The sale proscribed by a special power to mortgage under Article 1879 is a voluntary and independent

contract, and not an auction sale resulting from extrajudicial foreclosure, which is precipitated by the
default of a mortgagor. Absent that default, no foreclosure results. The stipulation granting an authority
to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage is an ancillary stipulation supported by the same cause or
consideration for the mortgage and forms an essential or inseparable part of that bilateral agreement. The
power to foreclose is not an ordinary agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the
principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own
protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. It matters not that the authority to
extrajudicially foreclose was granted by an attorney-in fact and not by the mortgagor personally. The
stipulation in that regard, although ancillary, forms an essential part of the mortgage contract and is
inseparable therefrom. No creditor will agree to enter into a mortgage contract without that stipulation
intended for its protection. (Bicol Savings & Loan Assoc. vs. CA, GRN 85302, March 31, 1989)

In order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property executed by an agent, it must upon its face
purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only.
It is not enough merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he, has not acted in
the name of the principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the agent describes
himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, it in fact the agent has acted in his own name and has
set his own hand and seal to the mortgage. There is no principle of law by which a person can become
liable on a real estate mortgage which she never executed in person or by attorney in fact. (Rural Bank of
Bombon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95703, August 3, 1992)

If her act had been understood by the Bank to be a grant of an authority to the Valencia to borrow in her
behalf, it should have required a special power of attorney executed by Castro in their favor. Since the
bank did not, we can rightly assume that it did not entertain the notion, that the Valencia spouses were in
any manner acting as an agent of Castro. (Rural Bank of Caloocan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-32116, April
21, 1981)

Although the power of attorney in question does not specifically mention the authority of petitioner's
counsel to appear and bind the petitioner at the pre-trial conference, the terms of said power of attorney
are comprehensive enough as to include the authority to appear for the petitioner at the pre-trial
conference. (Tropical Homes v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 40628, February 24, 1989)