Alvero v. Dizon G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946 76 Phil.

637 (1946)

Fact: Petitioner has been accused of treason; that at the hearing on his petition for bail,
the prosecution presented, as part of its evidence, certain documents which had been
allegedly seized by soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by Filipino
guerrillas, in the petitioner’s house; that petitioner immediately objected to the
presentation of said documents, and called the attention of the respondent judges to the
fact that he had filed a petition, in which he protested against the procedure of the
government in the seizure of said documents, and asked for their return to the
petitioner.

Issue: Whether the arresting officer committed unlawful searches and seizures when
they obtained the document being reclaimed by the petitioner

Held: No, The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein
petitioner, as a collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any
search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is unquestionable, under the
provisions of the Regulations relative to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of the
Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military papers in the possession
of prisoners of war and also under the proclamation, issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
as Commander in Chief of the United States of Army, declaring his purpose to remove
certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political
and economic influence in the Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration
of the war.

The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search
and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a
crime is being committed or after its commission. The right to search includes in both
instances that of searching the person of him who is arrested, in order to find and seize
things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed.
When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his possession or in his
control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right to
make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable
grounds to have committed a felony.

The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful searches

and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the
Federal Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by
a private person or under authority of state law.
People vs. Andre Marti G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

Fact: In 1987, the appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a
friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the
name and address of the consignee, namely, “WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052
Zurich, Switzerland” Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of
appellant’s representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages.
Before delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant’s box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, He made an opening on one of
the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a
laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He
brought the letter and a sample of appellant’s shipment to the Narcotics Section of the
NBI and informed the them that the rest of the shipment was still in his office.
Therefore, Job Reyes and three NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes’
office at Ermita. The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by
Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also
opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the
cigars. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the
contents thereof, after signing a “Receipt” acknowledging custody of the said effects .
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure committed by the private individual inviolate the
constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and seizures?

Held: No, The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and

seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus,
it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against
arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. Corolarilly, alleged
violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree
with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should
also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by
the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection.
Bache and Co., vs. Ruiz GR No. L-32409 February 27, 1971 37 SCRA 323 (1971)

Fact: Respondent Commissioner, wrote a letter to respondent Judge Ruiz requesting

the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of the National Internal
Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, and authorizing a
Revenue Examiner to make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, respondent De Leon and his
witness, respondent Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought
with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De
Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a
deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by
him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still
unsigned by respondent Judge. At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain
case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned,
respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer, upon request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could
be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for
search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant was then sign by
respondent Judge and accordingly issued. Three days later, the BIR agents served the
search warrant petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation. Petitioners’ lawyers
protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony
was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded six boxes of documents. Petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search
warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay
petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the
respondents, thru the Solicitor General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing,
the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an order
dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. Hence, Petitioners came to
this Court.

Issue: Whether a corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and

seizure?

Held: Yes, A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it
waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be
taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against by due process of law,
and is protected against unlawful discrimination. we are of the opinion that an officer of
a corporation which is charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or
of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to
produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to be understood as
holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
436 U.S. 547

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (No. 76-1484)

Argued: January 17, 1978

Decided: May 31, 1978 [*]

___

 Syllabus
 Opinion, White
 Concurrence, Powell
 Dissent, Stewart
 Dissent, Stevens

Syllabus

Respondents, a student newspaper that had published articles and

photographs of a clash between demonstrators and police at a hospital, and
staff members, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against, among
others, petitioners, law enforcement and district attorney personnel,
claiming that a search pursuant to a warrant issued on a judge's finding of
probable cause that the newspaper (which was not involved in the unlawful
acts) possessed photographs and negatives revealing the identities of
demonstrators who had assaulted police officers at the hospital had deprived
respondents of their constitutional rights. The District Court granted
declaratory relief, holding that the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth forbade the issuance of a warrant to search for
materials in possession of one not suspected of crime unless there is
probable cause, based on facts presented in a sworn affidavit, to believe that
a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable. Failure to honor the
subpoena would not, alone, justify issuance of a warrant; it would also have
to appear that the possessor of the objects sought would disregard a court
order not to remove or destroy them. The court also held that, where the
innocent object of the search is a newspaper, First Amendment interests
make the search constitutionally permissible

only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing that (1)
important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction;
and (2) a restraining order would be futile.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held:
1. A State is not prevented by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from
issuing a warrant to search for evidence simply because the owner or
possessor of the place to be searched is not reasonably suspected of criminal
involvement. The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the
property owner is suspected of crime, but that there is reasonable cause to
believe that the "things" to be searched for and seized are located on the
property to which entry is sought. Pp. 553-560.

2. The District Court's new rule denying search warrants against

third[p548] parties and insisting on subpoenas would undermine law
enforcement efforts, since search warrants are often used early in an
investigation before all the perpetrators of a crime have been identified, and
the seemingly blameless third party may be implicated. The delay in
employing a subpoena duces tecum could easily result in disappearance of
the evidence. Nor would the cause of privacy be served, since search
warrants are more difficult to obtain than subpoenas. Pp. 560-563.

3. Properly administered, the preconditions for a search warrant (probable

cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to
be seized, and overall reasonableness), which must be applied with
particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered
by the search, are adequate safeguards against the interference with the
press' ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate news that respondents
claim would ensue from use of warrants for third-party searches of
newspaper offices. Pp. 563-567.

550 F.2d 464, reversed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and
BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a
concurring opinion, post, p. 568. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 570. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 577. BRENNAN, J., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the cases.
Wilson v. Layne 98-0083, May 24, 1999

Fact: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners’ son in their home, respondents,
deputy federal marshals and local sheriff’s deputies, invited a newspaper reporter and a
photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention of such a media “ride-
along.” The officers’ early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with
petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the house. The
reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not involved in the
execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of
the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money
damages, contending that the officers’ actions in bringing the media to observe and
record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment
rights. The District Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide
whether the officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that
because no court had held at the time of the search that media presence during a police
entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the right allegedly violated was not
“clearly established” and thus respondents were entitled to qualified immunity.

Issue: Whether the search warrant and seizure violated the right of the petitioner went
the respondent invited members of media to “ride-along” during the serving of the said
warrant.

Held: Yes, media “ride-along” in a home violates the Fourth Amendment, but because
the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in this case took
place, respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Respondent violates the
Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or
other third parties into their home during the execution of a warrant when the presence
of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the warrant’s execution. The
Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home,
which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant
in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant. It does not necessarily
follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter petitioners’ home that they
were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth
Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the
objectives of the authorized intrusion. Certainly the presence of the reporters, who did
not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their task, was not
related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension of petitioners’ son.
Taken in their entirety, the reasons advanced by respondents to support the reporters’
presence–publicizing the government’s efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate
reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting
suspects and the officers–fall short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the
presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some circumstances
be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third parties was not.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

Fact: Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search
warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail”
and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum”
newspaper, were seized. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to
conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and
academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983,
that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla
and his witnesses. In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held “that the executing
officer’s prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would
seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit
the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the
executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched.”

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not

have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant
may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Issue: Whether general description of the things to be seized is enough to constitute

probable cause to validate the issuance of a search warrant and seizure

Held: No, Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in
of the respondent’s application that petitioner “is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents
which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended …” is a
mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft
of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave
error for respondent judge to have done so. Equally insufficient as basis for the
determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, “that the evidence gathered and collated by
our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles and things
above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-
a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement.”

In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, … after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. this Court ruled that “the oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.” As
couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly
meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court.
CHANDLER et al. v. MILLER, GOVERNOR OF GEORGIA, et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

No. 96-126. Argued January 14, 1997 -- Decided April 15, 1997

A Georgia statute requires candidates for designated state offices to certify

that they have taken a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying
for nomination or election and that the test result was negative. Petitioners,
Libertarian Party nominees for state offices subject to the statute's
requirements, filed this action in the District Court about one month before
the deadline for submission of the certificates. Naming as defendants the
Governor and two officials involved in the statute's administration,
petitioners asserted, inter alia, that the drug tests violated their rights under
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The District Court denied petitioners' motion for a preliminary
injunction and later entered final judgment for respondents. Relying on this
Court's precedents sustaining drug testing programs for student
athletes, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. ___, ___, Customs
Service employees, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659,
and railway employees, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S.
602, 608-613, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court accepted as settled
law that the tests were searches, but reasoned that, as was true of the drug
testing programs at issue in Skinner and Von Raab, the statute served
"special needs," interests other than the ordinary needs of law enforcement.
Balancing the individual's privacy expectations against the State's interest in
the drug testing program, the court held the statute, as applied to
petitioners, not inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Held: Georgia's requirement that candidates for state office pass a drug test
does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches. Pp. 6-17.

(a) It is uncontested that Georgia's drug testing requirement, imposed by

law and enforced by state officials, effects a search within the meaning of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The pivotal question here is
whether the searches are reasonable. To be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. See Vernonia, 515 U. S., at ___. But particularized exceptions
to the main rule are sometimes warranted based on "special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 619. When
such "special needs" are alleged, courts must undertake a context specific
inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests
advanced by the parties. See Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665-666. In evaluating
Georgia's ballot access, drug testing statute--a measure plainly not tied to
individualized suspicion--the Eleventh Circuit sought to balance the
competing interests in line with this Court's precedents most immediately in
point: Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia. Pp. 6-10.

(b) These precedents remain the guides for assessing the validity of the
Georgia statute despite respondents' invitation to apply a framework
extraordinarily deferential to state measures setting conditions of candidacy
for state office. No precedent suggests that a State's sovereign power to
establish qualifications for state offices diminishes the constraints on state
action imposed by the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 10-11.

(c) Georgia's testing method is relatively noninvasive; therefore, if the

"special need" showing had been made, the State could not be faulted for
excessive intrusion. However, Georgia has failed to show a special need that
is substantial--important enough to override the individual's acknowledged
privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's
normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Respondents contend that
unlawful drug use is incompatible with holding high state office because such
drug use draws into question an official's judgment and integrity;
jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including antidrug law
enforcement efforts; and undermines public confidence and trust in elected
officials. Notably lacking in respondents' presentation is any indication of a
concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment's main
rule. The statute was not enacted, as repondents concede, in response to
any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials. A demonstrated problem
of drug abuse, while not in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing
regime, see Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 673-675, would shore up an assertion
of special need for a suspicionless general search program, see Skinner, 489
U. S., at 606-608, Vernonia, 515 U. S., at___. In contrast to the effective
testing regimes upheld in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, Georgia's
certification requirement is not well designed to identify candidates who
violate antidrug laws and is not a credible means to deter illicit drug users
from seeking state office. The test date is selected by the candidate, and
thus all but the prohibitively addicted could abstain for a pretest period
sufficient to avoid detection. Respondents' reliance on this Court's decision
in Von Raab, which sustained a drug testing program for Customs Service
officers prior to promotion or transfer to certain high risk positions, despite
the absence of any documented drug abuse problem among Service
employees, 489 U. S., at 660, is misplaced. Hardly a decision opening broad
vistas for suspicionless searches, Von Raab must be read in its unique
context. Drug interdiction had become the agency's primary enforcement
mission. The covered posts directly involved drug interdiction or otherwise
required Customs officers to carry firearms, the employees would have
access to vast sources of valuable contraband, and officers had been targets
of and some had succumbed to bribery by drug smugglers. Moreover, it was
not feasible to subject the Customs Service employees to the kind of day to
day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments. In
telling contrast, the day-to-day conduct of candidates for public office
attracts attention notably beyond the norm in ordinary work environments.
What is left, after close review of Georgia's scheme, is that the State seeks
to display its commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. But Georgia
asserts no evidence of a drug problem among the State's elected officials,
those officials typically do not perform high risk, safety sensitive tasks, and
the required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort. The need
revealed is symbolic, not "special." The Fourth Amendment shields society
from state action that diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake. Pp.
11-16.

(d) The Court expresses no opinion on medical examinations designed to

provide certification of a candidate's general health or on financial disclosure
requirements, and it does not speak to drug testing in the private sector, a
domain unguarded by Fourth Amendment constraints. Pp. 16-17.

73 F. 3d 1543, reversed.

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
People v. Chua Ho San 308 SCRA 432 (1999) G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999

Fact: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,

CID began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While monitoring the
coastal area he intercepted a radio call from ALMOITE requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat. CID and six of his men. When the speedboat landed,
the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID
and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed direction and broke into a run upon
seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing by
holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the
man appeared impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his
bag, but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but
still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed “sign language;” he motioned with
his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. which was later found out that it was Shabu.
CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed
to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend.
Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and escorted the latter to
the police headquarters. CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of
methaphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. The RTC convicted Chua Ho San guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Chua Ho San prays for his acquitttal and the reversal of the
judgment of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the accused who was acting suspiciously constitute Probable Cause
impelling the police officers from effecting an in flagrante delicto arrest.

Held: No, the Court, finds that these do not constitute “probable cause.” None of the
telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other
prohibited drug, confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of
courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior and suspicious bulge in
the waist — accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in
this case. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such facts or as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While a
contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver dangerous
weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search
may extend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of
a weapon or evidence he can destroy, a valid arrest must precede the search. The
process cannot be reversed. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
Paderanga vs. Drilon G.R. 96080, April 19, 1991

Issue: Whether the Fiscal have the jurisdiction to determine the probable cause of the
accused

Held: Yes, Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed
in court. ence, the general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a
criminal prosecution. The fiscal has the discretion to determine whether or not he will
propound these questions to the parties or witnesses concerned.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of
the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary
Services Bureau, WesternPolice District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized
and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along
Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt
along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating
plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines,
pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said
than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall."
Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The
court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a
judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion;
 MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, petitioners, vs. HON. JAPAL M.
GUIANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cotabato City, respondent.
[G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000]

FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by
herein respondent Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City,
was filed before the Supreme Court. Murder complaint was filed but was dismissed by the
provincial prosecutor on the ground that there was no prima facie case for murder, for a
number of accused (6). However, he recommended the filing of an information for murder
against one of the respondents (accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge
Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial prosecutor for further investigation since
there was no necessary resolution required under the Rules of Court to show how the
investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8
respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it was assigned for
reinvestigation to another prosecutor who then recommended the filing of charges against
5 accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners.

On January 2, 1995, information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others.

The following day, January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of
petitioners. On January 4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside
the warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. Despite
said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside the
Warrant of Arrest. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the warrant of
Arrest be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Issue:
WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Held:

The Court reiterated the provisions of Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE
WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized.”

The Court held that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions
of our previous constitutions. The Court said that the emphasis demonstrates the intent of
the framers to place a greater degree ofresponsibility upon trial judges than that imposed
 under previous Constitutions. Accordingly, what the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses. The Court furthered, following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

In Ho vs. People, it enumerated the existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First,
as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose
different from that which is to be made by the judge.

Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused,
i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. The responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or non-existence of probable cause is lodged in
him by no less than the most basic law of the land.

Lastly, the Court said that it is not required that complete or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is
required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause.
Pasion Vda. De Garcia vs. Locsin G.R. No. L-
45950, June 20, 1938 65 Phil 68 (1938)
Facts: Anti Usury Law

Issue: Whether the issuance of the warrant of search and seizure was valid

Held: No, In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the
judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the
affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that
he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of
the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued
is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. instead, they were
turned over to the respondent provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases
against the petitioner. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no
case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily
for exploration purposes is not without basis. The lower court is, therefore, correct in
reaching the conclusion that the search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the
peace of Tarlac, Tarlac.
Alvarez vs. CFI of Tayabas Case Digest

● The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the
issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce.

● It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a

complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts.

● A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is
necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue.

Facts:

Mariano Almeda, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, applied for a search
warrant and presented to Judge David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas an affidavit
alleging that according to reliable information, petitioner Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, Almeda stated that his answers to the questions were
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable
person. On the basis of such affidavit, Judge David issued a warrant ordering the search of the
petitioner’s house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents
above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance
with the law.

With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and
residence at 7:00 pm and seized articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals, cash
bonds, check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of lading, credit
receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes and checks.
Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared illegal and that all the
articles in question be returned to him. He claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the
following reasons: (a) it was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no
personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause; (b) it was not supported by other affidavits
aside from that made by the applicant; (c) it authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized; and (e) it was issued for the
sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that
might be instituted against him for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the
validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof,
because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed
to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings.

The CFI ruled against the Alvarez and upheld the validity of the search warrant.

Issues:

1. Is the search warrant illegal when the affidavit is based on hearsay?

2. Is there a need for affidavit of another witnesses to support the application for search
warrant?

3. Can the search warrant be executed at night?

4. Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description as required by the law?

5. Is fishing evidence is valid?

6. Did Alvarez waived his constitutional right to question the validity of the search warrant or
the proceedings when he offered a compromise or settlement of the case?
Held:

1. Yes. The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of
the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the
deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

2. No. It is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a

complainant in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the
applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge
to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause
exists.

3. Yes. The search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. In this case, it does not appear
positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner and in the
place indicated; hence, the search and seizure could not be made at night.

4. Yes. A detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be
seized is necessary, but where, by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must
be rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean
that no warrant could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented
to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-
lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration
the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the
legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in
a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

5. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the
books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself.
Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the
purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that
the documents should be returned to him.

6. No. The petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or
settlement attributed to him, does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the
search and seizure. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the
petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such
was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents. Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, G.R. No. L-45358, January 29, 1937)
MATA V. BAYONA G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

FACTS:

l Petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306 "AN ACT GRANTING THE
PHILIPPINE JAI-ALAI AND AMUSEMENT CORPORATION A FRANCHISE TO OPERATE, CONSTRUCT
AND MAINTAIN A FRONTON FOR BASQUE PELOTA AND SIMILAR GAMES OF SKILL IN THE
GREATER MANILA AREA".

l The information against herein petitioner alleged that he offered, took and arranged bets on
the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from
the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities
concerned."

l During the hearing of the case, the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to
the issuance of the warrant is missing from the records of the case.

l This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized

l The court dismissed his motion stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the
Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP and the court made a certification that
the documents were not attached immediately and that there’s nowhere in the rules which
specify when these documents are to be attached to the records.

l Petitioner’s MR was also denied

l Hence, this petition praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be
invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the
case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

NO. The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

Furthermore, While the SC held that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized
cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, it was held that the illegality of the search warrant
does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

Petition granted.