080 Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Bildner (MATSUMURA) First, Erlinda claims that Sylvia and Lin were illegally restraining Potenciano.
May 12, 2000 & July 19, 2001| Pardo, J. | Habeas Corpus Moreover, that they were using Potenciano to sign away the conjugral property to
GR No. 139789
PETITIONER: Erlinda Ilusorio
RESPONDENTS: Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio, John Doe, and Jane Doe
GR No. 139808
PETITIONER: Potenciano Ilusorio, Ma. Erlinda Bildner, and Sylvia Ilusorio
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Erlinda Ilusorio
SUMMARY: Erlinda Ilusorio and Potenciano Ilusorio married in July 11, 1942 and
lived together for 30 years, bearing 6 children. In 1972, the couple separated from
bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Because of this, Potenciano lives in Urdaneta
Condominium when he’s in Manila, and in at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he’s in Baguio City. Meanwhile, Erlinda lived in Antipolo. In 1997,
when Potenciano arrived in Manila from his trip to the US, he stayed in Antipolo
with Erlinda. During this time, their children Erlinda (Lin) and Sylvia allege that
their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft, an anti-depressant drug
prescribed to him by his NY doctor. In 1998, Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano, arguing that he is of advances age, frail
health, poor eyesight, and impaired judgment. On May 31 of the same year,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo after his corporate meeting in Baguio and
instead stayed in Cleveland Condominium in Makati. Thus, Erlinda filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the CA to have custody over Potenciano alleging that Lyn
and Sylvia are refusing her demands to see Potenciano and are prohibiting him from
returning to Antipolo. The CA dismissed the petition, but ordered that Erlinda be
given visitation rights. Both parties appealed this decision. Hence, this case.
The issue is whether hebeas corpus will prosper, and the court ruled in the negative.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, of
by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. Here, the evidence shows that
Potenciano was not deprived of his liberty.Moreover, the court emphasized that the
fact of old age and that he is under medication does not render him mentally
incapacitated. During his testimony, he made is clear that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. Thus, there is no restraint in his liberty. As to the
order of visitation rights, the SC ruled that it was incorrect of the CA to grant such
because that will deprive him of his right to privacy.
Motion for Reconsideration: Thereafter, Erlinda filed a motion praying that
Potenciano be produced before the court and be medically examined by a team of
medical experts appointed by the court. The court denied this, hence this motion.
Again the SC emphasized that habeas corpus will not prosper.
companies controlled by Sylvia and Lin, and they they were controlling Potenciano’s
corporations. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the SC so that
the court can determine his mental state.
The SC ruled that the fact of legal restraint was not proven at the hearing before the
CA, and that Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children
to see Erlinda. Moreover, the question of mental state is a question of fact which has
already been decided by the CA which ruled that Potenciano is mentally capacitated.
With regard to the allegation that the children were taking control of the
corporations, such is a matter that should be threshed out in a separate proceeding,
irrelevant of habeas corpus.
Second, Erlinda argues that Article XII of the Constitution and Article 68 and 69 of
the Family Code state that husband and wife are duty bound to live together and care
for each other. The SC ruled that the law provides that hudband and wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity. This sanction is the
“spontaneous, murual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium.
DOCTRINE: The law provides that hudband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity. This sanction is the “spontaneous, murual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order” to
enforce consortium.
FACTS:
1. Erlinda Ilusorio (Erlinda) is married to Potenciano Ilusorio (Potenciano).
They got married in July 11, 1942 and lived together for 30 years. They had
6 children (Ramon, Erlinda Bildner, Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta, and
Shereen)
2. Potenciano is 86 years old, a lawyer, and possessed extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. He was also the Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club for many years.
3. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio
City. Meanwhile, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
4. On December 30, 1997, Potenciano came back from the US and stayed with
Erlinda for 5 months in Antipolo. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin),
alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of
200 mg instead of 100 mg of Zoloft (an anti-depressant drug) which was
prescribed to him by his doctor in New York. Because of this, Potenciano’s
 health deteriorated.
5. On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano before the RTC of Antipolo. She filed
this because of Potenciano’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight, and
impaired judgment.
6. On May 31, 1998 Potenciano did not return to Antipolo after he attended a
corporate meeting in Baguio. Instead he lived at Cleveland Condominium in
Makati.
7. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA
to have the custody of Potenciano. She alleged that her daughters Sylvia and
Lin, and John Doe and Jane Doe refused her demands to see and visit her
husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
8. After due hearing, the CA dismissed the habeas corpus petition, but ordered
that Erlinda be allowed to visit Potenciano.
9. Hence, the two petitions which were consolidated.
10. Erlinda filed an appeal pursuing her desire to have custody over Potenciano.
Meanwhile, Potenciano and his children Lin and Sylvia appealed the order
granting visitation rights to wife Erlinda.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether heabeas corpus will prosper — NO because no court is empowered
as a judicial auithority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition
for lack of merit. No costs. In G.R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and
nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to
respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs. SO ORDERED.
 petition for habeas corpus. No court is empowered as a judicial auithority to
RATIO:
1. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, of by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto.
2. It is available where a person continues to be
a. unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
b. where there is denial of due process,
c. where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are
unnecessary, and
d. where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary.
3. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom

4. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manners of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal.
5. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

6. Here, the evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention of
deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ. The fact that he is 86 years old, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not
hinge on age or medical condition, but on the capacity of the individual to
discern his actions.
7. Moreover, as to his mental state, the CA observed that he was of sound and
alert mind, having answred all the questions to the satisfaction of the court.
Thus, he possesses the capacity to make choices, including the choice of his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with.
8. Protenciano made is clear that he was not prevented from leaving his house
or seeing people. Thus, there is no restraint in his liberty.
9. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy.
10. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
compel a husband to live with his wife. That is a matter beyond judicial
aiuthority and is bets left to the man and woman’s choice.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION JULY 19, 2001
FACTS:
1. On October 11, 2000, the parties had a preliminary conference where the
Court laid down the issues to be resolved:
a. Determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of
Potenciano
b. Whether the same was relevant
c. If relevant, how will the court conduct the same
 2. Erlinda manifestation and filed a motion praying that Potenciano be 7. The SC stated that the law provides that hudband and wife are obliged to
produced before the court and be medically examined by a team of medical live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity. This sanction is the
experts appointed by the court. However, this was denied by the court. “spontaneous, murual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium.
3. Erlinda filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence, this case
8. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
ISSUE/s: Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
1. Whether heabeas corpus will prosper — NO. The law providing that the
husband and wife are duty bound to live together and care for each other is 9. The SC defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
not a legal mandate or order where consortium can be forced. experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda’s motion for reconsideration.
At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject. 10. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with
“amor gignit amorem” respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
RATIO: togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

1. First, Erlinda claims that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with
her and that his mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause
of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband’s custody. Clearly,
Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano to live with her.

2. Second, Erlinda claims that her daughters Sylvia and Lin were illegally
restraining Portenciano, and that they were using their sick and frail father
to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda’s property to companies controlled by
the daughters. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and
officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunica
tions, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and
Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations


3. However, the fact of legal restraint has not been proven during the hearing
at the CA last 1999. Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented
by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing
his wife and other children.

4. Erlinda highlighted that Potenciano suffered from various ailments and thus
did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda
argued that Potenciano be brought before the SC so that the court can
determine his mental state.

5. The SC ruled that this is a question of fact which has already been decided
by the CA which ruled that Potenciano is mentally capacitated. With regard
to the allegation that the children were taking control of the corporations,
such is a matter that should be threshed out in a separate proceeding,
irrelevant of habeas corpus.

6. Third, Erlinda argues that Article XII of the Constitution and Article 68 and
69 of the Family Code state that husband and wife are duty bound to live
together and care for each other.
 081 BURGOS vs ARROYO (STA. MARIA) Burgos’ abduction and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to
July 5, 2011 | Brion, J | Writ of Amparo and Habeas Corpus report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. We found the
referral necessary as the investigation by the PNP-CIDG, by the AFP Provost
G.R. No. 183711 Marshal, and even by the CHR had been less than complete; for one, there
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos were very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In
RESPONDENTS : PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, particular, the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of
LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on
CALDERON their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. The SC in its resolution
G.R. No. 183712 concluded that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos
RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas
JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of
FELICIANO, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of
G.R. No. 183713 these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more
PETITIONER: Edita T. Burgos meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. So
RESPONDENTS: CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. the CHR submitted the following findings: Based on the facts developed by
ALEXANDER YANO; Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced
RAZON, JR. disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the
SUMMARY: (the case did not state the facts of Jonas Burgos’ abduction, it Government have been fully determined. Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang
went straight to the CHR’s investigation so let me just give a quick have witnessed on that fateful day the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by
background of the case just in case sir asks, this is from the CA proceedings: a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the extension portion of
at around 1 pm of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. The eyewitnesses are Jeffrey
taken and abducted by a group of 4 men and a woman from the extension Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang, who at the time of the abduction were working
portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Ave, QC. The petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of
press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. The CA HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from
dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Write of Habeas Corpus, denied the faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he
the petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially described to the police, after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the
granted the privileage of the Writ of Amparo in favor of Edita. The CA found PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken
that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed some years thereafter. The same group of pictures were shown to detained
direct connection between the abductors of Jonas the the military. It found former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag- uman), who also
that the AFP and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga. The SC said that most if not all the
investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is
certain loose ends regarding the identity of Ka Roamon and the allegation otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some
that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the “Order of Battle.” As for the PNP-CIDG, police and military elites. The issues in this case are 1) WON the Writ of
the CA branded its investigation as “rather shallow” and “conucted Amparo should be issued? – The SC held in abeyance the ruling on the
haphazardly.”) The SC issued a Resolution referring the present case to the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and referred it back to the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as the Court’s directly commissioned CA. The CA shall continue with the hearing of the Amparo petition in light of
agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it already conducted
and the subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR Report. of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and
Thereafter, the CA shall rule on the merits of the Amparo petition. 2) WON recommendations to this Court.
the Writ of Habeas Corpus should be issued? – YES. In light of the new 2. We found the referral necessary as the investigation by the PNP-
evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly Jeffrey Cabintoy’s evidence that CIDG, by the AFP Provost Marshal, and even by the CHR had been
positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in the less than complete; for one, there were very significant lapses in the
abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, the SC resolved to set aside handling of the investigation. In particular, we highlighted the PNP-
the CA’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male
habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their
immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided the habeas interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction.
corpus petition 3. We held:
- we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to
(other issue) WON the CA’s dismissal of the contempt charge should be conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
affirmed? – YES however provisionally only. The pieces of evidence on disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the
record as of the time of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties)
did not provide a direct link between the respondents and the abduction of that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these
Jonas; The SC held that since investigations will continue, consistent with investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a
the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence undertaken.
affecting the conclusion the CA made, the SC said that the CA’s dismissal of - From the records, we note that there are very significant
the contempt charge should be provisional. lapses in the handling of the investigation - among them the
PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two
DOCTRINE: The Writ of Amparo requires that extraordinary diligence in the (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based
performance of a public official or employee’s duties should be observed. on their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse
(Although not written in the decision, this is seen in Sec. 17. Burden of Proof is based on the information provided to the petitioner by no
and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who
by substantial evidence. The respondent who is a private individual or entity identified the persons who were possibly involved in the
must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.
regulations was observed in the performance of duty. The respondent who is Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the
performance of duty. The respondent public official or employee cannot AFP.
invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to - No search and certification were ever made on whether these
evade responsibility or liability.) persons were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service,
such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by the petitioner,
FACTS: (in the decision, the facts were mixed up with different rulings by the no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in
court so I highlighted the rulings in certain parts so as not to confuse you) ascertaining the identities of the cartographic sketches of two of
1. On June 22, 2010, the SC a Resolution referring the present case to the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by State
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as the Court’s directly Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the
commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the lead investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to
investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction and the gathering have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
 - no independent investigation appeared to have been made by 7. On the basis of the evidence it had gathered, the CHR submitted the
the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipio’s and following findings: Based on the facts developed by evidence
Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the enforced
DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that
RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG his constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by
conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities the Government have been fully determined. Jeffrey Cabintoy and
and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007
omissions were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has the forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7)
yet to refer any case for preliminary investigation to the DOJ men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan
despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall,
all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO. 8. The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey)
- While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the and Elsa Agasang (Elsa), who at the time of the abduction were
investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor, respectively, at Hapag
even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been less Kainan Restaurant.
than complete. The PNP-CIDG’s investigation particularly leaves 9. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the
much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that face of HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. abductors, apart from the faces of the two abductors in the
4. The CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch
compliance with our June 22, 2010 Resolution. Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures of men taken some years
5. In this Report, the CHR recounted the investigations undertaken. thereafter.
6. The Team conducted field investigations by: (1) interviewing a) 10. The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB
civilian authorities involved in the first investigation of the instant Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag- uman), who also
case; b) military men under detention for alleged violations of positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s Sinumpaang
Articles of War; c) Security Officers of Ever Gotesco Mall, Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company
Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City; d) two (2) of the three (3) Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service
CIDG witnesses; e) two (2) eyewitnesses who described to the also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the
police sketch artist two (2) faces of a male and female abductors of Commander of Bravo Company. When he was arrested and brought
Jonas Burgos; f) Rebel-Returnees (RRs); g) officers and men in the to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not see Lt. Baliaga
military and police service; h) local officials and other government anymore at the said camp.
functionaries; and i) ordinary citizens; (2) inquiring into the veracity 11. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited from both Jeffrey and
of CIDG witnesses Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always
abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA look pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight they are in
guerilla unit RYG; (3) securing case records from the prosecution right now. It came as a surprise therefore to the Team when they
service and courts of law; (4) visiting military and police units. could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of Baliaga, as if
Offices, camps, detention centers, and jails and requesting copies of they know the man very well.
documents and records in their possession that are relevant to the 12. Moreover, when the Team asked how Jeffrey how certain was he
instant case; (5) searching for and interviewing witnesses and that it was indeed Baliaga that he saw as among those who actually
informants; and (6) pursuing leads provided by them. participated in Jonas’ abduction, Jeffrey was able to give a graphic
 description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affiliation
of the incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, with the military have been established by overwhelming evidence
specially Baliaga, who even approached, talked to, and prevented corroborated by detained former Army trooper Dag-uman.
him from interfering in their criminal act. 18. For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to
13. A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, investigate the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an
has identified the face of the female in the cartographic sketch as a independent body and pursuant to its mandate under the 1987
certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to include her Constitution.
identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of
a backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt. ISSUE:
Fernando in the cartographic sketch since both of them were 1. WON the Writ of Amparo should be issued? – The SC held in
involved in counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB, while she abeyance the ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the
was under the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left present case and referred it back to the CA. The CA shall continue
the 56th IB Headquarters in October 2007. with the hearing of the Amparo petition in light of the evidence
14. Lozada’s involvement in counter-insurgency operations together previously submitted, the proceedings it already conducted and
with Lt. Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR the subsequent developments in this case, particularly the CHR
Regional Office 3 Investigators, whose investigation into the Report. Thereafter, the CA shall rule on the merits of the Amparo
enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos was documented by petition.
way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008. 2. WON the Writ of Habeas Corpus should be issued? – YES. In light of
15. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy
had it not been for what is otherwise called as evidentiary evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct
difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military elites. perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of
The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the justice, we resolve to set aside the CA’s dismissal of the habeas
requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus
directive to the AFP but ipso facto created a disputable returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall
presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided
abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if the habeas corpus petition
not responsible, for the crime committed. This observation finds 3. WON the CA’s dismissal of the contempt charge should be
support in the disputable presumption "That evidence willfully affirmed? – YES however provisionally only. The pieces of evidence
suppressed would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e), Section on record as of the time of the CA proceedings were merely
3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on circumstantial and did not provide a direct link between the
Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines). respondents and the abduction of Jonas; The SC held that since
16. In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo
deemed that the requested documents and profiles would help proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and
ascertain the true identities of the cartographic sketches of two these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the
abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed that one conclusion the CA made, the SC said that the CA’s dismissal of the
of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits contempt charge should be provisional.
the description of his abductor.
17. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th RULING: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we
IB officer Lt. HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal RESOLVE to: I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No.
abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the CIDG witnesses 99839)
 a) ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a non-extendible period
the Court of Appeals who shall immediately refer the writ to the same of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the
Division that decided the habeas corpus petition; documents requested by the CHR, particularly:
b) ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. 1. The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas
No. 183711, and REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt.
Armed Forces of the Philippines; the incumbent Commanding General, Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly assigned
Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th Infantry with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the Armed
Division, Philippine Army at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph Forces of the Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the
T. Burgos, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and 2. Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon
to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be released from City and the complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that
detention; said covert military operation, including their respective Summary of
c) REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Information and individual pictures; and
Court of Appeals which shall continue to hear this case after the required 3. Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and
Returns shall have been filed and render a new decision within thirty (30) 69th Infantry Battalion and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004
days after the case is submitted for decision; and to June 30, 2007 with their respective profiles, Summary of Information
d) ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels who
Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies
separate from the original respondents impleaded in the petition, and the of their Tactical Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if
dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party- any. These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our
respondent. examination to determine their relevance to the present case and the
II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230) advisability of their public disclosure.
e) AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. j) ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
SP No. 100230, without prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as Commanding General of the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in
may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation this representation of their respective organizations, separately from the
Court has ordered; and original respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of
f) ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal- President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as party-respondent;
Arroyo as party-respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the k) REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department
contempt charge against her. of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA) Program, subject to the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981; and NOTE
g) ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter
G.R. No. 183713, without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with may investigate and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule
respect to others whose identities and participation may be disclosed in on the Writ of Amparo. SO ORDERED.
future investigations and proceedings;
h) DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file RATIO:
their Comments on the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a A. Amparo
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this 1. After reviewing the evidence, we resolve to hold in abeyance our
Resolution.1avvphil
ruling on the merits in the Amparo aspect of the present case and
i) REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP;
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22,
refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga and the
2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP, Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on
show cause and explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of the CHR Report within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be from receipt of this Resolution.
held in contempt of this Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010
2. The CA shall continue with the hearing of the Amparo petition in our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff,
light of the evidence previously submitted, the proceedings it AFP, to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible period of
already conducted and the subsequent developments in this case, fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should
particularly the CHR Report. Thereafter, the CA shall rule on the not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010
merits of the Amparo petition. For this purpose, we order that Lt. Resolution.
Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition (CA-G.R. SP
No. 00008-WA). This directive to implead Lt. Baliaga is without B. Habeas Corpus
prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others 4. In light of the new evidence obtained by the CHR, particularly the
whose identities and participation may be disclosed in future Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of
investigations. the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the
3. We also note that Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) interest of justice, we resolve to set aside the CA’s dismissal of the
failed and/or refused to provide the CHR with copies of documents habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeas corpus
relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby disobeyed our June 22, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall
2010 Resolution. immediately refer the writ to the same CA division that decided
4. To recall, we issued a Resolution declaring the CHR as the Court’s the habeas corpus petition
directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the 5. For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a
investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the gathering of evidence, party to the habeas corpus petition and require him – together with
with the obligation to report its factual findings and the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent Commanding
recommendations to this Court. In this same Resolution, we General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th
required the then incumbent Chiefs of the AFP and the PNP to make IB at the time of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano – to
available and to provide copies to the CHR, of all documents and produce the person of Jonas and to show cause why he should not
records in their possession and as the CHR may require, relevant to be released from detention.
the case of Jonas, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with 6. The CA shall rule on the merits of the habeas corpus petition in
the Constitution and existing laws. light of the evidence previously submitted to it, the proceedings
5. In its Report, the CHR recommended, for the Court’s consideration: already conducted, and the subsequent developments in this case
To REQUIRE General Roa of the Judge Advocate General Office, AFP, (particularly the CHR report) as proven by evidence properly
and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, to explain their adduced before it. The Court of Appeals and the parties may
failure and/or refusal to provide the CHR with copies of documents require Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco, Jeffrey Cabintoy, Edmund
relevant to the case of Jonas T. Burgos Dag-uman, Melissa Concepcion Reyes, Emerito Lipio and Marlon
6. Section 16 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides that any Manuel to testify in this case.
person who otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order
of the court may be punished for contempt, viz: SEC. 16. Contempt. (other issue)
– The court, justice or judge may order the respondent who refuses C. Petition for Contempt
to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who 1. We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate
otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court characterization of the charge filed by the petitioner against the
to be punished for contempt. The contemnor may be imprisoned or respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the
imposed a fine charge of filing a false return constitutes improper conduct that
7. Acting on the CHR’s recommendation and based on the above serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the
considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, administration of justice by the Court.
and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of
2. In People v. Godoy,which the CA cited, we specifically held that and consequently, had custody of him at the time they filed their
under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any returns to the Writ of habeas corpus denying custody of Jonas.
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct 8. However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically,
or degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal the investigative findings presented to us by the CHR pointing to
contempt. Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a twist to
3. A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui our otherwise clear conclusion.
generis as it partakes some of the elements of both a civil and 9. Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo
criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is achieved, and
proceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting
of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent the conclusion the CA made. For this reason, we can only conclude
that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a that the CA’s dismissal of the contempt charge should be
contempt proceeding. provisional, i.e., without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in
4. We have consistently held and established that the strict rules that the future should the petitioner find this step warranted by the
govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal evidence in the proceedings related to Jonas’s disappearance,
contempt; that the accused is afforded many of the protections including the criminal prosecutions that may transpire.
provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings under 10. To adjust to the extraordinary nature of Amparo and habeas corpus
statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. proceedings and to directly identify the parties bound by these
5. Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal proceedings who have the continuing obligation to comply with our
contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is directives, the AFP Chief of Staff, the Commanding General of the
on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Philippine Army, the Director General of the PNP, the Chief of the
The presumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of PNP-CIDG and the TJAG shall be named as parties to this case
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the without need of naming their current incumbents, separately from
satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of the then incumbent officials that the petitioner named in her
innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that original Amparo and habeas corpus petitions, for possible
for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a responsibility and accountability.
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely 11. In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria
true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a Macapagal-Arroyo who is no the longer the President of the
reasonable certainty and moral certainty – a certainty that Republic of the Philippines, she should now be dropped as a party-
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are respondent in these petitions.
to act upon it.
6. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the
respondents in contempt for filing false returns in the habeas
corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of
Jonas.
7. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of
the time of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did
not provide a direct link between the respondents and the
abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the respondents had a hand in the abduction of Jonas,
 082 Rodriguez v. Arroyo (OLAZO)
15 November 2011 | Sereno, J. | Amparo; Habeas Data
G.R. No. 191805: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
H. RODRIGUEZ
PETITIONER: NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
RESPONDENTS: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT,
MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer
named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC
under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG"
PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN
G.R. No. 193160: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
H. RODRIGUEZ
PETITIONER: POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT.
JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S.
MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ,
ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN
RESPONDENTS: NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
SUMMARY: Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP). Under the Oplan Bantay Laya, the military tagged KMP
members as an enemy of the state, making its members an easy target of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. On September 6, 2009,
Rodriguez just alighted from a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos in
Brgy. Tapel, Cagayan, when 4 men forcibly took him and forced him to get
inside a car. The men started punching Rodriguez inside the car, and forced
him to confess that he is a member of the New People’s Army (NPA).
Rodriguez remained silent until they reached a military camp belonging to
the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. Rodriguez was then
subjected to beatings and torture by members of the Philippine Army.
Members of the army wanted him to admit that he is an NPA member and
then pinpoint other NPA members and camp locations. Since Rodriguez
cannot answer, he is repeatedly beaten and tortured. Rodriguez was also
coerced to sign several documents to declare that he is a surenderree. On
September 17, 2009, Rodriguez’s mother and brother came to see him
(accompanied by members of the CHR – Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan).
They insisted to take Rodriguez home with them to Manila. Rodriguez
arrived in Manila on September 18. Callagan and 2 military members went
inside their house and took pictures for around 30 minutes despite
Rodriguez’s effort to stop them. On November 3, Rodriguez and his
girlfriend notices that several suspicious-looking men are following them on
the streets, jeepney and MRT. On December 7, Rodriguez filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers
for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition was filed against
former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit,
Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt.
Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan. Respondents contend that Rodriguez is a double
agent, and had been working as their informant/infiltrator in the fight against
NPA rebels. Then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through the solicitor-
general, insisted on her immunity from suits (by virtue of her position as
president). Supreme Court granted the writs after finding that the petition
sufficiently alleged the abduction and torture of Rodriguez by members of
the Philippine Army. SC directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition.
CA ruled in favor of Rodriguez and found Ibrado, Versoza, Bangit, Ochoa,
Tolentino, Santos, De Vera and Matutina liable for his abduction and torture.
As to Calog and Palacpac, the case was dismissed for lack of merit. On
President Arroyo, the case was dismissed on account of her immunity from
suits.
ISSUES AND RULING:
WoN the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor. – NO.
Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be
underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment.
Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of
the case is made. The privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted,
necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. The order restricting
respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of
the writ.
WoN former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the
basis of the presidential immunity from suit. – NO. (doctrine 1). Since there
is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo
and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or
extrajudicial killing. A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from
suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. The presidential
immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s
incumbency. Former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity
from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether,
within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or
accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
WoN the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and
habeas data cases. – YES. Although there is no determination of criminal,
civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may
nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability as
defined in Razon (doctrine 1) within these foregoing definitions. (Doctrine 2)
The requisites of the command responsibility are satisfied here because (a)
the president is the commander in chief of the military; (b) doctrine 3; and
(c) the president has the power to effectively command, control and
discipline the military. Nevertheless, even if the former President cannot use
immunity and that command responsibility is applicable in amparo cases,
former President Arroyo cannot be held liable for the reason that Rodriguez
failed to prove that she is responsible or accountable for his abduction.
WoN the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805. – YES. (doctrine 4). Taken in
their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the
contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give
credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by
soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
military. It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial evidence to show that they
violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and
security. The SC also held that the failure to conduct a fair and effect
investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to
life, liberty and security. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a
perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of
the events into consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the
reports and narration of the military. The absence of a fair and effective
official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right to
security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible
or accountable. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable
to establish any responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents
P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent
P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of
Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been
reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six
months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient
allegations were maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
*Please see long digest for specifics*
DOCTRINE 1: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to
the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
DOCTRINE 2: To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had
reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
(c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
DOCTRINE 3: EO 226: Knowledge of the commission of irregularities,
crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the
government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly
or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of
his immediate staff or office personnel are involved.
DOCTRINE 4: Doctrine of Totality of Evidence in Amparo cases, Razon
Case: The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced.
FACTS:
11. Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan, a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas.
12. Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the
State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
13. On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached
Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie
Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and
forced him into a car. The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered
him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching him.
During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent.
The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp.
There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the
word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp
belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was subjected to various acts of beating and torture
throughout the duration of his detention.
14. On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign
documents declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter in
Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a
military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he
received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so
using a different signature to show that he was merely coerced.
15. The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and
asked him if he knew the men appearing therein. When he told them
that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers
instructed him to write down the name of his school and
organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on
the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it,
and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs
of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him
down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive
another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for
about an hour.
16. In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez
started their descent. When they stopped, the soldiers took his
photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp.
Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked
him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was
then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil
(Dr. Ramil) examined him. When the doctor asked him why he had
bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them
when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s
medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in
the epigastric area, chest and sternum.
17. Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military
officials and took pictures of him while he was eating with them.
They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took
his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his
mother. Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he
was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a surrenderee
and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he
signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.
18. Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed
petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a pair of jeans and perfume.
While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him
repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience
in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the
military. At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of
Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men. His mother, Wilma
Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of
the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the military and
had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel),
informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR,
namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz
instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees
took photographs of his bruises.
19. A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp
for another two weeks to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking
revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and
Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and
insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers
reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also
told them that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and
guarded until they reached home.
20. Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the
soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was
made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor
tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign
the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his
abductors because they had already freed him.
21. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota
Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers
on board followed them. The Tamaraw FX pulled over and
respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a
mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and
two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo. Upon
reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt.
Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan
approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card.
The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back
home.
22. Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18
September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers went inside the house,
and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers
explained that the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the
fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely.
Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts,
they still continued and only left thirty minutes later.
23. On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained
by the International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation,
examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the
latter had been a victim of torture.
24. Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his
girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that several suspicious-
looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the
streets and on a jeepney.
25. On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The
petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to
desist from violating Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and
security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing
harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family and his
witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the
Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry Division, Maguing,
Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez
was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to
them regarding any report on Rodriguez, including operation
reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6
September 2009.1âwphi1
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to
Rodriguez, which are in the custody of respondents, to be
expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.
26. On 15 December 2009, SC granted the respective writs after finding
that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been
abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army. SC likewise ordered respondents
therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December
2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.
Finally, we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4
January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days after its
submission for decision.
27. During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals
required the parties to submit affidavits and other pieces of evidence
at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010. On 8 January
2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed their Return of the Writ, which was likewise
considered as their comment on the petition. In their Return,
respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the
military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance
and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels. According to his
military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius
P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating
in Cagayan Valley. Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl.
Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in
exchange for his protection.
28. Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made
to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract,
showing his willingness to return to society and become a military
asset. Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to
gather information. However, he feared that his NPA comrades were
beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator. Thus, with his
knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham
abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent.39
Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.
29. Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated
Return of the Writ dated 15 January 2010, alleging that they had
 exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating
his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back home
to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September
2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the
whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the military and
law enforcement agencies to determine his location. Cruz was able to
speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their
custody. This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director
Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.
30. When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the
17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade
Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina
alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced
by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the
latter’s Contract as Agent. The CHR officers observed his casual and
cordial demeanor with the soldiers. In any case, Cruz asked him to
raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment.
Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter,
Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a
certification to this effect. During the signing of the document,
herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force
employed against Rodriguez or his family.
31. During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR
officers observed that he was very much at ease with his military
escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina. Neither was there any force
or intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the
taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.
32. During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file
additional affidavits and position papers and to have the case
considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.
33. On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
Decision granting the petition and issuing the writ of amparo and
habeas data. Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents therein
filed their Motion for Reconsideration. Before the Court of Appeals
could resolve this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the
instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805),
raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief
for temporary protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the
nature of the writ of amparo, which has the effect of
enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to
petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of
petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in
the absence of an order preventing respondent from
approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility.
34. On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30
July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may
not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent
evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or
threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security,
as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to
the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order,
production order and temporary protection order) provided
under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ
of habeas data.
35. On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De
Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the
12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals. They alleged that
Rodriguez has not presented any adequate and competent evidence,
much less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that petitioners
have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to
life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is
not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data
and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order,
production order and temporary protection order) provided under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data.
ISSUE/s:
2. WoN the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted
after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in
his favor. – NO.
3. WoN former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on
 the basis of the presidential immunity from suit. – NO.
4. WoN the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo
and habeas data cases. – YES.
5. WoN the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were
violated or threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805. – YES.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial
Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No.
193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W.
Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent
Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to
any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence,
that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The
Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of
their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts,
the directives mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are
enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions.
Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
RATIO:
Preliminary Pronouncements
1. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and
habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the
people’s rights to life, liberty and security. The rules on these writs
were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
2. The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that
provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence,
or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that
will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both
preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in
that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.
3. Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances where such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an
independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy –
especially the right to informational privacy – the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of
criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the
petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may
(a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act
complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains
erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.
Issue 1 – Grant of Interim Reliefs
11. Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It
must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before
final judgment. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before
a final adjudication of the case is made. The privilege of the writ of
amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the
aggrieved party.
12. Since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is
no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the
former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez
is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.
Issue 2 – Presidential Immunity from Suit
13. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of
administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data
proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility
or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing.
14. Razon v. Tagitis:
 a. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts.
b. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of
remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing
the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of
the enforced disappearance.
15. Estrada v. Desierto: A non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s
tenure…The presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president’s incumbency.
16. It is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that
would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she
was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
Issue 3 – Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
17. Command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict."
18. Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the
command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil
cases for human rights abuses. Developments in the use of command
responsibility in civil proceedings show that the application of this
doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in
nature. Thus, it is the SC’s view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
19. Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility
may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for
and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to
enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
Nothing precludes the SC from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and
accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
20. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility
may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and
accountability as defined in Razon within these foregoing definitions.
Command Responsibility of the President
21. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between
the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as
his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was
about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.
22. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
23. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may
be charged with constructive knowledge.
24. Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect
of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did
not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of
irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b)
the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area
of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.
25. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note
that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has
the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military.
Responsibility or Accountability of former President Arroyo
 26. Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of
evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for
his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that
she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
Thus, Rodriguez failed to prove that former President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Issue 4 – Responsibility or Accountability of Respondents in G.R. No.
191805
27. Doctrine of Totality of Evidence in Amparo cases, Razon Case:
a. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced.
The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or
accountability of respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s
right to life, liberty and security.
28. After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are
convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient
evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September
2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.
29. Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a
meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with
the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and
maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. He
likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt.
Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture, and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR
representatives who appeared during his release.
30. More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was
corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009, wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances
surrounding the victim’s capture.
31. As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of
Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment
Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division.
32. If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the
military, then he should have unhesitatingly assured his family on 17
September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously
pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility.
33. Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from
the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents,
specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the
former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his
house, as well as the photos of his relatives.
34. Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez,
as well as the contradictory defenses presented by respondents in
G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been
abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.
35. It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial evidence to show
that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to
life, liberty and security.
The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a
violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security.
36. The right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of
the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate.
37. In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No.
191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation of
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their
abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of
his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and
Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting
no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration.
Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of
the military.
38. The absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the
claims of Rodriguez violated his right to security, for which
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or
accountable.
39. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to
establish any responsibility or accountability on the part of
respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and
Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when
the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while
 P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the
National Capital Regional Police Office six months before the
subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were
maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.



 083 Mamba v. Bueno (PANALIGAN)
7 February 2017 | Reyes, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO
N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI
SAGALON, JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL
ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG
RESPONDENT: LEOMAR BUENO
SUMMARY: Bueno was implicated as a suspect in the robbery of the
canteen of Emelita Mamba, who was the mother of the petitioners, the
Mayor of Tuao, and Atty Mamba, a Malacañang official. The Mambas and
Bueno had conflicting versions of how Bueno was taken into custody, but
according to Bueno, which was the version believed by the CA, he was taken
into custody by the Task Force Lingkod Bayan, was held in the house of the
Mayor, and was tortured with another co-accused to admit to the robbery.
Bueno was subsequently released from custody. Nonetheless, the mother of
Bueno sought the help of the local CHR in filing a petition for a Writ of
Amparo. CA gave due course and eventually issued the Writ and directed the
petitioners to launch an investigation as to the torture and taking into custody
of Bueno, as well as refuse from committing acts that either threaten to
violate or violate his right to life, liberty and security. The Mambas filed the
petition before the SC questioning the propriety of the issuance of the Writ;
one of their assertions was bare denial and the fact that Bueno was guilty
anyway of having robbed the canteen of Emelita Mamba. Issue: WON CA
erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo – NO,
THE WRIT OF AMPARO WAS VALIDLY ISSUED. The totality of the
evidence presented by Bueno, corroborated by the testimony of Haber,
meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. Accordingly, a writ of amparo
may still issue in Bueno’s favor notwithstanding that he has already been
released from detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to
facilitate the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through
subsequent investigation and action.
(Read facts for specific instances of torture)
DOCTRINE: The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles
in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
It is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation
and action.
Enforced disappearance has been defined as the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person,which place such a person outside the protection of the
law.
FACTS:
36. In June 13 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita Mamba in Tuao,
Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then
mayor of the municipality of Tuao, Cagayan, and Atty. Mamba, a
Malacañang official.
37. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force) undertook an
investigation on the robbery. The following day, several members of
the Task Force together with barangay officials, went to the house of
Leomar Bueno, a minor at the time, to invite him for questioning on
his supposed involvement in the robbery. He and his mother acceded
to the invitation. After which, he was brought to the Tuao police
station.
38. Version of Mamba et al: No police investigators or representative
from the local SWD were present, hence the investigation could not
proceed. An alleged eyewitness to the robbery, Raymund was at the
station; he pointed to Bueno as among one of those who robbed the
store and that Bueno told him (Raymund) that he would kill him for
ratting him out. Prosecution also alleged that Bueno had approached
Raymund prior to the robbery, asking Raymund to rob the canteen
with him but that Raymund refused. Bueno’s custody was referred to
the Task Force. Haber, another individual allegedly involved in the
robbery was also invited for questioning. His custody was also
referred to the Task Force since there were still no police
investigators. At the time the robbery occurred, both Mayor Mamba
and Atty. Mamba were not in Cagayan.
39. On June 17 2009 Atty. Bueno returned to Tuao. The mother of
Bueno approached him and asked him about her son. Atty Mamba
told her he did not know her son and that if indeed the son had
committed a crime, the mother should not tolerate the wrongdoing.
40. In June 18 2009, while the members of the Task Force were on their
way to bring Bueno and Haber to the police station, they were met
by the P/Supt. of the PNP Cagayan Regional Office (RO) where
Bueno’s custody was subsequently transferred.
41. When Mayor Mamba returned in Tuao, the mother of Bueno
requested that the members of the Task Force be brought to the
Mayor’s office; almost all members of the Task Force arrived,
however, she could not pinpoint who had taken custody of Bueno.
42. Version of Bueno: on June 14 2009, members of the Task Force
fetched Bueno from the police station and brought him to Mayor
Mamba’s house. That same evening, he was made to board a white
van where he was beaten with a gun and threatened to be killed.
Then he was returned to the Mayor’s house. That same evening
Haber was invited by the barangay captain for questioning, and the
following day, he was also brought to the Mayor’s house. Both
Bueno and Haber were tortured to admit their involvement in
the robbery.
43. The mother of Bueno went to the police station to look for her son
and was told that he was in the Mayor’s house. When she went there,
she was not permitted to see him and was told by the Mayor not to
condone the acts of his son. She then sought assistance of the P/Supt.
of the PNP Cagayan RO which was preparing a case for habeas
corpus when Bueno was released on June 18 2009 to the local SWD
office.
44. The mother of Bueno sought assistance of the RO of the CHR in
Cagayan. She filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo with the CA.
45. On September 14 2009, CA gave due course to the petition and
directed the issuance of the writ. On September 23 2009 Mamba et al
filed their return. CA conducted a summary hearing and also issued a
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to hear the testimony of
P/Supt. of the PNP Cagayan RO. On January 18 2010, the Petition
for a Writ of Amparo was granted.
46. The CA opined that Bueno’s rights to liberty and security were
undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the
Task Force for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba’s
house from the Tuao police station. It further pointed out that
notwithstanding that Mayor Mamba was not in Tuao when the
incident happened, he is still accountable since he failed to show
sufficient action to protect Bueno’s rights; that Mayor Mamba failed
to acknowledge the irregularity of the acts of the members of the
Task Force or to identify those who were responsible for the
violation of Bueno’s rights. The CA further ruled that it was
incumbent upon Atty. Mamba, being a public servant, to ensure that
Bueno’s constitutional rights are not violated.
47. The CA pointed out that the “invitation” extended to Bueno by the
members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real
purpose of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed
the night before. The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid
warrantless arrest since the circumstances of the case do not fall
within the purview of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
48. Further, the CA ruled that although Bueno was subsequently released
and that he failed to establish that there is an impending danger of
physical harm to him or his family, the refusal of the officials of the
local government of Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit
and address the irregularities committed by the members of the
Task Force is tantamount to a continuing violation of Bueno’s
right to security.
49. Mamba et al. sought reconsideration of the Decision but it was
denied. Hence the petition with the SC.
ISSUE:
6. WON CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo – NO, THE WRIT OF AMPARO WAS VALIDLY
ISSUED. The totality of the evidence presented by Bueno,
corroborated by the testimony of Haber, meets the requisite
evidentiary threshold.
RULING: WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution
dated March 2, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
00038 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the following terms:
1. Petitioners Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr.,
Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, Frederick
Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag and the
incumbent local government officials of Tuao, Cagayan are hereby enjoined
from doing any act of physical or psychological violence on respondent
Leomar Bueno and his family including those who assisted him in the filing
of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals;
2. The Regional Director of the Philippine National Police — Cagayan
Regional Office, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby directed to conduct an
investigation, using extraordinary diligence, on the violation of the rights to
life, liberty and security of the respondent when he was supposedly arrested
on June 14, 2009 by the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan until he
was released on June 18, 2009;
3. The petitioners and the incumbent officials of the local government of
Tuao are hereby ordered to provide genuine and effective assistance to the
investigation to be conducted by the Philippine National Police — Cagayan
Regional Office, including but not limited to furnishing and/or providing the
latter a list of the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan and all those
who had a direct involvement in the violation of the respondent’s rights to
life, liberty and security, including their whereabouts, and to allow the
investigation to run its course unhindered;
4. The investigation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from
receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the
investigation, the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police —
Cagayan Regional Office shall submit a full report on the results of the
investigation to the Court of Appeals;
5. The Court of Appeals, within thirty (30) days from the submission by the
Regional Director of the Philippine National Police — Cagayan Regional
Office of his full report, is directed to submit to this Court its own report and
recommendations on the investigation and furnish a copy thereof to the
incumbent Regional Director of the Philippine National Police — Cagayan
Regional Office, the petitioners, and the respondent; and
6. This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
proceedings directed at the monitoring of (a) the investigation to be
conducted by the Philippine National Police — Cagayan Regional Office, (b)
the actions to be undertaken in pursuance of the said investigation, and (c)
the validation of the results.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
Nature of the Writ of Amparo
1. The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address
specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights
to life, liberty or security. It specifically delmits the coverage of the
writ to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
2. Enforced disappearance has been defined as the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment
of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person,which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.
3. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims
by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability
against the person charged.
Propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
1. To corroborate his allegations, Bueno presented the testimony of
Haber who, during the hearing conducted by the CA on October 6,
2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he was brought to Mayor
Mamba’s house where he and Bueno were tortured. Haber testified
that hot wax was dripped onto their bodies while they were
handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten with a cue stick and an
alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he and Bueno were
brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by placing
plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire was inserted
inside their penises.
2. Bueno’s claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who testified
that on June 18, 2009, she examined Bueno and found that he
suffered several injuries and multiple second degree burns. Layus
also attested that she saw the scars incurred by Bueno on his head,
arms, and back when she interviewed him on July 26, 2009.
3. In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for Mamba
merely consisted in denial and the allegation that Bueno was indeed
the one who robbed the canteen. Clearly, against the positive
testimony of Bueno, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the
Mamba’s allegations must fail.
4. It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed,
it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of nonculpability;
otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and without evidentiary
value.
5. Further, even if Bueno was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it
to be true, it does not justify his immediate apprehension, in the
guise of an invitation, and the subsequent acts of torture inflicted
on him.
6. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Bueno, after four days of
detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force on
June 18, 2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the
propriety of the grant of a writ of amparo.
them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by Bueno
and to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the
illegal detention and torture suffered by Bueno were perpetrated
by the members of the Task Force themselves.
11. Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against
Bueno, Mamba et al seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention
and infliction of bodily harm upon Bueno by stating that the latter is
a habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of
the canteen. As stated earlier, even if Bueno committed a crime,
Mamba et al, as local government officials, are not at liberty to
disregard Bueno’s constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty
and security.
12. Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant
the conclusion that Bueno’s right to security, as a guarantee of
protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA
correctly issued the writ of amparo in favor of Bueno.

7. The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in

addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that
it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action.

8. Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in Bueno’s favor

notwithstanding that he has already been released from detention. In
such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of
those behind the illegal detention through subsequent investigation
and action.

9. In this case, it is incumbent upon Mamba et al, who all hold positions
in the local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an
investigation on the alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and
torture of Bueno. Mamba et al, nevertheless, claim that the Office of
the Mayor and the police station of Tuao, unknown to Bueno, are
conducting an investigation on the incident.

10. However, other than their bare assertion, they failed to present any
evidence that would prove the supposed investigation. Verily,
Mamba et al failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by
 084 CALLO v. MORENTE (PLEYTO)
Sept. 19, 2017 | Carpio, Acting C. J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Lorie Marie Tomas Callo
RESPONDENTS: Commissioner Jaime H. Morente, Bureau of
Immigration, OIC Associates Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration, and
Brian Alas, Bureau of Immigration (HEREINAFTER, BOI)
SUMMARY: Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport
No. XX5678508 issued by the DFA on March 5, 2010 and valid until March
4, 2015. On Jan. 15, 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for being an
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien in violation of the
Philippine Immigration Act. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a
fugitive from justice in the USA with an outstanding arrest warrant. A
Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was issued against Danielle Nopuente,
also known as Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that she arrived in the
Phil. under a Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of 1 year.
Pursuant to the SDO, she was arrested in Tagaytay on the premise that
Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and the same person.
She was taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan. She was still
detained when the SC decided this case because the deportation was not
carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with falsification and use of
falsified documents before the MTCC in Davao. Parker filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Pasig. BOI produced her before the RTC.
BOI alleged that the SDO had become final and executory. Also, it argued
that Parker cannot be released or deported without the final disposition of the
case in Davao. RTC dismissed the petition finding the detention legal. CA
affirmed the RTC decision. It held that Parker failed to prove that she was a
Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas corpus as it
gave weight to the Certification from the Office of the Consular Affairs of
the DFA, saying that there is no available data regarding Philippine Passport
No. XX5678508. Parker did not appeal the habeas corpus petition anymore.
Callo then filed this petition for a writ of amparo with prayer to issue Interim
Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan from Detention. The issue in
this case is WoN the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened
by the BOI to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently
the award of the interim reliefs. First, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is
endangered in the detention center, thus, the writ of amparo should be issued.
The third and fourth elements of enforced disappearance are not present.
There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to
give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits,
Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of
Immigration. BOI also does not deny this. In fact, the BOI produced Parker
before the RTC during the habeas corpus case. there is no intention to
remove Parker from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As the BOI explained, Parker has a pending criminal case against her in
Davao, which prevents the BOI from deporting her from the country. Callo
alleged that Parker’s life is in danger because of her co-detainees and the
living conditions there. However, even if proven, the remedy for this is not
the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Callo also alleges that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and thus
should not have been detained by the Bureau of Immigration. Callo failed to
prove that Parker and Nopuente are different persons. SC gave weight to the
fact that the DFA issued a certificate verifying that there is no available data
on Passport No. XX5678508, which was the Philippine passport used by
Parker. Moreover, the Certificate of Live Birth, which purportedly shows
that Parker was born in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino parents,
was only registered on 4 January 2010. There was no explanation given as to
why Parker's birth was registered only after almost 35 years. Callo also only
alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly for purposes of brevity. SC does
not see any reason why facts surrounding the existence of Parker should only
be presented from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed
about her is from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two
different persons, the life and existence of Parker should have been alleged
and proven since birth.
Lastly, there was no allegation of her relationship to Parker. while "any
person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a petition for the
writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the petition should be
strictly followed. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker
had no immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or
collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of Parker
as only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and discussed.
DOCTRINE:
1. Writ of Amparo is filed for cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Elements:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
2. While "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, in a
petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on who can file the
petition should be strictly followed.
FACTS:
1. Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport No.
XX5678508 issued by the DFA on March 5, 2010 and valid until
March 4, 2015.
2. Jan. 15, 2013: Parker was charged for deportation for being an
undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in violation of
Section 37 (a) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum No. ADD-
01-004.
3. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a fugitive from justice in
the USA with an outstanding arrest warrant issued against her.
4. Subsequently, on Jan. 24, 2013, a Summary Deportation Order
(SDO) was issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as
Isabelita Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that
she arrived in the Philippines on Mar. 23, 2011 under the Balikbayan
Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one year.
5. Parker was not in the list of approved applications of the DFA for
dual citizenship and her American Passport had been revoked by the
United States Department of State.
6. Thus, she was considered an undocumented, undesirable, and
overstaying alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act.
7. June 4, 2014: pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of
Immigration (BOI), Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the
premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one and
the same person.
8. She was then taken to the Immigration Detention Facility in Bicutan,
Taguig City.
9. She is still currently detained in the Immigration Detention Facility
as the deportation was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is
charged with falsification and use of falsified documents before
Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City.
10. Sept. 12, 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus before the RTC of Pasig City.
11. The BOI was able to produce the body of Parker before the RTC.
The BOI then alleged that as the SDO had become final and
executory, it served as the legal authority to detain Parker.
12. The BOI also argued that Parker cannot be released or deported
without the final disposition of her pending criminal case in Davao
13. RTC: dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of Parker was
legal. Parker then appealed the case to the CA.
14. CA: affirmed the RTC and found that Parker failed to prove that she
was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial intervention through habeas
corpus. CA gave weight to the Certification dated June 20, 2015
issued by the Office of the Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is
"no available data" regarding any record/information from the year
1990 onwards of Philippine Passport No. XX5678508.
15. Parker no longer appealed the denial of the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus and the decision of the CA became final and
executory on Jan. 5, 2016.
16. March 23, 2017: Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo with
prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan
Parker from Detention.
a. Callo argues that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the BOI
ISSUE/s:
7. WoN the right to life, liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by
the BOI to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and
subsequently the award of the interim reliefs — NO. This not a case
of EJK or enforced disappearance. Also, the relationship between
Callo and Parker was not shown as to give Callo authority to file the
writ of amparo.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied.
RATIO:
1. Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim reliefs
available under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate release of
Parker.
a. Callo alleges that Parker is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and thus should not have been detained by the Bureau of
Immigration.
b. Moreover, Callo alleges that the life of Parker is endangered
in the detention center
2. SC disagrees.
3. The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to expeditiously
provide relief to violations of a person's constitutional right to life,
 liberty, and security, and more specifically, to address the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
4. The writ shall coverextralegal killings andenforced disappearances or
threats according to Sec. 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
5. Enforced disappearance is defined under RA No. 9851, 5 Section 3
(g) as the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
6. Cases also defined the two:
a. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings.
b. enforced disappearance has been defined by the Court as the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of
persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.
7. Navia v. Pardico: with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on
the constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, but also on a
concrete statutory definition of "enforced or involuntary
disappearance."
8. Further, elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined
under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz.:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
9. It is clear that the elements are not attendant in this case. There is
also no threat of such enforced disappearance.
10. While there is indeed a detention carried out by the State through the
BOI, the third and fourth elements are not present.
11. There is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or
refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as
Callo admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention
Facility of the Bureau of Immigration. BOI also does not deny this.
12. In fact, the BOI had produced the body of Parker before the RTC in
the proceedings for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by
Parker herself.
13. Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the BOI explained,
Parker has a pending criminal case against her in Davao, which
prevents the BOI from deporting her from the country.
14. For the issuance of the writ of amparo, it is not sufficient to allege
and prove that a person has disappeared.
15. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support
or acquiescense of the government or a political organization, and
that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to give info on the
fate or whereabouts of the missing persons
16. Here, Parker has not disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently
justified by the BOI: (a) SDO and (b) a pending criminal case
17. Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because Parker,
a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a different person from Danielle
Nopuente, the person against whom the SDO was issued.
18. Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle
Nopuente are two different persons.
19. In particular, SC gives weight to the fact that the DFA issued a
certificate verifying that there is no available data on Passport No.
XX5678508, which was the Philippine passport used by Parker.
20. Moreover, the Certificate of Live Birth, which purportedly shows
that Parker was born in the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino
parents, was only registered on 4 January 2010. There was no
explanation given as to why Parker's birth was registered only after
almost 35 years.
21. Moreover, Callo only alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly for
purposes of brevity. We do not see any reason why facts surrounding
the existence of Parker should only be presented from 2005.
22. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed about her is from
2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and Nopuente are two different
persons, the life and existence of Parker should have been alleged
and proven since birth.
23. In this case, there is no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker
 was, or what she had been doing, before 2011. Taking all these legal standing to file this petition.
circumstances into perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently
prove that she is a different person from Danielle Nopuente.
24. Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immigration
Detention Facility because of the threats against her by her co-
detainees and the living conditions of the facility which pose health
problems for Parker.
25. Unfortunately, these allegations—even if proven—will not support
the issuance of a writ of amparo.
26. To repeat, the remedy of a writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy
that is meant to balance the government's awesome power and to
curtail human rights abuses.
27. The circumstances of Parker, as alleged by Callo, do not meet the
requirements for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
28. Finally, the petition for the writ of amparo was filed by Callo.
However, there was no allegation of her relationship to Parker.
29. In Boac v. Cadapan: the importance of the exclusive and successive
order of who can file a petition for a writ of amparo was emphasized.
The order is provided by Sec. 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or a nity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or
institution, if there is no known member of the immediate family
or relative of the aggrieved party.
30. The order of priority is not without reason — "to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless ling of petitions for amparo which
may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party."
31. Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority on
who can file the petition should be strictly followed.
32. In this case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or
collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity.
33. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial relationship of
Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were alleged and
discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority, Callo had no
 085 Republic v. Cayanan (ROSALES)
7 November 2017 | Bersamin, J. | Writ of Amparo
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG),
PNP
RESPONDENTS: Regina N. Cayanan and SPO1 Rolanda V. Pascua
SUMMARY: Regina Cayana filed a petition for habeas corpus in the RTC
alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being illegally detained by the
Director/Head of the CIDG. It was assailed that on July 9, 2007, a group of
armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua,
had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang Street, East Avenue, Diliman,
Quezon City without any warrant of arrest and had detained him at the office
of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Pablo had not been found or
heard since then and despite repeated demand by her and her relatives, the
CIDG operatives had not produced the body. The CIDG received the petition
for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. The CIDG filed its return on
the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or having detained
him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus. The RTC
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Regina, albeit
reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas corpus, amended her
petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo which was
issued by the RTC. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He
tendered explanations for his non-appearance, specifically: for the initial
hearing, he was then suffering acute gastroenteritis; and for the later
hearings, he wanted to protect his identity as part of his defenses in the
criminal case of kidnapping brought against him in the Department of
Justice. The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration; however, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration.
WoN sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the
RTC – YES because the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007
whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an eyewitness no less, detailed the
events of the abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was
consistent and credible in itself. Fist, Perez's statements therein definitely
recounted how the abductors perpetrated the abduction by blocking the path
of Pablo's Isuzu Sportivo with their whitecolored Kia 2-door Sedan and their
greencolored Toyota Lite Ace. Perez identified one of the perpetrators of the
abduction by name ("SP02 Rolando Pascua") and supplied another
identifying circumstance for Pascua ("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng
araw na yon ng International Drivers License, police po siya, dating naka-
destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame").
Second, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit
asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction. Yet, he did not
furnish details of the abduction that would have given to the investigators
firm leads to quickly comer the perpetrators as well as to determine and
locate the whereabouts of Pablo. Third, He could not even mention the type
and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly ordered to
board. He said that he was released by the abductors only after having
introduced himself as a police officer. But he thereby contradicted himself
because he also stated in the same counter-affidavit that he feared being shot
during the abduction if he identified himself as a police officer. Fourth,
Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo Cayanan and Leonila R.
Francisco, to corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the abduction.
Such other witnesses also identified Pascua as the person leading the
abductors of Pablo and Perez. Fifth, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang
salaysay had no evidentiary value for being general and bereft of any details.
A perusal shows that the recantation did not offer details of what had really
occurred if the abduction of Pablo did not actually happen.
WoN the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo – NO because the CIDG did not observe extraordinary
diligence as required by law. In its return, the CIDG only attached passive
certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not
being detained by any of them. Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by
supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons
tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the
abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended
in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have
reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the
Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself. To be noted at this
juncture is that the CIDG should have exerted greater effort at complying
with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of
Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the
abduction and disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the
CIDG in Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG's
investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the circumstances
justifying a broader inquiry.
WoN the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo is defective – NO
because as Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state
the probable whereabouts of the victim. The Court clarifies that the
application and implementation of the rule of amparo adopted in Mexico or
in any other country could only be persuasive at best. It was actually
presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence at all that
indicated the whereabouts of Pablo following the abduction. There was such
evidence, and it was substantial. Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang
salaysay stated the place where Pablo was detained or was last seen. “Inikut-
ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos po ay
pumasok sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa
labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark, mga isa't kalahating oras (3:30-
5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay
kinakausap nila SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis
na po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon; tumuloy na ako sa
upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay
siya ng mga dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.”,
“makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na Criminal
Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).” Pascua suggests that the
State, or any of its agencies or institutions like the CIDG, cannot be made a
respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo. The suggestion of Pascua
lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation may be
committed by the persons therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a
private individual or entity), it does not state that only the listed persons can
be made respondents. In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant
agencies may be impleaded; otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may
be rendered ineffective or toothless.
WoN the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua’s right
to presumption of his innocence – NO because proceedings taken under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal
prosecutions. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the
former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no
penal sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the
aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to
life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an issue. In
the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object
of the proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is
always the starting point. Hence, the need for the State to adduce proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is
required to also state in the return the actions that have been or will still be
taken: (b) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the
prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (e) to identify and
apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent
court. With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal
participation of Pascua in the abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly knew
more than he cared to reveal thus far about the abduction. As a start, Pascua,
as the leader of the abduction, knew the identities of the eight or nine other
abductors. He should be assiduously investigated for his participation in the
abduction, and, if warranted, he should be promptly but duly held
accountable for it. All those conspiring with him in abducting Pablo should
also be held to account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the NBI
should not halt in seeing to this, for they bear the primary responsibility in
that respect.
DOCTRINE: Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the
degree of proof required from the petitioner as a respondent named in the
petition for the writ of amparo – that of substantial evidence.
Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires the verified written
return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits.
As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state the
probable whereabouts of the victim.
Although Section 1 states that the violation may be committed by the persons
therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a private individual or
entity), it does not state that only the listed persons can be made respondents.
In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be
impleaded; otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered
ineffective or toothless.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is
required to also state in the return the actions that have been or will still be
taken: (a) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (b) to recover and
preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible; (c) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from
them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine the cause,
manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to
identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent
court.
FACTS:
1. On August 16, 2007, Regina Cayanan filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the RTC alleging that Pablo, her husband, was being
illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG; that on July 9,
2007 a group of armed men identifying themselves as operatives of
the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo on Magalang
Street, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City without any warrant of
arrest, and had then detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp
Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found or heard from
since then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her
relatives, the CIDG operatives had not produced the body of Pablo.
2. On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas
corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. On August 28, 2007, the CIDG
filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of
Pablo or having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for habeas corpus.
3. On September 7, 2007, the RTC directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
4. On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the
petition for habeas corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead
the issuance of a writ of amparo.
5. On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.
6. On November 5, 2007, the CIDG and Pascua submitted their
respective comments vis-a-vis the writ of amparo.
7. On November 5, 2007, Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a
temporary protection order and witness protection order. The RTC
granted her motion on November 6, 2007.
8. Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered
explanations for his non-appearance, specifically: for the initial
hearing, he was then suffering acute gastroenteritis; and for the later
hearings, he wanted to protect his identity as part of his defenses in
the criminal case of kidnapping brought against him in the
Department of Justice.
9. On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution,
disposing thusly:
Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows, to wit:
a. The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier
issued;
b. For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the
investigation it earlier conducted;
c. For SP02 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum;
d. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;
e. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed
of by the petitioner is hereby retained until the finality of the
case/cases related thereto.
It is so ordered.
10. The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration; however, the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration on January 31, 2008 through
the second assailed resolution.
11. Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo
by the RTC – YES because the sinumpaang salaysay executed on
July 30, 2007 whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an
eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the abduction of Pablo in
mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was consistent and credible in itself.
2. WoN the CIDG already discharged its duty as required by the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo – NO because the CIDG did not observe
extraordinary diligence as required by law.
3. WoN the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo is defective –
NO because as Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the
petition to state the probable whereabouts of the victim.
4. WoN the issuance of the writ of amparo by the RTC impaired
Pascua’s right to presumption of his innocence – NO because
proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin
or similar to those in criminal prosecutions.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review
on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the resolution rendered on December 13, 2007
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City in all respects
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS of the dispositive portion, as
follows:
Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to
wit:
1. The Court hereby grants the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
2. Ordering respondent CIDG Chief/Director and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation to cause the speedy conduct of a thorough
investigation of the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan probably caused by
members of the Philippine National Police then assigned in Camp Crame,
presumably with the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group;
3. Requiring the full investigation of SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua and other
persons who took part in the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan; and, if
warranted, charging them with the appropriate criminal offense or offenses in
the Department of Justice in relation to the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan;
4. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;
5. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the
petitioner is hereby retained until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.
It is so ordered.
The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in
Quezon City for the implementation of and compliance with this decision
with utmost dispatch. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that although this mode of
appeal is usually limited to the determination of questions of law, Section 19
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows the review by the Court
of questions of fact or of law or of both. Accordingly, we shall also
determine herein the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Issue 1
1. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the
writ of amparo as a remedy against enforced disappearances or
threats to life, liberty and personal security. Section 17 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from
the petitioner as a respondent named in the petition for the writ
of amparo – that of substantial evidence.
2. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This standard was
applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the first ruling
by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo:
a. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial
evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,
with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the
evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence
(usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case
may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial
evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on
the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the
standards of reason and relevance that underlie every
evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering
the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of
the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the
case.
b. While the need for substantial evidence remains the rule,
flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts
in Velasquez Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection
of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This
flexibility, we noted, requires that 'we should take a close
look at the available evidence to determine the correct
import of every piece of evidence - even of those usually
considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence - taking into account the surrounding
circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement.'
3. We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present
substantial evidence in support of her petition for the issuance of the
writ of amparo.
4. Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007 before
Special Investigator Cesar S. Rivera of the Anti-Kidnapping,
Hijacking and Armed Robbery Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an
eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the abduction of Pablo in
mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was consistent and credible in itself.
Perez's statements therein definitely recounted how the abductors
perpetrated the abduction by blocking the path of Pablo's Isuzu
Sportivo (plate numbered ZCW 283) with their whitecolored Kia 2-
door Sedan bearing plate numbered YBA 255 and their greencolored
Toyota Lite Ace with plate numbered "___-488." Perez identified
one of the perpetrators of the abduction by name ("SP02 Rolando
Pascua") and supplied another identifying circumstance for
Pascua ("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng
International Drivers License, police po siya, dating naka-destino sa
Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame"). He
thereby revealed having last seen Pablo on the day of the abduction
as being inside the Isuzu Sportivo that the abductors parked in front
of the main office of the CIDG in Camp Crame. Given that no ill-
motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as the
person leading the abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the
identification of Pascua was unassailable.
5. Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo,
albeit asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction.
Pascua's version on the abduction, as culled from his counter-
affidavit saying that, “while I am seated in a "turo turo" (cafeteria)
 talking to Ronaldo Perez regarding the license detail, a group of men
(referred to herein as "Malefactor" for brevity) more or less ten (10)
brandishing long and short firearms arrived and in a "Gestapo" like
manner hauled several persons including me and Ronaldo Perez”, “It
was along Kamuning or a few minutes after their (sic) hauling when
I had the opportunity to identify myself to one of the Malefactors
that I am a bonafide member of the police force. I was asked if I am
is (sic) sure that I am a police officer, to which I answered "Opo";”,
“A few minutes after and upon learning that I am a police officer, the
vehicle stopped and I was required to get off, which I immediately
did. I was however directed by one of the Malefactor not to look
back or I would be shot which I complied”, “The next day, July 10,
2007 (Tuesday), I was surprised to learn from Ronaldo Perez through
telephone call, that he was likewise released and that he is now ready
to process the requested International Driver's License of his relative
Rizalino Pascua Gani, Jr.”
6. Asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction was
Pascua's way of denying his participation in the abduction of Pablo.
Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction that would have given
to the investigators firm leads to quickly comer the perpetrators as
well as to determine and locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His
omission as fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his part
in the abduction by issuing a blanket denial. He was expected to
furnish details because he was a police officer sworn to uphold and
enforce the law. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful
in light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him
as the leader of the perpetrators of the abduction.
7. Thirdly, Pascua's version of being a victim of the same abduction
deserved no consideration. For one, he could not even mention the
type and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly
ordered to board. To justify his alleged inability to provide details
about the abductors in his counter-affidavit, he stated that he and
Pablo were told to "bow their heads and not to look." The
justification was implausible, however, because it was incompatible
with his declaration in the same counter-affidavit to the effect that
the "[s]ame vehicle, together with two or more vehicle apparently
taking the lead, drove all the way to EDSA southbound passing by
the street near the building where the Department of Interior and
Local Government is located." Furthermore, he said that he was
released by the abductors only after having introduced himself as a
police officer. But he thereby contradicted himself because he also
stated in the same counter-affidavit that he feared being shot during
the abduction if he identified himself as a police officer. Moreover,
he claimed that although he was released he submissively complied
with the order of one of the abductors for him "not to look back or
[he] would be shot." The claim of submissiveness was unnatural for
a police officer like him because he was expected - mainly because
of his training and experience as a police officer, or even because of
simple curiosity on his part - to have at least glanced at the fleeing
vehicle of the abductors in order to get a clue for the follow-up
investigation. And, lastly, his proceeding to a relatively farther police
station to report the incident, instead of to the nearer police station or
outpost made his version absolutely suspicious.
8. Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo
Cayanan and Leonila R. Francisco, to corroborate the allegation on
the occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified
Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.
9. And, fifthly, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no
evidentiary value for being general and bereft of any details. A
perusal shows that the recantation did not offer details of what had
really occurred if the abduction of Pablo did not actually happen.
Such details were the only means to directly contradict the details
stated in the recanted sinumpaang salaysay.
10. It is relevant to note that the RTC, whose ascertainment of the
credibility of conflicting testimonies is generally accorded great
respect by the reviewing court, easily disbelieved Perez's recantation
of his sinumpaang salaysay.
Issue 2
1. “Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. -
The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
a. The respondent who is a private individual or entity must
prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of
duty.
b. The respondent who is a public official or employee must
prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty.
c. The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed to evade the responsibility or liability.”
2. The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary
diligence in conducting its investigation of the disappearance of
 Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts. The CIDG's position
is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.
3. Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a
public official or employee impleaded as a respondent in the petition
for the writ of amparo should submit with the verified written
return.1
4. In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its
operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by
any of them. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of
the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such
affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG
and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land
Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the
abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts
expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really
conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation
of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the
abduction itself.
5. The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo
among its various operating divisions similarly constituted a general
denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted
the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches
had been conducted.
1
Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent
shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things,
contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to
life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved
party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission
against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have or
will still be taken:
(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) to recover ·and preserve the evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in
the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of
the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
6. The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG had undertaken an
administrative investigation against Pascua, and submitted in that
regard the certification on the pre-charge evaluation and
investigation of Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its investigation of
the disappearance of Pablo was conducted in tandem with that of the
NBI; that it had also formed its own investigating team to conduct a
"thorough investigation" of the abduction of Pablo; and that it had
meanwhile verified the vehicle used in the abduction from the LT0.
7. Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the
details of the investigations conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a
manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine whether
or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere
and adequate. The return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that
regard. To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG should have
exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in light of Perez's sinumpaang
salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the abduction and
disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in
Camp Crame. It is disheartening for us to see the CIDG's
investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the
circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no
affirmative showing of any investigation of the area of the abduction
itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from the area.
Indeed, the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez on
the abduction.
Issue 3
1. Pascua reminds that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was partly
patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo adopted in Mexico.
He posits that it has been an essential requirement in Mexico for the
petition for the writ of amparo to state where the victim of
involuntary disappearance was being held. He argues that upon the
recantation by Perez of his sinumpaang salaysay, there was no more
evidence from which to determine where Pablo was being held. The
argument of Pascua is unfounded.
2. As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state
the probable whereabouts of the victim. We have no doubt, however,
that Regina was not aware where Pablo had been kept at the time she
filed her petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
3. Nonetheless, the Court clarifies that the application and
implementation of the rule of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any
other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its being
 patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries,
particularly those in Latin-American, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent
on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been
implemented. Such operation and implementation, if worthy of
emulation, are only best practices to be considered and optionally
relied upon, if at all. Circumstances and needs peculiar to our
country, which the Court has well considered in crafting the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, dictate different operation and implementation.
4. It was actually presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no
evidence at all that indicated the whereabouts of Pablo following the
abduction. There was such evidence, and it was substantial.
Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang salaysay stated the place where
Pablo was detained or was last seen.
5. “Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30
nh), tapos po ay pumasok sa loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG
Building, parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building
nakapark, mga isa't kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang
ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay kinakausap nila SPO2
ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga
bandang alas singko (5:00) ng hapon; tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa
Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay siya
ng mga dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.”,
“makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na
Criminal Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).”
6. Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions
like the CIDG, cannot be made a respondent in the petition for the
writ of amparo. He probably bases his suggestion on the text of
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The suggestion of
Pascua lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation
may be committed by the persons therein listed (i.e., public official
or employee, or a private individual or entity), it does not state that
only the listed persons can be made respondents. The rule does not
list the State or its agencies as possible violators simply because the
State and its agencies may not be presumed to sanction such
violations.
7. In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may
be impleaded; otherwise, the rule on the writ of amparo may be
rendered ineffective or toothless.
Issue 4
1. Pascua supposes that the issuance of the writ of amparo issued
against him impaired or diminished his right to the presumption of
innocence. Pascua's supposition entirely misses the point.
2. The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not
akin or similar to those in criminal prosecutions. In the former, the
guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal
sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the
aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual
threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is
never an issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due
process of law is the object of the proceedings. The presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence,
the need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the guilt of the accused.
Reliefs to be granted
1. According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court
hearing the petition may grant the privilege of the writ
of amparo "and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate." This
means that the amparo court should enable every act or move to
prevent any violation of another person's right to life, liberty and
security or to defeat any threat of a violation of such right.
2. Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is
required to also state in the return the actions that have been or will
still be taken: (a) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (b) to
recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance
of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the
prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance; (d) to determine the cause, manner, location and time
of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and
apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.
3. With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal
participation of Pascua in the abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly
knew more than he cared to reveal thus far about the abduction. As a
start, Pascua, as the leader of the abduction, knew the identities of
the eight or nine other abductors. He should be assiduously
investigated for his participation in the abduction, and, if warranted,
he should be promptly but duly held accountable for it. All those
 conspiring with him in abducting Pablo should also be held to
account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the NBI should
not halt in seeing to this, for they bear the primary responsibility in
that respect.

 086 GAMBOA v. CHAN (Sabaupan)
24 July 2012 | Sereneo, J. | Writ of Habeas Data
PETITIONER: MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA
RESPONDENTS: P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the
PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIM O FANG,
in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos
Norte
SUMMARY: Pursuant to A.O. 275 issued by former PGMA, the Zeñarosa
Commission was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
(PAGs) in the country. This commission then released and submitted to the
Office of the President a confidential report (Report). Gamboa, then Mayor
of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, alleged that the PNP-Ilocos Norte conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her
as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered in her to
the Zeñarosa Commission, causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration
of individuals maintaining PAGs. However, she admitted that the Report
briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP. ABS-CBN
broadcasted the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Thus, she was publicly tagged
as someone who maintains a PAG based on the unverified information that
the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.
As a result, she claimed that her inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations. Contending that her right to
privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents
in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. RTC categorically
ruled the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as
published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy.
However, the RTC nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject
information originated from the police officers, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification.
The issue is whether the privilege of the writ must be granted. The Supreme
Court ruled in the negative. The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of
liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. Although the right
to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint, the right to privacy is not absolute. A limitation to
such right is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational
basis relationship test, there would be no infringement of the individual’s
right to privacy when the requirement to disclose information is for a valid
purpose. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private
armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted
authority. Thus, the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate aim, which
is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently. Here, Gamboa was able to sufficiently
establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler
came from the PNP. However, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zeñarosa Commission was NOT an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty, or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with
the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of
these notorious groups. The fact that the PNP released information to the
Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and
without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be
interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act
is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. Also, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation
system. Thus, safeguards were put in place to makes sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy. Gamboa also
failed to establish that the police officers were responsible for the unintended
disclosure to the media and that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment
and to increased police surveillance. The police officers sufficiently
explained that the investigators conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy
the presumption of regularity, which Gamboa failed to overcome.
DOCTRINE: The right to privacy is not absolute. It may succumb to
compelling state interest. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far
outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of a citizen, especially
when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against the
citizen was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
FACTS:
50. Marynette Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte. Respondents Chan and Fang are both police superintendent of
the Ilocos Police Provincial Office.
51. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative
 Order (A.O. 275), “Creating an Independent Commission to Address
the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country” which was
later referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission. This body was formed
to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Zeñarosa
Commission then released and submitted to the Office of the
President a confidential report (the Report).
52. Gamboa alleged that the PNP-Ilocos Norte conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her
as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of
data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered in her to the Zeñarosa Commission, causing her inclusion in
the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. She
specifically pointed out items reflected therein:
a. The Report cited PNP was its source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.
b. Attached to the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP
captioned as “Status of PAGs Monitoring by Special Task
Groups” which classifies PAGs in the country. The first
entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa
Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.
c. Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the
PNP.
d. The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the
PNP.
53. ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of
the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG. She alleged that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media. Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone
who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that
the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa
Commission.
54. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in
the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in
the Report also made her susceptible to harassment and police
surveillance operations.
55. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of
a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
56. After finding the Petition meritorious on its face, RTC issued the
corresponding writ. The trial court instructed the police officers to
submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the
Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs and directed them to cease and desist from
forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission or to any government entity
information that they may have gathered against her without the
approval of the court.
57. In their Return of the Writ, the police officers alleged that they acted
within the bounds of their mandate in conducting their investigation
and surveillance of Gamboa. The information stored in their database
supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which Gamboa was
implicated: a complaint for murder and frustrated murder, and a
complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted
murder.
58. Police officers also asserted that the Petition was incomplete for
failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rules:
a. The manner in which the right to privacy was violated or
threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life,
liberty, or security of Gamboa.
b. The actions and recourses she took to secure the data or
information.
c. The location of the files, registers, or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or
in control of the data or information.
59. The RTC categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list
of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted
a violation of her right to privacy. It ruled that the untold misery that
comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be insurmountable.
Despite this finding, the RTC nevertheless dismissed the Petition on
the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence
that the subject information originated from the police officers, and
that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission
without the benefit of prior verification. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/s:
8. Whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data should be granted.
NO — The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate.
RULING: WHEREFORE the instant petition for review is DENIED.
RATIO:
40. Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling
the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in
accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding
of unverified information on her must be considered lawful.
41. The police officers reiterated their argument that Gamboa failed to
present substantial evidence to show that her privacy in life, liberty,
or security was violated. They also argued that dismissal was proper
because Gamboa failed to prove that the police officers were the
source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG.
42. The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right. Liberty in the constitutional
sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful government
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if its if to be repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom.
43. The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of the Constitution and other laws.
a. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in
Philippines laws. For instance, a person meddling or prying
into the privacy of another is an actionable tort under the
Civil Code. It also holds a public officer or employee or any
private individual liable for damages for any violation of the
rights and liberties of another person and recognizes the
privacy of letters and other private communications.
b. The RPC makes a crime the violation of secrets by an
officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling.
c. Special laws like Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code also
provide the invasion of privacy constitutes an offense.
d. The Rules of Court on privileged communication also
recognize the privacy of certain information.
44. Although the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint, the right to privacy is
not absolute. A limitation to such right is an overriding compelling
state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, there
would be no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy when
the requirement to disclose information is for a valid purpose.
45. Thus, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weight both notions. In these
cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy
may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling.
46. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must
be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
47. In this Decision, the Court looked at a case decided by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) since the Philippine rule on Writ of
Habeas Data originated from the European tradition of data
protection. In Leander v. Sweden, ECHR balanced the right of
citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the
right of the state to protect its national security.
a. In that case, Leander worked as a temporary replacement
museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was
adjacent to a restricted military zone. He was refused
employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in
an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the
secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the
Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented
access.
b. He claimed that this procedure of security control violated
the European Convention on Human Rights on the right to
privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background
would warrant his classification in the register as a security
risk.
c. The ECHR ruled that his right to privacy was violated, but
the interference was justified in the following grounds:
i. the personnel control system had a legitimate aim,
which was the protection of national security.
ii. The Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner
of exercising discretion in the collection, recording,
and release of information by the authorities.
d. Significantly, the ECHR held that the fact that the
 information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Leander cannot by itself warrant the
conclusion that the interference was “not necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security,” as it
is the very absence of such communication which, at least
partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control
procedure.
48. The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private
armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly
constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character and is
controlled and administered by a national police commission. Thus,
the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
49. To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275
clothed it with the powers of an investigative body and authorized it
to deputized the AFP, NBI, DOJ, and PNP to assist the Commission
in the performance of its functions. Meanwhile, the PNP is empower
by law to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of
lives and properties, maintain peace and order, and investigate and
prevent crimes.
50. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
51. The Court held that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that
the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came
from the PNP. However, the forwarding of information by the PNP
to the Zeñarosa Commission was NOT an unlawful act that violated
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty, or security.
52. The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence
regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of
investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the
Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the
police force in the fulfillment of its mandate, and thus, had the power
to request assistance from the police.
53. The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa
Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without
affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted
as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation. Also, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a
validation system, which was used to update information on
individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data
mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in
place to makes sure that the information collected maintained its
integrity and accuracy.
54. To accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established
in existing law and jurisprudence, the Court deemed it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must
observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant
information.
55. Here, the police officers admitted to the existence of the Report, but
emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties
and the media was regrettable. However, Gamboa failed to establish
that the police officers were responsible for this unintended
disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to
the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
56. Finally, the Court held that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals
maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. The police officers
sufficiently explained that the investigators conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated.
As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which
Gamboa failed to overcome.
57. The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of
habeas data must be denied.
 087 VIVARES v. STC CEBU ET AL. (SEE)
29 September 2014 | Velasco, J. | Habeas Data
PETITIONER: Rhonda Ave S. Vivares and Sps. Margarita and David
Suzara
RESPONDENTS: St. Theresa’s College, Mylene Rhez T. Escudero, and
John Does
SUMMARY: Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, both minors, were graduating
high school students of ST. Theresa’s College (STC). While changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela
Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer
teacher at STC's high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted the pictures online. Escudero then asked her students if
they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others. Using
the school’s computers, the students logged into their personal facebook
accounts and showed Escudero the photos. Upon discovery, Escudero
reported the matter, and through one of her student;s facebook page, showed
the photos to Kristine Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-charge, for
appropriate action. following an investigation, STC found that students to
have violated the Student handbook. The students were then called to the
high school principals office and a day after, their parents were informed that
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises.
A week before graduation, Angela’s mom, Dr. Armenia Tan filed a petition
for injunction and damages against STC et al. she prayed that STC et al be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining
the commencement exercises. Rhonda Vivares, mom of Julia also joined as
an intervenor. STC et al, in their memorandum, submitted printed copies of
the photos in issue as annexes. The RTC issued a TRO allowing the students
to attend the graudation ceremony to which STC filed an MR. Despite the
TRO, STC still barred the students from participating in the graduation rites.
Vivares and Suzara, parents of the minors, then filed before the RTC a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data. The RTC issued the writ of
habeas data, STC et al filed their return and the petition for habeas data was
dismissed.
WoN a writ of habaes data should issue.—NO, there was no actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors. [DOCTRINE].
Vivares and Suzara, in support of their thesis about their children's privacy
right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children's
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said
photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors' privacy since their
Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends"
setting safeguarded with a password. As Vivares and Suzara's children
testified, it was Angela who uploaded the subject photos which were only
viewable by the five of them , although who these five are do not appear on
the records. Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my
students showed me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres.”
The SC ruled for STC. Not one of Vivares and Suzara disputed Escudero's
sworn account that her students, who are the minors' Facebook "friends,"
showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts
were ever resorted to by Escudero's students, and that it is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a post's or profile detail's privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user
who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user's own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which
was set at "Friends." As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue
are visible only to the sanctioned students' Facebook friends, respondent
STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since
it was the minors' Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
STC et al were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort
to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously
enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero. Furthermore, Vivares and Suzara failed to prove their contention
that STC et al reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what
Vivares and Suzara attributed to STC et al as an act of offensive disclosure
was no more than the actuality that STC et al appended said photographs in
their memorandum submitted to the trial court. These are not tantamount to a
violation of the minor's informational privacy rights, contrary to Vivares and
Suzara' assertion.
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
FACTS:
1. Julia Daluz and Julienne Suzara, both minors, were graduating high
school students of ST. Theresa’s College (STC). While changing into
their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were
then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook
profile.
2. Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a
computer teacher at STC's high school department, learned from her
students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero
then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are.
In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.
3. Using the school’s computers, the students logged into their personal
facebook accounts and showed Escudero the photos which include:
(a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
inside a bar; and
(b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
4. What is more, Escudero's students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students' photos
was not confined to the girls' Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
5. Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter, and through one of
her student;s facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Tigol
(Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-charge, for appropriate action.
following an investigation, STC found that students to have violated
the Student handbook for: (1) Possession of alcoholic drinks outside
the school campus; (2) Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or
lewd acts; (3) Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public
places; (4) Apparel that exposes the underwear; (5) Clothing that
advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually
suggestive messages, language or symbols; and (6) Posing and
uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
6. The students in the photos were called to the office of Sr. Purisima,
high school principal. The students claimed that during the meeting,
they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials. The
next day, their parents were informed that they are barred from
joining the commencement exercises.
7. A week before graduation, Angela’s mom, Dr. Armenia Tan filed a
petition for injunction and damages against STC et al. she prayed
that STC et al be enjoined from implementing the sanction that
precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
Rhonda Vivares, mom of Julia also joined as an intervenor.
8. STC et al, in their memorandum, submitted printed copies of the
photos in issue as annexes. The RTC issued a TRO allowing the
students to attend the graudation ceremony to which STC filed an
MR. Despite the TRO, STC still barred the students from
participating in the graduation rites.
9. Vivares and Suzara, parents of the minors, then filed before the RTC
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data on the basis of the
following considerations:
(a) The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were
taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the
occasion of a birthday beach party;
(b) The privacy setting of their children's Facebook accounts was set
at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected.
(c) STC et al, being involved in the eld of education, knew or ought
to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, STC et al knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and
not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
(d) The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used
and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC's o cials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of Vivares and Suzara' children were intruded upon;
 (e) The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person's right to control
information, data, and digital images happened at STC's Computer information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
Laboratory; and information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
(f) All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly achieve unlawful ends.
broadcasted by STC et al through their memorandum submitted to
2. The existence of a person's right to informational privacy and a
the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or
10. To Vivares and Suzara, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
invasion of their children's privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of
of habeas databe issued; (b) STC et al be ordered to surrender and
the writ may be extended.
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data
before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be
The writ of habeas data is not confined to cases of extralegal killings and
rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed,
enforced disappaerances.
saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
1. Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual
obtained in violation of the children's right to privacy.
freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it is erroneous
11. The RTC issued the writ of habeas data. STC et al then filed their
to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced
verified written return laying down the following grounds for denial
disappearances only.
of the petition: (a) Vivares and Suzara are not the proper parties to
2. Also, the meaning of “engaged” in gathering, collecting or storing of
file the petition; (b) Vivares and Suzara are engaging in forum
data or information, when taken in its proper context, as a whole,
shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data
irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against
may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy
unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private
as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing
12. The RTC then dismissed the petition for habeas data.
data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or
about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in
ISSUE/s:
the business of collecting or storing data.
9. WoN a writ of habaes data should issue.—NO, there was no actual
3. To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business
or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." It
security og the minors.
does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of
a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about
DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court,
the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
The right to informational privacy on facebook
RATIO:
1. The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with
Writ of habeas data
technological advancements having an influential part therein. This
1. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose
evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S.
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
Puno's speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where he explained
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
the three strands of the right to privacy, viz.: (1) locational or
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and
to informational privacy — usually defined as the right of
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
individuals to control information about themselves
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
2. Having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those
that occur in Online Social Networks (OSNs). The question is, up to
what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
3. Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability
to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by
the site.
4. To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to
regulate the accessibility of a user's profile as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court
recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy
settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies
that, although it makes every effort to protect a user's information,
these privacy settings are not fool-proof."
5. A facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images, posted on his personal wall except for profile picture and ID.
The user has the following options: (1) public; (2) friends of friends;
(3) friends; (4) custom; and (5) only me.
6. Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what
extent to disclose facts about [themselves] — and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences."
7. Without these privacy settings, STC et al's contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be
correct. However, such is not the case.It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective
expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile
will view the information they post or upload thereto. This, however,
does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.
8. Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
Vivares and Suzara,manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN's privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,
in cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
9. Vivares and Suzara, in support of their thesis about their children's
privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their
children's Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the
minors' privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under
"very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password. As Vivares and Suzara's children testified, it was Angela
who uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the
five of them , although who these five are do not appear on the
records.
10. Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that "my students
showed me some pictures of girls clad in brassieres.”
11. In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors'
testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students' act of
showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos
were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to
corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the
five of them, and without their challenging Escudero's claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
12. It is well to note that not one of Vivares and Suzara disputed
Escudero's sworn account that her students, who are the minors'
Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able
to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero's students, and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
13. Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that Vivares and Suzara'
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such
were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right
to informational privacy.
14. It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post's or profile
detail's privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be
viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source
of the content. The user's own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with
the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
 who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was
set at "Friends."
15. As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible
only to the sanctioned students' Facebook friends, respondent
STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors' Facebook friends who showed
the pictures to Tigol. STC et al were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously
enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed
any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
16. Furthermore, Vivares and Suzara failed to prove their contention that
STC et al reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what
Vivares and Suzara attributed to STC et al as an act of offensive
disclosure was no more than the actuality that STC et al appended
said photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in
connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These are not
tantamount to a violation of the minor's informational privacy rights,
contrary to Vivares and Suzara' assertion.
17. In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to
be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the
reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.
However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook's privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that
they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have
an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
 072 Rosendo Alba v. Court of Appeals (COSCOLLUELA)
29 July 2005 | Ynares-Santiago, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONER: ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and
natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal
capacity
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals and Rosendo C. Herrera
SUMMARY: Rosendo Herrera filed a Petition for Correction of Entry of the
following entries:
1. Surname Herrera to be removed
2. Reference to Herrera as the father Alba to be removed
3. Alleged marriage of Herrera to Alba’s mother, Armi, to be removed.
Herrera claims that the entries were false. Herrera also claims that he married
only once, with an Ezperanza Santos, and never married Armi nor fathered
Alba. Herrera amended his petition impleading Armi. RTC ordered the
setting of hearing, publication, and service to Armi and to the Civil Registrar
of Manila and the SolGen. RTC amended its order re-scheduling the hearing
and ordered publication in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in
Manila. Armi did not appear and according to the return of the notice, the
same was not received because she no longer resided at ther last known
address. RTC: ordered the correction of the entries, ‘Herrera, Jr.’ was
deleted, he was to be known as Rosendo Alba, and that the entry under date
and place of marriage was likewise ordered deleted. The order became final
and executory. Herrera filed a motion for amendment of the decision to
include cancellation of all entries having reference to him as father. This was
granted. Armi and Alba then filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over
their person. Armi argued that Herrera knew her address because they
cohabited there. Even after separation, Herrera continued to give support to
Alba and that the condo unit was conveyed to Armi by Herrera. The address
appearing on the birth certificate was entered through erroneous information
by Armi’s sister. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition.
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction.
YES. The filing with the trial court of the petition vested the court
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Service of summons or notice to the defendant is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. Substantial corrections or
cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or
legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition
under Rule 108 of the Revised RoC, with the proper RTC. Being a
proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of Alba is
therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. The service of the order at
the address appearing the in the birth certificate and publication thereof
sufficiently complied with the re quirement of due process. Considering that
the Certificate of Birth bears Armi’s signature, the entries appearing therein
are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the
publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including
Armi and Alba, which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be
rendered in the petition.
DOCTRINE: Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be
effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
RoC, with the proper RTC. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person is therefore not required. It is enough that the
trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
FACTS:
60. In Oct. 1996, Rosendo C. Herrera (Herrera) filed a petition for
cancellation of the ff entries (Petition for Correction of Entry) in the
birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. (Alba):
a. Surname Herrera to be removed
b. Reference to Herrera as the father of Alba
c. Alleged marriage of Herrera to Alba’s mother, Armi A. Alba
(Armi).
61. Herrera claims that the entries were false and that it was only
sometime in Sept. 1996 that he learned of the existence of the birth
certificate.
a. Herrera claims that he married only once with an Ezperanza
Santos and never married Armi nor fathered Alba. He
presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of
 Mandaluying and NSO as proof.
62. Herrera amended his petition impleading Armi.
63. RTC: set the petition for hearing and directed publication and service
to Armi and to the Civil Registrar of Manila and the SolGen.
a. Amended order: re-scheduled the hearing and was published
in Today, a newspaper of general circulation in Manila.
Copies were sent to Armi, the Local Civil Registrar and the
SolGen.
64. Counsel for SolGen appeared but did not oppose. Armi did not
appear and according to the return of the notice, the same was not
received because she no longer resided at ther last known address.
65. RTC: ordered the correction of the entries, ‘Herrera, Jr.’ was deleted,
he was to be known as Rosendo Alba, and that the entry under date
and place of marriage was likewise ordered deleted. The order
became final and executory.
66. Herrera filed a motion for amendment of the decision to include
cancellation of all entries having reference to him as father. This was
granted.
67. Armi and Alba then filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. Armi came to know of the decision
when San Beda (Alba went there for HS) was furnished by Herrera
with a copy of the court order directing the change of Alba’s
surname.
68. Armi argued that Herrera knew her address because they cohabited
there. Even after separation, Herrera continued to give support to
Alba and that the condo unit was conveyed to Armi by Herrera. The
address appearing on the birth certificate was entered through
erroneous information by Armi’s sister (Corazon).
69. Herrera denied paternity and purported cohabitation with Armi.
70. CA: dismissed the petition. Alba failed to prove that Herrera
employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court.
Further, that as an illegitimate son, Alba should bear the surname of
his mother. MR was denied.
ISSUE/s:
10. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction — YES. The filing
with the trial court of the petition vested the court jurisdiction over
the res. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
latter has jurisdiction over the res.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27,
2004 decision and the May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
58. Rule 47, Sec. 2 of the 1997 Civil Procedure provides that judgments
may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud. Also, whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Armi and Alba depends on the nature of Herrera’s action,
i.e., in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
59. In this case, the filing with the trial court of the petition vested the
court jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,
provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Acquired by:
a. Seizure of the property under legal process, brough into
actual custody of the law.
b. Result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective.
60. Service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements.
61. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry
records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
RoC, with the proper RTC. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of Alba is therefore not required in the
present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
62. The service of the order at the address appearing the in the birth
certificate and publication thereof sufficiently complied with the re
quirement of due process.
63. Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears Armi’s signature, the
entries appearing therein are presumed to have been entered with her
approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and Alba, which binds the
whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition.
64. Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was Herrera’s alleged
concealment of Armi’s present address, was not proven. Extrinsic
fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by
 fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here,
Armi contended that Herrera is aware of her present address
65. The documents presented2 only tend to prove Herrera’s previous
ownership of the unit and the subsequent transfer thereof to Armi,
but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does
the sale prove that the conveyance of the unit was part of Herrera’s
support to Alba. Indeed, intimate relationships and family relations
cannot be inferred from what appears to be an ordinary business
transaction. Also, while Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes
from Herrera, they were only attached as annexes to the petition and
not formally offered as evidence before the CA. More importantly,
said letters/notes do not have probative value because they were
mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic writing of
private respondent.
66. Further, the resort to Rule 65 was erroneous. They should have filed
a petition for review under Rule 45.
67. Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to
annul the trial court’s decision. In an action for annulment of
judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may
indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. In the
present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner
minor is an illegitimate child because she was never married to
private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that
he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an
unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname
of his mother.

2
(1) private respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts
allegedly issued to private respondent for payment of homeowner’s or
association dues; (2) a photocopy of a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the
subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter.
 073 CERUILA v. DELANTAR (DIM)
December 9, 2005 | Austria-Martinez, J. | Change of Name
PETITIONERS: Platon and Librada Ceruila
RESPONDENTS: Rosilyn Delantar represented by her guardian, Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
SUMMARY: Rosilyn filed a case of child abuse against her father Simplicio.
He was jailed, so this led to the involuntary commitment of Rosilyn with the
DSWD as the mother (Librada) could not be found. Later, Spouses Platon and
Librada Ceruila suddenly filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of
the birth certificate of Rosilyn on the ground of birth simulation as its material
entries were falsified, thus the certificate should be null and void. The RTC
served summons on the Civil Registrar of Manila and ordered for the
publication of the notice of hearingin a newspaper of general circulation for
three consecutive weeks. In the hearing, Spouses Ceruila submitted baptismal
certificates to prove that Delantar and Librada were siblings and could not
possibly have sired Rosilyn. The RTC granted the cancellation of the birth
certificate. Sometime later, Rosilyn, represented by the DSWD, filed a petition
for the annulment of the RTC judgment with the CA. She claims that she and
her guardian were not notified of the petition and they only learned it from the
news, thus there was a violation of her right to due process. The CA nullified
the RTC decision as Rule 108, Sec. 3 makes Rosilyn an indispensable party.
The issue before the SC is whether the CA erred in setting aside the decision
of the RTC – NO. As all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the
birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry. Not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties
thereto. Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the
cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation,
legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake. The SC ruled that summons must still
be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. This is but proper,
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so
chooses.
DOCTRINE: All matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth
certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry. All persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register must be made parties thereto. Publication is not substantial
notice.
FACTS:
1. Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn Delantar filed a case of child abuse
(prostitution) against her father Simplicio Delantar, who was
subsequently incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail. This led to the
involuntary commitment of Rosilyn with the DSWD, as her
mother, Librada Ceruila, could not be found.
2. In 1997, spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action in
the RTC of Manila for the cancellation and annulment of the
birth certificate of Rosilyn, on the ground that there was a
simulation of birth, thus the material entries in the certificate were
falsified and therefore invalid.
3. The RTC ordered to set the case for hearing; directed the publication
of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation; and stated that any person may
interpose their comment.
4. Summons were served to the Civil Registrar of Manila, but no
one showed up at the hearing.
5. In support of their petition, the Spouses Ceruila submitted the
baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar and Librada Delantar to
prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have
been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn.
6. The RTC was inclined to concur with the observation of the Ceruilas
that it is highly unlikely that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would
commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they
are the parents of the herein minor
7. The RTC then ruled in favor of Spouses Ceruila, declaring that
the birth certificate was null and void ab initio; ordering the Civil
Registrar and the National Statistics Office to expunge the entry of
birth and other pertinent documents.
 8. Sometime later, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the
DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the annulment of
judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
certificate. She claimed that she and her guardian were not notified
of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the
same only from the news on May 16, 1997.
9. Rosilyn, through the DSWD, argued that the RTC decision was
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due
process; that the judge did not have authority to declare her to be
illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of
the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy
10. The CA overturn the RTC decision, ruling that Rosilyn, through
her guardian, the DSDW, should not only have been notified, but
made a party to the special proceeding under Sec. 3 of Rule 1083.
The RTC decision was declared null and void for lack of due
process.
11. The CA cited Republic v. Valencia, in stating that corrections of
substantial entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors,
should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with
all the persons interested are made parties therein.
12. Spouses Ceruila appeal to the SC on the ground that since the
birth certificate is null and void for being contrary to law. The
CA should have construed the case as an ordinary civil action
and that summons were duly served on the civil registrar, who is
the proper party, and that publication is substantial notice to
Rosilyn.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the CA erred when it set aside the RTC’s ruling that
the birth certificate of Rosilyn should be cancelled – NO. The CA
is correct in stating that Rosilyn should have been made a party to
the petition under Sec. 3, Rule 108. Thus, Rosilyn is an indispensable
party and the RTC failed to afford her due process.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
RATIO:
Rosilyn is an indispensable party to the cancellation of entries
3
SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
1. All matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth
certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry.
2. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in
the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a
special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. Not only the civil registrar but also all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register must be made parties thereto.
3. As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito, unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same
shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of
the rules. Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested
in the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than Rosilyn
herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
4. Spouses Ceruila claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a
party to the proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in
the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is without merit.
Publication does not cure the lack of summons
5. Spouses Ceruila further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn
was cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the
case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation.
6. The SC ruled that summons must still be served, not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply
with the requirements of fair play and due process. This is but
proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect her interest if she so chooses.
Motive of the cancellation proceedings
7. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where
her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have
pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense
contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been
considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyn’s age and thus find
basis for statutory rape. (they tried to remove the birth cert. as
evidence)
 074 Republic v. Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a. Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante (IGNACIO)
20 July 2006 | Garcia, J. | Change of Name – Differences under Rule 103,
RA 9048, and Rule 108
PETITIONER: Republic of the PH
RESPONDENTS: Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante a.k.a. Maria Eloisa
Bringas Bolante
SUMMARY: [please take note of the dates!]
On 18 Oct 2001, Respondent BRINGAS filed a petition in RTC Bangued,
Abra, to change her name. She alleged that she did so because in her records
in the Office of Municipal Civil Registrar, her registered name is Roselie
Eloisa Bringas Bolante, but all her life she has been using the name Maria
Eloisa Bringas Bolante, which appears on all her school records, public
records, and private records. She petitioned to change her name in order to
avoid confusion. (her married name is Ma. Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella)
The RTC set the case for hearing on 20 Feb 2001, The notice of hearing
was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and December 7, 2000
issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted from the last day, December 7,
2000, of publication of the Order, the initial hearing scheduled on
February 20, 2001 would fall within the 4-month prohibition. The RTC
instead reset the hearing several times, finally settling on 25 September 2001,
which is beyond the 4-month period.
On 25 Sept 2001, BRINGAS presented documents for evidence. The
provincial prosecutor, who was deputized by the OSG to represent him in
said case, made no objections. He did not raise also issues on the
compliance with publication requirements and did not question the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC granted the petition & ordered the change of BRINGAS’ name from
Roselie Eloisa to Maria Eloisa. CA affirmed. In the present petition, OSG
is now questioning the compliance with the publication requirements, and the
lack of the NBI and police clearance to ensure that the petition was not
undertaken for fraudulent/illegal purposes.
SC ruled that the RTC rescheduled the initial hearing several times to meet
the 4-month limitation, and the OSG—who represents the public—was well
informed thru the provincial prosecutor, who did not offer any objection
either, thus there was no need for a re-publishing of the notice. As to the
issue of the lack of NBI and police clearances, the SC ruled that BRINGAS’
testimony was given in open court and under cross-examination; that Rule
103 does not provide a cquantum of proof to establish the fact that a
petitioner has no derogatory records; and existing jurisprudence has not
required a petitioner for change of name to present NBI and police
clearances to prove that the petition is not for fraud or illegal purpose.
DOCTRINE:
Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is valid if the following
requisites concur:
(1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and place for the
hearing must be published;
(2) the publication must be at least once a week for three successive weeks;
and,
(3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best.
Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the petition being
heard within 30 days prior to an election or within four (4) months after the
last publication of the notice of the hearing.
The purpose of the publication is to inform the public of the petition to
change name, and that any person may appear in court to oppose it. The
government, as an agency of the people, represents the public and,
therefore, the Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the
government, effectively represents the public. Since the OSG did not
timely object to the publication notice, there was no need for republication.
NBI & police clearances are not required by Rule 103, which does not
provide a quantum of proof in order to prove that the petition was not
undertaken for fraudulent/illegal purpose. The testimony of the petitioner
under oath and in open court is enough.
FACTS:
71. Respondent BRINGAS filed a petition in RTC Bangued, Abra, to
change her name. In her petition before the RTC, respondent alleged,
among other things, the following:
1. That she is a Filipino, of legal age, married, born to spouses
 Floriano B. Bolante and Paula B. Bringas and a resident since
birth of Bangued, Abra;
2. That per records in the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, Bangued, Abra, her registered name is Roselie Eloisa
Bringas Bolante which name, as far as she can remember, she
did not use but instead the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante;
3. That the name Maria Eloisa appears in all her school as well
as in her other public and private records; and
4. That her married name is Maria Eloisa B. Bolante-Marbella.
Thus, to prevent confusion, Ms. Bolante prayed that her
registered name be changed to conform to the name she has
always carried and used.
72. RTC set hearing on 20 Feb 2001, finding the petition sufficient in
form & substance, and ordered BRINGAS to comply with
jurisdictional requirements of notice & publication.
73. After said hearing, RTC ordered BRINGAS to file a written formal
offer of evidence to establish jurisdictional facts, and set the date for
presentation of evidence. On 26 March 2001, BRINGAS filed her
“Officer of Evidence for Marking and Identification Purposes to
Prove Jurisdictional Facts.”
74. The presentation for evidence/initial hearing was reset twice, but
then pushed through on 25 September 2001. BRINGAS presented
the following evidence without objection from the Republic,
represented by the OSG (who deputized the provincial prosecutor
to appear on his behalf):
a. Exh. "A" - The Petition
b. Exh. "B" - The Notice of Initial Hearing
c. Exh. "C" - The Certificate of Posting
d. Exh. "D" - The Appearance of the Solicitor General
e. Exh. "E" - The Authority given to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor
f. Exh. "F" - The Affidavit of Publication
g. Exh. "F-I" -The Newspaper Clippings
h. Exh. "G" - The Norluzonian Courier
i. Exh. "H" - Another copy of Norluzonian Courier
*note that there is no NBI or police clearance offered, & that the
OSG was represented by the provincial prosecutor
75. RTC declared its acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, and
BRINGAS took to the witness stand. She stated that the purpose of
her petition to have her registered name changed to what she had
been actually using through the years. She categorically stated that
she had not been accused of any crime under either her registered
name or rher present correct name.
76. On 23 Jan 2002 the RTC granted the petition and directed the
Municipal Registrar of Bangued, Abra, to change BRINGAS’ name
from Roselie Eloisa to Maria Eloisa
77. CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE/s:
11. Whether or not BRINGAS’ substantial compliance with SEC 3,
RULE 103 of the ROC is sufficient to vest the RTC with jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the petition – YES. The RTC rescheduled the
initial hearing several times to meet the 4-month limitation, and the
OSG was well informed thru the provincial prosecutor, who did not
offer any objection either.
12. Whether or not BRINGAS’ bare testimony, unsupported by any
other evidence, is sufficient to prove that the change of her name is
not resorted for illegal purposes – YES. Her testimony was given in
open court and under cross-examination; Rule 103 does not provide
a cquantum of proof to testablish the fact that a petitioner has no
derogatory records; and existing jurisprudence has not required a
petitioner for change of name to present NBI and police clearances to
prove that the petition is not for fraud or illegal purpose.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 21, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
On the issue of publication & acquisition of jurisdiction
68. On the postulate that the initial hearing of a petition for a change of
name cannot be set within four (4) months from the last publication
of the notice of such hearing, petitioner submits at the threshold that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for want or
defective publication. We are not persuaded.
69. As gleaned from the records, the basic petition for change of name
was filed on October 18, 2000 and set for hearing on February 20,
2001 via an Order issued on November 13, 2000. The notice of
hearing was published in the November 23, and 30, 2000 and
December 7, 2000 issues of the Norluzonian Courier. Counted
from the last day, December 7, 2000, of publication of the Order, the
initial hearing scheduled on February 20, 2001 is indeed within
the four-month prohibited period prescribed under Section 3, Rule
103 of the Rules. The Court, as did the CA, must emphasize,
however, that the trial court, evidently upon realizing the error
committed respecting the 4-month limitation, lost no time in
rectifying its mistake by rescheduling, with due notice to all
concerned, the initial hearing for several times, finally settling
for September 25, 2001.
70. It is the Republic's posture that the fact that the hearing took place on
September 25, 2001, beyond the four-month prohibited period, did
not cure the jurisdictional defect since notice of the September 25,
2001 setting went unpublished. Pressing on, the Republic would state
– and correctly so – that the in rem nature of a change of name
proceeding necessitates strict compliance with all jurisdictional
requirements, particularly on publication, in order to vest the court
with jurisdiction thereover.8
71. The Court, to be sure, is fully aware that the required publication
serves as notice to the whole world that the proceeding in question
has for its object to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any and against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
72. In the context of Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules, publication is
valid if the following requisites concur:
(1) the petition and the copy of the order indicating the date and
place for the hearing must be published;
(2) the publication must be at least once a week for three
successive weeks; and,
(3) the publication must be in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem
best.
Another validating ingredient relates to the caveat against the
petition being heard within 30 days prior to an election or within
four (4) months after the last publication of the notice of the
hearing.
73. It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of
name, any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy
shall appear on behalf of the Government. The government, as
an agency of the people, represents the public and, therefore, the
Solicitor General, who appears on behalf of the government,
effectively represents the public. In this case, the Solicitor General
deputized the provincial prosecutor of Abra for the purpose of
appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it were, the provincial
prosecutor of Abra was fully apprised of the new dates of the
initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a
republication of the initial notice of the hearing.
74. Not lost on the Court is the fact that during the September 25, 2001
initial hearing which, to reiterate is already outside the 4-month
limitation prescribed by the Rules, the provincial prosecutor of
Abra interposed no objection as to the genuineness, authenticity,
relevancy or sufficiency of the exhibits presented to prove the
jurisdictional requirements exacted by the Rules. In a very real
sense, therefore, the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly
acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the trial court. The peculiar
circumstances obtaining in this case and the requirements of fair
dealing demand that we accord validity to the proceedings a quo.
On the propriety of the desired change of name
1. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals for
purposes of identification, and that changing one's name is a
privilege and not a right. Accordingly, a person can be authorized to
change his name appearing in either his certificate of birth or civil
registry upon showing not only of reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change, but also that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
2. Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a
change of name. Among these are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change will avoid confusion;
(c) when one has been continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
(d) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public interest.
3. The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name
and the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause
therefor rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be
the best evidence available. What is involved in special proceedings
for change of name is, to borrow from Republic v. Court of Appeals:
"not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the petition, but
a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts."
4. With the view we take of the case, respondent's submission for a
change of name is with proper and reasonable reason. As it were, she
has, since she started schooling, used the given name and has been
known as Maria Eloisa, albeit the name Roselie Eloisa is written on
her birth record. Her scholastic records, as well as records in
government offices, including that of her driver's license,
professional license as a certified public accountant issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission, and the "Quick Count"
document of the COMELEC, all attest to her having used
practically all her life the name Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante.
5. The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant
petition is granted. But beyond practicalities, simple justice
dictates that every person shall be allowed to avail himself of any
opportunity to improve his social standing, provided he does so
without causing prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of
other people.
On the lack of NBI and police clearances
1. The OSG's argument that respondent's bare testimony is insufficient
to show that the requested name is not sought for any illegal purpose
and/or in avoidance of any entanglement with the law deserves scant
consideration. Surely, the issuance of a police and NBI clearance
or like certification, while perhaps apropos, cannot, as the OSG
suggests, be a convincing norm of one's good moral character or
compelling evidence to prove that the change of name is not
sought for any evil motive or fraudulent intent. Respondent's
open court testimony, given under pain of perjury and for which
she was cross-examined, that she had not been accused of any
crime under her registered name or under her present name
(name that she is using) had convinced the trial court of the bona
fides of her request for change of name. As the CA correctly
ratiocinated:
In the case at bar, petitioner [now respondent] seeks to change
her registered name in order to avoid confusion having used a
different name all her life. This is a valid ground under the afore-
mentioned enumeration not to mention that the instant remedy
presents the less cumbersome and most convenient way to set
her records straight.
2. Anent the contention of oppositor-appellant that petitioner failed to
prove that the petition is not resorted to for an illegal purpose due to
her inability to present NBI as well as police clearance to the effect
that she has no derogatory records, due perusal of the requirements
of Rule 103 reveals that it does not so provide such a quantum of
proof to establish the fact that a petitioner has no derogatory
records. This purpose, we think, is served upon the declaration and
affirmation of the petitioner in open court that the petition is not to
further fraud but for a legitimate purpose, coupled by the absence of
any oppositor to the petition. There is yet no jurisprudence requiring
a petitioner in a petition for a change of name to present NBI and
police clearances to prove that the said petition is not resorted to for
purpose of fraud. Until such time, we see no urgency to impose the
requirements espoused by oppositor-appellant.
3. At bottom, petitioner Republic has not demonstrated that the
allowance of the basic petition is whimsical or based on a
consideration other than to avoid confusion. The trial court
appears to have exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted
the petition. Like the CA, the Court loathes to disturb the action thus
taken.
 075 Re: Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC
Branch 67, Paniqui, Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-07-414-RTC (LEONG)
Oct. 19, 2007 | Tinga, J. | Differences under Rule 103, RA 9048 and Rule
108
Re: Final Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the RTC Branch
67, Paniqui, Tarlac, A.M. No. 06-07-414-RTC
SUMMARY: A judicial audit and physical inventory of cases was
conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the RTC, Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then
presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February
2006.
The audit team noticed that there were no special proceedings case records
presented. Upon inquiry, the Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod asserted that
most of these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry and gave the audit team copies of the decisions.
The audit team observed that almost all of the petitions have no hearings
conducted and that the date of filing indicated in the docket books and the
date of the decision was so near that it will be improbable to comply with the
publication requirement under the Rules of Court.
In view of these observations, the Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod
were made to explain why these petitions for change of name and/ or
correction of entries in the civil registry were granted without the required
hearing.
In their answer, they explained that these petitions may be covered by RA
9048 which authorized city or municipal registrar to correct clerical or
typographical errors in the civil registry without need for a judicial order.
They further averred that these petitions were filed before the trial court
because there was no incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil
Registrar could not act on these petitions. Since RA 9048 allows correction
of entries without hearing and publication, the trial court considered the same
procedure. The trial court also adopted the procedure in civil cases where the
defendant is declared in default and the court renders judgment based on the
pleadings filed by the plaintiff.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether trial court still have jurisdiction over petitions on
change of name and correction of entries? YES. During the deliberation, it
was clear that the local civil registrar is given the authority to act on petitions
for corrections of entries and change of first name or nicknames, yet there
was no mention that such petition can no longer be filed with the regular
courts. There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the
authority of the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil
registry. It can thus be concluded that the local civil registry has primary, not
exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and
change of first name or nickname.
2. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in RA No. 9048 should be
adopted in cases filed before the courts? NO. Since RA 9048 refers
specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before the local civil
registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure to petitions
for correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The
promulgation of rules of procedure for court of justice is the exclusive
domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover, as observed by the Office of the
Court Administrator, there is nothing in RA 9048 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein
for petitions before the court even for purposes of expediting the resolution
of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if
RA 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in
the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be
followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103
and 108 still have to be complied with.
DOCTRINE: There should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the
courts as if RA 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure
provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding
and should be followed by the courts. The procedural requirements laid
down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be complied with.
FACTS:
78. This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical
inventory of cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by
Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired on 23 February
2006.
79. As of audit date, the RTC had a total caseload of 523 cases
consisting of 309 criminal cases and 214 civil cases, including 33
unaccounted LRC cases. The Audit Team made the following
 observations: the Rules of Court. The docketing of cases was not also in
sequence as to its date of filing.
80. In the conduct of the audit, the Team used the case numbers in the
Docket Books from January 2003 up to the present as reference in 84. In view of its observation, the Audit Team recommended in its
the inventory of cases. Entries in the docket books are insufficient Memorandum dated 11 July 20052 that Judge Sotero and Clerk of
especially in the special proceedings cases which merely indicate the Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to explain the following within
title of the case and the date the case was filed and the word ten (10) days from notice:
"decided."
(a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries
81. During the audit, it was observed by the Team that there was no
special proceeding case records presented. Upon inquiry, Clerk of in the civil registry were granted without the required hearing and
Court Paulino Saguyod averred that most of these cases are for publication, in gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the
Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry and most are Rules on Civil Procedure;
already decided and there are only few pending. Considering that the
docket books have insufficient entries, the Team Leader used as (b) why the dates of filing of 86 other petitions were either the same
reference the case numbers filed from January 2003 up to [the] as or ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision;
present. During the random sampling of records, the same cannot be
produced as the records were already bundled. (c) why 70 petitions had no court action after their filing or no
further action/setting for a considerable length of time after the last
82. COC Saguyod gave the team four copies of decisions in the special
order/incident of the case;
proceedings cases. Initial findings reveal that the date of filing
indicated in the docket books and the date of decision was so near (d) why nine (9) petitions had similar docket numbers and three (3)
that it will be highly improbable that the required publication will be
other cases had the same docket number; and
complied with. Hence, the Team demanded for the production of 608
case records of special proceedings cases.
(e) why the records of 179 special proceedings and those of 33 land
83. In the copies of decisions presented, common in the second registration case were not presented to the Audit Team.
paragraph of the pro-forma decisions, are statements that "finding the
85. It was also recommended that Clerk of Court Saguyod be required
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same was set for
to: (a) explain why the initial deposit of ₱ 500.00 per ballot box for
hearing on x x x. On said date and time, the petition was announced
61 ballot boxes made by the protestant in Election Protest No. 001-
in open court. Nobody interposed any objection. Accordingly, the
04 pursuant to the order of 4 June 2004 was not remitted to the
counsel for petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove
Fiduciary Fund Account; and (b) explain the discrepancy in the
jurisdictional facts ([Exh.] "A" and series). Thereafter, he moved
official receipts representing the payment of filing fees for Spec.
and was allowed to adduce further evidence before the Clerk of
Proc. Nos. 1028, 1029 and 1030 which appeared as payment for
Court and at [sic] the presence of the Assistant Provincial
Spec. Proc. Nos. 1032 and 1033.
Prosecutor who appeared in behalf of the State." However, during
the course of the audit it was observed by the Team that almost 86. Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an
all of the petitions are pro-forma and notarized by COC Explanation dated 1 August 2005,5 giving the following reasons for
Saguyod as ex-officio notary public. There are even unsigned,
their actions:
unverified and not notarized petitions granted by the Court.
Further, almost all of them have no hearings conducted that it
(a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and
will be improbable if not possible that the court orders be
published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by publication —
 Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all
of these petitions may be covered by RA No. 90486 which
authorizes city or municipal civil registrars to correct clerical or
typographical errors in an entry and/or change the first name or
nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The
petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no
incumbent Local Civil Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could
not act on these petitions under R.A. No. 9048. Since R.A. No. 9048
allows corrections of entries without hearing and publication for as
long as the necessary documents are submitted, the trial court
considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for
correction of entries filed before it. The Clerk of Court still held ex
parte hearings to receive the evidence. In resolving these petitions
which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the trial court
adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared
in default and the court renders judgment based on the pleadings
filed by plaintiff and grants such relief as may be warranted,
following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said
petitions to afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of
criminal and civil cases that required more attention.
(b) As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same date as the
date of filing or date of hearing —
87. These petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved
innocuous errors that may be subject of administrative corrections
under R.A. No. 9048. The trial court resolved these petitions with
dispatch to accommodate the petitioners’ need to have their civil
registry documents immediately corrected to conform with their
passport applications, applications to take board examinations and
petitions to travel abroad. The petitioners discovered the errors after
they submitted the required documents and yet they were given a
limited period to secure the correction of the erroneous entries. If the
corrected documents were not submitted on time, the applications of
the petitioners would be denied and the denials would mean lost
opportunities, particularly for the applicants for overseas contract
work and applicants to take board examinations. Judge Sotero was
more lenient in such instances since in his view no substantial
prejudice would ensue. In any event, he resolved to adopt,
henceforth, a stricter policy in cases where no publication is
required, by imposing a ten (10) day period for posting of the
petition after its filing and seeing to it that the petition is set for
hearing only after it is so posted.
88. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum
dated 8 May 2006,7 deemed the explanation bereft of merit or
deserving of scant consideration. The OCA noted that the petitions
for change of name and/or correction of entries in the civil registry
are special proceedings governed either by Rules 103 or 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 3, Rule 103 specifically provides when
the order for hearing of such petitions shall be issued and what the
order should contain.
89. The OCA maintained that the provisions of the Rules of Court on
publication of the order of hearing should have been strictly
observed as publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Hence, the
OCA remarked, it is appalling that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court
Saguyod favorably acted on the petitions even though they were only
pro-forma and notarized by Saguyod as an ex officio notary public
and still others were unsigned, unverified or unnotarized. Some 86
petitions were found to bear dates of filing which are the same as or
ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision, clearly belying the
claim of Judge Sotero that hearings on these petitions were
conducted or that they were referred to the Clerk of Court for
presentation of evidence ex parte. Said practices, according to the
OCA, constitute a mockery of established procedure under the Rules
of Court, especially since nothing in R.A. No. 9048 or its
Implementing Rules and Regulations would justify the procedure
that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod adopted.
90. The OCA observed that what R.A. No. 9048 mandates is the
administrative proceeding for change of name/correction of entry in
the civil registry which has no application to a petition for change of
name or correction of entry filed in court. Thus, the OCA went on to
say, Judge Sotero’s ratiocination for adopting the procedure under
R.A. No. 9048 or for treating the petitions in the same manner as
ordinary cases where the defendant is declared in default displays a
deplorable lack of grasp or total ignorance of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, notwithstanding his claim that he did so for the purpose
 of expediting the resolution of the petitions.
91. As to the fifty-six (56) petitions where no action was taken by Judge
Sotero for almost one year, the OCA found him to be decidedly
remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities. As court
manager, it was incumbent upon Judge Sotero to adopt a system of
record management since the prompt disposition of the court’s
business is attained only through proper and efficient court
management, the OCA added.
ISSUE/s:
13. Whether trial court still have jurisdiction over petitions on change of
name and correction of entries? YES. During the deliberation, it was
clear that the local civil registrar is given the authority to act on
petitions for corrections of entries and change of first name or
nicknames, yet there was no mention that such petition can no longer
be filed with the regular courts. There was no intent on the part of the
lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make judicial
corrections of entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded
that the local civil registry has primary, not exclusive jurisdiction
over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of
first name or nickname.
14. Whether the summary procedure prescribed in RA No. 9048 should
be adopted in cases filed before the courts? NO. Since RA 9048
refers specifically to the administrative summary proceedings before
the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same
procedure to petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry
before the courts. The promulgation of rules of procedure for court
of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court. Moreover,
as observed by the Office of the Court Administrator, there is
nothing in RA 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that
warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before
the court even for purposes of expediting the resolution of said
petitions.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent retired Judge Cesar
M. Sotero of the Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67,
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and FINES him in the amount of
Forty Thousand Pesos (₱ 40,000.00) to be deducted from the One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱ 100,000.00) withheld from him pursuant to the Court’s
Resolution dated 27 March 2007. The remainder of the withheld amount is
ordered released to him.
RATIO:
Issue 1
75. A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it
was enacted to give the people an option to have the erroneous
entries in their civil records corrected via an administrative
proceeding before the local civil registrar that is less expensive and
more expeditious. In his sponsorship speech at the Senate, the main
proponent mentioned in particular that the judicial process under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court for the correction of clerical
errors is tedious and expensive. To address the problem, it was
proposed that Article 412 of the Civil Code be amended by
providing, by way of an exception thereto, that clerical or
typographical errors be corrected by the city or municipal civil
registrar. The sponsor specified that the errors that may be corrected
under the proposal are only those "committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in
the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as a misspelled
name or place of birth which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing records," and that "in no case may the correction
involve the change of nationality, age, status or gender of a
person."
76. The authority or jurisdiction of the trial courts over petitions for
correction of entries and change of first name or nickname was never
taken up at the deliberations. In contrast, it is quite clear from the
deliberations that the local civil registrar is given the authority to act
on such petitions filed before his office, yet there was nary a mention
or even insinuation that such petitions can no longer be filed with the
regular courts. In fact, it was clarified that the grounds upon which
the administrative process before the local civil registrar may be
availed of are limited under the law; hence, outside of such limited
grounds, the judicial process should be availed of. Indeed, there was
no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the
trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry.
It can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary, not
 exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical
errors and change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048
prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil registrar
should follow.
Issue 2
77. R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary
proceeding before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate
to apply the same procedure to petitions for the correction of entries
in the civil registry before the courts. The promulgation of rules of
procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the
Supreme Court. Moreover, as observed by the OCA, there is nothing
in R.A. No. 9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that
warrants the adoption of the procedure set therein for petitions before
the courts even for the purpose of expediting the resolution of said
petitions.
78. Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the
courts as if R.A. No. 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the
procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such petitions
remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The
procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to
be complied with. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have
applied the procedure prescribed in Rules 103 and 108 in resolving
the petitions before him, not the procedure prescribed in R.A. No.
9048 or the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 9 which applies in
civil cases where the defendant is declared in default.
79. Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed
and verified by the person desiring a change of name, and set forth
compliance with the residency requirement, the cause for which the
change of name is sought, and the new name asked for. The court,
after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, shall
issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition and fixing the date
and place for the hearing of the petition, and direct the publication of
the order before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition, with the Solicitor General or city fiscal
appearing on behalf of the Government. The court shall grant the
petition only when satisfactory proof has been presented in open
court that the order had been published as directed, the allegations in
the petition are true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for
changing the name of the petitioner.
80. Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation
or correction of entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province; and that the civil
registrar and all persons who claim any interest and who would be
affected by the petition be made parties to the proceeding and be
allowed to file their opposition to the said cancellation or correction
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition or from the last
date of publication. It is only after a hearing that the court may either
dismiss or grant the petition. Whether the proceeding under this rule
is summary or adversarial, depending on the type of errors to be
corrected, the procedural requirements under this rule still need to be
complied with, the nature of the proceeding becoming adversarial
only when any opposition to the petition is filed and actively
prosecuted.
81. In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries
filed before the RTC of Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not
fall within the purview of R.A. No. 9048. In other words, not all of
said petitions pertain to the change of first name or nickname or the
correction of typographical errors in the entries of the registry. Some
of said petitions involve substantial changes in the registry such as
change of age, sex, status, and nationality, and even of middle names
and surnames of the petitioners. Judge Sotero’s conduct in acting on
the petitions, without full compliance with the procedural
requirements under Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, is appalling.
82. Observance of the procedure under R.A. No. 9048 does not excuse
Judge Sotero’s blunders. It appears though that he could have acted
under the false impression that the petitions could be filed only with
the local civil registrar and not with the courts. As a member of the
bench, he should be equipped with the basic knowledge of rules of
procedure, including Rules 103 and 108, which govern the
disposition of the petitions. Judge Sotero’s actuations clearly
exposed a deplorable deficiency in his grasp of the basic principles
of law and rudimentary rules of procedure, for which he should be
held administratively liable.
 076 Republic v. Mercadera (LU) be set right under Rule 108.
December 8, 2010 | Mendoza J. | Rule 103 & Rule 108 Distinction
This rule in “names,” however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a
summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the
RESPONDENTS: MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship,
EVELYN M. OGA civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there
is an adversary proceeding. “After all, the role of the Court under Rule
SUMMARY: Merlyn Mercadera through her attorney-in-fact sought the 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.”
correction of Mercadera’s name from “Marilyn L. Mercadera” to
“Merlyn L. Mercadera” before the Office of the Civil Registrar in Dipolog. The Supreme Court found no concrete contention that the dangers
Because the Civil Registrar did not have permanent appointment as sought to be prevented by an adversarial proceeding described in Rule
required by R.A. 9049, Mercadera was constrained to file the case with 103 are attendant in this case. The RTC found documents that
the RTC under Rule 108. Finding the petition sufficient in form and Mercadera has been using the name of Merlyn ever since and no
substance, the RTC issued an order setting the hearing, notifying the confusion would be formed. Furthermore, no oppositor contested the
OSG, and ordered the publication of the order. OSG appeared and petition despite publication.
deputized the city prosecutor. There being no objections, Mercadera
presented evidence (diplomas and GSIS certificate) indicating she never
used the name Marilyn all her life despite Marilyn being indicated in her DOCTRINE: The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and
birth certificate. Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change
of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided
RTC: Granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to correct by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a
Marilyn’s name to Merlyn L. Mercadera. proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess
OSG opposed claiming that since the change in the name was material the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
and susbstantial, Rule 103 would’ve been the proper procedure. adversarial proceedings.

CA: Affirmed the RTC. FACTS:
1. On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in granting the change of the respondent’s sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga),
name under Rule 108. – No. Rule 108 is the proper procedure as it sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. Certificate of Live Birth—from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L.
Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
SC ruled that Rule 108 is the proper procedure as the petition simply City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048). The
sought a correction of a misspelled given name. [Insert Doctrine Here]. petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other 3427).
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the 2. Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes “changes of name,” the general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or
it to say, not all alterations allowed in Corrections for clerical errors may typographical errors in civil registry entries.
3. “Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name
is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now
excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first
filed and subsequently denied” and removes “correction or changing
of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule
108.” Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are
substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.
4. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog refused to effect the
correction unless there’s a court order because the Civil Registrar
was not equipped with the permanent appointment as required by RA
9048.
5. Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of
Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under
Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC).
6. Upon receipt of the petition, the Court issued an order finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, set the hearing, ordered the
publication of the order once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, and
caused the service of the copy of the petition to the Solicitor General.
7. OSG entered its appearance and deputized the Office of the City
Prosecutor.
8. The hearing was reset because of the absence of the prosecutor. During
the subsequent hearing, Mercadera moved to present evidence ex
parte. There being no objection, the Court granted the motion and the
clerk of court was designated to receive evidence.
9. Upon formal offer of evidence, RTC admitted the exhibits of the
Mercadera. The pieces of evidence would show that Merlyn
Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 in Dipolog City but her
certificate of live birth indicates she was born as “Marilyn.” In all her
relevant documents, she was named as “Merlyn L. Mercadera
(elementary, high school, college diploma, and GSIS certificate of
membership). However, when she procured her birth certificate in
2005, she found out that her name is “Marilyn.”
10. RTC: Granted Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of the
City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in
her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to
MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
11. OSG: Prayed for reversal of RTC Decision assailing 1) wrong
remedy considering material correction; thus Rule 103 is the proper
remedy and 2) admitting photocopies and admitting testimony due to
hearsay.
12. CA: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether the RTC erred in granting the change of the respondent’s
name under Rule 108. – No.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
1. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given
name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.
This rule provides the procedure for an independent special
proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his
relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to,
the rest of the community. In petitions for change of name, a person
avails of a remedy to alter the “designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known.”
When granted, a person’s identity and interactions are affected as he
bears a new “label or appellation for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him.”
Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and
to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
2. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which
requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the
State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When
complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but
the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely
bar all who might make an objection. “It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.”
3. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of
one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
However, “there could be instances where the change applied for
may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire
certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties
might be erroneously impressed on the public mind.” Hence, in
requests for a change of name, “what is involved is not a mere matter
of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious
evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced x x x
4. Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the
correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to
Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to
“acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons,” also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. Before,
only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the
entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant x x x
5. Finally in Republic v. Valencia, the above stated views were adopted
by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil
registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the
parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. “If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the
clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an
order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly
construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved.
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein
all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or
represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x.” “Where such a
change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive
right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil
registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper
enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.”
6. The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103
must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of
one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name,
there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and
proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his
official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked
therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.
7. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and
other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.
Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also
includes “changes of name,” the correction of a patently misspelled
name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations
allowed in Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule
108.
8. This rule in “names,” however, does not operate to entirely limit
Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries
by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v.
Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other
entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected
using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. “After all,
the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about
the facts recorded therein.”
9. The Supreme Court found no concrete contention that the dangers
sought to be prevented by an adversarial proceeding described in
Rule 103 are attendant in this case. The RTC found documents that
Mercadera has been using the name of Merlyn ever since and no
confusion would be formed. Furthermore, no oppositor contested the
petition despite publication.
10. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls
under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given
name. To correct simply means “to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from.” To change means “to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.”36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly
prayed for the lower court “to remove the faults or error” from her
registered given name “MARILYN,” and “to make or set aright” the
same to conform to the one she grew up to, “MERLYN.”
11. Granting that Rule 103 is the proper procedure, the publication and
posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation
and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are
sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one
opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less
adversarial in nature.
 077 Republic of the Philippines v. Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-
Magpayo (MAGBUHOS)
02 February 2011 | Carpio-Morales, J. | Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in Civil Registry
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo (aka Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng)
SUMMARY: Born in Makati, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
filed on July 22, 2008 at the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. His birth
certificate shows that his parents contracted marriage but he claims that his
parents were never legally married. The notice setting the petition for hearing
was published in the newspaper Broadside and a copy of the notice was
furnished the OSG. No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order
of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed
respondent Julian to present evidence ex parte. The RTC granted the petition
and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati to delete the entry “Coseteng” in
the space for Middle name of the respondent, among others.
The Republic lodged this present petition for review to the Court on pure
question of law. The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the
date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate
has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through
an appropriate adversary proceeding.
The issue is whether or not the petition of change of name involves change
of respondent’s civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, and therefore,
should be made through adversarial proceedings. YES.
The change being sought in respondent Julian’s petition goes so far as to
affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which
concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the
entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present
case, and “all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding.
Republic v. Labrador mandates that “a petition for a substantial correction
or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby.” It cannot be gainsaid that change
of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or
change of entry in the civil registry.
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated.
DOCTRINES: Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that “changes
which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegi-
timate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings.”
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
b. when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation;
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and
f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of,
or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
FACTS:
92. Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent Julian) is the son of Fulvio
M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who,
as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage
on March 26, 1972.
93. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married,
Julian filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
94. In support of his petition, Julian submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique
“does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent
also submitted his academic records from elementary up to
college3 showing that he carried the surname “Coseteng,” and the
birth certificate of his child where “Coseteng” appears as his
surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, Julian ran and was
elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name
“JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.”
95. On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, Julian amended his
petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
96. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008
was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October
31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20,
2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
97. No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general
default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent
Julian to present evidence ex parte.
98. By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent
Julian’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry “March 26, 1972” in Item 24 for “DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES” [in herein respondent’s
Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry “MAGPAYO” in the space for the Last Name of the
[respondent] to “COSETENG”;
3. Delete the entry “COSETENG” in the space for Middle Name of
the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry “Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr.” in the space for
FATHER of the [respondent]
99. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July
2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for
review to the Court on pure question of law.
100. The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the
date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth
certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
101. The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of
respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of respondent’s
father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate, the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord with
respondent’s prayer.
102. Respondent Julian counters that the proceeding before the
trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of copies of
the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the
Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the
notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before
the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of
the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three
consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the
scheduled hearing.
ISSUE/s:
83. Whether or not the petition of change of name involves change of
respondent’s civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, and
therefore, should be made through adversarial proceedings. YES.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that “changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegi-
timate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings.”
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is
NULLIFIED.
RATIO:
Issue 1
84. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including:
a. when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
b. when the change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation;
c. when the change will avoid confusion;
d. when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
e. a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and
f. when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.
85. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
86. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of
the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner,
Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since
childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her
legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her
mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her
favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her
mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case,
however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
87. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to
affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent’s supplication.
88. Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that “changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegi-
timate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings.”
89. Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 1084 applies.
90. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought
to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and
“all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby” should be made parties to the proceeding.
91. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in
Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City.
And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his
father and mother were made parties thereto.
92. According to Republic vs. Belmonte, “The procedure recited in Rule
103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate
and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the
sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render
nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of
one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds.”
93. Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed
4
“SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.”
 of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to
have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above,
aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the
case.
94. Republic v. Labrador mandates that “a petition for
a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry
should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby.” It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a
child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change
of entry in the civil registry.
95. Labayo-Rowe highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable
parties in a petition which involves substantial and controversial
alterations
a. According to the Supreme Court in Labayo-Rowe, “aside
from the OSG, all other indispensable parties should
have been made respondents. They include not only the
declared father of the child but the child as well, together
with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary
rights would be adversely affected thereby.”
b. It added, “the fact that the notice of hearing of the petition
was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the
nature of the proceedings taken.”
c. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible
to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity orfiliation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said
rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise
which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights.
96. Section 45 provides for Notice and Publication, while Section 56
5 6
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
provides for opposition.
97. A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108
clearly mandates two sets of notices to different “potential
oppositors.”
a. The first notice is that given to the “persons named in the
petition” and
b. the second (which is through publication) is that given to
other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties,
such as creditors.
98. That two sets of notices are mandated under Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5 which provides for two periods (for the two
types of “potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition
(15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
99. In the cases of Barco v. Court of Appeals and Republic v. Kho, what
is clear is that the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to
implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and
legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-
respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is not established
to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the
petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through
publication.
100. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.”
 078 CORPUZ v. STO. TOMAS (ROSALES,A)
11 August 2010 | Brion, J. | Cancellation & Correction of Entries in Civil
Registry
PETITIONER: Gerbert Corpuz (Corpuz)
RESPONDENTS: Daislyn Tirol Sto. Tomas & Solictor General (Sto.
Tomas)
SUMMARY: FACTS: This is a petition under Rule 45 directly from the
RTC of Laog. Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He married Sto, Tomas in
Pasig City. Corpuz left abroad due to work and professional comitments. But
he returned on April 2005 to surprise Sto. Tomas, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. (huhu L)
Hurt and disappointed, Corpuz returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce which was granted. Two years later, Corpuz moved on, found
another Filipina to love and wanted to marry his fiancée. He went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Sto. Tomas’ marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Corpuz that the marriage between him and Sto.
Tomas still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Corpuz
filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. However, the RTC
DENIED the petition stating that the second paragraph of Article 26 can
only be availed by the Filipino spouse. Futher going into the legislative intent
as pronounced in Republic v. Orbecido III: the provision was enacted to
"avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse." Hence, the present appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree? NO — alien spouse can claim no
right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
HELD: Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or
her to remarry. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision. The non-availability of Art 26 does not
strip Corpuz of his legal remedies, he may still file a petition for recognition
of Foregien judgement. (IMPORATANT) The SC noted that the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Corpuz and
Sto. Tomas marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.
The SC considers the recording to be legally improper. The mere
presentation of the divorcee decree does not automatically mean the
annotation of the marriage certificate. A judicial decree is required. Futher, A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation
of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that
"no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. Requiring. 1) verified petition must be filed with the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
2) that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; and 3) that the time and place
for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation
DOCTRINE: A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Rule108 of the RoC set out sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. Requiring. 1) verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 2) that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings; and 3) that the time and place for hearing must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation

FACTS:
103. This is a petition under Rule 45 directly from the RTC of
Laog.
104. Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on
November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
the wedding.
105. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Sto. Tomas, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. (huhu L) Hurt and
disappointed, Corpuz returned to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The
divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.|
106. Two year later, Corpuz has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Wanting to marry his new Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines, Corpuz went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Sto.
Tomas’ marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Corpuz that the marriage between him and Sto. Tomas
still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
107. Corpuz filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)
with the RTC. Although summoned, Sto. Tomas did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Corpuz's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Corpuz.
108. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Corpuz’s
petition. The RTC concluded that Corpuz was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or
her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 second
paragraph of the Family Code reads:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
109. The RTC’s decision stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v.
Orbecido III; the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse."
110. Corpuz appealed the decision of the RTC to the SC
ISSUE/s:
15. Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree? NO — alien spouse can
claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse.
RULING: WHEREFORE we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil
Registrar General. No costs.
RATIO:
Issue 1
101. Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court's
holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse's
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree
between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations . . . cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
102. As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Given the rationale and
intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
provision.
103. We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Corpuz’s petition before
the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
104. (IMPORATANT) The SC noted that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Corpuz and Sto. Tomas marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree. The SC considers the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
and the bar to what had been done.
105. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
touching upon a person's legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."
106. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of
Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. — A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(e) divorces;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and
 preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1) Birth and death register.
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
107. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in
the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration.
The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Corpuz and Sto. Tomas’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented
by Gerbert.
for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
110. (VERY IMPORATANT) Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that
the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the
RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

111.
108. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No.
4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
series of 1982 — both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and
cannot produce any legal effect.
109. Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court,
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not
be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry — one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish
the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
 079 ZAYCO v. HINLO JR. (SORIANO) record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal
16 April 2008 | Corona, J. | Appeals in Special Proceedings should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or
final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of
PETITIONER: Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo in their capacity as appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order
judicial co-administrators of the Estate of Enrique Hinlo denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. From the
RESPONDENTS: Atty. Jesus v. Hinlo, Jr. time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their motion for
reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they had 30
SUMMARY: After Enrique Hinlo died intestate, his heirs filed a petition for days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record on
letters of administration of his estate in the RTC of Negros Occidental. appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on time.
Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special
administratrix of Enrique’s estate. However, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and DOCTRINE: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s
Remo Hinlo were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with
Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate;
duties as special administratrix. Respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a It is a final order, hence, appealable.
grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of representation, filed
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice
urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from
Enrique’s estate. receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA,
469 SCRA 633 (2005), the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and
In an order dated July 23, 2002, the RTC revoked the appointment of record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying
petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000
bond. Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, FACTS:
2002 and moved for its reconsideration on August 9, 2002. The RTC denied 1. After Enrique Hinlo died intestate on January 31, 1986, his heirs filed a
the motion for reconsideration in an order dated July 23, 2003. Petitioners petition for letters of administration of his estate in the Regional Trial
received a copy of the July 23, 2003 order on July 31, 2003 and filed a notice Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40.
of appeal the same day. They submitted a record on appeal on August 29, 2. Ceferina Hinlo, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special
2003. RTC denied the notice of appeal and record on appeal. It ruled that administratrix of Enrique’s estate.
petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 3. On December 23, 1991, petitioners Nancy H. Zayco and Remo Hinlo
were appointed as co-administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who
2003 orders were interlocutory and not subject to appeal. Even assuming
was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as
that appeal was the proper remedy, it was filed late.
special administratrix.
4. On March 4, 2003, respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of
WON RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003
Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition
orders were not appealable – YES. An order appointing an administrator of for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent
a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique’s
parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement estate.
of the decedent’s estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable. 5. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.
6. In an order dated July 23, 2002, the RTC revoked the appointment of
WON RTC erred when it ruled the notice of appeal and record on petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the
appeal were not filed on time – YES. In appeals in special proceedings, a
 issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent on a P50,000 RATIO:
bond.
7. Respondent posted the required bond, took his oath as administrator and RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders
was issued letters of administration. were not appealable
8. Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2002 order on August 2, 2002 1. An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a
and moved for its reconsideration on August 9, 2002. final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the
9. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated July administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate. It is
23, 2003. a final order and, hence, appealable.
10. Petitioners received a copy of the July 23, 2003 order on July 31, 2003
and filed a notice of appeal the same day. They submitted a record on RTC erred when it ruled the notice of appeal and record on appeal were
appeal on August 29, 2003. not filed on time.
11. In an order dated January 5, 2004, the RTC denied the notice of appeal 1. In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The
and record on appeal. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy notice of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30
as the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003 orders were interlocutory and not days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.
subject to appeal. Even assuming that appeal was the proper remedy, it 2. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal
was filed late. and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order
12. Petitioners challenged the January 5, 2004 RTC order in the CA by way denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
3. From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their
13. In a decision dated June 27, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003,
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC as the
they had 30 days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal
notice of appeal and record on appeal were in fact filed beyond the
and record on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal
prescribed period. was made on time.
14. Petitioners sought reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, this
petition.


ISSUE/s:
1. WON RTC erred when it ruled that the July 23, 2002 and July 23, 2003
orders were not appealable – YES. An order appointing an
administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final order and,
hence, appealable.
2. WON RTC erred when it ruled the notice of appeal and record on appeal
were not filed on time – YES. the 30-day period to file the notice of
appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration.

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 27, 2005
decision and October 27, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 82129 affirming the January 5, 2004 order of the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental, Silay City, Branch 40 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.