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ABSTRACT
The task of this paper is to explore and compare ways of defining surveillance. In order to give meaning to
concepts that describe the realities of society, social theory is needed. Therefore social theory is employed
in this paper for discussing ways of defining surveillance. “Living in ‘surveillance societies’ may throw up
challenges of a fundamental – ontological – kind” (Lyon, 1994, p.19). Social theory is a way of clarifying
such ontological questions that concern the basic nature and reality of surveillance. A distinction between
neutral and negative concepts of surveillance is drawn. Some potential disadvantages of neutral concepts
of surveillance are outlined. This paper wants to contribute to the discussion of how to best define
surveillance and wants to show that one of the main theoretical differences and questions in surveillance
theory is if surveillance should be defined as a negative or a neutral concept.
Keywords: surveillance theory, social theory, neutral surveillance theory, negative surveillance theory,
critical surveillance studies
INTRODUCTION
News of the World surveillance of detective: what Rebekah Brooks knew. […] As editor of the News of
the World Rebekah Brooks was confronted with evidence that her paper's resources had been used on
behalf of two murder suspects to spy on the senior detective who was investigating their alleged crime.
(The Guardian, July 6, 2011).
Lidl Systematically Conducted Surveillance of Employees. Hidden cameras, pages-long protocols: Lidl
has put employees in many of its stores under surveillance. Monitored were private conversations, life
situations and the ways of work of employees. That the secret spying is illegal, seemed to disturb the
food discounter little. (Der Spiegel, March 26, 2008; translation from German).
Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods. Wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping are virtually as old as the telephone. But the debates over wiretapping have intensified
in recent years, as the pressure to fight terrorism after the Sept. 11th attacks and rapid technological
change led to an unprecedent expansion of electronic surveillance. (New York Times, October 19,
2010).
∗
Chair in Media and Communication Studies Uppsala University, Department of Informatics and Media
Studies. Sweden. E-mail: christian.fuchs@im.uu.se
1
Acknowledgement: The research presented in this paper was conducted in the project “Social
Networking Sites in the Surveillance Society”, funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): project
number P 22445-G17. Project co-ordination: Dr. Christian Fuchs.
More Employees Under Surveillance at Work. Employees are being put under increasing strain
because their bosses are using surveillance equipment to keep track of how hard they are working, a
survey has found. More than half of employees claim their managers use electronic systems to keep a
log of their work. (The Telegraph, January 9, 2008).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). […] On March 31, 2010, a federal judge ruled that the
National Security Agency's program of surveillance without warrants was illegal, rejecting the Obama
administration's effort to keep shrouded in secrecy one of the most disputed counterterrorism policies
of former President George W. Bush. (New York Times, April 1, 2010).
T
hese randomly collected news clippings from newspapers give us an idea of how
important the topic of surveillance has become for the media and for our lives.
Economic and state surveillance seem to be two issues that affect the lives of all
surveillance and consumer surveillance in order to enable the capital accumulation process.
State institutions (like the police, the military, secret services, social security and unemployment
offices) are using surveillance for organizing and managing the population. All of this takes
place in the context of the extension and intensification of surveillance (Ball and Webster, 2003;
Lyon, 2003) in post-9/11 new imperialism that is afraid of terrorism and at the same time creates
this phenomenon and in the context of neoliberal corporate regimes that subjugate ever larger
spheres and parts of life to commodity logic (Harvey, 2003, p. 2005). If organizations are an
important source and space of surveillance, then it is important to understand how surveillance
can be defined.
Given the circumstance that there is much public talk about surveillance and surveillance
society, it is an important task for academia to discuss and clarify the meaning of these terms
because academic debates to a certain extent inform and influence public and political
discourses. The task of this paper is to explore compare ways of defining surveillance. In order
to give meaning to concepts that describe the realities of society, social theory is needed.
Therefore social theory is employed in this paper for discussing ways of defining surveillance.
kind” (Lyon, 1994, p. 19). Social philosophy is a way of clarifying such ontological questions that
I approach the notion of surveillance by suggesting one possible typology for defining
surveillance. On the one hand I see neutral concepts of surveillance that see surveillance as an
ontological quality of all societies or all modern societies and identify besides negative aspects
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also actual or potential positive qualities of surveillance. Examples for neutral surveillance
concepts will be discussed in section two. Negative surveillance concepts consider surveillance
section three. The task of this paper is not to suggest that only one distinction/typology of
the ways surveillance can be defined is important in order to show commonalities and
differences between various approaches. In my view, it is especially necessary to spell out besides
common characteristics of surveillance studies also the differences between various approaches
because constructive controversy is a way for advancing the state of a field and a sign that a
The overall view that this paper advances is that surveillance should not be defined in a
neutral way, but in a negative sense. In section four, reasons for this position are given and some
arguments that question neutral surveillance concepts are provided. Finally, some conclusions
Max Horkheimer says that neutral theories “define universal concepts under which all
facts in the field in question are to be subsumed” (Horkheimer, 1937/2002, p. 224). Neutral
valid and characteristic either for all societies or all modern societies.
that can be stored by an agency of collectivity as well as to the supervision of the activities of
subordinates by their superiors within any collectivity (Giddens, 1981, p.169). Surveillance is
“the coding of information relevant to the administration of subject populations, plus their
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direct supervision by officials and administrators of all sorts” (Giddens, 1984, p. 183). With the
rise of modern, capitalist society, Giddens argues, the nation-state and surveillance have become
power – through the storage and control of information – is the primary means of the
1985, p. 181). The modern state would make use of surveillance in the sense of gathering
information about the subject population in order to allow overall organization and control.
Information gathering would include data on births, marriages, deaths, demographic and fiscal
statistics, ‘moral statistics’ (relating to suicide, divorce, delinquency and so on) etc. and would
result in the power of the state and bureaucratic organization. Computer technology would
expand surveillance in the sense of information control. Modern technology would also allow a
technical control and supervision of workers that is a much more anonymous form than face-to-
face supervision that was used in the early days of capitalism. Giddens sees surveillance as a
and surveillance are inextricably linked for Giddens and would have taken on systematic forms
in the modern nation state. He therefore also argues that all modern societies are information
societies (Giddens, 1987, p. 27; see also: Lyon, 1994, p.27). Dandeker (1990) stresses based on
One claim of neutral surveillance concepts is that there is a positive side of surveillance or
that there is a negative as well as a positive side of surveillance. Kevin Haggerty (2006) argues
that surveillance scholars do not want to see positive aspects of surveillance such as infectious
disease control or surveillance in parenting because they “are trained in a tradition of critique”
(Haggerty, 2006, p. 36). David Lyon says that surveillance has two faces, an enabling and a
constraining one (Lyon, 1994, p. ix). Elia Zureik (2003, p. 42) says that surveillance is “disabling
as well as enabling”.
Surveillance can serve goals of protection, administration, rule compliance, documentation, and
strategy, as well as goals involving inappropriate manipulation, restricted life opportunities, social
control, and spying. […] To varying degrees, surveillance is a property of any social system – from
two friends to a workplace to a government (Marx, 2007, p. 535).
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since the act of socialisation would be unthinkable without the surveillance of adults. How else
could children be fabricated into cultural competent members of a society? (Norris and
Armstrong, 1999, p. 5).
In one form or another, it [surveillance] is a basic and ubiquitous social process, occurring in
settings ranging from the family to state bureaucracies – whenever one party seeks to shape its
treatment of the other on the basis of the latter’s past performance (Rule, 2007, p. 14).
Various examples for neutral definitions of surveillance can be given. The following list of
(1) the collection and storage of information, presumed to be useful, about people or objects; (2)
the supervision of the activities of people or objects through the issuing of instructions or the
physical design of the natural and built environments; and (3) the application of information-
gathering activities to the business of monitoring the behaviour of those under supervision and, in
the case of subject populations, their compliance with instructions, or with non-subject
populations, their compliance with agreements, or simply monitoring their behaviour from which,
as in the control of disease, they may have expressed a with to benefit (2006, p. 225).
Surveillance involves the collection and analysis of information about populations in order to
govern their activities (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006, p. 3).
Surveillance is “the garnering and processes of personal information to regulate, control, manage
and enable human individual and collective behaviour” (Hier and Greenberg, 2007, p. 381).
To surveil something essentially means to watch over or guard it. Guardianship is not a simple
constraint, but an art of control that makes it safe for something to move freely. You keep a close
eye on your child playing, or someone deflects a danger close to you before you even sense it
(Bogard, 2006, 98f).
Systematically harvested personal information, in other words, furnishes bases for institutions to
determine what treatment to meter out to each individual. I call such operations systems of mass
surveillance. Mass surveillance is a distinctive and consequential feature of our times. Whether
carried out by government agencies or private-sector organizations, it shapes the ways we
approach major institutions and our treatment at their hands. Surveillance in this sense does not
necessarily entail harmful intent. […] What has changed in the last hundred years is the rise of
mass, bureaucratic surveillance based on formal record-keeping. Surveillance in this form ranges
from the benign to the repressive—from the personal information systems supporting intensive
care in hospitals to those mobilized to track and curtail terrorists (Rule, 2007, p.14).
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Surveillance is “the act of monitoring the behaviour of another either in real-time using cameras,
audio devices or key-stroke monitoring, or in chosen time by data mining records of internet
transactions” (Wall, 2007, p. 230).
For Max Horkheimer, the “method of negation” is “the denunciation of everything that
mutilates mankind and impedes its free development” (Horkheimer, 1947/1974, p.126) For
Herbert Marcuse, negative categories are “an indictment of the totality of the existing order”
(Marcuse, 1941, p. 258) and at the same time “already contain their own negations and
imperative” (Marcuse, 1936/1988, p. 86). For Horkheimer, the goal is “a state of affairs in which
injustice” (p. 221). Theories’ “goal is man’s emancipation from slavery” (p. 249) and “the
happiness of all individuals” (p. 248). This requires “the idea of self-determination for the human
race, that is the idea of a state of affairs in which man’s actions no longer flow from a
mechanism but from his own decision” (p. 229). Such a society is shaped by “reasonableness,
and striving for peace, freedom, and happiness” (p. 222) and the “the establishment of justice
phenomenon of society that not only exists in contemporary or heteronomous societies, but in
surveillance for denunciating and indicting domination and dominative societies. By doing so
being also a society without surveillance. In a negative theory, surveillance is a negative concept
that is inherently linked to information gathering for the purposes of domination, violence, and
coercion and thereby at the same time accuses such states of society and makes political
demands for a participatory, co-operative, dominationless society that is not only a society
where co-operative modes of production and ownership replace classes and the exploitation of
surplus value, but also a society where care and solidarity – in one word: democratic socialism –
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surveillance, it makes critique more difficult and may support the ideological celebration and
normalization of surveillance.
The most influential thinker for the elaboration of negative surveillance concepts has
been Michel Foucault. Howard Rheingold argues that Foucault “was to surveillance what
For Foucault, Marxism is on the one hand not so different from liberalism because they
share, he argues, a typical 19th century belief in the “fulfilment of an end to History” (Foucault,
1973, p. 261). On the other hand, Foucault refers to Marx when discussing the role of
surveillance and disciplinary power in production (Foucault 1977, 163f, 175, p. 221). Foucault
(1973) assumes based on Nietzsche that history is based on difference and radical
Institutions such as the state, the family, the university, medicine, teaching systems,
psychiatry “are made to maintain a certain social class in power, and to exclude the instruments
formulas of domination” (Foucault 1977, p. 137), it includes penal mechanisms (p. 177), it
encloses humans into institutions such as schools, orphanages, training centres, the military,
towns, factories, prisons, reformatories, houses of correction, psychiatry, hospitals, asylums, etc
in order to control their behaviour and to partition and rank them (Foucault, 1977, p. 141; see
also 1994, p. 57, p.75) and to normalize, punish, hierarchize, homogenize, differentiate, and
exclude (Foucault, 1977, p. 183). Foucault argues that in order to secure domination, disciplines
make use of certain methods such as the hierarchical observation, the normalizing judgement,
and the examination (p.170). The instrument of hierarchical observation establishes the
that coerces by means of observation” (p. 170). The “means of coercion make those on whom
they are applied clearly visible” (p. 171). For Foucault, disciplinary power is also characteristic
for the logic of capitalism. “Liberalism turns into a mechanism continually having to arbitrate
between the freedom and security of individuals by reference to this notion of danger”
(Foucault, 2008, p. 66). A consequence of “liberalism and the liberal art of government is the
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extension of procedures of control, constraint, and coercion” (Foucault, 2008, p. 67). “Economic
freedom, liberalism in the sense I have just been talking about, and disciplinary techniques are
the rule or not” (Foucault, 1994, p. 59). It is “permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent” (Foucault,
through the invisibility of disciplinary power (p. 187), it “must see without being seen” (p. 171),
is “capable of making all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible” (p. 214), it is a
“system of permanent registration” (p. 196) in which “all events are recorded” (p. 197), a
“machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad” (p. 202). “One is totally seen, without ever
seeing” (p. 202). “He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject
in communication” (p. 200). “We live in a society where panopticism reigns” (Foucault 1994, p.
Foucault argues that drawing up tables was one of the important problems of disciplinary
power in the 18th century (Foucault, 1977, p. 148). The table is a “procedure of knowledge” (p.
148), surveillance and disciplinary power produce reality, knowledge about individuals (p. 194).
Surveillance always includes “a network of writing” and “a whole mass of documents” (p. 189).
In contemporary society, tables take on the form of digital databases that store huge amounts of
data that can be automatically collected, assessed, manipulated, and remixed, are available in
real time, are distributed at high speed all over the world, are easy and cheap to collect and
distribute, and can be duplicated without destruction of the original data. The computer
database enables an extension and intensification of surveillance based on tables. The computer
and the computer network used for surveillance constitute one of the “innovations of
disciplinary writing” (p. 190) of the contemporary age. The connection power/knowledge that
Foucault stresses as constitutive for surveillance takes on the form of power/digital data in the
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information age.
A number of authors argue that Foucault’s notion of the panopticon can be used for
characterizing and criticizing contemporary society. Gordon (1987) speaks of the electronic
panopticon. Zuboff (1988) says that computers advance workplace panopticism. Poster (1990)
has coined the notion of the superpanopticon: “Today’s ‘circuits of communication’ and the
windows, towers or guards” (Poster, 1990, p. 93). Gandy (1993) defines the panoptic sort as “a
difference machine that sorts individuals into categories and classes on the basis of routine
basis of those measures and the administrative models that they inform” (Gandy, 1993, p. 15). It
is a system of power and disciplinary surveillance that identifies, classifies, and assesses (Gandy,
1993, p. 15). James Boyle (1997) argues that the works of Foucault allow an alternative to the
“suggestive insights into the ways in which power can be exercised on the Internet” (Boyle, 1997,
p. 184). Robins and Webster (1999) argue that in what they term cybernetic society “the
computer has achieved […] the extension and intensification of panoptic control” (Robins and
Webster, 1999, p. 180, see also pp. 118-122). They focus on consumer surveillance and social
Taylorism. Webster (2002, p. 222) argues that computers result in a panopticon without physical
walls. Elmer (2003) speaks of diagrammatic panoptic surveillance. Mathiesen (2004) argues that
the panopticon, where the few see the many, is accompanied in contemporary society by the
synopticon that is based on the mass media and “in which the few see and survey the many”
Foucault’s theory for analyzing contemporary surveillance. Lyon (1994, 26, p. 67) argues that
Foucault’s notion of the panopticon does not give attention to two central features of
but Foucault’s focus was on more historical, older forms of surveillance. His method of
genealogy traces surveillance with examples back in history in order to identify more general
principles of surveillance for modernity. He stresses that surveillance is an open and historical
phenomenon; his analysis can therefore be applied to contemporary contexts. Foucault argues
that disciplinary mechanisms have the capability of swarming (Foucault 1977, p. 211), they can
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spread out through society. This principle allows giving an explanation for the extension of
surveillance would today no longer be centralized, but operate in a decentralized and networked
form so that there is not a central surveilling power, but many disperse and heterogeneous
agents of surveillance.
Certainly, surveillance today is more decentralized, less subject to spatial and temporal constraints
(location, tie of day, etc.), and less organized than ever before by the dualisms of observer and
observed, subject and object, individual and mass. The system of control is deterritorializing
(Bogard, 2006, p. 102).
Lace (2005, p. 210) argues that “allusions to Big Brother scrutiny are becoming dated –
instead, we now are moving towards a society of ‘little brothers’” (see also Castells, 2004, p. 342;
Haggerty and Ericson (2000/2007) define surveillance based on Gilles Deleuze and Félix
hierarchy of surveillance, such that groups which were previously exempt from routine
surveillance are now increasingly being monitored” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000/2007, p. 104).
They argue that one should conceive contemporary surveillance with analytical tools that are
different from Foucault and Orwell. Haggerty (2006) calls for demolishing Foucault’s notion of
the panopticon. Haggerty and Ericson (2000/2007) argue that contemporary surveillance is
heterogeneous, involves humans and non-humans, state and extra-state institutions, “allows for
the scrutiny of the powerful by both institutions and the general population” (Haggerty and
Ericson 2000/2007, p. 112). They interpret Mathiesen as saying that synopticism means
“‘bottom-up’ forms of observation” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000/2007, p. 113). Hier (2003/2007,
p. 118) argues that the surveillant assemblage brings about “a partial democratization of
surveillance hierarchies”.
synopticon was not, as unfortunately implied by Haggerty’s and Ericson’s usage of the term, to
argue that surveillance has become a form of democracy. He did not suggest that the synopticon
brings about democratic surveillance, but that the panopticon and the synopticon are
interlinked, “feed on each other” (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 231) and are structures of domination. He
points out that the synopticon of the mass media “first of all directs and controls or disciplines
our consciousness” (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 230) and refers in this context to the critical theorists
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Enzensberger, Adorno, and Horkheimer and their culture industry theory. Mathiesen says that
in the synopticon there is “an extensive system enabling the many to see and contemplate the
few”, whereas in the panopticon the few “see and supervise the many” (Mathiesen, 1997, p. 219).
There is a difference between seeing and supervising, in Mathiesen’s concept the many do not
have the power to supervise the few, but the few have the power to supervise the many. The
synopticon is not, as argued by scholars such as Haggerty and Ericson, a democratic system, he
does not see an optimistic alternative to Foucault in existence, but rather “things are much
Foucault assumes that the historical forms that he analyzed have “a central point”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 173), a “central tower” (p. 207) that illuminates everything and is “a locus of
convergence for everything that must be known” (p. 173), “a perfect eye” (p. 173), “a centre
towards which all gazes would be turned” (p. 173), from which all order come and where all
activities are recorded (p. 174). Due to the availability of digital networks, surveillance operates
with the help of global decentralized networks and can in principle be exerted by many actors
who have access to such networks. There is not one single geographical point of access to
gathered data, it can be accesses from everywhere. Also there is not one central electronic
database for surveillance, but many dispersed ones that can be used in combination by powerful
actors in order to conduct interlinked data searches. These are important technological changes,
but it is a postmodernist misbelief that surveillance becomes symmetric and can be exercised by
everyone. Gathering a huge amount of data about many people is complex, time- and resource-
intensive, actors who control money and bureaucratic power can therefore easier accomplish it,
i.e. corporations and the state are privileged actors in conducting surveillance because they
control economic and political power. To obscure this unequal power geography of surveillance
trivializes the coercive realities of economic and political surveillance. If we understand Foucault
as saying that powerful actors control disciplinary power, then the notion of centralized and
hierarchical surveillance is still valid. It is easier to exert counter-power, but there is an unequal
relationships that have a tendency towards centralizing power and organizing it into a hierarchy.
The technologies of surveillance have evolved from more geographically centralized and
continuous methods. Foucault’s analysis does not exclude that the methods of surveillance can
become more decentralized and dispersed because he says that surveillance is “a network of
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relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally”
The analysis that corporations and states are the central surveillance actors can for
Toshimaru Ogura (2006, p. 272) argues that “the common characteristics of surveillance
are the management of population based on capitalism and the nation state”. He distinguishes
management in the nation state; 3) mass media and advertising as tools for the control and
manipulation of the human mind; 4) computerized surveillance that allows new forms of
marketing based on the social sorting of consumers; 5) surveillance based on networked ICTs.
The intention of surveillance in modern capitalist society is to control and mobilze each individual
as labour power and to integrate various subject identities into a national identity. […]
Modern/postmodern surveillance-oriented society is routed in a deep scepticism of humans. In
other words, modern/postmodern society inherently has a kind of machine fetishism at the core of
its worldview. It assumes, therefore, that being human lies at the root of uncertainty, that machines
are without error, and that following instructions faithfully is an ideal model of humans (Ogura,
2006, p. 277).
For Oscar Gandy, corporations and the state are the central actors that conduct
surveillance. “The panoptic sort is a technology that has been designed and is being continually
revised to serve the interests of decision makers within the government and the corporate
bureaucracies” (Gandy, 1993, p. 95). Gandy argues that the panoptic sort is an antidemocratic
system of control of human existence (Gandy, 1993, p. 227), threatens the autonomy of the
individual because if personal information becomes available to those who are able to make
decisions about a person’s options (p. 180), that some parts of a person are used by another
relations and the technological forces of surveillance. It is not clear if surveillance is considered
as a technology or a social relation. I therefore argue that it is important to distinguish and see
the difference between technologies of surveillance (what could be termed the productive forces
of surveillance, which also points towards the historical development of the productivity of
production of surveillance).
Surveillance is today panoptic not because surveillance technologies are centralized and
hierarchic (they are more dispersed and decentralized, for example the Internet), but because
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states and corporations are dominant actors that accumulate power that they can use for
“the term ‘power’ designates relationships” (Foucault, 1994, p. 337), “it brings into play relations
between individuals” (p. 337). Surveillance is a social relationship between humans that involves
disciplinary power and makes use of instruments for producing knowledge about these humans
in order to coerce and dominate the. To reduce surveillance to the level of surveillance
reductionism and fetishism that reifies surveillance and thereby destroys the concept’s critical
potential.
Big Brother envisions a centralized authoritarian power that aims for absolute control, but the
digital dossiers constructed by businesses aren’t controlled by a central power, and their goal is not
to oppress us but to get us to buy new products and services (Solove, 2004, p. 7).
Although businesses each collect data for their own marketing and accumulation
purposes, a certain share of these data are traded and decentralized collection results in a
centralized power of capital as totality over citizens. Marketing and advertising are also forms of
oppression because they aim at capital accumulation that benefits only a few people in financial
terms. Solove (2004) prefers the notion of intransparent bureaucratic surveillance from Kafka’s
“The Trial” to Orwell’s notion of Big Brother or the idea of the panopticon for describing
because so much data about us is stored that we do not even know about. But this
intransparency helps two powerful collective actors, capital and the state, to control our lives,
which means that the little sisters converge in two panoptic Big Brothers.
Deleuze (1995) has stressed that contemporary domination operates based on self-
control, identification, inclusion, networks, modulations, flexibility. Deleuze compares the post-
fordist individual to a serpent and the fordist individual to a mole. Individuals in flexible
capitalism must be agile like a snake, flexible, innovative, motivated, dynamic, modern, and
young in order to survive. The dull compulsion of economic relations forces individuals to
engage full-scale in their own economic exploitation, to positively respond to the participatory
management strategies that tell them that they should be creative, bring up new ideas,
permanently innovate without gaining ownership rights (see Fuchs, 2008, pp. 148-153). The
self-control that Deleuze speaks about is an ideology in the sense of knowledge that fails to
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identify the essence of real phenomena. For Georg Lukács, ideology “by-passes the essence of
the evolution of society and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately” (Lukács, 1971, p. 50).
Slavoj Žižek (1994, p. 305) argues that “‘ideological’ is a social reality whose very existence
identify with their own exploitation and domination, they consent to it and take active part in its
reproduction. They do not or cannot recognize the true nature of the relations they are part of.
Self-control is not a process of surveillance because it is not based on external data gathering for
repressive ends. No external supervision for disciplinary ends is needed in self-control, the
universe, Deleuze’s notion of self-control is useful for describing the partial obliteration of
surveillance by self-control and ideology. Surveillance does not vanish, but is in many cases
implemented as a security mechanism so that surveillance and self-control are used as two
mechanisms (one of direct violence and one of ideological violence) for reproducing and
securing domination. Managers are called for by strategists to no longer understand themselves
as watchpersons, but as partners of the workforce. Just in case that participatory management
does not work for securing and increasing productivity and efficiency, surveillance systems are
To sum up, we can say that negative approaches tend to define surveillance as the
collection of data on individuals or groups that are used so that control and discipline of
behaviour can be exercised by the threat of being targeted by violence. The negative notion of
surveillance can for example be found in the works by Foucault, in neo-foucauldian surveillance
instrumental reason and competition because it is based on the idea that others are watched and
data on their behaviour, ideas, look, etc. are gathered so that they can be controlled and
disciplined and choose certain actions and avoid others that are considered as undesirable.
Competitive interests and behaviours are involved, the controlling group, class or individuals try
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to force the surveilled to avoid certain actions by conveying to the latter that information on
them is available that could be used for actions that could have negative influences on their lives.
Surveillance operates with threats and fear; it is a form of psychological and structural violence
Following Ogura’s (2006) and Gandy’s (1993) argument that a common characteristic of
surveillance is the management of population based on capitalism and/or the nation state, we
can distinguish between economic and political surveillance as the two major forms of
surveillance. Surveillance by nation states and corporations aims at controlling the behaviour of
individuals and groups, i.e. they should be forced to behave or not behave in certain ways
because they know that their appearance, movements, location, or ideas are or could be watched
by surveillance systems. In the case of political electronic surveillance, individuals are threatened
by the potential exercise of organized violence (of the law) if they behave in certain ways that are
undesired, but watched by political actors (such as secret services or the police). In the case of
economic electronic surveillance, individuals are threatened by the violence of the market that
wants to force them to buy or produce certain commodities and help reproduce capitalist
relations by gathering and using information on their economic behaviour with the help of
electronic systems. In such forms of surveillance violence and heteronomy are the ultimo ratio.
One can certainly criticize that Foucault did not want to provide thoughts about
alternatives to surveillance and disciplinary society because he was cautious and argued that
such claims might result in new disciplines. Foucault made clear that the “struggle against
(Foucault, 2004, p. 39). Foucault does not go beyond this specification, whereas in the
Foucault/Chomsky debate Chomsky argued that “solidarity and sympathy” are “fundamental
human needs” (Chomsky and Foucault, 2006, p. 55) and that a future society can be built on
these qualities and be organized as a “system of decentralized power and free association” (p.
63). The counter-pole to surveillance is solidarity and co-operation, a co-operative society built
David Lyon has constructed a theory of surveillance (Lyon, 1994, p. 192). In my view,
Lyon’s surveillance studies approach is ambivalent in character. On the one hand, he says that
surveillance is janus-faced, which speaks for a neutral notion of surveillance. “I regard some
form of surveillance as an inherent – and not necessarily evil – feature on all human societies”
(Lyon, 1994, p. 19). On the other hand, David Lyon’s approach is normative and clairaudient for
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the voices and interests of political activists, which is more characteristic for negative concepts
of surveillance. David Lyon defines surveillance as the “contexts within which personal data is
collected” (Lyon, 1994, ix). Lyon refined his definition so that surveillance was later defined as
“any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of
influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered” (Lyon, 2001, p. 2) and as
“routine ways in which focused attention is paid to personal data by organizations that want to
influence, manage, or control certain persons or population groups” (Lyon, 2003, p. 5). The
terms influence, management, and control are ambiguous. Depending on how exactly they are
understood/defined, either as general concepts or as more negative concepts, one will either get
In my opinion, there are four reasons that speak against defining surveillance in a neutral way.
Etymology
Surveillance stems etymologically from the French surveiller, to oversee, watch over. Lyon
(2001, p. 3) says that literally surveillance as “watching over” implies both involves care and
control. Watching over implies that there is a social hierarchy between persons, in which one
person exerts power over the other. Watching, monitoring, seeing over someone is
etymologically connected to nouns such as watcher, watchmen, overseer, and officer. If the word
surveillance implies power hierarchies, then it is best to assume that surveillance always has to
do with domination, violence, and (potential or actual) coercion. Foucault there fore sees
surveillance as a technique of coercion (Foucault, 1977, p. 222), it is “power exercised over him
[an individual] through supervision” (Foucault, 1994, p. 84). John Gilliom (2001) studied the
attitudes of women who were on welfare in Ohio, whose personal activities are intensively
documented and assessed by computerized systems. Gilliom stresses that this system works as
“overseer of the poor”. He concludes that these women saw surveillance as inherently negative.
Surveillance would be “watching from above”, an “expression and instrument of power” used
“to control human behavior” (Gilliom, 2001, p. 3). “The politics of surveillance necessarily
include the dynamics of power and domination” (Gilliom 2001, p. 2). Gilliam also notes the
connectedness of the term surveillance to the categories overseer and supervisor (Gilliom, 2001,
p. 3).
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Theoretical conflationism
Neutral concepts of surveillance analyze phenomena as for example taking care of a baby
or the electrocardiogram of a myocardial infarction patient on the same analytical level as for
economic surveillance of private data and online behaviour by Internet companies such as
Facebook, Google, etc for accumulating capital by targeted advertising. If surveillance is seen as
violence and care. The danger of surveillance conflationism is that violence and care can no
longer be analytically separated because they are always both at the same time contained within
the very concept of surveillance. If surveillance is used as a neutral term, then the distinction
blurred, both phenomena are amassed in an undifferentiated unity that makes it hard to
distinguish or categorically fix the degree of coercive severity of certain forms of surveillance.
The double definitional strategy paves the categorical way for trivializing coercive forms of
surveillance. It becomes more difficult to elaborate, apply, and use normative, critical concepts
In everyday language use, citizens tend to use the concept of surveillance in a negative
way and to connection the Orwellian dystopia of totalitarianism with this notion. In academia,
the notion of surveillance is besides in the social sciences especially employed in medicine.
Surveillance data and surveillance systems in medicine are connected to the monitoring of
diseases and health statuses. In the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), the most frequently
cited paper that contains the word surveillance in its title, is a medical work titled “Annual
report to the nation on the status of cancer, 1975-2000, featuring the uses of surveillance data for
cancer prevention and control” (SSCI search, April 30, 2010). This shows that there is a
difference between the everyday usage and the predominant academic usage of the term
surveillance. The first tends to be more political and normative, the latter more analytical. My
argument is that the social science usage of the term surveillance should not be guided by the
understandings given to the term in medicine, the natural sciences, or engineering because the
specific characteristic of the social sciences is that it has a strong normative and critical tradition
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Difference between information gathering and surveillance
is the same as information society studies and the surveillance society is a term synonymous for
the category of the information society. Given these assumptions, there are no grounds for
claiming that surveillance studies is a distinct discipline or transdiscipline. For me, information
and information society are the more general terms. I consider surveillance as one specific kind
of information process and a surveillance society as one specific kind of information society.
The notion of the surveillance society characterizes for me certain negative aspects of
sustainable information society (Fuchs, 2008, 2010; Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund and Sanvoal;
Fuchs and Obrist, 2010). Depending on societal contexts and political regulation, information
has different effects. I suggest that the opposing term of surveillance is solidarity, which allows
to categorically separate negative and positive aspects and effects of information processes.
I do not intend to say that information technologies do not have positive potentials and I
do agree with David Lyon and others that Foucault’s account is too dystopian and lacks positive
visions and strategies for the transformation of society. The relationship of information
technology and society is complex and dialectical and therefore creates multiple positive and
negative potentials that frequently contradict each other (Fuchs, 2008). But under
heteronomous societal conditions we cannot assume that the pros and cons of information
technology are equally distributed, the negative ones are automatically present, the positive ones
remain much more latent, precarious, and have to be realized in struggles. My suggestion is
therefore that the term surveillance should be employed for describing the negative side of
information gathering, processing, and use that is inextricably bound up with coercion,
Normalization of surveillance
surveillance politically because surveillance is then a term that is used in everyday language for
all sorts of harmless information processes that do not inflict damage on humans. The post 9/11
world has seen an intensification and extension of repressive surveillance. Therefore I consider
it important to have categories available that allow scholars, activists, and citizens to criticize
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these developments. If surveillance is a normalized concept of everyday language use that
characterizes all forms of information gathering, storage, and processing and not only a critical
concept, then this normative task becomes more difficult. If everything is surveillance, then
there is no outside of surveillance left, no transcendental humanistic sphere, idea, or subject that
allows to express discontent coercive information gathering and the connected human rights
violations. Repressive surveillance has slowly, but steadily, crept into our lives and it therefore
becomes easier that policy makers and other powerful actors present its implementation as
necessary and inevitable. The normalization of the concept of surveillance may ideologically
strange concept that is connected to feelings of alienation and domination. For doing so, it is
necessary to alienate the notion of surveillance from its normalized neutral usage.
CONCLUSION
The task of this paper was to argue that it is important to deal with the theoretical question of
how surveillance can be defined. My view is that it will be impossible to find one universal,
generally accepted definition of surveillance and that it is rather importance to stress different
approaches of how surveillance can be defined, to work out the commonalities and differences
of these concepts, and to foster constructive dialogue about these questions. A homogenous
state of the art of defining surveillance is nowhere in sight and maybe is not even desirable.
the weakness or of a field, but an indication that it is developing and in a good state. It is not my
goal to establish one specific definition of surveillance, although I of course have my own view
of what is surveillance and what is not surveillance, which I try to ground by finding and
communicating arguments. Theorizing surveillance has to take into account the boundary
between surveillance and information and it has to reflect the desirability or undesirability of
normative and critical meanings of the term. No matter how one defines surveillance, each
surveillance concept positions itself towards theoretical questions such as the relation of
abstractness and concreteness, generality and specificity, normative philosophy and analytical
theorizing, etc.
My personal view is that information is a more general concept than surveillance and that
surveillance is a specific kind of information gathering, storage, processing, assessment, and use
that involves potential or actual harm, coercion, violence, asymmetric power relations, control,
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manipulation, domination, disciplinary power. It is instrumental and a means for trying to
derive and accumulate benefits for certain groups or individuals at the expense of other groups
assessing, and using data about humans so that potential or actual physical, ideological, or
structural violence can be directed against humans in order to influence their behaviour. This
influence is brought about by coercive means and brings benefits to certain groups at the
expense of others. Surveillance is in my view therefore never co-operative and solidary – it never
benefits all. Nonetheless, there are certainly information processes that aim at benefiting all
humans. I term such information processes monitoring, it involves information processing that
aims at care, benefits, solidarity, aid, and co-operation, benefits all, and is opposed to
surveillance.
* teachers watching private activities of pupils via webcams at Harriton High School, Pennsylvania;
* the scanning of the fingerprints of visitors entering the United States;
* the use of speed cameras for identifying speeders (involves state power);
* electronic monitoring bracelets for prisoners in an open prison system;
* the scanning of Internet and phone data by secret services with the help of the Echelon system
and the Carnivore software;
* the usage of full body scanners at airports;
* biometrical passports containing digital fingerprints;
* the use of the DoubleClick advertising system by Internet corporations for collecting data about
users’ online browsing behaviour and providing them with targeted advertising;
* CCTV cameras in public means of transportation for the prevention of terrorism;
* the assessment of customer shopping behaviour with the help of loyalty cards;
* the data collection in marketing research;
* the publication of sexual paparazzi photos of celebrities in a tabloid;
* the assessment of personal images and videos of applicants on Facebook by employers prior to a
job interview;
* the collection of data about potential or actual terrorists in the TIDE database (Terrorist
Identities Datamart Environment) by the US National Counterterrorism Center;
* Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer from Europe to the United States in aviation;
* Telekomgate: spying on employees, trade unionists, journalists, and members of the board of
directors by the German Telekom;
* the video filming of employees in Lidl supermarkets and assessment of the data by managers in
Germany;
* watching the watchers: corporate watch systems, filming of the police beating of Rodney King
(LA 1992), YouTube video of the police killing of Neda Soltan (Iran, 2009).
The point about these examples is that they all involve asymmetrical power relations,
some form of violence, and that systematic information processing inflicts some form of harm.
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We live in heteronomous societies, therefore surveillance processes can be encountered very
characteristic of all societies and all social systems. Just think of the situations in our lives that
involve altruism, love, friendship, and mutual care. These are examples that show that non-
dominative spheres are possible and actual. My argument is that it is possible to think about
alternative modes of society, where co-operation, solidarity, and care are the guiding principles
(Fuchs, 2008). If information processes are central in such a society, then I would not want to
Here are some examples of monitoring that are not forms of surveillance:
*consensual online video sex chat of adults;
* parents observing their sleeping sick baby with a camera or babyphone in order to see if it needs
their help;
* the permanent electrocardiogram of a cardiac infarction patient;
* the seismographic early detection of earthquakes;
* the employment of the DART system (Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis) in
the Pacific Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea for detecting tsunamis;
* the usage of a GPS-based car navigation system for driving to an unknown destination;
* the usage of a fire detector and alarm system and a fire sprinkling system in a public school;
* drinking water quality measurement systems;
* the usage of smog and air pollution warning systems;
* the activities of radioactivity measuring stations for detecting nuclear power plant disasters;
* systems for detecting and measuring temperature, humidity, and smoke in forest areas that are
prone to wildfires;
* measurement of meteorological data for weather forecasts.
The point about these examples is that there are systematic information processes in our
societies that do not involve systematic violence, competition, and domination, but aim at
benefits for all. One can certainly discuss if these are particularly good examples and if the
boundaries between the first and the second list can be clearly drawn, but the central point I
want to make is that there are political choices between advancing and regulating systematic
information processing that has repressive or solidary effects and that this difference counts
normatively. Certainly, forms of monitoring can easily turn into forms of surveillance, and
surveillance technologies might be refined in ways that serve solidary purposes. The more
crucial point that I want to make is that normative theories, critical thinking, and critical
political practices matter in our society and that they need a clear understanding of concepts. I
question postmodern and constructivist approaches that want to tell us that it has become
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completely impossible to distinguish what is desirable and undesirable or that all normative
ideas and political projects are inherently prone to producing new forms of violence and
especially in times of global crisis important to have clearly defined concepts at hand that help
criticizing violence and domination and points towards a different world. I therefore see a need
designed in different ways and used in different societal contexts. Therefore technologies as such
in most cases do not determine the larger effects in society. What is and what is not surveillance
can therefore in my opinion not be determined at the level of technologies, but only at the level
of social structures, by observing if the contexts, outcomes and effects of certain surveillance
technologies benefit all, or cause harms and enforce and deepen domination, exploitation, and
alienation. I therefore argue for a critical theory of surveillance. Such a theory is also a realist
and non-constructivist theory because it argues that humans are able to observe and make
grounded and reasonable judgements about the positive and negative effects of technologies.
Neutral surveillance approaches see surveillance as having two faces, a positive and a
negative one, argue that surveillance exists in all societies, and that it involves any kind of
information gathering in organizations. Neutral surveillance approaches have become the new
orthodoxy of Surveillance Studies that hardly anybody has questioned. Surveillance Studies
wants to be a broad interdisciplinary field that institutionalizes itself, therefore the suggestion to
conceptualize surveillance as purely negative concept does not fit into this task. Negative
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surveillance approaches point out that surveillance is a repressive process of information
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Article received on 20th August 2011 and approved on 24th September 2011.
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