized during petitioners’ apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in salacious poses as well as
boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent Immigration Commissioner violated petitioners’ constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

RULING:

NO. The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three
(3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant.
Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and are therefore admissible in evidence.
81.

Tran van Nghia v Liwag; G.R. No. 78596; 13 Jul 1989; 175 SCRA 318

FACTS:

A complaint was filed with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation against petitioner alleging
that the French national is an undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to public safety and
progress.” Respondent CID commissioner issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner after the latter
twice refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and legal.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit
on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn
complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

Petition is DISMISSED.
82.

Salazar v Achacoso; G.R. No. 81510; 14 Mar 1990; 183 SCRA 145

FACTS:

Respondent POEA administrator issued a closure and seizure order against petitioner who was charged
with illegal recruitment.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor may validly issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38
of the Labor Code.

RULING:

NO. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. The power
of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to
order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is
the sole domain of the courts.
83.

Republic (PCGG) v Sandiganbayan; G.R. Nos. 112708-09; 29 Mar 1996; 255 SCRA 438

FACTS:

The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) issued separate orders against private
respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their sequestration.
PCGG also issued a “Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking Corporation.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.

RULING:

NO. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order in the first place. Only a “judge” and “such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law” were empowered by the FREEDOM CONSTITUTION to
do so, and the PCGG is neither. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in “Baseco,” and the PCGG
cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law” because Executive
Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue search warrants/orders.

Petition is DISMISSED.
84.

Quintero v NBI; G.R. No. L-35149; 23 Jun 1988; 162 SCRA 467

FACTS:

Petitioner is a delegate of the First District of Leyte to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He delivered
a privileged speech at the plenary session and disclosed that certain persons are bribing some delegates.
He eventually released from his hospital bed a sworn statement the names of the persons who gave him
the money, implicating the First Lady among others. On the basis of a search warrant, agents of the
respondent National Bureau of Investigation raided petitioner’s house and a criminal complaint for
direct bribery was filed against him.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid.

RULING:

NO. The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge upon the applicant NBI agent showed that
the latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to show that petitioner had committed any
offense. The statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole basis for the issuance of the search
warrant, was replete with conclusions and inferences drawn from what he allegedly witnessed when he
visited petitioner in the hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness which would have been
present, had the same statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed.

Search warrant issued is declared NULL and VOID.


85.

Columbia Pictures v Flores; G.R. No. 78631; 29 Jun 1993; 223 SCRA 761

FACTS:

Petitioners applied for a search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against private
respondents for violation of the Protection of Intellectual Property law. Upon the offer of pieces of
evidence, a search warrant was issued.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there are requirements to the issuance of a valid search warrant.

RULING:

YES. In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory
requirements. He must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions. The search warrant must contain a
specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be seized must be described
with particularity.

Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed order is AFFIRMED.


86.

People v Rubio; G.R. No. L-35500; 27 Oct 1932; 57 Phil 384

FACTS:

Appellant’s house was searched on the strength of a warrant issued to internal revenue agents and
seized from therein fraudulent books, invoices and records.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to particularly describe the things to
be seized.

RULING:

NO. While the place to be searched and the property to be seized under a search warrant must be
particularly described in the warrant, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the
conditions will ordinarily allow. By the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue.
87.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 111267; 20 Sep 1996; 262 SCRA 219

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued pursuant to information received that private respondent violated
Presidential Decree No. 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property). The trial court granted private
petitioner’ motion to quash said search warrant for being a general warrant, applying the 20th Century
Fox decision. The quashal was affirmed by the respondent Court.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the 20th Century Fox decision is applicable to the motion to quash the search warrant.

RULING:

NO. The 20th Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case to justify the quashal
of the search warrant. Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, and more so there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
88.

Nolasco v Paño; G.R. No. L-69803; 08 Oct 1985; 139 SCRA 152

FACTS:

Petitioners were arrested on the strength of a search warrant issued for rebellion. The searching party
seized 428 documents and written materials, including a portable typewriter and two wooden boxes.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant is void for being general.

RULING:

YES. The search warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
CPP and the NDF. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize.

Petition is GRANTED.
89. Casar naman oo! Casar Montano. Hehe. Yung bday greetings niya ba. Hahaha

PANGANDAMAN vs CASAR G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does”
transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the
persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No.

Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject.”[30] Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects,
be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of
the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50) “John Does.” The
respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the
preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1748 of his court for further appropriate
action.
90. Penpen de sarapen, de kutsilyo, de Tambasen.

Tambasen v People; G.R. No. 89103; 14 Jul 1995; 246 SCRA 184

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued against petitioner who was believed to be in illegal possession of firearms,
hand grenades, pistols, dynamites and subversive documents. The police team searched petitioner’s
house and seized cash envelopes, radio handsets, an FM transceiver, battery packs, a notebook and
assorted papers.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

RULING:

NO. The search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the
issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365
reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition
and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a
“scatter-shot warrant” and totally null and void.

Petition is GRANTED and the People is ORDERED to RETURN the money seized to petitioner.
91.

Veroy v Judge Layague; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992; 210 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero, acting upon a directive, raided the Davao City residence of petitioner spouses
who were already residing in Quezon City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. The team did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they
did not have a search warrant. When contacted by Obrero to ask permission to search the house, Ma.
Luisa relented if the search would be conducted in the presence of longtime family friend, a ranking
military officer. The team gained entry into the yard and the kitchen. With the help of a locksmith, the
team entered the children’s room and conducted the search with resulted in the recovery of several
articles which include a firearm and jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the officers violated the petitioners’ constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.

RULING:

YES. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound,
he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present.
This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in
entering the house but rather contacted the petitioners to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was indeed granted by petitioner to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of
rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances, it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not.

Petition is GRANTED and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is
DISMISSED.
92.

People v del Rosario; G.R. No. 109633; 20 Jul 1994; 234 SCRA 246

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued authorizing the search and seizure of an “undetermined quantity” of shabu
and its paraphernalia in the premises of appellant’s house. An entrapment was planned that led to the
arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia’s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3
live ammunition.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the seizure of the firearms was proper.

RULING:

NO. The raiding party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the use thereof and no
other. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The search
warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was not mentioned, much
less described with particularly, in the search warrant.
93.

People v Gesmundo; G.R. No. 89373; 09 Mar 1993; 219 SCRA 743

FACTS:

A team of policemen arrived at the house of accused-appellant armed with a search warrant. She invited
one of them to enter the house. While seated at the sala and showing her the search warrant, the other
policeman had entered the house through the backdoor which was open and found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana flowering tops in the kitchen.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.

RULING:

NO. Apparently, the search of the accused-appellant’s house was conducted in violation of Section 7,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other
premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the
execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the RPC.

Appealed judgment is REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.


94.

Umil v Ramos; G.R. No. 81567; 09 Jul 1990; 187 SCRA 311

FACTS:

The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound at
a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon is actually petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad
responsible for the killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car and fired at
the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crime.

Petitions are DISMISSED.


95.

Resolution on the motion for Reconsideration, 202 SCRA 252

Wa pud
96.

People v Sucro; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991; 195 SCRA 388

FACTS:

During a surveillance operation of appellant’s activities, police operatives saw appellant sell marijuana to
a group of persons. The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant and recover from him
sticks and teabags of marijuana. These were offered in evidence during his trial where he was found
guilty.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant’s arrest without warrant is lawful.

RULING:

YES. An offense committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.

[It would suffice if the overt act were to be seen by a police officer, although from a distance of, for
example, two meters.]
97.

PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992]

Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated
with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter,
the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as
marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report,
based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the
father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The
accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained
and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

Held: The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person
posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated
accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances
wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental
to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have
justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some
time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have
first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in
the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia
presented as evidence against appellant:

CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced
therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against
the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent
plastic bag.

Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white
colored plastic labelled "Robertson".

Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.

Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.

Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.

Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in
the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the
marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the
occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the
corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed
and set aside and accused is acquitted.
98.

People v Enrile; G.R. No. 74189; 26 May 1993; 222 SCRA 586

FACTS:

A buy-bust team was dispatched to entrap appellant Rogelio Abugatal, a plan made on the strength of a
tip given by a police informer. After witnessing the exchange, two policemen approached appellant and
placed him under arrest, at the same time confiscating the wrapped object he gave the poseur-buyer.
Upon prodding, appellant Abugatal led the police to the house of his co-accused Enrile where he
identified the latter as the source of the marijuana. Appellant Enrile was frisked and the marked money
was found inside his front pocket.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant Enrile’s warrantless arrest and search was justified.

RULING:

NO. The policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no personal knowledge that he was the
source of the marijuana. The discovery of the marked money on him did not mean he was caught in the
act of selling marijuana. The marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it were, that fact alone
would not retroactively validate the warrantless search and seizure.
99.

Go v CA; G.R. No. 101837; 11 Feb 1992; 206 SCRA 138

FACTS:

Petitioner, in a case of road rage, shot the victim and fled the scene. After establishing that that
petitioner was probably the assailant, the police launched a manhunt. Six days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself before the police to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the
police. He was immediately detained.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner’s warrantless arrest was valid.

RULING:

NO. Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The arresting officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot
Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as
effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating that
petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.

Petitioner is ORDERED released upon posting of a cash bail bond without prejudice to any lawful order
that the trial court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
100.

People v Gerente; G.R. No. 95847-48; 10 Mar 1993; 219 SCRA 756

FACTS:

The Valenzuela Police Station received a report about a mauling incident. Upon learning at the hospital
that the victim died on arrival and being informed of the cause of death, the policemen proceeded to
the crime scene where they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of
marijuana. After being told by the eyewitness the identity of one of the three assailants, the policemen
went to appellant’s house where they introduced themselves, and apprehended him and confiscated
dried marijuana leaves.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search of appellant’s person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his
possession were valid.

RULING:

YES. The policemen arrested appellant only some three (3) hours after he and his companions had killed
the victim. They saw the victim dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death. The eyewitness reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, the appellant, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the
policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that
appellant and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest him without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did. The search conducted on appellant’s person was likewise lawful because it was made
as an incident to a valid arrest.

Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification.


101.

Callanta v Villanueva; G.R. No. L24646 & L-24674; 20 Jun 1977; 77 SCRA 377

FACTS:

The City Fiscal has shown intent to prosecute petitioner for charges of grave oral defamation. After
conducting his preliminary examination and after acquiring jurisdiction over the petitioner, respondent
Court referred the criminal complaints to the City Fiscal. Arraignment and hearing of the cases were
postponed because the City Fiscal was investigating them. At the proceedings, the City Fiscal entered his
appearance for the government and manifested his readiness for trial.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not warrants of arrest issued were valid.

RULING:

YES. Posting the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty renders the issuance of the warrants valid.
Posting of a bail bond constitutes a waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person, estops
him from discussing the validity of his arrest.
102.

Bagcal v Villaraza; G.R. No. L-61770; 31 Jan 1983; 120 SCRA 525

FACTS:

Petitioner was arrested without a warrant on February 28, 1982 by the Philippine Constabulary and has
been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City since then. City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro filed an
information for murder against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The
information was accompanied by affidavits not subscribed before respondent Judge, who failed to ask
affiants to ratify their oaths nor asked searching questions. City Fiscal did not conduct preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge issued the warrant of arrest.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner may assail the validity of his warrant of arrest.

RULING:

NO. Although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured when
petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail, submitting a
memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his application was
denied.
103.

People v Salvatierra; G.R. No. 104663; 24 Jul 1997


FACTS:

For the fatal stabbing of Charlie Fernandez, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, meted accused David
Salvatierra for the crime of Murder the penalty of reclusion perpetua and payment of the amount of
P30,183.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victims. Consequently,
thereto, herein accused appealed his case to the Supreme Court assailing that the lower court erred in
not finding that the arrest, investigation and detention of the accused-appellant for the offense charged
in the instant case violate of his constitutional rights and for giving weight and credence to the vague
and ambiguous testimony of the prosecution witness.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner may assail the validity of his warrant of arrest.

RULING:

NO. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised
this before entering his plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. This is the first time that appellant is raising this issue as he
did not even move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on the ground of illegal
arrest. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by his voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and participated during the
trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was free from error.
104.

People v de Guzman; G.R. Nos. 98321-24; 30 Jun 1993; 224 SCRA 93

FACTS:

Equipped with search warrants, combined Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police elements
searched several houses on the basis of intelligence reports about the presence of armed men who
were suspected to have pulled an ambush. No firearm was found but 10 suspects were picked up and
later presented in a police lineup to witnesses who positively identified them. All were prosecuted for
three counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder, but only appellant was found guilty.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant may assail the validity of his arrest without a warrant.

RULING:

NO. It bears emphasis that accused-appellant, together with his co-accused, pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment. Appellant is, thus, estopped from questioning te legality of his arrest. Any irregularity
attendant to his arrest was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial.

Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications with respect to the civil indemnity to be paid to the
heirs of each victim who died.
105.

People v Lopez; G.R. No. 104662; 16 Jun 1995; 245 SCRA 95

FACTS:

The police promptly arrested appellant seven months after he stabbed two people, one of whom died
from his wounds. He was charged with and convicted of murder.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant may still question is warrantless arrest.

RULING:

NO. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. He did not move for the quashal of
the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his
arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by
entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is
not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial
free from error.
106.

People v Dural; G.R. No. 84921; 08 Jun 1993; 223 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Two witnesses came forward to give their statement regarding a shooting incident. They were brought
to a hospital where they saw appellant Dural who shot the two victims. The appellants were taken to
Capcom’s Bicutan headquarters for questioning.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest was legal.

RULING:

YES. It is too late for the appellant to question the illegality of their arrests. The irregularity, if any, was
cured when they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing a petition for bail,
entering a plea of not guilty and actively participating at the pre-trial and trial.

Judgment of conviction as to appellant Dural is AFFIRMED. Appellant Itucal is ACQUITTED.


107.

De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil 689

Facts:

Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the
petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for “certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers
relating to her activities as usurer.” The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioner’s bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who
was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof.

The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

While the Solicitor-General admits that, in the light of decisions of this court, the search warrant was
illegally issued, he maintains the waiver may be either express or implied. No express waiver has been
made in the case before us. It is urged, however, that there has been a waiver by implication.

The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.

Issue:

W/N there has been a waiver by the petitioner of her constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Ruling:

No. It may be admitted that waiver may be the result of a failure to object within a reasonable time to a
search and seizure illegally made. However, the petitioner, on several occasions, and prior to the filing of
criminal actions against her, had demanded verbally, through counsel, the return by the Anti-Usuary
Board of the properties seized.
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right
exists; secondly, that the persons involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. She could not
have objected because she was sick and was not present when the warrant was served upon Alfredo
Salas.

Of course, the petitioner came to know later of the seizure of some of her papers and documents. But
this was precisely the reason why she sent her attorneys to the office of the Anti-Usuary Board to
demand the return of the documents seized. In any event, the failure on the part of the petitioner and
her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver
of constitutional right.

The delay in making demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result in waiver by
implication.
108.

People v Omaweng; G.R. No. 99050; 02 Sep 1992; 213 SCRA 462

FACTS:

A checkpoint was put up and all vehicles that went through it were stopped and checked. The officers
flagged down the car driven by the accused and asked permission to inspect the vehicle to which he
acceded. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially
covered by the rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. The officers
again asked permission to see the contents of the bag. appellant consented to the request. Inside, the
officers found forty-one plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized substances which was
later identified as marijuana.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and seizure was unreasonable and a violation of the appellant’s
Constitutional right.

RULING:

NO. Accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. He willingly gave prior consent to the
search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused
waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Since in the course of the valid search
forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was
necessary for such seizure.

The decision of the lower court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is AFFIRMED.
109.

Aniag v COMELEC; G.R. No. 104961; 07 Oct 1994; 237 SCRA 424

FACTS:

In preparation for the scheduled synchronized elections, COMELEC issued a Gun Ban resolution. Ceding
to the request of the House of Representatives Sergeant-at-Arms to return the firearms issued to him,
petitioner instructed his driver to pick up the firearms from his house and to bring the same to Congress.
The driver was then apprehended at a checkpoint after the policemen found the firearms in a bag in the
truck of the car.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner’s driver acquiesced to the warrantless search.

RULING:

NO. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone
and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest
against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the “implied acquiescence,” if
there was any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and
“consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
110.

People v Exala; G.R. No. 76005; 23 Apr 1993; 221 SCRA 494

FACTS:

A private jeep driven by accused-appellant was stopped at a police checkpoint for routine inspection
regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items. A member of the inspection team noticed a
black leather bag with its sides bulging at the back of the jeep. He became suspicious after the three
became fidgety when asked of the bag’s contents. Found inside were marijuana. The three were then
charged, tried and found guilty.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the warrantless search may be admitted was valid.

RULING:

YES. Appellant never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was
obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of
such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence.
111.

People v Ramos; G.R. Nos. 101804-07; 25 May 1993; 222 SCRA 557

FACTS:

Following a tip from an informer, police operatives patrolled Miranda Subdivision for a possible
engagement with the suspects of a series of armed robbery incidents. Accompanied by one of the
victims, the lawmen chanced upon petitioner Felimon Ramos who the victim identified as one of the
armed men he encountered during the robbery. When accosted and frisked by the lawmen, Ramos
yielded in his waistline a .38 caliber snub nosed “paltik” revolver loaded with two (2) live bullets. At the
police headquarters, Ramos admitted involvement in the aforementioned robbery incidents and
identified all his cohorts, one of home is Antonio Contreras.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the frisking and seizure of the gun tucked on petitioner’s waistline were illegal for lack
of a valid search warrant.

RULING:

NO. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily allowed himself to be
frisked and that he gave the gun to a police officer. Thus, there was deemed a valid waiver.
112.

People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174

Wa na pud
113.

People v Solayao; G.R. No. 119220; 20 Sep 1996; 262 SCRA 255

FACTS:

While conducting an intelligence patrol, the arresting officers met appellant who was drunk and wearing
a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. After introducing himself as PC, the police officer seized the dried
coconut leaves which appellant was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm
locally known as “latong.” The latter had no permission to possess the same. The firearm was
confiscated and he was turned over to the custody of the Caibiran police who subsequently investigated
him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm which is a product
of an unlawful warrantless search.

RULING:

NO. Solayao and his companion’s drunken actuations as well as the fact that Solayao was attired in
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit and the flight of his companions aroused the suspicion of the police
officer’s group.
114.

People v Barros; G.R. No. 90640; 29 Mar 1994; 231 SCRA 557

FACTS:

While aboard a bus, two peace officers inspected appellant’s carton which the latter placed under his
seat and found that it contained marijuana. Appellant was invited to the detachment for questioning as
the suspect. The bus conductor was called to identify the owner after appellant denied his ownership.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been
violated.

RULING:

YES. There existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two police
officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. There was nothing to show that appellant Barros was
then in the process of “actually committing” or “attempting to commit” a crime. There was nothing on
the record that could have reasonably led the police officers to believe that “an offense [had] in fact just
been committed” when appellant boarded the bus or when he was asked whether he owned the box at
the checkpoint. The police officers had no “personable knowledge of facts indicating that appellant had
committed it.” There was, in brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and
seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and invalid.

Decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED.
115.

Veroy v Judge Layague; G.R. No. 95630; 18 Jun 1992; 210 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero, acting upon a directive, raided the Davao City residence of petitioner spouses
who were already residing in Quezon City on information that the said residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. The team did not enter the house since the owner was not present and they
did not have a search warrant. When contacted by Obrero to ask permission to search the house, Ma.
Luisa relented if the search would be conducted in the presence of longtime family friend, a ranking
military officer. The team gained entry into the yard and the kitchen. With the help of a locksmith, the
team entered the children’s room and conducted the search with resulted in the recovery of several
articles which include a firearm and jute sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the officers violated the petitioners’ constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure.

RULING:

YES. The reason for searching the house of herein petitioners is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound,
he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the owners were not present.
This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in
entering the house but rather contacted the petitioners to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was indeed granted by petitioner to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of
rebel soldiers. Under the circumstances, it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to
procure a search warrant but did not.

Petition is GRANTED and the criminal case against the petitioners for illegal possession of firearms is
DISMISSED.
116.

People v Musa; G.R. No. 96177; 27 Jan 1993; 217 SCRA 597

FACTS:

A day after elements of the NARCOM team had conducted a surveillance and successful test buy on
appellant pursuant to an information received that he is engaged in the sale of marijuana, a buy-bust
operation was planned which resulted in appellant’s arrest. The team found a plastic bag containing
dried marijuana.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.

RULING:

YES. The NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but
found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag
hanging in a corner. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the “plain view” of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

Appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.


117.

Posadas v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 89139; 02 Aug 1990; 188 SCRA 288

FACTS:

While conducting a surveillance, the two policemen spotted petitioner carrying a “buri” bag and acting
suspiciously. He attempted to flee when the policemen approached him and identified themselves but
his attempt was thwarted. Found inside the “buri” bag were one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) rounds live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
Petitioner failed to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found
in his possession. He was subsequently prosecuted for and found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was probable cause to justify the warrantless search and arrest of the petitioner.

RULING:

YES. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
118.

People v Rodriguez; G.R. No. 79965; 25 May 1994; 232 SCRA 498

FACTS:

Pursuant to a report that somebody was selling marijuana, police officers proceeded to the location,
spotted appellant and his co-accused acting suspiciously, and placed the two under arrest. A small
packet containing marijuana was found inside appellant’s pocket. Only appellant was charged of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid.

RULING:

NO. The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or
personal belonging except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. There is no
evidence to show that appellant was committing any crime at the time of his arrest.

Appellant’s conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.


119.

People v Tangliben; G.R. No. L-63630; 06 Apr 1990; 184 SCRA 220

FACTS:

A group composed of policemen and barangay tanods requested a man, later identified as appellant, to
open his red travelling bag. The man initially refused but later acceded to the request when the
patrolmen identified themselves. Found inside the bag were approximately a kilo of marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper. Appellant was taken to the police headquarters, tried and convicted for
violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended).

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the package of marijuana seized from appellant may be validly admitted in evidence.

RULING:

YES. Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. Although
the trial court’s decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was
an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant.

Judgement of conviction by the trial court is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
120.

People v Malmstedt; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991; 198 SCRA 401

FACTS:

Due to persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs, a temporary checkpoint was set up for the checking of all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. During their inspection of a bus, one of the officers noticed a bulge, suspected to be a
gun, on accused’s waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and found therein hashish, a
derivative of marijuana. Accused was carrying two travelling bags, each containing a teddy bear with
bulges inside which did not feel like foam stuffing. The accused was arrested, tried and convicted for
violation of RA 6425, as amended.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and arrest of the accused were illegal for lack of warrant.

RULING:

NO. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto.
121. Yapdi na kami Catan-tan.

People v Catan; G.R. No. 92928; 21 Jan 1992; 205 SCRA 235

FACTS:

A team of operatives rushed inside appellant’s house to arrest him after a “buy-bust” operation and
conducted a search of the premises in the presence of a barangay official, the house owner and
appellant himself. The search yielded dried marijuana fruiting tops and seeds.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest and search were valid.

RULING:

YES. Appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to the
poseur-buyers. The subsequent search of his house which immediately followed yielding other
incriminating evidence, and which became the basis of his conviction for possession of a prohibited
drug, was a search contemporaneously made and as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest in the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. That is a recognized exception to the general rule that
any search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant.

Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.


122.

Pita v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 80806; 05 Oct 1989; 178 SCRA 362

FACTS:

Pursuant to the anti-smut campaign of the City of Manila, elements of the police force seized and
confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent
and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the publications seized and later burned were
magazines published and co-edited by petitioner.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.

RULING:

NO. Private respondents were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
123.

People v dela Cruz; G.R. No. 83260; 18 Apr 1990; 184 SCRA 416

FACTS:

After receiving a confidential report from their informant, a buy-bust operation was conducted by a
team from the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit to catch the pusher/s. At the scene, it was the accused-
appellant who first negotiated with the poseur-buyer. Appellant instructed his co-accused to give one
aluminum foil of marijuana which the latter got from his pants’ pocket and delivered it to the buyer.
After ascertaining that the authenticity of the marijuana, the agent gave signal. The two accused were
arrested.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest was valid.

RULING:

YES. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one’s person
without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident
to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested was committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is
a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red-handed.

Judgment of the lower court is AFFIRMED.


124.

People v Kalubiran; G.R. No. 84079; 06 May 1991; 196 SCRA 645

FACTS:

Appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-bust” operation. The arresting officer frisked him and
recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on appellant’s person.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the arrest and search violated appellant’s constitutional right.

RULING:

NO. The accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually
committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under
Section 12 of Rule 116.

Appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto.


125.

People v Zapanta; G.R. No. 90853; 13 Mar 1991; 195 SCRA 200

FACTS:

Accused was arrested following a buy-bust operation. Police operatives searched his mat, pillow and
blanket, recovering one marijuana stick. However, the buyer still had the marked money in his hand.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the confiscated marijuana stick is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO. Apart from the uncertainty among the witnesses as to how many marijuana cigarettes, if any, were
found in accused’s possession during the raid, the search in his shack was made without a warrant,
hence, the marijuana cigarette or cigarettes seized in that raid were inadmissible as evidence

Appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.


126.

Roldan v Arca; G.R. No. L-25434; 25 Jul 1975; 65 SCRA 336

FACTS:

Petitioner Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy seized and impounded two fishing
vessels owned by respondent company for illegal fishing with dynamite.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not search and seizure of the fishing vessels without a warrant were unlawful.

RULING:

NO. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs
laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. The
same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard.

Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID.


127.

Hizon v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 119619; 13 Dec 1996; 265 SCRA 517

FACTS:

On the strength of the report submitted by the Task Force Bantay Dagat, the PNP Maritime Group
boarded and inspected a big fishing boat with the acquiescence of the boat captain. In the course of the
inspection, the police discovered a large aquarium full of live fishes. Some of the fishes were tested to
contain cyanide.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search of the fishing boat was lawful.

RULING:

YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted
on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. The same exception
ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are
normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
128.

People v Aminnudin; G.R. No. L-74869; 06 Jul 1988; 163 SCRA 402

FACTS:

Having earlier received a tip from an informer identifying the accused by name who was on board a
vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana, the PC officers simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him and he was eventually convicted.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not Aminnudin’s arrest and search were lawful.

RULING:

NO. It is clear that the PC had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received,
they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.”
129.

People v Saycon; G.R. No. 110995; 05 Sep 1994; 236 SCRA 325

FACTS:

Accused, a suspected shabu “courier,” was intercepted at a checkpoint set up by a combined team of
NARCOM and Coastguard personnel after receiving information that the accused will be arriving aboard
a boat at that moment. He obliged to the request for him to open his bag, inside which was found a
cigarette pack containing the suspected “shabu.”

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search of the accused’s bag was illegal.

RULING:

NO. Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles —automobiles, trucks, etc. —
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a
vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case.

Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.


130.

Papa v Mago; G.R. No. L-27360; 28 Feb 1968; 22 SCRA 857

FACTS:

Acting upon a reliable information that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port and loaded on two
trucks, police officers intercepted and seized said trucks.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not a police officer could seize imported goods without a search warrant.

RULING:

YES. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.

Writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for is GRANTED.


131.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX, QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980

FACTS:

The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a
shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge
car. Spurred by such lead, they stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North
Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City.

A light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina approached the
exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and
overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter
instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could not go through
because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car
and the latter stopped.

The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to what those boxes
were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Respondents told that they were bringing the boxes to the
Tropical Hut at Epifanio de los Santos.

Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man
who according to Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col.
Abad "called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo.

An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear
seat and seven (7) more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders of Col. Abad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted is lawful.

RULING:

What ASAC agents did was a faithful performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs
Code directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles reasonably suspected of having been
possessed, issued or procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government has a direct
interest.
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely within the privileged area where search
and seizure may lawfully be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less receptive to
the applicability of the classic American ruling, the latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision
must be upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the constitutional guarantee has not been
violated and the respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20, 1975 declaring as
inadmissible evidence the items or articles obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any
search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to be presented as evidence against the
accused.

WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded for further
trial and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such action as
the prosecution may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove
directed.
132.

People v Balingan; G.R. No. 105834; 13 Feb 1995; 241 SCRA 277

FACTS:

Upon receipt of an information that appellant was going to transport a bag filled with marijuana, a
surveillance team was formed to monitor her movements. In the course of such surveillance, she was
apprehended inside a bus and a bag containing bundles of marijuana flowering tops were confiscated.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the search done inside the bus and the consequent seizure of the marijuana flowering
tops were illegal for the absence of a valid warrant.

RULING:

NO. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a
moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant.

Conviction is AFFIRMED in toto.


133.

PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122

FACTS:

In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a tip from one of its informers about an
organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate
the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and “deep penetration agents” under OPLAN
SHARON 887. One such agent was Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted
regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates. CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan
sharon 887, in turned informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia’s activities.

Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another agent named George. Lim wanted a
male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by Lim.
Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be
Tia’s intended companion.

Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4, 1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that
they would return to the Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to Guangzhou in
mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they
were opened for examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wing’s room and he saw two other
men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning a substance on a piece of
aluminum foil using a lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke
emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing what cargo they would bring to Manila,
the latter replied that they would be bringing Chinese drugs.

The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the bags containing the tin cans of tea.
Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In Manila, They
were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded
their luggage in the taxi’s compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another taxi.

Meanwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned themselves in strategic areas around the
airport. The CIS men who first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS car
overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team
asked the taxi driver to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked permission to search their
luggage.

A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the CIS pried the lid open and
pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum came
out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened
for inspection. All the bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to
escape. However, they were later captured.

Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects were indicted for
violating Art. III, sec.15 of the Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000 each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as
a state witness. The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents since the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties were in their favor.

ISSUES:

1. Was the warrantless search valid?

2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?

HELD:

1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known exceptions to the valid
warrantless search and seizure. To still get a search warrant from a judge would allow the accused go
scot-free.

2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as evidence in any
proceeding.

3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)

a. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857

b. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16

c. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517

d. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721

4. Seize of evidence in plain view

a. Harris vs. US, 390 US 234

b. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

c. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135

d. PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213

5. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;


a. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689

b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336

c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid waiver to a warrantless
search, the waiver or consent should be given by the person affected, not just anybody. Example: The
landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said tenant himself
should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs. Commissioner to the effect that it
could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)

d. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house allowed the policemen to
enter his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they instead
seized an unlicensed firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)

6. STOP AND FRISK.

a. People vs. Mengote, June, 1992

b. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288

c. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw several suspicious looking
men at dawn who ran when they went near them. As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed
firearm was confiscated. The search is valid)

d. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless
arrest)
134.

Valmonte v de Villa; G.R. No. 83988; 29 Sep 1989; 178 SCRA 211

FACTS:

The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated on January 20, 1987 pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintain peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region. The NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not checkpoints are illegal as they violate the people’s right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

RULING:

NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but it is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Between the inherent right of the state to
protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

Petition is DISMISSED.
135.

Mustang Lumber v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 104988; 18 Jun 1996; 257 SCRA 430

FACTS:

Acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside
petitioner’s lumberyard, a team of foresters and policeman was organized and sent to conduct
surveillance. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the
petitioner’s truck loaded with lumber. The driver could not produce the required invoices and transport
documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the seizure of the truck and its cargo without warrant was unlawful.

RULING:

NO. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after
personally determining the existence of probable cause.

Petition is DENIED.
136.

Bagalihog v Fernandez; G.R. No. 96356; 27 Jun 1991; 198 SCRA 614

FACTS:

A politician was shot to death shortly after disembarking at the airport. Witnesses said that one of the
gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, petitioner’s house was searched with his consent of the
killers but the search proved fruitless. Two days later, members of the Philippine Constabulary seized
sans a search warrant petitioner’s motorcycle and impounded the same on the suspicion that it was one
of the vehicles used by the killers.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the motorcycle was lawful.

RULING:

NO. The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone”
by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution. The vehicle cannot even be detained on the
ground that it is a prohibited article the mere possession of which is unlawful.

Order of the respondent judge is SET ASIDE.


137.

Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

387 U.S. 523, (1967)

Facts: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using
part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to
inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment
building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant.

The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days later, and
again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him
to appear at the district attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other
inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have
a search warrant.

A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was
denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section “does not violate
Fourth Amendment rights because it ”is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than
criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and
may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.’

Issue: Whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate
Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment?

Held: Yes. “[Frank v. Maryland], to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be
overruled.”

“In [Frank v. Maryland], [the Supreme Court] upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public
nuisance.” “[T]he Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to
the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

The majority here observed, “[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the
discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we
have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search.
We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this
context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those
safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.”

“Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other than by
balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But [the majority thought]
that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code-enforcement
inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the
public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any
other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions — faulty wiring is
an obvious example — are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to
the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed
at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s
privacy.”

Further, “[after] concluded that the area inspection is a ”reasonable’ search of private property within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, [the majority observed] it is obvious that ”probable cause’ to
issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting
an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary
with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the
building (e. g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not
necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. It has been
suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in criminal cases would be
to authorize a ”synthetic search warrant’ and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth
Amendment.”

Moreover, “[t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private property
is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a
valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably
restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines applicable to
criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause requirement in this area. It merely
gives full recognition to the competing public and private interests here at stake and, in so doing, best
fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government
invasions of privacy.”

Discussion: The majority was careful not to limit all searches in emergency circumstances. It observed:
“Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of reasonableness, nothing we say today is
intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld
in emergency situations. On the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no
compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow
inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that
warrants should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint
or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a
warrant procedure does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most
situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.”
138.

TOMAS CHIA vs COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-43810 September 26, 1989

FACTS:

A verified report of a confidential informant that asserted electronic and electrical equipment and other
articles illegally imported into the Philippines by a syndicate engaged in unlawful “shipside” activities
(foreign goods are unloaded form foreign ships in transit through the Bureau of Customs, thereby
evading payment of the corresponding customs duties, and were found inside the “Tom’s electronics”
and “Sony Merchandising” after valuation, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure and
detention Nos: 14925 ad 14925-A.

Search Warrant:

Various electronics equipment like cassette tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph
needles, portable TV sets, imported long playing records, spare parts of TVs and Radios and
other electrical appliances.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrants of seizure and detention are general warrant issued in violation of Rule 126,
Sections 3 of Rules of Court?

HELD:

Petition dismissed.

RATIONALE:

Section 2208 (Customs) – Tariff and Customs Code – Right of Police Officer to enter in closure, a
warehouse, store, or other building or in closure used for keeping or storage or articles does not
become a dwelling house within the meaning.

Section 2536 (Seizure of other articles) – The Commissioner of Customs and Collector of Customs and or
any other Customs officer, with the prior authorization in writing by the commissioner, may demand
evidence of payment of duties and taxes on foreign articles.

Search of Dwelling House (Section 2209) – Upon warrant issued by a Judge of the Court or such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law, upon sworn application showing probable cause and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
The warrants issued by the Collector of Customs in this case were not general warrant, as erroneously
alleged by petitioner for they identified the stores to be seized, described the articles to be seized and
specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
139.

Guazon v de Villa; G.R. No. 80508; 30 Jan 1990; 181 SCRA 615

FACTS:

The military and police conducted a series of saturation drives or areal target zoning intended to flush
out subversives and criminal elements. Petitioners alleged that these activities were conducted without
any search warrant or warrant of arrest.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the saturation drives are illegal.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution grants to Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights.

Petition is REMANDED to the trial court where petitioner may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
140.

People v de Gracia; G.R. Nos. 102009-10; 06 Jul 1994; 233 SCRA 716

FACTS:

A team from the NCR Defense Command conducted a surveillance on a Eurocar building pursuant to an
intelligence report that elements of the RAM-SFP was occupying the said establishment as their
communication command post. After they were fired at by a group of five men, a searching team raided
the Eurocar Sales Office, finding and confiscating ammunition, dynamites, M-shells and “Molotov”
bombs inside one of the rooms and arresting appellant who was holding a C-4.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

RULING:

YES. The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There
was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts.

Impugned judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, but the recommended executive clemency is
DELETED.
141. Pag recits tapos namental block ka. Ayun, lahat ng nabasa mo Demaisip.

Demaisip v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 89393; 25 Jan 1991; 193 SCRA 373

FACTS:

Petitioner was tried for and convicted of illegal possession of marijuana. The Court of Appeals admitted
in evidence the marijuana seized from him and affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not petitioner may object to the admissibility of the evidence against him during this appeal.

RULING:

NO. Objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence obtained
thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the legality of the search warrant was raised during
the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the evidence obtained through said warrant.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.


142.

People v Diaz; G.R. No. 110829; 18 Apr 1997; 271 SCRA 504

FACTS:

During their trial for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, appellants interposed the
defenses of alibi and denial. They were subsequently found guilty.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not they may still question the admissibility of the evidence against them in their appeal.

RULING:

NO. Their objection is too late. The records show that they failed to object to the admissibility of said
evidence during their formal offer. Thus, they waived their right against their admissibility. Amidst a
waiver, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.


143. Ayeeeee, 143 daw oh.

People v Salazar; G.R. No. 99355; 11 Aug 1997; 277 SCRA 67

FACTS:

Appellants were arrested without warrants after eyewitnesses implicated them as the perpetrators in a
robbery with homicide incident. Trial on the merits ensued and they were convicted on the special
complex crime on the weight of the eyewitnesses’ testimonies.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the illegality of their arrest rendered the eyewitnesses’ testimony inadmissible.

RULING:

NO. Granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these
eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Considering that their
conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court which are
not inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter.

Assailed judgment is MODIFIED. Appellants are found GUILTY of the separate crimes of homicide and
theft.
144. 12 squared

Roan v Gonzales; G.R. No. 71410; 25 Nov 1986; 145 SCRA 687

FACTS:

On the strength of the challenged search warrant, petitioner’s house was searched but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the searching officers found in the premises one
Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which were all confiscated and were made the bases of
the charge against him.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the prohibited articles seized are admissible in evidence and must be immediately
returned.

RULING:

NO. The search being illegal, the pistol and bullets cannot be used as evidence against the petitioner in
the criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of the case,
however, the said articles must remain in custodial egis.

Assailed search warrant is declared NULL and VOID and accordingly SET ASIDE.

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