HILTON V.

GUYOT
FACTS: Guyot, a Frenchman, sued Hilton, an American, in a French court for the recovery of a
sum of money. The French court rendered judgment in favor of Guyot. Plaintiff brought the
action to a US court to recover the sum of money adjudged by the French court to be due from
the defendant to the plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nation’s court entitled to full credit and has a
conclusive effect when sued to other nation.

HELD: No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which its
authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory,
whether by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree shall be allowed to operate
within the dominion of another nation depends upon the comity of nations. A foreign judgment
is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued upon another nation but is a prima facie evidence
only of the claim.

GEMPERLE V.SCHENKER
FACTS: Paul Schenker acting through his wife Helen Schenker filed a complaint against petitioner
for the enforcement of Paul Schenker’s allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the
Phil. Swiss Trading Company and the exercise of his alleged preemptive rights to the unissued
original capital stock of said corporation. Believing that the suit was only for the purpose of
harassing and degrading his reputation, he also filed a damage suit against the Schenkers. The
trial rendered in favor of Gemperle thus Helen Schenker appealed alleging that Paul Schenker
cannot be sued or joined as defendants because the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over
his person because he was outside of the Phil. thus he is beyond the jurisdiction of our court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can acquire jurisdiction over the person of an alien defendant?

HELD: Yes, where a Swiss citizen, residing abroad was served with summons through his wife who
was residing in the Phil. and who was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
which was filed at her behest in her aforementioned capacity, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over his person by means of service of summons to his wife. As a the wife had authority to sue in
his behalf, so she was also empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in
a case which is a consequence of the action brought by her in his behalf.

BELEN V. CHAVEZ
FACTS: Respondent Sps. Silvestre and Patricia Pacleb filed an action before the RTC of Rosario,
Batangas against petitioners, Sps. Belen for the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by
Judge Green of the superior court of the State of California, in a complaint for breach of contract
against herein petitioners ordering them to pay private respondents monetary award. The
summons was served on petitioner’s address in San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna received by a
certain Marcelo Belen as alleged in the complaint. Atty. Alcantara, whose services were retained
by the petitioner’s relatives, entered his appearance for the petitioners, filed an answer stating
among others that petitioners are actually residents of California, USA. Atty. Alcantara on a later
date moved to dismiss the complaint due to the judgment of dismissal rendered by the same
foreign court which was denied for failure to present a copy thereof. Subsequently, the RTC
ordered a judgment in favor of the respondents which judgment was not received by Atty.
Alcantara due to his death but by a certain Leopoldo Avecilla. Thereafter, Att. Carmelo Culvera,
petitioner’s new counsel assailed the judgment before the CA for lack of jurisdiction over the
petitioners in view of the improper service of summons. The CA affirmed the said decision.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

HELD: Yes. Even if the service of summons was defective upon non- resident defendants, the
appearance of Atty. Alcantara impliedly authorized by the defendants to appear on their behalf
and his filing of numerous pleadings were sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants.

PENNOYER v. NEFF
FACTS: Mitchell brought suit against Neff to recover unpaid legal fees. Mitchell published notice
of the lawsuit in an Oregon newspaper but did not serve Neff personally. Neff failed to appear
and a default judgment was entered against him. To satisfy the judgment Mitchell seized land
owned by Neff so that it could be sold at a Sheriff‘s auction. When the auction was held Mitchell
purchased it and later assigned it to Pennoyer. Neff sued Pennoyer in federal district court in
Oregon to recover possession of the property, claiming that the original judgment against him
was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction over both him and the land. The court found that the
judgment in the lawsuit between Mitchell and Pennoyer was invalid and that Neff still owned the
land. Pennoyer lost on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE: Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been
personally served while within the state and whose property within the state was not attached
before the onset of litigation?

HELD: No. A court may enter a judgment against a non-resident only if the party: 1) is personally
served with process while within the state, or 2) has property within the state, and that property
is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi in rem jurisdiction). Since the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the validity of judgments may be directly questioned on the ground that
proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. Due process demands
that legal proceedings be conducted according to those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.
To give legal proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal with legal authority to pass
judgment, and a defendant must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within
the state, or by his voluntary appearance. The substituted service of process by publication in
actions brought against non-residents is valid only where property in the state is brought under
the control of the court, and subjected to its disposition by process adapted to that purpose, or
where the judgment is sought as a means of reaching such property or affecting some interest
therein; in other words, where the action is in the nature of a proceeding in rem. The Oregon
court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was not served in Oregon. The
court‘s judgment would have been valid if Mitchell had attached Neff‘s land at the beginning of
the suit. Mitchell could not have done this because Neff did not own the land at the time Mitchell
initiated the suit. The default judgment was declared invalid. Therefore, the sheriff had no power
to auction the real estate and title never passed to Mitchell. Neff was the legal owner.

INTERNATIONAL SHOE v. STATE OF WASHINGTON

FACTS: Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St. Louis,
Missouri. The corporation is engaged in the manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear.
During the years from 1937 to 1940, appellant employed eleven to thirteen salesmen whose
primary tasks were to exhibit samples of merchandise and solicit orders from prospective buyers.
These salesmen resided in Washington. In the course of business, they rented permanent sample
rooms, in business buildings or temporary ones in hotels for exhibiting samples. In accordance
with Washington statutes requiring contributions to the state unemployment compensation
funds from employers, appellee through its Commissioner issued an order and notice of
assessment to collect from the appellant its contribution to said fund. Appellant moved to set
aside the order and notice of assessment alleging among others that: the service upon appellant's
salesman was not proper service upon appellant; that appellant was not a corporation of the
State of Washington, and was not doing business within the state; that it had no agent within the
state upon whom service could be made; and that appellant is not an employer, and does not
furnish employment within the meaning of the statute. The motion was heard on evidence and
a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal, which denied the motion and ruled that appellee
Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the
Commissioner; both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether appellant International Shoe, a Delaware corporation, has, by its activities in the
State of Washington, rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state to
recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund exacted by state
statutes

HELD: Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their
de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other
form of notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." The activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout
the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course of
which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right
to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here sued upon
arose out of those very activities. It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts
or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which appellant has incurred there. Hence, we cannot say that the maintenance of the present
suit in the State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue procedure.

We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon an agent
whose activities establish appellant's "presence" there was not sufficient notice of the suit, or
that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle
for communicating the notice. It is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the
state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance
that the notice will be actual.

MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST

SHAFFER v. HEITNER
FACTS: Appellee Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware, is the owner of one share of stock in the
Greyhound Corp., a business incorporated under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of
business in Phoenix, Ariz. Heitner filed a suit in the Court of Chancery naming as defendants
Greyhound, its subsidiary Greyhound Lines, Inc., and 28 present and former officers both of the
corporations alleging in essence that the individual defendants had violated their duties which
resulted in the corporations being held liable for damages in a private antitrust suit and a large
fine in a criminal contempt action. Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, Heitner filed
a motion for an order of sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual defendants.
Attached to the motion was an affidavit stating that the individual defendants were nonresidents
of Delaware. The request for the sequestration order was approved and pursuant to that order,
the sequestrator "seized" approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound common stock belonging
to the defendants. (Delaware was the situs of ownership of all stock in Delaware corporations.)
The 21 defendants whose property was seized assailed the sequestration order contending that
the ex parte sequestration procedure did not accord them due process of law and that the
property seized was not capable of attachment in Delaware. In addition, appellants asserted that
under the rule of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), they did not have
sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain the jurisdiction of that State's courts.
The Court of Chancery rejected these arguments and held that the purpose of the sequestration
was to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer and defend a suit
brought against him in court. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Chancery.

ISSUE: Whether the presence of appellants' properties in Delaware vests the court of that State
to take jurisdiction of a lawsuit by sequestering any property of the appellant located in the said
State

HELD: In order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be
sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in the thing." The
presence of property in a State may bear upon the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts
among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation, as for example, when claims to the
property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and defendant,
where it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction.
But where, as in the instant quasi in rem action, the property now serving as the basis for state-
court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action, the presence of the
property alone, i. e., absent other ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, would
not support the State's jurisdiction. Though the primary rationale for treating the presence of
property alone as a basis for jurisdiction is to prevent a wrongdoer from avoiding payment of his
obligations by removal of his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit,
that is an insufficient justification for recognizing jurisdiction without regard to whether the
property is in the State for that purpose. Moreover, the availability of attachment procedures
and the protection of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, also militate against that rationale.