GROUP 3

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Group Members:

Madrideo, Ellaine

Marasigan, Gian

Medina, Aira

Muhi, Christian Joshua

Potestas, Charmili

Quiñones, Jenny Marie

Ramos, Karl Ernest

Reyes, Charlyn

Rosales, Dianne Kris

Vito Cruz, Remiel Wallace

I.Constitution

 Sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and
those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary sovereignty.
(Legaspi v. MInistry of Finance, GR No. 58289, July 24, 1982)
 The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the land.
 It is an instrument permanent in nature that intends to not only meet the existing
conditions but also to govern the future
 Doctrine of Constitutional supremacy: The Constitution is the supreme law to which
all other laws must conform to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.
 Written charter enacted and adopted by people by which a government for them
is established
 absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates (people)
 The Philippine Constitution is written, rigid, and enacted.
 Written: precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents
 Rigid: can only be amended by a formal and usually difficult process
 Enacted: struck off at a definite time and place following a conscious or
deliberate effort taken by a constituent or ruler.

II. Origin and History of the Philippine Constitution

Constitution of the Philippines:

1. Malolos Constitution (Jan. 20, 1889)

2. 1935 Constitution or Commonwealth Constitution (May 14, 1935)
3. 1973 Constitution or Marcos Constitution (Jan. 17, 1973)
4. 1986 Constitution or Freedom Constitution (March 25, 1986)
5. 1987 Constitution or the Present Constitution (Feb. 2, 1987)

Where it all started:

1. During the Pre-Hispanic period the system of laws were promulgated by the datu

and/or council of elders.

2. 1521 or Spanish Era: this started the Spanish Regime/Civil Law of Spain which

was enforced for 300 years.

3. June 12, 1898. Proclamation of the Philippines Independence

4. January 21, 1899: Establishment of the First Philippine Republic

5. December 10, 1898: signing of the Treaty of Paris where Philippines was ceded to

U.S.A; organization of a military government by U.S. A.

6. Creation of the Schurman Commission (First Philippine Commission)

7. Taft Commission (Second Philippine Commission)

8. Philippine Bill of 1902: called for the creation of the Philippine Commission as the

Upper House and Philippine Assembly as the Lower House in a bicameral

legislature in 1907.

9. The Jones Law of 1916 promulgated the Philippine Autonomy Act which then

created the Senate and the House of Representatives; Upper and Lower House

respectively

10. Tydings – McDuffie Act of 1935: established the Philippine Commonwealth

11. September 21, 1972 was the Declaration of Martial Law of Pres. Ferdinand E.

Marcos. (Proclamation 1081)

12. •January 17, 1981: Lifting of Martial Law under Proclamation No. 2045.

13. 1985: Call for Snap Election by President Marcos.

14. February 1986 People Power installed President Corazon C. Aquino.

15. Proclamation No. 1, February 28, 1986 (adoption of a Provisional/Revolutionary

Government); Executive Order No. 1, February 28, 1986; Proclamation No. 3,

March 25, 1986 (Adoption of a Provisional Constitution)

16. February 2, 1987: adoption of the 1987 Constitution

III. Primary purpose of Constitutional Construction

Like a statute, the primordial rule in the construction and interpretation of the
constitution is to ascertain the intent of the framers of the written constitution. The
intention being referred to is that which is readily available in the constitution itself. Thus,
the first consideration for construction of the constitution is the natural meaning of the
words used in every provision should be taken as it is. Technical words should be given
meaning, unless it appears that terms and were used in a more popular sense.

However, the construction and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution

must also give effect to the fundamental purpose of the Philippine Constitution, which is
to protect and enhance the people’s interests, as a nation and as persons. Thus, the
interpretation of the constitution that should be effected is in a perspective to attain this
fundamental objective.

IV. Construction construed as enduring for ages

A constitution is not intended to provide only for the exigencies of a few years but
is to endure through a long lapse of ages. It must also governs the life of the people not
only at the time of its framing but as far as to the indefinite future. It should not be inflexible
nor immobile to adapt to various crisis of human affairs. It constitutes not only limited for
the passing hour, but principles for the expanding future as well. It is something that must
be solid, permanent and substantial for the stability that protects the rights, liberty and
property of the rich and the poor alike.

A constitution must be construed as a dynamic process envisioned to stand for a

great length of time, to be progressive and not static. Its construction ought not to change
with emergencies or conditions nor be construed to inflexibly identify its text with the
circumstances that inspired its adoption that would make it incapable of responding to the
needs of the future. Neither should it be interpreted narrowly or pedantically because it
does not contain mathematical formulas but organic living institutions.

Therefore, a constitution should be given such meaning and applied as to meet

new or changed conditions as they arise that would make the constitutional provision
consistent with reason, justice and the public interest.
 V. How language of constitution construed

The primary source from which to determine constitutional intent or purpose is the
language of the constitution itself. The words used do not have a narrow or constricted
meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies.

1. Verba legis – Where the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution that
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
because the fundamental law is essentially a document of the people

Rule: general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary is indicated.

2. Ratio legis est anima – Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.

The case of Ordillo v. Comelec (Verba legis)

Issue: Whether the sole province of Ifugao can be validly constituted in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) under Section 15, Article 10 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

Held: No. The keywords like provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas connotes that a region consists of more than one unit. In its ordinary sense region
means two or more provinces, this Ifugao cannot be constituted the Cordillera
Autonomous Region (CAR).

The case of Lazada v. COMELEC (Ratio legis est anima)

 The term “Batasang Pambansa,” which means the regular national

assembly, found in many sections of the 1973 Constitution refers to the
regular, not to the interim or temporary Batasang Pambansa.
 The above example has acquired a technical meaning before they are used
in the constitution must be taken in that sense when such words as thus
used are construed.

VI. Aids to construction, generally

Apart from the language of the constitution as the primary and intrinsic aid to
constitutional constructions, courts likewise resort to such extraneous aids:

 The history or realities existing during the adoption of the constitution

 Proceedings of the adoption of the constitution (The debates or the records)
 Priors laws and judicial decisions
 Contemporaneous construction
 Consequences of alternative interpretations
 It has been held that the most important single factor in determining the intention
of the people from whom the constitution emanated is the language in which it is
expressed. The interpretation of a constitution tends to respond to changing conceptions
of political and social values.

VII.Realities existing at the time of adoption; object to be accomplished

History many a time holds the key that unlocks the door to understanding. The
courts look to the history of the times, examine the state of things existing when the
constitution was framed and adopted, and interpret it in the light of these factors.

In Legaspi v. Minister of Finance (G.R. No. 58289, July 24,1982, 115 SCRA
418) explains the importance of historical background of the constitution in construing it,
ff: In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because
there are certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment at
the time of its adoption.

CASE:

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:

Petitioners maintain that the Executive Order which, in effect, allows members

of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other

government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. This runs counter

to Art. 7, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which provides that the President, Vice-President,

the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless

otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during

their tenure.

ISSUE:

W/N the prohibition in Art. 7, Sec. 13 admits of the broad exceptions made for

appointive officials in general under Art. 9-B, Sec. 7, par. 2.

HELD:

No. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention

underlying the provision. The practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the

scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during the Marcos era. The

qualifying phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution” of Sec. 13, Art. 7

cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions of Sec. 7, Art. 9-B of the 1987

Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple

offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is

meant for the exception of the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,

their deputies and assistants. To construe otherwise would be to render nugatory and

meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution. E.O.

284 is therefore declared null and void.

VIII. Proceeding of the convention

 General rule: If the language of the constitutional provision is plain it is not

necessary to resort to extrinsic aids
 EXCEPTION: when the intent of the framer doesn’t appear in the text or it
has more than one construction.
 Intent of a constitutional convention member doesn’t necessarily mean it
ialso the people’s intent.
 The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into because it
sheds light into what the framers of the constitution had in mind at that time.
Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR illustrates the rule that the debates or proceedings may
be resorted to, to ascertain the intent of the framers of the Constitution as to the meaning
of a phrase or word used therein.
 Whether the term “agriculture” as used in the Constitution embraces raising
livestock, poultry and swine • Transcript of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of “agriculture” clearly shows that it was never
the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program
of the Government
 Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and residential lands
 Held: it is evident in the foregoing discussion that Sec 2 of RA 6657 which includes
“private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine
raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is INVALID, to the extent of the
aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform
program of the State.
IX. Contemporaneous construction and writing

 It may be resorted to resolve, but not to create ambiguities.

 In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction are entitled to great
weight however when it comes to the constitution it has no weight and will
not be allowed to change in any way its meaning.
 Writings of delegates – has persuasive force but it depends on two things:
 if opinions are based on facts known to them and not
established it is immaterial
 on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not be a shade
better in the eyes of the law.

X. Previous laws and judicial rulings

• framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of prevailing judicial doctrines

concerning the subject of constitutional provisions. THUS when courts adopt
principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to overrule
said principle.

XI. Changes in phraseology

• Before a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of revisions and changes in

phraseology (ex. deletion of words) and these changes may be inquired into to
ascertain the intent or purpose of the provision as approved.

• HOWEVER mere deletion, as negative guides, cannot prevail over the positive
provisions nor is it determinative of any conclusion.

• Certain provisions in our constitution (from 1935 to the present) are mere
reenactments of prior constitutions thus these changes may indicate an intent to
modify or change the meaning of the old provisions.

Galman v. Pamaran

• the phrase” no person shall be x x x compelled in a criminal case be a witness

against himself” is changed in such a way the words criminal cases had been
deleted simply means that it is not limited to criminal cases only.
XII. Consequences of alternative constructions

• Consequences that may follow from alternative construction of doubtful constitutional

provisions constitute an important factor to consider in construing them.

• If a provision has more than one interpretation, that construction which would lead to
absurd, impossible or mischievous consequences must be rejected. • e.g. directory and
mandatory interpretation: Art. 8 Sec 15(1) requires judges to render decision within
specific periods from the date of submission for decision of cases (construed as directory
because if otherwise it will cause greater injury to the public)

XIII. Constitution construed as a whole

• Provision should not be construed separately from the rest it should be interpreted as
a whole and be harmonized with conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and
effect. • sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together
to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution.

CASE :

Arturo Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance and Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995

Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
The present case involves motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision
dismissing the petitions for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there
are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners.
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the
press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. At any rate, it is averred, “even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional”, citing in support of the case of
Murdock v. Pennsylvania.

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand,
asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies
transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that
taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall “evolve a progressive
system of taxation”.

Further, the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP), argues that the legislature was
to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present
Constitution embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT
would, therefore, be to infringe a constitutional policy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the aforementioned grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the
Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever
waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the
law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other businesses have
long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not
discriminate against the press because “even non discriminatory taxation on
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in that
case (Murdock v. Pennsylvania) of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly
for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior
restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax.
It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed
on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of
services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to
its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution.

XIV. Mandatory and Directory

It is to be complied that the constitutional provisions are to be interpreted as mandatory

in nature, except if it is expressly provided that there is different intention to be complied
with. The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency. Expediency is to be defined as convenient and practical or
suitability. The reason for expediency is that the general public will disregard the letter
of the Constitution which will result less injury on their part. The courts usually regard it
as mandatory rather than directory, as a general rule.

It is presumed and ruled as mandatory for the reason of the sovereign itself speaks and
lays down rules which for the time being at least are to control alike the government and
the governed.

The constitutional provisions are binding upon all departments of the government. The
failure of the legislature to enact the necessary legislation as required by the constitution
does not make the legislature illegal or its member de facto officers, but the failure to
discharge a mandatory duty would automatically result the forfeiture of an office, in the
absence of a statute to that effect.

In the case of ACORD v. Zamora invoked Article X, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
which raises the constitutionality of General Appropriations Act (GAA).
ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT,
INC., VS. ZAMORA (G.R. No. 144256)

FACTS:

The President proposed an Internal Revenue Allotment of P121,778,000,000. This

became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also
known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000.

It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that

the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.

Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same
under “Unprogrammed funds”. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has
ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present
case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the
constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not
automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.

HELD:

Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the
executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution
amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers
intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead
of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded
differently.

Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof,
the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or
impede the automatic release of the IRA.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was
motivated by the laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal
management.” The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule
of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the
parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of
the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a
portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

XV. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE

The rule is that the constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the letter of its
provisions clearly intended to operate retrospectively.

An example for the principle of prospectivity is the provision, Article IV, Section 20 of the
1973 which states: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence”

In the Magtoto v. Manguera case, the provision was ruled to be given a prospective effect
not retrospective.

FACTS:
Petitioner Clemente Magtoto contended that the confession obtained from a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to
silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with Article 6, section
20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution. Petitioner stressed that since Article 6, section 20 of
1973 Philippine Constitution favor the accused it should be given retroactive effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be
given retrospective effect
HELD:
Supreme Court holds that Article 6, section 20 of 1973 Philippine Constitution should be
given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained
from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been
informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same
had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same
had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after
January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no
law gave the accused the right to be informed before that date.
XVI. Applicability of Rules of Statutory Construction

 Rules of Statutory Construction are also applicable in construing

constitution (e.g. Sarmiento v. Mison).
 In the case of Sarmiento v. Mison, the case was construed on the following
considerations:
a. The court will construe the applicable constitutional
provisions, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed, but in accordance
with what they said and provide;
b. Constitutional provision must be presumed to have been
framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them; and
c. The clear and positive intent of the framers.

CASE:

Sarmiento v. Mison (G.R. No. 79974)

FACTS:

In 1987, then President Corazon Aquino appointed Salvador Mison as Commissioner of

the Bureau of Customs without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments. Herein petitioners, both of whom happened to be lawyers and professors
of constitutional law, filed the instant petition for prohibition on the ground that the
aforementioned appointment violated Section 16, Art. VII of the1987 Constitution.
Petitioners argued that the appointment of a bureau head should be subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of a Commissioner of Customs is subject to confirmation

by the Commission on Appointments.

HELD:

No, construing Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution would show that the President
is well within her authority to appoint bureau heads without submitting such nominations
before the Commission on Appointments. In its ruling, the SC traced the history of the
confirmatory powers of the Commission on Appointments (which is part of the legislative
department) vis-a-vis the appointment powers of the President.
  Under Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential
appointments required the consent or confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. As a result, the Commission became very powerful, eventually
transforming into a venue for horse-trading and similar malpractices.
 On the other hand, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was molded
and remolded by successive amendments, the 1973 Constitution placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part
of the legislature.

Under the current constitution, the Court held that the framers intended to strike a "middle
ground" in order to reconcile the extreme set-ups in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
As such, while the President may make appointments to positions that require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution also grants her
the power to make appointments on her own without the need for confirmation by the
legislature.

Section 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution enumerates four groups of public officers:

 Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this constitution;
 All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
 Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
 Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

According to the Court, only the presidential appointments of the first group of public
officers are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. A review of the
deliberations would show that bureau heads have been deleted from the first group,
precisely because they are lower in rank as compared to other officers enumerated in the
same group.

Therefore, Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs need not be

confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

XVII. Generally, constitutional provisions are self–executing

General rule: Constitutional provisions are self-executing.

Exceptions:

 When the provisions themselves expressly require legislations to implement them;

and
 When, from their language or tenure, they are merely declarations of policies and
principles.

Self – executing provisions is:

  One which is complete by itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislations;
 Supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected.
 However, a self-executing provision does not preclude the legislature from
enacting laws which facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of self-
executing provisions, prescribe a practice to be used for their enforcement, provide
a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place safeguards around the exercise of the right.
 Example of self-executing constitutional provision is Sec. 10 second par. of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS)

Note: The rule is that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective.

CASE:

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997

FACTS:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,”
will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale
may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.

2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

RULINGS:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.

a) Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of

the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

b) A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the

right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.

c) 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.

2. The Court agrees.

 a) In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.

b) It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the

present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

c) Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling
stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

XVIII. Three Maxims employed as aids to construe constitutional provisions

1. Verba legis - Plain meaning rule. Whenever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed.

2. Ratio legis est anima - Where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.

3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat - The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

(Francisco v. House of Representatives, GR No. 160261, November 10, 2003

XIX. Construction of US Constitutional provisions adopted in 1987 Constitution

The Bill of Right, and most of the provisions on eminent domain, police power, and
taxation in the 1987 Constitution, 1935 Constitution, and 1973 Constitution were
patterned after the US Constitution.

It is a settled rule in the construction of statutes that if laws were patterned after a
forign statute, the decision of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled
of great weight of such local statutes. Likewise applies in the constitutional provisions that
were patterned after the US Constitution, that the construction of the US courts
concerning such provisions will be given persuasive effect and given consideration.
XX. Other illustrative cases in constitutional construction

Office of Ombudsman v. Masing

GR No. 165465
January 22,2008

FACTS: The respondent, Florita A. Masing was former principal of Davao City Integrated
Special School (DCISS) was charged guilty by the Ombudsman to have violated the RA
6713 and ordered for her dismissal from office. The respondent appealed the
Ombudsman decision to the Court of Appeals in contention that, Ombudsman does not
have jurisdiction over the case against her, but, DECS who has the proper authority to
hear, try, and decide the case. She invokes RA 4670, “The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.” The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Ombudsman decision and
ordered for her reinstatement. Therefore, the original petitioners, parents of students
studying at the DCISS filed a petition for review for certiorari.

While the first case is on appeal before the Supreme Court, the respondent was once
again charged with oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official
duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.
With the second case, she was found guilty by the Ombudsman and ordered for her
suspension for six months without pay. The respondent once again, appealed her case
before the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction
over her case as contemplated in the Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and
RA 4670, the latter reversed and set aside the Ombudsman decision. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school officers and
employees, or merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports?

RULING: Yes. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670
confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A.
No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was
ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its
meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were
quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all
public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. If an issue should ever
arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 have
abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by implication are not favored, and courts
have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or
inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No.
4670 “reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school
teachers” should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed
in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS.
In Re Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch
24, Cabananatuan City, respectively.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998

FACTS: Honorably Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta were appointed as
judges of the Regional Trial Court signed by the President on March 30, 1998 however,
such appointment papers was received by the Chief Justice’s chamber on May 12, 1998.
Such appointment made by the president was contested by some sectors for its
constitutionality to the Court of Appeals in view of the forthcoming May 1998 presidential
elections. The question on the constitutionality on the appointments Hon. Valenzuela and
Hon. Vallarte was on the ground of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the president from appointing two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall
not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The invoked Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution may coincide with Section 4(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides: The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. ** **. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Also pertinent although not specifically discussed is Section 9 of the same Article VIII
which provides that for the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments —
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Council for every vacancy — within
ninety days from the submission of the list.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can make appointments to the judiciary during the
period of ban in the interest of public service?

RULING: No, the appointment of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta is void. The time
frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of
appointments, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the
former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils
outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition
of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally
and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those
occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited
appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed
out, their making is considered an election offense.
To the contention that may perhaps be asserted, that Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII
should prevail over Section 15 of Article VII, because they may be considered later
expressions of the people when they adopted the Constitution, it suffices to point out that
the Constitution must be construed in its entirely as one, single instrument.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) AND PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
GR No. 191002
March 17, 2010

FACTS: Chief Justice Reynato Puno will vacate the position on May 10, 2010, and a
presidential election is scheduled to be held on May 2010. Thus, Chief Justice Puno’s
retirement would coincide with the Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution that
prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within
90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor.
With this occasion, Judicial Bar Council (JBC) is left with a dilemma if they will resume
the screening the candidates nominated to succeed Chief Justice Puno and submit the
list of nominees to the incumbent president even during the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Prior to the case at bar, the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch
62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela), the Court
held that Section 15, Article VII, prohibits the exercise by the President the power to
appoint and it includes the vacancy in the judicial positions during the period stated in the
provision. This case was used by JBC to defer from submitting to the incumbent president
a list of nominees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President may appoint the next chief justice as an exception
to Section 15, Article VII?

Ruling: Yes, the president can appoint the next chief justice. As can be seen, Article VII
is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by
the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in
Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department
and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among
others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing
for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article
mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They
would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article
VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall—an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be disregarded. Thereby,
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The
failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution. The 90-
day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for
the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it
was “couched in stronger negative language.” Such interpretation even turned out to be
conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations on
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 83896
February 22, 1991

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Execution Order 284 (EO 284), to which the
petitioners contends that Sections 1-3 of the said Executive Order allows members of
Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, which is in contradiction with the
provision of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits public
respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure. Thus, the petitioners contest the
constitutionality of EO 284 for adding an exception to Sec 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President
may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII
thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional
basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed
to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII
or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned
therein are concerned.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional?
RULING:
EO 284 is unconstitutional.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision
under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils,
if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers
of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to
that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
17

particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the

whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during
their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution
is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
21

literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution
itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under
Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under
Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations,
Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.