‘The Truth of Protagoras CM. Gillespie Mind, New Series, Volume 19, Issue 76 (Oct., 1910), 470-492. Stable URL: fip:flinks jstor-org/sici sici-0026-4423%28 19 1010%292%9A 19%3AT6H3C4T0%3ATTOP%IE2.0,.CORBL-B ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at fp (fw. jstor orglaboutitersihtml. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless You. have obtained prior permission, you ray not download an entire issue of &joumal or multiple copies of aricies, and You may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR twansmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sercen or lnted page of such transmission. Mind is published by Oxford University Press. Please contact the publisher for fucther permissions regarding the use ofthis work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at htip:l/www.jstor.org/joumals/oup hurl. Mind ©1910 Oxford University Press ISTOR and the ISTOR logo are trademarks of ISTOR, and are Registered in the US. Patent and Trademase Office. For mote information on ISTOR contact jstor-info@umich edu, ©2002 STOR, hup:thrwwjstor orgy Fri Now 15 15:46:15 2002IL—THE TRUTH OF PROTAGORAS. By C. M. Gtrszsere. “PRE dictum of Protogoras, “Manis the measure of all things,” ‘was, according to Mfr, Schiller, the first statement of the fondamental principle of Pragmatism, or as ho prefers to ‘call it, Humanism. No one has ever doubted that Pro- tagoras was a humanist in the older sense of the word : he was a sophist, and insisted perhaps more emphatically than any of his colleagues that the true aim of education is mot the acquisition of learning but the taining of the citizen. Bat Mr, Schiller asks us to believe that the greatness of Protagoras Jey in his epistemology, far he held one of the positions which modem Pragmatism regards a8 peculiarly its own, According to the current interpretation of the homo mensura, Protagorss tought that the judgmentof the individual is final Thisy Mr, Schiller argues, ss wrong. Protagoras taught that every judgment claims to be true, but thatite validity depends ‘on ather conditions, according to'the common way of think- ing. Where he differed was in making utiity for human purposes, end not correspondence with an independent anche- ‘type, the test of validity. ‘Truth is essentially a value, Pro~ tagoras’ theory of reality'was not, as is commonly supposed, relativiat, but pragmatist, ‘The existence of so subtle a theory at a time when epis- temological investigation was in its infaney excites doubt as to the correctness of the interpretation. ‘Thisdoubt is inten- sified hy an examination of the only evidence we have of any importance, the writings of Plato. ‘The Theateius is of course our chief witness, but the Pretagoras and the Cratylus aifonl valuable corroborative evidence. Bat is Platos tenstworthy witness? His good faith is not challenged by Mr. Schiller, Mz. Schiller even goes farther ‘than many erities in allowing that the views enunciated by the Protageras of the Dialogues may be attributed to the historical Protagoras* Flere T believa Mr Schiller to bein 2 Studiss fe Hemanter, pp. 32M: Plate ov af passim Slats Felagorar? pee} Tao ot corp See Seliger acount ‘of the cecamatances which led Plato to epitomise the work, Prof, Huet‘TAR preven OF PROPAGORAS. an the right, Tagsee with him in regarding the defence of Pro- tagoras in Theaisivs, 166 ff, as containing the key to the in- terpretation of the Homo monsura : if is not purely imaginary nor a statement of the views of a Inter foliower of the sophist, but an exposition of the docirine of Protagoras s Plato understood tt.. That Plato had read the work seems proved by the statement of Thevtetus that it was familiar to hua (152A). ‘Tho same prineiple of interpretation moy fairly be extended to the profession of big faith as a public teacher put into the mouth of Protegoras in the dialogue of that name: the writer's attitude in that part of the dialogue is sympathetic rather than critical: and the carefully drawn portvaits of various sophists, would lose point if Protegoras were not made to speak in character. But Mz, Schiller questions Plato's insight. ‘The accoumb given hy Plato is a travesty of Protagoras’ real meaning, which Plato did noi, understand, but whieh may be econstrueted out of the data fornished By Plato himself. Such a cherge is obviously dificult to establich in the sbsence of independent evidence ; ‘the central count must he that Plato's version exhibits inner inconsistencies so great that it canao! be accepted as an adequate rendering of the original. fr. Schiller, together with most erities, treats the homo ensure as an epistemological principle of universal validity, and there can be little doubt that Protagoras meant it to be 50, especially if the words in which it was staied wero the ‘opening words of his “Truth”. But it is all-important to find out how he approached the question. Plato's awn theory of lmawledge was profoundly influenced hy his mathe- matical studies. Was Protagoras similarly led to formulate his principle through the examination of a certain kind of Jmowledge, and, if éo, what kind? ‘The only way we can determine this point is to consider the illustrations of the prin ciple given by Plato. We cannot be quite sure that Prata- goras had these applications a mind ia the fomulation of ‘hie dictum: but if the Defence ot Protegoras is substantially historical we are entitled to make use of them, and if we can show that they really throw light on the meaning of the dictum, there is a strong presumnption that facts of the kind brought forward in the illustrations weighed largely with Protagoras himself ‘Now the examples of tho principle, which Plato treats as (Mun, W.S., xvi, 422) danies that the Defence con on euhstance a ‘asoine aggament of Protagorsy’, msinly for reasons of date, Biss eriti- flsm aeons to me valid againat Mr, Schllo's sesount, but not to inali- Sato the position tazen im tls paper472 OK, @ItEmserE asserting that tarly is equivalent to Soect elva, fall into tee ‘well-marked classes. ‘The first, comprises the secondary qualities of matter as perceived by the senses, cold, eal, sweet, bitter (162 B, 168 E, 171 8); the second ré aakurved, (179A), especially jastice, moral and social principles and virtues’ In the absence of other testimony we must secept these as prominent applications given by Protagoras himsel? to his own principle i ‘This being granted, we nnust next inquire what appesr to be the relations of these applications to each other. In the ‘TDelenoe there 1s no. doubt whatsoever: the example of the ihysicin who subsitutes a good sensation fora bad in is patient's experience is an illustrative analogy leading up to The conception of the sopbist cr publfe teacher who induces the commanity to accept good opinions on Justice in place of bad. Atan earlier stage of the dialogue, indeed, the sensation- ‘application appears by itself. In 152 A the assertion of Thortetus that sensation is knowledge is said by Socrates to he equivalent ta the home mensura, and the example of the wind that feels hot and cold to diflevent people is adduced in illusération. But in. whet follows Plato is careful to show that he is not divectly criticising Protegoras, but doctrines which he regards as having an alfinity with the dicta. ‘The assertion of Themtetus is correlated with (1) the dictum of Protagaras, (2) Heraclitiem (152 €), by which Plato simply means the assumptions anil methods of physical science such as all philosophers except Parmenides (152 E) have adopted) a toned theory of sense~orcention (156,A) atib- uted fo certain xoutpérepoe, the discussion of which develops a. system of psychology without a soul. This quite clear that in (2) and (2) Plato bes in view others than Protagores, ‘Te pre- liminary dialectical criticisms on Proiagorasin 161 A fl contain no reference either to the Heraclifism or to the detailed theory of sense-parception ; the tone of the Defence, 168 ff, shows that the wuiter does not endorse these criticisms, and suggests that Plato is here condemning the polemical methods af other crities of the homo mensura. Tt appears, ‘then, that the application of the homo menstira in 152 ie really a peg on which to hang an account of contemparary theories starting from the same empirical point of view, and -that the real importance of the sensation-apnlication is to be ‘obtained from the Defence, where it is subsidiary. ‘This leaves the only serious application of tke principle in {he Defence en ethical and woialone, Have we any evidence to support or oppose the interprotation ted by tho Delano thet thw wat the applention wien Protagorts(UME nomi OF PROTAGORAS. 473 himself chiefly had in view? Gomperz denies this on two grounds (Grivohiscke Denker, iy 362): (1) the emphatic uni- versality of statament shows thai it was meant as an epistemological principle; (@) there is no evidence that Fhotagoras epplied it to ethicn, though his followers may hhave done so. The second paint falls altogether if the Defence is substantially the view of Profagoras himself. With regard to the first, the dictum may have been am epistemological principle of general import, and at the same ‘time have been originally motived by ethical interests. ‘Now there is conclusive evidence that the raain interest of Protagoras was ethical. In Pratagoras, 319 D, E, he is depicted teaching only the arts of the eitizen (oieavojeey and rok of}, and as looking with disfavour on the mathematics, as tronomy and mesic laught by other sophists, The dialogue as a whole bears out this statement: the sabject is an ethicat one, “Can virtue be taught?” ‘The positive contribution of Protagoras to the discussion is a striking discourse on the ‘origin of society and the influence of sooiety on the individual. Tho Defence of Protagoras in Theatetus, 166 ff., begins and ends with an attack on captious eritiista, in which we rast suppose that Plato is really expressing his own views. ‘The Goutal section, im which Profagoras is supposed 0 eupply the detailed meaning of his dictum (de ére cablarepov juille i Adym, 188 B), is quite short and consists of two parts only. ‘The fist dlustratos the prinaiple by the case of the physician who restares his pation to normal health, whereby the wine which before tasted bilter comes to taste sweet, The second apples i to polities: that is right which soeme sight to the community ; the orator is the physician who brings the community to a better state of health. Can there he any doubt that the former applicetion is an analogy to illustrate the latter? ‘The clearest proof thet it is an analogy is to be found in the fact that the function of the physician here described is ap accidental one: his esvential aim is to re- store the patient to health, not to change his perception of the wine. ‘The trivial case of the paysician and his patient is treated just so far as it scems parallel to the important case of the publicist and the state. Bettar health in the state is better opinions as to right and wrong, and so bettor hhealth in the patient is regarded as better feclings. ‘The Beraclitism and elaborate theories of sonse-perception of the earlier passages are not alluded to, ‘The Delence of Pro~ tagoras is substantially a vindication of his position ag @ moral teacher, and is in striking agreement with the profes sion of faith assigned to him in the Profagoras. We have 32,4h, GM, exnneserR : the same personal note; the teacher expounding the aims of bis teaching; the same defence of the sophist's art on the same ground? ; the vopbist males men better in the sense of being better able to transact. public and private business, the saune disciaiming of special knowledge. ‘Thus the inner evidence of the passage itself, supported by the resemblance fo the Proiagoras, leads us to seek for the real meaning of the dictam in the’ words which must be regarded a the climax of the Defence, but to which Mr. Sebiller seems to attach little importance (see Plato or Proiagoras ? pp. 15, 16), ofe.: old tiv éxderrp médee Bleaua wah kadés Sox, raiira tai elvar abrh, das dv aire voplty (167 C).! Now there is no doubt whatever ahout the meaning of these words, taken in themselves. dévaca are the legal principles, add the wider social’ and cthical prineiplas current in the community (see the Dialansés). ‘The uéjos of the community determines for it the standard of sight and wrong; and when it is stated that the adviser cannot do moro than substitute. s good system of right aad wrong for a bad one, the primary reason for this is that the dis: tinetion of right and wrong is regarded as dependent on the will of the community.? ‘The individual as such is not the ., Measure of right and Wrong: the community is. Right and wrong imply an authority other than that of the individual. A similar insistence on the réle of the community is tound in the Protagoras. ‘Tho myth describing the origin-of society represents Justice as a social fact (899 D), amd society is Inter ‘treated as the great moral teacher (325 C £1). ‘hus in morils the homo mensura means in the first. place ‘that the commanity is the authority, the judge of what is right and wrong. But when Protegoras insists that tar is the measure he means max avd not another authority co ‘accepled, What can this authority be? Something supra- hhaman. Tn the then state of thought this can only mean ‘the gods. ‘The dictum must be primarily a claim for free- 2 Shurely Plato intends the main enmphass to fall on this comtenos, the nly ome'im the detailed dafenes which pula with full ospictaess that ‘enedention of sppeotance and Taliy which fe trea a3 the emence tthe homomensura, a me trends underiaed. Mi. Schiller takes no ‘ore notice tran thin "the sage or opin perform a similar serine fx cithes" (Pats or Protagrvaat p. 16); cits often do aol know tele soe advantage” (hi. p24)” Ils interpretation of the Defeuss soema US fhsow the emphanis oh the wsong wots tbroghons. *T'have mated this it modem tars. A Grack would always soy che judgusant of toe coonmunty where vo sy ‘nll: you acon yor Tew SF what vesma good to you ‘The ambiguity of the verb gored aypencs " ‘and appeots goot-iaker: the transition from the’ petcepon of the fcsered patient to the will of the community very éasy-‘(THR ture OF PROTAGORAS 475 dom of thought in ethical matters, @ claim that hes been concoded in physical matters. You must not, he says in effect, regard the social reformer a impious because he ~ soci to probe and perhaps to remove long-established asages which azo regarded as having a divine sanction, Ali human taws and customs are made by man, nat for moan: actual morality is wu and not giver ‘To’ this extent, at least, wn ‘males his own reality ”. But this is not all. If we look at the subject empirically, historically, we shali see that they have been mado by man in the courte of his pursuit of happiness. This is the teach ing of the myth in the Proiagoras. If the account there given of the origin of society is divested of its mythieal trappings, it appears that a distinction is drawa between the orginal “and the aquired capacities of men. Man is born with the capacities of the other animals, and in addition with the knowledge of the arts, based on the use of fire But the ‘roneruci réxen i8 a later development (821 D), prompted by the wisery of the natural state of war. | The law is a means adapted by men who have formed ‘therselvas into com- tmunltics, » means to the end of happiness. ‘This i the famnitiar donvention-theory of society. Now, says Protagoras, «__*Toannot undesstand the persistence of the eritics im holding thst the eyth in Protagcraa, $20 Cf, contains the position that Justiceis dou and nok mately ving, Soe, a.g, Susemihl, Dis genititehe Ratwiedslung dee Platonischon Philosophie, by 48; Hora, Patonstudion, i, 41; Wandt, Genchichte dav grachsschen thik, 1, 468, TPheit reason’ seem to he 1) reverence and Jistioe ate given to mem by Zeus, wheresa the flier Iximan Tacultion ate allotted by Prometheus} (2) deus lnsrects Hermes to diate them among all men, not among sections Lixo the ‘apwcial arta, Hlonco ie in told that the mith represcnts reverence and fistioe as universal instincts (Susemihl, Lx). Now Prometiiows simply Ze Nowe, ia he sense in which Nalare ja contrasted with Conzenticn. ‘aa natural mon lack tho socal virtues. But ho tries to farm societies; ie sovisty ia nan mode, mot Nature made. Amd it is made in the spun of the effort to auc nhapptncs (3B). The att wy wan ‘lon trea to farm socioty la that he has special iutoligonea, syimhodiged in the myta by his partiapetion in the Diriue nature (922 A). "Zeus Imeve deus ex machina ; hin appearance in the story is duo to the raquire- rents of the myth-form, whieh represents all fcuition we gifte to man ‘Tastice and reverence cannot he introduced a4 given by Pramethaus, who sande for Nasutre Zaye simply reason, Dias made claar by tad ‘words of Zeus tinsel; Zeus does not pow as am al-powerful nenefactor to rman; he speaks as the raonallat inquirer who goes that those virtuos ae indispensable to the existenoe of the state.” ‘The myth emphasises, hat their divine origin, but taoir essentially social character, « ‘Then again cho disteibution to all mon (322 D) has been misinterpreted. ‘Your commentator aitier tries én read Platonie prinelpiceinla the speech ‘of Protagras (Sureihl, (4) 0, boentse i is pub info the mouth of an ‘pponent af the Platonic Noarate, ison the look t for incanastoncies, tus, waen Protagaras in 329 D states that soval vetue ia mot oriarmal46 0. Mt, GIEuBRPrE + you, must not regard the moral teacher who propounds he ideas a2 one who is trying to upaet the eablished order. Tightly regarded, he is only doing what you have been doing al slong, audenvouring (0 tho best of bie ability to eecure human happiness. And on the other hand the teacher must not lay claiin to superior wisdom: his attitude can only he this: "if you adapt my énggestions, and make them law, as you have évery right to do, you will find that they wili lead to your greater happiness. “But I do not set up as an in- fallible entthority ; you mnst judge ultimately what happiness is and whether my schemes will promote it, But you must judge rationally: nob under the influence of onstom and iradition, int in accordance with, the carefully thought-out results of your own experience.” Not. only actual moral codes are vduo; the ultimate prineiptes of morals are wae, founded on men's judgments of whet is for their advantage. Thus the dictum provides an epistemological besis for the contemporany theory that eocety is conventional, Tt ostab- lishes a human fonndation for moral and political obligation. Plato took it in this sense; in Thaatetus, 172 A, B, he points ‘out that many bald that Justice is by convention but, the Good by nature, whereas Protagoras teaches that hotb are by + convention (Gf. Republic, vi.. 505 A). ‘This view accords well with the general standpoint from which Protagores must have regarded his problems. The theory thal the state originated in a social compact and the closely allied account in the myth of the Proiagcras treat society as progressive, in but acquired by ths fadividul, he is aad by Hlorm (Lc) to be contradic jing the garlior eatemon! that sociat virtue ia given ty the gods to all ten, Baore iv ne. contradiction. We nad not resart to the device of saying hat Zeus gave the capacity for virtue to all man, but that taining is tlsg nsceasaey or ity development.” Ie ia never sisted that Hermes ave it to all men without exospifon j the actual words of Zone, © and. [oy down's law that he who cannot partake of peveromeo apd justice shall be sain aa plague to tho stato” (292 D), oontamrpiage the existance. of Individuals devoud of these virtage, “Frotazeras is not sigaing that the Social vireues are universal netincy ; he fe looking at the hole queen from the lde of the etate, nat from the aide of the idividonl, and main- lin that the shate exnnct stand unless the socal virus ate widespread ‘and tharefore capaie af asquistion by the normal man. ‘There is mo uuestian of inatineke ; the virtacs are devated UaneugRaut a8 ncoompich- ‘ments. ‘Thus the shale Zens episode is nmmply the siatauent ot the position tht justicoand abedicace are cooiat vietuee. Tn $23.0, Pools + potas proceeds ta show that in actual socztins Use comunity ieif ie the wor power that iastils these vires ines the individual snind ; Zede sual is tho ecllostira experience of te rice, prnetical reason ange” in Socuring the general happiness. Removs the mythical dreay aid the Secount is closely akin to J. 8, Mill's utilitarian description af the origi, oft oral Note tat she dacsine tat punnegnt so uaatialy Bre veative (824 A) is pure uilitarianiam. :‘THE raury OF PROTAGORAS. an direct opposition to the poctioni conception of a Golden Age. ‘They are substantially an application to human society of the principles long soceptod in the interpretation of the physical history of the worli—trom Anaximander to Amax- agoras—and reflected in the historical methodao! Thucydides Protagoras is strongly imbued with the spirit of the physical soience of the day. ‘The methods af empirical science are patent alike in the development of the homa.mensura and in the theory of the origin of society assigned to him in the Protageraa. That bis general starting-point was that of ‘eupittee! science is implied by the fact thet Plato bizekots his dichim with Heraclitiem in the Theatetus, ‘There are indications that he was much influenced by Atomism. The subjectiviet treatment of sensation hss a closer affinity with this than with any other] of the physical systetns, His sceptical attitude to religion accords with the position of Demosritus, snd is in marked opposition to the efforts of Diogenes of Apoilonia and others to reconcile ecience end religion. Tdo not think that we can regard the dictum ag primarily diveeted against Parmenies from the standpoint of empirical science, ‘The only direct evidence for thia interpretation is citation from Porphyry in Buscbius (Diels, FVS. 537) Porphyry states that he has come across a work by Pro- tagaras on Being, which contains detailed arguments against the Tleatic position. Was this work the same as the Truth $ Biven if we grant that this work on Being was geuine, we need not suppose that the main abject of Protagarss was the refutation of Hleaticism, Pleto and Aristotle do not bring the dictum into elose connexion with the Parmenidean principle, The Theateius treats it as a corollary from the assumptions of physical sefence, not as a justification of these assumptions, end Arisiotle follows suik in the Melaphysier (10096, 1 ff}. As we have seen, the chief application in the ‘Theatetes is to ethics, which we have no reason to believe specially interested the Hleatics. Moreover, the warding of the dictam does not suggest that it was directed against Parmenides; the dvGsarros is pointless, for Parmonides and Zena might reply that in their eyotem ‘human reason is the measure of reality. Protegoras would have to argue on the lines of the Gorgian paradoxes, that there is tio human faculty capable of apprehending the Rleatic Being. We havo no evidence of hie having argued on these lines, Again the plural réy doray suggests that Profagoras is assuming, not roving, the plurality of being, ie. the empirical standpoint foreover, the examples tendiag to prove that you cannot say478 ©. M, GILLEsPER: what the wind and the wine are in themselves have na force against Permenides, who deniés the reality af the wind and “the wine; they follow the same line of thought as that which led Democritus to his physical doctrine of the second. ary qualities of matter. T cannot, thetefore, admit that the dictum was primarily directed against the Bleaties, though Protagoras may have argued against them incidentally or in another eannexion. Further, there is evidence that: Protagoras was specially in- terested in'theological questions. ‘The list of works attributed to him by Diogenas Laertins (ix, 85, Diels, FVS, 526) contains ‘the names of z treatise wepi dear and another mepl rav dv Alou. ‘The famous passage expressing scepticism about the gods io quoted by Enseblin (Dies, PVG. 602) a6 trom the eginning of the former work, ‘There is reason to believe that this treatise was the second part of the work called of Karofdxravres, of which the first part wes 5 'AMjdea, Plato cites the’ hemo mensura as from the beginning of the Truth (Theat,, 161 0), Sextus Empiviens (adv. math, vii, 60, Diels, FVS, 536) as from the beginning of the Kara@aAnevres. Now Euripides’ Bascka, 199-208, contains a reference to the Protagorean scepticism about the gods, in which occurs the phicase obdeis aid xarafaded Mayas, Which suggests that the scepticism was expressed in the KaraBddxorres, . And why “the plural? Were there three paris af the Karapéadovres, the ‘rath (perhaps with the sub-title “On Being”), Concarn- ing the Gods, and Concerning Hades? ‘The title of the last-named work is not well attested: bat it would be quite in accordance with the doctrines of Protegoris to deny that there is any retribution or reward for mon in an afterlife, ‘Was the whole hook the jdiyas Nios of Aneed., Pat, (Diels, PS. 687)? Prof, Burnet (Minn, N.8., svili, 428) conjectures that Protagoras ‘had merely intended to attack the mathernatical and astrongmicsl science of his day and especially the in- finite divisibility of space. ‘The dictum would thas be primarily connected with the sensutionist critique of the geometers alluded to in Aristotle, Metaph., 997 b, 82. This ‘would explain the use of the word“ measare”. But in the absence of direct testimony that the dictum was ever so understood im antiquity, Prof. Burnet’s reasons seem ineuf- ficient, Ae far ag I can understand the meaning of his zemaris, he classes Protagoras and the Atomiste together as ie appears only in the list of Diogenes, mhich contains some titles apparently derived trom misundersiandings of passagesin Plato; and Diels, ey auggotis a confusion with s work atgributed to Democritus.‘tis navry OF PROTAGORAS. 479 ‘opponents of the new mathematical science of Western reece, instancing the Atomist view of the earth a dise- shaped, as showing that Atomiiam stands nearer to immediate cxperjoneo than the Pythagouan view, of the, earth ap so ical. Whnt has the latter to do with the doctrine of infinite divisibility ? Does not Atomism itself notoriously transcend the sensation point of view? 80 far as antiquity is concerned the dictum is interpreted as fatal alike to the stoma of Leacippus and the points of she Pythagoreans, ‘Again, T cannot, sea how the account of the researches of ‘Thesteins into the theory of square roots in the introductory part of the Theatetus would convoy to a reader of the dialogue the original application of Hie hemo mensura, viz,: its attack ‘on incommensurables, of which there is no direct suggestion in - the whole corse of the dialogue, This account is introduced prima facie as an example of logical method, and there is no ‘Gbvious reason for connecting it more closely with the dizenssion of one definition of Imowledge than with that of another. Ti seems to me thet several difficulties in conaoxion with fhe ome mensra are easly colved by this interpret, of it as being primarily ethical. First, the connexion of truth and “value”. Mr. Schiller * regards the subsumption of truth under the concept of utility as the central dootrine of Protagoras, and holds that Plato is mistaken in making its edsence to be eubjectivim, 1 sub- mit that thero ia no evidence in the Defence or elsewhere for Mr, Shiller's view ; that the only reasonable interpretation is that Protagoras taught that man elone determines what is ood and useful. Mr. Schiller has to admit that in Plato's account Protagoras does not say that the better is the truer : the sophist who inducos in his public a “better” opinion im place of a“ woree” does not substitate a“ truer” for a ‘less fe”: in tact Protagoras is made to assert degtecs of value and deny degrees of trath But Mr. Schiller treats this as zneroly a technical divergence from the pragtastist principle (Plato or Protagorat? p. 17). T hold, on the contrary, that Protagoras subsumes the right Gust) under the useful (good), ‘and that the association of truth with utility is secondary and accidental. He draws a distinction between the Just, law and custom, and the Good, human welfare, ‘This distinetion i& a commonplace of Greek ethical dinctission from the outset Barly ethical thought assumes that men must be just, obey the comman moral cade of their state, and inquires, what 1 the best kkind of lifé subjeet to this condition, ‘The ‘thinkers480 0. Me, GILLESPIE of the Tnlightenment fst raised the question whether this condition was binding, by analysing the grounds of moral tad political obligatian, "We know trom Plato that many found the claims of the state (justice) and those of the individual (happiness) to be irreconcilable. Hence the doctrine that mightis right and the glorification of tyranay. But these aro not the views of Protagoras. His political ideal is the free democratic state, His ideal of private life is that of the citizen of such a stats, He accepts the right of the commanity fo eoorce the individual in its own interests.” or the low is « neoessary means to the good of the whols. So far as the Just is concemed, man is the measure, for the community is the autbority. ‘The object of the teacher is to show that if the community will accept new—not trucr— conceptions of justice, it wll tend to their welfare, be better for them, But here again the komo mensura comes in, for it is implied (1) that the teacher forms some judgment of what is to the publie advantage, (2) that the mbfic forms & sienilar jndgmont. ‘Thus from first to last, what is right, ée. usefal, and what is good, is determined hy some human jodament: tif be objected that the association of truth with utility is aseerted in the Theatetus universally, and not merely in connexion with morals, reply : (1) it i not universally 5- serted, but only in connexion with the teacher (166 D} and * the physician (167 B); (2) the application to the physician ig not independent, hut an analogy to ‘illustrate the applica tion to the teacher: (3) the Proiagoras proves that Protagoras openly profes jo leach noting but the principles of pub- io and private conduct; the contents of the Defenee shaw that the immediate subject of discussion is the principles protoened by Protagoras 8s a teacher. Th, therefore, wo ean ind a simple explanation of the association of trith with uulity, by assuming that ethical truth is meant, an ex- planation in accordance alike with known tendencies of ethical thought in the fith century and with Plato's inter- pretation of the dictum as asserting the identity of seeming and being, we are justified in accepiing it. Another diffically is easily explained on thess lines, Did Protagoras mean man as such ox each individual man? Both. | In his geuerab-statement of the diotum he did not dis- tinguish, because the distinction was irvelevant to his pur- pore, Tt he was arguing for the right of men to solve their Social problems in their own way and ia view of their own happiness, ib was not to the paint to draw a distinction be- fween men in general and individual men, Hermogenes in \ Protagoras, 392 D,TRE racra OF PROTAGORAS. 481 ‘the Cratylus (344 C, D) in stating the case for the theory that: names ate cvidijep allows both private and public names: if names are arbitrary, not fixed jor man by Nature, every man has a right to give any nate he pleases to any thing; from this paint of view it is not a matter of principle, though, convenient for puirpases of communication, that individuals should use the same names for the seme things, In the same way naturalistic utilitarianism regards society and the ob- sservence of public rales by individuals as means to the happiness of individuals. nother feature ofthe Protagorean dostine is. most easily accounted for on the prineiple that the dietam ie primarily connected with the woap theory of society. ‘The Platonic treatment implies that'on Protagoreen. vrineiples not only is the jndgment true for the maker, but < dass not claim tobe true except for the maker. ‘The standpoint isempirical and natur istic. Man (as in the myth of the Protagaras) is a part of ‘Nature end differs from the other animals mainly in reapect ‘of his capacity for social life. What ie good and usefal for fone creatine if not necessarily good and useful for anather (Protagoras, 394 A,B), Social judgments about right and wrong are the ways hy which man adepts himself to the attsiament of his own good. If we consider the variety of customs amd af morél judgments, we shall sec that in passing Judgments of right and wrong, useful and burttnl, good and bad, men do not really mean to assert their ob Jostive validity beyond the limits of their own society and their own conditions of life, Right and wrong, good and bad are siways roi. Tf T assert this is vighé, L must qualify ‘with “for an Athenian, for a Spartan”. And the judgment is always by an Athenian ox a Spartan. Homanity is com- posed ofa namber of groups, each of which passes. judge ments claiming validity only for iiself, and having a0 higher ‘authority. Hence thelr beliefs are true s0 long a8 they eon ‘tinue to bold them. Within the group there may be in- dividual variations of opinion, but society is banded together to suppress these. Peachers and reformers there are, but ‘thoir function is confined to changing pablie beliefs, Again, this intorpretation gives point to the retort, “How ‘gan Jou on your own rnciplos lay cain, to wisdom?” For Protagosas was 2 professed taseher of the principles of practical conduct. If im bis treatise on the ‘TTrath he laid special emphasis on the point that all raoral judgeasnts are equally, te, the quostion. sk once arose, what were his claims to be & teacher? Hé bad an easy answer. In a free omraunity of educated mén he laid no claim to superior492 cM. anuussere : wisdora: he only asked them to listen ta ane who hed fhought on these matters more than most, and to consider for themselves what be bad to say. He claimed the atter~ tiow due to the gpdayues, nob the obedience exacted by the aogés or expert! His collesgue the physician is not the jodge whether the wine taates wall of ill to his pationt; for this he must rely on the statement of the patient, himself bout he is able to make it taste well, So the sophist claims that if his hosters wil oply listen to him, he can make them ‘come round to his way of thinking. Yes, replies Plato in the Hepublic, but that is just hecanse the sophist really tates, his principles from his public, T should maintain that the Humanism of Protagoras has a naturalistic rather than # pragmatist tings, Moral trath {resolved into beliefs, treated objectively ss means of adapiation to circumstances, like the protective fur and wool of ather animals. ‘The superiority of the teacher is ulti- mately bis power to change belief; as man is assumed to be always animated by a desire for his own advantage, thia power shows itself in his abjlity to convince his andience: that i wll be to, thee edvantags to adopt new measures new iders of vight and wrong. Progross implies a struggle between ideas. I may be asked: if the examples from sense-pereeption were in essence illustrations supporting a theory of the moral judgment, why did Protagoras choose them ? Several ‘easoris may be given. Whether or no the dietinetiow bo- tween the primary and secondary quolitics of matter bed hheen explicitly drawn hy the timo Protagoms wrote, the scientific investigations into the conditions of sense-percep- tion must have called attention to the vaciability of certain kinds of aense experience. As the examinstion of lmewledge go knowledge began wit the investigation of rereetion asa the perceninal judgenent, one of the first discrepancies to be noticed would be thet betwoon the judgment of sensation “it fools cold, tastes sweet’ and the judgment of perception it (he wind) is cold, jt (Whe wine) is sweet”. The lattor clsims an objective validity which the former does not. ‘To ‘2 writer anxious to get simple illustrations for the principle that the Just and the Fair are valid only for the community which adopts them and not for other communities, the parallel of the judgments of sensation and perception is apt. Reva matter of fact, Plato's real gound for rejecting, Pr0- ‘compare the argument that overy man's jadamont bas yalue in polities (Protdgora, 328 A, B).‘THR mor oF PROTAGORAS. 488. tagoreanism in the Theatetus is that he regards it as reducing all judgments to the level of these judgments of sonsation. ‘There is another reason for the choice: cold, warm, bitter, sweet are intrinsically good or bad, Cold atvd bitter ate ner se unpleasant, so that the change from bitter to eweet sensations is a chenge from bad to good experience, of which the individual is thesole judge, ‘This is the point: the dividual, Ja sole jndge bath of the sweetness and of the pleasantness ‘We mist assums that the individual, whether man or com- nninity, desires the good, ce. whet seams to him good : and there 1s'no good for ran éxcept the seeming good. If, there fate, the sophist convinces the public that its customs are toad, we must suppose that it will try to change them. ‘The real history of the oma mersura | take fo be this. Tt was enunciated by Protagoras nat as an epistemological principle in the abstract but as embodying the fundamental ascumptions of the new school of ethical thought. ‘The woris “man” and “all things” bad a special polemical reference. ‘That human reasan is the ultimate jadge of truth is a principle acted on by the scientific ingnirers who have bean working out s echeme of materiel reality, aud the claim. hhas not heen seriously disputed in respect of Nature. But popular though has hitherto refused to recognise the claim in regard to homan institutions. Vaguely and unreflectively it has looked on laws and customs as of divine ot semi- divine origin, and resisted attempts ab soientific analysis and rational reform on this ground. Wrongly. For it maust be recognised that in evary gpbere man is the ultimate judge, he dictum declares the right of re jnquiry int all problems of conduct. ‘Taken in iteelf the dictum means man in general, But in the working out of his principle Protagoras, under the in- fluence of the empirical, historical methods derived from the gueuol, gave to it an interpretation which implied that exch man (and state) is his own judge. ‘This interpretation is part and parcel of the sdyp theory of saciety. ‘The laws and ‘customs of a society determine for that society what is just. and fair. But the law contains the experienced judgment, of a society working out its own salvation on its own lines, The goad af one society is not necessarily the good of another. The /ree cousmunity is in the last resort nesponsible for its jdeas..of what is hest for it Hlence the community ig the ultimate judge both of the end—its own good—and of the means—moral rules. ‘Now this doctrine implied a restriction of the validity of the moral judgment. The moral judgment does not claim.484 GM, GILLESPIE: to be valid beyond the sphere of the social group which forms it; popular thought is merely mistalzen in supposing that it docs. Th the next generation, when epistemological questions came io he discussed more on their own merits, snd not merely as subsidiary to other problems, the work af Proiagoras was found to contain the prineiple that every judgment is relative, — Protagoras himself had had the moral judgment chiefy in mind, but had also illustrated his rineiple from the region of sense-perception, So the principle bat to bo sto somo be became aacoinicd wilh Wie name Pisto’s abjection to the principle really is this, that Protagoras did not, understand the nature of 4 judgment. When he treats homa mensura as equivalent to the identification of Amnowletige with sensation, and couples it with Hereclitiem, he is in effect saying that if'you approach the sabject of kaw ledge from what is vietually the standpoint of physiological psychology and regard the arousing of a passing sensation by a physical stimulus as the typical fact of knowledge, you ‘cannot but misunderstand the Whole question. "This 1s what rotagoras bas done: instead of examining the judgment from the inside, he has merely transierted to at the characters ‘of sensation: hence his failure to see that the judgment ‘claims @ universal validity. And so Plato dismisses Prota. gorae and the Heracliteans, ie. the physical inqnirars, and + passes on to the consideration of the judgment (Theat., 184 B fi). ‘That Protagoras had not specially examined the judz- mnt and. probably mistook ite natmee seems in accordance with whst is known of the history of psyehology and logic (the early inquirers seem to have confined their psychological investigations to the physical conditions of sensation ; (2) the examination of the judgment, itself followed the growth of dialectic, chiedy in the Socratic schools, and the Aumerons deroplas to which it gave risa show that the analysis of the Judgment presented great dificulties: indeed, it would seem that only fhe Academy succeeded in formulating any satis- factory account of it Let us now turn to the question whetiner the Theatetus contains any refutation of Protagoras, and whether there ate any important discrepancies between the Defence and the rejoinder of Socrates. f do not attach the same importance as Mr. Sohiller docx 40 the rejoinder itself, because,.as I have said, Plato's chief objections are to be found in the form of the dialogue as a whole, But a word of protest mustbe entered against Mr. Sobiller’s methods. An essential part of his case is this: thesrejoinder shows that Plato hasHs reer oF PROTAGORAS. 485, misundersiood his opponent; he has trested the dictum as meaning the relativity of trath to the individual, whereas it really meant that utility validstes the claim of the jadg- ment tobe true. Wastjstheevidence ? Mr. Schiller’s inter- pretation is based entirely upon the short statement in the Defence, stateinent made by Plata himself, ‘There is nob fa word of independent avidence for.it. The rejoinder of Socrates is directed entirely against the relativism of the dictum. But Mr. Schilier does not use the rejoinder to confirm his interpretation ; he simply argues that the ro- joinder js all wrong and irrelevant, because it docs not agree with his interpretation, amd then uses this supposed irrelevance to confirm his interpretation. But Mr. Scbiller is not entitled to use a supposed discrepancy as independent confirmatory evidence, heoause there is no teal discrepancy unless his interpretation of the Defence is correct. He mush rrest his cass entirely on the Defence! ‘Now (1) he has no right to uge the Defence as evidence entirely independent of tho rejoinder, becanse even thongh we assume thet it substantially reproduces the views of Protagoras, these are obviously stated in Plato's own words, Hence sich oriticisms as those on page 98 of his Plato or Pro- iagcras # thet Socrates illegitimately substitutes byavd and + suppéporra for yonzrd are mezely captious. Mr. Schiller dzivan by the exigoucies of polemic to treat the Defoaco as if itcontained the igsissima cerba af Protagorss, ‘The rejoinder must be uted to confirm the reading of the Defence, and small vaviatfons of language cannot be Dressed. ‘Q) Mr, Schiller’s zeading of the Defence emphasises the element of utility and mates the relativiem quite secondary ; hence the acensation of irrelevaney in the rejoinder. Bub another, and, I believe, a more correct treading makes the relativiom primary. If Ploto in hie defence of Protagoras treated the element of utility as being secondary and ignored it in his reply, we have no right, in the absence of inde pendent evidence, to xegard it as primary. @) Mr. Schiller admits (seid. p. 17) that there is a differ- ence between the views of Protagoras expounded in the Defence and modem Pragmatism, but treats it as merely @ technical difference. - Pragmatism teaches that every heliel is fas euch true to the heliover: this “formal claim” to trath is distinguished from the validity of the belief; vabdity is what 2 Mi, Soller realy nde a dua pecsonnity in Plats the writer ofthe ‘Defences ntelgen? enough ta aarsaad Protaras: the Wir ofthe Tejtinder of Socrates Sa waablo todo eae his sumadka 5 the fot of pose 2 of his Plat or Brotayora?486 GM, GUAESPIR : ordinary people call truth ; for'the pragmatist » valid belief 35 mpl a belief that ought (0 bp old, aad tho only justi ation for holding it is tbat it, has value, in other words is ‘useful. Hence “value is a bridge connecting “ truth,” é. belief, and “validity,” ia bth im the commonvuse of the word. Now Proiagaras draws 2 distinction between. a eliet and its value : so do we all: this is no discovery of the prag- matist. Doos the Protagoras of the Defence sstate that ite value gives to it another sort of rath, or validity? Not at all: he seems ta distinguish truth and utility as conceptions with no point of mutual contact. He recognises no such distinction as that between tie claim and the validity of’ a belief. ‘The pationt believes and ought to believe that he has feelings of bitter and unpleasant, they are guaranteed by his immediate experience, The other experience of sweet- nese is hatter but nok in any sense trae: Lam the sole judge ‘of both. 89 in the example of the state aud its moral belies ‘What is believed right and what ought to he believed right are identical. ‘The de facto law is the law, lai and validity are ideniified. If it is desirable to change our beliefs, itis because we form snothior belief—of whieh again we are the sole judges—concerning utility. If Mr. Schifler can rogard thie as merely a techmical deviation from Pragmatism, it is hecanse Pragmatism is content to claim Relativism as a brother. Mz. Schiller’s own account of the formation of the temple of truth (0., p. 17) is the purest relativism 1 form 4 belief (claims): sce ita value: therefore Thold that it ought to be believed (validity): I persuade others of its su advantages: thoy adopt it and bold that it ought to fo bo- lieved (objective vatidity): henes “the validity of a claim to truth is neither logieally nor etymologically other than its strength”. Put in the relation to the individual (ru) which the ancients always susposed Protagoras to insist upon as qualifying hoth “claim” and “ validity,” and the Relativism is absolute, (4) Thore is much resemblance between, Relativism and Pragmatism for the very good reason that the latter is a de- velopment of the former, necessary, perhaps, to save Re- lativiam from mere scepticism, An attack on’ the relstivist basis of Pragmatism would be relevant, as against Pragma- tiem. And if the “pragmatism ” of ‘Pratagaras was only tn incident in his doctaine of relativity, then Plato's 10- joinder would be very mach to the point. Suppose. that Protagoras argued for the relativity of truth, ée, what is be- lieved is true, and denied sny outside authority. Suppose that in answer to the question, “Do you draw any distine-THR meuTH OW PROTAGoRAs 487 ‘tion between whats bolieved and what ought to he belioved 2” he said, “Yes. You ought to believe what is useful te os, and you are the sole judge of what é wanful." Tn that case lato would be quite justified in neglecting the utility al- together —the pragmstism—as being quite gubsidiary to the lativism, ‘The rejoinder shows that this is how Plato 1m fod the doctrine, and I have tried above to show how such a doctrine might arise, not “as a freak of irresponsible subjectivism" but as an expression of a well-suthenticated tondeney of thought in the fifth centixy. Mr. Schiller gives no explanation how the doctrine as he understands it arose, and can give no explanation of the confusion of which he ‘acauses Plato except an intelleetualist bias. ‘Therejoindor consists of two parts The first (170 A-171.C) is the ‘wallkeown seperpore which soaks to prove shar ‘Protagoras raust on his own principles deny the iuth of his dictum, Mr, Schiller is indignant. with Plato for criticising Protagoras without malting use of the Defence (Le. p. 19). But the second prt of the rejoinder does deal with the points raised in the Detence (171 D, E). ‘The frst part isa dialectical argument againet the abstract principle that the individual ia the only authority for his trath (170 A). I cannot see that ‘Mr. Schiller is justified in saying that the argument involves a confusion between the claim of a judgment to be tras and Sha actual. vabulity (Sindy to Hemanton yp. 128146); Plato Js anguing against a doctrine whicli he understands as identi- fying claim and validity. ‘The rerarks on page 20 of Plato ‘or Protagoras? axe so wide of the mark that they hardl require refutation. ‘The argament is a dialeetical one in whiel the dybofor of the wodAoc is set against the Bove of & oodés. Tn 170 A Socrates does not “msist on treating the difference eiwons tho authoray-and tae foo cs merely ome tn tna deige, despite the protest in 167 A". He is simply stating the popular bobo» which regarda tbe difference of tue wise man 4nd the fool as meaning What the opinions of the one are true ‘and those of the othar false, His object is merely to establish the point that commonsense is opposed to the dictom, Throughout the argument be is careful 4o keep the Prota: foveal postion ae Le understands it: be males no appeal to any objective standards of truth: he merely assumes Protagoras holding tug cpmioa and. the vost of ieiad elders “the geient rms on he spiation of another popular #v6agor,. which seers to be implied in ali Gisenssion, oiz., that one man has a right to challenge the trath of another's statement (172 D), According to popular488 otk GILLESPIE + usage, the many have a right to call the Protagorean principle false, as conflicting with the first é00foy. Now Pratagoras ‘may do one of two things. He may either deny or allow the claim of one man to eall another's judgment felse: if he denies it, he identifies “claim” and “ validity,” if he allows it, he draws a distinction between thet, Tn any ease, he cannot consistently allow any other test of truth than ‘the judgment of some man or men. Butif he denies the claim, then he mnet adrnit that for the majority their own proposition intrue that man is not the measure of all things ; if he grants it, then he admits thet Ais proposition thet man is the measure of all things is false for the majority. But if no one believes it except himself, then, on the acsumption that belief dete mines truth, it follows that the contradictory is trae for (virtually) everybody. The argument is clearly divected against # dctrino which seemed to treat the claim of a judgment to trath and its actual trath or validity as equiva- Jent. Mr. Schillet's Protagoras can escape by saying that his dictam js trae even thougin he alone believes it, bocsuse & jndgment is not validated merely by heing believed: but Pains Pootagors cannot escape thus because belie and Yalidity are the same, according to Plato's account of the dictum, “Hence the relevance of the proof depends on ovr interpretation of the dictum. I think that Protagoras him- self could have replied, not that his doctrine is misrepresented in the way Mr. Schillor makes out, but that he never held. the dootrine of relativity in. the exizeme form which it here assumes. T suspect, indeed, that this extreme form of the principle, like the propositions of Jansenius condemned by the authorities, did not appear in the sctual writings of the ‘author to whom it was cureentiy attributed. Te is not to he found in the statement of the dictum itself. Generalised from some more qualified staterent it probably hecame a catch- word of discusgion. And Plato's own language seetns to show that he was quite aware of this: the words of Soerates in 4169 B show Plato's good faith: he has made Protagoras in his defence protest against captions dialectical criticism of fan sbatract principle: in 109 E he is morely saying that this ia dalton argument nected against the abstnetprin- ciple ond requiring to be supplemented by en argument Gaaling "with the matter of Protagoras' doctrine; thin is done in the second part of the rejainder. In 171 C the proof is said fo he provisional, and it is stated that. if Protagoras came to life he might declare ito be folly in 179 B this proof isgiven 2 secondary position. "Pie second argument, then, is the one on which Plato relies (171 G-172B, resumed 177 0-179 C), Tt examines theINE tRore OF FROTAGORAS. 49, materiat account of the dictum given in the Defence, and especially the relation between the true and the good here expounded, Mr. Schiller’s acousation that Plato has ignored ‘the mattor of the Defence in his reply has not the least found ation in fact (Plato or Proiagoras? p.19). Like the frst proof it is dioleotical.! Tt staris from the popalar évBofov that there is 2 difference between the wise and the ignorant, an as- sumption which is universal and accepted by Protagoras him- self. But this immediately passes into the évdagon of certain opel other than Protagoras, But whose general afade is that of Protagoras himeolf. ‘The method 13 that, of setting the ‘bSofov of one cogis against the Béczs of snother. ‘The aodot to whom appeal is made ate those who expiain the world on the principles of empirical scienice (Heractitism in the sence of 152 B, described as 7aix rhv ecouéony odatay Néyovtas, 177 0), and apply these principles to ths explaretion of haman society. heir HBok are set against that of Protagoras, with the object of showing that the home mexsura cannot be asserted {nike unqualified manner in which it was advanced by Bro- tagores, becuse those inquiters who work out a theory of human society on this line do nat really accept it uneondition- ally. 4 fortior, it cannot be xccepted by these who deny his promiseds = Tf we examine the views of these aadoi wo find thet they accept part of the Protagorean doctrine, ub reject another part, ‘They agree that the patient ia the sole judge for the nature of his feolings, the state the sole authority for tite law. Here they ate followed by many whose philosophic stand- porn is quite different (172'B). But they do not really accept the Protagorean position that the saperiority of the copée Les only in his power to change the opinions of the individual cor the staia ‘They admit on intrinsic difference betweon gréator and less Imawledge. Alter stating this point Socrates goes off into the digres- sian on the comparative values of the philosophic and the practical life, and on resuming (177 B) proceeds to exrry out tho implications of the &8ofos. Protagoras hed reduced the superiority of the wise to superiority in power. Socrates shows that this power rests on superiority in knowledge: ‘and this difference in knowledge implies a difference between appearance and reality. ‘The wita toscher is never regarded merely op one who can make hishowregadogt new opinions, ‘mt as one who can show taem their real advantage, “Flere LON fair dubia, dan yotebos iio atrois, bool rate dower, wah ri becstna ie sae Liye IAD. thee ads toes Uo ingle "aa he vows id in he aon ac ae ot ntemporry sn490 6. at, GILERSPIE is implied a realism inconsistent with the unqualified rela- tiviam of the dictum, An enlightened commonsense, which hhas reflected on the investigations of science, will allow that man is the uttimate judge of veality (1) in the case of sensa- tion, whore the individual is the sole jadge of his own im- modiaés experionce; (2) in eaee of moral laws, where the community is the measire, because it is the author, of the laws, Bub it will deny that man is the measure of the good, whether of the body or of the community, because eommon- Sense is realist, and recognises the existence of independent conditions, over which man has not complete contral. In the words ofthe Craiylas, men believe that “ things have some permanent nature of their own; that they do aot exist merely in relation to us, twisted ‘hither and thither by us and our ideas, but independently maintaining the pro- r relation to their own nature”, . Oz, as the Repualic pats it (505 D), “Do we not see that many are willing to do or to have o to seem to be what is jast and honourable with- ‘ont the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance ‘of good-—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the goad, appearance is despised by every one”. Hence Plato's answer to Protagoras may be expressed as follows : frst you deny any distinction between appearance and reality; then you resolve the difference between the wise man and the ignoramus into one of better and worse; but experience, as ‘expressed in commonsense, shows that the distinetion between the better and the worse itaplies difference between appear- ance and reality; therefore in assuming that you can teach, ‘you are assuming the fundamental principle that you deny " On this’ argument we may remark (1) shat it confirms the reading of the dictum as being primarily ethical in its scope whet Plato is epecially attacking ie the identification of the good and the apparent good. (2} There is no indication that Plato felt any didieulty in replying to Protagoras; the reply is clear and confident: “if you are going to substitute nutibty for trath as the goal of human effort, your success ‘must depend on the degree of mastery you have over reality ; once aliow that reality is not entircly in your power, and uiility is dependent on the degree of your knowledge". (8) Te is quite clear that for Plato subjectiviam was the essence ‘of the Protagorean doctrine, and was to be met by some forma of realism, Eis argument is directed throughout against a ‘view which seems to him to make man the eomplate magister nature, As agains’ the doctrine that man bas no dserpres ‘natura except himself, the argument has, of course, no force. 180 far T agios with Mr. Schiller and Prof. Burnet that: Plato has nob anawered ProtagorseTHE rRUTH OF PROTAGORAS. 491 Whatever may be said of the cageney of the reasoning, it is intelligible, relevant, snd shows no diserspancies with the account of the hore’ mensura in the Defence. Mr. Schiller's criticisms are vitiated by his inability to recognise the dialectical character of the argurmetst, “Thus he objects % Socrates making a distinction of which nothing was said in the Defence: '“a division of tervitory whereby the sphere of perseption would be left to the dictum, while that of good fand evil, and of health and disease would he assigned to the control of authority" (p. 22}. Socrates estahlishes this point ‘against Protagoras dialectically ; Pisto understands Protagoras to deny any difference of authority for the seneation and the good. I cannot understand the remarks on page 23. Sorrates ‘says nothing about “allowing states to judge ss they please about the just and the moral. What he does fey ie that eduonted opinion goos with Protagoras in regand- ing the just (the many *justs”) and the mora! as being deter- mined by the vias of the state, Actual morality is widely treated as vdyp by people who insist that the good is does, ‘We must bear ini mind, in this connexion, the prominence of the conception of causation in all the ethical though! of the Greeks. All action is regarded as means to the realist- tion of some end or ends which have value in themselves. Condaeé so far as rational involves two distinct jadgments, (1) that & certain possible end has value, (2) that this act will ccaute the realisation of the end. Hence it is essamed that in acting you do what appears to you bkely to promote your advantage Bab error 1s possible; what seems to you ad- vantagcous may not he advantageous. TE yon aet pon yout judgment of what seems fikely to be profitable, your judg- mont is infallible only on the impossible condition that you are the cause not only of your own set but of al its ciream. stances as well, And this is just what Plato seems to be contending for. He shows that if you allow the common view that there is an independent feality conditioning ha. man activity, man cannot be regarded as the sole arbiter of hie destiny. ‘So far as the Protagoroan_ principle that man is the measure meant that in dealing with the problems of Iie we mnt ultimaialy rely on our judgments concerai things, this is obviously no anawer. Bat if itis interpeete in an anti-seientific sense ; if it is brought into opposition to the feeling which inspires the scientific investigator, the foal- ing that reality contains a vast unexplored region, then one of the chict motives to research will he removed, and the winejple becomes thoroughly pernicious. Men ean only Frome masters of Natuce by "eeogaising shat che. mastery implies a process requiring every effort of which they are492. M. GIELEGYIE: THE zaUr OP PROZAGORAS. capable. TY, again, it is interpreted in an anti-moral sense it comes to mesn that man may do what he yloases, that his welfare depends .on the satisfaction of the desiras he himself forms and not aiso on the haman nature which he inherits, itamay easily lead to Calliclean developments. It is against such applications of the dictum that Plato is arguing here. ‘To sum up, The leading idea of Protagoras was relativity, subjectivty, as if was alloys suppoged to be mn, antiquity. Tie homo mensura was first entnciated with a specific ethical prspose,, fn te gonoral statment Ht msant man in, general nut in the warking aut, owing to Protagoras’ ompirical, developmental treatment of the social question, it came also to moan the individual, community in one eontext, man in another. In this working out Protegoras taught that the moral judgment is valid only for the community interested, and claims no further validity, illustrating his pomt from thé phenomena of sensation. From this wes extracted «catch Phrase Uke the Universal Flux, “appesrance is realy.” ‘which was treated as the essence of the Protagorean doctrine, This abstract principle wes made game of by some smong the dislecticians, whom Plato eites in Theatatus, 161 0 fy and rebukes in the Defence in the person of Protagoras, adding whet he regards as the real meaning of the dictum, He himself supplies thoe anawern (1) In the firet part of the rejoinder he gives a dialectical refutation of the abstract principle that every judgment is trae (validity) hecanse it is true (claim) to the maker. (2) In the second part he attacks the morai application; granting (provisionally) the arbitrary nature of actual mors? codes he denies that. the Good is axbitrary on the ground that welfare depends on objective conditions. (3) But bis main objection is to be found in his treatment of, the hora mensura as a doctrine ‘which makes knowledge and sensation equivalent terms: the syohology of Protegoras is ab ‘ult: he bas failed to see the nndsinental difference batwoen the claims of the sensation and the judgment to objective validity: if he bad seen the difference he coitld not have drawn 20 close a parallel bebween sensation and the moral judgment. Toonclude that there is no justification whatever for the view that Protagoras tanght that truth is @ “value " or any similar Pragmatist doctrine, and that we must nat read any epistemological meaning into the idea of ability os it appears in Plato's accmmnt of the dictum, its presence being die 0 the prédominance of the ethical and social interests in the theary of Protagoras,