doi:10.1093/bjc/azp039 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL.

(2009) 49, 788–809

Advance Access publication 26 June 2009

COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

Preferences of Police Officers from 22 Countries in Transition

Cynthia Lum*

Since the 1970s, approximately 60 countries in the world have experienced major political transition

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away from authoritarianism towards democracy and more liberal modes of governance. Subsequently,
this era has provided opportunities for researchers to observe how major changes in the political
environment affect a country’s policing practices. This study is the first of a two paper series on the
relationship between democratization and police attitudes, preferences and behaviours. This study
reports the results of a pilot study of 315 police supervisors from 22 transitioning nations asking
about their preferences towards two different styles of crime prevention—community-oriented policing
and zero tolerance approaches. The results indicate that the officers from countries more democratically
consolidated tend to have stronger relative preferences towards community-oriented policing over
zero tolerance styles.
Keywords: policing, democracy, community policing, zero tolerance, democratic
consolidation

Introduction
Since the 1970s, approximately 60 countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and
Africa have experienced major political transitions in their modes of governance
(Huntington 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996). Although scholars argue contentiously about
the causes, validity, longevity, definition and consequences of these transitions, there is
some general agreement that these transitions are characterized by changes from
authoritarian to relatively more liberal and democratic forms of governance, even if only
in ideology or national rhetoric. This overall movement has been described by scholars as
a transitional ‘wave’ (Huntington 1993; Held 1987; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996;
O’Donnell et al. 1991) and is marked by key moments in history, including the Portuguese
Revolution of Carnations in 1974 and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989.
For comparative criminal justice, this transformational era provides a unique
opportunity for researchers to examine explanations of justice agent behaviour from a
governance perspective. Transformations in governance can result in important changes
in justice bureaucratic practices, such as adapting to new rules, laws, citizen expectations,
and performance measures, as well as dealing with new trends and categories of crime.
In turn, changes in the way justice agents work may be visible and meaningful enough
to more broadly affect the relationship between the state and society, which then further
drives transformations in governance. Thus, studying how criminal justice changes
during political transitions provides a better understanding of political development
and the relationship between governance and criminal justice forces.
*
Deputy Director, Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy, Administration of Justice Department, George Mason University, 10900
University Blvd, MS 4F4, Manassas, VA 20110, USA; clum@gmu.edu.

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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies (ISTD).
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 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

This is especially true in policing, which is arguably the most visible and on-the-
ground display of government authority. Determining how the police change during
such transitions and how they facilitate or impede such values can lend evidence and
context to policy deliberations on how to define, create, implement and sustain styles
of policing that, in turn, contribute to a country’s new goals (Bayley 1997; 2006). Yet,
policing and governance, while seemingly inseparable, are often discussed and
studied separately. Policing research tends to be non-comparative and dominated by
studies of agencies within stable, Western democracies (usually the United States
and United Kingdom). Because these countries have not had recent or dramatic
political transitions, the political environment is of less interest as an exogenous

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factor for police behaviour than other variables such as organizational culture,
personnel characteristics, neighbourhood contexts, situational aspects of police–
citizen interactions or characteristics of individuals whom the police encounter (see,
e.g. National Research Council 2004). In political science, where democratization
and political transitions are both major subfields, the vast majority of scholarship has
focused not on empirical analyses of justice institutions—a surprise, given their
centrality in governance—but rather on transformations in other political, social and
economic realms such as elections, political parties, civic society, economic growth,
social relationships or culture.
However, this significant and recent period of political change, even with all of its
definitional and research complexities, affords a valuable opportunity to better
understand and explore the relationship between governance and policing. Towards
this goal, this study reflects the results of a one-year pilot project in which I surveyed and
spoke with 315 police officers from 22 nations in order to determine the feasibility of an
even larger study (Lum and LaFree forthcoming). For this pilot, I interacted with these
officers in ten sessions over the course of a year through interpreted questionnaires as
well as focus group interactions using simultaneous translators. These commanders
came from countries that had experienced major political transformations in the wave
of liberalization beginning in the 1970s. Through these interactions, I tried to gauge
their preferences towards two well known styles of policing of which preliminary analysis
showed that they were well aware: community-oriented and zero tolerance approaches.
In speaking with and surveying these officers, I hoped to determine whether variations
existed in their preferences for these two styles and whether such variations were linked
to the extent to which their respective countries have liberalized. Though not without
difficult limitations, this study represents the first of its kind in empirically examining
the governance–policing relationship.

Background: Democratization and Policing

The recent wave of world political transformations since the early 1970s can generally
be described as a period of ‘democratization’ or ‘liberalization’ from more authoritarian
modes of governance, prompting the question for police researchers whether policing
has also transformed in these nations. But, despite the widespread recognition of this
democratization trend, the complications within these transitions, as well as the
normative debates that surround their study, have led paradoxically to both a push for,
and impediments in, empirical analysis (see, e.g. Diamond 1999; Diamond et al. 1997;
Held 1987; Huntington 1993; Inglehart et al. 2004; Lijphart 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996;
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O’Donnell et al. 1991; Sorensen 1998). At the outset, such labels and their study
immediately generate contentious debates, concerns and controversies. For instance,
what is meant by democratization, democratic policing, liberalization, authoritarianism or
transition, and can we really objectively agree to their meanings? Does the use of such
terms imply simplicity and a linearity that clearly does not characterize the very complex
and rocky road of political transition and democratization? Further, when does one
know a country and its police force have transitioned, and what measures can be used
to mark those changes?
To move forward, but also to exhibit caution about using these terms, I present as
background two research perspectives from the study of democratization in comparative

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political science and the study of democratic policing from criminology. By drawing
from both disciplines, I propose possible hypotheses about how we might expect police
to change during the political transformations that we have seen, but ultimately advocate
for a more empirical approach in examining the relationship between governance,
changes in governance, and policing outputs.

Democratization research
Most democratization research has been conducted in the field of comparative political
science rather than in criminology and criminal justice, resulting in less emphasis on
the role that transformations in justice institutions contribute to democratization.
Scholars in this area have debated definitions of democracy (see, e.g. Dahl 1956; Held
1987; Schumpeter 1961), examined its social and economic causes and preconditions
(see e.g. Diamond 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rose and Munro 2002; Rose et al. 1998;
Sorensen 1998; Wiarda and Mott 2001), categorized its varieties (Held 1987; Lijphart
1999; Martinez and Diaz 1996; Sorensen 1998) and documented its notable periods
and the political, social and economic correlates and outcomes of such periods
(Diamond 1999; Huntington 1993). They have devised both quantitative and qualitative
measures of democratization using a variety of political, economic, social and cultural
indicators (see Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2004;
Inglehart 1988; Inglehart and Welzel 2002; Marshall and Jaggers 2002; Sorensen 1998).
The multiple facets and arguments in this research area reflect definitional, theoretical,
methodological and policy-related debates, and the field’s complexities are far from the
seemingly linear, positive or dichotomous connotations that the term democratization
seems to suggest.
The notion of democratic consolidation or ‘deepening’ (Diamond 1999; Diamond
et al. 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996) is one of the major perspectives within democratization
research that reflects this complexity, rejecting a dichotomous perception of
democratization and presenting a theoretical context to understanding how institutions
change within larger transformations. Democratic consolidation specifically refers to
how political, economic, cultural and social institutions develop over time in ways that
strengthen, sustain and reflect values associated with democracy, however defined
(Diamond 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996). Consolidation emphasizes that a country does
not simply become democratic when a revolution, overthrow or other transitional event
occurs, or even when free elections are established. A consolidation perspective
emphasizes that democratization is described by empirical realities and thus measured
by the extent to which those realities have taken root in political, economic, social and
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 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

cultural institutions; civic society; national consciousness; and the everyday behaviours
and attitudes of political elites, government bureaucrats and the general public.
Examining democratization as a process rather than as an event or outcome builds a
flexibility into both its conceptualization and measurement. A consolidation perspective
allows a number of aspects of society, including those related to criminal justice, to
influence and be influenced by this process, including making the process stop or go
backwards (thus, consolidation does not presuppose that democratization is always a
forward-moving process). These aspects can include such factors as reforms in electoral
and party processes (Linz and Stepan 1996; Niemi et al. 2002; O’Donnell et al. 1991),
improvements in economic health (see Bates 2001; Lipset 1959; Przeworski and Limongi

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1997; Sorensen 1998) or the nurturing of civic society and public engagement (Almond
and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Inglehart et al. 2004; Putnam 1993). And these factors
have been used (with much debate) to create scales, ratings and other quantifications
of consolidation. Commonly employed measures have included Freedom House scores,1
Polity ratings,2 the World Bank’s Dimensions of Governance Indicators3 and measures
of political and civic culture from the World Values Surveys4 or the Latino Barometer.5
Criminal justice measures, and policing indicators more specifically, are not strongly
represented in these quantifications, and Larry Diamond, a central figure in this area,
asserts that the police–democratic relationship is a ‘commonly overlooked arena of state
strengthening’ (Diamond 1999: 94). He argues that ‘the police are the agents of the
state authority whom ordinary citizens are most likely to experience in their daily lives.
… If new democracies are to deliver the balance of freedom and order their peoples
want and to keep the military out of the business of internal security (and thus politics),
they must develop professionalized, disciplined, resourceful, and accountable police
forces’ (Diamond 1999: 94). Others in criminology also share his view. David Bayley, in
his influential work on democratic policing, comments that ‘police activity can have a
profound influence … on the vitality of the processes that are essential to democratic
political life’ (Bayley 2006: 18).
Democratic consolidation could provide a useful research framework and theoretical
perspective for studying the relationship between policing and governance. Political
transitions can reflect significant changes in and challenges to interactions and relations
between the state and society, often manifested in police–citizen exchanges (Bayley 2006;
Marx 2001). Such changes in these exchanges reflect the dynamic and developmental
aspect of democratization as articulated by consolidation theorists. Weber’s notion of the
state, as defined by its monopoly of the legitimate use of force (see Weber 1919 [1946]),
directly implicates the relationship between the police and governance and furthermore,
between justice and transition. This notion suggests that changes in the exercise of this
monopoly, as described by changes in governance, can affect police action and interaction
with the polity. Even if one disputes Weber, it would be difficult to argue that the police
are not an empirical regularity of any modern state (whether democratic or not) and a

1

See www.freedomhouse.org.
2

See www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
3

See http://go.worldbank.org/N14HUIK3J0.
4

See www.worldvaluessurvey.com/.
5

The Latino Barometer is the Latin American version of the World Values Survey conducted by the Corporaciòn Latinobaròmetro.
See www.latinobarometro.org/.

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manifestation of the state’s need to provide control and security. The way the state,
through its police force, treats the accused or the victims of crime can symbolize and
reflect the fundamental values of many different types of governance structures.
Subsequently, major changes in that relationship also reflects the attempt to transition
to new approaches. In more authoritarian regimes, the police may have been the source
or facilitator of government oppression, brutality, discrimination or dictatorship at the
micro level. Because of this, during consolidation, the police are often the target of
protests and reforms and are forced to change their ways, adopt different systems of
interacting with the public, be bound by a new set of operating procedures and laws or
be held to different expectations and higher standards of performance.

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Examining changes in policing in transitioning countries could measure whether
broader consolidation is reflected in those changes. There are many ways in which such
empirical evidence of changes in police in transitioning countries can be observed. Most
obvious is actual, sustained changes in actions. During consolidation, changes may be
found in police organizational transformations such as the application of the rule of law,
or in cultural changes, shifts in deployment choices, changes in expectations between the
police and people or even in the way police record and follow up on crime. Some
empirical observations might require on-the-ground observations of the actions of
multiple countries’ officials—a task well beyond this unfunded study. However,
consolidation theory also points to another set of indicators that may be useful in
measuring change: the preferences, attitudes, expectations and political mentality of
police decision makers. Numerous scholars have argued and empirically studied
preferences and values as a significant indication of consolidation or reversion (see
Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Inglehart and Welzel 2002; Inglehart et al. 2004;
Katznelson 1997; Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997; Putnam 1993; Tessler 2002). Measuring
changes and variations in police officials’ preferences, attitudes and expectations
regarding how to control crime and disorder across stages of democratic consolidation
may be one approach in gauging democratic deepening in a nation and the extent to
which police have ‘democratized’.

Democratic policing research

But which changes in policing and police attitudes would indicate consolidation towards
a more liberal form of governance? Democratization literature in comparative political
science only generally guides us to a framework of thinking about political change.
However, because it does not usually examine police institutions, this research provides
little empirical knowledge of justice institutions in the transitioning nations from which
propositions might be drawn. In criminal justice research, although we also lack
empirical studies of police at different stages of democratic development across multiple
nations, there is a growing theoretical discussion on what ‘democratic policing’ might
entail from a number of case studies (see, e.g. Bayley 1997; 2001; 2006; Diamond 1999;
Einstein and Amir 2001; Fielding 1996; 2001; Maguire et al. 1998; Marenin 1998;
Mastrofski and Lum 2008; National Institute of Justice 1997; Reiner 2000; Shearing
1997). This research does not seem to impose or suggest a single definition of democratic
policing but emphasizes the importance of policing in governance, drawing parallels
between the general values or democratic consolidation and how these might be
institutionalized into, be detected within, or even conflict with, police functions.
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The difficulty, however, in describing democratic policing is the complex and

paradoxical nature of police in democracies that can obfuscate definitions and result in
simultaneously existing policing preferences that may seem at odds with each other or
democratic ideals. This special nature reflects a both a balance and tension between two
responsibilities that law enforcement officials in democracies have: ensuring safety, security
and civility and operating within an environment of political and personal freedoms, civil
liberties, sensitivity to and protection of minorities, demands for accountability and
responsiveness to citizens and extensive due process protections (for general discussions
of this tensions, see Amir and Einstein 2001; Einstein and Amir 2001; Mastrofski 1999;
Packer 1964). The complexity in these potentially conflicting goals, combined with the

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high levels of discretion that characterizes policing, allows for the possibility of different
and sometimes contradictory operational styles to coexist (Bayley 1997).
As an example, community policing is one particular style that has been espoused as
having characteristics that parallel values in liberal democracy (see discussions by
scholars in the edited volume of Amir and Einstein 2001). Such parallels are drawn
because community policing is viewed as a more citizen-consensus approach that is not
only or always aimed at crime reduction, but often used to increase the accountability
and legitimacy of the police. For instance, a central ideal of a community-oriented
policing philosophy is the direct involvement of citizens in crime control and the
representation of their interests in prioritizing police activities (Greene and Mastrofski
1988; Jones et al. 1996; Maguire et al. 1998; Rosenbaum 1994; Skogan 1990; 2004;
Skolnick 1999; Skolnick and Bayley 1986; 1988). Such representation can be facilitated
through strategies like neighbourhood watch, community meetings, community policing
boards (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994; Friedman 1994; Roth et al. 2004), problem-solving
attempts that involve citizens (Goldstein 1987; 1990; Kelling and Moore 1988) and other
police–community partnerships (Mastrofski and Ritti 2000; Skogan 2004). Other parallel
concepts might be citizen-based authorization, consent and legitimacy, which emphasize
the mandate and power that citizens in a democracy have over the police (Jones et al.
1996; Kelling and Moore 1988; LaFree 1998; Maguire et al. 1998; Sherman 2001) and
may be realized through citizen review boards, a complaint process, open channels with
the media, a willingness to work with police researchers or regularly held community
meetings (see Jones et al. 1996; Sherman 2001; Skolnick 1999). Yet another parallel
between ideals of democracy and community-oriented policing is that government
agents do not reign over citizens to exploit them, but exist to serve and be responsive to
them (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994; Goldstein 1987; 1990; Jones et al. 1996; Marx 2001;
Trojanowicz et al. 1998; Van den Broeck 2001).
But, to anticipate a positive relationship between democratic consolidation and the
transformation of police forces into community-oriented agencies may be inaccurate
because of the other, more social-control nature of police and its dual nature (Mastrofski
2006; Pino and Wiatrowski 2006). Not only might community policing be at odds with
some of the legitimate functions of the police in democracy (e.g. equal treatment of
opposing communities), but it does not necessarily ensure that the democratic goals of
crime reduction and safety will occur (see Sherman et al. 2002). Furthermore, even in long-
consolidated democracies, other strategies are often employed that are not community-
oriented, but that reduce crime, are popularly supported and are within the rule of law.
For instance, it is not uncommon for agencies in the United States and United
Kingdom to advocate and use both ‘zero tolerance’ and community-oriented policing
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styles, arguably two very different approaches, to prevent and control crime. Zero
tolerance policing, sometimes referred to as broken windows policing (Wilson and
Kelling 1982)6 or ‘crackdowns’, is an arrest-based, crime-control approach. It that has
been justified and used extensively in the United States and the United Kingdom as a
way to reduce crime and disorder and increase the safety and security of citizens (see
Bowling 1999; Bratton 1998; Innes 1999; Kelling and Sousa 2001; McArdle and Erzen
2001; Rosenfeld et al. 2007). This tactic encourages officers to reduce their discretion to
arrest, resulting in the use of arrest for all types of crimes—especially ‘quality of life’ and
disorder misdemeanours—in order to reduce violence more generally. Like many police
practices, zero tolerance has its controversies (see Innes 1999; Rosenfeld et al. 2007) and

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may result in abuses of authority, illegal use of force, and a transformation of policing
culture into one that could be inflexible or overly repressive. At the same time, it can
be used within the rule of law and a democratic framework. Indeed, it might be preferred
during democratic transitions because of the belief or reality of a rise in crime during
democratization (Clinard and Abbott 1973; Howard et al. 2000; Karstedt and LaFree
2006; LaFree and Drass 2002), which could lead to a greater demand by citizens or
political elites for more arrests, crackdowns and harsher policing policies (Caldeira
2000; Neild 2001; Rose and Munro 2002; Shaw 2000).
Given these uncertainties, it would be inaccurate to argue that community policing is
the natural interpretation of democratic policing simply because it reflects ideals in
certain definitions of democracy. A more realistic approach would be to empirically
examine how police transform during democratic consolidation, and build theory from
that knowledge. It is to this task that this study now turns.

The Current Study

In this study, a cross-sectional approach is taken by examining police officials from
twenty-two transitioning/democratizing countries to detect variations in their
preferences between community policing and zero tolerance. As already noted, a
preference for one policing style over another does not mean that country is ‘more
democratic’ or that the particular style reflects a more democratic approach. Rather,
this empirical exercise is to determine whether a difference does exist and, if so,
whether that difference can be used to further understand policing and democratic
consolidation.

The sample and data collection

The sample consists of 315 police commanders from 22 countries, all of whose political
transformations occurred at various times and circumstances. These 22 countries are
within three major world regions: Africa (Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania), Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and

6

Although Wilson and Kelling did not use the term ‘zero tolerance’ policing, those discussing zero tolerance often reflect
and draw upon broken windows theory as support for this strategy (see Rosenfeld et al. 2007). But, Wilson and Kelling initially
framed their broken windows theory in a community-oriented context by suggesting that disorder policing is often a priority for
communities, over other types of crimes (see also Kelling and Coles 1996).

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 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

South and Latin America (Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua
and Peru). This first pilot data collection took place during ten in-person sessions
between the author and these officers over a period of a year,7 with two to three countries
of 30–50 students represented during each session. All surveys and interactions used
written and simultaneous oral interpretation in each participant’s own official language.
This process was facilitated by the author’s connection with the US State Department’s
International Law Enforcement Academy, and all interactions took place at the location
of the academy in Roswell, New Mexico (ILEA-R).
The countries were chosen to attend ILEA-R at the discretion of the US Department
of State and tended to be developing, rather than fully consolidated democracies. The

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individuals who attended the four-week academy were chosen by their respective police
agencies and therefore were not a representative sample of police officers from each
agency. Every member of the sample, for instance, had supervisory responsibilities (non-
ranked officers did not attend such training sessions) and had most likely attended
other international training sessions. The vast majority of attendees were male as were
the survey respondents (92%).
The survey asked officers whether they had heard of community policing and zero
tolerance, as well as a third, more managerial style not discussed in this paper because of
its lack of responses (New York City’s COMPSTAT programme). Questions in the survey
probed whether respondents’ agencies had implemented the two strategies and whether
they felt the programmes were beneficial.8 One possible concern with the survey was the
interpretation and definition of the terms community-oriented policing and zero tolerance
which can be value-laden and present different conceptualizations even in English
(Mastrofski 2006; Seagrave 1996). And, while these terms may be more familiar to police
in the places where they are used, this may not be the case across developing democracies.
Thus, to ensure clarity, focused group discussions were used before and after administering
the written survey to come to a very general understanding and consensus of these terms
and also to further understand crime prevention styles and preferences of officers.
Concerns about the understanding of these terms ultimately proved unfounded; 94
per cent of the participants had heard of the term community-oriented policing upon initial
interpretation without any explanation; it was clear that the idea of community policing
has diffused across many societies around the world, as Das and Lab (2002) note. While
the term zero tolerance presented less initial understanding upon translation (66 per cent
had heard of the actual term as it was initially translated in their language), it quickly
became clear that this was a problem of translation rather than of substance. After a very
brief explanation, all participants understood the police tactic of full enforcement by
the increased use of arrest on even minor crimes. The pre- and post-survey discussions
of the terms also reflect this general understanding; discussions often resulted in debate
about the merits of both approaches, rather than about their definitions. The author
and language interpreters were also available in person to answer any questions during
the implementation of the survey. Of the 315 police commanders who agreed to answer

7

This pilot survey and discussions were conducted between January 2003 and January 2004. The second wave of more detailed
surveys was conducted over two years—2005 through 2006. Statements made or written from those interviewed cannot be printed
due to human subject protections requirements and to maintain the privacy of individuals who may still be employed in these
agencies.
8

The survey instrument can be viewed at http://gemini.gmu.edu/cebcp/documents/DemoISurvey.pdf.

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the survey, 84 per cent (266) provided enough information to be analysed. To ensure
the confidentiality of respondents, surveys were anonymous and protected by human
subject applications and consent documents.
This study, and the subsequent analysis currently underway, is the first of its kind to use
this multi-language, written and oral approach to gauge the attitudes of hundreds of
officers across a large proportion of recently transitioned countries. However, as with all
comparative research, there were also limitations. First, this was a sample of convenience,
as it would have been nearly impossible, given the difficulties in conducting empirical
multinational surveys of police officials, to survey a random sample of officers from 22
developing democracies. Further, interactions between the participants and the author

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only included police officials from these countries with supervisory responsibility and
who attended the International Law Enforcement Academy. It could be argued that the
daily behaviour and attitudes of the lowest ranks of the police who have the most contact
with citizens is the most meaningful measure of the extent to which democracy has
deepened in justice institutions. Although such an on-the-ground examination was not
possible for this study, recording the preferences of supervisors who have influence over
the types of policing styles employed in their agencies could also be viewed as advantageous.
These officials influence subordinates in action, organizational culture, and attitudes;
their beliefs are just as meaningful to study.

The dependent variable: preference for community policing

To develop a measure of preference between community-oriented policing and zero
tolerance, individuals were asked to separately rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, whether they felt
community-oriented policing and zero tolerance were ‘1’ very harmful to ‘5’ very
beneficial. The ratings of community-oriented policing and zero tolerance were
combined into a relative preference for community-oriented policing, where a score of
‘1’ was given if the participant gave a higher rating to community-oriented policing than
to zero tolerance, and a ‘0’ if they did not give community-oriented policing a higher
rating. Rather than examining the ratings separately, this method was taken to present
a conservative approach in measuring a relative preference between the two. It should
be noted, however, that separate hierarchical ordinal regressions were also run on each
of the ratings separately, which resulted in the same general direction and statistical
significance of the findings presented below.

Explanations for preferences

The primary interest of this study was to test the hypothesis that police from more
consolidated democracies would prefer community policing more than zero tolerance
approaches. To do so requires a hierarchical examination of such preferences with
democracy scores for countries from which officers hailed. While many indices exist
that measure the level of democratization and democratic consolidation for all countries,
there are debates as to which scale is most valid (see Hadenius and Teorell 2004). Thus,
two of the most commonly used measures of democratic consolidation were employed—
Freedom House and POLITY IV scores, which are derived for almost every country in
the world. Freedom House ratings are developed by scholars in a peer-reviewed process
by scoring 39 different measures of political and civil freedoms associated with liberal
796
 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

democracy. Those 39 scores are then combined into two seven-point scales labelled
‘political rights’ and ‘civil liberties’. To be consistent with the year the data was collected,
the 2003 Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties were aggregated
and then inverted into a single 13-point scale, ‘1’ representing countries that scored the
lowest on the indicators used to gauge democratization in a nation in that year, and ‘13’
being the highest score or, in the terms used by Freedom House, the ‘most free’. POLITY
IV scores (see Marshall and Jaggers 2002) were collected from the fourth wave of this
survey in 2002 and consist of a combined 21-point measure of the level of democracy
and autocracy in a country (where a score of ‘–10’ indicates high levels of autocracy and
‘+10’ indicates high levels of democracy). Additionally, the Polity index of ‘Durability’

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was used, which is a measure of the number of years since the significant event that
began a country’s democratic transition.
Other country-level statistics such as poverty, crime rates, and socioeconomic indicators
may also influence an officer’s preference and attitude towards crime prevention. Thus,
these factors were collected from the World Bank9 databases for the year 2002 (since the
survey was administered in 2003). It was expected that many of the country-level explanatory
variables, including the democratization measures, would be highly correlated to each
other, which could confound statistical analysis (see Lijphart 1971; Przeworski and Teune
1970). Thus, principal component analysis was conducted and a three factor solution
emerged:10 CONSOLIDATION, a general measure of democratization, included high
loadings of Freedom House and Polity IV scores, as expected, and also percentage of urban
population, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and life expectancy. The AID
component included a measure of foreign aid per capita and a weaker loading of life
expectancy. This factor serves as a proxy for the influence of and reliance on outside nations
in a country’s domestic policies. POPULATION combined measures of total population
and population density. The Polity IV Durability index (the length of time passed since the
transition event) did not load on any component and was separately retained. Additionally,
World Health Organization (WHO) intentional death statistics were collected as a general
measure of homicide in each country (see LaFree 1999 and Marenin 1997 for support for
the use of this measure). However, because the WHO only had homicide data for 16 of the
22 countries in this study, a separate model incorporating this variable was run.
In addition to country-level variables, individual characteristics of officers may also
matter. While the collection of individual information for this study was extremely
limited due to human subjects concerns, the age and regional affiliation of officers were

See www.worldbank.org.
9

10

Varimax Rotated Component Matrix

CONSOLIDATION AID POPULATION

Freedom score (inverted) 0.920

Percentage urban population 0.868
GDP per capita PPP (international dollars) 0.844
Polity score (converted to 0–20 scale) 0.824
Life expectancy 0.679 –0.459
Foreign aid per capita 0.939
Population 0.832
Population density –0.575

Determinant =
0.001, KMO =
0.47, Rotation: Varimax. Scores shown >
0.40.

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available. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each of the variables and
components generated from the factor analysis.

Analysis and Results

As these data involved measures of individuals nested in countries of which explanatory
variables would be used, a generalized form of hierarchical linear modelling (HLM) was
employed for this analysis (see Hox 1995; Raudenbush and Byrk 2002). In particular, I
used a Bernoulli specification for non-linear models with dichotomous outcomes.11
Figure 1 anticipates the results of this hierarchical analysis. This scatter plot shows the

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percentage of police officials from each participating country who ranked community-
oriented policing as relatively more beneficial and less harmful than zero tolerance,
plotted against the consolidation score for that nation as measured by Freedom House
(an almost identical figure was generated using Polity IV scores). Figure 1 indicates that
police from more strongly consolidated countries appear to have greater proportions of
respondents who prefer community-oriented policing over zero tolerance approaches.

Table 1
Descriptive statistics for final individual and country-level variables

N Minimum Maximum Mean SD

Individual-level variables
Preferred community-oriented policing 266 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Age 266 21.00 58.00 37.30 7.12
Regional indicator 266 N/Aa N/A N/A N/A
Country-level variables
CONSOLIDATION COMPONENT 22 –1.76 1.20 0.00b 1.00b

Freedom score (inverted) 22 2.00 13.00 9.32 3.12

Polity score (converted to 0–20 scale) 22 1.00 20.00 16.09 4.83

Percentage urban population 22 15.92 82.39 54.23 17.38

GDP per capita PPP (international dollars) 22 579.31 18,614.68 6,858.27 5,542.32

Life expectancy 22 37.54 75.91 66.14 10.93
AID COMPONENT 22 –1.61 2.55 0.00 1.00

Foreign aid per capita 22 2.15 111.60 42.13 27.83
(and life expectancy, but weaker loading)
POPULATION COMPONENT 22 –1.32 3.64 0.00 1.00

Population 22 1.4m 174.5m 19.3m 36.2m

Population density 22 8.12 309.70 74.93 65.45
Polity DURABILITY score 22 1.00 20.00 9.41 5.14
WHO intentional death statistics 16 12.10 61.90 26.35 14.28

a

The distribution of this regional indicator was Africa
=
30, Latin/South America =
100, Eastern Europe/Central
Asia =
136.
b

The mean and standard deviations of the components are 0 and 1, respectively, as the component is a standardized
score.

11

The Bernoulli distribution is a special case of the binominal distribution and uses a logit link in HLM to estimate effects. For both
level 1 and 2 predictors, the locations of these predictors were centred on the grand mean and the following model was specified:

Level 1 (individual-level variables): COP Preference
=
β0 + β1 (AGE) + β2 (REGIONAL DUMMY)

Level 2 (country-level variables): β0 = γ00 + γ01(DURABILITY) + γ02(CONSOLIDATION) + γ03(AID) +
γ04(POPULATION)
+
u0
β1 = γ10
β2 = γ20

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 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

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* This score represents a modified combined Freedom House score of measures of ‘political rights’ and
‘civil liberties’ on a 1:13 scale, where 1 = not free and 13 = free.
Fig. 1
Preferences for COP over ZT for countries ranked with Freedom
House scores

More telling are the results of the generalized hierarchical models (Table 2). The first
three columns of Table 2 report findings from separate hierarchical analyses using the
inclusion of a different regional dummy variable. The fourth column illustrates a
separate model that incorporates the WHO intentional death statistics for the 16
countries in which data were available and a regional dummy variable indicating Eastern
Europe/Central Asia =
1 and Latin/South America =
0 (since African homicide data
were not available). A number of interesting findings emerged. First, the extent to which
a country had democratically consolidated, embodied by the combination of Freedom
House and Polity scores as well as GDP per capita, life expectancy and urbanization, is
positively related to preference for community-oriented policing. Specifically, as
countries become more consolidated, there is an average increase of 15 per cent in the
predicted probability that a police supervisor from that country will prefer consensus or
community-based policing styles over more crime control/authoritarian ones. No other
country-level variable or factor was significantly related to this preference.
Also interesting were the regional effects found, particularly between the Latin/South
Americans and the Eastern Europeans/Central Asians. Commanders from Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, which had pre-transition legacies of Soviet communism, had
a reduced probability of preferring community-oriented policing of 13 per cent, while
Latin or South American commanders had an increased probability of preferring
community policing by 14 per cent.12 The effects of being African were not statistically
significant and may be the result of the small sample of Africans in the model.

A one-way analysis of variance with post hoc tests was also conducted. The tests revealed significant variation among the regions
12

(omnibus F =
3.47, p <
0.05) as well as significant differences between Eastern Europe/Central Asia and Latin/South America using
Tukey’s HSD test.

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 LUM

Table 2
Unit-specific HLM results for non-linear logit model

Fixed effect With East With Latin
=
1 With Africa
=
1 With

Europe/Central HOMICIDE
Asia
=
1 and Europe
=
1

INTERCEPT β0 INTERCEPT γ00 0.83 0.87 0.85 0.75

DURABILITY γ01 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.97
CONSOLIDATION γ02 2.33** (+16%) 1.88* (+15%) 2.02* (+14%) 2.98* (+18%)
AID γ03 1.25 1.40 1.24 1.31
POPULATION γ04 0.89 1.00 1.10 0.86
HOMICIDE γ05 – – – 1.00
AGE slope β1 INTERCEPT γ10

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0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97
REGIONAL
DUMMY slope β2 INTERCEPT γ20 0.34* (–13%) 2.11* (+14%) 1.52 0.26* (–12%)

Odds ratios (exp β) are displayed, with changes in predicted probability given a one unit increase in the
independent variable in parentheses for statistically significant predictors.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <
0.001.

Furthermore, both regional and consolidation effects remained statistically significant

when levels of homicide were introduced. Homicide was not a statistically significant
predictor of policing style preference (although the last column only represents
participants from 16 non-African countries from which homicide data were available).
In other words, while one might expect that police from countries with higher rates of
homicide may prefer more crime control or authoritarian strategies, this was not found
to be the case. Although WHO homicide statistics are considered the best measure of
homicide, I also analysed the model with Interpol data. Interestingly, when Interpol
data were used as a proxy measure for crime, higher homicide rates were associated with
more preference for community-oriented policing, not with zero tolerance models.
The group discussions reinforced these statistical findings. Particularly remarkable was
the stark difference between the comments made by police supervisors from ex-Soviet
satellites and those by supervisors from Latin and South America. Although more
informal and unstructured, these discussions with each country are useful as a point of
reflection. Due to human subject protections, specific official’s comments and their
represented country cannot be revealed, but more general regional trends still provide
interesting findings. The Eastern European/Central Asian commanders spoke of zero
tolerance as a viable, positive option. Many believed that community-oriented policing
was a way for communities to gain illegitimate control of the police (potentially resulting
in corruption), and there was sometimes a disdain for this style of policing. Officers saw
community policing as simply ‘political’ or representative of ‘corruption’, and supported
more ‘centralized control’ and crackdown tactics, especially against illegal immigrants
and ‘gypsies’. When describing their organizational tendencies, the term reactive was
commonly used, although, in some Central Asian countries, there are discussions of
attempting to move towards some community-based approaches, especially in the rural
areas of those countries.
The discussions with the Latin and South American police supervisors were qualitatively
different, at least in rhetoric, and focused more on issues related to communities and
their importance in policing. Members of the community were seen as an ‘important
constituent’, and the term solidarity (between the police and the citizens) was often
800
 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

used. Officers from Latin and South America were more likely to emphasize the
importance of the community in police legitimacy and in new innovations, although,
when further probed about how relations between the police and citizens were measured
or documented, officers were more vague. Interestingly, many officers from Latin
America associated zero tolerance with Bill Bratton, who had consulted with many of
their countries to implement COMPSTAT. The New York quality-of-life enforcement
efforts were generally seen as either not culturally acceptable in some of the Latin
American countries or were abandoned by police leadership.
Furthermore, officers from Eastern Europe and Central Asia centred their explanations
of the deployment tendencies of their agencies on organizational hierarchy and police

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authority, rather than describing programmes developed with citizens, which was a
more regularly non-solicited discussion by officials from Latin and South America. The
Eastern Europeans and Central Asians’ tactical descriptions focused on traditional,
arrest-based strategies to reduce crime, rather than on programmes involving improving
community problem-solving partnerships. When asked about the deployment styles
used by their agencies, officers from the Latin and South American countries chose to
discuss community-based tactics and strategies (such as volunteer neighbourhood
patrols or even restorative justice approaches) and frequently cited the importance of
the community in their responses and discussions to the author.
Of course, the proof of community policing lies in more than these assertions. Indeed,
there are still documented abuses by the police in some Latin American countries
(Caldeira 2000) that are clearly not in the spirit of community or consensus-oriented
policing. However, there were at least differences in the acknowledgement of the legitimacy
of community members in the discourses between the Latin Americans and the Eastern
Europeans. General problems, however, were raised by officers across all countries, more
broadly reflecting the challenges of consolidation and tempering more optimistic
discussions about community-oriented and proactive policing innovations. These
problems included the difficulty in establishing accountability and information systems in
their agencies, improving legitimacy among citizens, balancing crime control with often
newly created democratic values, dealing with ineffective court systems and working to
undo problematic organizational cultures and seniority systems. And new crime challenges
were regularly cited and attributed to democratization, including rises in random violence
and youth crimes as well as increases in illegal immigration and smuggling.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study is the first to measure police commander deployment preferences across
multiple democratizing nations. The findings indicate that there may indeed be a link
between attitudes by police supervisors towards different styles of policing and the
extent to which a country has democratized, at least as measured by indicators such as
POLITY or Freedom House. Although more testing is needed, these findings present
empirical results that can support theories of the relationship between governance and
policing—a relationship that is vastly under-researched but potentially central to
understanding democratic consolidation and subsequently reforms and efforts towards
liberalization. Documenting styles of police activity in countries of transition (as well as
older democracies) may provide an indication that democratic consolidation is occurring
(or not) and may also be a catalyst (or impediment) for that process. And, such
801
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indications of democratic consolidation might be found not only in more macro changes
in a nation’s justice system (such as the adoption of the rule of law, standard operating
procedures, professionalism or civilianization), but also in the transformation of
individual beliefs, attitudes and preferences of on-the-ground, justice bureaucrats.
While the positive relationship found between democratization and community-
oriented policing should not be overstated, this finding reiterates the importance of
exploring the influence of governance and political changes on police behaviour, which,
in democratizing nations, may be just as important in studying the impact that
organizational or situational characteristics have on policing outputs. Political change,
like democratic consolidation, may affect how police view their mandate, which, in turn,

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might alter police preferences and subsequently their behaviours (Manning 1977; van
Maanen 1978), leading to outputs that, in turn, reinforce democratic governance. The
results suggest that officers from countries who ranked higher on POLITY IV or Freedom
House measures tended to perceive their function not solely in terms of ‘law enforcer’,
but rather as a more complex mandate that reflects the aforementioned competing
tensions in policing democracies. This, in turn, may affect their preferences for tactical
choices that are less single-minded and more complicated and multi-faceted in nature,
including approaches that involve community partnerships, problem solving and other
tasks not necessarily only geared towards crime suppression. Of course, this is not to say
that police in democracies cannot be authoritarian, corrupt, brutal or unjust, as
Caldeira’s (2000) ethnographic accounts of Sao Paolo, Brazil, shows. But, this analysis
suggests that at least alternative mentalities such as community-oriented policing are
more evident in police officials from countries rated as more consolidated. Such
alternative mentalities may indicate another democratic value—more openness to
different options and viewpoints.
The regional findings of differences between the Latin and South American supervisors
and their Eastern European counterparts are especially illustrative of the nature of this
relationship. Democratization scholars have repeatedly pointed out that Latin and
South American transitions are qualitatively different from those of Eastern Europe
(Diamond et al. 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; O’Donnell et al. 1991). Democratization in
Latin and South America began earlier, in the mid-1980s, compared to Eastern Europe,
where democratization began in the late 1980s to mid-1990s. This may lead to a greater
likelihood for post-Soviet policing agencies to have democratically inexperienced
personnel, lingering authoritarian police culture, adherence to practices of pre-
transitional authoritarian regimes or instability created by transitions themselves
(Heymann, 1997; Rose and Munro 2002), all of which may contribute to the preference
for a more straightforward, crackdown approach.
Additionally, the greater emphasis of grassroots movements during and prior to transition
in Latin America (see, e.g. Martinez and Diaz 1996; Wood 2000) may explain regional
differences as well. Unlike the Latin American experience, Rose and Munro (2002) and
Rose et al. (1998) suggest that Eastern European transitions were elite-driven, a product of
Gorbachev’s liberalization policies that ultimately led to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
This difference in the start of political transition and the role of grassroot forces may provide
insight into the extent to which civil society has developed and interacts with political
governance and change, which in turn is reflected in policing styles.
Another regional difference is suggested by Wiarda and Mott (2001), who point to the
Catholic, corporatist and Iberian legacies as influential in the political development in
802
 COMMUNITY POLICING OR ZERO TOLERANCE?

Latin America, which tends to emphasize the importance of group responsibility and
group subculture in everyday governance. Although corporatist modes of governance
can also be authoritarian and anti-democratic (Stepan 1978), corporatism could have
created forces within civic society or political culture that, at least for policing, may make
the police more amenable to, or at least understanding of, community-based initiatives
and action. For Eastern Europe and Central Asia, however, Rose and Munro (2002)
suggest that the totalitarian legacy of communism in Europe encouraged the emergence
of states that were philosophically opposed to nurturing civic society. However, these
institutional structures and civic society may be the necessary preconditions to the
development of democratic policing systems that emphasize more community-based

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orientations (Rose and Munro 2002; Rose et al. 1998; Wiarda and Mott 2001).
In addition to expanding the theoretical knowledge of the influence of governance
on police behaviour, the relationship between democratic consolidation and a preference
for community-oriented policing may also help develop an empirically based, realistic
description of ‘democratic policing’ and, in turn, provide clues on how to achieve it. As
David Bayley (1995; 2006) has extensively discussed, there is much debate, enterprise,
difficulty and uncertainty in how to reform and democratize police in countries that
have experienced transitions from authoritarian, totalitarian and oppressive forms of
governance to democracy. At the same time, as Diamond (1999) has emphasized, the
transition of the police is an essential component of consolidation. While advocating the
adoption of community policing is in no way a panacea to the major organizational,
cultural, personnel and crime problems that transitioning police agencies in transitioning
nations face, these findings at least indicate that there is evidence of alternative,
community-oriented philosophies held by officers of more consolidated democracies. If
democratic policing requires a level of complexity in perceptions of police styles that
extend beyond a single, linear conceptualization which tends to characterize authoritarian
styles, then there is value in promoting alternative and multiple conceptualizations of
police deployment (Shearing 1997). Perhaps, police officials who are open to community-
based styles or who value citizen input and influence may also be more likely to respect
human and civil rights, fairness and equity—all valuable consolidation commodities.
Additionally, even if community policing does not necessarily lead to substantial
reductions in crime, its effect on increasing the agency’s legitimacy and reducing fear
may be just as important to help transition police agencies as a step towards broader
democratization.
The use of community-oriented policing as leverage for democratization is already
evident in international and domestic efforts to reform police in transitioning nations.
The European Union’s Constitution, which outlines requirements for consideration of
candidacy and ultimately membership (see European Union 2005), emphasizes justice
values such as equity, representation, fairness and accountability—all ideals suggested
by community policing scholars. Community policing also appears in many discussions,
reports, papers, press releases and articles of the European Union.13 Membership of the
European Union can often be stalled when such standards are not met by justice systems,
an example being Turkey (see European Union 2004). The case of Northern Ireland

To see the many uses of this term, see the European Union’s official website, http://europa.eu/.
13

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also provides a case study of how internal, domestic pressures and conflict in a developing
democracy have led to a community-oriented variety of police reform (see Independent
Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland 1998). Also known as the ‘Patten
Commission’ Report, these directives clearly emphasize community-oriented, not crime-
control, goals, which philosophically are more aligned with consociationalistic objectives
of the broader Good Friday Agreement.
Overall, these findings provide interesting insights into the relationship between
democratic consolidation and policing, as well as in forming policy options regarding
‘democratizing the police abroad’ (see Bayley 2006). The study provides empirical
support for the often made assumption that community policing and democracy hold

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similar values and that community policing, at least philosophically, may be a cultural
leverage for establishing a democratic police force. It suggests that—like elections, party
systems, political culture and civic society—the attitudes and behaviours of justice
bureaucrats may be an additional way to measure the quality of consolidation as well as
push the process along. However, the findings also serve as a caution to those involved
in attempts to implement reform efforts in developing democratic police forces.
Democratic policing is a complex and often paradoxical task. Advocating zero tolerance
or other harsh-on-crime approaches may not serve the goals of democratization that
reformers seek, even though, in stable democracies, these tactics may be believed to be
promising in reducing crime. In total, this research emphasizes the need for more
comparative policing research to inform both international policing organizational
theory and policy.

Funding
None.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to acknowledge the cooperation of the International Law
Enforcement Academy in Roswell, New Mexico, which made this completely unfunded
study possible. Additionally, the author appreciates the helpful comments of Gary
LaFree, Susanne Karstedt, Stephen Mastrofski and James Willis in the development of
this paper, as well as the research and editorial assistance of George Fachner, Karen
Jensenius, Julie Willis, Julie Wan and Brittany Davenport.

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