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Home > Philippine Supreme Court Resolutions > Year 2002 > MMDA vs. JANCOM Env'l. Corp., et al.:
147465 : April 10, 2002 : Atty. Carreon : Third Division:
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[G.R. No. 147465.April 10, 2002]
MMDA vs. JANCOM ENV'L. CORP., et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated APR 10 2002.
G.R. No. 147465(Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioner, vs. Jancom Environmental
Corporation and Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia, respondents.)
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our decision dated January 30, 2002 affirming the judgment
of the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed that of the regional trial court, declaring that there is a
valid and perfected waste management contract between the Republic of the Philippines and JANCOM
Environmental Corporation, and dismissing the petition filed by petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority for lack of merit.Petitioner has likewise filed a motion that the case at bar be
heard and resolved by the Court en banc.
In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner reiterates its arguments that (1) resort to a petition for
certiorari was proper; (2) that the waste management contract never got through the negotiation stage;
(3) that the signature of the President is necessary for the perfection of the contract in question; and (4)
that the contract could be unilaterally cancelled by the Government since incineration is prohibited by the
Clean Air Act.
A cursory look at petitioner's arguments readily discloses that the same are a mere rehash of the issues
and arguments raised in the original petition.The first procedural issue raised, which parenthetically, was
resolved by us in our January 30, 2002 decision, is whether or not it was proper for petitioner to resort to
a petition for certiorari, instead of appealing the decision of the trial court.
In justifying its resort to certiorari, petitioner claims that a garbage crisis was imminent due to the trial
court's decision to prohibit and enjoin MMDA from conducting a bidding for the establishment and
operation of a new sanitary landfill.Petitioner contends that this prohibition - and the specter of garbage
lying open in the streets - impelled it to file a petition for certiorari rather than a regular appeal.As we
stated in our decision, "[t]he existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to
certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter remedy is precisely that 'there
should be no appeal' (Mercado vs. CA, 162 SCRA 75 [1988])." The special civil action for certiorari is
available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law (Sec. 1, Rule 65, id.).Well-settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari may not be
invoked as a substitute for the remedy of appeal (BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267
[1998]).
Petitioner claims, however, that while appeal was available, the same was an inadequate remedy under
the circumstances, stating that "the availability of appeal is not sufficient to preclude a petition for
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate, equally beneficial, speedy and efficient remedy.For it is the
inadequacy and not the mere absence of other legal remedies which determines the propriety of
certiorari."This argument was previously confuted by the Court of Appeals in the following disquisition,
which we quote with approval:
[T]he RTC decision is not immediately executory.Only judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support and such other judgments as are now
or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory shall be enforced after their
rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by
 President's approval (Petition, p. 16), Sec. 59 provides that such approval is required
only in infrastructure contracts involving amounts exceeding the ceilings set in Sec.
58.Significantly, the infrastructure contracts treated in Sec. 58 pertain only to those
which may be approved by the Secretaries of Public Works and Highways,
Transportation and communications, Local Government (with respect to Rural Road
Improvement Project) and the governing boards of certain government-owned or
controlled corporations.Consequently, the BOT contract in question, which was approved
by the DENR Secretary and the EXCOM Chairman and Co-Chairman, is not covered by
Exec. Order No. 292.

(Rollo, p. 51-52.)

Petitioner also claims that even if the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources had the authority
to enter into the contract, the approval of the National Economic and Development Authority must first
be secured for the contract to be valid, citing the second paragraph of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6957
(the Build-Operate-Transfer Law), as amended by Republic Act No. 7718.Said Section provides:

x x x
The list of all such national projects must be part of the development programs
of the agencies concerned.The list of projects costing up to Three hundred million pesos
(P300,000,000) shall be submitted to the ICC of the NEDA for its approval and to the
NEDA Board for projects costing more than Three hundred million pesos
(P300,000,000).The list of projects submitted to the ICC of the NEDA Board shall be
acted upon within thirty (30) working days.
x x x

Petitioner's argument is not in point.A perusal of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, readily shows that
the required approval of NEDA refers to the list of priority projects which must be included in the
development program of the agencies concerned.In other words, under Section 4, what NEDA must
approve is the proposal by an agency that a certain project be considered for financing, construction,
operation, or maintenance by the private sector, not the contract itself.This conclusion is bolstered by
Section 5 of the same law which provides that after NEDA approval, the head of the agency concerned
shall then publish a notice inviting prospective bidders to bid for the project so approved.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the incineration technology provided in the contract is prohibited by law,
citing the Clean Air Act in support thereof.This matter was hardly treated by the two courts below,
rendering it almost a non-issue.The Court of Appeals, in its 20-page decision, devoted two short
paragraphs comprising all of three sentences to this matter (Rollo, p. 54).The regional trial court, for its
part, said that the issues "which should be addressed are the following: (1) Is there a perfected contract
between the parties? and (2) Does certiorari and/or prohibition lie in the case at bar?" (Rollo, p. 157).We
need but repeat now that, as pointed out by the appellate court, Section 20, which provides:

SECTION 20.Ban on Incineration.- Incinertion, hereby defined aas the burning

of municipal, bio-chemical and hazardous wastes, which process emits poisonous and
toxic fumes, is hereby prohibited: xxx."

does not absolutely prohibit incineration as a mode of waste disposal; rather, only those burning
processes which emit poisonous and toxic fumes are banned.

The rule that a statute should be given effect as a whole requires that the statute be so construed as to
make no part or provision thereof a surplusage.Each and every part of the statute should be given its due
effect and meaning in relationto the rest.It is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal provision must
not beso construed as to be a useless surplusage and, accordingly, meaningless in the sense of adding
nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever therein(Uytengsu vs. Republic, 95 Phil 890 [1954]).To
consider Section 20 of the Clean Air Act as prohibiting all forms of incineration would render the phrase
"which process emits poisonous and toxic fumes" a useless surplusage, which could not have been the
intention of legislature, seeing that our learned legislators even took pains to define, in Section 5, Article
II of the Clean Air Act what poisonous andtoxic fumes are, viz:

Section 5. Definitions.- As used in this Act:

t) "Poisonous and toxic fumes" means any emissions and fumes which are
beyond internationally-accepted standards, including but not limited to World Health
Organization (WHO) guideline values;

It may not, thus, be argued that the Clean Air Act prohibits all forms of incineration as to make the
contract in question violative of the Clean Air Act.This is not to say, of course, that the contract involved
does not in fact run afoul with the Clean Air Act.That issue may still be raised by the proper party in a
proper action.

Prescinding from the issues at hand, several motions for leave to intervene, with the corresponding
petitions-in-intervention, were filed in this case.These motions for intervention were not granted by the
Court.Moreover, the issues raised by these would-be petitions-in-intervention - such as the claim that the
contract was not a publicly bidded contract but a negotiated one, that the signatories therein committed
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act, that the decision contravenes public policy to
promote the constitutional rights to health and healthful ecology - were not raised during the trial.The
rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process (PAL vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 459 [1996]).

We, therefore, hold that petitioner has failed to bring out any matter which could justify a reversal.It
bears emphasizing, however, that the Court, in deciding the instant case, is not making any
pronouncement as to whether or not the contract in question is advantageous or disadvantageous to the
government.The only question before the Court is whether or not there is a valid and perfected contract
between the parties.As to the necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the contract, these are outside the
realm of judicial adjudication.These considerations are primarily and exclusively a matter for the
President to decide.While the Court recognizes that the garbage problem is a matter of grave public
concern, it can only declare that the contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the
parties, but the same is still ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President, the contract itself providing that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.

ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED and this denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.(Carpio, J. - No part.)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court

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