Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.

N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.: ñé+ .£ª wph!1

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch
38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).

Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named
Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts
(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqw â£

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my
daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them
in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978
in Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53,
Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the
codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for
Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine
and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.

In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives
(administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in
the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa
Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F,
pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She
also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing
of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C.
Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and,
at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to
the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000
on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co.,
Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate
case).

Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and
others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not
signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to
Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2%
(pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot
considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).

Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the
sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p.
78, testate case).

Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2,
1979. It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no
objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in
conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate
case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar,
Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.

Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in
collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was
then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be
set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35,
Rollo).

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts
spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because
Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27,
1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of
the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-
42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äw phï1.ñët

Makasiar (Chairman), Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Escolin, J., concur in the result.

Concepcion, Jr. and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.

Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 —
against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros
Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila Court,
respectively — praying:

... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H')
and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of respondent Manila court
denying petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of the same
estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.

For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until
further orders of this Court.

Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:

6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing
to declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don
Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Manila
court erred in failing to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of
prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.

The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.

On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION
FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that
judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and February 26,
1964, the first disapproving his record on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further
commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We
issued a resolution deferring action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari (G.R. L-
21938) is taken up on the merits.

On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that the
respondent courts had committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
for certiorari.

It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son
of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case
No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the
Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days
later it set the date for the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in accordance
with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the Philippine, National Bank never
actually qualified as special administrator.

On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the above-
mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last
Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has been requested and which shall be submitted
to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to commence
the intestate proceeding.

On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No.
51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal
basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of
the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the
Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on
July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of
appealing from said orders to this court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed by
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal, and under date
of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the following order:

Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for being incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on
appeal was approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R.
No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of law which is
tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.

WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the petitioner is
hereby disapproved.

In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned heretofore.

On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila
Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings
had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente
Uriarte filed in the same court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for
his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he filed the
action, as well as when he commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been acknowledged as
natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.

The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed
to qualify.

On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the
Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for
probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order issued by the
Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of
Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.

Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed
by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with
the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the
Negros Court and petitioner Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the proceedings
for its probate.

The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court similarly
erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding
No. 6344 in the Negros Court.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is
beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should
be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he
had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before
Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had
first taken cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said decedent (Special
Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No.
51396 intended to settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that consequently,
the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a
clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for
the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding No.
6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.

The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support the view that he should have submitted
said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in accord with public
policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if
several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila
Court. In the second place, when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to
the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio
Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as
Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding
No. 6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right
to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition
for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with
the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only
to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier,
or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of
the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have
the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where
the objection against said proceedings is raised too late.

In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros Court said
that he was "not inclined to sustain the contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action justifies the institution
by him of this proceedings. If the petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his
contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings entitled Special
Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for
indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful character pending the final decision of
the action for compulsory acknowledgment."

We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is
finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should
be declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil.
249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G.
1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that in view of the conclusions heretofore stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said
supplemental petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give due course to the
appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the
first being the order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second being an order denying
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been
said heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be other than that the intended appeal
would serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer
question the validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for
and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

Castro, J., is on leave.

Fernando and Teehankee, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO,
PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-
appellants
vs.
FELINO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.

Ramon C. Zamora, Lorenzo E. Coloso, Jose L. Castigador, Arthur Defensor & Sixto Demaisip and Flores,
Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.

Nacianceno G. Rico & Felipe G. Espinosa for oppositors-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, in Special
Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of
Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4, 1963 in the Court of First
Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1736. In the course of said intestate
proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial
Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves
in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge
3
Emigdio V. Nietes, ed he diamond partition on March approve extrajudicial on March 21, 1964.

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was
delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto,
Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares
in said with which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said
will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1)
for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of
Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special
6
Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto.

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

The Court of First Instance of iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November 16, 1968
denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. A
motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order of denial. On motion of
Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed late. A motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as
additional ground that the appeal is improper was issued.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. L-30479.
This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:

L-010479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT
RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue of
whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent Judge was
made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in
the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in
question. 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and citation, fl Art issued a resolution dated July 15, 1969 which
reads:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-30479,
Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969, the Court
resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter of whether or
not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order of November 16,
1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of the alleged will in
question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein such matter will be more
appropriately determined. 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED AND
REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.

II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT OR
ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).

III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED OUT OF
EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY ARRESTED IN THE DISTRIBUTEES OF
THEIR ASSIGNS.

IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO ARE NOW
ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY TENDER THIS PROCEEDING, THEY HAVING
CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES. 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the with on the basis of the
finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged win sought to be Probated had been destroyed and
revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors' contention that the petition for probate is now barred
by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE .kl).NIITTEI)I,Y GENUINE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF PETITION FOR PROBATE
— SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER
(ADRIANA MALOTO).

II
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF THE
AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO) IS NOW BARRED
BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS NOW RES ADJUDICATA

III

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID PETITION FOR
PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN
NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-CITED DUE COURSE.12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in
Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the was denied because the same was filed out of time.
Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been
revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16,
1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And this court stated in its
resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present
petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana
Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Gurerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 18.

2 Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 20-25.

3 Petition, p. 3, Rollo, p. 12.

4 Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 26-38.

5 Annex "C", Rollo pp. 39- 43.

6 Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 44-49.

7 Annex "L", Rollo, p. 103.

8 Rollo, p. 215.

9 Rollo, pp. 104-119.

10 Rollo, p. 120.

11 Annex "Q", Rollo, pp. 194-203.

12 Brief for the Petitioners- Aplellants, pp. 1-2, Rollo, p. 233.

13 Rollo, p. 88.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated
21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived
by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both
surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first
marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things,
that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs
and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general
circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13
March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the
appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court,
giving as reasons the following:

It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try
this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with.
Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow
and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-
7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu
court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding
in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the
Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April
1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's
petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
The pertinent portion of said order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss
reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of
Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule
73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to understand
that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he
died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in Quezon
City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate
proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the
desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper
because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will
and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the
decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his
first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one
will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or
which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before
this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and once this court acquires
jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27
April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent
was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared
and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-
oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
 (b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;

(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and
did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature
thereto.6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly
complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and
Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the
documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed
of donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by
him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last
will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the
law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in
his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from
proceeding with case No. Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and
against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI
having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached.
It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the
decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding
2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in
which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special
Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the
Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for
this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It
is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's
jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is filed,
but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a
trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to
refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said
respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled. The
writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July
1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the
appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the
Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to
be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court
respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to
dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.

The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the
following considerations: —

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different
courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts." The cited Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy
Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of
the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to
follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been
submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not
resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor
who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first
time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in
the province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province.
 That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore,
section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the
probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure
is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought.
Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition
is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented
in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate
petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the
will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at
the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it
and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined
to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court
indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same
rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of
the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared,
as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the
present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this
wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with
his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings
for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan
Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking
for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed
but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October
31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put
a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor,
if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raised
too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on
the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in
comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case.
The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly
invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail
in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court.
Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one,
requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the
ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased
was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper
court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al.,
G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would
depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the
Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the
Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for
itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as
the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding
based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual
residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and
inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76,
section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional
facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent,
his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the
State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon
City was not the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the
decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's
action should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing
the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing
the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if
the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As
stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole
proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another
province "is too obvious to require comment."

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a
petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section
1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from
doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue
is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be
converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the
decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last
will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were
certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration
of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and
despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu
court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen
days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings
be converted into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as
per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and
petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last
will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law
on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's
marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision,
notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to
the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the
decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of
the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the
probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance
with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down
only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of
prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that
the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken
in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly
had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the
Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City
court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of
the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the
venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of
First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and
their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which reason
they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the
venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of
First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and
their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which reason
they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

Footnotes

1 1964 was a leap year.

2 Cited in Annex "C", page 42, Record.

3 Cited in Annex "C", page 46, Record.

4 Cited in Annex "C", page 47, Record.

5 Id., Id., Id., emphasis supplied.

6 Order of 11 May 1964, Annex B, p. 36, Record.

7 Republic Act No. 2961, sec. 44 (e).

8 Emphasis supplied.

9 74 Phil. 239, 241 (1943), notes in parenthesis and emphasis supplied. See 3 Moran's Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. 370-372.

10 Source of Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75), section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

11 Superseded by the Judiciary Act, R.A. 296 as amended.

12 33 SCRA 252 (May 29, 1970).

13 The minor factual difference of that case is that there, the Negros court granted the testamentary
heirs' motion to dismiss the intestate petition first filed before it by the therein petitioner who claimed
to be an acknowledged natural child, and that said petitioner's attempt to intervene in
the probate proceedings subsequently filed in Manila by the testamentary heirs, was declared too
late. Here, the Cebu court acceded in part to petitioner-widow's motion to dismiss by declining to
take cognizance of the first intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court which it asked to
act first on the second petition for probate, and while opposition was filed against probate, oppositors
failed to appear at the hearing despite due notice.

14 33 SCRA at p. 259, emphasis supplied.

15 Idem, at p. 260, notes supplied.

16 Idem, at pp. 260-261, emphasis copied..

17 97 Phil. 330 (1955).

18 90 Phil. 585 (1951); see also 3 Moran's 1970 Ed., p. 400.

19 3 Moran's Comments 1970 Ed., p. 395.

20 Rule 78, section 6.

21 "SEC. 2. Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. — When the marriage is dissolved
by a death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either. (Rule 73, emphasis supplied).

22 See People vs. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (Nov. 26, 1970) and Article X, sec. 5, par. 4 providing
that the Supreme Court shall have the power to "order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for
lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-
F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be
the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-
2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live
Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that
the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their
relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did
not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso
satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the
counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on
the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that
the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by
the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
1âwphi 1

must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating
to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need
to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light,
it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be
threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1484 dated July 9, 2013.

1 Rollo, pp. 3-25.

2 Id. at 28-30. Penned by Judge Hermes B. Montero.

3 Id. at 31.

4Id. at 32. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246 are as follows: Francisca Y. Trilla, Elena Yntig, Cerelo
Ypon, Esterlita Y. Sereño, Alvaro Ypon, Rogelio Ypon, Simplico Ypon, Jr., Monaliza B. Judilla, Lilia B.
Quinada, Teodora A. Baron, Teofilo Ypon, Mauricio Ypon, Vicente Ypon, Pabling Ypon and Diega Ypon,
Erudita Baron, Cristobal Ypon, Elizabeth Ypon, Francisco Ypon, Lolita Y. Gamao, Egnacia Y. Cavada,
Serafin Ypon, Victor Ypon, Prudencio Ypon, Jr., Allan Ypon, Raul Ypon, Rey Rufo Ypon, Galicursi Ypon,
Minda Y. Libre, Moises Ypon, Jr., Bethoven Ypon, Divina A. Sanchez, Cicero Ypon, Minerva Ypon, Lucinita
Ypon, Crisolina Y. Tingal, Jessica Ypon, Nonoy Ypon, Wilson Ypon, Arthur Ypon, Yolanda Ypon, Lilia Y.
Cordero, Ester Y. Hinlo, Lydia Ypon, Percival Ypon, Esmeralda Y. Baron, Emelita Y. Chiong, Victor Ypon,
Primitivo Ypon, Jr., Pura Ypon, Ma. Nila Ypon, Roy Ipon, Eric Ypon, Henry Ypon, Felipa, Ypon, Felipa Ypon,
Vivian Ypon, Hilarion Peñalosa, Angeles D. Libre, Clarita P. Lopez, Vicente Y. Peñalosa, Jr., Columbus Y.
Peñalosa, Jose Y. Peñalosa, Alberto Y. Peñalosa, Teodoro Y. Peñalosa, Louella P. Madraga, Pomelo Y.
Peñalosa, and Agnes P. Villora. (In boldface are the names of the plaintiffs who are also petitioners in this
case.)

5 Id. at 32-39.

6 Id. at 33.

7 Id. at 34.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 53-54.

10 Id. at 54.

11 Id. at 28-30.
 Id. at 69. Docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 608-T. Entitled "In Re: Petition for Issuance of Letter of Administration,
12

Minda Ypon Libre, Cristobal E. Ypon, and Agnes P. Veloria, petitioners v. City Registrar of Deeds and City
Assessor of the City of Toledo, respondents."

13 Id. at 30.

14 Id. at 31.

Based on the records, it appears that only petitioner Hinidino Y. Peñalosa was not a complainant in Civil
15

Case No. T-2246.

16 See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

17 Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (CA), 336 Phil. 824, 833 (1997).

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court Davao City, Branch 8, G.R. No. 147058,
18

March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.

19 The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA, 274 Phil. 947, 955 (1991).

20 Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court partly provides:

SEC. 1. When order for distribution of reside made. —

xxxx

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

21 G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 70.

22 Id. at 78-80.

23Id. at 80-81. "[When] there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties
as their inheritance x x x [i]t would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir x x x specially [when the parties to the civil case
had] voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship in these proceedings [and] the RTC [had] assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently
rendered judgment thereon."

24"Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if
a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can
no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order
to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased." (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 07, 2010, 624
SCRA 360, 443, citing Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184-
189).

25 Peltan Development, Inc. v. CA, supra note 17, at 834.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150206 March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely: LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN, PEREGRINO GABATAN,
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and FREIRA
GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated April 28,
2000, and Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 52273. The
challenged Decision affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19,
dated October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an action for Recovery of Property and Ownership and
Possession, thereat commenced by respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against petitioners, heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan, Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.

Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the same
from her deceased mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero (Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that her mother,
Hermogena, is the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration. It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the
land but to no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property. According to respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado took possession of the disputed land despite respondent’s
demands for them to vacate the same.

In their answer, petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners maintained that
Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited
the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. Petitioners clarified that Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no interest in the subject land; the former is merely the husband of Teofilo’s
daughter while the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added that a similar case was previously filed by respondent
against Teofilo’s wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No. 5840 but the case
was dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally, petitioners contended that the complaint lacks or states
no cause of action or, if there was any, the same has long prescribed and/or has been barred by laches.

On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually named, to wit: Lolita
Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita
Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.

On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended answer, additionally alleging that the disputed land was already
covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan
(Teofilo’s daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, declaring the
plaintiff the owner of Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering the
defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-3316 in favor
of plaintiff Lourdes Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance; ordering the defendants to pay ₱10,000.00 by way of
moral damages; ₱10,000.00 as Attorney’s fees; and ₱2,000.00 for litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.4

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 52273.

On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC. Dispositively, the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the questioned decision of the lower court dated October 20, 1995 is hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Discounting petitioners’ argument that respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the CA declared that respondent’s
claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight and are not disturbed except for
cogent reasons, such as when the findings of fact are not supported by evidence.

The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo,
Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:

x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age, married, Filipino citizen and presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao
del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.

To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was signed by Teofilo and
the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the
daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying Section 38, Rule 1306 of the Rules of Court on the declaration against interest,
the CA ruled that petitioners could not deny that even their very own father, Teofilo formally recognized
Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately passed on to respondent.

As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that petitioners’ possession of the disputed property could not ripen into
acquisitive prescription because their predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never held the property in the concept of an
owner. lawphil.net

Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court via the present recourse principally contending that the CA committed
the following reversible errors:

FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that Juan Gabatan died single and without issue;

SECOND ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee (respondent) as the sole and
surviving heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN";

THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred in declaring that a certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the
child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

FOURTH ERROR: The lower court erred in failing to appreciate by preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners) claim that they and the heirs of Justa and Macaria both surnamed
Gabatan are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to inherit the land subject
matter hereof;
 FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in not declaring that the cause of action of plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) if any, has been barred by laches and/or prescription.7

Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must pass upon certain preliminary matters.

In general, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Questions of fact cannot be the subject of this particular mode of appeal, for this Court is not a trier of
facts.8 It is not our function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence presented before the
concerned tribunal upon which its impugned decision or resolution is based.9 1avv phi 1

However, there are established exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of fact by the lower courts,
such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.10

Moreover, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review
rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors
but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain
or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which
is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to
avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial
court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned,
is dependent. 11

In the light of the foregoing established doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the case.

The respondent’s main cause of action in the court a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property. It
is undisputed that the subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his
lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties, both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.13

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals15 where the Court held:

xxx where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife,
Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that ‘such declarations (that
Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be,
ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating
to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,17 this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.

However, we are not unmindful of our decision in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the Court relaxed its rule and
allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the party therein as heirs, to
wit:

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before
the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the
civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v.
Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties
during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties
as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding
for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the fact that
the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.

We GRANT the petition.

After a meticulous review of the records of this case, we find insufficient and questionable the basis of the RTC in
conferring upon respondent the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.

Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to possession and ownership of the property, pinned her claim entirely on
her alleged status as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to present preponderant evidence in
support of her complaint.

Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth certificates19 of respondent were presented at the RTC. Respondent, during her direct
testimony, presented and identified a purported certified true copy of her typewritten birth certificate which indicated
that her mother’s maiden name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners, on the other hand, presented a
certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate which differed from the copy presented by
respondent. Among the differences was respondent’s mother’s full maiden name which was indicated as
"Hermogena Calarito" in the handwritten birth certificate.

In resolving this particular issue, the trial court ruled in this wise:

The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each other by presenting two conflicting Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of
plaintiff herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants.
Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and requires serious scrutiny. The
Court is of the observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a certified true copy is in due form and bears the
"as is and where is" rule. It has the impression of the original certificate. The forms (sic) is an old one used in the
1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the
entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten which is very unusual and of dubious source. The form used is of latest
vintage. The entry on the space for mother’s maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There seems to be an apparent
attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother filiation with the omission of the surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined to believe that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far more genuine and authentic
certificate of live birth.20

Having carefully examined the questioned birth certificates, we simply cannot agree with the above-quoted findings
of the trial court. To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted, was an original typewritten document, not a mere
photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s vintage21 but this Court is unable to concur in the trial court’s finding
that Exhibit 122 was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which was one of the trial court’s bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary, the printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states
"Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial
court’s finding regarding which form was of more recent vintage was manifestly contradicted by the evidence on
record. No actual signature appears on Exhibit A except that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly certified on July 6, 1977
that Exhibit A was a true copy of respondent’s birth certificate. The names of the attendant at birth (Petra Sambaan)
and the local civil registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten
beside their names. The words "A certified true copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of Maximo P. Noriga on
Exhibit A appear to be inscribed by the same typewriter as the very entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit A
and the information stated therein were prepared and entered only in 1977. Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was
never presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A. Said document and the signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein
were identified by respondent herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be deemed sufficient authentication of
her birth certificate.

We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the
one of dubious credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the handwritten birth certificate of respondent
(petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly authenticated by two competent witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms.
Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E.
Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila. Both witnesses testified
that: (a) as part of their official duties they have custody of birth records in their respective offices,23 and (b) the
certified true copy of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate is a faithful reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices.24 Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the original of the handwritten
birth certificate before the trial court and respondent’s counsel confirmed that the certified true copy (which was
eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal likewise categorically testified
that no other copy of respondent’s birth certificate exists in their records except the handwritten birth
certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that the original of respondent’s handwritten birth certificate found in the
records of the NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied) was the one officially transmitted to their office
by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho testified and brought their
respective offices’ copies of respondent’s birth certificate in compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial court and
there is no showing that they were motivated by ill will or bias in giving their testimonies. Thus, between
respondent’s Exhibit A and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the latter documents deserve to be given greater probative
weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the birth certificate presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a
reliable document, the same on its face is insufficient to prove respondent’s filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan
Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had been credible and authentic, would have proven was that respondent’s mother
was a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan" is the
daughter of Juan Gabatan. Even the CA held that the conflicting certificates of live birth of respondent submitted by
the parties only proved the filiation of respondent to Hermogena.28

It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s cause of action that she convincingly proves the filiation of her mother to
Juan Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that
the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic
document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her mother
enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of these two classes of
evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the Rules of Court of her mother’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best evidence of
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did respondent
present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing Hermogena’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who testified that they personally knew Hermogena (respondent’s mother) and/or Juan Gabatan, that they
knew Juan Gabatan was married to Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the child of Juan and Laureana.
However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of
birth of Hermogena to Juan and Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly
married Laureana or when Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and
Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by, or
heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Other circumstances prevent us from giving full faith to respondent’s witnesses’ testimonies. The records would
show that they cannot be said to be credible and impartial witnesses. Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of
Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His testimony
regarding the relationships within the Gabatan family is hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana and Cecilia
Nagac Villareal who are children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of according probative weight to their
testimonies since respondent admitted during her cross-examination that her (respondent’s) husband is the son of
Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other words, although these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of petitioners, they
are also the mother and the aunt of respondent’s husband. They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested in the
outcome of the case.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a photocopy of a
Deed of Absolute Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the siblings and
the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this document involving the sale of a lot different from Lot 3095 C-5,
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors. The RTC
deemed the statement therein as an affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, petitioners’ predecessor in
interest, that Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same statement as a
declaration against interest on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein, as
competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a mere photocopy
and not being properly authenticated.35 After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
this Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.36 Although the best evidence rule admits of exceptions and there
are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed, such as when the original is lost or
the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence must still be established. Thus,
in Department of Education Culture and Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain
the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the
court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified the
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the whereabouts of the
original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.

There is an ostensible attempt to pass off Exhibit H as an admissible public document. For this, respondent relied on
the stamped notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is a certified true xerox copy and said notation was signed
by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., Assessment Officer, who seems to be an officer in the local assessor’s office.
Regarding the authentication of public documents, the Rules of Court38 provide that the record of public documents,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying officer must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.40

To begin with, no proof whatsoever was presented by respondent that an original of Exhibit H was registered or
exists in the records of the local assessor’s office. Furthermore, the stamped certification of Honesto P. Velez is
insufficient authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s certification did not state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the
original. Even worse, Velez was not presented as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true copy from the original.
Indeed, it is highly doubtful that Velez could have made such an attestation since the assessor’s office is not the
official repository of original notarized deeds of sale and could not have been the legal custodian contemplated in
the rules.

It is the notary public who is mandated by law to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his notarial register
and to forward the same to the proper court. It is the notary public or the proper court that has custody of his notarial
register that could have produced the original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the Deed of Absolute Sale
was identified by Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a disinterested
witness and as can be gleaned from her testimony, she had no personal knowledge of the preparation of the alleged
certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale. She did not even know who secured a copy of Exhibit H from the
assessor’s office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H renders it
inadmissible for the purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or admitted the status
of Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.

Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper authentication of Exhibit H and consider the same admissible, it still
nonetheless would have only provided proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan Gabatan.
Exhibit H does not show the filiation of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan Gabatan. As discussed
above, the only document that respondent produced to demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena Gabatan"
(respondent’s Exhibit A) was successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence presented by petitioners.

As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to likewise rule against respondent. According to respondent’s own
testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to
recover the decedent’s property from third parties or to quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet,
respondent and/or her mother Hermogena, if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their
rights as such. It is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first complaint to recover the subject property, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo Gabatan.43 However, that case was dismissed
without prejudice for failure to prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until 1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the
present case.45 She claimed that she waited until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her case out of respect because
Rita was then already old.46

We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy reason. It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her contemporaries (who
might have personal knowledge of the matters litigated in this case) were advancing in age and might soon expire
that respondent should have exerted every effort to preserve valuable evidence and speedily litigate her claim. As
we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids
the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity."47

All in all, this Court finds that respondent dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing, credible and independently
verifiable proof, her assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property under
litigation. Aggravating the weakness of her evidence were the circumstances that (a) she did not come to court with
clean hands for she presented a tampered/altered, if not outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live birth and (b)
she unreasonably delayed the prosecution of her own cause of action. If the Court cannot now affirm her claim,
respondent has her own self to blame.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273, affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO**
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO***
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION****
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno is on official leave

** Additional member in lieu of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno as per Special Order No. 584.

*** Acting Chairperson as per Special Order No. 583.

**** Additional member as per Special Order No. 570.

1Penned by Associate Justice Mario M. Umali (ret.) with Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 16-34.

2 Rollo, p. 35.

3 Id. at. 37-47.

4 Supra, note 3.

5 Rollo, pp. 309-311.

6 Rule 130.

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. – The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against
himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.

7 Rollo, p. 8.

8Air Philippines Corporation v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 151963,
September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 51, 76 .

9 Junson v. Martinez, G.R. No. 141324, July 8, 2003, 405 SCRA 390, 393.

Toriano v. Trieste, G.R. No. 146937, January 23, 2007, 512 SCRA 264, 267-268; Madrigal v. Court of
10

Appeals, G.R. No. 142944, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 247, 256.

11 Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112519, November 14, 1996, 332 Phil. 206, 217.

12It is only on appeal that petitioners posit the contention that Juan Gabatan and his siblings were co-owners
in equal shares of Lot 3095 C-5 since they allegedly inherited the same from their parents. However, it is
well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the
lower court need not be considered by the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal (Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation, G.R. No.
146726, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 9, 23). In this instance, petitioners conceded in their answer and other
pleadings with the court a quo that the subject property was owned by Juan Gabatan and their claim of
ownership was based on their status as heirs of Juan Gabatan.

13 Heirs of Yaptinchay v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 124320 March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 18, 23.

14 G.R. No. L-7644, November 27, 1956, 100 Phil. 364, 378.

15 182 SCRA 119, 128 (1990).

16 G.R. No. 154645, 434 SCRA 260, 274 (2004).

17 342 Phil. 302, 313 (1997).

18 G.R. No. 155555, 467 SCRA 184, 199 (2005).

19 Record, pp. 251 and 415.

20 Rollo, p. 44.
21The printed notation on the upper left hand corner of Exhibit A states "Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised
on Dec. 1, 195X)." The last digit of the year is not clear and appears to be either 1953 or 1958. In any event,
considering that respondent’s birth date is December 17, 1950, the Court believes that it is impossible that
respondent’s true birth certificate would use a form that appears to have only come into existence after her
birth.

22Exhibit 1 is a certified true copy of respondent’s birth certificate which was identified by witness Rosita
Vidal of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office, Cagayan de Oro. It is identical in material respects to Exhibit 8
which was identified by witness Maribeth Cacho of the National Statistics Office, Manila.

23TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated February 16, 1993 at p. 5 and TSN of Ms. Cacho’s Deposition dated
June 16, 1993 at p. 6.

24TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated February 16, 1993 at p. 6 and TSN of Ms. Cacho’s Deposition dated
June 16, 1993 at p. 8.

25
TSN of Ms. Vidal’s Testimony dated February 16, 1993 at p. 5.

26 Id. at. 6-7.

27 TSN of Ms. Cacho’s Deposition dated June 16, 1993 at p. 9.

28 CA Decision, p. 14; rollo, p. 29.

29 TSN of Frisco Lawan’s testimony dated December 13, 1990 at p. 8.

30 Justa Gabatan Nagac was the sister of Juan Gabatan.

31 TSN of respondent’s testimony dated March 31, 1992 at p. 43.

32 Supra, at note 5.

33 RTC Decision at pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 44-45.

34 CA Decision at pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 29-31.

35TSN of the Deposition of Felicisima Nagac Pacana dated July 8, 1992 at pp. 7, 8, 15, 21, 27-28 and 38-
39.

36 Rule 130, Section 3, Rules of Court.

37 G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 299, 313.

38Rule 132, Sections 24 and Section 25 of the 1989 Rules of Evidence and the present Rules of Court are
similarly worded.

39 Rule 132, Section 24.

40 Rule 132, Section 25.

41 Supra note 35, at p. 28.

42 Supra note 31, at p. 7.

43 Id. at 36
44 Id. at 40; see also rollo, p. 51.

The complaint was filed on March 15, 1989 and the amended complaint was filed on June 20, 1989;
45

Records, at pp. 1 and 38.

46 Supra note 31, at p. 40.

47 G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005; 451 SCRA 749.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a
person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
dispute over the estate of their loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-
Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock
investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate
be divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
"paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in
the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26,
1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit
an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.12

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an Order
be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the
declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature
and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory
are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate
court ratiocinated as follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer
of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the
instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by
petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between
the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer
for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondent’s claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution,
the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the
probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions
of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of
private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:

"I

RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE
ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT
ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO
CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND
RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend
to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for
this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of
this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994,
and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion.
Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right
to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."

Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties
which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit
his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his
possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties
which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he
acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or
should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The
intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:

"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed
that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of
oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she
allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and
direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to
"determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that
the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material
and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in
court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of
the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of
resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her
real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been
to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long
line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the
course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot
do so."22

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is
not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging
to Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of
the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate,
as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either
in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties
until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on
the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in
the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:

"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her
bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:

"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:"
In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to
give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that
being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you
recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is
that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with
respect to the estate of your late husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen…

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?

A: Wala po."24

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and
deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies,
Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be
partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for
the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San
Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang
dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to
her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of
her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to
change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter
most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over
them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever
rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1
Rollo at 9-14.

2
Id. at 16-17.

Entitled "Emilio B. Paciolis, Jr. versus The Honorable Judge Felix De Guzman, as Presiding Judge of RTC
3

Quezon City, Branch 99 and Miguela Ching."

4
Records at 1-9. The case was filed and docketed as SP No. Q-92-131555.
5
See Opposition, Records at 27-29.

6
See Motion for the Appointment of Oppositor as Special Administratrix, Records at 30-32.

7
See Motion to Strike-Out Opposition, Records at 91-99.

8
See Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated December 21, 1992, Records at 101-
106.

9
Records at 137-140.

10
The order, insofar as Emmanuel Ching is concerned as co-administrator, is the subject of an appeal before
the 10th Division of the Court of Appeals docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 46763.

11
Records at 337-346. Amended Inventory at 347-353.

12
May 17, 1995, Records at 360.

13
Records at 366-371.

14
See Manifestation/Opposition to Omnibus Motion dated July 20, 1995, Records at 383-387.

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947, September 29, 1997, 279 SCRA 647; Ramos vs. Court of
15

Appeals, G.R. No. 42108, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 635.

In Jimenez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, the Court
ruled: "It is hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership
is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot pass upon with finality. This pronouncement no
doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding x x x."

16
Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587, November 22, 2000, 345 SCRA 541; Jimenez vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, ibid.

17
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 885.

18
Records at 383-387.

19
Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

20
Records at 437-440.

21
Baybayan vs. Aquino, No. L-42678, April 9, 1987, 149 SCRA 186.

Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Morales vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite, G.R. No. L-47125,
22

December 29, 1986; 146 SCRA 373; Cuizon vs. Ramolete, L-51291, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 495.

23
L-45494, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 213.

24
TSN, February 26, 1993.

25
TSN, May 20, 1993.

26
Respondent’s Opposition dated October 28, 1992 reads:
"b) the bulk of the estate of the deceased consists of paraphernal property of the deceased most of which
were donations coming from the herein Oppositor, and therefore, the herein Oppositor has a better right to
its administration." (Records at 27-29)

27
Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Strike-Out Opposition dated January 5, 1993, reads:

"3. That, the Petitioner cannot deny the fact that majority of the estate left by the decedent came from the
Oppositor by way of donation, and this was brought about by the fact that when the father of the decedent
died, the latter did not receive any kind of inheritance, as Chinese custom and tradition dictate that female
children inherit nothing from their deceased parents and the only heirs entitled to inherit are the surviving
spouse and the male children, which happens to be the herein Oppositor and the only brother of the
decedent in the person of Emmanuel Ching. But the herein Oppositor, in the exercise of her liberality and
sound direction, and with the end in view of giving the decedent a share of the estate of her deceased
husband, gave half of her inherited property to the decedent, with an undertaking that the latter
herein Oppositor and they will undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the
capacity of business partners." (Records at101-106)

Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. No. 132803, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 384; Bongalon vs.
28

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10, 2004, 441 SCRA 553.

29
Baybayan vs. Aquino, supra.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO,
MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

Antecedents

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V.
Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage,
namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of
Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).1 The RTC granted the
petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on
September 7, 1992.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had
"left no real properties but only personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth ₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion
through the order of January 8, 1993.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that
she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the
supporting documents Teresita had submitted.

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory.

With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should
be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8

Ruling of the RTC

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly
ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the
administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including
therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the
revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this order.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.9

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of
March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already
come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.

On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should
be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue.

Decision of the CA

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in
ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined
by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH
WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE
IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION
(MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

III

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12

On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:13

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders
dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of
land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of
Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned and affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC
directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect
that the ownership of the thing sold "shall be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery,"
and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to
the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No.
3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that
Emigdio had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to
Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that
in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included"; that as to
the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such
parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment
dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory "considering that there is nothing
wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to
take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation;
that a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the
RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which
properties should be included in the inventory.

The CA further opined as follows:

In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what
properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent
court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a
third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of
a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15

Issue

Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Was certiorari the proper recourse

to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.

Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the
RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and
interlocutory orders as follows:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject
matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal
from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the
hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will
necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory
order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing
the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order
dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the
order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be
changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion
was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San
Lorenzo Village lots." The Court observed there that:

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June
14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a
testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v.
Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed
orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also
governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court
of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable" may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and
the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues
may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
 (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which
multiple appeals are permitted.

II

Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion

in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?

In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties
in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and
the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of
the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon
issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation
and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has
the duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real
and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of
such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid
the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a
final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate."23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the
question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates
of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere
with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of
discretion."25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as
part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by
title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still
revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then
the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising
general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination
of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties
in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in
Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted,
while being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted
by her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties
constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not
include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by
her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal
undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof
should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank
account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said
bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of
the properties constituting as estate of her husband.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in
Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S.
Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995,
it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation
never intervened in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado
himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit
N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two
days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought
that the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this
case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of
death. Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at
least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on
October 31, 1991 (Exhibit O).28

Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the
procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive
to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from
whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.

Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.

Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3,
1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s
estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting
that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried
the burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of
Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the
estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.

Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made
findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the
1âwphi1

order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.

Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case
No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could
have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita
herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized
instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of
sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee
the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of
regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay
v. Court of Appeals:33

x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not
the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place,
intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the
primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned
by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his
death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering
that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard,
whether the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be
validated by the facts to be established in court.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid
basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the
execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to
lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of
1âwphi 1

the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest
damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to
any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or
that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed
their duties.35

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots
should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC
itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it
does not prevent the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of
that deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was
still "deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving
the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property
or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the
decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties
donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent
grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave
abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted
and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Instead of administratrix, the gender-fair term administrator is used.

2
Rollo, p. 118.

3
Id. at 125.

4
Id. at 127-129.

5
Id. at 130.

6
Id. at 134.

7
Id. at 56.

8
Id. at 135.

9
Id. at 140.

10
Id. at 24.

11
Id. at 156.

12
Id. at 25.

Id. at 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), and concurred by Associate
13

Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino.
14
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

15
Rollo, p. 35.

16
G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 566-567.

17
No. L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540.

18
Id. at 545-546.

19
G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 216, 226-227.

20
G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, 372.

Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (as amended under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC; effective December 27,
21

2007) provides:

Section 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;

(b) An interlocutory order;

(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;

(e) An order of execution;

(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the
court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
as provided in Rule 65.

The word all means "every one, or the whole number of particular; the whole number" (3 Words and
22

Phrases 212, citing State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 66 Me. 488, 510). Standing alone, the word all means
exactly what it imports; that is, nothing less than all (Id. at 213, citing In re Staheli’s Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185,
188).

23
Siy Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 493, 500 (1934).

24
71 Phil. 66 (1940).

25
Id. at 68.

26
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 455.
 Id. at 471-473, citing, among others, Coca v. Pizarras Vda. De Pangilinan, No. L-27082, January 31, 1978,
27

81 SCRA 278, 283; Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899; Cunanan v.
Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948); and Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 (1942).

28
Rollo, pp. 139-140.

29
See. FAMILY CODE, Art. 105, 116.

Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483, 490, citing Coja v. Court of Appeals,
30

G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 517, 528.

31
See Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899.

San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446 citing Nazareno v. Court of
32

Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.

G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 430, 452-453, cited in Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,
33

G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.

34
Rollo, p. 138.

Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, G.R. No.
35

177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217, citing Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006,
485 SCRA 424, 445.

Reyes-Mesugas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345, 350, citing Pio Barretto
36

Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62431-33, August 3, 1984, 131 SCRA 606.

37
Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra at 621.

38
Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 340, 345.

Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA
39

410, 422-423.