The sociologist looks over the process of justice system reform in Albania (2014-2018)

Fatmir Zanaj1
Associate Professor
University of Tirana

Abstract

Despite the unstructured debate and constant tension among the leading factors of political life in
post-communist Albania, the country has made sure steps ahead in cooperation with EC,
gradually preparing itself for the opening of membership negotiations with EU. Since 2014,
preparations have started for a comprehensive reform of the justice system, considered a key
factor in meeting the political and other standards that the European Commission has put forward
to Albania as a condition for obtaining candidate country status for membership and then for
opening membership negotiations in the EU. From the sociologist point of view the author shows
how reforms in the justice system in Albania were developed in 2014-2018, the preparations that
were made and the steps that were done in the reform process of this system in three main phases.
Addressing the main historical, political, juridical and cultural factors that have conditioned the
course of developments in the justice system in Albania in the last 100 years, the author
highlights particularly the influence of communist legacy that party's directive stands above the
law, and challenges the country justice system faced after the overthrow of the communist
system, - the severe deformities it suffered in the first two decades of post-communist society,
which sparked party politicization, corruption, failure to meet the required standards of
professional expertise in the ranks of jurists, judges and prosecutors. The sociologist also tries to
identify the socio-political forces that hinder the process of justice system reform in Albania and
the steps taken to neutralize their actions by the spring of 2018, the period after which the reform
process was made irreversible and establishment of new mechanisms for the running and
functioning of the new justice system started in this country.

1. Introduction: Reformation of the justice system - the main condition for the opening of
accession negotiations between Albania and the European Union

The reform of the justice system in Albania unfolded before the public’s eyes from 2014 to 2018
and became of vital interest to our country. Since June 2014, when the European Council gave
Albania the status of candidate country for EU membership, Albanian public opinion agreed that
the successful realization of justice reform was the most important political condition for the
country's progress towards European integration. Indeed, in a 2016 report, the European
Commission listed the reform of the judiciary as a major criterion in order to prepare to open
accession negotiations with the European Union (Albania PR 2016: 4).
Since March 2002, the European Commission has regularly reported to the Council and
the European Parliament on the progress made by the Western Balkan countries in general. In
particular, the process of reforming the justice system has been the focus of two years of

1
Professor Zanaj is a lecturer in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tirana, Albania. This paper is
based on Chapter 14 of the textbook “Sociologjia e së Drejtës” (Sociology of Law), second edition, published in
April 2018 by Julvin Publishing Studio in Tirana. Professor Zanaj included this new chapter in his book to provide a
sociological view of the current process of justice system reform in Albania.

1
international monitoring by two strategic ally powers, the United States and the European Union.
Throughout the progress reports produced by the European Commission (EC) regarding the
transition situation in Albania, the justice system has always taken an important place. In the
2005 Progress Report, after highlighting a number of positive developments since the severe
crisis of 1997, weaknesses in the Albanian legal and judicial systems are also noted, with
comments such as “little progress in fostering the status and independence of judges”; “Objective
rules for the transparent assignment of cases to judges have still to be established”; "a more
transparent and merit-based evaluation system remains to be developed” (referring to the
evaluation of work done by prosecutors) (Albania PR 2005: 14-15). Thanks to progress made in
various fields since 2003, on June 12th 2006, Albania signed the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (SAA) with the EU. In the Progress Report for Albania in October of that year, the
EC welcomed the positive changes made in the justice system. The report noted the
government's attempt, through the adoption of a new law, to improve the career structure of
judges and clarify the disciplinary procedures against them, as well as the attempt to establish an
administrative court and the organization of a lottery between judges who adjudicate a particular
case. However, the report also highlighted the fact that the new law, intending to eliminate
conflicts of interest in the High Council of Justice (the independent body that appoints judges),
deprived six courts of their judges, which delayed the courts' work for several months.
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court declared much of the new law unconstitutional, trying to
defend the independence of the judiciary (Albania PR 2006: 5-7).
On April 28th 2009, Albania submitted its application for membership to the European
Union. With this application began a new phase in the Albania-EU partnership, underpinned by
an intensifying of the demands of European partners to accelerate the reform of the justice
system, with consensus among those involved in the process being key. The stepping up of these
demands was also conditioned by the overall financial and political crisis that the EU had been
experiencing since 2008 and which was increasing the influence of extremist and ultra-
nationalist parties, fueling euro-skepticism and divergent tendencies within Europe. The 2009
EC Progress Report for Albania underlined, among other things, that: “the culture of dialogue
between the main political parties deteriorated before the elections (June 2009). This held back
progress on key reform areas, such as the judiciary. The last session of parliament was unable to
adopt key legislation due to a boycott by some political parties”; “A tendency by the executive to
exert control over independent institutions, in particular in the judiciary, raised concerns”;
“Attempts by the government to curtail the independence of the judiciary have politicised the
debate about judicial reform and hampered progress”; “…court procedures remain problematic
in terms of efficiency and transparency”; “Overall, judicial reform in Albania remains at an early
stage. Key pieces of legislation needed to complete the legal framework have not been adopted.
The justice system continues to function poorly due to shortcomings in independence,
transparency and efficiency, which are key European Partnership priorities to be addressed”
(Albania PR 2009: 6-11).
In its 2010 Analytical Report, the EC expressed its opinion on Albania’s application to
join the EU, highlighting weaknesses in the country’s capacity to draft laws in the ministries and
other administrative bodies of government, leading to their inappropriate application in practice.
It was noted that in “a number of cases, decisions and rulings of the Constitutional Court have
been seriously challenged or even disregarded by governmental institutions”. “Furthermore, as
stated in the Report, implementation (of laws, FZ) is hampered at times by the lack of full
understanding of the social and political role of laws by relevant public sector institutions; these

2
disregard certain legal provisions as a result. There have been cases in which respect for
legislation and the rule of law have been put into question by the government, with
Constitutional court decisions and rulings being challenged or even disregarded.” Despite the
constitutional provisions in force, “parliament does not function properly as an independent
institution and accordingly does not exercise effectively and efficiently its oversight and control
function over the government” (Albania AR 2010: 10-13).
In the 2012 Progress Report, after assessing the positive changes in the relations between
Albania and the EU leading to visa liberalization for Albanian citizens traveling to Schengen
member states, as well as the progress made in the fight against corruption within the judiciary
through the adoption of constitutional amendments restricting the immunity of judges, the report
raises the following criticisms: “no progress has been made in territorial administrative reform;
There has been moderate progress in judicial reform, which is a key priority of the Opinion (EC,
2010); Reform of the laws on the High Court and the Constitutional Court are still pending. The
process of appointing judges to these courts remains an issue of concern due to possible
politicization. The neutrality and independence of these institutions are still not fully guaranteed.
Poor working conditions, a lack of adequate safety arrangements for courts and judges and
generally low remuneration, plus the absence of adequate controls and the opaque system of
appointments, promotions and transfers, continue to be key risk factors for corruption in the
judiciary. Albania needs to further accelerate the implementation of the judicial reform strategy
in order to ensure the independence, efficiency and accountability of its judicial institutions”
(Albania PR 2012: 9-14). Albanian governments with parliament majorities of all colors have
made a number of efforts to address these shortcomings and have marked year-by-year
achievements in overcoming them. This has led to reforms in all sectors of life in the country and
the EC kept encouraging Albania to move in this direction ever since. As the country gained the
status of "candidate country" to the EU in 2014, international institutions once again emphasized
the need for a deeper reform of the justice system, linked to the vetting of the whole lawyer corps
and the building of a new, incorrupt and independent judiciary that is free from political
interference, professionally capable and with high moral integrity.

2. How do our legal traditions, old and new, further today’s justice system reform?

The success of the deep reform of the justice system has become a key priority for the opening of
Albania’s EU accession negotiations. For this reason, it is important to analyze the following
three main questions regarding the role of the law in the integration process: (a) To what extent
does the Albanian legal tradition approximate the European legal tradition founded on Roman
and Western historical traditions?; (b) What is the degree of development of professional
expertise amongst the lawyers of our country?; and (c) What is the level of corruption present in
our justice system?
A. The legal traditions of today’s EU countries are based on those of both the Roman
and European traditions of the late Middle Ages, renewed in particular in Italian universities
during the Renaissance period. In Machiavelli’s secular republics, jurists retained a kind of
independence against political power. According to that tradition, which has been developed and
enriched in modern times, lawyers served the princes and depended on them, but were
nevertheless a kind of independent expert. The law doctrines of the time were by no means
merely a way of expressing the interests of political superiors. What kind of legal traditions did
we inherit in Albania? Do these traditions help the process of legal approximation and the

3
acquisition of the acquis communautaire (as is termed the inventory of European Union
legislation) by the Albanian justice system? In a series of studies of different periods carried out
by Prof. Dr. Ismet Elezi and others, it has been shown that Albania also relies on the Roman and
European legal traditions. The Nullum Crimen Sine Lege Principle, (Nulla Poena Sine Lege),
which means "there is no crime or punishment if there is no law that prohibits a possible action",
has always been applied in Albanian territories, even during the Middle Ages when territories
inhabited by Albanians fell under Ottoman rule. For centuries, the official juridical order was
subject to the legal will of foreign invaders however, and shifted away from the Roman legal
tradition. The Ottoman legal system introduced religious law over all subjects, hence the
influence of the Shari'ah. But just as Ottoman Islam was a synthetic system that combined the
practices and beliefs of Sunism, Sufism and local Christianity, Ottoman law accepted the
multinational and multilateral reality of the empire where, alongside Muslims, Christians and
Jews were organized in millets (the term “millet” in the Ottoman Empire referred to a non-
Muslim religious community) that were responsible for both religious and secular affairs in their
communities.
The Albanian tradition, within the framework of local self-government, survived in the
northern and southern parts of the country several centuries before the proclamation of the
independence of Albania, and continued even after that time. It continued through the
Canon/Kanun of Lek Dukagjini (and in others, such as the Kanun of Skanderbeg, Kanun of
Mirdita, Kanun of Puka, Kanun of Labëria, etc.), whose sources come from antiquity and which
constitutes an ancient juridical universe. The formulas of oaths in the canon text do not mention
the Gods by name. Expressions such as “for heaven and for this land”, “for this stone”, “for this
weight” and “for this bread” express a pagan mythical belief (The Canon of Lek Dukagjini: §
533). The survival of this text to modern times testifies to its value to the local population – even
Ottoman rule did not succeed in undoing this tradition. Benussi (2002: 28) points out that in the
19th century, in Shkodra and Koplik there was a special office known as the “Djibali Court”,
which judged cases according to the Kanun of Lek Dukagjini. When necessary, the decisions of
this court were sometimes executed with the help of Turkish authorities (Ibid).
The entire Kanun of Lek Dukagjini is founded on Roman traditions and law: careful
readers of the Kanun will notice Latin references at the end of each page, explanations and
quotations of the father Shtjefën Gjeçovi and father Gjergj Fishta, as well as the agreement of its
content with Roman law. The Kanun begins with a chapter entitled “Church”, highlighting the
ancient Christian civilization of Albanians, a resilient pre-Ottoman and pre-Islamic civilization
that survived the assimilation pressure of the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the Vlora Assembly,
which proclaimed Albania's independence on November 28th 1912, was forced to consider the
Ottoman Penal Code of 1858 valid. Some practicing of Khadi justice (Muslim Law) continued
until around 1920-1922. Subsequently, the Republic and then the Kingdom of Albania adopted
the systems of Western legislation, using them as a foundation for a new criminal justice system
in Albania (Elezi 2009: 8, 10).
Of course, our legal tradition has some significant shadows. The positive efforts made
during the era of the Zogu monarchy were not enough to overcome the deep semi-feudal cultural
and legal backwardness of our country. Significant cultural changes took place during the first
three decades of the communist regime, particularly in the field of legal education and in the
expansion of the number of jurists in the country. However, a decade of ultra-leftist reforms then
occurred from 1966-1976, resulting in the degradation of the legal system in Albania through
extreme ideological over-saturation and politicization. This regressive phenomenon led to the

4
suppression of the Ministry of Justice, which was the heart and brain of the justice system,
playing an indispensable role in the process of legal codification. In addition to the Ministry of
Justice, the profession of lawyer (advocate) was also eliminated. From 1966, Roman Law was
removed from the university curriculum. Aggressive ideological saturation tendencies were
manifested by the introduction of the so-called “ideological axis” into university juridical
education and in the shortening of university studies for law just to three years in the early 1970s.
In the 1976 Constitution of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, the first chapter declared
that “Albania is a country of the dictatorship of the proletariat”, and that “the Albanian Party of
Labor is the only leading force of the state and of society”, thus fixing the Enverist idea that “the
party is in command” everywhere – in every sector of the state and of Albanian society. The
entrenchment of the party-state's role in the country during the final two decades of the
communist regime resulted in the submission of the Albanian legal system to the mentality that
“the party's directive stands above the law”, a mentality, or a fetish, that greatly deformed
judicial practice and weakened the role of judicial interpretation and the status of judges in
society.
Unlike other authoritarian regimes in the 1970s such as those in Spain, Portugal and
Chile, which benefited from the adoption of Western law, the development of advanced legal
education and a low level of politicization of the state apparatus, in the communist countries of
Eastern and South-eastern Europe, the judicial apparatus was completely politicized. The
nihilistic erosion of the boundaries between law and politics and the submission of judges and
their decisions to the Party's directives left behind a deformed cultural and institutional legacy
(Magalhaes 1999: 45). In this situation of extreme ideological saturation and politicization, the
institutions of justice in ex-communist societies could not demonstrate the advantages that
sociologists consider as “latent functions” of institutions in general. The Stalinist legacy in
Albania was so severe and anti-democratic (according to Western standards) that even five years
after the collapse of the communist regime, a 1996 Human Rights Watch report on Albania
stated that: “Even after five years it has not disappeared, how much it would be the
antidemocratic legacy of Enver Hoxha's rule. The complete lack of independent courts during the
past communist regime, the lack of free media mechanisms and the protection of human rights, is
a real challenge for today's Albanian democracy. What is it more serious, the country's mentality
is still rooted in one party's mentality: critics and opponents of the ruling Democratic Party are
often seen as opponents of “democracy”. As a result, Albanian citizens still suffer from serious
human rights violations, from restrictions on their freedom of expression and association, from
manipulation of the legal system and from police violence”(Human Rights Watch 1996: 2).
Despite the negative of outcomes of the pre-pluralist legal tradition, major democratic
transformations in the justice system occurred in Albanian society after the collapse of the
totalitarian regime. With the repeal of the 1976 Constitution and the adoption of the
Constitutional Package by the first pluralist Assembly of the country in 1991, deep structural
reforms were launched in the justice system, including in the field of legal education. Since 1992,
the system of advocacy and the notary service were restored; the Ministry of Justice was rebuilt,
alongside a functioning pyramid of justice institutions, the High Council of Justice, the High
Court and the Constitutional Court. From the first years of pluralism, significant improvements
were made in the university curricula in Tirana and in other districts. In this period, a large
number of Albanian students completed university studies and postgraduate law degrees in
universities in the USA and various Western European countries. Later, in 2002, the High School
of Magistrates began operating in Tirana, and in the past decade, a considerable number of

5
private universities have started operating in the country, many including faculties of law. The
justice system is in the process of deep reforms aimed at guaranteeing its autonomous and
independent functioning, as well as enhancing the professionalism and integrity of lawyers,
consolidating the legal order and protecting the rights of citizens in the country.
B. In Western jurisprudence and sociology, the mitigation of conflict among the political
actors of society is perceived as the fundamental function of the law and of legal professionals.
The legal integration of the community at the supranational level is also an old idea elaborated in
the original neo-functionalist view of Ernst Haas in the late 1950s. In this view, the legal
integration of the community is understood as the gradual penetration of EU law into the national
law of union member states and candidate countries. In the case of Albania, the alignment with
European standards and the acquis in the field of the judiciary and fundamental rights is of
critical importance. According to European researchers, this process has two principal
dimensions. The first is the dimension of formal penetration: the expansion of (1) the types of
supra-national legal acts, from treaty law to secondary community law, which take precedence
over domestic law, and (2) the extent to which citizens may invoke European law directly in
their home courts. The second dimension is that of substantive penetration: the spilling over of
European community legal regulation to many areas of the lives of citizens of EU member and
candidate countries. In the process of legal integration, judges play a primary role, as
exemplified by the case of the European Court of Justice. It was precisely in the early 1990s,
when European integration was deemed politically dead and academically moribund (at least by
the academics of the two preceding decades), that an unsung hero marked a significant turning
point for the project of integration. This hero was the European Court of Justice, and more
specifically, 13 of her judges who worked quietly in Luxembourg, transforming the Treaty of
Rome into a constitution, which was then replaced by the Lisbon Treaty. With their work, a legal
foundation was laid for an integrated European economy and polity (See Burley & Mattli 1993:
41-76).
This was a very important experience to be studied and implemented by countries such as
Albania that are on the path of development. In overcoming similar situations related to the
almost permanent over-politicized tension between the two main political forces of the country,
the Socialist and Democratic Parties, an independent and professionally consolidated judiciary
can play an important role. Through the reasonable application of the law, conceived by
sociologists as an instrument of change and social development, the judiciary serves as a
“functional” domain that can circumvent the direct clash of political interests. In order for it to
fill that role, it is vital to increase the expertise of law professionals, making all of them aware of
his or her important role in the functioning of a modern and democratic legal system. According
to American sociologist Talcott Parsons, a typical member of this group of legal professionals is
educated and trained according to the Roman and European traditions, usually by a formally
organized educational process. Such a lawyer is considered qualified to practice the profession.
In addition, only members of this profession are treated by society as qualified persons who have
the authority to interpret the legal tradition, and to develop and improve it. According to Parsons'
vision, mastery of expertise, closely related to the mastery of the cultural tradition, serves as a
criterion for assessing the professional role of a lawyer. In a nutshell, the true legal professional
is a “technical expert” of some order, by virtue of his or her mastery of the tradition and the skills
associated with it (Treviño 2008: 307).
Despite great advances made in the two decades after 1990, the level of expertise of the
Albanian lawyer corps (in its broad sense) is problematic and exhibits various shortcomings. In

6
the wake of generous support of the international community for the new right-wing political
parties during 1991-1996, abuses paved the way for the unrestrained march of mediocrity to
occupy the peaks of all social power in Albania. 2 This greatly weakened attempts to foster
genuine law professionals. During this period, the mediocre, who were swept into the
“democratic revolution” swell, pushed professionals aside, humiliated them, prevented them
from building careers, and forced them out of their professional fields. Sociologists have
emphasized that discussions on expertise and on expert power “typically have political
implications” (See Turner 2001: 123-149), but the political agendas behind these implications
are rarely formulated and explicitly expressed. Moreover, various social and political forces hold
different attitudes, often opposed to the role of expertise and the expert in society. Our
experiences of dictatorship and the absurd campaigns “against bureaucracy and technocratism”
in 1966-1976 period remind us that the ultra-leftist parties and populist forces who fear and
ignore the role of expertise and the expert in social life disguise this fear by theorizing about “the
political threat to democracy posed by the existence of expert knowledge” (Turner 2001: 123).
This threat is rooted in the idea that “expertise is treated as a kind of possession which privileges
its possessors with powers that the people cannot successfully control and cannot acquire or
share in [...] So we are faced with the dilemma of capitulation to ‘rule by experts’ or democratic
rule which is ‘populist,’ that is to say that valorizes the wisdom of the people even when ‘the
people’ are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumor” (Turner 2001: ibid.). As a result
of the inertia of the communist past, when obtaining a university diploma ensured a certain
appointment and some sort of career, today a diploma is still often referred to as “a piece of
cardboard”. The process of acquiring one, without having deep, broad and consistent scientific
knowledge in the field of justice, so without assimilating the sound legal expertise that combines
deep knowledge of the tradition and of contemporary legal science, continues to pose a real
concern for the preparation of legal professionals in Albania.
Along with the communist past, there are a number of current factors that have reinforced
these negative developments. First of all, there are the political-electoral interests of competing
parties. As a result of the reforms in the justice system after 1992, a gap was created in the
judges’ pool. Specifically, the country needed 300 judges, however only 150 were in office. The
need to rapidly fill these vacancies justified the organization of a 6 month legal training course at
Durrës Beach in March 1993, where the overwhelming majority of registered trainees were
selected from formerly persecuted groups, with the argument that they were being compensated
for the denial of their rights during the communist regime. Moreover, although many of them
completed university studies by correspondence at the Faculty of Law, their political orientation
coincided with the political majority of the time, as right-wing Democratic Party sections on the
ground had prepared lists of who would attend the Durrës course. The International Human
Rights Watch expressed the concern that, by being nominated by the ruling party, there was a
risk that the political loyalty of attendees would undermine their impartiality and pave the way
for further interference by the executive power into the judicial system (Human Rights Watch

2
While discussing recent developments in the General Prosecutor's Office on “Real Story” (TV “Vizion+”) and
“Java” on RTSH (February 15th 2018), the freelance journalist Artan Hoxha decried the fact that the former Chief
Prosecutor from 2012-2017 (Mr. A. Ll) has a law school diploma, but not a high school diploma. According to this
journalist, there is a matriculation number in the register of the high school where the former prosecutor claims to
have completed his studies, but there is no record of his grades in the class register. Interestingly, his personal file at
the law faculty where A. Ll. completed his higher education and within which a high school diploma should be
enclosed, cannot be found.

7
1996: 10-11). According to some calculations, this contingent of dubious and semi-skilled jurists
accounted for about 70% of the Albanian judiciary in 2013.
A confirmation of that concern can be found in the Bertelsmann Albania Country Report
2018: “The independence of the judiciary (in Albania) is heavily impaired by underground
political links and high levels of corruption. […] The politicization of the judiciary […] is deeply
rooted in the initial reforms of 1992 to 1996 when the then DP government removed former
communist judges. The new personnel were educated through a short three-to six-month course
and were often hand-picked from among the party militants, enabling the infiltration of party
cronies into the highest echelons of the judiciary. The subsequent presidential nominees further
consolidated a system of party patronage around key DP leaders, reducing all levels of judiciary
to a politically controlled structure serving specific party agendas” (BTI 2018: 12).
The unrestrained enlargement of legal education in public and private law schools during
the years 2005-2013, generally through political enrollment criteria, has resulted in a lowering of
the quality of the lawyers entering the labor market. In addition to admission problems and a lack
of harmonization between programs, one of the main causes for not the inability to guarantee the
quality of legal education is related to the absence of merit-based evaluation. According to the
polls, students are subject to unsubstantiated assessments of merit and for corruption in higher
education (GENL 2015: 10).
Justice and politics are of course closely linked, and only in a consolidated democratic
society can there be a fair degree of autonomy between the two. Sociologists acknowledge that
the law also functions as a mask for politics, playing the role that neo-functionalists anticipate for
economics. The need for a domain, for an area that would surround and amortize the direct clash
of political interests, has been clearly expressed in the work of Parsons and neo-functionalists.
They suggest that although the legal field can never be completely separated from the political
sphere, it can at least provide a sufficient buffer zone to achieve results that could not be directly
obtained in the political realm but are achievable when debated and decided in the language and
logic of law (Burley & Mattli 1993: 44). In recent decades, the concerns expressed in the
European Commission’s first Progress Report on Albania in early 2004, where it is generally
concluded that in Albanian everyday politics, medium-term interests were often sacrificed for
short-term political goals, have been shown to be realistic. Such attitudes also violate the equality
of citizens before the law, fueling corruption and the culture of selective adherence to the law by
those who draft, administer, or implement them. This phenomenon has been categorized by the
Albanian Helsinki Committee as an anti-institutional tendency (AHC 2003: 144) to gain
immunity against judicial proceedings while avoiding the act of defending the attitudes and
behaviour of key political actors as criminal defendants in the courtroom. The country has an
urgent need to consolidate democratic political culture. Sociologists have emphasized that
increasing respect for legal expertise and strengthening the independence of the courts would
assist the lessening of ideology and politicization in the all aspects of society, and especially in
government and institutions. Against this objective tendency for a democratic society can only
arise “totalizing parties”, which construe the world ideologically, order the life experiences and
social life of their members, and reject the worldviews of other parties (Turner 2001: 126).
A fair understanding of the irreplaceable role of expertise and the professional training of
specialists in the field of justice would create the possibility of consolidating a new democratic
culture of governance in Albania. In these circumstances, contrasting the application of
clientelism (or cronyism) and party militancy in building new legal and judicial institutions on

8
the one hand, and meritocracy, impartiality and legal professionalism on the other, - the latter
would prevail.
C. The level of corruption in our justice system is best evidenced in the document “An
Analysis of the Justice System in Albania” (June 2015), prepared by the High Level Expert
Group by order of the Special Parliamentary Commission on the Reform in the Justice System
(established by Decision of the Albanian Parliament no. 96/2014 on November 27th 2014). The
group found that the public perceives the justice system as corrupt, affected by external
influences and characterized by a lack of transparency, an inordinate lengthening of processes
and a failure to implement judicial decisions. In 2015, the judiciary was also described as highly
corrupt in the appraisal reports of foreign and domestic organizations, as well as in public
complaints and denunciations made in phone number for public complaints in each institution. In
a 2009 poll entitled “Corruption in Albania: Perceptions and Experience” and carried out by the
Institute for Development Research and Alternatives (IDRA), it was found out that Albanians
believed that trials are tainted by monetary interests, business ties, the personal relations of
judges, and political considerations (see IDRA 2009: 22-24). These surveys have shown that
Albanians see the judiciary as one of the three institutions (alongside Parliament and
Government) offering the smallest contribution to the fight against corruption.
In fact, the broad public opinion and some close observers of legal sector claim that some
prosecutors and judges pay for their appointments or transfers to jobs in Tirana or other
important cities. Nonofficial information data suggest that the cycle of corrupt payments begins
with the judicial police, whose corrupt officers receive payments to destroy evidences at crime
scenes. According to these data, corrupt prosecutors accept payments in return for not initiating
an affair or as an incentive to raise charges, and corrupt judges delay the scheduling of the first
session or base their final decision on bribery. In general, bribery is not given directly, but
through the mediation of a third person, often a close relative of the judge or prosecutor’s family,
a common friend, or a lawyer. Often, illegal benefits are sent abroad or given to the relatives of a
judge or prosecutor, or to trusted third persons. A SELDI regional analysis of the 2016
Corruption and Hidden Economy in Southeast Europe sheds light on the groups that citizens
deem to be the most corrupt, showing that political party and coalition leaders are ranked first,
followed by members of parliament, ministers, local political leaders, customs officials and
judges (SELDI 2016: 22). In October 2012, the Center for Transparency and the Right to
Information conducted a survey questioning 58% of all judges. Out of these, 25% admitted that
the justice system is corrupt and 58% believed the system was perceived to be corrupt (see
GENL 2015: 10). The corruption of the courts is also apparent in the violation of the right to
inform citizens about judicial activities. Although a new law regarding transparency in
communication between the courts and the public was adopted in 2014 (Law no. 149/2014 “On
the Right to Information”), incompetence and corruption in the justice system hampers the
implementation of this law. In a survey conducted by the AIPS (Albanian Institute for Political
Studies) in May 2015 regarding the transparency of the Tirana First Instance Court, most
respondents were not satisfied with the quality of information services provided by the court.
Most also did not believe in the punishment of public officials under the law, lacking confidence
in the ability of the court to respond in a timely and transparent manner (AIPS 2015: 31). This
also weakens their faith in the justice and legality of court decisions. European studies on public
trust in the courts also confirm that the regard for the justice and legitimacy of judicial
institutions is higher among the citizens of Nordic countries and lowest among the citizens of
Eastern and South-eastern Europe (Jackson et al. 2011: 8). At a justice reform conference held in

9
Tirana on June 8th 2015, the EU's ambassador to Tirana, Romana Vlahutin, declared that Albania
cannot be changed from the outside: “Albanians, you have to do it.” At the same event, US
Ambassador Donald Lu said that “In a country like Albania that is a NATO member which
aspires to be part of the EU, as well, political elites and criminals cannot act without punishment”
(see Panorama 2015: 1). During a visit to Albania two years later, the president of the Venice
Commission, Mr. G. Buquicchio, reminded Albanians that “If you do not have an impartial judge,
you will not have foreign investments, as an entrepreneur does not come here to spend his money
to develop the Albanian economy, whenever in a case of conflict there will be no an impartial
decision by justice. This is for the economy, but also for ordinary citizens, it is important to have
impartial judges, non-corrupt, who make the decisions as they should be by law” (Buquicchio
2017: Vizion Plus).

3. Main stages of justice system reform in 2014-2018

Phase 1:

● November 27th 2014: In a plenary session, the Parliament of Albania approved the creation of
the Special Parliamentary Commission on Reform in the Justice System. The commission would
consist of 15 members. The majority of members were MPs from the ruling coalition (the
Socialist Party (SP) and Socialist Movement for Integration (SMI)). The Democratic Party (DP)
and the Party of Union for Justice and Integration (PUJI) (the latter in opposition at that time)
voted against the establishment of this commission. With the persistent demands of the right-
wing opposition, the leftist majority later agreed that the commission should be made up of an
equal number of members (5) from each party coalition, as a guarantee that any constitutional or
legal changes and the establishment of new governing structures in the justice system would not
be dominated by either side. Time proved that this maneuver by the right-wing opposition to
establish the principle of parity in the composition of the commission was part of its strategy to
delay and hamper reforms by diminishing the ability of the commission to come to any decisions,
as these had to be approved by a majority of members.
The composition of the Special Parliamentary Commission on Reform in the Justice System was
as follows:
1. Fatmir Xhafaj, Chairman (SP) 9. Gent Strazimiri (DP)
2. Eduard Halimi, Deputy Chairman (DP) 10. Fatmir Mediu, (RP in coalition with DP)
3. Vasilika Hysi, secretary (SP)
4. Ulsi Manja (SP)
5. Pandeli Majko (SP) Substitutes:
6. Spartak Braho (SMI, in coalition with SP) 1. Silva Caka (SMI)
7. Oerd Bylykbashi (DP) 2. Vexhi Muçmata (SP)
8. Arben Ristani (DP) 3. Jorida Tabaku (DP)

● July 24th 2015: The High Level Expert Group (GENL in Albanian) created by the Albanian
Parliament upon the request of the Justice Reform Commission submitted a draft document
entitled “The Reform Strategy in the Justice System” to the Commission. GENL was assisted by
a technical secretariat whose task, among other things, was to formulate justice reform draft laws.
The whole process was conducted with the contribution and support of international experts and
institutions, such as representatives from the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development
10
(OPDAT) from the United States and representatives of the EURALIUS IV Mission from the
European Union. The group also benefitted from the assistance of external consultants,
specifically, leaders and experts from structures with a similar status, such as USKOK, a special
office dedicated to combating corruption in Croatia, and Romania’s National Anticorruption
Department (DNA).
● July 30th 2015: With decision no. 14, the Commission adopted the document “An Analysis of
the Justice System in Albania”, concluding the first phase of the process. This was the first
publicly consulted document to objectively, scientifically and professionally analyze the
application of the law in Albania, as well as the current state of the justice system and all of the
acute problems that have affected it in terms of organization, functioning, good governance,
efficiency and administration.

Phase 2:

● July 22nd 2016: The Albanian Parliament unanimously voted (140 votes) in favor of the draft
constitutional bill on judicial reform. This is a rare case when all Albanian MPs were participants
in the Assembly and all gave their vote for a bill.

● October 3rd 2016: With 122 votes in favor, none against and no abstentions, the Assembly
adopted the draft law “On the Organization and Functioning of Institutions in the Fight Against
Corruption and Organized Crime”. After the adoption of this law, the opposition left the
Assembly hall stating that it refused to vote on other draft laws that, from a procedural point of
view, “violate” the Constitution. Following this, the parliamentary majority in the Assembly (the
SP-SMI-PUDI coalition), with 86 votes in favor, one abstention and none against, endorsed a
number of draft laws including “On the Status of Judges and Prosecutors in the Republic of
Albania”; “On the Organization and Functioning of the Prosecutor's Office in the Republic of
Albania”; "On the Organization of Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania”; “On Some
Additions and Amendments to Law no. 8577, dated 10/02/2000”; and “On the Organization and
Functioning of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania”.
These laws adopted recently provide the legal basis of founding the “Special Structure
against Corruption and Organized Crime”, or SPAK in Albanian. Under the authority of the
SPAK, are the Special Prosecution Office and the Special Investigation Unit, named the
“National Bureau of Investigation”, or BKH in Albanian. The staff in these three structures must
meet the following security conditions:
- Each candidate declares in writing and submits documents declaring any property and conflicts
of interest to the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interests
(ILDKPKI in Albanian), which are controlled within 120 days.
- The candidate submits a security questionnaire to the National Security Authority, in
accordance with the legislation in force. Within 90 days, the Director of the National Security
Authority submits a report to the authority that assigns or takes on the candidate, detailing
whether the questionnaire was accurately filled out and indicates any concerns that may arise
from the verification of the candidate’s responses.

11
- The candidate completes a written statement signed by him/her and his/her immediate family
members consenting to having any telecommunications recorded and agreeing to give up the
right to privacy related to these communications.
Members of the Special Prosecution Office are appointed for nine year terms by the High
Prosecution Council, after being vetted by the Assets Inspectorate (ILDKPKI) and the National
Security Authority. The mandate shall be suspended or terminated only if the High Inspector of
Justice requests disciplinary proceedings against the prosecutor. At the end of the mandate,
he/she returns to a previous position or to a vacant position in the prosecution system, having
precedence over other candidates. Special Prosecutors act and make decisions independently. A
senior prosecutor does not give instructions to a special prosecutor regarding the essence of an
investigation. Prosecutors in the Special Prosecution Office investigate and prosecute other
Special Prosecutors or judges against charges of corruption and organized crime if there is
evidence that the prosecutor or judge is corrupt, supports a criminal organization, or has
committed a criminal offense that is in the purview of the Special Prosecution Office. Regarding
the relationship between the Special Prosecution Office and the National Bureau of Investigation
(BKH), it is the former that directs the work of the BKH as well as judicial police services
related to investigations. The BKH is a specialized section of the judicial police, acting under the
direction of the Special Prosecution Office. The Director of the BKH is recommended by a
commission comprised of the head of the Special Prosecution Office and two special prosecutors
with many years of experience, while the appointment is made by the High Council of
Prosecution. The director of the BKH has a five year mandate, with the right to be reappointed to
the position only once.

Phase 3:

● June 2016: To overcome the delay in judicial reform and to meet the objectives of the third
stage, the High Level Expert Group (with the assistance of the Technical Secretariat and based
on the findings of the System Analysis Document and the objectives of the Strategic Document)
submitted a draft of the package of laws necessary for reforming the justice system to the Justice
Reform Commission for discussion. The majority repeatedly emphasized that the opposition’s
concerns regarding the inclusivity of the process were unwarranted, having been conducted with
the contribution and support of justice system institutions, local experts, international partners,
other interested parties and the public. The list of drafted laws (41 in total) is as follows:

I. Package of constitutional changes 5. Law on the Inspection Body and for

1. Constitutional Amendments to the Justice
System
2. Constitutional Amendments to the Issues of
EU, NATO, decriminalization etc
3. Law on the Constitutional Court
4. The Organic Law for the President of the
Republic
5. Law on Referendum
II. Legal package on judicial reform
1. Law on Judicial Organization
2. Law on Judicial Administration
3. Law on the Status of Judges
4. Law on the High Council of Justice
Disciplinary Proceeding
6. Law “On the National Judicial Conference”
7. Law on Administrative Courts
8. Law “On the Code of Civil Procedure”
III. Legal package for criminal justice
1. Law on Prosecution & the High Council of
Prosecutors
2. Law “On Judicial Police”
3. Criminal Procedure Code
4. Criminal Code
5. Law “On Prison Police”

12
 6. Law “On the Execution of Criminal Decisions”
7. Law “On the Rights and Treatment of Persons
Convicted and Held in Detention on Remand”
IV. Package of anti-corruption legal measures
1. Law on National Anti-Corruption Prosecution
2. Law “On the Serious Crimes Court and Anti-
Corruption”
3. Law “On the Prevention of Conflict of Interest
in the Exercise of Public Functions”
4. Law “On Declaration and Control of Assets
and Financial Obligations of Elected Persons
and Some Public Officials”
5. Law “On Some Amendments to the Anti-
Mafia Law”
V. Legal package for legal education and law
schools
1. Law “On Higher Education” (Proposals
for possible changes)
2. Law “On the Profession of Lawyer”
3. Law on State Exam
4. Law “On the School of Magistrates”
5. Law “On the Legal Education of Citizens”
VI. Legal package for free professions and legal
services
1. Law “On the Profession of Lawyer”
2. Law “On Private Judicial Executor”
3. Law “On Notary”
4. Law “On Mediation of Disputes”
5. Law “On State Advocacy”
VII. Legal package for funding
1. Law “On the Management of the State Budget”
2. Law “On the Budget of the Judiciary”
3. Law on Office of Administration of Judiciary
Budget
4. Law “On Judicial Fees”
5. Law “On the Prevention of Money Laundering
and Financing Terrorist Activities”
6. Law “On Banks or Regulations Regarding
Banks”

For all of the aforementioned laws, the right-wing opposition and its allies generally did
not actively participate in the meetings of the Parliamentary Committee of Laws, where the draft
laws in question were discussed. When they did participate, they behaved in an obstructive way,
denouncing the government’s alleged “attempts to seize the justice system”, or it’s supposed
“violation of the constitution”. Often, the SMI joined in on these accusations, particularly after
the June 25th 2017 elections, when it adhered itself to the opposition. In contrast however, its
representatives formally participated in the in Parliamentary Committee of Laws meeting
without playing any active role.

● September 20th 2017: Eight International Monitoring Operations (OMN in Albanian) experts
arrived in Tirana to oversee the process of vetting. Seven were from the judiciaries of European
countries and one was from the United States of America. Experts will stay in Tirana throughout
the entire reform process.

● January 22nd 2018: Following 6 hours of fierce debate, obstructive behavior by the opposition
prevented the selection of the five members of the High Judicial Council (HJC) and the five
members of the High Council of Prosecutors (HCP) by a free vote. The parliamentary
subcommittee therefore decided to select the members itself through an evaluation all of the
candidates for the HJPC and HCP (which came from the ranks of lawyers, professors and civil
society). The list was presented for voting in the plenary session of the Assembly on January 25th
2018. But the DP-SMI opposition refused to reach a consensus on these candidates. Only in the
third round, with a simple parliamentary majority (72 votes in favor), did the Assembly adopt the
full list of HJC and HCP members (on February 8th 2018). “Do not focus on the bad news that
politicians failed to cooperate again in the selection of members of the HJC and the HCP”,
declared the American ambassador to Albania at the time. “I have more confidence in a random

13
selection than in the selection by politicians” (Lu 2018: 4) he went on to say, indicating his
belief that both left and right politics in Albania are afraid of reform in justice system.

4. Delays and obstacles in the justice system reform process in Albania - the causes and
perpetrators
“I know, here who is afraid of reform in justice” declared the US Ambassador, Mr. D. Lu, on
November 13th 2015, “…corrupt ministers, criminal MPs, incompetent judges, prosecutors who
take your money but never prosecute someone... Think of them whenever you hear that these
people criticize reform in justice. [...] I can assure you that the United States fully supports the
current proposals. We have participated in the writing and the discussions of the experts on each
of the constitutional changes. [...] not even a single Albanian believes that the justice system is
independent - is not independent of bribery, is not independent of justice by phone, where
powerful people directly call judges with instructions, and not independent of the criminal threats
of organized crime” (Lu 2015: Balkanweb).
It was obvious that behind this public statement, made by the US ambassador, stood both
the United States and the European Union. The criticism was addressed to all Albanian political
parties that had been brought to power since 1992. The right-wing opposition, who had lost
power in the June 23rd 2013 elections, attempted to present any criticism levelled against the
political class and the justice system in Albania as criticism aimed solely at its main political
opponent, the SPA in offfice. It strived to use those criticisms as its strongest weapon in the
parliamentary war against the left-wing ruling coalition, accusing it of bringing criminals to
power by accepting their help and money to win both the 2013 election and the June 21st 2015
local elections. The left coalition government “For a European Albania” reacted positively to
criticism from the opposition and international factors, and on December 17th 2015, accepted to
cooperate with the opposition in the drafting of Law no. 138/2015 “On the Guaranteeing of the
Integrity of Persons Elected, Appointed or that Exercise Public Functions” otherwise called the
“decriminalization law”. Efforts to draft bylaws and other legal acts for the implementation of
that law were also initiated. It took 4 days of negotiations (1-4 March 2016) within the
Parliamentary Committee of Laws to unanimously adopt the decriminalization bylaws.
Negotiations were pending on a “Self-declaration Form”. While both parties agreed that
providing false data constituted a criminal offense of false testimony, punishable by the Criminal
Code, the issue that prevented compromise was related to the role of the prosecution in enforcing
this law. The opposition doubted the sincerity of the parliamentary majority, which controlled
the Assembly, while the government doubted the role of the prosecution as a whole system of
people selected and appointed by the former government of Mr. S. Berisha, the former leader of
the DP. Finally, the parties agreed that the data provided in the form should be subject to full
verification by state bodies and the General Prosecutor's Office. Pursuant to the
decriminalization law, the ruling coalition parties cleansed their parliamentary group, followed
by similar actions in municipalities such as Kavaja, which dismissed several of its
representatives with criminal records. The right-wing opposition often tried to defend its
representatives with criminal records, abusing the support it had in the Central Election
Commission and the prosecution bodies.
The right-wing opposition counted as political advantages over the left coalition in office,
several episodes such as the adoption of the decriminalization law, the worrying dimensions of
cannabis cultivation in the country in 2016, rumors of the former socialist Minister of the
Interior's name (Mr. S. Tahiri) appearing in the conversations of accused drug traffickers from

14
the district of Vlora (recorded on behalf of the Italian prosecutor's office), as well as the
unexpected victory of Republican candidate Mr. D. Trump in the fall 2016 US presidential
election, whose rhetoric at the height of the US campaign was rebuked by the prime minister of
Albania, Edi Rama, and was publicly denounced on CNN. Based on these estimates of an
supposed advantage over the ruling majority, the right-wing opposition began gradually
countering and obstructing the government's efforts to implement justice system reform, which it
had partly initiated when DP was in power but which had taken on new dimensions from 2014,
when it was designed as the deepest structural reform in the history of Albanian justice, aiming
to ultimately drive it out from its dependence on political parties and the quagmire of corruption.
The opposition and its supporters, as well as the general public, held the belief that the new
structures of the justice system created through the reform would lead to a reopening of old
criminal and corruption cases, resulting in in-depth investigations and arrests, trials and
sentencings of the responsible persons. By 2015, the leaders of the SMI were feeling the pressure
of this public sentiment, pushing them deviate from their support of justice reform. At that time,
the justice minister, Mr. N. Naço (SMI), was a member of the left coalition government’s cabinet,
but following his resignation, his replacements in the cabinet (under the command of the leaders
of the SMI) gradually began to reiterate the anti-reform rhetoric of the right-wing opposition and
adopt its stumbling political attitudes.
From July 2015 to July 2016, despite the socialist members of government's will (headed
by Edi Rama) and mounting international pressure on the opposition and SMI, the reform was at
a standstill. The next legislature was closed and the Assembly would not yet approve the main
laws needed to start the justice reform. At the beginning of this period, Prime Minister Edi Rama
proclaimed that he would end the difficult negotiations with the opposition and that he would
accept any of its requests, provided that the request had previously been approved by the United
States and the European Union. The international community did not support this argument
however, insisting that the solution to the political stalemate on justice reform should be the
result of direct negotiations between the government and the opposition. “I propose a simple
solution,” declared the US ambassador in Tirana. “I challenge both the prime minister and the
opposition leader and urge them to meet face to face on Monday (July 17th 2016) and publicly
promise they will not leave the meeting room until they find a solution. Let's see who really is in
favor of reaching a compromise. […] The parties have two paths: or they will find a solution that
will be supported both by the government and the opposition, or let them both be locked together
in that room forever” (Lu S-2016: 1).
From a sociology perspective, the strategy of obstructing justice reform by Albanian
politicians, and in particular by the right-wing opposition, was realized through the following
tactics:
 By attacking the High Level Expert Group, created by the Parliamentary Justice Reform
Commission, as “supporters of the socialist government” and as judges who “had been also
active in political trials during communism”, with the aim of overturning the draft document
prepared by that group entitled “Justice System Reform Strategy”, as well as “An Analysis of
Justice System in Albania” and all draft law packages.
 By submitting the entire package of draft constitutional amendments for review by the
Venice Commission, in order to postpone as long as possible time of its adoption by parliament.
 By complaining that the translation of the documents in that package was incorrect and
that this was a deliberate attempt by the government to mislead the Venice Commission.

15
  By establishing a group of parallel legal experts from the opposition to produce
alternative assessments of the justice system in Albania as well as draft reform laws.
 By encouraging various organizations and associations of judges, prosecutors and
lawyers under its influence to submit a series of complaints and proposals to the Constitutional
Court to delay and impede the implementation of the constitutional changes.
To clear the political scene from all of the opposition’s allegations and suspicions
regarding the content of the draft laws and draft amendments to the Constitution of Albania, on
October 1st 2015 the head of the Special Commission for Justice System Reform, Mr. F. Xhafaj,
sent the document of constitutional changes to the Venice Commission for its opinion. The same
thing was done on October 5th of the same year by the Speaker of the Albanian Parliament, Mr. I.
Meta. Even his party ministers (from the SMI) in the Rama cabinet established expert
commissions for justice reform. The reform situation became very complex, or, as commented
the President of the Venice Commission, Mr. G. Buquicchio, this reform “became a reform [...]
perhaps a bit more complex than it was, apparently this complexity is needed, considering the
Albanian situation, where, unfortunately, there is no trust that should be between the opposition
and the majority” (Buquicchio 2017: Vizion Plus). The red line dividing the parties was the
mandate or role of internationals in the process of vetting (control and verification of candidates
for judges and prosecutors). Would they have an observer or decision-maker role? Who was
more afraid of the role of internationals in the vetting process? Each party levelled accusations at
the opposing one.
But after two years of suspicions, objections, negotiations and attacks between the two
political parties, international pressure, and in particular the threatening tones of American
diplomats regarding the serious consequences facing MPs considering voting against the bill of
constitutional changes on judicial reform, produced a result. On July 22nd 2016, the draft of the
constitutional law on judicial reform was voted in the parliament of Albania, with 140 votes in
favor. All Albanian MPs participated in this plenary session of the Assembly and voted
unanimously in favour the draft law – an extremely rare occurrence. This can be considered as
the “critical moment” of the three-year period of 2014-2017. “We wanted […] political leaders,
parliamentarians, party leaders to know [...] that if they would vote against this reform, there
would be consequences”, US Ambassador Donald Lu said later. “There would be consequences
for Albania in terms of its relationship with the United States, but also individual consequences
for certain persons in relation to the United States” (Lu S-2016: Ora News).
Many people believed that the vote signaled the falling of the right-wing opposition’s
barriers to justice system reform and that from that time onward, it would cooperate with the
government for the smooth realization of the reforms. Sociologists point out that there are
moments in a process that are considered “critical” due to the importance they have and the
consequences they bring. Theorists of historical institutionalism who study the meaning of
“critical moments” or “critical junctures” in everyday life and in the history of nations point out
that these junctures are characterized by the adoption of a separate institutional agreement, a
choice of one option among some possible alternatives. Once the actors who have made a deal
start moving in a particular agreed-upon direction, they achieve increasing returns and continue
to move in that direction. Returns processes generate irreversibilities, removing certain options
from the subsequent menu of political possibilities. Once an option is selected, it is progressively
more difficult to return to the initial point (see Hogan 2006: 660-661). On July 22nd 2016, all
parliamentary parties expressed in their statements that it was a day of hope for Albanians since
justice reform would affect all citizens and with the changes to the Constitution, all would see a
16
benefit in their lives. But the politicians who had obstructed justice reform until that day did not
dare tell their electorate that their own interests differed greatly from the interests of Albanians.
The great difference between the narrow interests of these politicians and the interests of
the entire Albanian population pushed right-wing opposition leaders to continue their efforts to
delay and hamper justice reform. They simply changed tactics after the vote. In view of the
organizational weaknesses of its own structures, of a huge loss of electoral support and the
expected defeat in the upcoming May 2017 elections, the right-wing opposition, backed by the
controversial stances of the SMI (formally in coalition with SP), kicked off serious efforts to
delay and hamper justice reform on February 18th 2017, a month after Mr. Donald Trump was
sworn in as the 45th president of the United States. That day, a protest took place in the
"Dëshmorët e Kombit" boulevard in Tirana attended by thousands of sympathizers and members
of the DP chanting slogans of decriminalization and the fight against the cannabisation of our
country (as the spread of cannabis fields across the country was referred to), and demanding for a
the resignation of PM Edi Rama and creation of a technical government as a precondition for
having free and fair elections. Following the protest, the opposition locked itself under a tent in
front of the government building. All relevant international factors considered the opposition's
demands for the resignation of Edi Rama's government three months before an election to be
absurd. In essence, the ludicrous demands of the opposition, which remained under the tent in the
main boulevard of Tirana for three weeks, aimed to prevent the conclusion of justice reform
before the May 2017 parliamentary elections. The opposition’s hope was that trumpeting the so-
called cannabisation of the country and the corruption of the government would draw the
attention of European political circles and of President Trump, eventually preventing a victory
and second four-year governing mandate for the Socialists. Right-wing attacks on the US and EU
ambassadors (Donald Lu and Romana Vlahutin) increased, with accusations of being
manipulated by Edi Rama levelled at both ambassadors, as well as claims that Mr. Lu and Mrs.
Vlahutin follow their own personal agendas and not the official policy of the countries they
represent. On various television programs, and particularly in those leaning to the right,
opposition representatives (such as Mr. Genc Pollo, DP Mp) articulated the thesis that “socialists
respect the president's ambassador rather than the [American] president!” The opposition went
so far as to not register an electoral candidate at the Central Election Commission before the
legal deadline (April 9th). On May 13th 2017, the right-wing opposition reiterated its
demonstration of force in the “Dëshmorët e Kombit” boulevard, again urging the prime minister
to resign.
Numerous American and European delegations and diplomats came to Tirana around this
time to try to overcome the three month long political stalemate, including the former US Deputy
Secretary of State, Mrs. Victoria Nuland and Mr. Hoyt Brian Yee, US Deputy Assistant
Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs and German MP David McAllister. Pressure was
applied to both the opposition and the Albanian government, with the aim of pushing both parties
to make some concessions and of bringing the PD out of the tent and into the election. Faced
with the tough stand of the right-wing opposition, all foreign diplomats almost unanimously
declared to the DPA leaders that elections would be held and recognized internationally, even
without the opposition's participation. Under international pressure, the political stalemate ended
with a political agreement (on May 18th 2017) between the head of the opposition, Mr. L. Basha,
and the Socialist leader, Prime Minister Edi Rama. In a move never seen in 27 years of political
pluralism in Albania, two months before the elections, the ruling party gave the post of Deputy
Prime Minister, as well as 6 technical ministers (including the Minister of the Interior), head of

17
Central Electoral Commission, People's Advocate and 5 general directorates to the opposition.
According to the agreement, elections were postponed to June 25th 2017. The only conditions
that Prime Minister Rama placed on Mr. Basha were the participation of the DPA in the elections
and support for the opening of accession negotiations with the European Union after the election.
Following the overwhelming victory of the SPA in the June 25th 2017 election, the doubts
and obstacles to justice reform did not die down, now spearheaded by the new opposition
coalition formed by the right-wing DPA and the left-wing SMI. This was manifested by the
violent protest by these two parties, both inside and outside the parliament, to prevent the
election of the interim chief prosecutor in December 2017. When the establishment of bodies
that would create the structures of the new system justice, as well as the SPAK (which in
Albanian stands for the Special Structure against Corruption and Organized Crime) occurred in
February 2018, the successful completion of the reform seemed imminent. The DP-SMI coalition
tried to hide its fear of reform in the justice system and its powerlessness before the political will
of the socialist government and the majority of Albanian people with statements and “mournful”
laments, decrying that the reform is likely to fail, that it is being used by authoritarian and
corrupt leaders as a pretext for putting the justice system under their control, so as to use it to
launch witch hunts against political opponents. Since 2015, President B. Nishani (elected to that
position by the DP majority in 2012) has expressed doubts about the reforms to the justice
system, because according to him, the laws we have up to now are very good and he does not
believe in the new proposed legal institutions. In line with the resistance of DP against justice
reform Mr. Nishani kept trying to relativise the necessity and importance of this reform,
sarcastically speaking: “we say to the Albanian citizens that we are bringing you a product, we
bring you mechanisms that will significantly improve your justice, because we are changing
some laws and we are creating some bodies and boards, and new agencies”(Nishani 2015: 3),
alluding suspiciously that these changes will not bring anything new.
However, now that the mechanisms of reform are on their feet and work has started to
establish new structures in the justice system, it remains to hope that the doubts expressed by
many politicians in 2014-2015 will not materialize. The latest studies and the results seen in
September-October 2018 from the ongoing vetting process seem to demonstrate it.3

Conclusion

In this article I have focused on the questions of the justice system reform in Albania (2014-
2018), its progressing on three phases, and on its expected and first achieved results.

International institutions that monitor the process of Albania's approach to the most democratic
standards in order to be ready to join the EU, are assisting our country in the process of deepest
and comprehensive reform in the justice system, linked to the vetting of the whole lawyer corps
and the building of a new, incorrupt and independent judiciary that is free from political
interference, professionally capable and with high moral integrity.

3
During December 2017 - March 2018, the number of resignations from the justice system amounted to a total of 14
judges, prosecutors and legal assistants, including the former Prosecutor General Adriatik Llalla and the former
chairman of Council of Appointments to the Justice System and member of the Constitutional Court, Besnik Imeraj.
The Special Qualification Commission has dismissed 37% of vetted jurists and has confirmed 47% of them (but
some of these initially confirmed jurists were dismissed after appeals by the Public Commissioner of Justice
Reform (see IPS 2018: 3-4).

18
Reform of the justice system in Albania has faced various obstacles. These arise from the lack of
a developed tradition of rule of law, which comes not only from the old tradition of five century-
Ottoman rule but also from the legacy of the communist dictatorship, that nourished and fostered
the mentality and practices of the rule of the party rather than the rule of law. Another major
obstacle is the widespread dissemination of the culture of corruption.

Parties that politically controlled the justice system in Albania by 2013 have fostered its
aggressive politicization by filling up ranks of prosecutors and prosecutors up to 70 % with party
militants without proper legal expertise. Feared for losing their control over justice system, and
therefore fearing the punishment of their corrupted leaders, these political parties are at the
forefront of various forces to prevent, slow down and deform the current reform in this field.
They have used and continue to use different tactics and tools to achieve their goals by
countering not only the efforts of the Albanian government to develop the justice system reform
but also openly speaking out against the support that international factors give to the work for
achieving the success of this reform.

The overwhelming majority of the Albanian people, youth and intellectuals, support the
development of reform in the justice system, expressing this with their vote in favor to political
forces fighting for the successful development of this reform in the two last political elections
and local administrative elections held in our country since 2013. With the completion of this
reform, they believe Albania has meet key political criteria as a candidate country and will
receive the invitation for full membership in the EU.

References

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