turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor.
But service of the order upon
[G.R. No. 120905. March 7, 1996] MENDOZA
RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
ROGELIO DE CASTRO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]
JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RENATO U. REYES, respondents.
• Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992.
• On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo.
• It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00
from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks
issued to him by the National Reconciliation and Development Program of the
Department of Interior and Local government were never received by the
Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and
that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle
dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven
months.
• Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office.
• petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been
terminated without giving him a chance to be heard.
• A temporary restraining order was issued by the court on February 7, 1995,
enjoining the SangguniangPanlalawigan from proceeding with the case.
• decision of the SangguniangPanlalawigan could not served upon Reyes. But
on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the temporary restraining order and
without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was
made to serve the decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila.
• refused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon
petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.
• Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A.
Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully
petitioner was also refused.
• March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the Office of the
Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong.
• Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the disqualification of
petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) which disqualifies those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
• absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for
in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
• May 9, 1995, the COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution,
disqualifying Reyes
• May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently
unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the
duly-elected mayor.
• petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the COMELECs Second Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en
banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently,
set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor of Bongabong.
• Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the second highest number of votes next to
petitioner Reyes in the same elections of May 8, 1995, intervened in the
COMELEC on June 13, 1995 (after the main decision disqualifying RenatoReyes
was promulgated), contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia)
was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
W/N decision of SP not yet final for lack of service: NO.
• Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
ordering him removed from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a
copy thereof.
• failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due
to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision.
• repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by
registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.
• Manzos certification states:
o March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila to furnish a
copy of the decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V.
Garcia, which said counsel refused to accept.
o March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again
went to the office of the Mayor of Bongabong to serve the
decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes, himself present, refused to accept the
ORDER enforcing the decision citing particularly the pending case filed in
the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as the basis of his refusal.
o 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER, mailed the
 same (registered mail receipt No. 432) on the Bongabong Post Office to
forward the ORDER to the Office of Mayor Renato U. Reyes.
o March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the following inscriptions on the back
by the Postmaster: out of town; can’t be contacted; can’t be contacted;
refused to accept
o March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went
to Bongabong to serve the same ORDER enforcing the decision.
Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not present so the copy was left on the
Mayors Office with comments from the employees that they would not
accept the same.[3]
• rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and
judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual
or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the
party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge
thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.[4]
• Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners
counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
• In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigancertified, service by
registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes.
• judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him,
service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered
validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would
be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.
• that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been
rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for
the Sangguniang Panlalawigannot to have the decision served upon him and his
client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending.[6]
• His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his
part to have a copy of the decision.
• In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence
required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No.
7160, 67.[8] But petitioner did not do so.
• when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing
of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality.
• Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at the
hearing held on February 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the
counsel of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect
service of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final resolution of
the petition for certiorari.
• This alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and
the Sangguniang Panlalawigancannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was
illegal. And it would have been no less illegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to
have carried it out because R.A. No. 7160, 66(a) makes it mandatory that
[c]opies of the decision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be
to furnished to respondent and/or interested parties.
W/N reelection rendered the question moot: NO.
• Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,[11] in which it was held
that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior
term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
• But that was because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the
administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office
during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.[12]
• case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes
brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary
restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,
because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code,
he was disqualified from running for reelection.
• at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision similar to 40
(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the
ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case.
• 40(b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
• it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He
failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting
his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later
that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a
ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the
case against him moot by his election.
W/N second highest can be proclaimed: NO.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. 120905 and G.R. No. 120940 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995 VITUG
HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional
Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO,
Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.
• controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on
22 July 1992, against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor
Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public
officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and
Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
• The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as
amended,5 Articles 1706 and 1717 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713.8
• caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the
allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
• day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was
executed by Mandaue City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in
support of the accusations against respondent officials.
• The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City
Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido
• Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of
respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case.
• opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August
1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case
filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local
officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with
the Office of the President.
• Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991 could not
have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all
public officials and that, in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
• Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on
15 October 1992, denied the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction:
o endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in
order that each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since
the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague
and gives wider discretion to disciplining authority to impose
administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee
while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code provides for
more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective
official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could
be considered that the latter law could be an exception to the authority and
administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation
against local elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct
administrative investigation against local elective officials is already
lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No.
7160.
• The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13
(1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution,14 thus:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient;
• Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on
all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions,
though in accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of
facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper
purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
• Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman, viz.:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. —
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of
the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
• Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus
contends that the Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority
to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under
investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy
may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by
the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided.
• Local Government Code of 1991:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified
complaint against any erring local elective officials shall be prepared
as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the
gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local
elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60)
days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative
cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively
suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the
same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
W/N Ombudsman has jurisdiction over LGU officials: YES.
• there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
• The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other .
• Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored,16 and
that courts must generally assume their congruent application.17
• Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies
the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said
office from the long tentacles of officialdom."24
• Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with
the provisions then existing under the old code.
• authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive
suspension over elective provincial or city officials before was entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24
thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local
Government by the Office of the President.
W/N 6-month preventive suspension proper:
• Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without
pay under Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day
preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to
even now maintain its application.
• The two provisions govern differently.
o Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and
(a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b)
 the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the • Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct
respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed against recourse to this Court on matters involving orders arising from administrative
him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:
all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under
investigation. Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .
o Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time
after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from
the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
the records and other evidence.
of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

W/N GAD in suspending without hearing: NO.

All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly;
grant the petition.
• The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after
the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for
WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is
preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered
with the directive of petitioner.
DISMISSED. No costs.
• not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an
official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard. SO ORDERED.
• Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or
innocence.
• respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after
petitioner had found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier,28 that
the evidence of guilt was strong.

W/N petition should have been entertained: NO.

• being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in

his 21 September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial
court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any

court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law.
 [G.R. Nos. 117589-92. May 22, 1996] DAVIDE
ROMEO R. SALALIMA, DANILO S. AZAA, JUAN VICTORIA, LORENZO
REYEG, ARTURO OSIA, CLENIO CABREDO, VICENTE GO, SR.,
RAMON FERNANDEZ, JR., MASIKAP FONTANILLA, WILBOR
RONTAS and NEMESIO BACLAO, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive Secretary, VICTOR R.
SUMULONG, RENATO C. CORONA and ANGEL V. SALDIVAR, in
their capacity as Members of the Ad Hoc Committee, MAYOR NAOMI
C. CORRAL, KGD. FRANCISCO ALARTE, MAYOR ANTONIO
DEMETRIOU; and DOMINADOR LIM, JESUS JAMES CALISIN,
EVELYN SILVERIO, SILVERIO COPE, TOBIAS BETITO, MANUEL
LANUZA, JAMES ENRICO SALAZAR, RODOLFO ANTE, JUAN
RIVERA, MARCIAL TUANQUI, DR. SALVADOR SAMBITAN, ATTY.
EUTIQUIO NEPOMUCENO, in their capacity as ACTING
GOVERNOR, ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR, and ACTING MEMBERS
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ALBAY,
respectively, respondents.
• O.P. Case No. 5470
o malversation and consistent & habitual violation of pars. (c) and (d)
of Section 60 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.
o NPC through then President Pablo Malixi and the Province
represented by respondent Salalima, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) [Exhs. 7 to 7-A] whereby the former agreed to
settle its tax liabilities, then estimated at P214,845,104.76.
o Mayor Corral formally requested the Province through respondent
Salalima, to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and certain
barangays of Tiwi where NPCs properties are located (concerned
barangays) relative to the payments made by NPC (Exh. B).
o Office of the President through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Antonio Carpio opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and the
Province merely recognized and established NPCs tax liability. He
further clarified that the sharing scheme and those entitled to the
payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided
under the law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said tax liabilities,
NPC may remit such share directly to Tiwi.
o The law clearly provides that the proceeds of all the delinquent taxes
and penalties as well as the income realized from the x x x disposition
of real property acquired by the province or city at a public auction x
x x, and the sale of delinquent property or the redemption
thereof shall accrue to the province, city or municipality in the same
manner and proportion as if the tax or taxes have been paid in the
regular course (Sec. 87(c) supra).
o shares of Tiwi, Daraga, the concerned barangays and the national
government in the payments made by NPC under the MOA, should
be, as they are in fact, trust funds. As such, the Province should have,
upon receipt of said payments, segregated and lodged in special
accounts, the respective shares of Tiwi, Daraga, the concerned
barangays and the national government for eventual remittance to said
beneficiaries. Said shares cannot be lodged in, nor remain part of, the
Provinces general fund.
o total disregard of the law, the Province treated the P40,724,47 1.74
NPC payments as surplus adjustment (Account 7-92-4 19) and lodged
the same in its general fund. No trust liability accounts were created
in favor of the rightful beneficiaries thereof as required by law.
o Report No. 93-11 (Exh. N), prepared and made by the Special Audit
Office (SAO) of the Commission on Audit (COA) further support our
findings, thus –
o Ordinance No. 09-92 (Exhs. K to K-1) declaring as forfeited in favor
of the Province the entire amount of P40,724,471.74 paid by NPC to
be patently illegal as it unlawfully deprives Tiwi and Daraga, the
barangays concerned, and the national government of their rightful
shares in said payments. Being illegal, said ordinance may not be
used or relied upon by the respondents to justify the disbursements of
funds in excess of their share.
o Respondents raise the common defense that the findings contained in
SAO Report No. 93-11 are not yet final as they have filed an appeal
therefrom.
o Considering that the factual findings under SAO Report 93-11 are not
disputed, this Committee has treated said factual findings as final or,
at the very least, as corroborative evidence.
o as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and being the
second highest official of the Province, respondent Azaa is jointly
responsible with other provincial officials in the administration of
fiscal and financial transactions of the Province. As presiding officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent Azaa has a duty to see
to it that resolutions or ordinances passed are within the bounds of the
law. He cannot merely preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan unmindful of the legality and propriety of resolutions or
ordinances being proposed or deliberated upon by his colleagues.
o Being entrusted with such responsibility, the provincial governor,
vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
must always be guided by the so-called fundamental principles
enunciated under the Local Government Code, i.e., No money shall
be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriations ordinance or law; local revenue is generated only from
sources authorized by law or ordinance and collection thereof shall at
all times be acknowledged properly; all monies officially received by
a local government officer in any capacity or on any occasion shall be
 accounted for as local funds, unless otherwise provided by law; and
trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out except in
fulfillment of the purposes for which the trust was created or the
funds received (Sec. 305, R.A. 7160).
o This Committee, thus, finds all the respondents guilty of abuse of
authority, and accordingly, recommends the imposition of the
following penalties of suspension without pay: Salalima 5 months; all
others 4 months each
• OP Case No. 5469: Hiring private lawyer; see previous digest.
• OP Case No. 5471
o filed by the Tiwi Mayor Naomi Corral against Albay Governor
Romeo Salalima, Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members Juan
Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Arturo Osia, Jesus Marcellana, Nemesio
Baclao, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap Fontanilla, Vicente Go, Sr.,
Wilbor Rontas and Clenio Cabredo, and Tiwi Vice-Mayor Rodolfo
Benibe for abuse of authority and oppression under Sec. 60 (c) and (e)
of R.A. No. 7160.
o Mayor Corral and seven (7) Kagawads of the Tiwi Sangguniang
Bayan charged herein respondent Governor Salalima and Vice-
Governor Azana for abuse of authority, misconduct in office and
oppression.
o refusal of said respondents to remit Tiwis share in the P40,724,47
1.74 tax delinquency payments made by NPC.
o respondent-members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed
Omnibus Resolution No. 2 recommending that Mayor Corral be
placed under preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending the
resolution of Adm. Case No. 05-92 (Exh. 18).
o Salalima approved said resolution and, on the same date, officially
directed herein respondent Tiwi Vice-Mayor Benibe to assume the
office and discharge the functions of Tiwi Mayor (Exh. 18).
o Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary
Rafael Alunan III directed the lifting of the 11 January 1993
suspension order issued by respondent Salalima. It said that
preventive suspension was issued after refusal to accept answer;
suspension premature and therefore lfted
o Office of the President (OP), acting in OP Case No. 4982, after
finding that the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the
offense and the great probability that the continuance in office of
respondent Governor Romeo R. Salalima could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence, placed respondent Salalima under preventive
suspension for sixty (60) days (Exhs. D to D-2).
o Salalima subsequently sought the reversal of the OP Order dated 26
January 1993 but the same was dismissed by the Supreme Court on
26 May 1993
o In the multiple charges for libel and perjury against Mayor Corral,
arising from her complaint in OP Case No. 5470, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, the Supreme Court ordered the
lower court to cease and desist from proceeding with the case in a
resolution dated 16 September 1993 (Exhs. Q to Q-2).
o Oppression has been defined as an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful
exaction, domination or excessive use of authority.
o Abuse means to make excessive or improper use of a thing, or to
employ it in a manner contrary to the natural or legal rules for its use.
To make an extravagant or excessive use, as to abuse ones authority It
includes misuse
o Section 63(d) of R.A. No. 7 160 expressly states that, [a]ny abuse of
the exercise of the powers of preventive suspension shall be penalized
as abuse of authority.
o review of the proceedings reveal that the same were marked by haste
and arbitrariness. This was evident from the start when Mayor Corral
was preventively suspended (in Adm. Case No. 05-92) even before
she could file her answer. In the other cases, respondent-members of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ruled that Mayor Corral had waived her
right to adduce evidence in her defense.
o respondents did not also fully evaluate the evidences presented to
support the charges made. As such, all the decisions of respondents
suspending Mayor Corral were ordered lifted suspended by the DILG
and OP.
o Thus, even the cases filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, which
were based on the same incidents complained of in the said
administrative cases, were subsequently dismissed.
o Respondents should have inhibited themselves from assuming
jurisdiction over said cases as timely moved by Mayor Corral
considering that they were the respondents in various administrative
complaints she earlier filed with the OP and with the DILG starting
with OP Case No. 4892. However, despite the violation of due
process resulting from their collective acts, respondents, in their
determination and eagerness to suspend and harass Mayor Corral,
proceeded to hear and decide said cases.
o OP has no jurisdiction over administrative complaints filed against
elective municipal officials. Under Sec. 6 1(b) of R.A. No. 7160, [a]
complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President.
• OP Case No. 5450
o against Governor Romeo Salalima for violation of - Section 60, pars.
(c) and (d) of the Local Government Code, Section 3, par. (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019, and the provisions of PD No. 1594
o Tabaco Public Market was destroyed by fire
o OP advised Mayor Demetriou and respondent Salalima that the P12.0
Million in Budgetary Assistance to Local Government Units
(BALGU) funds earlier remitted by the national government to the
Province, should be used for the rehabilitation of the Tabaco Public
Market, and that the project should be implemented by the Provincial
Governor in consultation with the Mayor of Tabaco
o public bidding was conducted by the Albay Provincial Government
for the repair and rehabilitation of the Tabaco Public Market
o Province represented by respondent Salalima and RYU Construction
entered into a contract for P6,783,737.59 for said repair and
rehabilitation (Exh. H). Among others, the contract stipulated that the
contracted work should be completed in 150 days.
o contractor started the project on 1 July 1991 and completed the same
on 2 June 1992 (Exh. 41).
o 6 March 1992, the Province represented by respondent Salalima
entered into another contract (Exh. 1) for P4,304,474.00 with RYU
Construction for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the
Tabaco Public Market.
o The terms and conditions of this contract are the same as those
stipulated in the 29 May 1991 contract except for the construction
period which is only for 90 days.
o Construction of the second project commenced on 27 March 1992 and
was completed on 2 June 1992
o Mayor Demetriou alleged that despite the delay in the completion of
work under the first contract, liquidated damages were not imposed
on, nor collected from, RYU Construction by the Province.
o second contract with RYU Construction was entered into in violation
of P.D. No. 1594 as RYU incurred delay with respect to the first
contract.
o reading of items CI 8 and CI 11 above shows that the collection of
liquidated damages is mandatory in cases of delay unless there are
valid orders of extension of contract work given by the Government.
o view of the delays in project completion the Team requested from the
Provincial Engineer any copy of the order suspending and resuming
the work (suspension and resume order) since the same was not
attached to the claims of the contractor or paid vouchers.
o no basis for the extension of contract time and the contractor should
have been considered as behind schedule in the performance of the
contract. Despite its deficiency, no liquidated damages was ever
imposed against the contractor.
o Before signing the 6 March 1992 contract, which was entered into on
a negotiated basis and not through bidding, respondent Salalima
should have inquired whether or not RYU Construction incurred
negative slippage. Had he done so, the matter of imposing and
collecting liquidated damages would have been given appropriate
attention. This is aggravated by the fact that respondent knew that
RYU Construction was the contractor for the original rehabilitation
and repair work for the Tabaco Public market being the signatory to
the first contract.
o there was a failure on the part of the Province to impose and collect
liquidated damages from the erring contractor, RYU Construction.
o government contracts especially infrastructure contracts are awarded
only through bidding. As explicitly ordained by Sec. 4 of P.D. No.
1594, construction projects shall generally be undertaken by contract
after competitive bidding. By its very nature and characteristic, a
competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by
giving the public the best possible advantages through open
competition. At the same time, bidding seeks to prevent or curtail
favoritism, fraud and corruption in the award of the contract which
otherwise might prevail were the government official concerned is
vested with the full or absolute authority to select the prospective
contractor
o negotiated contracts can be resorted to only in a few instances such as
that provided under par. 1 (c) of item IB 10.4.2 of the IRR of PD No.
1594, supra. However, said proviso requires that the contractor had
not incurred negative slippage and has demonstrated a satisfactory
performance.
o since RYU Construction incurred negative slippage with respect to
the repair works under the 29 May 1991 contract as found by COA, it
was anomalous for the Province through respondent Salalima to enter
into a negotiated contract with said contractor for additional repair
and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public market
o contract may also be violative of the following: (a) COA Circular
No. 85-55-A. (dated 8 September 1985) prohibiting irregular
expenditures or uses of funds; and (b) Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
o respondent guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence.
Accordingly, it is recommended that the penalty of suspension
without pay be meted out on respondent Salalima for five (5) months.
• suspension imposed on respondents shall be served successively but shall not
exceed their respective unexpired terms, in accordance with the limitation
imposed under Section 66(b) of the Local Government Code.
• As to O.P. Cases Nos. 5450, 5469, and 5470, the issues presented by the
petitioners may be reformulated in this wise: Did the Office of the President
act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in suspending the petitioners for periods ranging from twelve to twenty
months?
W/N suspension is valid: YES.
 • Anent the first issue, the petitioners contend that the challenged administrative
order deprived them of their respective offices without procedural and
substantive due process. T
• heir suspensions ranging from twelve months to twenty months or for the
entire duration of their unexpired term, which was then only seven months,
constituted permanent disenfranchisement or removal from office in clear
violation of Section 60 of R.A. No. 7160 which mandates that an elective local
official may be removed from office by order of the court.
• Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160 expressly provides: The penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said
penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as
long as he meets the qualifications for the office.
• provision sets the limits to the penalty of suspension, viz., it should not
exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of office of the
respondent for every administrative offense.[1]
• An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission
which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary
action. The offenses for which suspension may be imposed are
enumerated in Section 60 of the Code
• An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
• OP committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and
the unexpired portion of the petitioners term of office.
• The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative
offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision
that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the
unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. Their term of
office expired at noon of 30 June 1995.[2]
• And this Court is not prepared to rule that the suspension amounted to
the petitioners removal from office.[3]
W/N proper to base decision on SAO Report of COA Audit Team: YES.
• Respondents contention that COAs factual findings, as contained in SAO Report
No. 93-11 cannot be considered in this investigation is untenable. For no
administrative and criminal investigation can proceed, if a respondent is allowed to
argue that a particular COA finding is still the subject of an appeal and move that
the resolution of such administrative or criminal case be held in abeyance. This will
inevitably cause unnecessary delays in the investigation of administrative and
criminal cases since an appeal from a COA finding may be brought all the way up
to the Supreme Court.
• matters raised by the respondents on appeal involve only conclusions/interpretation
of law. Surely, investigative bodies, such as COA, the Ombudsman and even this
Committee, are empowered to make their own conclusions of law based on a given
set of facts.
• sufficient evidence has been adduced in this case apart from the factual findings
contained in SAO Report No. 93-11 to enable this Committee to evaluate the merits
of the instant complaint.
W/N can be held liable for contract from previous term: NO.
• Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No.
5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with
RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public
Market. Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No.
5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus
Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials
cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term
• Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to
furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides
that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the
officer was elected or appointed.
• each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as
a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor
WHEREFORE, the instant special action for certiorari is hereby partly
GRANTED. That part of the challenged Administrative Order No. 153 imposing the
penalty of suspension on petitioner Governor Romeo Salalima in O.P. Cases Nos. 5450
and 5469 and on petitioners Vice Governor Danilo Azaa and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members Juan Victoria, Lorenzo Reyeg, Arturo Osia, Wilbor Rontas,
Clenio Cabredo, Ramon Fernandez, Jr., Masikap Fontanilla, Vicente Go, Sr., and
Nemesio Baclao in O.P. Case No. 5469 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil or criminal actions against them if
warranted by the attendant circumstances.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 125955. June 19, 1997] ROMERO
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents.
• October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no
less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.
• Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila
during the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed
office.
• Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national
elections.Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6)
City Councilors.
• In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of
his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position.
• quo warranto[3] filed before the COMELEC by Cenon Ronquillo, another candidate
for councilor in the same district, who alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected
councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more
cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II in the Office of the Ombudsman
and in the Department of Interior and Local Government.[4] All these challenges
were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Bascos continued stay in office.
• Ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final
term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor
seats.
• On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct
No. 966, District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for
disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for the suspension of his
proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly
elected Councilor of Manilas Second District.
• same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly
furnished with a copy of the petition.
• The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later.
• hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
• the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly elected
councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates
who vied for the seats.
• immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-
Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
• Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty
proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC.
• Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation
he made earlier
o cannot be disqualified on the ground of Section 40 paragraph b of the
Local Government Code because the Tordesillas decision is barred by
laches, prescription, res judicata, lis pendens, bar by prior judgment, law
of the case and stare decisis;
o Section 4[0] par. B of the Local Government Code may not be validly
applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity.
o already been proclaimed. And the petition being a preproclamation contest
under the Marquez v. Comelec Ruling, supra, it should be dismissed by
virtue of said pronouncement.
o three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon
by the people
o petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed;
it was premature as an election protest and it was not brought by a proper
party in interest as such protest.:
• COMELECs First Division resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on
October 6, 1995, ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme
Court on respondent Basco on October 31, 1981 was wiped away and condoned by
the electorate which elected him and that on account of Bascos proclamation on
May 17, 1965, as the sixth duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila,
the petition would no longer be viable.[6] MR denied.
• Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective
position since he had been removed from office as a result of an administrative case
pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code (the Code), which took effect on January 1, 1992.[8]
W/N Sec. 40(b) of LGC applies retroactively: NO.
• Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass
retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as
intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless
such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment.
• no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively.
• 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
• A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to
overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit,
non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward.[14]
W/N reelection wiped away and condoned admin penalty against him and
restores his eligibility for public office: IRRELEVANT.
• However, the issue of whether or not Bascos triple election to office cured his
alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on
the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three
 previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco
was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from
office on or after January 1, 1992.
• Moreover, under the former Civil Service Decree,[16] the law applicable at the time
Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term
reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position:
“Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED to a position in the career
service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated
therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is
qualified.”
W/N proclamation was void ab initio: NO.
• Rep. Act 7166 reads:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.-
(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless
authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be
void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the
election.
• This is not applicable; refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested
returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.
• Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states:
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Underscoring supplied).
• The use of the word may indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is
merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer
discretion.[21] What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is
the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest.
• Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether
or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must
be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and
substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically
and capriciously.[22]
• Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure says: effect of petition if
unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is proclamation shall be
suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in
such election.
• being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain
consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
• there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as
the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the
election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of
the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers
concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.
• the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all
irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other
purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not in any manner refer
to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.
o Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same
was made contrary to the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election
returns.
o Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due
to the Board of Canvassers violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to
succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of
Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner,
declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor.
o Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that
it was based only on advanced copies of election returns which, under the
law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal basis for
proclamation.
Can 7th placer be declared winner: NO.
• The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the
one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate
is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in
favor of the ineligible candidate.
• Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed resolution of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) is SPA 95-212 dated July 31, 1996 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998] PUNO
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor of the
Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR &
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, represented by SECRETARY ROBERT Z.
BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R. SANCHEZ, MR.
OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as Provincial Vice-Governor of Nueva
Ecija, and MR. LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S.
ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR.VICENTE C. PALILIO,
and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their capacity as Provincial
Board Members of Nueva Ecija, respondents.
• September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President a
letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority.
• morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial
capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner
belligerently barged into the Hall;
• angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening words at
them; close behind petitioner were several men with long and short firearms who
encircled the area.
• Private respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a
pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva
Ecija obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank;
• that petitioner's acts were intended to harass them into approving this loan;
• no session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum
and the proposed legislative measure was not considered;
• private respondents opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an
unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior
authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
• that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had earlier disclosed that the
province could not afford to contract another obligation;
• that petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a serious
insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and
• that the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private respondents'
lives and safety.
• Private respondents prayed for the suspension or removal of petitioner; for an
emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the review of
the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the province, to wit:
• President acted on the complaint by writing on its margin the following:
"17 Sep 96
To: SILG info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:
1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force,
intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the Session
Hall. 2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions. 3.
BREAK NOT the PEACE.
• letter-complaint together with the President's marginal notes were sent to
Secretary Robert Z. Barbers on September 20, 1996. Acting upon the
instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against him[4] and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
annexes.
• Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and
private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties
entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and
order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing
cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.[6]
• peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents
reiterated their letter-complaint. P
• Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then
Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default
and to have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were
ordered to present their evidence ex-parte because of failure to file answer
(kept filing for petition to extend)
• petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss."Petitioner alleged that
the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of
the President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no
authority to require him to answer the complaint.
• on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under
preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges
against him.[17]
• August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of
Preventive Suspension.
• Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that in the morning of September 12,
1996, while he was at his district office in the town of Munoz, he received a
phone call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del Mundo. Del
Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party, informed him that Vice-
Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who were in petitioner's party because they refused to place on the agenda the
ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province.
• He said that like Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his
official security escorts whenever he reported for work.
• petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation."Petitioner prayed
that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order
No. 23; denied
• declared that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the
requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.[28]
• the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings
and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on petitioner the
penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without pay
• January 14, 1998, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of the order of the Executive Secretary.
• Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials are
governed by
o the Local Government Code of 1991,
o the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991, and
o Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and
Procedures on the Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases
Against Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized
Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities and Municipalities
in Metropolitan Manila."[35]
o Rules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a
suppletory character.[36]
• When an elective local official commits an act that falls under the grounds for
disciplinary action, the administrative complaint against him must be verified
and filed with any of the following:
"Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.-- A verified
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President.
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the
President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final
and executory."[37]
• A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the
Office of the President.
• A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
• barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan.
• oson is an elective official of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint
against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the President.According
to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal
requirements set by the Code.
• He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; t
• hat private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with the
Office of the President.[38]
W/N properly filed: YES.
• The absence of the document, page or book number of the notarial register of the
subscribing officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these
entries may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in
complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They
may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission.[40] But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the letter-
complaint was filed with the Office of the President.
• fact of intercalation insufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita C. Santos.
Private respondent Santos was one of the signatories to the letter-complaint. In her
affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the complainants since she had
just joined the political party of petitioner Joson.
• The requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when
he acted on the complaint.
• formal, not jurisdictional requisite.[42] Verification is mainly intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not mere speculation.[43]
W/N DILG Secretary has jurisdiction: YES.
• In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority of
the DILG Secretary over the case. He contends that under the law, it is the Office
of the President that has jurisdiction over the letter-complaint and that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying the alter-ego principle because the power to discipline
elective local officials lies with the President, not with the DILG Secretary.
• Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials
is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating
Authority. A.O. No. 23:
"Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified,
against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be
acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the
Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining
Authority."
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may
 constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and
Local Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service,
constitute a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government."[46]
• Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary.
• The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority,
who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of
the DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the
DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
• power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local
officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local
governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
• the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the
alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency: establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive."[55]
• doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.[56] The power of control
over executive department is provided in the Constitution
• As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some
of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
personally.[59] The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in
certain matters because the President cannot be expected to exercise his control
(and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and
must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.[60]
• procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating Authorities should exercise their
powers is distinctly set forth in the Local Government Code and A.O. No. 23.
Section 62 of the Code provides:
"Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.-- (a) Within seven (7) days after the
administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to
submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and
commence investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent.
xxx."
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5[61] of A.O. No. 23 provide:
"Sec. 1. Commencement. Within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the
answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the complaint and answer,
together with their attachments and other relevant papers, to the Investigating
Authority who shall commence the investigation of the case within ten (10)
days from receipt of the same.
"x x x
"Sec. 3. Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint
and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine whether there is
a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative
proceedings."
• petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the power of the President when
he required petitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint
was filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG Secretary who
ordered petitioner to answer.
• Office of the President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The
Office should have first required petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the
complaint and the answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority
for further proceedings.
• Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is
necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the
case.[62]
W/N DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing MTD: NO.
• true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the Local
Government Code of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23.
• Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file a motion to dismiss in the order to
file answer.
• Thrice, he requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the
search for competent counsel and the demands of his official duties.
• formal investigation of the case is required by law to be finished within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the time of formal notice to the respondent.The
extensions petitioner requested consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period.[63]
• Petitioner, in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months after the first notice.
• Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to
file answer.
• speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public service.
W/N preventive suspension is proper: YES.
• In view of petitioner's inexcusable failure to file answer, the DILG did not err in
recommending to the Disciplining Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation.
• Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the Local Government
Code
• preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time
o (a) after the issues are joined;
o (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and
o (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
• Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President, imposed preventive
suspension on petitioner Joson after finding that all the requisites for the imposition
of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to file his
answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his
right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues
were deemed to have been joined.
• The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was
strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case could
influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence
against him.
W/N finding of guilt and 6 month penalty suspension valid: NO.
• Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal investigation
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23.
• In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied
• The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit evidence one may have in support of one's defense
• denial of petitioner's Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation is erroneous.
• Petitioner's right to a formal investigation is spelled out in the following provisions
of A.O. No. 23, viz:
"SEC. 3 Evaluation. Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the complaint
and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine whether there is
a prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal administrative
proceedings.
SEC. 4. Dismissal motu proprio. If the Investigating Authority determines
that there is no prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under
the preceding Section, submit its recommendation to the Disciplining
Authority for the motu proprio dismissal of the case, together with the
recommended decision, resolution, and order.
SEC. 5. Preliminary conference. If the Investigating Authority determines
that there is prima facie case to warrant the institution of formal
administrative proceedings, it shall, within the same period prescribed under
the preceding Section, summon the parties to a preliminary conference to
consider the following:
a) whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence
on record; and
b) If the parties desire a formal investigation, to consider the
simplification of issues, the possibility of obtaining
stipulation or admission of facts and of documents,
specifically affidavits and depositions, to avoid
unnecessary proof, the limitation of number of witnesses,
and such other matters as may be aid the prompt disposition
of the case.
• The Investigating Authority shall encourage the parties and their counsels to
enter, at any stage of the proceedings, into amicable settlement, compromise
and arbitration, the terms and conditions of which shall be subject to the
approval of the Disciplining Authority.
• After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall issue an
order reciting the matters taken up thereon, including the facts stipulated and
the evidences marked, if any.
• Such order shall limit the issues for hearing to those not disposed of by
agreement or admission of the parties, and shall schedule the formal
investigation within ten (10) days from its issuance, unless a later date is
mutually agreed in writing by the parties concerned.
• The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process.
• Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 does not give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted.
"Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full
opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through
compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum."
• local elective official has the
• (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel;
• (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and
• (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence.
• There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against
elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers.
• A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and
hearing.[72]
• A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a
hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in
contrast but contradictory to each other.
• Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective government officials are
not exactly similar to those against appointive officials.
• Local Government Code, the entire Title II of Book I of the Code is devoted
to electiveofficials.
• Appointive officers and employees are covered in Title III of Book I of the Code
entitled "Human Resources and Development." All matters pertinent to human
resources and development in local government units are regulated by "the civil
service law and such rules and regulations and other issuances promulgated thereto,
unless otherwise provided in the Code."
• Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the Civil Service, that
primarily governs appointive officials and employees.
• The disciplining authority in such actions is the Civil Service
Commission[81] although the Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities are also given the power to
investigate and decide disciplinary actions against officers and employees under
their jurisdiction.[82]
• When a complaint is filed and the respondent answers, he must "indicate whether
or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory."[83]
• The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more
stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but
not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly
responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite term of
office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal
from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective
official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man
they had elected.
• Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the
elective official of their choice.[88]
• Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is
accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998 of the public
respondent Executive Secretary is declared null and void and is set aside. No Cost.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. MTJ-98-1147. July 2, 1998] DAVIDE
JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C.
MONZON, respondent.
• 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of San Pablo City against one Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of
Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and
violation of law in that, among other things, said respondent Maghirang appointed
his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on
17 May 1989 in violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code.
• violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City
Prosecutor against Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed[2] on 30 September
1993 on the ground that Maghirangs sister-in-law was appointed before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits a punong
barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity as barangay secretary.
• Opinion No. 246, s. 1993[3] from Director Jacob Montesa of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by
Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337,
the Local Government Code prior to the Local Government Code of 1991.
• ffice of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the case, but ordered
Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary.
• 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon reconsider[5] the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No.
246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa.
• Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion
for reconsideration and recommending the filing of an information for unlawful
appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang.
• The information for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was
forthwith filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in San Pablo City and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the presiding judge,
respondent herein, issued a warrant for the arrest of Maghirang, with a
recommendation of a P200.00 bond for his provisional liberty.
• City Prosecutor filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension[8] of
accused Maghirang pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
• Order of 30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the
ground of reelection beign condonation
• MR denied: preventive suspension is applicable only if there is [sic] administrative
case filed against a local official who is at the same time criminally charged in
Court. At present, the records of the Court shows [sic] that there is no pending
administrative case existing or filed against the accused; duly reelected
• On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office
of the Court Administrator for respondent’s gross ignorance of the law
• respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at this time,
for he had only three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the
compulsory age of retirement of seventy (70); and that for the last 25 years as
municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as presiding judge of the
MTCC, San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity.
• OCA recommended that liability:
o Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the
Court) to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information
charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in
court.
o The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from
using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or
continue committing malfeasance in office.
o All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused
stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-described
crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension.
o Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension
because offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for
removal during the present term is untenable because several cases already
said that the rule doesn’t apply to criminal cases
W/N judge should be disciplined: YES.
• Adopted OCA findings
• However, the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of
the fact that despite his claim that he has been continuously keeping abreast
of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed the
Bar Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall
that as early as 18 December 1967 in Ingco v. Sanchez,[17] this Court
explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the
administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his
previous term of office
• When the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they
did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or
forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any -- refers only to
an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case,
because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere
misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public officer in the discharge of
his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to the
State as a whole.
• Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and
the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that constitutes
the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone a
 crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body
politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by
a public officer prior to his reelection.
• condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a
previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can
be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to his criminal guilt.
• If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and
jurisprudential development [sic] in the law, it was impossible for him to have
missed or misread these cases.
WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine
interpreting a law, or deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby
FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that the
commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO
RAMIR R. PABLICO, petitioner, vs. ALEJANDRO A.
VILLAPANDO, respondent.
• August 5, 1999, Solomon B. Maagad, and Renato M. Fernandez, both members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against respondent
Alejandro A. Villapando, then Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of
authority and culpable violation of the Constitution.[3]Complainants alleged that
respondent, on behalf of the municipality, entered into a consultancy agreement
with Orlando M. Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate in the May 1998 elections.
• They argue that the consultancy agreement amounted to an appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B,
Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution.
• respondent countered that he did not appoint Tiape, rather, he merely hired him.
• Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992,
stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the
election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office
or position as prohibited by the Constitution.
• February 1, 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan found respondent
guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal
from service.[4]
• Respondent appealed to the Office of the President which, on May 29, 2000,
affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan.[5]
• Pending MR, June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-mayor of San
Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor.
• Court of Appeals[8] declared void the assailed decisions of the Office of the
President and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered petitioner to
vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.[9] A motion for
reconsideration was denied on April 23, 2001.[10] Hence, the instant petition for
review.
W/N sanggunian can dismiss respondent: NO.
• Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis supplied)
• It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of
dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by
a court of law.
• Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al.,[11] we held that [t]he Office of the President is
without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively
vested in the proper courts
• Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that (b) An elective local official may be
removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article
[The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by
order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
• The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.[12]
• This is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the
Rules and Regulations.
• clear legislative intent to make the subject power of removal a judicial prerogative
is patent from the deliberations in the Senate quoted as follows:
Senator Pimentel. This has been reserved, Mr. President, including the issue of whether
or not the Department Secretary or the Office of the President can suspend or remove an
elective official.
Senator Saguisag. For as long as that is open for some later disposition, may I just add
the following thought: It seems to me that instead of identifying only the proper
regional trial court or the Sandiganbayan, and since we know that in the case of a
regional trial court, particularly, a case may be appealed or may be the subject of an
injunction, in the framing of this later on, I would like to suggest that we consider
replacing the phrase PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR THE
SANDIGANBAYAN simply by COURTS. Kasi po, maaaring sabihin nila na mali
iyong regional trial court o ang Sandiganbayan.
Senator Pimentel. OR THE PROPER COURT.
Senator Saguisag. OR THE PROPER COURT.
Senator Pimentel. Thank you. We are willing to accept that now, Mr. President.
Senator Saguisag. It is to be incorporated in the phraseology that will craft to capture
the other ideas that have been elevated.
• The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly
construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or
removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is
 not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
• Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.