1.) OVERVIEW OF THE
Pedro Lantin,
SUBJECT
2.) DEFINITION (RULE 128,
SEC. 1)
a.) Atienza V. Board of
Medicine 2011
Facts:
1. Due to her lumbar pains,
private respondent Editha
Sioson went to Rizal Medical
Center (RMC) for check-up
on February 1995.
2. Sometime in 1999, due to
the same problem, she was
referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin
III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic
laboratory tests. She
underwent kidney operation
after the tests revealed that
her left kidney is non-
functioning and non-
visualizing.
3. Private respondent’s
husband Romeo Sioson then
filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or
incompetence before the
Board of Medicine for the
removal of Editha’s fully
functional right kidney,
instead of the left, against the
doctors who allegedly
participated in the kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd
dela Vega, Dr.
III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio
Florendo and petitioner Rico
Rommel Atienza.
4. After Romeo Sioson
presented his evidence,
Editha filed her formal offer
of documentary evidence,
which consisted of certified
photocopies of X-Ray request
forms where interpretation
of the ultrasound results
were written, for the purpose
of proving that her kidneys
were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the
time she was operated.
5. Petitioner filed his
comments/objections to
Editha’s formal offer of
exhibits, alleging that said
exhibits are inadmissible
because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated,
intended to establish matters
which are hearsay, and
incompetent to prove the
purpose for which they are
offered.
6. The formal offer of
documentary exhibits of
private respondent was
admitted by the BOM.
Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the Order,
which was denied on the
ground that BOM should first
admit the evidence being
offered so that it can
determine its probative value
when it decides the case, and
later on determine whether
the evidence is relevant or
not.
7. Disagreeing with the BOM,
Atienza filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA. The
CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the exhibits are
inadmissible in evidence
Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin
with, it is well-settled that the
rules of evidence are not
strictly applied in
proceedings before
administrative bodies such as
the BOM. Although trial
courts are enjoined to
observe strict enforcement of
the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence
which may appear to be of
doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held
that, “it is the safest policy to
be liberal, not rejecting them
on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them
unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent,
for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond
the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter
found relevant or competent;
on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out
later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring
them.”
Admissibility of evidence
refers to the question of
whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is
to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative
value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it
proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s
insistence that the admission
of Editha’s exhibits violated
his substantive rights leading
to the loss of his medical
license is misplaced in light
of Section 20, Article I of the
Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of
Procedure. As pointed out by
the appellate court, the
admission of the exhibits did
not prejudice the substantive
rights of petitioner because,
at any rate, the fact sought to
be proved thereby, that the
two kidneys of Editha were in
their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was
operated on, is presumed
under Section 3, Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court on
Disputable presumptions.
The exhibits are certified
photocopies of X-ray Request
Forms filed in connection
with Editha’s medical case,
which contained handwritten
entries interpreting the
results of the examination.
The fact sought to be
established by the admission
of Editha’s exhibits, that her
“kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations
at the time” of her operation,
need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory
judicial notice. These
exhibits do not constitute
hearsay evidence of the
anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys because the
position and removal may
still be established through a
belated ultrasound or x-ray
of her abdominal area.
Contrary to the assertion of
petitioner, the best evidence
rule is also inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130
provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document
must be produced;
exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible
other than the original
document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has
been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part
of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in
the custody or under the
control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original
consists of numerous
accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only
the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a
public record in the custody
of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this
case is whether respondent
doctors before the BOM are
liable for gross negligence in
removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha
instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the
proper anatomical locations
of Editha’s kidneys. As
previously discussed, the
proper anatomical locations
of Editha’s kidneys at the
time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not
only through the exhibits
offered in evidence.
In fact, the introduction of
secondary evidence, such as
copies of the exhibits, is
allowed, especially as one of
the witnesses testified that
the Records Office of RMC no
longer had the originals of
the exhibits “because [it]
transferred from the previous
building, x x x to the new
building” and ultimately, the
originals cannot be
produced.
3.) SCOPE
a.) Sasan Sr. V. NLRC 2008
FACTS:
Sasan et al are employed by
Helpmate, Inc (HI), a
janitorial and messengerial
service provider, and
assigned to E PCI Bank in
Gorordo Branch, Cebu City.
Their services were cut off
when EPCI decided to bid out
the janitorial and
messengerial jobs to two
other service providers.
Sasan et al then filed an
action for illegal dismissal
alleging that they are regular
employees of PCI, and HI has
no authority to dismiss them.
After submission of legal
positions to the Labor
Arbiter, it concluded that HI
is engaged in labor on
contracting as it operates
without substantial capital as
required by the Labor Code,
declaring PCI as the principal
employer and awarding
money claims to the
employees for their illegal
dismissal.
PCI and Hi appealed the LA's
decision to the NLRC and
submitted for the first time
photocopy of documents
proving that they have
sufficient capital to operate
as an independent
contractor. The NLRC
modified the LA's decision
taking into consideration the
documentary evidence
submitted by HI.
On charges of illegal
dismissal, the NLRC ruled
that the complaint for illegal
dismissal was prematurely
filed, furhter, deleted the
award of backwages and
separation pay, but affirmed
the award of 13th month pay
and attorneys' fee.
The petitioners appeal to CA,
which affirmed the NLRC's
decision. Further, appealed
to the SC, hence, this
petition.
Sasan et al are employed by
Helpmate, Inc (HI), a
janitorial and messengerial
service provider, and
assigned to E PCI Bank in
Gorordo Branch, Cebu City.
Their services were cut off
when EPCI decided to bid out
the janitorial and
messengerial jobs to two
other service providers.
Sasan et al then filed an
action for illegal dismissal
alleging that they are regular
employees of PCI, and HI has
no authority to dismiss them.
After submission of legal
positions to the Labor
Arbiter, it concluded that HI
is engaged in labor on
contracting as it operates
without substantial capital as
required by the Labor Code,
declaring PCI as the principal
employer and awarding
money claims to the
employees for their illegal
dismissal.
PCI and Hi appealed the LA's
decision to the NLRC and
submitted for the first time
photocopy of documents
proving that they have
sufficient capital to operate
as an independent
contractor. The NLRC
modified the LA's decision
taking into consideration the
documentary evidence
submitted by HI.
On charges of illegal
dismissal, the NLRC ruled
that the complaint for illegal
dismissal was prematurely
filed, furhter, deleted the
award of backwages and
separation pay, but affirmed
the award of 13th month pay
and attorneys' fee.
The petitioners appeal to CA,
which affirmed the NLRC's
decision. Further, appealed
to the SC, hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON the NLRC is allowed to
received evidence and give
merit with the same
introduced for the first time
during appeal?
HELD:
The submission of new
evidence before the NLRC is
not prohibited by its new
Rules of Procedure. Rules of
evidence prevailing in in
courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters
are directed to use every and
all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively,
without regard to
technicalities of law and
procedure all in the interest
of substantial justice.
The court further ruled that
the petitioners were not
illegally dismissed by HI.
Upon the termination of the
Contract of Service between
HI and EPCI , the petitioners
cannot insist to continue
work for the latter. Their
pull-out from EPCI did not
constitute illegal dismissal.
WON the NLRC is allowed to
received evidence and give
merit with the same
introduced for the first time
during appeal?
The submission of new
evidence before the NLRC is
not prohibited by its new
Rules of Procedure. Rules of
evidence prevailing in in
courts of law or equity are not
controlling in labor cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters
are directed to use every and
all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively,
without regard to
technicalities of law and
procedure all in the interest
of substantial justice.
 The court further ruled that
the petitioners were not
illegally dismissed by HI.
Upon the termination of the
Contract of Service between
HI and EPCI , the petitioners
cannot insist to continue
work for the latter. Their
pull-out from EPCI did not
constitute illegal dismissal.
4.) ADMISSIBILITY
a.) People V. Wagas 2013
Facts:
Gilbert Wagas ordered from
Alberto Ligaray 200 bags of
rice over the telephone. As
payment, Wagas issued a
check in favor of Ligaray.
When the check was
deposited it was dishonored
due to insufficiency of funds.
Ligaray notified Wagas and
demanded payment from the
latter but Wagas refused and
failed to pay the amount,
Ligaray filed a complaint for
estafa before the RTC. RTC
convicted Wagas of estafa
because the RTC believed
that the prosecution had
proved that it was Wagas who
issued the dishonored check,
despite the fact that Ligaray
had never met Wagas in
person. Hence, this direct
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Wagas
is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
Held: No. The Supreme
Court acquitted Wagas. The
check delivered to Ligaray
was made payable to cash.
Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of
check was payable to the
bearer and could be
negotiated by mere delivery
without the need of an
indorsement. This rendered
it highly probable that Wagas
had issued the check not to
Ligaray, but to somebody else
like Cañada, his brother-in-
law, who then negotiated it to
Ligaray.1wphi1 Relevantly,
Ligaray confirmed that he did
not himself see or meet
Wagas at the time of the
transaction and thereafter,
and expressly stated that the
person who signed for and
received the stocks of rice
was Cañada.
It bears stressing that the
accused, to be guilty of estafa
 as charged, must have used
the check in order to defraud
the complainant. What the
law punishes is the fraud or
deceit, not the mere issuance
of the worthless check.
Wagas could not be held
guilty of estafa simply
because he had issued the
check used to defraud
Ligaray. The proof of guilt
must still clearly show that it
had been Wagas as the
drawer who had defrauded
Ligaray by means of the
check.
b.) People V. Lauga 2010
c.) Tating V. Marcella 2007
d.) PNOC Shipping and
Transport V. CA 1998
5.) ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT
a.) Ramirez V.CA 1995
b.) Salcedo-Ortanez V. CA 1994
c.) Ganaan V. IAC 1986
6.) ARRESTS, SEARCHES,
AND SEIZURES
a.) Pollo V. CSC 2011
b.) People V. Amminudin 1988
c.) People V. Mengote 1992
d.) People V. Laguio 2007
e.) People V. Dela Cruz 2008
7.) HUMAN SECURITY ACT
a.) Republic V. Roque 2013
8.) JUDICIAL NOTICE
a.) G Holdings V. National
Mines and Allied Workers
Union Local 2009
b.) Spouses Latip V. Chua 2009
c.) Corinthian Gardens V.
Spouses Tanjangco 2008
d.) Social Justice Society V.
Atienza 2008
9.) JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
a.) Toshiba Information V.
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue 2010
b.) Cuenco V. Talisay Tourist
Sports Complex 2009
c.) Social Justice Society V.
Atienza 2008
d.) Alfelor V. Halasan 2006
10.) OBJECT EVIDENCE
11.) DNA EVIDENCE
a.) Lucas V. Lucas 2011
b.) People V. Umanito 2009
c.) Habeas Corpus Case
Reynaldo De Villa 2004
d.) People V. Vallejo 2002
e.) Tijing V. Court of Appeals
2001
f.) People V. Yatar 2004
12.) ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
a.) People V. Enojas 2014
b.) Nuez V. Cruz-Apao 2005
c.) Ang V. Court of Appeals
2010
d.) National Power Corporation
V. Codilla 2007
 e.) Vidallon-Magtolis V. Salud
2005
13.) PARAFFIN TEST
a.) Marturillas V. People 2006
14.) VIDEO AS EVIDENCE
15.) PHOTOGRAPH AS
EVIDENCE
a.) Jose V. Court of Appeals 200
16.) CHAIN OF CUSTODY
a.) People V. Abetong 2014
b.) People V. Morales 2011
17.) DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE
18.) PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
19.) INTERPRETATION OF
DOCUMENTS