International media assistance and aid effectiveness:

Conceptual blindspots and institutional incentives

Abby Jones and Silvio Waisbord

George Washington University

Paper prepared for presentation at American Political Science Association Conference

September 2-5, 2010
Washington, Dc

Please do not quote or re-print any portion of the research without the
authors’ permission.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1667444

 The volume of international media assistance (IMA) has significantly grown

during the past two decades (Kumar 2006, LeMay 2007). Although the levels of funding

are minuscule compared to overall expenditures of international aid i , major donors have

increased support for initiatives aimed at fostering freedom of expression, media

independence, diversity of opinion, democratic press legislation, investigative journalism,

and equal access to information technologies. This has resulted in the multiplication of

IMA programs worldwide. Contributions by the United States alone in the last ten years

have equaled an estimated $1 billion and that does not include the wealth of “experts,”

private contractors, and in-kind contributors participating in the process (CIMA 2008,

Price et al 2002, Kumar 2006, Arsenault 2008). Only recently, however, scholars have

paid attention to the conceptual underpinning as well as the impact of IMA. Despite the

long and rich tradition of scholarship in the field of development and international aid

(Jacobson and Servaes 1994, Waisbord 2008), issues related to media and democracy

have received meager attention (Price et al 2002). As an instance of international aid “at

work”, IMA offers a wealth of experiences to examine the contributions of global donors

and organizations to promoting development and social change goals. Also, the analysis

of IMA provides a window into key issues that are at the center of current debates about

the challenges for aid effectiveness.

Despite differences rooted in diverse media tradition on both sides of the Atlantic

(Tudor and Becker 2005; CIMA 2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), IMA programs sponsored

by U.S. and European donors are largely aimed at promoting, what is broadly understood

as, “free and independent media” and the “professionalization of journalism.” Such goals

are embedded in classic Western ideals about freedom of speech as a pillar of democracy,

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1667444

and the modern paradigm of Anglo-American journalism. Contemporary definitions of

democracy place the unobstructed dissemination of information, and freedom of the press

as sine qua non conditions (Berman and Witzner 1997, Dahl 1998; Diamond et al 1988,

Price et al 2002, Arsenault 2008). Additionally, notions about press independence and

freedom of expression are enshrined in international documents, and agreements that

offer conceptual references for IMA programs, such as Article 19 of the United Nations

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

This growing centrality of the media in contemporary politics further reinforces the

need to prioritize media democracy in international aid. The strengthening of democracy

worldwide inevitably requires supporting media systems that function according to well-

established expectations about freedom and independence (Carothers 1999). In the

literature on international aid and development, questions about media democracy are

linked to the promotion of good governance, political participation, and the quality of

democracy (LeMay 2007).

What free and independent media actually means in specific contexts, however,

remains unclear. Despite countless definitions in programmatic reports and institutional

mission statements (Howard 2003; USAID 1999), the meanings of “media democracy”

and other IMA goals are ambiguous. This should not be surprising considering that, as

academic studies have shown, there is not a single model of media and democracy, but

rather, varying configurations of media systems in even Western democracies (Hallin and

Mancini, 2004). The characteristics of media systems that are based on democratic ideals

are notoriously different across old and new democracies. Issues such as the definition of

professional journalism, the role of the state and markets in media systems, the place of

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civic/citizens’ media, or the contributions of partisan/advocacy media to democracy are

constant matter of debate.

Despite scholarly calls to clarify these issues (McConnell and Becker 2002), many

questions remain unanswered. What does “free and independent media” mean across

various political and cultural contexts? If challenges for media democracy vary across

countries and regions, how does IMA effectively incorporate contextual factors in the

promotion of similar goals? How do programs operationalize broad goals? What does the

vast number of IMA programs tell us about the link between aid interventions and media

transformations? After over two decades of multi-million dollar investments across the

world, what do we know about the process of media transformation and the role of

international actors?

These questions are important particularly amidst increased interest in aid

effectiveness and accountability as well as concerns about the impact of IMA,

(Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008; Miller 2009; Oates 2006; USGAO 2005). In the past

decade, the question “does aid work?’ (Lancaster 2007; Ridell 2007) has attracted much

attention from scholars, agencies, and practitioners. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid

Effectiveness, and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action have articulated ongoing priorities

across a range of actors, and outlined key ideas to inform further debate about the impact

of aid. The Paris Declaration has emphasized the ideals of accountability, transparency,

and non-discrimination as central to good governance and the expression of voices of

socially marginalized people. The Accra Agenda for Action has highlighted the

importance of dialogue, transparency, and local ownership in development. These issues

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are relevant to IMA particularly given the limited amount of data about program

effectiveness.

Against this backdrop of renewed interest in the impact of foreign aid and

increased funding for IMA, this paper analyzes how selected programs articulate broad

media objectives with program goals and apply indicators to determine impact. Our

interest is to understand how media assistance goals are operationalized and measured,

and how program goals are linked to broad objectives. Program goals are where the

rubber of theoretical assumptions about media democracy and foreign aid meet the road

of the challenges of specific media systems. They are embedded in conceptual

frameworks about media democracy as well as model(s) of media change. They

operationalize the meanings of “media independence/freedom” and models of media

change into concrete courses of action. They are more than just the crystallization of “big

ideas” about media democracy and “how to get there” in specific settings, however. They

distill conceptual notions into manageable interventions funded by donors and designed

by organizations with specific goals.

This paper discusses how IMA programs articulate broad objectives about media

and democracy and project goals and indicators. We propose to approach program goals

in IMA not only as the reflection of normative arguments about desirable media

structures and practices, and models of development and change. They also need to be

viewed as the expression of the dynamics and organizational goals of aid institutions.

Programs are not simply or, one could reasonably argue, mostly about translating ideals

about media and democracy, theories about social change and international development,

and evidence-based models about effective aid. They reflect institutional missions,

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priorities, opportunities, and constraints within the complex and sensitive politics of

international aid. Our analysis is guided by the notion that institutions and institutional

incentives matter in international aid. Ideas about development and media democracy and

funding assigned to achieve specific goals are channeled through institutions with distinct

objectives and dynamics. This is why the study of IMA programs is important. They

allow us to analyze critically the conceptual underpinnings of media assistance and the

workings of aid organizations.

Cases and methodology

To analyze how organizations define their programmatic goals, objectives and

indicators, we examined specific programs, both ongoing and completed projects at four

different organizations: International Research and Exchange Board (IREX),

International Women’s Media Fund (IWMF), Internews, and Media Development Loan

Fund (MDLF).

Information was gathered through reports provided by the organization,

conversations with staff members and on-line sources. Within each organization four to

five specific programs were examined in comparison to the organizations’ overarching

missions that were found on-line and confirmed by organizations’ staff members.

Conversations, both by phone and in person, with one to three senior program staff

members at each organization not only offered insights but also greater access to program

reports that ran from pre-program planning to post-program evaluation. Program level

staffers were chosen as the primary interviewees, as after preliminary discussions with

various staff members, they appeared to play a significant role in all stages of program

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implementation and evaluation. They also had a good deal of direct contact with

journalists and partner organizations “on the ground” at each site.

These contractor organizations, all of which have been at the forefront of IMA for

the past decades, were chosen both for their similarities and differences. They share

similar organizational missions, and all work directly with journalists and news

organizations. They also all “work to maintain an independent approach to media

assistance without allowing reliance on a single donor government to exert undue

influence over their work” (Price et al 2002, pg. 22). Yet, the organizations vary in the

focus of their work: the IWMF focuses on women and media, the MDLF is primarily

interested in questions of financial sustainability, and IREX and Internews have both

supported a range of initiatives. This variation will allow us to isolate how institutional

priorities impact the use and definition of objectives, goals and indicators in the IMA

field as a whole.

IREX was founded in 1968, and has worked in the field of media assistance since

1990’s. One of the largest implementers of USAID programs, they annually dedicate

approximately $20 million of their annual portfolio of over $60 million to their media

development projects in 16 countries and Media Sustainability Index (MSI) studies in 80

countries. According to their website, “IREX is an international nonprofit organization

providing leadership and innovative programs to improve the quality of education,

strengthen independent media, and foster pluralistic civil society development.” Key to

this paper is their understanding of the contributions of the news media: “Independent

media informs and engages citizens through the free flow of information that advances

democratic and economic development. A professional media sector builds more

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transparent and effective governance, promotes fair and open economies, and generates

responsible discussion about social and political issues.” IREX’s wide-ranging program

agenda includes: journalism training and education, media strategy and management,

business development, news and public affairs production, media law reform, technology

and infrastructure development.

The IWMF was founded in 1990, and by their own definition “is a vibrant global

network dedicated to strengthening the role of women in the news media worldwide as a

means to further freedom of the press.” IWMF categorizes their work as falling in four

areas: networking, cultivating leadership, honoring courage and pioneering change.

Programming at IWMF ranges from sponsoring global Leadership Institutes “that give

women the skills and the network they need to become successful newsroom leaders,” to

their Courage Award to acting as a clearing house for research on women in the media

and the issues they are reporting on to undertakings such as the current South Asia

Initiative on Women and HIV/AIDS Policymaking.

Internews was founded in 1982, and like IREX, developed a focus on media

development in post-Soviet states after 1989. As these states have largely transitioned

and needs in other settings have arisen, the organization has also transitioned to work

globally. They define themselves as, “an international media development organization

whose mission is to empower local media worldwide to give people the news and

information they need, the ability to connect, and the means to make their voices heard.”

Having worked in more than 70 countries, Internews activities include: training,

production assistance, providing infrastructure support and media law policy adoption

efforts. More specifically they implement global programs on issues such as health and

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environmental journalism, reporting on conflicts, media development research and

government and transparency. Internews claims to having supported the development of

approximately 4800 independent media outlets and has projected revenues of $35 million

for 2009.

The Media Development Loan Fund is “a mission-driven investment fund for

independent news outlets in countries with a history of media oppression. [They] provide

low-cost capital, solutions and know-how to help journalists in challenging environments

build sustainable businesses around professional, responsible, quality journalism.”

Additionally, “MDLF provides leading journalists with the support they need to create

lasting institutions for change.” MDLF works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Southeast

Europe and the CIS helping “essential independent new providers to expand their

audience, improve their news products and become financially sustainable.”

Blindspots

Our examination of selected programs yields four key findings: imprecise

definitions of broad programmatic goals, the lack of clear rationale for how goals are

operationalized into specific activities and interventions; discrepancy between objectives

and programmatic goals; and the absence of measurement of long-term impact. These are

four blindspots in IMA that deserve attention for they have important implications for

effective actions in support of various goals.

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Conceptual vagueness

First, the goals laid out lack uniform and clear definition. Each of the

organizations utilizes terms such as “professionalism,” “sustainability,” “press freedom,”

“independent media,” “responsibility,” and “fair and balanced journalism,” among many

others when setting organizational and programmatic goals, but the definitions of these

terms are few and far between. MDLF defines “Independent Media” as “privately owned,

non-political enterprises that provide the general public with a socially valuable service

through the publishing or broadcasting of independent news.” None of their public

documents, however, offer a broad or case specific indication of what “holding

governments to account” would entail or explain how “financial or economic

independence” leads to the creation of “lasting institutions for change,” or even what

specific societal “change” they are seeking, beyond the direct building of media

organizations. (Media Development Loan Fund, 2010).

In USAID-funded IREX’s Kosovo Strengthening Independent Minority Media

(SIMM) example there were two overall desired results/ programmatic goals:

Strengthening of minority broadcast media and strengthening independent media

enabling institutions. Although IREX documents, gathered on-line and directly from staff

members, go into detail about the activities and indicators involved in achieving these

goals, they do not define what a “strengthened” media outlet or enabling institution

would be comprised of. Additionally, under these goals IREX cites the achievements of

“professionalizing minority media” and “improving business practices” but offer no

definition of a “professional media” or “good business practices.” They seek a result of

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having the Independent Media Commission regulating “the broadcast media fairly and

transparently,” stating this and the other goals mentioned here will “contribute to higher-

level USAID objective of overall governance of the media,” but again do not define the

amorphous terms of “fairly and transparently.”

When asked about working specifically on USAID-funded projects, staffers at

more than one organization spoke about how the projects fit into larger, strategic, country

based frameworks and that typically the goals come from the “priorities set in

Washington, although the bidding organizations can use their expertise to help gently

guide a project’s direction in some ways.” One staff member specifically spoke about

how even the fact that USAID chooses the countries for reasons unrelated to media

development can cause the “overall goals of the project to be skewed.”

As part of its Law and Policy efforts, Internews claims it “has worked for the

adoption and implementation of fair media laws in 21 countries making the transition

from a formerly totalitarian or autocratic state towards a more democratic society [and]

helped create 112 national media associations, which advocate for just and open media

laws, defend the civil rights of journalists, and promote industry reform.” The meaning of

key objectives such as fair media, relationship between government and the press, or

professional reporting, is not clearly defined. When asked about it, program officers refer

to the existence of implicit “unwitting consensus about what makes up good quality

journalism” and common knowledge among “people who work in the field.” Such

observations presumably allude to conventional understandings of those ideals. Yet if one

even slightly scratches the surface of what “democratic media,” “good journalism,”

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“quality reporting” and other ideals that are commonly bandied about in IMA, it is not

obvious what they mean.

To stress the conceptual ambiguity of staple concepts is not just a matter of

academic fastidiousness and rigor. Rather, the problem is that vague definitions offer

poor guidance for actual programming. They help neither to clarify the value-laden

assumptions embedded in concepts largely culled from Western experiences nor to

operationalize objectives into coherent plans that articulate program goals and activities.

This gap is striking considering the rich academic literature on media democracy in the

West (for example, Graber, Norris, and McQuail 2007; McQuail 1987; McChesney and

Nichols 2002) and in the global South (Browley and Romano 2004; Curran and Park

2000) that throws into question the existence of universal models of media democracy,

professional journalism, and so on. Our point is not to propose a series of definitions to

normatively guide IMA programs. Far from it, we believe that what model(s) of media

democracy is desirable is, ultimately, an empirical question that needs to be determined

by local actors within specific political-cultural contexts. Instead, we want to call

attention to programmatic problems grounded in the uncritical use of concepts and the

persistent ambiguity of the objectives of IMA.

The lack of a clear model of media change

Second, none of the materials examined explain how programmatic activities

and/or sub-objectives serve to accomplish larger media democracy goals. How does

strengthening the role of women in African newsrooms a means to further freedom of the

press? What is the expected sequence of events between training a certain number of

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university journalism students on U.S. government-provided computers to improving the

professionalism and sustainability of the media sector? The rationale for operationalizing

broad objectives (“professionalism”, “independent media”) into specific programmatic

goals is nebulous. It is rarely clear why certain program activities and goals are best-

suited to promote those objectives in specific locations.

Our point here is not to question whether there is a connection between these

programmatic activities and desirable goals. In fact, one might identify several ways in

which they can make positive contributions. What is missing is evidence-based, tested

explanations that link specific interventions to broad processes of media change. This

would require the elaboration of strategic analyses that establish a clear sequential model

that proposes feasible solutions to addresses problems and identifies how interventions

are linked to ongoing local actions and are part of long-term developments to foster

further transformations. Aid agency staffers we spoke with admitted that due to resource

constraints and donor priorities they do not undertake this type of systemic work, and

instead are focused on specific programs and their outputs. A staffer at one aid

organization asserted, “…the funders largely decide what the priorities should be and

they want results. If you have decided a country does not need further assistance, you

have to move on to other locations where they do need it. We have had this discussion

internally and if money was made available, we would certainly be interested in doing

longer term evaluations and systemic work but we have not found that to be a wish of our

funders.”

Even if an encompassing model is absent, it would be important that interventions

are guided by key questions: “What are the entry points to catalyze media changes?”

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What are the most likely “drivers of change” (structures, institutions, and agents) that

would contribute to desired transformations? What’s the most likely positive change? As

several studies on foreign aid have argued, asking these questions is crucial not to sketch

out the dynamics of change, but also to understand how international programs dovetail

with local actions and ownership to further positive transformations.

Discrepancy between objectives and programmatic indicators

Third, we found a substantial discrepancy between the stated programmatic goals

(both the overall and more intermediary objectives) and the indicators being used to

measure their achievement. The stated programmatic goals are similar to the larger

organizational goals—often based on achieving sizeable, long-term societal concepts

such as “engaging citizens,” “fighting corruption,” and “increasing civil society’s access

to objective and varied information, thereby promoting and supporting their participation

in policy and decision-making process.”

To achieve these types of goals IMAs seek to alter media systems through

transformations such as “increasing professionalism,” “improving media environments,”

“promoting independent media sectors,” or “strengthening media organization.” Such

goals significantly differ from the indicators used to gauge achievement, which are

typically intermediary, formulated at a micro-level, and often designed to measure

immediate programmatic output. These include common “yardsticks,” such as the

number of journalists who were trained by a certain program or the number of non-state

news outlets assisted. We will designate these “Internal Programmatic Indicators” (IPIs).

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A primary example of this discrepancy between goals and indicators is seen in IWMF’s

Reporting on Women and Agriculture: Africa Project, “a four-year initiative to enhance

and increase news media coverage of agriculture, rural development and women in Mali,

Uganda and Zambia.” Here, a goal such as “increasing and sustaining accurate, consistent

and more rigorous news media on agriculture and rural development,” which included

objectives such as “increase the quality and number of stories…,” and “create in-house

sustainable agriculture journalism beats,” was measured using principally quantitative

IPIs, including hiring agriculture reporting trainers and the solidifying of partnerships

with six news media organizations. Also listed under the indicators used to measure this

goal, IWMF hired a third party monitoring and evaluation organization to conduct what

they defined as, “ongoing monitoring and evaluation.” Quite different from measuring

the goal itself, this organization was contracted to create “an evaluation plan [to] capture

best practices and provide opportunities for direct interventions for the project’s

improvement where necessary.” This was a true IPI, utilizing event-tracking forms,

trainee evaluation of modules, trainer reporting form and staff activity reports. When

asked about why they made the choice to measure program success in this form, one

staffer spoke about how not having the resources to “conduct pre and post surveys of

stakeholders, farmers, women farmers and the general public with regard to the level of

knowledge about the role of women in agriculture cause[d] them to focus on more direct

program impact,”

Even when organizations did move beyond IPIs and measure changes in the

media environment we still found this differentiation between goals and indicators.

Specifically in this IWMF example, journalistic progress for the four months after the

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original training was primarily measured in term of “number of articles and radio

broadcasts produced by project trainees.” While this would measure an “increase,” there

were few qualitative measurements applied that would indicate the accuracy or rigor from

the program goals or objectives. IWMF’s final report did indicate they attempted to

follow-up more substantially, but their staff was “overwhelmed” by their programmatic

responsibilities and returned to “using a simple tally sheet for rapid enumeration and full

reporting of story titles and production.”

Discrepancy between goals and indicators is also observed in several of IREX’s

programs. While IREX employs a mixture of specific indicators for their programs, for a

majority of their undertakings they break down the goals into smaller and smaller sub-

objectives and then apply IPIs such as counting how many journalists they are training or

“the number of [journalism] students trained using USAID-provided computer

equipment.” Significantly though, while the IPIs do appear to more accurately indicate

achievement of these smaller objectives, there was still a substantial discrepancy between

the indicators and the larger programmatic goals.

The Jordan Media Strengthening Program (JMSP), a USAID-funded effort

through IREX from 2007-2009, is an example of this sub-objective oriented model.

JMSP had a stated Program Objective of supporting “a sustainable and professional

independent media system [that] provides citizens of Jordan with the news and

information necessary to participate effectively in political and economic institutions.”

According to IREX’s own report this objective responded directly to the strategic

statement for the larger USAID mission: to “help Jordan become a prosperous,

democratic country whose government is increasingly accountable to its people, that

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plays a central role in promoting peace and democracy in the Middle East, and that is an

active participant in the world economy” (IREX, 2010). Working with a monitoring sub-

contractor, IREX developed a Media Content Analysis Tool (MCAT) to detect changes

in Jordanian media content based on training. IREX contends that using this tool they

could detect quantifiable changes in scores on measures such as accuracy, relevancy,

objectivity, creativity, and technical proficiency” (IREX 2010).

In addition to these larger program goals, four “key goals” for the program were

designed by IREX: building professionalism among emerging mid-career journalists,

fostering local media, improving the enabling environment for local media, civil society

and media business support. Below these were even more specific sub-objectives such as

“University level project oriented assistance” (under “building professionalism among

emerging mid-career journalists”) for which the number of students being trained of the

USAID computers was the “performance indicator,” a measurement that tells nothing

about a “a sustainable and professional independent media system” or citizen

“participation in political and economic institutions.”

Measurement of the overall objective of the JMSP was tied to IREX’s own Media

Sustainability Index (MSI). “The MSI assesses five “objectives” in shaping a successful

media system: Legal and social norms protect and promote free speech and access to

public information, Journalism meets professional standards of quality, Multiple news

sources provide citizens with reliable, objective news, independent media are well-

managed businesses, allowing editorial independence, and Supporting institutions

function in the professional interests of independent media. These objectives were judged

to be the most important aspects of a sustainable and professional independent media

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system, and served as the criteria against which countries were rated.” They arrive at

rankings on a scale ranging between 0 and 4. These scores represent the strength of the

media sector components and can be analyzed over time to chart progress (or regression)

within a country. Additionally, countries or regions may be compared to one another.”

In comparing this definition of the MSI to the stated expected “end result” from

USAID, we found that there was a fairly close match in their wording. It states:

“Increased professionalism and independence in the media sector. To promote a

professional and independent media sector which advances the flow of information to

citizens as a measure of encouraging government accountability… improve performance

of a journalist; upgrade educational curricula and teaching method…; establish new

media outside Amman; and increase financial sustainability of media outlets.” Yet, as

will be discussed further below, there are questions concerning the definition of concepts

IMAs and funders use in their goals and indicators, including in organizationally created

measurement tools such as the MSI. Without the operationalization of terms like

“professionalism” (one of the most commonly used) or “independence” by both USAID

and IREX can we know they are seeking the same end result.

In another example, the Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF) states that:

“Measuring the impact of our work is important to us, our clients and our investors.”

Findings show that for the large part this is conducted using indicators of sales, readers,

listeners and viewers and financial viability. And while these indicators do appear to

connect to what could be considered the sub-objective, “financial self-sustainability of

(their) clients,” in the MDLF one program model, there is the same discrepancy between

these indicators and those that would fully measure MDLF’s program goals. This

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includes the goal of “providing independent news businesses with the financing they need

to hold governments to account, expose corruption and fight for justice for all”.

We are not arguing against the need to use these measurements. Programmatic

monitoring is a crucial component of any aid effort. They allow those implementing

programs to know how their internal organizations are operating and, as we will address

in the discussion section, they meet important organizational imperatives. Yet, these

indicators should not be mistaken for or used in the place of measurements of impact that

is more closely linked to effective interventions to address challenges, and the overall

rationale that gives legitimacy to programs. Different indicators are necessary to measure

the impact of programs aimed at promoting media democracy.

Absence of measurement of long-term impact

Lastly, we found that the majority of measurement indicators, whether IPIs or of

the change in media environment, are designed to measure results immediately after

program implementation or only during the relatively short-term lifespan of specific

programs. An example of this is IREX’s Strengthening Independent Minority Media

(SIMM) project in Kosovo where like the majority of the program’s goals, Intermediate

Result #1: Link and Strengthen Minority Broadcast Media is being measured semi-

annually by the percent share of available Serb Audience consuming the programming.

Yet, there is no indication of how the measurement will continue after the program’s

three-year funding ends. Officers say that projects rarely have funding for evaluation, and

that donors seldom commission other agencies to evaluate projects after they concluded.

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While monitoring outputs is standard and are expected to be included in progress and

final reports, systematic short or long –term evaluation is rare.

The issue of programmatic finality versus long-term measurement appears

particularly relevant with USAID-funded projects. When USAID closes a larger country

project, staff members reported, they rarely go back, for example, five or ten years later,

to measure its success, programmatically or goals wise. When asked how they are able to

bring lessons learned from one program to another, a staff member said they don’t have

the resources to “collect actual post-program data, but from the early results in the project

they are “able to get a sense of what works.” Another field staff member spoke of the

frustration of not being able to conduct “Where are they now?” work. Most often, due to

“resource limitations,” they are not able to “truly know” how the media has improved in a

particular place or the impact they had on the public or policy makers. Several staff

members were clearly frustrated over the fact that most programs were “not in-line with

measuring (long-term) success.”

Findings show that, although they currently only track their clients while they are

receiving assistance, MDLF’s evaluation model offers some of the most positive insight

into what long-term program evaluation could look like. During the monitoring period,

they “…..collect in-depth financial information from each client [monthly], and “analyze

this information during the project, “to produce an intimate portrait of the development of

each news outlet…” They not only collect information, but also track trends that measure

client and portfolio “impact on the sustainability of independent media.” Still, we

recognize that for MDLF or others IMAs to monitoring post-program achievements

significant questions about the resources required would arise. Most notably, as several

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interviewees argue, donors would need to be convinced that this was a worthy use of

resources.

The absence of measurement of long–term impact makes it difficult to assess

whether programmatic goals have effectively contributed to broad objectives. What is

measured is process outputs such as numbers of people trained, and number of stories

published. For example, Internews’ 2009 promotional brochure emphasizes the numbers

of broadcast networks they work with, people they trained in “media skills, national

media associations they promoted and “hours per-year of original, high quality

broadcasts” they produced. While such indicators are important to assess whether

activities have been effectively implemented or the immediate products that resulted from

specific programs, they are hardly strong measurements of broad goals of media

democratization. They may fit the requirements of project cycles and the need for

evidence demonstrating immediate outputs that resulted from disbursements, as it will be

discussed later. They are insufficient, however, to the understanding of how

programmatic goals support objectives or test the strength of media transformations

models. As long as the focus remains on measuring programmatic outputs, several

questions remain unanswered: How are specific goals linked to overall media changes?

What do they show about the impact of IMA on media changes across settings? What are

cost-effective interventions? What IMA programs are successfully tied to local processes

of change? These questions are crucial to assess the effectiveness of programs in the long

run.

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The prevalence of institutional imperatives in IMA

Our review of programmatic goals, objectives and indicators found that IMAs

typically focus on measuring the concrete, short-term output of the programs themselves,

as opposed to long-term impact on media systems or other development goals. Mission

objectives are written in broad, fairly undefined terms with intentions of changing media

environments and strengthening democratic societies. Objectives are not typically defined

on case-by-case/ country specific basis, which may be necessary to embed them within

local circumstances, needs, and expectations. Rather, the same programmatic objectives

are identified across sites, while indicators are adjusted, if primarily only in terms of the

named participants or slight timelines. One example is the IREX programs funded by

USAID, including the SIMM program in Kosovo, where not only the program objective

of “sustainable (minority) language broadcast media provide professional local news to

citizens” the same from all SIMMs projects, but the desired intermediate results vary only

slightly from project to project. IREX’s Media Sustainability Index is their largest cross-

country effort to gauge improvement on issues of media democracy. They attempt to

measure attributes they see as “typical in a successful and sustainable media sector.”

They state their “guiding questions” on their measurement questionnaire in a positive

fashion, for example, “stories are objective and well sourced,” believing that in doing so

they are allowing the local professionals who assess them to use “local knowledge of the

media system.” It is however important to note that IREX uses the same questionnaire in

all 80 nations.

22
 We also found that program goals and measurement indicators either examine the

internal accomplishments of the programs or fail to make the connection between the

changes in a media environment to societal changes. There are conceptual jumps between

intended missions and actual programmatic goals expressed in the selection of

performance indicators disconnected from original objectives. The promotion of “media

independence,” “professional journalism” and other goals is often reduced to training

workshops. What assumption underpins such decisions is not self-evident.

Based on a substantial body of literature rooted in the democratic tradition of the

press (Christians et al 2009), one could argue that media democracy necessitates certain

professional competencies such as fairness, evenhanded reporting, ethics of public

service, and critical scrutiny of government and economic powers. It is not obvious,

however, how such competencies effectively address entrenched and diverse problems

for freedom of expression, particularly in contexts where media democracy has a

historically weak record, or none of the conditions that originally spawned forms of

critical, public-oriented media in established democracies. Neither the underlying model

of change to promote “media independence” or “professional journalism” is evident nor

do programs explain how training projects dovetail with local efforts. The impact of

adequately trained reporters on addressing power relations, stopping anti-press violence,

and successfully overcoming the multidimensional challenges for media democracy is not

justified. Furthermore, domestic media systems are not virgin territory upon which aid

interventions are rolled out. Not only media ecologies are complex systems that result

from the historical development and combination of political, legal, economic, social and

cultural forces. They also articulate power relations among local actors with varied views

23
and interests about how the media should be organized. If reporters cannot apply newly

learned competencies because of legal obstacles, self-censorship, collusion between

media owners and the government, business influence, and/or anti-press violence, then, it

is questionable whether training effectively spearheads and supports sustainable changes.

In fact, one may predict that, in all likelihood, programs may generate frustration among

reporters who cannot put new skills into practice rather than make inroads in media

systems plagued by authoritarianism and patrimonialism (Berger 2001).

We propose to understand the selection of prevalent program goals and indicators

as reflective of organizational imperatives inside aid agencies. They mainly serve to meet

organizational needs, rather than external transformations indicated in organizational

missions. As institutional theorists have argued, institutional rules and practices regulate

the actions and decisions of individuals (March and Olsen 1984; Meyer and Rowan

1977). The rationality of individual actors is bounded by the kind of expectations,

resources, and information existing within organizational contexts (Di Maggio and

Powell 1983). The institutional environment, including informal codes and practices, give

rise to the parameters for accepted ideas and interests and the formulation of problems

and decision.

The institutional rationality of aid agencies and “development brokers” (Lewis

and Mosse 2006) needs to be analyzed to understand the incentives that encourage and

reward certain choices of goals and indicators. Staffs make decisions, including about

outcomes and impact measurements, based on the information available to them, as well

as institutionally accepted and rewarded needs, values, and preferences. As Selznick

(1957, 251) put it, “every formal organization… attempts to mobilize human and

24
technical resources as a means for the achievements of its ends… They interact as

wholes, bringing to bear their own special problems and purposes… the organization may

be significantly viewed as an adaptive social structure, facing problems which arise

simply because it exists as an organization in an institutional environment, independently

of the special… goals which called it into being.” In the case of the IMAs, participants,

donors, employees of both and the organizations they partner with—all are dependant on

the organizations to fulfill certain individual needs, and the organization is dependent on

the foreign aid environment. To this end they must meet institutional expectations and

follow certain “performance incentives” (Martens 2004) that define “success”. As one

staffer frustratingly asserted, “when we write our year end reports the things used to

measure whether we are doing our job are concrete measurements such as how many of

the journalists we trained thought our sessions were useful, we aren’t asked whether they

are working or what type of media outlets they are working for.”

Whereas aid agencies have become justifiably concerned about institutional rules

and practices in “recipient” governments and non-government organizations in order to

assess effective ways to deliver assistance, the literature has paid scant attention to

similar issues inside aid agencies (for exceptions, see Lewis and Mosse 2006). Several

studies have examined various institutional dimensions of the local partners and

implementers of foreign aid including patterns of decision-making, operational structure,

governance, absorptive capacity, accountability, and transparency. These issues also need

to be examined to understand the institutional rationality of aid organizations that

underpins the selection of goals, design, implementation and evaluation of programs.

25
 Our argument is that the programmatic and evaluation priorities of IMA largely

reflect a range of institutional demands. Accountability, learning, self-legitimation, and

marketing (Martens 2002; Michaelowa and Borrmann 2006) are some of the prevalent

organizational expectations in aid agencies which favor the selection of certain goals,

activities, and indicators. Preference for training programs and output indicators suggest

the need for manageable, short-term, quantitative results. They satisfactorily meet

pressures for predictable disbursements of earmarked funds, completing projects within

certain timeframe and allocated funding, and tangible results for upper management and

decision-makers. Just as contractors need to show that they deliver effective results to

donors (Ebrahim 2005), donors need to demonstrate responsible and successful

utilization of funding to government officials.

Institutional concerns influence the choice of outcomes. Aid agencies and

contractors make decisions based on self-interest maximization in a competitive, business

environment. Institutions and individuals need to demonstrate productivity, which is

critical to legitimize their status in the aid system. Such concern drives the interest in

short-term indicators. Institutional incentives aren’t put on demonstrating long-term

impact; rather, they reward the successful completion of tasks and disbursements in the

limited timeframe of most projects. One staff member bluntly stated that while he would

“love to measure larger societal-media impact,” he was not going to “trade it” for

knowing how he or his team were “doing on a daily or monthly basis… We are still in a

sense a business with a bottom line.” Such statement echoes conclusions by recent

academic studies according to which the emphasis continues to be on delivering aid

projects rather than development results (Kharas and Linn 2008). One officer of an

26
implementing organization says: “Given the length of the project the reality is that you

have to focus on defining what goals you have for the project (such as the number of

media outlets producing certain number of stories that focus on local issues). The longer

term vision often takes a backseat, which also has to do with the funding limitations for

measurement and evaluation…[this is] the toughest part of the process… We struggle

with this in every project we undertake.” Asked about the paucity of long-term analysis,

another officer responds: “This is primarily a question of resources. The funders largely

decide what the priorities should be and they want results. If you have decided a country

does not need further assistance, you have to move on to other locations where they do

need it.”

There does not appear to be an appreciation or understanding for the patience or

trust that long-term results require. If such understanding exists, it is sidelined by other,

more important priorities, such as the need to deliver tangible “deliverables” and assign

resources to activity implementation rather than evaluation. Donors want to see their

money is being well spent, and they require concrete, immediate, and low-cost

measurements. Showing “steady progress,” as one officer put its, is essential. Staff

members need to prove they are delivering effective products to fulfill job expectations

and advance professionally. Also, contractors must regularly compete for funding in

order to ensure organizational survival in a competitive environment. Thus, they need

measurable, short-term results to demonstrate impact and efficient use of resources.

Furthermore, the aid industry reinforces norms that lead to organizational

behavior and constraints. The persistence of silo-like projects that are rarely fully

articulated with local efforts or other donor’s initiatives reflects institutional incentives

27
that are contrary to local ownership and sector-wide approaches (de Haan 2009).

Constant competition for resources across agencies and contractors in the multilateral aid

system (Riddell 2007), and the fragmentation and superposition of programs with similar,

if not identical, goals (e.g. train journalists, strengthen independent media) do not

contribute to comprehensive and integrated approaches to address media systems. One

program director spoke about the need for organizations to keep the “competitive edge”

to remain “a leader” in the field. While he reported that they did collaborate

“occasionally” with other organizations, they were very careful about what information

they shared. For example, when it came to creating measurement and evaluation tools

this encompasses a great deal of “in-house intellectual capital” that they were not going

to “just share” with other organizations competing for the same projects. Thus, agencies

and organizations to remain viable are permanently in an endless race to demonstrate

quick results to meet expectations, ensure their survival, and increase earmarks.

IMA programs are embedded in the social, cultural and political environment of

the larger aid industry. Their structures and practices are reflections and responses to, as

institutionalist sociologists argue, the rules, conventions and paradigms of the

environment (Powell 2007). If one organization is not able to produce immediate tangible

results, others that seek to undertake the same efforts and are producing results may gain

favor from donors. They participate in a common enterprise where organizations may

either construct themselves or change their goals or develop new practices to become

more similar to each other in order to meet environmental constraints. In one of the

clearest statements concerning the atmosphere, one staffer bluntly stated, “we don’t want

to lose our edge.” Adoption of innovation becomes about providing legitimacy as

28
opposed to improving performance, or in the IMAs, measuring impact (Meyer and

Rowan 1977).

Therefore, the conceptual jumps and the reduction of ambitious missions to

manageable activities and products respond to dominant institutional practices and

system of incentives. It is questionable whether training attracts the lion’s share of

expenditures (CIMA 2007b) because they deliver impeccable results. In our review, we

haven’t found evidence demonstrating such direct relationship. The persistence of

“training” mindset is remarkable considering not only the absence of data showing how

educational programs solve challenges. Their popularity is also curious given the strength

of extensive reviews (DFID 2008) showing that integrated approaches that address

populations, practitioners (which, besides journalists, also include civic activists,

teachers, and academics) organizations, and systems, have better chances of delivering

successful and sustainable results.

The preference for training activities is grounded on the fact they are better suited

to meet such expectations and provide tangible performance evidence than other

interventions. For example, providing technical support to local groups pushing for legal

reforms, conducting advocacy with governments and other domestic actors to raise

awareness and set up concrete indicators of good governance, supporting projects aimed

at linking mediated debates to decision-making, or giving financial support to public

bodies managing or regulating media operations, are exceedingly more messy,

unpredictable, and political. Any of these interventions is, arguably, directed to tackling

structural obstacles and power relations that are constitutive of media systems. They are

less likely to deliver the kind of tangible and regular results that would satisfy

29
institutional expectations. They may run into unforeseeable obstacles that would derail

programs and, thus, make it impossible to fulfill contractual commitments. They may

become entangled in complex and partisan domestic politics which are antithetical to the

political caution and technocratic sensitivities among donors (Odugbemi 2005). These

factors account for why the preference for certain goals and indicators is shaped by

institutional considerations, rules, and practices that are more tightly linked to the

strategic rationality of aid agencies rather than to conceptual matters or models of media

development and change. Institutional imperatives explain why ambitious goals about

media democracy or interest in sound strategies laid out in mission statements and

bidding proposals virtually disappear from actual programs.

Given the conceptual gaps between missions and program goals, the challenges of

IMA are not just about the paucity of evidence demonstrating impact. No question,

producing solid evidence about program implementation is critical for actors to learn

from past experiences, apply insights across programs, and show results. Yet the main

challenge is to know that what is measured is what matters. If the purpose is to train

journalists based on the principles of “professional reporting,” provide equipment to radio

stations, or set up “center of media excellence”, assessing programmatic impact is

relatively straightforward. Indeed, dozens of reports and final evaluations do exactly that

in ways that they demonstrate effectiveness. Such data, however, do not answer

important questions. What difference do programs make to address problems? Have

programs tackled small or big problems? What contributions did programs make to local

processes to strengthen media pluralism? These questions need to be brought to the

forefront in the design and evaluation of programs.

30
Conclusions

The findings from our study confirm arguments made by previous studies about

the problems of aid effectiveness in non-media sectors such as economy, health, and

agriculture. Besides other well-known problems such as inappropriate conditions and the

lack of local participation (Groves and Hinton 2004), there are persistent challenges in

the way aid is delivered (Knack and Rahman 2007; Riddell 2007). Conceptual models are

detached from local realities and ignore the messy reality of implementation (Eyben

2006). Aid objectives uneasily fit the complexity of domestic situations and politics.

International aid operates in a gap between buzzwords and the lack of demonstrable

progress that tackles the fundamental problems of societies in the global South. No

doubt, providing solid evidence demonstrating causal attribution, teasing out the single

and combined impact of interventions, or measuring the contributions of international aid

to local processes, are complex tasks. IMA programs are not the exception; rather, they

confront and reflect the same challenges already identified in global aid. Consequently,

the question asked about economic, health, agricultural and other programs certainly

apply to IMA: How is aid effectiveness possible?

A key consideration is to assess the kind of impact of IMA. Programs continually

produce a wealth of output data to measure process and levels of activity, meet

institutional expectations for accountable expenditures, and fit annual workplans.

Certainly, this data is important for program development. Rather, we question its

significance to understand the effectiveness of IMA. A different set of questions needs to

be asked: What kind of impact do programs have? How do they contribute to broad

31
objectives related to media democratization, governance and other development goals?

How do programs contribute to local efforts to promote positive change? How do

programs reconcile the pressure to produce short-term results with the long-term nature

of media transformations? These are not easy questions to answer, but IMA need to

engage with them to produce compelling impact data and sophisticated explanations.

Particularly at a time when questions about aid effectiveness are at the center of current

debates, IMA programs can’t afford to ignore such questions. They are important not

only to justify significant amounts of funding invested in media development and change.

They are also need to produce answers that convincing arguments for why investments in

media assistance contribute to broad development goals, and bolster the legitimacy of

media programs across aid agencies (CIMA 2007a). In doing so, IMA practitioners and

researchers could jointly contribute to the overall debate about “effective aid.”

However, as long as prevalent institutional incentives prioritize short-term goals,

it is unlikely that programs would produce the kind of evidence necessary to assess why,

when, and how IMA makes a difference. Needless to say, none of the grand objectives of

IMA (e.g. “media democracy,” “professional journalism”) can be achieved during the

typical lifespan of aid programs. It is absurd to expect that programs aimed at

strengthening professionalism, promoting media diversity, or modifying press legislation

would produce results showing that they partially or single-handedly contributed to

significant changes in short periods of time. Programs face the predicament of

demonstrating impact in addressing ingrained and intractable problems within the typical

organizational constraints of the aid industry, such as short-term funding cycles,

pressures to meet annual goals, and expectations to submit deliverables. Given these

32
requirements, it is no surprising that programs generally measure “number of trained

journalists” or “number of stories that workshop participants produced.” Such indicators

may offer a convenient and effective shortcut to produce tangible results that fit

institutional needs, but they are incongruous with the kind of challenges that IMA

programs confront to support “media democracy” around the world. It is necessary to

break away from a mindset that prioritizes immediate organizational concerns at the

expense of long-term collaboration between local and global partners in support of media

pluralism.

Our purpose has been to make a call to reconsider the relationship among broad

objectives, programmatic goals, and results in ways that they are crystallized in rigorous

models that integrate approaches towards supporting media democracy. Just as

institutional incentives play a critical role in current decisions about goals and indicators

that largely measure outputs, a different set of organizational arrangements is needed to

enable different decisions. Donors and implementers need to start program design with

clear definitions of objectives, and the operationalization of objectives into manageable

program goals and activities. Rather than simply assuming that the grand goals of IMA

are unequivocally clear or that they can be operationalized in a straightforward manner,

programs need to tease out their significance and normative underpinnings. A more

analytical approach is necessary to determine how aid programs can smartly dovetail with

local efforts and appropriate policies to support media pluralism. Programs also need to

be anchored in evidence-based strategic models that outline courses of action to promote

changes, and provide justifications for the selection of specific interventions. Such

models need to bring together academic frameworks and the rich expertise of

33
practitioners to integrate conceptual ideas and the institutional requirements of aid

organizations, and blend comparative research on media democratization with the

dynamics and the insights of international and local actors.

Our study confirms that recent calls for more efficient aid across sectors (e.g.

economic, political, agricultural) are warranted. Questions remain about how to promote

aid effectiveness amidst the prevalence of institutional cultures among “development

brokers” that remain focused on process. Further research needs to analyze what

institutional imperatives make it possible to adopt integrated, long-term approaches in

international media assistance, and compare the design and implementation of programs

across international donors. This analysis could help understand better the institutional

conditions inside the aid industry that make it possible to go beyond the “training”

mindset to address the multiple problems for media democratization. In line with recent

interest in sector-wide approaches in international aid (CIDA 2004; SIDA 2008), media

assistance programs need to be informed by broad perspectives, provide comprehensive

and coordinated planning towards media sectors, and informed by the principles of

accountability, transparency and local ownership. The way aid is delivered is crucial to

maximize effectiveness. Yet to deliver aid more effectively, it is necessary to rethink

institutional practices and norms that put the wrong set of incentives and reward isolated

projects divorced from comprehensive sector-wide approaches.

34
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39