1. Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs.

Secretary of Budget and Management

FACTS:

For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or
the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a
mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the
above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual
senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to
propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and,
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive
function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-
legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered
nothing less than malfeasance.

RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere
speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES:

I. whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and
II. whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and
illegal.

HELD:

I.

A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as
citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and
this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before
the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient
interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established.
Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

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Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

II.

The Court rules in the negative.

In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of
validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there
must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of
proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x
x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it.”

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s
request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.

PORK BARREL:

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may
be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are
consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the
President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.

As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress
receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the
Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

_______________

NOTES:

POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

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2. Senate vs. Ermita

FACTS:

This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them
to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate
President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample
time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate
Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the
Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet
given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials
invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

HELD:

To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the
Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question
hour.

Question Hour:

The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations
shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or
the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads
during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation:

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The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected
by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must
be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of
a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power -- the President.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof,
whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a
declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that
the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds
of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the
President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive
considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted.
It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary
legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.

3. Pimentel vs. Aguirre

FACTS:

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In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and agencies, including
SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the
year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non--personal services items (Section 1) and (2)
ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued
AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a
25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy; and
II. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments

HELD:

I.

I.

Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country.
However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are
subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the
internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x
x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged
public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and
Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the
implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was
suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with
the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust,
much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of
supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to

5
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing
economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an
advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory
imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.

II.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000)

4. The Province Of North Cotabato, Et Al . vs. The Government Of The Republic Of The Philippines, Et Al .

FACTS:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to
be signed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases
bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court namely:-

 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare unconstitutional
and to have the MOA-AD disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to
exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally
impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD
and without operative effect and those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently
enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement
derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal and
impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the MILF starting
in 1996; then in 1997, they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of
2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000, they took the hall of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation.
It was when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF
was hesitant; however, this negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace
talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire
between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the crafting of
MOA-AD in its final form was born.

MOA-AD Overview

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This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the
Tripoli Agreement, organic act of ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter
etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment (law of compact, treaty and order). The body is
divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and
its adjacent islands. These people have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they
have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe
the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having
entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the
"Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region,
involving the present ARMM, parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The
territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the
signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate agreement.
Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of
the BJE territory; they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to
the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that
within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and
management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no
provision on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade
relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as
environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE
is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation in international meetings
and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate
in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to
or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE shall also have the right to explore its
resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to
natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions
and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e.
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the
Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the
right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the
comprehensive compact as well.

ISSUES:

I. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial
review;
II. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD; and
III. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

7
The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

I.

On the Procedural Issue

As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on issues that
are hypothetical, feigned problems or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for
adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable rights and
obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse of
discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating
their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie
case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists.
When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts
made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in
question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato, Province of
Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan, City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City
of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it is their LGUs which will be affected in whole
or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as
taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional
plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is
also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement
for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim
Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since
they stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been suspended
and that the President has already disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and
academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (b) the
situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained
of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case especially when the
plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions
moot and academic. The MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable expectation
that petitioners will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of

8
repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD,
such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat.

II.

On the Substantive Issue

The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, and integrated therein is the recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if
nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public
affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of
expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards —the
effectivity of which need not await the passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be
responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to information and
disclosure. And feedback means not only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents.
Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the
constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave abuse of
discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of executive privilege because he already waived it when he
complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as enshrined in
the State policy. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement
of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that would clearly
affect their lives, rights and destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should
have observed the free and prior informed consent to the ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by
the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since they allowed delineation and recognition of
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.

III.

With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be all accommodated
under the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:

 On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in crafting the
MOA-AD, the term association was adapted from the international law. In international law, association happens

9
when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its international status as state; free association is
a middle ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are
consistent with the international definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into
the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently
objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant
to a local government; even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies
recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the MOA-AD
merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to
enter into relations with other states. As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic.

On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the
plebiscite for them to become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these
areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law
states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming
that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included
in its territory are areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the BJE in the
MOA-AD shall be within sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is
necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled
that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution; otherwise new legislation will not concur with the
Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD. The Constitution is clear
that only the President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation. Should the
BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and
development. Because clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but
rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing
a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

 On matters of domestic statutes.

Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro
people used in the MOA-AD. Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal
peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a clear
departure from the procedure embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

 On matters of international law.

10
The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land. In
international law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that people can freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. There are the
internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which takes
the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with
respect accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in
exceptional cases when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-
determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional cases, recognizes that
the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated within states
do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, but they do
have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination; have the right to
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for
financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own police and
security force; but rather, it shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the
people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous people, the law does not obligate States to grant
indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent states.

 On the basis of the suspensive clause

It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the provisions assailed as
unconstitutional shall not take effect until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from the
President stating that negotiations shall be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—
such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-AD. Apart from this, the suspensive
clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks even if
it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence
hinges on the query whether the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace
Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. The
power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but is rather
implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to
prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may
require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course,
unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may not be prevented from submitting
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for
constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly,
the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly

11
consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally
implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were
assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to the preservation and defense of the Constitution
but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.

The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is not a question
of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is
mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework –which changes would include constitutional
amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to
propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence,
it must be struck down as unconstitutional.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the
Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-AD not being a document that can
bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state
within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would
give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is
through an undue influence or interference with that process.

5. Madriaga, Jr. vs. China Banking Corporation

FACTS:

Spouses Trajano were the original registered owners of the properties in dispute. ). Sometime in 1991, they agreed
to sell the properties to the petitioner’s father, Cesar Madriaga, Sr. (Madriaga, Sr.) for P1,300,000.00 payable on
installment basis. Upon completion of payment, Spouses Trajano executed in Madriaga, Sr.’s favor a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 2, 1992. However, they failed to deliver the lot titles so Madriaga, Sr. sued for
specific performance with the RTC. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, but to which the Spouses
failed to comply with. On motion of Madriaga, Sr., the RTC issued a writ of execution on September 6, 1994, and
several properties of Spouses Trajano were levied upon, including the disputed properties. After being declared as
the winning bidder, a final deed of sale was issued covering TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M). Both were
cancelled and replaced by TCT Nos. T-284713(M) and T-284714 in his name. On January 27, 1997, he secured an ex
parte writ of possession.

Meanwhile, on January 2, 1995, Spouses Trajano obtained a loan from China Bank in the amount of P700,000.00,
payable in one year and secured by a mortgage over TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M). They defaulted on their
loan, and on October 20, 1997, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage and was declared the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale. TCT Nos. 114853(M) and 114854(M) were replaced for the second time, in favor of China Bank.

China Bank then filed a petition for writ of possession. Writ was granted and a copy of it was served upon
Madriaga Sr. He then filed an opposition to the writ asserting that he is the true owner of the properties, having
obtained them at an earlier execution sale, and that his titles were subsisting. The RTC dismissed his opposition
and denied his motion for reconsideration.

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The petitioner, who succeeded to his father’s properties then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA averring that
the RTC gravely and seriously abused its discretion in denying the motion to abate/quash the writ of possession; in
considering the issuance of the writ as ministerial; and in not declaring China Bank in bad faith, hence, not entitled
to possession of the properties. CA affirmed RTCs decision stating moreover that the motion had already been
moot and academic after the writ was satisfied on April 15, 2005 with the physical removal of Madriaga, Sr. from
the premises. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the case has been rendered moot and academic by the full
implementation/satisfaction of the writ of possession; and
II. Whether or not the issuance of the ex parte writ of possession violated Madriaga, Sr.’s right to due
process.

HELD:

I.

YES. With the writ of possession having been served and satisfied, the said motions had ceased to present a
justiciable controversy, and a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where there is no more live
subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make any pronouncement. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction on the ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional
issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when
the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review, which are not extant in this case.

II.

NO. Indeed, the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial
proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adversely
interested. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without affording the person against whom the relief is
sought the opportunity to be heard. No notice is needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject
property. And as held in Carlos v. Court of Appeals, the ex parte nature of the proceeding does not deny due
process to the petitioners because the issuance of the writ of possession does not bar a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale. Hence, the RTC may grant the petition even in the absence of
Madriaga, Sr.’s participation.

Moreover, records show that Madriaga, Sr. was able to air his side when he filed: on November 1, 2002 an
opposition to the writ; on April 13, 2005, a "Motion to Quash/Abate the Writ of Possession"; and on March 6,
2006, a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 6, 2006 denying his motion to quash/abate the
writ of possession. When a party has been afforded opportunity to present his side, he cannot feign denial of due
process.

6. Garcillano vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:

Garcillano (in G.R. No. 170338) filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the House Representatives Committees
from using the tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and
for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken

13
off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.

Ranada and Agcaoili (in G.R. No. 179275), retired justices of the CA, filed a Petition for Prohibition to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.

Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

While both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the
second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

ISSUES:

I. WON petitioners have legal standing. [YES]

II. WON there is an actual case or controversy. [NO: against the House of Rep. YES: against the Senate]

HELD:

(The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.)

LOCUS STANDI

General Rule: Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus, generally,
a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Exception/Liberal application: However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court,
in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo articulates that a "liberal
policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.

Garcillano = direct injury. Ranada and Agcaoili = concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. Intervenor
Sagge = alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge
asserts his constitutional right to due process, they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34

14
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in
the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

 Versus House of Representatives

Court dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual
cases and controversies. By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The
power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the
Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when
its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot
question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.

The Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the
widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to
the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain
the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.

 Versus the Senate

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with
the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.

7. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011

FACTS:

In 1958, the Spanish owners of Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold Hacienda Luisita and
the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugar mill of the hacienda, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),
then owned and controlled by the Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group. The Central Bank of the Philippines assisted Tadeco in
obtaining a dollar loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS extended a PhP5.911 million loan in favor of Tadeco to pay
the peso price component of the sale, with the condition that “the lots comprising the Hacienda Luisita be
subdivided by the applicant-corporation and sold at cost to the tenants, should there be any, and whenever
conditions should exist warranting such action under the provisions of the Land Tenure Act.” Tadeco however did
not comply with this condition.

On May 7, 1980, the martial law administration filed a suit before the Manila RTC against Tadeco, et al., for them
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) so that the land can be distributed to
farmers at cost. Responding, Tadeco alleged that Hacienda Luisita does not have tenants, besides which sugar
lands – of which the hacienda consisted – are not covered by existing agrarian reform legislations(PD 27-rice and
corn). The Manila RTC rendered judgment ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. Therefrom,
Tadeco appealed to the CA.

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On March 17, 1988, during the administration of President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, the Office of the Solicitor
General moved to withdraw the government’s case against Tadeco, et al. The CA dismissed the case, subject to the
PARC’s approval of Tadeco’s proposed stock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of its farmworkers. [Under EO 229
(Sec10) and later RA 6657(Sec31), Tadeco had the option of availing stock distribution as an alternative modality to
actual land transfer to the farmworkers.] On August 23, 1988, Tadeco organized a spin-off corporation, herein
petitioner HLI, as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, Tadeco conveyed to
HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of Hacienda Luisita in
exchange for HLI shares of stock.

On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified
in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). On May 11, 1989,
the SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR
Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLI’s SDP, which was eventually approved
by the PARC after a follow-up referendum conducted by the DAR on October 14, 1989, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of
5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI.

As may be gleaned from the SDOA, included as part of the distribution plan are: (a) production-sharing equivalent
to three percent (3%) of gross sales from the production of the agricultural land payable to the FWBs in cash
dividends or incentive bonus; and (b) distribution of free homelots of not more than 240 square meters each to
family-beneficiaries. The production-sharing, as the SDP indicated, is payable "irrespective of whether [HLI] makes
money or not," implying that the benefits do not partake the nature of dividends, as the term is ordinarily
understood under corporation law. (5,117 out of 5315 = shares; 132 = land distribution)

Prior to approval, DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago proposed that the SDP be revised, along the following
lines:

1. That over the implementation period of the [SDP], [Tadeco]/HLI shall ensure that there will be no
dilution in the shares of stocks of individual [FWBs];

2. That a safeguard shall be provided by [Tadeco]/HLI against the dilution of the percentage shareholdings
of the [FWBs], i.e., that the 33% shareholdings of the [FWBs] will be maintained at any given time

November 21, 1989 - the PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issued Resolution No. 89-12-2, approving the
SDP of Tadeco/HLI.

From 1989 to 2005, HLI claimed to have extended the following benefits to the FWBs:

(a) 3 billion pesos (P3,000,000,000) worth of salaries, wages and fringe benefits

(b) 59 million shares of stock distributed for free to the FWBs;

(c) 150 million pesos (P150,000,000) representing 3% of the gross produce;

(d) 37.5 million pesos (P37,500,000) representing 3% from the sale of 500 hectares of converted
agricultural land of Hacienda Luisita;

(e) 240-square meter homelots distributed for free;

(f) 2.4 million pesos (P2,400,000) representing 3% from the sale of 80 hectares at 80 million pesos
(P80,000,000) for the SCTEX;

(g) Social service benefits, such as but not limited to free hospitalization/medical/maternity services, old
age/death benefits and no interest bearing salary/educational loans and rice sugar accounts.

Two separate groups subsequently contested this claim of HLI. (the petitions/protets)

16
CONVERSION PROPER

On August 15, 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to
industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application on August 14, 1996, subject to
payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI’s continued compliance with its
undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions.

On December 13, 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary Holdings,
Inc. (Centennary), ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the
entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an
industrial complex. From this area was carved out 2 parcels(180 has and 4 has), for which 2 separate titles were
issued in the name of LIPCO. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC) in payment of LIPCO’s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations to RCBC(dacion en pago). LIPCO’s titles were
cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC.

The other 200 has was transferred to Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC) in two separate transactions in 1997 and
1998, both uniformly involving 100 hectares for PhP 250 million each.

Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by
the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained
of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

Such, was the state of things when two separate petitions reached the DAR in the latter part of 2003. The first was
filed by the Supervisory Group of HLI (Supervisory Group), praying for a renegotiation of the SDOA, or, in the
alternative, its revocation. The second petition, praying for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the
distribution of the lands in the hacienda, was filed by Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid ng Hacienda Luisita
(AMBALA). The DAR then constituted a Special Task Force (STF) to attend to issues relating to the SDP of HLI. After
investigation and evaluation, the STF found that HLI has not complied with its obligations under RA 6657 despite
the implementation of the SDP, AND RECOMMENDED. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the assailed
Resolution No. 2005-32-01, recalling/revoking the SDO plan of Tadeco/HLI. It further resolved that the subject
lands be forthwith placed under the compulsory coverage or mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP.

From the foregoing resolution, HLI sought reconsideration. Its motion notwithstanding, HLI also filed a petition
before the Supreme Court in light of what it considers as the DAR’s hasty placing of Hacienda Luisita under CARP
even before PARC could rule or even read the motion for reconsideration. PARC would eventually deny HLI’s
motion for reconsideration via Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated May 3, 2006.

ISSUES:

I. Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP?

II. [Issue raised by intervenor FARM (group of farmworkers)] Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock
transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional?
III. Is the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid? [Did PARC gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the subject SDP
and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme?]
IV. Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by
purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution? [Did the PARC gravely abuse its
discretion when it included LIPCO’s and RCBC’s respective properties that once formed part of Hacienda
Luisita under the CARP compulsory acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage?]

HELD:

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HLI: PARC has no authority to revoke the SDP; it has the power to disapprove, but not to recall its previous
approval of the SDP. It is the court which has jurisdiction and authority to order the revocation or rescission of the
PARC-approved SDP

I.

YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLI’s SDP under the doctrine of necessary implication.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of
the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. Contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke
the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on agrarian
reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority,
however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.

Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express power to approve
a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke
or recall the approval of the plan. To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of
CARP, because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved
SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.

HLI: the parties to the SDOA should now look to the Corporation Code, instead of to RA 6657, in determining their
rights, obligations and remedies. The Code should be the applicable law on the disposition of the agricultural land
of HLI.

SC: NO! the rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA embodying the SDP are primarily governed
by RA 6657. It should abundantly be made clear that HLI was precisely created in order to comply with RA 6657,
which the OSG aptly described as the "mother law" of the SDOA and the SDP. It is, thus, paradoxical for HLI to
shield itself from the coverage of CARP by invoking exclusive applicability of the Corporation Code under the guise
of being a corporate entity.

II.

NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to pass upon the constitutional question
because it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the
case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of
acquisition under RA 9700.]

While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of a small minority of 27 farmers,
has yet to explain its failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 as early as November 21, 1989
when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, and why its
members received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14
years after approval of the SDP that said plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to
stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT
question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the purported flaws and gaps in the
subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did
not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly
belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed its Supplemental
Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM members slept
on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality
of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional

18
issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of numerous events and
activities which resulted from the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the very lis mota of the case does
not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the
resolution of the case. If some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.

The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM
members previously belonged) and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the
conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not
PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact
that the SDP, as couched and implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any
of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover,
looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but
rather it is the alleged application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.

It may be well to note at this juncture that Sec. 5 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 7 of RA 6657, has all but superseded
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said Sec. 31. In its pertinent part, Sec. 5 of RA 9700
provides: “[T]hat after June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
compulsory acquisition.” Thus, for all intents and purposes, the stock distribution scheme under Sec. 31 of RA 6657
is no longer an available option under existing law. The question of whether or not it is unconstitutional should be
a moot issue.

III.

YES, the revocation of the HLI’s SDP valid. [NO, the PARC did NOT gravely abuse its discretion in revoking the
subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition and distribution scheme.]

The revocation of the approval of the SDP is valid: (1) the mechanics and timelines of HLI’s stock distribution
violate DAO 10 because the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as
a result of the use of “man days” and the hiring of additional farmworkers; (2) the 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-
FWBs stock transfer is contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes.

In our review and analysis of par. 3 of the SDOA on the mechanics and timelines of stock distribution, We find that
it violates two (2) provisions of DAO 10. Par. 3 of the SDOA states:

3. At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY [HLI] shall arrange with the
FIRST PARTY [TDC] the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY [FWBs] on the basis of number of
days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock
of the SECOND PARTY that are presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY, until such time as the entire
block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY.

[I]t is clear as day that the original 6,296 FWBs, who were qualified beneficiaries at the time of the approval of the
SDP, suffered from watering down of shares. As determined earlier, each original FWB is entitled to 18,804.32 HLI
shares. The original FWBs got less than the guaranteed 18,804.32 HLI shares per beneficiary, because the
acquisition and distribution of the HLI shares were based on “man days” or “number of days worked” by the FWB
in a year’s time. As explained by HLI, a beneficiary needs to work for at least 37 days in a fiscal year before he or
she becomes entitled to HLI shares. If it falls below 37 days, the FWB, unfortunately, does not get any share at
year end. The number of HLI shares distributed varies depending on the number of days the FWBs were allowed
to work in one year. Worse, HLI hired farmworkers in addition to the original 6,296 FWBs, such that, as indicated
in the Compliance dated August 2, 2010 submitted by HLI to the Court, the total number of farmworkers of HLI as

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of said date stood at 10,502. All these farmworkers, which include the original 6,296 FWBs, were given shares out
of the 118,931,976.85 HLI shares representing the 33.296% of the total outstanding capital stock of HLI. Clearly,
the minimum individual allocation of each original FWB of 18,804.32 shares was diluted as a result of the use of
“man days” and the hiring of additional farmworkers.

Going into another but related matter, par. 3 of the SDOA expressly providing for a 30-year timeframe for HLI-to-
FWBs stock transfer is an arrangement contrary to what Sec. 11 of DAO 10 prescribes. Said Sec. 11 provides for
the implementation of the approved stock distribution plan within three (3) months from receipt by the corporate
landowner of the approval of the plan by PARC. In fact, based on the said provision, the transfer of the shares of
stock in the names of the qualified FWBs should be recorded in the stock and transfer books and must be
submitted to the SEC within sixty (60) days from implementation.

To the Court, there is a purpose, which is at once discernible as it is practical, for the three-month threshold.
Remove this timeline and the corporate landowner can veritably evade compliance with agrarian reform by simply
deferring to absurd limits the implementation of the stock distribution scheme. the reason underpinning the 30-
year accommodation does not apply to corporate landowners in distributing shares of stock to the qualified
beneficiaries, as the shares may be issued in a much shorter period of time.

Taking into account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC should be upheld [because of
violations of] DAO 10. It bears stressing that under Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to
issue rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the
force and effect of law and must be duly complied with. The PARC is, therefore, correct in revoking the SDP.
Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, l989 approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and
voided.

IV.

YES, those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO acquired by purchase
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution.

[T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith, namely: (1) that the
purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or
before he or she has notice of the claim of another.

It can rightfully be said that both LIPCO and RCBC are purchasers in good faith for value entitled to the benefits
arising from such status.

First, at the time LIPCO purchased the entire three hundred (300) hectares of industrial land, there was no notice
of any supposed defect in the title of its transferor, Centennary, or that any other person has a right to or interest
in such property. In fact, at the time LIPCO acquired said parcels of land, only the following annotations appeared
on the TCT in the name of Centennary: the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Teresita Lopa, the Secretary’s
Certificate in favor of Shintaro Murai, and the conversion of the property from agricultural to industrial and
residential use.

The same is true with respect to RCBC. At the time it acquired portions of Hacienda Luisita, only the following
general annotations appeared on the TCTs of LIPCO: the Deed of Restrictions, limiting its use solely as an industrial
estate; the Secretary’s Certificate in favor of Koji Komai and Kyosuke Hori; and the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
RCBC to guarantee the payment of PhP 300 million.

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To be sure, intervenor RCBC and LIPCO knew that the lots they bought were subjected to CARP coverage by means
of a stock distribution plan, as the DAR conversion order was annotated at the back of the titles of the lots they
acquired. However, they are of the honest belief that the subject lots were validly converted to commercial or
industrial purposes and for which said lots were taken out of the CARP coverage subject of PARC Resolution No.
89-12-2 and, hence, can be legally and validly acquired by them. After all, Sec. 65 of RA 6657 explicitly allows
conversion and disposition of agricultural lands previously covered by CARP land acquisition “after the lapse of five
(5) years from its award when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes or
the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or
industrial purposes.” Moreover, DAR notified all the affected parties, more particularly the FWBs, and gave them
the opportunity to comment or oppose the proposed conversion. DAR, after going through the necessary
processes, granted the conversion of 500 hectares of Hacienda Luisita pursuant to its primary jurisdiction under
Sec. 50 of RA 6657 to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its original exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. The DAR conversion order became final and
executory after none of the FWBs interposed an appeal to the CA. In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO
purchased the lots in question on their honest and well-founded belief that the previous registered owners could
legally sell and convey the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage. Ergo, RCBC and LIPCO
acted in good faith in acquiring the subject lots.

And second, both LIPCO and RCBC purchased portions of Hacienda Luisita for value. Undeniably, LIPCO acquired
300 hectares of land from Centennary for the amount of PhP750 million pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated July 30,
1998. On the other hand, in a Deed of Absolute Assignment dated November 25, 2004, LIPCO conveyed portions of
Hacienda Luisita in favor of RCBC by way of dacion en pago to pay for a loan of PhP431,695,732.10.

In relying upon the above-mentioned approvals, proclamation and conversion order, both RCBC and LIPCO cannot
be considered at fault for believing that certain portions of Hacienda Luisita are industrial/commercial lands and
are, thus, outside the ambit of CARP. The PARC, and consequently DAR, gravely abused its discretion when it
placed LIPCO’s and RCBC’s property which once formed part of Hacienda Luisita under the CARP compulsory
acquisition scheme via the assailed Notice of Coverage.

[The Court went on to apply the operative fact doctrine to determine what should be done in the aftermath of its
disposition of the above-enumerated issues:

While We affirm the revocation of the SDP on Hacienda Luisita subject of PARC Resolution Nos. 2005-32-01 and
2006-34-01, the Court cannot close its eyes to certain “operative facts” that had occurred in the interim.
Pertinently, the “operative fact” doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action null and void, or, by
extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting unfairness must be avoided. This is
as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations
justly incurred in the meantime. The actual existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination,
an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration.

While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must,
by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose
whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in
1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA (or the MOA), which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC
per its Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the FWBs were said to have received
from HLI salaries and cash benefits, hospital and medical benefits, 240-square meter homelots, 3% of the gross
produce from agricultural lands, and 3% of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and the
80.51-hectare lot sold to SCTEX. HLI shares totaling 118,391,976.85 were distributed as of April 22, 2005. On
August 6, 20l0, HLI and private respondents submitted a Compromise Agreement, in which HLI gave the FWBs the
option of acquiring a piece of agricultural land or remain as HLI stockholders, and as a matter of fact, most FWBs

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indicated their choice of remaining as stockholders. These facts and circumstances tend to indicate that some, if
not all, of the FWBs may actually desire to continue as HLI shareholders. A matter best left to their own
discretion.]

The dissents in the July 5, 2011 decision

The dissents of the minority justices were on the other fine points of the decision.

Chief Justice Corona dissented insofar as the majority refused to declare Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional. The
provision grants to corporate landowners the option to give qualified FWBs the right to own capital stock of the
corporation in lieu of actual land distribution. The Chief Justice was of the view that by allowing the distribution of
capital stock, and not land, as “compliance” with agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 contravenes Sec. 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution, which, he argued, requires that the law implementing the agrarian reform program should
employ [actual] land redistribution mechanism. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, he noted, the corporate landowner
remains to be the owner of the agricultural land. Qualified beneficiaries are given ownership only of shares of
stock, not [of] the lands they till. He concluded that since an unconstitutional provision cannot be the basis of a
constitutional act, the SDP of petitioner HLI based on Section 31 of RA 6657 is also unconstitutional.

Justice Mendoza fully concurred with Chief Justice Corona’s position that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional. He
however agreed with the majority that the FWBs be given the option to remain as shareholders of HLI. He also
joined Justice Brion’s proposal that that the reckoning date for purposes of just compensation should be May 11,
1989, when the SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and the FWBs. Finally, he averred that considering that more
than 10 years have elapsed from May 11, 1989, the qualified FWBs, who can validly dispose of their due shares,
may do so, in favor of LBP or other qualified beneficiaries. The 10-year period need not be counted from the
issuance of the Emancipation Title (EP) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award CLOA) because, under the SDOA,
shares, not land, were to be awarded and distributed.

Justice Brion’s dissent centered on the consequences of the revocation of HLI’s SDP/SDOA. He argued that that the
operative fact doctrine only applies in considering the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute or
a rule issued by the Executive Department that is accorded the status of a statute. The SDOA/SDP is neither a
statute nor an executive issuance but a contract between the FWBs and the landowners; hence, the operative fact
doctrine is not applicable. A contract stands on a different plane than a statute or an executive issuance. When a
contract is contrary to law, it is deemed void ab initio. It produces no legal effects whatsoever. Thus, Justice Brion
questioned the option given by the majority to the FWBs to remain as stockholders in an almost-bankrupt
corporation like HLI. He argued that the nullity of HLI’s SDP/SDOA goes into its very existence, and the parties to it
must generally revert to their respective situations prior to its execution. Restitution, he said, is therefore in order.
With the SDP being void, the FWBs should return everything they are proven to have received pursuant to the
terms of the SDOA/SDP. Justice Brion then proposed that all aspects of the implementation of the mandatory
CARP coverage be determined by the DAR by starting with a clean slate from [May 11,] 1989, the point in time
when the compulsory CARP coverage should start, and proceeding to adjust the relations of the parties with due
regard to the events that intervened [thereafter]. He also held that the time of the taking (when the computation
of just compensation shall be reckoned) shall be May 11, 1989, when the SDOA was executed by Tadeco, HLI and
the FWBs.

Justice Sereno dissented with respect to how the majority modified the questioned PARC Resolutions (i.e., no
immediate land distribution, give first the original qualified FWBs the option to either remain as stockholders of
HLI or choose actual land distribution) and the applicability of the operative fact doctrine. She would instead order
the DAR to forthwith determine the area of Hacienda Luisita that must be covered by the compulsory coverage
and monitor the land distribution to the qualified FWBs.

Erroneous interpretation of the Court’s decision

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The High Tribunal actually voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition of HLI and to AFFIRM the PARC
resolutions. This is contrary to media reports that the Court “voted 6-4” to dismiss the HLI petition. The five (not
four) minority justices (Chief Justice Corona, and Justices Brion, Villarama, Mendoza, and Sereno) only partially
dissented from the decision of the majority of six (Justice Velasco Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, and Perez). Justice Antonio Carpio took no part in the deliberations and in the voting, while Justice Diosdado
Peralta was on official leave. The 14th and 15th seats in the Court were earlier vacated by the retirements of
Justices Eduardo Antonio Nachura (June 13, 2011) and Conchita Carpio-Morales (June 19, 2011).

Another misinterpretation came from no less than the Supreme Court administrator and spokesperson, Atty.
Midas Marquez. In a press conference called after the promulgation of the Court’s decision, Marquez initially used
the term “referendum” in explaining the High Court’s ruling. This created confusion among the parties and the
interested public since a “referendum” implies that the FWBs will have to vote on a common mode by which to
pursue their claims over Hacienda Luisita. The decision was thus met with cries of condemnation by the
misinformed farmers and the various people’s organizations and militant groups supportive of their cause.

Marquez would later correct himself in a subsequent press briefing. But since by then the parties had already filed
their respective motions for reconsideration, he called upon everyone to just “wait for the final resolution of the
motion[s], which is forthcoming anyway.” The resolution of the consolidated motions for reconsideration came
relatively early on November 22, 2011, or less than five months from the promulgation of the decision.

8. Javier vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when
several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter’s men. Seven suspects,
including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent’s proclamation, the petitioner went to
the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and
the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon
came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers
of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before this Court, the
proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of
the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. Finally, on July 23, 1984, the Second
Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the
elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. The petitioner then came to this Court, asking to annul the said
decision on the basis that it should have been decided by COMELEC en banc.

The case was still being considered when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and
in broad daylight. And a year later, Batasang Pambansa was abolished with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, contending it to be moot and academic.

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ISSUES:

I. Whether it is correct for the court to dismiss the petition due to the petitioner being dead and the
respondent missing.
II. Whether the Second Division of the Commission on Elections was authorized to promulgate its decision of
July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

HELD:

I.

No. The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner
and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for
dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms
that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government.
The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There
are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

II.

No. The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by
divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all
matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful
consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc
only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the
grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates, which has resulted in the
frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent’s theory

24
would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily
decided by only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been
observed by the Commission en banc.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have
legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission
on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.

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