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Sikh Nationalism in India

Article · February 2017

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Rafael Fuentes
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Sikh Nationalism in India: Nanakshahi Calendar & The Khalistan
Movement.

According to Sikh organizations and individuals supporting Nanakshahi calendar’s

implementation, one of the main motives behind its introduction is how the new almanac
would help to cement a distinguished identity for the Sikh nation. They argue how even
followers of newest religion in the world, named Bahai Faith, have abandoned previous Hijri
calendar and adopted a new calendar based on tropical year like NC (Singh Purewal 1999). In
fact, those Sikh bodies and devotes who are urging to follow NC in its original format
highlight how all major religious in the world possess their own calendar in order to schedule
ritual practices. The Sikh separatist movement dates back for over a hundred years and can be
divided into four main stages, each one representing the various socio-political approaches of
their leaders (Telford 1992). The first stage commences in 1873 with the origin of Singh
Sabha organizations, which clearly intended to restore Sikh heritage and values within
communities of Punjab. They were led by individuals from hegemonic castes such as Khatri
and Arora. During the second stage, Singh Sabhas were substituted by political party Akali
Dal which was primarily directed by Master Tara Singh and members of urban middle-
classes from Punjab’s Majha region – between the Beas and Jhelum rivers. In the third stage,
Akali Dal party was divided and main section was now led by Sant Fateh Singh in
collaboration with wealthy Jat land-owners from Malwa region in South-Eastern Punjab. Sant
Fateh Singh moved the party towards a secular strategy and a long-term campaign for
‘Punjabi Suba’, the formation of a ‘new’ Punjabi state on basis of language and culture
(Telford 1992). Secular strategy was a clear attempt from the Akali Dal to soothe the central
government of India, clearly distrustful of religious demands after partition of Pakistan in
1947. In fact, Akali requests were fructiferous almost immediately and ‘Punjabi Suba’ was
fulfilled in 1966. Thus, Punjab was subsequently divided into a Punjabi-speaking state
detached from the linguistically Hindi states of Haryana and Himachal Pradesh. Within this
novel Punjab, Sikhs represented 56 per cent of population instead of the 33 per cent which
they formed before secession (Telford 1992: 971). A priori, Akalis deemed that these new
circumstances would increase their electoral chances. In a clear attempt to appeal to this Sikh
electorate, Akalis drafted the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (ASR) which asserted that Sikhs
were indeed a qaum (nation) and set the ideological basis for the formation of Khalistan, a
Sikh independent state (Chopra 2011: 49). Nonetheless, this Sikh majority was still too
narrow and after elections in 1977, Akalis were compelled to govern Punjab in coalition with
the Hindu Janata Party. This forced them to continue with a secular strategy and commit any
radical demands from the central government of India, which at the time was also formed by
the Janata Party. In addition, Akalis commenced following a federal approach towards Punjab
rather than an absolute devolution of powers. SGPC is an organization founded in the 1920s
by orthodox Sikhs to control gurdwaras. Thus, it is responsible for regulating a big range of
affairs within Sikh communities around the world. SGPC regularly holds elections to
designate its board members, which generally tend to belong to the Akali Dal party.
Management of gurdwaras by SGPC provides the Akali Dal with enormous resources –
moral, human and also financial. During the third stage of Sikh separatism, the secular
Punjabi Suba strategy of the Akalis was also reflected in the SGPC. Therefore, from the
demands of the Sikh people exhibited by Master Tara Singh in the previous stage, SGPC
committee commenced at this stage to talk about the ‘political demands of the Punjabis’
(Telford 1992: 974). The organization in this period became tremendously political shifting
in this manner from its religious origins and depriving a platform for groups within the Sikh
community who attempted to emphasize faith-related issues.

The fourth and last stage of Sikh nationalism in India commenced in the early 1980s
when Sant Jarnail Bhindranwale – by then the head of a minor Sikh seminary named
Damdami Taksal – erected himself as leader of entire Sikh panth (spiritual way) and
challenged the secular and federalist approach of the Akaly Dal party triggering, in the
process, the biggest political crisis between Punjab and the central government of India in
recent history. Bhindranwale’s first objective was to revitalize Sikhism. Sikh identity as
previously defined by Singh Sabhas – this is by merely wearing the external symbols of
Sikhism – was of little use for him. Instead, Bhindranwale emphasized how Sikhs must
demonstrate allegiance by taking baptism and joining the khalsa or brotherhood of the pure.
Drawing heavily from doctrines of Sikhism, Bhindranwale presented his audience a clear
message of orthodoxy and austerity. His message highlighted how Sikh communities in
Punjab were undermined by both internal conflicts and threats from Indian government. He
specifically blamed the Akali Dal party and Hindus for it. However, it was an attack on the
Nirankaris, a sect of Sikhism already proclaimed as enemies of the panth by priests at the
Golden Temple, what really transformed Bhindranwale into one of the most popular Sikh
figures in Punjab. In 1978, on the holiest of Sikh festivals named Vaisakhi, Bhindranwale
delivered a passionate speech at the Golden Temple and launched a collective assault on the
Nirankaris during which more than a dozen Sikhs were killed. According to Telford (1992:
976), this incident marked the beginning of Sikh movement’s radicalization and allowed
Bhindranwale to gain legitimacy and mobilize devotees towards a greater political
achievement, supremacy within the Sikh community. Despite his popularity, Bhindranwale
necessitated the support of a mass base which he gathered amongst the poor and educated
Sikhs of the Majha region, who were suffering from the uneven distribution of wealth
generated by the Green Revolution.

The Green Revolution in Punjab

The modernization of agricultural techniques and strategies in India from the 1960s to the
1980s, commonly referred to as the Green Revolution, generated an acute increase of
cultivated products in Punjab (Byres 1983: 38). Thus, agricultural output grew exponentially
from 4.2 million tons in 1996 to 11.96 million tons in 1980 (Telford 1992: 976). Nonetheless,
benefits of this modernization were unevenly distributed amongst different districts of
Punjab. Whereas Malwa region’s districts occupy the top six positions, Amritsar and
Gurdaspur districts within the Majha area performed considerably worse. The crisis of Sikh
separatist movement in Punjab during the 1980s did not merely respond to politico-religious
ideas, it clearly presented class and regional dimensions too since militants behind
Bhindranwale proceeded mainly from Sikh poor rural farming families from Majha districts.
On the other hand, Akali Dal supporters belonged to Sikh wealthy landowner clans from the
Malwa region. In fact, it was a period of intense turmoil since these two factions – which
represented different economic classes of Sikhs – competed with each other for hegemony
while continuing in profound disagreements with the Central Government in New Delhi.
Furthermore, a considerably improvement in education accompanied the Green Revolution in
Punjab. Agricultural modernization permitted children to release themselves from labour and
attend schools. As a result, literacy rose from 27 % in 1961 to 41% in 1981 (Telford 1992:
979). Regrettably, these new conditions did not translate into an economic improvement for
rural Sikh youths from the Majha region, who continued to show high levels of
unemployment. In addition, Indian wars with Pakistan made of Punjab a troubled border state
which received a lack of investment towards its industrial sector from the Central
Government. After ‘Punjabi Suba’ division in 1966, industrial facilities from New Delhi were
transferred to Haryana and extraction of minerals and forest resources to the newly formed
Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, this delayed and almost non-existent industrial development
together with improvement of educational opportunities created a high level of
unemployment amongst college and university graduates.

Rise of Bhindranwale in Punjab during the 1980s coincided with a really dreary
situation for a first generation of educated rural Jat Sikhs. On top of the financial difficulties
due to unemployment already mentioned, we must also consider the alienating aspects of the
urban environment into which they attended universities and how the Akali Dal was engaged
in federal politics which did not collect their demands. These ‘... enormous changes in
economy, society and culture...’ within such a short time, less than twenty years, generated
the basis for two ideologies that subsequently engaged in a relationship of co-existence
(Singh & Purewal 2013: 135). Firstly, Marxist ideas commence spreading amongst rural
educated Sikh youth at universities across Punjab. Maoist stress on armed struggle blended
well with Sikh historical tradition and further encouraged students to pursue a Sikh identity
with egalitarianism at its core. Secondly, religious revivalist groups started divulgating
ethical interpretations of pure ‘Sikh’ way of life. At this point, Bhindranwale emerged
launching a moral crusade against the depraved way of consumerist style of life which,
through capitalist modernization of the agriculture, was penetrating Punjab and broadening
the use of alcohol, cigarettes, pornography and lewd music. He emphasized how ‘new ways’
of capitalism aggravated social differences and eliminated opportunities for those individuals
of lower status, making his message really attractive amongst those educated young Sikhs
from poor farming families in the Majha region of Punjab.

Operation Blue Star & Its Aftermath in Punjab

Indira Gandhi regained control over the Indian state in 1980 and dismissed the Akali regime,
who as a result attempted to consolidate support once again amongst communities in Punjab
by endorsing the figure of Bhindranwale. Indira Gandhi clearly intended to centralize
administration of natural resources such as river waters and improve the distribution of wheat
from Punjab to the rest of the country amid increased blockades in the region (Chopra 2011:
50). She had dismembered Pakistan in 1971 with creation of Bangladesh and this time
promised to eradicate the enemy within that Sikhism represented. Meanwhile, Bhindranwale
organized a huge rally in Amritsar to proclaim his innocence in the murder of a Nirankari
leader, an event in which he received the support of every senior Akali leader. However,
Bhindranwale did not intend to stop there and violence quickly escalated in Punjab after
Amrit Singh, leader of All-India Sikh Students’ Federation (AISSF) and fervent supporter of
his ideas, was released. In June 1984, Indira Gandhi launched ‘Operation Blue Star’ and the
Indian army fought their way into the Golden Temple (Amritsar) where Bhindranwale and
his supporters had entrenched. After one week of an intense armed struggle in and around the
temple, Indian army gained control of the situation and Bhindranwale and Amrit Singh –
amongst many other Sikh followers – were killed. In October that very year, Indira Ghandi
died at the hands of her two Sikh bodyguards in an act of retaliation for ‘Operation Blue
Star’. Violent anti-Sikh riots erupted in New Delhi and other parts of the country claiming
more victims in response to her assassination. Peace was partially restored in 1985 when
Rajiv Gandhi, brother and successor of Indira, signed an agreement with Akali leader
Harcharan Singh Longowal. However, weeks after the accord Longowal was also murdered
by Sikh militants and no other figure since Bhindranwale has been able to unify the internal
cleavages of the Sikh community. After his dead, that according to many Sikh devotees
resembled those of the Sikh martyrs in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, this era of
Sikh separatism seemed to fade away.

Display of Bhindranwale’s image in Punjab during the late 1980s gave a sense of ‘lest
we forget’ the incidents of ‘Operation Blue Star’. During the 1990s instead, his image
disappeared completely from public life as police targeted baptised Sikhs and their families.
Particularly, if they belonged to villages in militant districts such as Amritsar, Batala or
Gurdaspur (Pettigrew 1995: 14-23). Additionally, curfews and men disappearing under
unusual circumstances cemented a feeling of continuous unrest, fear and retribution. More
than 25.000 cases of torturing practices involving the police were reported within this period
(Singh & Purewal 2013: 138). Director General of police in Punjab, K.P.S Gill, acquired a
particular notoriety amongst rural Sikh communities where he infamously became to be
known as the ‘butcher’ of Punjab in honour to his sinister methods. India’s government
response was to continue employing him as an advisor to contain insurgence of Maoist
Naxals in Central India and Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Images of Bhindranwale were
removed from gurdwaras in India and abroad, in a clear attempt to eradicate the implicit
association between Sikh religious ideas and Sikh separatist politics represented by his
persona. Dissatisfaction increasingly gathered in Punjab and the diaspora given the total lack
of official recognition or justice towards these crimes. Indian government and police ignored
completely claims of civil society and their actions commenced to be interpreted as the attack
of one community on other one. Perpetrators of the mentioned anti-Sikh riots have not been
charged yet and there are serious allegations against Delhi police for the events which
resulted in killings of hundreds of Sikhs after Indira Gandhi’s murder. The Akali Dal party
failed to voice these concerns and their demands to the central government were not in
accordance with the popular sentiment of corruption and power politics in Punjab.

Resurgence of Bhindranwale & Introduction of NC

Beginning of the new millennium has witnessed in Punjab a revival of Sikh separatist
movement and a continuous search for justice and recognition regarding atrocities committed
during ‘Operation Blue Star’ and its aftermath. Amongst Sikh communities Bhindranwale has
become a symbol of their cause and a reminder of the repression and resistance endured after
his dead. Since 2008 his images have commenced once again to be emphatically displayed
across public places in Punjab. From 1998 India has pursued a model of political unification
by seeking support from regional moderate parties. Thus, the alliance of Akali Dal party and
the Hindu ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ (BJP) has shaped Punjab politics in recent years
generating a sense of alienation and lack of any real options. Bhindranwale’s images
personify a mode of resistance against this partisan manner of doing politics and highlight the
discontent amongst poorer Sikhs towards social differences created by current penetration of
market economy in Punjab. He is visible across local bazaars which sell coffee mugs,
watches and car stickers with his image, often also displaying the sentence: “I will have to
make a comeback”. In addition, youths in villages are frequently seen wearing bright T-Shirts
with a picture of Bhindranwale carrying an AK-47 assault rifle (Singh & Purewal 2013: 143).
Sikh separatism and formation of Khalistan continues to have an enormous appeal in Punjab.
A clear example of this is the mass rally organized against the scheduled hanging of Balwant
Singh Rajoana in 2012. Pleading guilty of leading the assassination of Chief Minister of
Punjab in 1995, Rajoana also refused to supplicate mercy and his position has become a
contemporary sign of Sikh stance against Indian state and refusal to accept its autocratic
demands. Rajoana’s case still reverberates in Punjab and the diaspora by way of multiple
organizations, particularly, through the ‘Pledge Orange Campaign’.

The Nanakshahi Calendar is a magnificent opportunity to provide a sense of identity

and belonging amongst Sikh individuals in Khalistan, a nation which lacks internationally-
accepted borders. In fact, time-measurement devices such as calendars, clocks or schedules
are not bereft of relevant socio-cultural or political meanings. According to Munn (1992:
109), management of time is not a mere strategic form of interaction but also a medium of
‘hierarchic power and governance’. Thus, sovereignty over an annual calendar or other
chronological devices does not only control routines and special events in the lives of
individuals, it also ties this level of command to capital values on which authority is based.
Calendrical ‘shifts’, such as the introduction of NC discussed in this dissertation, immediately
erect cultural governance by synchronizing individuals’ natural rhythms and daily tasks with
a wider universe of power. Burman (1981) discusses the pre-colonial characteristics of the
annual almanac on Simbo (Solomon Islands). The denominated ‘coconut shell model’ was
controlled strictly by a member of the island’s founding group and demarcated the lunar
cycles which underpinned the temporal tokens recognized by all inhabitants. This group also
managed the shell rings which had the ability to please the gods and therefore alter natural
phenomena such as rains and earthquakes. Therefore, by commanding those two powerful
time devices the founder clan controlled the very idea of time (Burman 1981: 259). However,
the arrival of missionaries to the Solomon Islands completely altered this structure with the
introduction of the numerical Gregorian Calendar. New temporal cycles – such as the seven-
day week, capital Sunday and twice-a-day religious services – transferred the power of
regulating time and demarcating daily activities from the ‘root’ clan to the Church’s
mediators. Additionally, during the French Revolution a calendric reform attempted to
disrupt the continuity between the religious past of the nation and the present political
attitudes of the state through chronological features. Thus, the French Republican Calendar
was based on the ‘rational’ decimal system instead of the Judeo-Christian septimal model of
the Gregorian Calendar in a clear attempt to embed the nation’s time in a different
ontological foundation of political power (Munn 1992: 110).

Over the last hundred years Sikh community in Punjab has revealed profound
cleavages in its vision of a possible independent nation and the mechanisms required to attain
it. These divisions have exhibited profound disagreements not merely on class relations,
particularly between wealthy landowners from the Malwa region and poorer educated
farmers of the Majha area, but also on which steps leadership should take regarding the
demands of an excessively centralized Indian political and economic system. Opportunities
have arisen along the years to consolidate a Sikh identity and subsequently lay the
foundations of Khalistan, the Sikh state. Nonetheless, leaders in Punjab – often baffled by
political interests – have been ambivalent between a clear support of this cause or to contest it
altogether from within. The Akal Takht – Sikhism’s highest governing body – and Akali-led
SGPC implemented NC in 2003. However, seven years later both organisms altered NC’s
solar features by introducing numerous lunar elements from the previous Bikrami Calendar,
 which is also used by Hindus, to determine all Sikh religious events. This is interpreted by
Sikh bodies that support implementation of NC’s original version as ‘vote-blank politics’
from governing party Akali Dal (Tribune 2015). They believe Akalis are operating under
pressure from Hindu organizations such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) who aim to
force Sikhs to continue using Bikrami Calendar or, at the very least, its lunar features.

My research is a magnificent opportunity to shed some light on Sikhism’s sharp

divisions and political processes in Punjab from the Green Revolution until today’s struggle
with the Central Government for an independent Sikh state. Thus, to conduct a
comprehensive ethnography of NC’s introduction will allow me to fully recognize the driving
forces behind this temporal dispute, and understand if the original version of this calendar
should be considered a cultural ‘tool’ that provides the means for Khalistan, a nation without
internationally-accepted borders. There are gaps in sociological literature regarding history of
Sikh nationalism and its recent revival which my research aims to address. Furthermore, a
long-term period of ethnographic fieldwork amongst Sikh communities in Punjab is capital
since it will undoubtedly contribute to expand anthropological knowledge on the inherent
qualities of time-measurement which erect cultural governance.

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