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NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY


ISLAMABAD

NATIONAL SECURITY & WAR COURSE 2016

INTERNAL RESEARCH PAPER (IRP) 2015-16

PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS:
Reconciling National & Political Interests

PARTICIPANT: Dr. Aman Rashid (FSP) L-166

SUPERVISOR: MrTauqir Hussain Sargana


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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION

It is hereby recommended that the IRP submitted by Dr Aman Rashid


“PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: Reconciling National & Political Interests” be
accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the NDU-NSWC 2016

Date:_________

Supervisor
Tauqeer Hussain Sargna
Directing Staff (NDU)

Date:_________ External Examiner

Date:_________ External Examiner


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SUPERVISOR’S DECLARATION

This is to certify that the IRP dissertation submitted by Dr. Aman Rashid titled
"PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: Reconciling National & Political Interests” was
supervised by me and is submitted to meet the requirements of a NDU-NSWC 2016

Date:_________ ____________________
Tauqir Hussain Sargana
Supervisor
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PARTICIPANT’S DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the thesis submitted by me titled “PAKISTAN-INDIA


RELATIONS: Reconciling National & Political Interests” is based on my own
research work and has not been submitted to any other institution for any other degree.

Signature: ___________________
Date:_________ Dr. Aman Rashid ( FSP)
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I most humbly thank Almighty Allah, for his continued blessings upon me. In
process I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Mr. Tauqir Hussain Sargana, for
his support and sincere guidance. I am also grateful to my colleagues who shared their
valuable experiences and wealth of knowledge on the subject.

The research material used in the preparation of this paper has been derived from
published / printed material available in the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad,
books on the subject and various Reports/ articles in Magazines and local news papers
including talks delivered by guest speakers during the course. I am grateful to the staff of NDU
Library for the whole hearted assistance.

I hope that this modest attempt contributes towards better understanding of the
nuances of managing the Pakistan-India relations keeping the Kashmir issue under
focus and its centrality within the security calculus of South Asia.

Dr. Aman Rashid(FSP)


December 21, 2015
Islamabad
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARTS Contents Page No
Abstract 1-3
PART-I Introduction 4-6
Main Argument 6
Hypothesis
6
Current state of relations 6-12
Regional situation & 12-16
security paradigm in South Asia
Indian Defence spending 16

PART-II KASHMIR DISPUTE 16-29

Background 16-18

UN Resolutions 18

Pakistan`s Position on Kashmir 19-20

Post 9/11 scenario 20-21

Indian stance on Kashmir 21-22

Special status of Kashmir in Indian Constitution ( art.370) 22-23

Simla Agreement 23

Kashmir in turmoil- till 1990 23-24


The Lahore Declaration 24

Kargil Operation 24
Agra Summit 25
President Musharaff`s out of box thinking on resolution of 25-26
Kashmir issue
Current situation in IOK-BJP^s hard line on on kashmir 27
Elections - 2014 in IOK 27-28
Third Party Intervention on Kashmir 28-29
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China 28
USA 28-29
PART-III Role of Media ( Hostile propaganda) 29-30
PART-IV WAY FROWARD 30-32
CONCLUSION 32-33
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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ABSTRACT

Sixty eight years have passed since independence but Pakistan and India have
been unable to resolve the issues that bedeviled their relations, making them hostile
neighbours who have fought three wars and inflicted incalculable damage to the
prospects of socio-economic development of the entire south asian region preventing
the realization of the full potential of its populace. The climate of mistrust and suspicion
developed right at independence of the two from the British has grown thicker over the
years as disputes like Kashmir await solution and the future of over a billion people
remains hostage to these unresolved issues. There have been ups and downs and
hopes have been falsified particularly in the years when the Indian National Congress
(INC) was at the helms from 2004 to 2013. The composite dialogue process was a
development of that period. The unpleasant events of the Samjohta Express incident in
2007 and Mumbai attacks in 2008 have marred its promise and unilateral violations of
the ceasefire by India at LoC which had been respected by both sides since 2003, have
further vitiated the atmosphere for resumption of a bilateral dialogue.

2. Since the events of 9/11, India has been obsessed with one point agenda to
discuss only "terrorism" with Pakistan, which was also one of the main reason of failure
of the Agra summit held on 15 July 2001.

3. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif called Narendra Modi on 16 May 2014, to


congratulate him on becoming the Indian Prime Minister and BJP`s victory in the
elections to open a new chapter of bilateral relationship with India. He even attended
Modi`s oath taking ceremony on 26 May 2014 in New Delhi where the two leaders
decided to resume dialogue at the Foreign Secretary level in the larger regional interest.
But it could not be materialized and again both decided that the National Security
Advisors of two nations would hold meeting after they met at the SCO Conference 10
July, 2015 and start discussion on “all outstanding” issues (Kashmir, Siachen, Sir
Creek, terrorism, water issues, interference, etc.) However, once again the meeting
proposed to be held from 23-24 August, 2015 in New Delhi, India, was postponed as
India insisted on discussing Terrorism issues only without including kashmir in the
agenda. India even expressed doubts on seriousness of Pakistan in solving the Mumbai
attack case. Pakistan had also collected incontrovertible evidence alleging that India’s
intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), was openly supporting
and funding terrorist outfits in Karachi. Moreover, Pakistan maintains that India’s
proactive policy toward Pakistan is aimed at undermining its latest counter-terrorism
operations across the country. Pakistan raised the issue of Indian involvement in
Karachi and Baluchistan at the United Nations followed by handing over dossiers on
Indian involvement to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon. In his meeting with UN
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Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also said that
the UN should implement its resolutions on Kashmir in the Security Council. He also
pointed out that "bilateralism" had failed to resolve the issues in the last twenty years
since the start of composite dialogue in May 1997. These dossiers were also shared
with US government during Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif`s visit to US from 22-24
October 2015 . Subsequently, prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in his address at the 70th
session of the UNGA on 30th September 2015, suggested a four point strategy aimed
at improving Pakistan-India relations. These included: (i) Pakistan and India to
formalize and respect the 2003 understanding for a complete ceasefire on the line of
control in Kashmir and agree to UNMOGIP expansion to monitor the observance of the
ceasefire; (ii) Pakistan and India to reaffirm that they will not resort to the use or the
threat of use of force under any circumstances; (iii) Steps to be taken to demilitarize
Kashmir, and (iv) Reach an agreement to an unconditional mutual withdrawal from
Siachen Glacier.

4. India did not respond to these proposals and continued its belligerent attitude till
Indian Prime Minister Modi met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the side lines of the
Paris Climate Change Conference on 30th November at his own initiative. As a follow
up to this meeting the National Security Advisers, accompanied by the Foreign
Secretaries, met in Bangkok on 6th December. It was agreed to carry forward the
constructive engagement. It was followed by another positive development when the
External Affairs Minister of India, Smt. Sushma Swaraj led the Indian delegation to the
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process in Islamabad on
December 8-9, 2015. She called on the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad
Nawaz Sharif and held discussions with Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign
Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz. A Joint Statement was issued wherein Indian Foreign Minister
and the Adviser condemned terrorism and resolved to cooperate to eliminate it. Both
sides also agreed to a Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue and directed the Foreign
Secretaries to work out the modalities and schedule of the meetings under the Dialogue
including Peace and Security, CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar
Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Economic and Commercial Cooperation,
Counterterrorism, Narcotics Control and Humanitarian Issues, People to People
exchanges and Religious Tourism. The dates are to be finalized soon.

5. It is widely believed that Pakistan`s restraint from responding to Indian hostile


media statements and blatant violations of the LoC followed by Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif`s mentioning of the human rights violations in IOK in his UNGA speech and
handing over the dossiers on Indian involvement in destabilizing Baluchistan to UN
Secretary General had a salutary effect on the international community. Consequently,
India may have been advised, led by the USA, to resist temptation for any military
adventurism under the nuclear overhang in south asia. However, Indian sincerity on
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resolving outstanding issues with Pakistan would become evident when the two Foreign
Secretaries hold their meeting. As former Foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri, in his
book " Neither a Hawk Nor A Dove" says that " both countries had begun to realize that
perpetual tension would be a barrier to attaining their full potential, Modi may have been
advised on this which brought this Indian change of heart.

6. We should realize that under the current BJP led government, relations will
continue to suffer from recurrent periods of tensions and strains because of India’s
hegemonic designs in South Asia. In any case Pakistan should engage with India on the
principle of sovereign equality and avoiding appeasement as well as political
expediency for short term gains overriding issues of national interest like the Kashmir
dispute. For a lasting peace in the region, resolution of the Kashmir dispute in line with
the relevant UN resolutions according to the wishes of the kashmiris is the right way
forward. Pakistan should continue its unflinching political, moral and diplomatic support
for the kashmiri people and keep rasing the issue at the UN and other international fora
specially OIC.The continued human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK)
should also be highlighted at United Nations Human Rights Council and others.
Pakistan should also make efforts in making the role of the UNMOGIP more relevant
and assertive.
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INTERNAL RESEARCH PAPER (IRP) 2015-16


PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS: Reconciling National & Political Interests

PART- I

INTRODUCTION

Sixty eight years have passed since independence but Pakistan and India have
been unable to resolve the issues that bedeviled their relations, making them hostile
neighbours who have fought three wars and inflicted incalculable damage to the
prospects of socio-economic development of the entire south asian region preventing
the realization of the full potential of its populace. The climate of mistrust and suspicion
developed right at independence of the two from the British has grown thicker over the
years as disputes like Kashmir await solution and the future of over a billion people
remains hostage to these unresolved issues. There have been ups and downs and
hopes have been falsified particularly in the years when the Indian National Congress
(INC) was at the helms from 2004 to 2013. The composite dialogue process was a
development of that period. The unpleasant events of the Samjohta Express incident in
2007 and Mumbai attacks in 2008 have marred its promise and unilateral violations of
the ceasefire by India which had been respected by both sides since 2003, have further
vitiated the atmosphere for resumption of a bilateral dialogue. Analysts like Gen. (retd.)
Asad Durrani believe that "the design logic of the Peace Process (Composite Dialogue)
was rightly based on resolving contentious issues at a deliberate pace, slow, but
realistic in view of our poor track record and an over cautious bureaucratic culture.
There was always the threat of sabotage, not only by the militants who would find
periods of no progress ripe for their activity, but also from any other quarters, external or
internal, not in favour of an Indo-Pak rapprochement. Even though heroic statements
were once made in the two capitals that acts of terror could not derail the process,
unfortunately Mumbai terrorist attack did it." He further points out that due to lack of
sincerity on both sides, no one supported “joint investigation” after the Mumbai carnage
from either side. In India people felt that this was simply not needed since all the
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evidence available at their end was shared and Pakistan was only required to tie up
loose ends1.

2. Since the events of 9/11, India has been obsessed with one point agenda to
discuss only "terrorism" with Pakistan, which was also one of the main reason of failure
of the Agra summit held on 15 July 2001. However, in view of the fact that the world
focus is shifting from geo-politics to geo-economics in the 21st century, it is incumbent
upon the two new governments to resume dialogue and make sincere efforts for finding
lasting solutions to all long standing unresolved issues through negotiations as war is no
more an option under a nuclear over hang. If India joins the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (C-PEC) withdrawing its objection that the route is passing through the
disputed territory of Gilgit- Baltistan, not only peace would dawn but it would bring long
awaited shared prosperity to the south asian region. This idea may not see the dawn of
reality during Prime Minster Modi`s regime in India.

3. At the peoples` level, there is a complex love-hate relationship. Language, custom,


and cultural similarities unite as well as divide them. This divisiveness goes beyond
political differences and territorial disputes. The level of exploitation of the shared
history of mutual hostility by the RSS Hindu extremists in promoting the Hindutva ( anti-
religion anti-muslim) agenda has touched unprecedented heights making a big dent in
the secular and pluralistic claims of Indian polity. Saner elements in the Indian media
and secular intelligentsia including writers, journalists have pointed out the grave
consequences of "safronization" of the Indian society under Prime Minister Modi. It is
jeopardizing any measures taken to redress the shared problems between India and
Pakistan.

1. 1Asad Durrani and A.S.Dulat. Kashmir : Confrontation to Cooperation. The


Criterion, Jan-Mar. 2014
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Main Argument

4. In the current state of Pakistan-India relations, can the vital national interest
(Kashmir issue) be sidelined to improve relations with BJP led India ?

HYPOTHESIS

5. Under the current BJP Government in India led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
chances of achievement of the policy objective of the Nawaz government for creating a
"peaceful neighborhood" and resolution of all outstanding issues including Kashmir are
remote.

Current state of relations

6. On its part, after the victory of the BJP in the 16th Lok Sabha elections and
Narendra Modi’s appointment as Prime Minister of India, Pakistan had tried to open a
new chapter of bilateral relationship with India. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif took the
initiative and immediately called Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 16 May 2014, to
congratulate him on the impressive victory of BJP and invited him to visit Pakistan. Mr.
Modi invited all SAARC Heads of States on the occasion of his oath-taking ceremony on
26 May 2014. The Prime Minister decided to visit New Delhi on 26-27 May 2014. The
visit afforded an opportunity for a bilateral meeting on 27 May, and both decided on the
need for normalizing the relations in the larger regional interest, when they agreed that
the two Foreign Secretaries should meet soon to set the bilateral agenda. However, on
the pretext of Pakistani High Commissioner’s meeting with the Kashmiri leaders (APHC)
in New Delhi on 18 August 2014, India announced cancellation of the FS-level talks.
Pakistan saw the cancellation as a ‘setback’ to the positive trajectory of bilateral
relations. Even the Indian intelligentsia saw the cancellation of FS-level talks as an
over-reaction, stating that the consultations with the Hurriyat leaders had been in vogue
since long and no Indian government, including BJP in its previous term, objected to
such meetings. The appointment of hawkish officials, most prominently of Ajit Doval, an
experienced intelligence man, as National Security Advisor is also not seen favourably
in Pakistan.
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7. This Indian behaviour at the outset was not at all surprising considering Narendra
Modi’s past record as the Chief Minister of Gujarat and his life-long association with
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a militant organization with total commitment to
Hindutva or the Hindu way of life and antipathy towards Pakistan and the Muslims. His
hard-line views about Pakistan expressed during the election campaign could not be
overlooked. Narendra Modi’s alleged role in the massacre of around two thousand
Muslims in Gujarat Pogrom in 2002 during his tenure as the Chief Minister of the state
is well known. The BJP election manifesto promising to build Ram temple at the site of
the Babri mosque, abrogate Article 370 of the Indian constitution which grants special
autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir, and review India’s nuclear doctrine sends
out negative vibes for regional peace. In addition, allowing greater participation of
armed forces in the decision making process is overshadowing Modi’s slogans of
regional economic development and integration. India’s status as the world’s biggest
arms importer and Modi’s ambition to build an advanced defense industry rightly alarms
Pakistani policy circles.

8. Modi’s rise as the Prime Minister of India and BJP’s victory in the elections do not
bode well for Pakistan-India relations. Narendra Modi is deeply steeped into the politics
and philosophy of RSS. He is unlikely to adopt an inclusive and moderate style of
politics. In comparison, Atal Bihari Vajpayee was a refined and cultured person whereas
Modi possess a ruthless character and low communal psyche. Modi refuses to
apologize on the large scale massacres of the Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 for which
many analysts hold him directly responsible. There is a general perception that whereas
Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the right man in the wrong party, Narendra Modi, from
Pakistan’s perspective, is the wrong man in the wrong party.2

9. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif again met Narendra Modi during the SCO Summit on
10 July, 2015 in Ufa, Russia. Realizing that peace and development was the collective
responsibility of India and Pakistan both leaders decided that two National Security

Touqir Hussain. India, Pakistan and Kashmir. The Criterion, July-Sep. 2014
2
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Advisors would meet to start discussion on “all outstanding” issues (Kashmir, Siachen,
Sir Creek, terrorism, water issues, interference, etc.) However, once again the meeting
proposed to be held from 23-24 August, 2015 in New Delhi, India, was postponed as
India insisted on discussing Terrorism issues only without including kashmir in the
agenda. India even expressed doubts on seriousness of Pakistan in solving the Mumbai
attack case. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his visit to Bangladesh, openly
acknowledged and acclaimed India’s intervention in East Pakistan’s separation in 1971,
which has drawn acute criticism from Pakistan. In his comments Mr. Sartaj Aziz Advisor
to Prime Minister of Pakistan on foreign affairs remarked that Modi’s “open admission”
of Indian intervention in East Pakistan, while regretful, justifies Pakistan stance on fall of
Dhaka3.

10. On the contrary, the Indian government, despite repeated assurances at the
highest level, has not brought to justice the perpetrators of Samjohta terrorist Attacks
(2007), which resulted in the death of more than 42 innocent Pakistan civilians.
Independent investigation by Indian law enforcement agencies established the
involvement of senior Indian military official, Colonel Profit, RSS ideologue Swami
Aseemanand (the self confessed accused) in Samjohta Blasts, and many others.

11. Pakistan has also collected incontrovertible evidence alleging that India’s
intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), is openly supporting and
funding terrorist outfits in Karachi. Recently, a BBC report, in a rare revelation, reported
that the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)–the largest single party in urban Sindh–
has been receiving funding from Indian authorities. India rejected the allegations.
Moreover, Pakistan maintains that India’s proactive policy toward Pakistan is aimed at
undermining its latest counter-terrorism operations across the country. Pakistan raised
the issue of Indian involvement in Karachi and Baluchistan at the United Nations
followed by handing over dossiers on Indian involvement to UN Secretary General Ban
3
Umar Jamal: Coalition of the Unwilling: Pakistan and India Bring Confrontation
to the SCO. The Diplomat 30th July 2015
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Ki Moon. In his meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Pakistani Prime


Minister Nawaz Sharif also said that the UN should implement its resolutions on
Kashmir in the Security Council. He also pointed out that "bilateralism" had failed to
resolve the issues in the last twenty years since the start of composite dialogue in May
1997. These dossiers were also shared with US government during Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif`s visit to US from 22-24 October 2015 .

12. However, there is a realization in Pakistan that to fully utilize the bilateral trade
potential of almost US $ 10 billion, confidence building measures like stopping the
hostile statements by leadership and media propaganda is a pre-requisite to build an
atmosphere for cooperation and increase the trade from US $ 2.5 billion, to the above
stated figures. Unfortunately, 'emotion' negates 'reason' and prevents the two from
'shaping' and 'working' a vision of 'shared destiny' for socio-economic uplift of millions in
south asia. Pakistan is facing a dilemma. How do you achieve the twin objectives of
putting pressure on India to solve the Kashmir dispute and seek improved relations with
India? India wants us to make a choice.

13. Despite its aspirations for a global power status, India has remained fixated to the
ground realities of the region. Without stable relations with its neighbours, India will find
it difficult to "Take Off" economically defying South Asia's gravitational pull. This concern
was clearly at display at the 18th SAARC Summit held in November 2014 in
Kathmandu where Prime Minister Modi held bilateral meetings with the heads of all the
SAARC members except for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. It is widely believed that
Pakistan-India relations have impacted adversely on prospects of promoting regional
cooperation. SAARC has not been able to realize its promise of a peaceful and
prosperous South Asia or deepen the processes of economic integration.

14. According to Amb.(Retd) Tauqir Hussain, Modi government`s intension is to avoid


discussions on the Kashmir issue therefore, India views the normalization process with
Pakistan not horizontally but vertically, as a kind of pyramid. Its base is the so called
confidence building measures (CBMs), including military hotlines, people to people
contacts and economic and commercial relations, to which India has lately added
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terrorism. Then in the middle it has other non-Kashmir issues like energy, water,
Siachen, and Sir Creek. And the top of the pyramid is Kashmir. India wants both
countries to climb to the top by stages. India feels that by the time the two sides reach
near the top of the pyramid, if at all, one of the four eventualities could happen: India will
have changed the ground situation in Kashmir to its favor to which Pakistanis would get
reconciled; or, any normalization of relations in non-Kashmir issues that may have taken
place could induce Pakistanis to have a different perception of India and Kashmir; or,
India could simply turn its back on any negotiations on Kashmir; or Pakistan may simply
be forced to reassess its position by its internal difficulties to which India itself is
contributing by interfering in Baluchistan and putting pressure on Pakistan on the
Western front. The underlying theme in all this is to marginalize a weak Pakistan to
make it irrelevant in the dispute, simultaneously alienate the Kashmiris from Pakistan
breaking their resolve and impose India’s will on them. To have its way India has been
reacting very strongly to incidents along the Line of Control, basically to affirm
inviolability of the LOC and to emphasize that the borders cannot be changed.4

Four Point Proposal for improvement of relations

15. The Nawaz government policy of stable, friendly, cooperative neighbourhood is fully
in line with its strategic priority of economic development. It is rational and has broad
popular support. Main political parties in Pakistan, in principle, favour an improvement in
relations with India and seek a peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir and other
disputes. 'India Bashing' is no longer fashionable and relationship with India is no
longer an issue raised during the election campaigns.

16. In his address at the 70th session of the UNGA on 30th September 2015, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif suggested a four point strategy aimed at improving Pakistan-
India relations. These included: (i) Pakistan and India to formalize and respect the 2003
understanding for a complete ceasefire on the line of control in Kashmir and agree to
UNMOGIP expansion to monitor the observance of the ceasefire; (ii) Pakistan and India

4 Touqir Hussain. India, Pakistan and Kashmir. The Criterion, July-Sep. 2014
18

to reaffirm that they will not resort to the use or the threat of use of force under any
circumstances; (iii) Steps to be taken to demilitarize Kashmir, and (iv) Reach an
agreement to an unconditional mutual withdrawal from Siachen Glacier.

17. India did not respond to these proposals and continued its belligerent attitude till
Indian Prime Minister Modi met Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the side lines of the
Paris Climate Change Conference on 30th November at his own initiative. As a follow
up to this meeting the National Security Advisers, accompanied by the Foreign
Secretaries, met in Bangkok on 6th December. Discussions were held in a candid,
cordial and constructive atmosphere. They were guided by the vision of the two leaders
for a peaceful, stable and prosperous South Asia. Discussions covered peace and
security, terrorism, Jammu and Kashmir, and cease fire along the LoC. It was agreed to
carry forward the constructive engagement. It was followed by another positive
development when the External Affairs Minister of India, Smt. Sushma Swaraj led the
Indian delegation to the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul
Process in Islamabad on December 8-9, 2015. She called on the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and held discussions with Adviser to the Prime
Minister on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sartaj Aziz. A Joint Statement was issued wherein
Indian Foreign Minister and the Adviser condemned terrorism and resolved to cooperate
to eliminate it. They noted the successful talks on terrorism and security related issues
in Bangkok by the two NSAs and decided that the NSAs will continue to address all
issues connected to terrorism. The Indian side was assured of the steps being taken to
expedite the early conclusion of the Mumbai trial. Both sides also agreed to a
Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue and directed the Foreign Secretaries to work out
the modalities and schedule of the meetings under the Dialogue including Peace and
Security, CBMs, Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul
Navigation Project, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Counterterrorism,
Narcotics Control and Humanitarian Issues, People to People exchanges and Religious
Tourism. The dates are to be finalized soon. Most of the analysts believe that
comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue will provide space for adding agenda items into the
previously fixed agenda of the Composite dialogue. I disagree on this explanation and
19

feel that by changing the Title of the dialogue Process, BJP government in India has
very smartly delinked the previous progress achieved on agenda items achieved during
BJP`s previous government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee.

18. It is widely believed that Pakistan`s restraint from responding to Indian hostile
media statements and blatant violations of the LoC followed by Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif`s mentioning of the human rights violations in IOK in his UNGA speech and
handing over the dossiers on Indian involvement in destabilizing Baluchistan to UN
Secretary General had a salutary effect on the international community. Consequently,
India may have been advised, led by the USA, to resist temptation for any military
adventurism under the nuclear overhang in south asia. However, Indian sincerity on
resolving outstanding issues with Pakistan would become evident when the two Foreign
Secretaries hold their meeting.

Regional situation

19. Since independence India has harbored hegemonic designs. India’s determination
to achieve hegemony in South Asia was clearly explained by leading Indian security
analyst, C. Raja Mohan in his article published in Foreign Affairs, July-August, 2006. He
writes, “India’s grand strategy divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first,
which encompasses the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto
over the actions of outside powers. In the second, which encompasses the so-called
extended neighborhood stretching across Asia and the India Ocean littoral, India has
sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its
interests. In the third, which includes the entire global stage, India has tried to take its
place as one of the great powers, a key player in international peace and security." The
first of the three factors which in C. Raja Mohan’s opinion have prevented India from
realizing its grand strategic goals was the partition of South Asia and the creation of
Pakistan based on religious lines. This factor, according to him, left India with a
persistent conflict with Pakistan and an internal Hindu-Muslim divide, separated India
from Afghanistan, Iran and, one may add, Central Asia, and created profound problems
20

for India’s engagement with the Muslim Middle East because of Pakistan’s character as
an Islamic state. The other two obstacles identified by Raja Mohan in the way of the
realization of its grand strategic goals were its socialist system and the Cold War which
put India on the losing side of the great political contest of the second half of the
twentieth century. He further points out that while the second and the third obstacles
identified by him have disappeared, India needs to deal with the first obstacle, that is to
say Pakistan, in the realization of its grand strategic goals.

20. Indian hegemonic designs in South Asia and its ambitions to rival China are
recognized by noted scholars of international politics. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski
in his latest book “Strategic Vision”, after taking note of the Indian ambitions and the
emerging China-India rivalry, point out: “Indian strategists speak openly of a greater
India exercising a dominant position in an area ranging from Iran to Thailand. India is
also positioning itself to control the Indian Ocean militarily; its naval and air power
programs point clearly in that direction — as do politically guided efforts to establish for
India strong positions, with geostrategic implications, in adjoining Bangladesh and
Burma.”

21. The historical record of decolonization of subcontinent reinforces this conclusion.


The way India tried to destabilize Pakistan soon after its creation by delaying in sharing
cash balances with Pakistan, cutting off the supply of river water from two head-works
under her control in 1948, and the stoppage of trade with Pakistan in 1949 because of
the latter’s refusal to devalue its currency were early examples of India’s hegemonic
ambitions. India’s covert military intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 was an obvious
attempt to cut Pakistan down to size. Even handling of disputes with Pakistan,
particularly Kashmir, Sir Creek and Siachen, reflects a hegemonic Indian mindset.
India’s ambitious struggle for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is also
reflective of her penchant for a great power status.
21

Security paradigm in South Asia

22. Historically, India’s has always wanted a role in Afghanistan due to India’s growing
economic needs which will eventually necessitate a much needed expansion of ties with
its energy-rich neighbors in Central Asia. Moreover, any planned oil and gas pipeline
from Central Asia to South Asia must go through Afghanistan, which further accentuates
the geostrategic centrality of Afghanistan for any regional economic plan–including the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. Pakistan views Indian
involvement in Afghanistan as her design to encircle Pakistan from both sides creating a
strategic threat to its security interests .

23. Afghanistan also has become a big factor – more than ever before – in India-
Pakistan relations as peace in the region has become indivisible. Pakistan and India
should cooperate to stabilize Afghanistan. The rewards that a stable Afghanistan could
possibly bring include an integrated South Asian market that also takes care of the
water and energy issues, which are a strong incentive to both India and Pakistan to
normalize their overall relations.

24. Terrorism is also a challenge for both countries and requires a coordinated
response India has to make a strategic choice whether to be a partner of Pakistan in
solving the terrorism issue or use it as a whip to malign Pakistan internationally and by
contrast appear a peaceful victim. Not to mention the free hand it gives to India to
unleash repression in Kashmir. Suspicions have been raised, even in India, about the
possible involvement of Indian intelligence agencies in the 2001 attack on the Indian
Parliament. [xi] The reality is wherever the attack on the Indian Parliament came from
and whoever was responsible the trigger was Kashmir. The two countries very nearly
came to war following this attack.

25. India is spending massively on its conventional force modernization. With a


defense spending of around $ US 40 billion, Pakistan is concerned that it is detrimental
for peace and stability in the region. Pakistan is also concerned at the Civil Nuclear
deals signed by India with major world powers and its efforts to gain entry in to nuclear
22

regulatory regimes, allowing access to additional nuclear fuel. This would result in
aggravating the strategic balance in South Asia between the two nuclear neighbors.
Pakistan does not subscribe to any nuclear or conventional arms race. It strictly abide
by the concept of credible minimum deterrence. Deterrence stability in South Asia is
essential to save the region from turning into a nuclear flashpoint. The need for
confidence building in nuclear and conventional realm in South Asia is more significant
than ever before.

26. Since Pakistan has acquired a nuclear deterrent, India is not in a position to defeat
Pakistan militarily defeat on Pakistan for bringing it down on its knees. Indian strategy ,
therefore, would focus on political, economic, and cultural means to overcome
Pakistan’s opposition to its hegemonic designs in South Asia. India’s rapid economic
growth over the past decade and a half, despite the recent slowing down, has enabled it
to undertake a massive armament program me not only for positioning itself as a great
power and competing with China but also for putting pressure on Pakistan for an arms
race to increase its military expenditure correspondingly in conventional field.

27. The United States has accorded an important role to India in its strategy to contain
China. In a statement of far reaching strategic importance issued in March 2005,
Washington announced its intention to help build up India as a major global power of
the 21st century. Soon thereafter the US entered into major agreements with India for
commencing cooperation with it in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the
military field. The fact that the US modified its domestic laws and persuaded other
members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to allow civilian nuclear cooperation with India
despite its nuclear explosions of 1998 showed the importance that it attached to its
future strategic cooperation with New Delhi. President Obama`s two day visit to India in
last week of January 2015 when he also attended the Republic Day celebrations was
projected as `" qualitative reinvigoration of strategic ties". A lengthy joint statement, a
Declaration of Friendship, a joint strategic Vision for Asia pacific and Indian Ocean
Region were celebrated as the harbingers of beginning of a new strategic partnership
era of two largest democracies in the world. The centre piece of this growing new
partnership seems to be on security and military cooperation based on Defence
23

Technology and Trade Initiative and a Framework for US-India Defence Relationship
(Make in India) for the next 10 years. This has given tremendous boost to the growing
US-India strategic partnership, making Modi government arrogantly dismissive of any
proposals for regional integration.

Indian Defence Spending

28. In pursuit of acquiring Big Power Status, India has also increased rapidly its
defence expenditure and acquisition of advanced weapon systems to translate its
growing economic strength into military power. India’s military expenditure would be
around $36.3 billion during the year 2014-15. This represents an increase of 10% over
the defence budget for the preceding year.[vi] India received nine per cent of global
arms transfers from 2006 to 2010 making it the world’s leading importer of weapons.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India was
also the leading importer of weapons during the period from 2008 to 2012. It has been
acquiring advanced defence weapon systems from major world suppliers to increase its
military capabilities. Its plans to acquire aircraft carriers reflect its intentions to develop
Blue Water Navy projecting its power far beyond the areas of the India Ocean
region(IOR).
PART-II
Kashmir Dispute
Background

29. The Kashmir dispute is the unfinished agenda of decolonization of sub-continent


which created two independent states India and Pakistan. The basic principles of
geographic contiguity, religious affinity of the majority population and their will to join
either Pakistan or India was not judiciously applied in the case of state of Jammu and
Kashmir. The dishonesty and malafide intentions of Lord Mountbatten while partitioning
the Sub-Continent are reflected in the memoires of Sir Christopher Beaumont, Private
Secretary to the senior British Judge Sir Cyril Radcliffe reported by BBC Reporter
Alastair Lawson5. Sir Beaumont said; “Mountbatten not only bent the rules when it came

5 1947: The partition of Punjab was a disaster by Alastair Lawson


24

to partition – he also bent the border in India’s favour.” The documents repeatedly
allege that Mountbatten put pressure on Radcliffe to alter the boundary in India's
favour." While partitioning the Punjab, the Radcliffe Award divided the Muslim majority
district of Gurdaspur in such a way that besides Pathankot Tehsil, the Muslim majority
tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala to the South were given to India, the sole purpose of
which was to facilitate India’s land access to Kashmir. Later, the provisional award of
Radcliffe Commission of 12 August 1947, was published after the date of partition on 16
August 1947.6 This deceit on part of Mountbatten caused armed confrontations and
later on wars between the two countries and exacerbated the acrimony and mistrust
between the two neighbours.

30. The renowned British author on Kashmir, Alastair Lamb is of the view that the
Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, on all counts, should have formed part of
Pakistan. Geographically, it was bound by Pakistan from all sides. It was connected to
the outside world through Pakistan and its trade routes and supplies depended on
Pakistan, hence a reason for signing of the standstill agreement between Pakistan and
Kashmir. The significance of Kashmir has been aptly summed up by our visionary
Quaid, who described the princely state as “the jugular vein of Pakistan.” At another
occasion the Quid said, “The accession of Kashmir to India was not a bona fide one
since it rested on fraud and violence and would never be accepted by Pakistan –
accession was the end of the long intrigue”.

31. The provision of Indian Independence Act 1947 advised princely states to join
either India or Pakistan. The right of self-determination was to be exercised by these
princely states through an instrument of accession to be signed by the ruler. In doing so
the rulers were not to act as arbiters of the state’s future but merely as instruments for
exercising the will of the people in accordance with the true spirit of the principles of
self-determination. The British established a criteria to ensure that the element of
discretion was taken out of the rulers hands and the accession reflected the will of the
people. Lord Mountbatten had advised the rulers to make decisions on the basis of the
states’ geographical location, economic and commercial interests and linkages,
6
Incomplete Partition, Alastair Lamb, Ali Majeed Printers Kacha Rashid Road, Lahore. P 43
25

communications, historical and cultural links, and, above all, the religious mixture of the
populace. If the decision of a ruler violated these guidelines then it would mean the ruler
had gone against the will of the people and thus lost both their trust and the legitimacy
of his rule. This would have one obvious implication – the right of this exercise naturally
passed on to the people and was to be exercised by them. Kashmiris (77.11 %
Muslims) wanted that Kashmir should join Pakistan but the Maharaja of Kashmir
decided to accede to India. Plans on this line were set afoot before any intervention by
Pakistan was possible, in fact, even before the boundaries had been demarcated.
Indian troops were landing in Srinagar even before the so called signing of the
instrument of accession by the Maharaja.

32. The people of Kashmir revolted against Maharaja for deciding against their wishes
and soon liberated whole of Poonch, Muzaffarabad, Baramula, Bhimber and Kotli. They
were soon joined by the tribal Lashkar from NWFP in their struggle against the
Maharaja. Indians failed to control the situation and referred the matter to the UN
Security Council, which decided that the dispute should be settled by holding free
plebiscite under the auspices of UNO.

UN Resolutions

33. The Security Council has adopted 18 resolutions so far directly or indirectly dealing
with the Kashmir dispute. All affirm that the final disposition of Jammu and Kashmir
should be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a UN
supervised plebiscite. The most recent resolution was No.1172, adopted in 1998.

34. The UN Security Council Resolutions 47 of 21 April 1948, 51 of 3 June 1948, 80 of


14 March 1950, 91 of 30 March 1951, 122 of 24 January 1957 and Resolutions of
UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 declare that the final disposition of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir would be made in accordance with the will of the people
expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted
under the auspices of the United Nations. The UN Security Council Resolution 47 of
April 21, 1948 sets out the manner of behaviour, number and location of Indian forces in
26

Jammu and Kashmir (IOK). The presence of 700,000 Indian troops in IOK and their
behaviour and locations violate this resolution of the UN.

Pakistan`s Position on Kashmir

35. Pakistan’s principled position on Jammu and Kashmir dispute is based on the UN
Security Council Resolutions, which provide for the final disposition of Jammu and
Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people to be determined through a free and
impartial plebiscite under the UN auspices. Pakistan extends unflinching political, moral
and diplomatic support to the just cause of the Kashmiri people and shall continue to do
so. Pakistan rejects Indian claims to Kashmir, based on the Instrument of Accession.

36. Pakistan believes that the Maharaja did not have the support of the majority
Kashmiris and the Maharaja handed over control of Jammu and Kashmir under duress,
thus invalidating the legitimacy of the claims. Pakistan claims that India violated the
Standstill Agreement and that Indian troops were already in Kashmir before the
Instrument of Accession was signed. Pakistan claims that the Kashmiri uprising
demonstrates that the people of Kashmir no longer wish to remain part of India.

37. Pakistan feels concerned at the widespread human rights violations in Indian
Occupied Kashmir (IOK) and has been raising the issue at the United Nations Human
Rights Council and other related international fora like OIC etc. These concerns have
been further aggravated by the Modi led BJP Indian government’s moves to unilaterally
change the status of the dispute either by attempting to abrogate Article 370 of the
Indian constitution, through trifurcation or by changing the demography through
settlement of Hindu refugees from West Pakistan in Sri Nagar. Pakistan hopes that the
international community, especially friendly countries, would play their role in helping
the Kashmiris to attain their right to self-determination.

38. In the context of international law, the dispute has been fully examined by the
International Commission of Jurists report of 1995 which was based on their fact finding
mission to Kashmir. Page 98 of their report sums up by saying that the state did acquire
the right of self-determination in 1947, that remains to be exercised and it is not
27

“affected by acts of the Government of Pakistan”. The report also confirms that the right
of self-determination is not vested in the rulers but in the people.

39. India’s case is weak politically as well. As a 2004 US Institute of Peace report on
Kashmir written by a senior Indian civil servant, Wajahat Habibullah, with extensive
administrative experience of Kashmir who was a senior fellow at the USIP in 2003-
2004, observes “whatever the legal right, the Accession was more than 50 years ago.
Does that right still hold through all that has happened since? Nations, much less
democratic nations, may be created but not built as a result of legal decree alone.
Military strength in itself can secure only a transient unity. The will of the people, or at
the very least their willing acceptance, must be the binding force of a nation, particularly
one that aspires to freedom. When that will erodes, mighty empires will fall.”

Post 9/11 Scenario

40. The Extremists Islamists Jihadists groups have started propagating their own
misguided believe that Pakistan was created for service of Islam of which India is seen
as an arch enemy and Kashmir as a battleground. The other developing extreme point
of view Is Kashmir more important than Pakistan? There are divided view points on
Kashmir . If it were just one dimension of the Kashmir dispute it might have been
resolved or forgotten long ago. Kashmir, however, has moral, political, diplomatic, and
economic dimensions. First of all Pakistan does have a moral commitment to the
Kashmir cause which is hard to back away from. It is a dispute that also has strong
political weight as can be seen from public opinion. Then there is the diplomatic
dimension. If Pakistan does not keep up the pressure on India, as was done during the
decade of 80s, the Kashmir cause is as good as lost. The fact is, Kashmiris would not
have come this far without Pakistan’s help. Apart from the humanitarian aspect of the
issue, Kashmir as the life line can be well understood by having a look at the map of
Pakistan. Three out of six rivers, which run through Pakistan, originates from Kashmir
namely River Indus, Jhelum and Chenab where as remaining three namely Rivers Ravi,
Sutlej and Bias originate from India. Economically, the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and
Chenab, which originate through Kashmir, are vital to the agricultural life of Pakistan.
28

The possibility of a confrontation on water issues cannot be ruled out especially in the
backdrop of the differences in the interpretation of clauses on implementation of the
Indus Water Treaty on the Indian side.

Indian Stance on Kashmir.

41. India continues to assert its sovereignty over the entire region of Kashmir and
refuses to acknowledge the "disputed nature"7 of the issue; as a result all efforts to
solve the conflict have been futile so far.

42. Indian stand on Kashmir is summarized in the following paragraphs:-

 India claims that as the Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession
in October 1947, handing control of the Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir over to
India, the region is theirs, having been validated by the Indian Independence Act
and the departing British Empire.
 India claims that the UN Resolution in 1948 accepted India’s stand regarding all
outstanding issues between India and Pakistan.
 India claims that Pakistan has not removed its military forces, which India
views as the first step in implementing a resolution.
 India accused Pakistan of funding military groups in the region to create
instability, and accuses Pakistan of waging a proxy war.
 India accuses Pakistan of spreading anti-India sentiments among the people of
Kashmir through the media to alter Kashmiri opinion.

43. To allure the Muslims population of IOK through malicious propaganda India
claims that most regions of Pakistani Kashmir, especially northern areas, continue to
suffer from lack of political recognition, economic development and basic fundamental
rights.

44. After the terrorists attacks on twin towers in new York on 9/11, India has tried to
delegitimize the Kashmiri resistance by redefining the Kashmir issue in terms of
international terrorism and by blaming the insurgency on cross border infiltrations. The

7 Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute (Rwp,Svc Book Club, 2000) P-39


29

allegations of infiltrations from Azad Kashmir side are over exaggerated as the
substantial core of Kashmiri resistance is indigenous. “No external influence could have
persuaded the Kashmiri people to sustain their struggle for so long in the face of India’s
brutal military repression. It is always a popular desire for freedom which evokes such
overwhelming passion and sacrifices.”

45. The terrorism argument has strengthened India’s hand in dealing with the
Kashmir problem. India is treating Kashmir as a troubled and discontented state of India
whose population needs to be pacified. As an Indian academic has stated, “India’s dual
strategy of opposing a third party intervention and a time tested technique of wearing
out the militants before making political concessions, which it has tried with some
success in the northeast and Punjab, is expected to succeed in Kashmir as well” [vii]. A
twin strategy of dividing the resistance, through coercion and money is at play.
Draconian antiterrorism laws and the policy of systematic threatening and terrorizing
the population who cooperate with the insurgents remains while financial and political
favours are thrown over those who are willing to cooperate. They take full advantage of
the disunity of the freedom loving Hurriyat Conference and its boycott of the political
process in IOK.

Special status of Kashmir in Indian Constitution ( art. 370).

46. Indians believe it to be the land of Hindu Pundits and Head of their Mahabharata.
That is why Nehru himself had personal biases and interests attached to his ancestral
land. Kashmir being the only Muslim majority state within Indian Union, has a special
significance for Indian secularism.While Nehru originally considered the accession of
Kashmir to be provisional, pending a plebiscite, he was eventually converted to the view
that the Maharaja's accession was absolute.8 When the Indian Constitution was finally
drafted in January 1950, it contained special provisions relating to Jammu and Kashmir.
While Article 1 declared the state an integral part of the Indian Union, Article 370
conferred upon it special status unlike any other state in the Union. The powers of the

8
Alastair Lamb, Kashmir, A Disputed Legacy, 1846 –1990 (Hertfordshire : Roxford Books, 1991) P 133
30

Indian Union Parliament in Jammu and Kashmir were limited to defence, external affairs
and communications.

Simla Agreement.

47. After the trauma of 1971 war, Simla agreement was reached between Pakistan
and Indian on July 2, 1972. It renamed the cease-fire line as the Line of Control. The
relevant excerpt says, "In Jammu and Kashmir the Line of Control resulting from the
cease fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to
the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally
irrespective of material differences and legal interpretations. Both sides undertake to
refrain from threat or use of force in violation of this line". In addition, the two countries
also agreed to settle their differences including a final settlement of Jammu and
Kashmir by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful
means mutually agreed upon between them. As can be seen, the agreement to which
Pakistan continues to adhere does not alter status of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed
territory.

Kashmir in Turmoil –Till 1990.

48. In August 1965, some indigenous insurgency operations were started but the
movement fizzled out very soon. As a matter of fact, this was pushed to the periphery
after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. After the war and Simla Accord, the Kashmir Issue
was side lined. India Gandhi made a deal with Sheikh Abdullah In 1975 in exchange, to
return him to power. She hoped, for his cooperation for permanently integrating Jammu
and Kashmir into the Union. The plan backfired. However, elections held in 1977,
Abdullah won by a landslide.9 Malhotra Jagmohan the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir
sworn in, on 31 July 1984 a true puppet government under G.M. Shah. Jag Mohan
announced the imposition of direct Governor's rule and suspension of the Legislative
Assembly on 7 March 1986. In September, direct rule from New Delhi was imposed. By
January 1990 the Kashmir Freedom Struggle got initiated. Thus began a Kashmiri

9
Alastair Lamb, Kashmir, A Disputed Legacy, 1846 –1990 (Hertfordshire : Roxford Books, 1991) P 182-183
31

Intifada which soon came to be supported at the political level by a broad coalition,
setup in 1993. Named ‘All parties Hurriyat Conference’ (APHC), its objective was Azadi
(freedom). Azadi, however, remained undefined but certainly meant rejection of Indian
dominance. This brought the dispute at the centre of the Indo-Pakistan relations. After
neuclarisation of south Asia in 1998, Kashmir dispute became the nuclear flash point
and a threat to the peace and security of the region.

The Lahore Declaration:

49. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India (First BJP PM) , visited Pakistan
from 20-21 February, 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service on
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif`s invitation. A historic declaration called "The Lahore
Declaration" was signed by the two leaders which interalia agreed that their
Governments: 1). Shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of
Jammu and Kashmir. (2). Shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s
internal affairs.(3). Shall intensify their compositor and integrated dialogue process for
an early and positive outcome of the agreed bilateral agenda. (4.) Shall take immediate
steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and
discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence
building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.”

Kargil Operation.

50. No follow up dialogue could take place following the Lahore Declaration due to the
Kargil War immediately after the pact. After 9/11 and War against Terrorism, the focus
was diverted from the Kashmir issue. However the people of Kashmir still hope for their
better future. Kargil operation had excited the interest of people all over the world. It was
a rare occasion that the Indian Army ranking third in the world was totally surprised and
unnerved. India inducted more troops into IHK under the garb of Kargil hostilities and all
confidence building measures (CBMs) were halted. However, Kashmir dispute once
again got attention of international community.
32

Agra Summit.
51. A few months after Kargil, former BJP Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee invited
President Musharraf to India and they met in Agra on 15 July 2001. Wide-ranging
discussions were held on Pakistan-India relations but the talks ended in a dead lock as
the Indian side did not like President Musharraf`s meeting with the APHC leadership
earlier on 14 July in New Delhi. No agreement could be reached due to Indian
insistence on inclusion of a reference to cross border terrorism in final press release
which was never issued. After the summit the Indian Government marshaled its forces
to crackdown on the movement in IOK with renewed vigor to break the will of Kashmiri
people through unbridled campaign of terror and murder. No progress could be
achieved on the Kashmir dispute during the Islamabad SAARC summit in 2004 either.

President Musharraf’s - OUT OF BOX THINKING on resolution of Kashmir issue

52. On October 25, 2004, President General Pervez Musharraf while addressing
local media, called for a national debate on new options for the Kashmir dispute. The
necessity for this debate stemmed from the fact that demands for conversion of LoC
into an international border and plebiscite were not acceptable to Pakistan and India
respectively. To break the deadlock he suggested that identification of various zones of
the disputed territory needs to be carried out followed by their demilitarization and a
determination of their status. He identified seven regions for this purpose. Two regions –
Azad Kashmir and Northern areas – are under the control of Pakistan whereas five
regions are under Indian control. The first part comprises Jammu, Sambha and Katwa
where Hindus are in majority. The second part also comprises Jammu but the areas
include Dodha, Phirkuch and Rajawri where Muslim population is in majority which
includes Gujars, Sidhans and Rajas who are also associated with Azad Kashmir. The
third part is the area of Kashmir Valley which also has a Muslim majority. The fourth part
is Kargil which has Shia and Balti population in majority and the fifth area is Ladakh and
adjoining areas where Buddhists live.

53. President Musharraf further said that it was imperative that the linguistic, ethnic,
religious, geographic, political and other aspects of these seven regions should be
33

reviewed and a peaceful solution to the problem found. President Musharraf’s call for
open discussion on Kashmir was termed by the Pakistani Opposition parties as a “roll-
back” and it was dismissed by India as unacceptable as it envisaged redrawing of the
territorial map in J & K.

54. President Musharraf’s proposal for the creation of seven demilitarized zones in J
& K was consistent with his earlier attempts to help create the much needed negotiating
space for India and Pakistan that would allow them to move beyond their stated
positions on Kashmir. In this context it is worth recalling that in a remarkable reversal of
Islamabad’s verbal strategy on Kashmir, President Pervez Musharraf publicly stated on
December 17, 2003 that even though “we are for United Nations Security
resolutions…now we have left that aside.” To mollify New Delhi’s concerns relating to
the issue of alleged “cross-border” infiltration from Pakistan, President Musharraf
categorically pledged in an Joint statement issued in Islamabad following his meeting
with the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee on January 6, 2004, on the
sidelines of Islamabad SAARC Summit that “he will not permit any territory under
Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner.”

55. By dropping its longstanding demand for a UN-mandated plebiscite over divided
Kashmir and by assuring New Delhi that Islamabad would not encourage violent activity
in the Indian- held Kashmir, President Musharraf went a long way to help create much
needed political space for New Delhi to have a substantive engagement with Islamabad
on the Kashmir dispute. Instead of transforming the dynamics of India-Pakistan conflict
from a zero- sum competition over Kashmir to a positive sum situation in which both
sides would gain from a settlement of the dispute, India used President Musharraf`s
commitment to his Four Point Formula negatively by declaring the Kashmiri freedom
struggle as state sponsored terrorism. In his book "neither a Hawk nor a Dove" Khurshid
Kasuri the former Foreign Minister has mentioned that Musharraf’s 4-point formula is
regarded as a realistic way forward in resolving the Kashmir issue and both sides were
close to a solution.
34

Current Situation in IOK


BJP`s Hard Line on Kashmir

56. BJP is the only main political party that has included in its elections manifesto
the repeal of Article 370 that grants IOK special autonomous status within Indian Union.
Since its coming into power there are more ceasefire violations along LoC and WB than
previously have been. BJP also harbors plans to change demographic make-up of IOK
by settling West Pakistan Refugees, other non-State non-Muslim subjects in IOK and
turning its Muslim majority into a minority. It has been reported in Indian media that
some Indian officials have long been advocating the idea of settling non-State non-
Muslim subjects in IOK as the ‘final solution’ to the ‘Kashmir problem’. It is suspected
that by bringing changes in the religious make-up of IOK India will feel confident of
getting a favourable outcome should it decide to conduct a plebiscite styled on the
guidelines given by the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Recently plans have been unfolded
to resettle the Kashmiri Pundits to their ancestral homeland as well.

Election 2014 in IOK

57. Pakistan and majority of Kashmiris reject any farcical elections being held under
coercion in IOK and do not consider these as a substitute to free and impartial plebiscite
under the UN auspices. Elections for 87-seat IOK Legislative Assembly were held in five
phases starting from 25th November 2014. Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) emerged
as the largest party winning 28 seats. BJP which had created much hype by announcing
its Mission of getting 44+ and forming its government in IOK could get only 25 seats.
But in its campaign polarized IOK on communal lines as it whipped up Hindu
nationalism to consolidate the Hindu votes of Jammu. This led to a sharp division
among electorates on communal lines as Muslims totally disowned BJP while most of
the Hindus rallied behind it.

58. PDP had to form a coalition with BJP. Both parties agreed on a common
minimum agenda. Mufti Muhammad Sayeed was sworn in as new Chief Minister of IOK.
In making an alliance both parties agreed on a Common Minimum Programme. The
PDP diluted its stand on Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) whereas the BJP
35

took a complete U-turn on Article 370 and both parties left open the issue of
rehabilitation of West Pakistan refugees. The coalition government will be empowered
to catalyze reconciliation and confidence-building within and across the Line of Control,
thereby ensuring peace in the state.

THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION ON KASHMIR

CHINA

59. China has always advised Pakistan to solve the Kashmir issue bilaterally with
India. The Chinese believe that promotion of trade and commercial relations promotes
economic dependency, creating a conducive environment for addressing the difficult
and mutually contentious issues.

60. Over the years, taking advantage of the West’s fascination with “rising India” and
especially after terrorists attacks of 9/11 Delhi has tried to bring both the Kashmiri
struggle and Pakistan into disrepute by linking them to religious radicalism and
terrorism. The move has had its desired effect. Even China, a traditional supporter of
Pakistan’s position on Kashmir, has shifted to neutrality in the interest of improving
relations with India and out of its concern about the impact of religious extremism on the
situation in Western China.

USA

61. Both Afghanistan and India want to improve relations with Pakistan but expect
Pakistan to change its behavior by not allowing terrorists operate from its soil. The
implication is that the change will be in Pakistan’s interest and will be its own reward. It
means the improvement in relations to be cost free for them. Pakistan being a major
partner of the US in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan expects a conciliatory role
in establishment of peace in the region. USA cannot defeat Al Qaeda and Taliban
without a stronger partnership from Pakistan which at peace with itself and enjoying
peaceful neighbourly relations with India and Afghanistan. For that India and
Afghanistan will also have to reciprocate.
36

62. Obama Administration should exert its influence over both. USA should impress
upon India to include a meaningful progress on the Kashmir dispute. India has always
been opposed to any third party intervention in Kashmir and under Modi this opposition
is becoming stronger.

PART-III

Role of Media (Hostile Propaganda)

63. Over the years a positive change has been observed in the Pakistani media
which is no ore obsessed with India with the exception of reports on the recent hostility
along the Line of Control (LoC) that has become a major irritant for both the countries.
However, in India, the popular view of Pakistan is still rigid and often infused with
antagonism. Pakistan continues to figure in India's domestic political discourse.
'Pakistan Bashing' is seen as a 'vote gainer'. This was also evident in the recent Indian
elections. The Indian media mostly has a negative hard line approach towards
Pakistan. This restricts domestic space in Delhi for taking any bold initiatives at
reconciliation and mutual accommodation or even responding positively to any such
move.

64. Lately, a barrage of unprovoked hostile statements by Indian leadership mainly


from BJP against Pakistan for domestic consumption and negative referencing in
international conferences and seminars increase the level of tension between the two
sides. Similarly hostile propaganda carried out by the media creates negativity.
Pakistan government has time and again brought this issue to the attention of the Indian
side and stressing on the need for creating a conducive environment, enabling the two
sides to move forward on issues of mutual importance.

65. The Indian offensive against Pakistan spearheaded by a cultural invasion


through the use or misuse of Pakistan’s electronic and print media, some misguided
NGO’s, and the soft power of the Indian film industry is ably conducted through Indian
media. This cultural invasion is targeted at the people and the intelligentsia of Pakistan.
37

Its real aim is to convince our people that Pakistan and India are culturally the same.
The propagation of this line of thought strikes at the very roots of Pakistan’s ideology
and the rationale for its establishment. The purpose of this propaganda campaign is to
break the will of the people of Pakistan to resist India’s hegemonic designs.

66. Ambassador(retd) Tauqeer Hussain believes that this propaganda lacks validity
on factual grounds. A comparison of the essential characteristics of the Hindu and
Islamic civilizations would show that they are far apart from each other. While Islam
teaches human equality and brotherhood, Hinduism is based on an impregnable
division of the society into castes barring vertical mobility. Those born in the lower strata
of the society are condemned to accept their exploitation at the hands of the people in
the higher castes without any possibility of improving their lot. The untouchables, as the
name suggests, are at the lowest rung of the society, destined to lead a life of abject
misery and deprivation. Quaid-i-Azam highlighted the cultural differences between the
Muslims and the Hindus in the following manner in his correspondence with Gandhi in
1944: “We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any
definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million and, what is more, we
are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art
and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws
and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions.
In short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of
international law we are a nation.”

WAY FORWARD

67. It is high time that a soul searching is done at the highest level how to conduct
relations with India in the changing global emphasis from geo-politics to geo-economics
which has put India in the center of the US pivot to Asia policy. Bartering away or
compromising on Kashmir as part of historical baggage to improve relations with India is
not an option at all. Our internal challenges have now become far graver than the
external ones and that is where all our national energies should be focused. The human
instruments used in advancing our interests in Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir, have
38

become irrelevant after 9/11 especially after our tacit acceptance in the Joint statement
with India during Islamabad SAARC Summit of 2004 and later after Mumbai attacks in
2008. A major national effort is now needed to redefine Pakistan’s national purpose that
leaves no room for such menacing forces regardless of whether they are, or used to be,
strategic assets, political allies of the mainstream parties, or militant affiliates of the
Islamic parties.

68. Pakistan is now a responsible nuclear power and has enough conventional
capability to face any aggression. This strength should give us confidence and courage
to take the risk for peace. A major paradigm shift is required taking clear positions
against the Taliban, other extremists and sectarian radicals—regardless of the fact
under what name they operate, whatever their agenda and target and whichever part of
the country they are based in—as one. In this age of high tech satellite imagery policy
of hedging will not work anymore. The Army Public school terrorist attack in December
2014 is a "water shed" in Pakistan`s war against internal terrorists and extremist being
carried out by the brave armed forces of the country under the name " Zarb-e-Azb"
following the unanimous approval of the National Action Plan (NAP) by the National
Parliament in January 2015. The current government, therefore, has finally got the
critical public support to meet this challenge.

69. To safeguard our vital national interests, Pakistan has no choice but to resist
India’s hegemonic designs in the region while recognizing the strategic necessity of
peace between the two countries. This would be possible, however, only if we are able
to achieve internal political stability, maintain our cultural identity, and increase our
economic strength relative to that of India while maintaining a credible deterrent at the
lowest level of armaments and armed forces.

70. On the Indian side, there is little hope for a movement on the Kashmir dispute
during the tenure of Indian Prime Minster Narendra Modi due to its hindutva agenda and
domestic political compulsions. Our diplomatic efforts should be on defusing tensions
with India to reduce the risk of an armed conflict and to enable us to allocate more
resources for economic development. Trade with India should be conducted on a level
39

playing field and on mutually beneficial basis with due regard to the concerns of local
traders and industry. According to Mr. Khurshid Kasuri, " both countries had begun to
realize that perpetual tension would be a barrier to attaining their full potential10.

71. In addition to fully implementing the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, we must
upgrade and strengthen our strategic partnership with China. Promote friendly relations
with Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan to balance India’s power advantage over us. We
should also build up bridges of understanding with Russia while developing cooperation
with Central Asian Republics. For regional cooperation, the Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO) should be given preferred attention as it could open doors for
tapping economic opportunities in CARs under the CPEC.

72. For a lasting peace in the region, resolution of the Kashmir dispute in line with
the relevant UN resolutions according to the wishes of the kashmiris is the right way
forward. Pakistan should continue its unflinching political, moral and diplomatic support
for the kashmiri people and keep rasing the issue at the UN and other international fora
specially OIC.The continued human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK)
should also be highlighted at United Nations Human Rights Council and others.
Pakistan should also make efforts in making the role of the UNMOGIP more relevant
and assertive.

CONCLUSION

73. A stable and prosperous Pakistan having good neighbourly relations with India is
necessary for economic rise of India. There is definitely a strategic imperative of peace
between Pakistan and India because of their status as de facto nuclear powers and the
need for them to focus their energies and resources on the mammoth task of socio-
economic development of a large portions of their populace. The resolution of the
Kashmir dispute is essential for achievement of these objectives.

10 Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove P. 320


40

74. Under the current BJP led government, relations will continue to suffer from
recurrent periods of tensions and strains because of India’s hegemonic designs
in South Asia. In any case Pakistan should engage with India on the principle of
sovereign equality and avoiding appeasement as well as political expediency for short
term gains overriding issues of national interest like the Kashmir dispute.
41

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