PASEI v.

Drilon “[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster
(Police Power defined)
the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
FACTS: embrace.

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the

recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary
No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household
make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the
are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-
members of the same class.
making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided
by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for
the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement
with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of

police power.

RULING:
U.S. v. Pompeya refuse to render the same.

G.R. No. L-10255, August 6, 1915

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in
the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which
FACTS:
prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of
therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the
the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the
maintenance of peace and good government?
municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and
without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty,
In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the
required under said municipal ordinance.
primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of
which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist
Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts
in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.
charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the
municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the
of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the
citizens.
state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the
municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the
The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the
provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in
complaint.
derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.
Hence, this appeal.
Is there a cause of action?
ISSUE:
The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of
of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he
action under the said law
was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in
existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed
him for the services mentioned in the law.
HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act

No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied
male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well
as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the
maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by
apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of the
existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a
punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other
Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes
are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one
Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in
the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof
directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in
Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial
governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and
was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said
action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by
provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head,
the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an
unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it
unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the
Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or
not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later
no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may
make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof,
to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature
merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to
the execution of the law. This is necessary since the provincial governor
and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge “when such as course is deemed necessary
in the interest of law and order”. As officials charged with the
administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, they
are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable
for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a
backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an
unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
provincial official and a department head.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance
No. 4760 for being violative of the due process clause, contending that
said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 proposes to check the clandestine harboring
of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these
transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the
purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing
several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal"
and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is unconstitutional
Held: No.
be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or
local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be
too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people.
In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such
police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power
may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted
the injuction on the Ordinance in question.
*** Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will
fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.

Rationale:

The mantle of protection associated with the due process

guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public
morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on
conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public
needs."

It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy

the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to
HON. RENATO C. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOR PILOTS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES Held: NO

G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997
Facts:
Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) provides that all
appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall,
henceforth, be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity subject
to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid
evaluation of performance.
PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 whose
avowed policy was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better
protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage
services.
On Aug 12, 1992, respondent, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas,
questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Dept of Transportation and
Communication.
On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order
directing the PPA to hold abeyance the implementation of the said
administrative order. PPA countered that the said order was issued in
the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor
pilots under Section 6, Article I of P.D. 857.
The Court is convinced that PPA No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard
of respondents’ right against deprivation of property without due
process law. The Supreme Court said that in order to fall within the
aegis of the provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is
a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper
observance of due process.
Neither does that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way
taint the validity of the administrative order. As general rule, notice and
hearing, as the fundamental requirement of procedural due process, are
essential only when administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations, an Administrative body needs to
comply with the requirement of notice and hearing.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature
of a property right. It is readily apparent that the said administrative
order unduly restricts the right of harbour pilots to enjoy their
profession before their right of harbor pilots to enjoy their respective
profession before their compulsory retirement.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through Assistant Executive Secretary

Renato Corona, dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order
issued. He concluded that the said order applied to all harbor pilots and,
for all intents and purposes, was not an act of Dayan, but of the PPA,
which was merely implementing P.D. 857, mandating it to control,
regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction

with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages before the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: WON Administrative Order No.04-92 is constitutional

Beltran v. Secretary of Health
FACTS:
RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) was enacted in 1994, seeking to
provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. Section 7 thereof
provided for the phase-out of all commercial blood banks within 2 years
after its effectivity.
The Act was passed after studies showed that blood transfusions could
lead to transmission of diseases, and that blood sold by persons to
commercial blood banks are three times more likely to have blood
transfusion transmissible diseases than those donated to the Philippine
National Red Cross.
Prior to the expiration of the commercial blood banks’ licenses, they filed
a petition assailing the constitutionality and validity of RA 7719 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, for discriminating against
freestanding blood banks in a manner, which is not germane to the
purpose of the law.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RA 7719 violates the equal protection clause.
2. W/N Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes unlawful deprivation of
personal liberty and property.
HELD:
1. NO. One, RA 7719 is based on substantial distinctions. Nonprofit blood
banks operate for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service,
and encourage voluntary blood donation. On the other hand, commercial
blood banks are motivated by profit and treat blood as a sale of
commodity.
Two, the classification and the consequent phase-out of blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, which is to provide the nation with
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service
rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase-out of
commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a
business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood
donors who are considered unsafe.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its
enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the
situation nor was it intended to apply only to existing conditions.
Four, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without
exception.
2. NO. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the
purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase-out
commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners
and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but
their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the
public.
DOCTRINE: Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others is prohibited; but classification on a reasonable basis and not
made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.
Lupangco VS CA
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
Held: It is not Constitutional.

Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any
tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the
like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of
the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days
immediately proceeding every examination day including examination
day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions
prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take
the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and
November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter
from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitution.
The questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure
examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
PRC Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy
their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
personal growth

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the

ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin
the enforcement of its resolution.

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had
jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission
from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to
be unconstitutional.

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed

with the Court of Appeals.
Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of
the Philippines
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process
FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with
accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was
then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC
Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue
due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending,
Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on
with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J
Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the
arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented
Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new
life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented
that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details
of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further
deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties.
There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver
requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of
the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts
must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano
has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for
retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking
Due Process – impartial and competent court
his action for the justice they expect.
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election,
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play.
Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-
Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with
duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by
a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial
the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on
(and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the
winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd
ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is
Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
and the pertinent law.
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made
before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had
seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion,
one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law
partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned
down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation
of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s
tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
Luis A. Tabuena, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan (268 SCRA 332, February
17, 1997)
FACTS:
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager
of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to
pay directly to the president’s office and in cash what the MIAA owes the
Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated
in a Presidential memorandum.
In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of
Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting
Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused the release of P55M
of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs.
Fe Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt
for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. Later, it turned out that
PNCC never received the money.
The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena
and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting
them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.
Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional
malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would
appear that they were convicted for malversation with negligence.
Hence, their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated
their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not
charged in the amended information; and
(2) Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
HELD:
(1) No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved.
(2) Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President
and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest
official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was
regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently
lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This
fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one
to act swiftly without question.
However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation
of the accused's basic constitutional right to due process. Records show
that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense
witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court were
in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation,
probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the
issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to
consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled
doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be
found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject
of assignments of error or not.
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process
was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its
overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate.
Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are
entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.
HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of
malversation.
Rivera vs. CSC, Land Bank of the Philippines (January 4, 1995)

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS (Art. III, Sec 1)

Facts:
Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit of LBP and
was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal use of fee, gift or
other valuable thing in the course of official duties, committing acts
punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws, and pursuit of private business
vocation or profession without permission required by CSC. Rivera
allegedly toldPerez that he would facilitate the processing, approval and
release of his loan if he would be given 10% commission. Riverawas
further charged having served and acted, without prior authority
required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao andconsultant in
various companies where Lao had investments. LBP held Rivers guilty of
grave misconduct and actsprejudicial to the best interest of the service
in accepting employment from a client of the bank. The penalty of
forcedresignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was
thereupon imposed on Rivera.

Issue:
Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in composing the
capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and
conclusions

Ruling:
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation
in resolving Rivera’s appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence
to a fundamentalaspect of due process.CSC resolution is SET ASIDE and
the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans the participation of
CSCCommissioner Gaminde, as she was the Board Chairman of MSPB
whose ruling is thus appealed
Regalado P. Samartino Issue:
vs. Whether or not the right of petitioner to due process is violated.
Leonor B. Raon, Agustin G. Crisostomo, The Municipal Trial Court of
Noveleta, Cavite, Hon. Manuel A. Mayo, Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, Cavite City, Hon. Rolando D. Diaz, Regional Trial Court, Branch
Ruling:
17, Cavite City, Sheriff Danilo G. Lapuz, Cavite City and The Hon.
Court of Appeals

Yes. The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity

G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002
to file his answer violated his right to due process. There being no valid
substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire
Facts: jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that
the service of summons is not only required to give the court jurisdiction
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the
over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter an
surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-
opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus,
Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in
an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due process is
Noveleta, Cavite, registered under the name of co-owners Lido Beach
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January 25, 1996, respondents
evidence one may have in support of his defense. It is elementary that
instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for
before a person can be deprived of his property, he should first be
ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she
informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
leased her share in the property to petitioner for a period of five years
premised.
counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended
thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite
demands therefor. Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother
of petitioner. At the time of service of summons at petitioner’s house, he
was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay
City since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and
rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison
officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification
that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the
complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six
months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he
can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.
YNOT v. IAC
FACTS
Here, the constitutionality of former President Marcos’s Executive
Order No. 626-A is assailed. Said order decreed an absolute ban on the
inter-provincial transportation of carabao (regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose) and carabeef. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission (NMIC) may see fit, in the case of carabeef. In the case of
carabaos, these shall be given to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry (AI) may also see fit. Petitioner had transported six (6)
carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo. These were confiscated
by the police for violation of the above order. He sued for recovery,
which the RTC granted upon his filing of a supersedeas bond worth 12k.
After trial on the merits, the lower court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos, and as they can no longer be produced, directed the
confiscation of the bond. It deferred from ruling on the constitutionality
of the executive order, on the grounds of want of authority and
presumed validity. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, such
ruling was upheld. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. On the
main, petitioner asserts that EO 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation, and that its penalty suffers from
invalidity because it is imposed without giving the owner a right to be
heard before a competent and impartial court—as guaranteed by due
process.
ISSUE
Whether EO 626-A is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause.
HELD
YES. To warrant a valid exercise of police power, the following must be
present: (a) that the interests of the public, generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference, and; (b) that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose. In US v. Toribio, the Court has ruled that EO 626 complies with
the above requirements—that is, the carabao, as a poor man’s tractor so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful
subject of the order, and that the method chosen is
also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not
unduly oppressive. The ban of the slaughter of carabaos except those
seven years old if male and eleven if female upon issuance of a permit
adequately works for the conservation of those still fit for farm work or
breeding, and prevention of their improvident depletion. Here, while EO
626-A has the same lawful subject, it fails to observe the second
requirement. Notably, said EO imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement. The object of
the prohibition is unclear. The reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the disputed
measure is missing. It is not clear how the interprovincial transport of
the animals can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, as they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining them in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more that moving them to another will make it
easier to kill them there. Even if assuming there was a reasonable
relation between the means and the end, the penalty is invalid as it
amounts to outright confiscation, denying petitioner a chance to be
heard. Unlike in the Toribio case, here, no trial is prescribed and the
property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared as forfeited for the government. Concededly, there are certain
occasions when notice and hearing can be validly dispensed with, such
as summary abatement of a public nuisance, summary destruction of
pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs.
However, these are justified for reasons of immediacy of the problem
sought to be corrected and urgency of the need to correct it. In the
instant case, no such pressure is present. The manner by which the
disposition of the confiscated property also presents a case of invalid
delegation of legislative powers since the officers mentioned (Chairman
and Director of the NMIC and AI respectively) are granted unlimited
discretion. The usual standard and reasonable guidelines that said
officers must observe in making the distribution are nowhere to be
found; instead, they are to go about it as they may see fit. Obviously, this
makes the exercise prone to partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 79690-707, February 1, 1989 “requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
170 SCRA 1 (1989) the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation.
Facts: The court have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously
written Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-
counsel for respondent Raul M. Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam interest test,” the court believe that the statements made by respondent
Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We have reviewed once are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such
more the Court’s extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. This
argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude conclusion was implicit in the per curiam Resolution of October 7,
that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings 1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil” which
embodied in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the
copious quotations and references to foreign texts which, however, instant case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence
whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this jurisdiction. or similar disruptions of public order. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a “substantive
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure,
evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a
some of the conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution,
particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
addressing in the process some of the “Ten (10) Legal Points for
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
Reconsideration,” made in the Motion for Reconsideration.
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and
Issue: Whether the decision of the SC inviolate the Petitioner’s right to officers of the courts. The “substantive evil” here involved, in other
Freedom of Expression. words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or rioting
but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its
Held: No, The Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct implications for society.
including: “any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.” The “clear
and present danger” doctrine invoked by respondent’s counsel is not a
magic incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with
analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free
speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment
the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear
and present danger” doctrine has been an accepted method for marking
out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in
certain contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been
recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom of expression
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the “hierarchy of civil liberties”.
Freedom of expression is not an absolute. The prevailing doctrine is that
the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion
for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press,
which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television
and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests test”. The principle