G.R. No.
137571 September 21, the respondents is actually fo[r] the Court
2000
TUNG CHIN HUI, petitioner,
vs.
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of
Immigration; and the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Provisions that were not reproduced in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are deemed
repealed. Hence, having been omitted from
the 1997 Rules, deemed already repealed is
Section 18, Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of
Court, which had theretofore provided for a
48-hour reglementary period within which to
appeal habeas corpus cases. Accordingly, the
period for perfecting appeals in said cases
and ordinary civil actions is now uniform -- 15
days from notice of the judgment or order.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 2, 1999 Order1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 26) in Special
Proceedings No. 98-92014. The challenged
Order reads in full as follows:2
"For resolution is a Motion For
Reconsideration filed by petitioner thru
counsel with comment/opposition thereto filed
by respondents thru counsel.
"After careful consideration of the grounds
relied upon by both parties, this Court finds for
the respondents. The Notice of Appeal filed by
On January 11, 1999, respondents filed a
Decision dated January 7, 1999 and not for
[the] Court Order dated January 29, 1999.
"In view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
"Meanwhile, the Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby ordered to immediately transmit the
record of the instant case to the Honorable
Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
today."
The Facts
From the records and the pleadings of the
parties, the following facts appear undisputed.
After obtaining a visa at the Philippine
Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a
"Taiwanese citizen,"3 arrived in this country on
November 5, 1998.
On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by
several policemen, who subsequently turned
him over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID). Thereafter, on November
25, 1998, the BID Board of Commissioners,
after finding him guilty of possessing a
tampered passport earlier canceled by
Taiwanese authorities, ordered his summary
deportation.
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before
the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas
Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal. After respondents filed a Return of Writ
controverting his claim, the trial court issued a
Decision dated January 7, 1999, granting his
Petition and ordering his release from
custody.
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the trial court in an Order dated January
29, 1999.
Respondents then filed a "[N]otice of [A]ppeal
from the judgment of the Honorable Court in
the above-stated case, dated January 29,
1999, a copy of which was received by the
Bureau on February 11, 1999 and was
received by the undersigned counsel on
February 15, 1999 x x x."4 Dated February 15,
1999, it was received by the RTC on February
16, 1999 at 9:45 a.m.
Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming that
the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-hour
reglementary period for filing appeals
in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the
pre-1997 Rules of Court. Although
respondents alleged that they had received
the said Order on February 15, 1999,
petitioner contended that they had in fact
received it on February 11, 1999, "as
evidenced by the receipt of the service thereof
and by the Sheriff’s Return."5
In an Order dated February 18, 1999, the RTC
rejected petitioner’s contention and granted
due course to the Notice of Appeal.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing this time that the
Notice should be rejected because it had
referred not to the RTC Decision but to the
January 29, 1999 Order denying
reconsideration. In its assailed March 2, 1999
Order, the trial court denied his Motion.
Hence, this Petition raising pure questions of
law.6 In a Resolution dated March 22, 1999,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order "directing the respondents to cease and
desist from deporting the petitioner x x x until
further orders."7
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:8
"(a) Is the reglementary period to
appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] now
15 days from notice of judgment as
contended by [the] lower court?
"(b) Is the reglementary period to
appeal [a] habeas corpus [case] still
48 hours from notice of judgment as
provided for in Section 18, Rule 41 of
the Revised Rules of Court? or
"(c) Is the provision of Sec. 1, sub-
paragraph (a) of Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure -- prohibiting
appeal from an Order denying a
motion for reconsideration -
mandatory or merely discretionary on
the part of the lower courts?
"(d) Are petitions for writs of habeas
corpus already brought down to the
level of ordinary cases despite the fact
that in habeas corpus the liberty of
persons illegally detained is involved?"
In the main, the Court will resolve whether the
Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed. In the
process, it will determine the applicable
reglementary period for filing an appeal
in habeas corpus cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue: Reglementary Period for
Appealing
Habeas Corpus Cases
Petitioner contends that the Notice of Appeal
was late because respondents filed it only on
February 16, 1999, five days after they had
received the Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration on February 11, 1999.9 He
argues that the reglementary period for filing
an appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in
Section 18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:
"SEC. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases,
how taken. - An appeal in habeas corpus
cases shall be perfected by filing with the clerk
of court or the judge who rendered the
judgment, within forty-eight (48) hours from
notice of such judgment, a statement that the
person making it appeals therefrom."
The argument is devoid of merit, because the
foregoing provision was omitted from and
thereby repealed by the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1
to 71. The well-settled rule of statutory
construction is that provisions of an old law
that were not reproduced in the revision
thereof covering the same subject are
deemed repealed and discarded.10 The
omission shows the intention of the rule-
making body, the Supreme Court in this
case,11 "to abrogate those provisions of the old
laws that are not reproduced in the revised
statute or code."12
Clearly then, the reglementary period for filing
an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now
similar to that in ordinary civil actions13 and is
governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which provides:
"SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. -- The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. Where a record on appeal is
required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty
(30) days from notice of the judgment or final
order.
"The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of
1âw phi 1
time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed."
In this light, the appeal was seasonably filed
within the 15-day reglementary period.
Stare Decisis
Petitioner insists, however, that the
"application of Section 18, Rule 41 under the
Revised Rules of Court must be maintained
under the doctrine of stare decisis."14 , Thus he
urges the Court to apply precedents that held
that the 48-hour period for perfecting an
appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional. He
specifically cites Saulo v. Cruz,15 Garcia v.
Echiverri16 and Elepante v. Madayag.17
The principle cited by petitioner is an
abbreviated form of the maxim "Stare decisis,
et non quieta movere."18 That is, "When the
court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases where the facts are substantially
the same."19 This principle assures certainty
and stability in our legal system.20 It should be
stressed that stare decisis presupposes that
the facts of the precedent and the case to
which it is applied are substantially the same.
In this case, there is one crucial difference. All
the incidents of the present controversy
occurred when the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court was already in effect. On the other
hand, all the cited precedents had been
resolved under the pre-1997 Rules.
Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this
Court to apply to the present case the alleged
precedents decided during the regime of the
pre-1997 Rules. The cited cases applied a
specific provision of the Rules in effect at the
time. But because that provision had already
been repealed when the facts under present
consideration occurred, the Court can no
longer rely on those cases. Indeed, to rule
otherwise is to bar the effectivity of the 1997
amendments, which conflict with
jurisprudence decided under an old and
repealed rule. Verily, petitioner’s contention
effectively precludes changes and freezes our
procedural rules.
Subject of the Notice of Appeal
As earlier observed, the Notice of Appeal
referred to the "judgment of the Honorable
Court in the above-stated case, dated January
29, 1999." Petitioner now argues that the
Notice was improper because it referred to the
Order denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration, not the Decision itself which
was dated January 7, 1999. He cites Section
1 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules, which
provides that an order denying a motion for a
new trial or a reconsideration may not be
appealed.21
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that
because the Notice of Appeal contained the
word "judgment," their clear intent was to
appeal the Decision.
We agree with respondents. In referring to the
trial court’s "judgment," respondents were
clearly appealing the January 7, 1999
Decision. Had they thought otherwise, they WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
would have referred to the "Order." Indeed, the assailed Order AFFIRMED. The
"judgment" is normally synonymous with Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
"decision."22 Furthermore, the wrong date of Court is hereby immediately LIFTED. No
the appealed judgment may be attributed pronouncement as to costs.
merely to inadvertence. Such error should not,
by itself, deprive respondents of their right to SO ORDERED.
appeal. Time and time again, it has been held
that courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of this right.23 They are
encouraged to hear the merits of appealed
cases; hence, the dismissal of an appeal on
grounds of technicality is generally frowned
upon.24 Indeed, the postulates of justice and
fairness demand that all litigants be afforded
the opportunity for a full disposition of their
disputes, free as much as legally possible
from the constraints of technicalities.25 To rule
otherwise is to let technicality triumph over
substantial justice. Indeed, "the real essence
of justice does not emanate from quibblings
over patchwork legal technicality."26
Other Matters
Petitioner insists that the Order deporting him
is invalid, as he was not given notice or
hearing.27 We reject this argument because it
properly pertains to the appeal before the CA,
not in these proceedings instituted merely to
determine the timeliness of the Notice of
Appeal.
Likewise, we reject the submission of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the
promulgation of the CA Decision resolving the
appeal rendered the present case moot and
academic.28 It should be stressed that the
validity of the proceedings before the
appellate court ultimately hinges on the issue
before us: whether the Notice of Appeal was
seasonably filed.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189021 February 22, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA M. GOMEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present Petition seeks to reverse the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
promulgated on 24 July 2009. The Decision
affirmed the order for the registration of a 430-
square meter property situated in Barangay
Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan in the name of herein
respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Lot No. 2872, Csd 06-005822, Psc. 24,
Kalibo, Cadastre was alleged to have been
originally possessed by Gabriel Gomez. In
1936, his nephew Emilio Gomez, who was the
father of respondent herein, bought the lot in a
public auction and declared it under the name
of the heirs of Gabriel Gomez.
In 1945, the lot was declared for taxation
purposes and was issued Tax Declaration
(TD) No. 2234. In 1955, Emilio declared part
of Lot No. 2872 under his name. When he
died in 1969, his surviving spouse and
children allegedly took continuous possession
and occupancy of the lot, for which they paid
real property tax. On 29 December 1986, the
lot was allegedly partitioned by Emilio’s heirs
when they executed a Deed of Adjudication
with Consolidation and Extrajudicial Partition,
by which Lot No. 2872-I was allegedly
partitioned to petitioner.
Thus, on 15 December 1999, respondent filed
an Application for registration of title with
regard to her part.
Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed its
Opposition to the Application on the following
grounds:
1. That neither the [respondent] nor
[her] predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
(Sec. 48 (b), C.A. 141,[2 ] as amended
by P.D. 1073).
2. That the muniments of title and/or
the tax declaration/s and tax
payment/s (sic) receipts of
[respondent] does (sic) not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence
of bona fide acquisition of lands
applied for; or her open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation thereof, in the concept
of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto. The alleged tax declarations
adverted to in the petition do not
appear to be genuine and the tax
declaration/s and/or tax payment
receipt/s indicate the pretended
possession of applicant/s to be recent
vintage.
3. That the claim of ownership in fee
simple on the basis of Spanish title or
grant can no longer be availed of by
the applicant/s who have failed to file
an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six (6)
months from February 16, 1976 as
required by P.D. No. 892.3 From the
records, it appears that the instant
application was filed on April 21,
1998.4
4. That the parcel/s applied for is/are
portions of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines not subject to private
appropriation.5
On 28 November 2002, the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) rendered its Decision6 in favor of
respondent, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
parcel of land described in the survey plan of
Lot 2872 as Lot No. 2872-I, Csd-06-005822,
Psc-24 Kalibo Cadastre and its corresponding
technical description with an area of four
hundred thirty (430) square meters, more or
less, situated in Brgy. Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan,
Philippines brought under the Property
Registration Degree (sic) (P.D. 1529) and the
title thereto registered and confirmed in the
name of Lucia M. Gomez, single, Filipino, of
legal age, and resident of Toting Reyes
Street, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, petitioner alleged that respondent
failed to prove that the subject lot was
alienable and disposable; that she was further
not able to prove open, continuous, exclusive,
and peaceful possession for at least thirty (30)
years; and that the requirements of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 15297 had not
been complied with.
Petitioner asserted that respondent had the
burden to prove that the subject lot was
alienable and disposable. Failing to present
this certification, she failed to overcome that
burden.
Petitioner also contended that the witnesses
of respondent gave general statements and
inconsistent testimonies. In addition, it posited
that tax declarations under respondent’s name
or those of her predecessors were not
conclusive proofs of ownership in land
registration cases.
Finally, petitioner pointed out that respondent
failed to state in her application or to testify
whether she wanted to have the line of way or
road determined, in accordance with Sec. 20
of P.D. 1529.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed the appeal. It
held that the Certification made by Geodetic
Engineer Rafael Escabarte that the land was
alienable and disposable was sufficient. The
Certification states:
I hereby certify that this is inside the alienable
and disposable area as per L.C. Map no.
2415, project no. 1 of kalibo, aklan, certified
by the bureau of forest development now
department of environment and natural
resources on dec. 22, 1960 and it is outside
civil, (sic) and military reservation.
This Certification was found in the subdivision
plan of Lot No. 2872, the mother lot of Lot No.
2872-I.8 The subdivision plan was also
approved by the Officer-in-Charge, Regional
Technical Director Edgardo R. Gerobin of the
Land Management Division of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The CA also considered that the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) also certified9 that
the lots adjacent to Lot No. 2872-I were
alienable and disposable.
Finally, the CA affirmed the MTC’s findings of
fact with regard to respondent’s open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot.
Petitioner is now before this Court contending
that the CA erred in ruling that respondent
was able to sufficiently prove that the land
was alienable and disposable; and that she
had possessed the subject lot in the manner
and for the duration required by law.
The Petition is meritorious.
In Republic v. Doldol,10 we said that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must
prove (a) that the land is alienable public land;
and (b) that the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of
the land must have been either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act.
In resolving the case at bar, we find Republic
of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.11 is
on all fours with the present case. In 1999,
T.A.N. Properties sought the registration of a
property for which it presented a Certification
from the CENRO. Thus, we held that this
Certification was inadequate to prove that the
land was alienable and disposable, to wit:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not
appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. The onus to
overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable and
disposable rests with the applicant.
In this case, respondent submitted two
certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City,
certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San
Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an
area of 596,116 square meters falls within the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under
Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No.
582 certified [on] 31 December 1925." The
second certification in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, which was
issued by the Regional Technical Director,
Forest Management Services of the DENR
(FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area
falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas
certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."
The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18
dated 30 May 1988, delineated the
functions and authorities of the offices
within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series
of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of
land classification status for areas below
50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues
certificate of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated
19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series
of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained
the authority of the CENRO to issue
certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares, as well as the
authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of
land classification status for lands covering
over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent
applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The
area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50
hectares (564,007 square meters). The
CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot
10705 with an area of 596,116 square
meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of
1990, is beyond the authority of the
CENRO to certify as alienable and
disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to
issue certificates of land classification. Under
DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of
ordinary minor products (OM) permits
except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-
sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use
permits covering over five hectares for
public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of
registration for logs, poles, piles, and
lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of
ordinary minor [products] (OM)
permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of
registration for logs, poles, and piles
and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-
sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for
20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity
declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of
special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure
projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of
a memorandum to the trial court, has no
probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or
CENRO to certify that a land is alienable
and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the
PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These
facts must be established to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent’s Operations
Manager, identified the certifications
submitted by respondent. The government
officials who issued the certifications were not
presented before the trial court to testify on
their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as
proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section
19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records
of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before
a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of
public documents referred to in Section 19 (a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy…The
CENRO is not the official repository or
legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as
alienable and disposable. The CENRO
should have attached an official
publication of the DENR Secretary’s
issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. —
Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by
a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. All other public
documents are evidence, even against a third
person, of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the
class of public documents contemplated in the
first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect "entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by
a public officer," such as entries made by the
Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by
a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The
certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official
records in the legal custody of a government
office. The certifications are not even records
of public documents. The certifications are
conclusions unsupported by adequate proof,
and thus have no probative value. Certainly,
the certifications cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that
Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and
disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR
Secretary. Such government certifications do
not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. Such government certifications
may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the
certifications are prima facie evidence of their
due execution and date of issuance but they
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is likewise important to note that the
Certifications considered by the CA were not
presented during trial, but only on
appeal. This being so, the genuineness and
1âwphi1
due execution of these documents were not
proven. Furthermore, they did not cover the
contested property, but merely the lots
adjacent to it.
In conclusion, respondent was not able to
comply with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529, or the
Property Registration Decree, which states:
Who May Apply. — The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 79088 is
hereby SET ASIDE. The application for
registration filed by Lucia M. Gomez
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E.
HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H.
RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Resolutions1 dated March 9,
2006 and May 22, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648. The
CA Resolution of March 9, 2006 dismissed
petitioners' petition for review, while the CA
Resolution dated May 22, 2006 denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a criminal
complaint for falsification of public documents
filed by herein respondent against herein
petitioners with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila.
On February 11, 2004, an Information for
falsification of public documents was filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila
by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila
against herein petitioners.2
On April 23, 2004, herein petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on
Absence of Probable Cause.3
After respondent's Comment/Opposition4 was
filed, the MeTC issued an Order5 dated July 9,
2004 dismissing the case on the ground of
lack of probable cause.
Aggrieved, respondent, with the express
conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.6
On July 21, 2005, the RTC rendered judgment
setting aside the July 9, 2004 Order of the
MeTC and directing the said court to proceed
to trial.7
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA
via a petition for review.
On March 9, 2006, the CA rendered its
presently assailed Resolution8 dismissing the
petition.
The CA ruled that the Decision of the RTC is
interlocutory in nature and, thus, is not
appealable.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but the CA denied it in its Resolution9 dated
May 22, 2006.
Hence, the instant petition based on the
following grounds:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
outrightly dismissing the Petition for Review
on the ground that the remedy availed of by
petitioners is improper.
Strict enforcement of the Rules may be
suspended whenever the purposes of justice
so require.10
In their first assigned error, petitioners
contend that the Decision of the RTC is final
as it disposes with finality the issue of whether
the MeTC erred in granting their Motion to
Dismiss.
The Court does not agree.
The Court notes at the outset that one of the
grounds relied upon by the CA in dismissing
petitioners' petition for review is the latter's
failure to submit copies of pleadings and
documents relevant and pertinent to the
petition filed, as required under Section
2,11 Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. While
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
they, however, failed to comply with these
requirements. Worse, they did not even
mention anything about it in the said Motion.
Section 3, Rule 42 of the same Rules
provides:
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with
requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege,
and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law.12 An
appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court.13 Deviations from the Rules cannot be
tolerated.14 The rationale for this strict attitude
is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are
designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
appealed cases.15 In an age where courts are
bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules need
to be followed by appellants with greater
fidelity.16 Their observance cannot be left to the
whims and caprices of appellants.17 In the
instant case, petitioners had all the
opportunity to comply with the Rules.
Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their
non-observance even when they sought
reconsideration of the ruling of the CA
dismissing their petition. Such obstinacy is
incongruous with their late plea for liberality in
construing the Rules.
On the above basis alone, the Court finds that
the instant petition is dismissible.
Even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the
present petition, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of
the CA.
The factual and legal situations in the present
case are essentially on all fours with those
involved in Basa v. People.18 In the said case,
the accused were charged with swindling and
falsification of public documents.
Subsequently, the accused filed a Joint
Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts
charged in each Information do not constitute
an offense. Thereafter, the MeTC issued an
order in favor of the accused and, accordingly,
quashed the Informations. The private
complainant, with the conformity of the public
prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration
but the MeTC denied it. On appeal, the RTC
reversed the order of the MeTC and directed
the continuation of the proceedings. The
accused then filed a petition for review with
the CA. In its assailed decision, the CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that the
remedy of appeal from the RTC decision is
improper, because the said decision is
actually interlocutory in nature.
In affirming the ruling of the CA, this Court
held that:
Petitioners erroneously assumed that the RTC
Decision is final and appealable, when in fact
it is interlocutory. Thus, they filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals under
Section 3 (b), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
xxxx
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall
be by petition for review under Rule 42.
xxxx
Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, states:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A
party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, may file a
verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, x x x.
The above provisions contemplate of an
appeal from a final decision or order of the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.
Thus, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42
resorted to by petitioners is improper. To
repeat, the RTC Decision is not final, but
interlocutory in nature.
A final order is one that which disposes of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be
done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined. Upon the other hand, an
order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of
a case completely, but leaves something more
to be done upon its merits.
Tested against the above criterion, the RTC
Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in
nature. It is essentially a denial of
petitioners' motion to quash because it
leaves something more to be done x x
x, i.e ., the continuation of the criminal
proceedings until the guilt or innocence of
the accused is determined. Specifically, the
MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then
proceed to trial and finally render the proper
judgment.
It is axiomatic that an order denying a motion
to quash on the ground that the allegations in
the Informations do not constitute an offense
cannot be challenged by an appeal. This
Court generally frowns upon this remedial
measure as regards interlocutory orders. The
evident reason for such rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action. To
tolerate the practice of allowing appeals from
interlocutory orders would not only delay the
administration of justice but also would unduly
burden the courts.19 (Emphases supplied)
In the present case, the assailed Decision of
the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and
directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by
allowing the prosecution to present its
evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC
Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose
of the case completely, but left something
more to be done on its merits.
In their second assigned error, petitioners
claim that assuming for the sake of argument
that the remedy they availed of is not proper,
the facts of the case would readily show that
there exist just and compelling reasons to
warrant the relaxation of the rules in the
interest of substantial justice.
Petitioners contend that the PNP Crime
Laboratory Questioned Document Report,
submitted as evidence by respondent to the
prosecutor's office, showed that the findings
therein are not conclusive and, thus,
insufficient to support a finding of probable
cause.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is clear from a perusal of the cited PNP
Crime Laboratory Questioned Document
Report No. 048-03 that the document
examiner found that the signatures appearing
in the questioned Deed of Sale as compared
to the standard signatures "reveal
divergences in the manner of execution and
stroke structure [which is] an indication that
they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND
THE SAME PERSON."20 The Court agrees
with the prosecutor's pronouncement in its
Resolution21 dated September 22, 2003, that
although the findings of the PNP Crime
Laboratory were qualified by the statement
contained in the Report that "no definite
conclusion can be rendered due to the fact
that questioned signatures are photocopies
wherein minute details are not clearly
manifested," the fact that an expert witness
already found that the questioned signatures
were not written by one and the same person
already creates probable cause to indict
petitioners for the crime of falsification of
public document.
In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc.,22 this
Court held:
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there
is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense. What is determined
is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure
a conviction.23
In the instant case, the Court finds no
justification to depart from the ruling of the
RTC that the offense charged was committed
and that herein petitioners are probably guilty
thereof.
With respect to respondent's legal personality
to appeal the July 9, 2004 Order of the MeTC,
suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the
RTC was made with the express conformity of
the public prosecutor who handles the case.
It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the
OSG which has authority to file an appeal with
the RTC. Section 35 (l), Chapter 12, Title III
1âwphi1
of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent "the
Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings."
On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential
Decree No. 1275, entitled "Reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice
and the Offices of the Provincial and City
Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution
Service, and Creating the National
Prosecution Service," which was the law in
force at the time the appeal was filed,
provides that the provincial or the city fiscal
(now referred to as prosecutor) "shall have
charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city or
municipal ordinances in the courts of such
province or city and shall therein
discharge all the duties incident to the
institution of criminal prosecutions."24 In
consonance with the above-quoted provision,
it has been held by this Court that the fiscal
represents the People of the Philippines in
the prosecution of offenses before the trial
courts at the metropolitan trial courts,
municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial
courts and the regional trial courts.25 Since
the appeal, in the instant case was made with
the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City
Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the
Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file
the same.
Moreover, petitioners' reliance on Presidential
Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited
provision refers only to cases where the
assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to
file an information or dismiss a case is
predicated or conditioned upon the prior
authority or approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is
nothing in the said law which provides that in
cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor
or a State Prosecutor may file the same only
upon prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
Stated differently, unless otherwise ordered,
an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State
Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC,
questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a
case for lack of probable cause, even without
prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29648, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168703 February 26, 2013
RAMON G. NAZARENO, Petitioner,
vs.
MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC., and
ELITE SHIPPING A/S, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review
on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated
April27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84811, and the
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2005 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents are
as follows:
On February 16, 2001, petitioner Ramon G.
Nazareno was hired by Maersk Filipinas
Crewing Inc. (MCI) as Chief Officer for and in
behalf of its foreign principal Elite Shipping
A/S (Elite) on board its vessel M/V Artkis
Hope for a period of six (6) months with a
basic salary of US$1,129.00.
On March 25, 2001, the vessel was berthed at
Port Belem, Brazil to load timber. While
petitioner was checking the last bundle of
timber to be loaded, he suddenly lost his
balance and fell at a height of two (2) meters.
He landed on the timber and injured his right
shoulder. Due to the pain he felt in his right
shoulder, he was later examined at
Philadelphia, U.S.A. and was considered not
fit for work. It was recommended that
petitioner should be confined for thorough
evaluation and further tests, such as MRI.
Petitioner was also advised to see an
Orthopedic Surgeon and/or a
Neurologist.3 However, petitioner was not
permitted to disembark as there was no one
available to replace him.
On August 8, 2001, at Ulsan, South Korea,
petitioner was brought at the Ulsan Hyundai
Hospital where he was treated and given
medication for his "frozen right shoulder."4 He
was also advised to undergo physical therapy.
Consequently, petitioner was declared unfit to
work and was recommended to be signed off
from duty.
On August 10, 2001, petitioner was
repatriated to Manila. He then reported to MCI
which referred him to the Medical Center
Manila (MCM) where he underwent a physical
therapy program under Dr. Antonio O.
Periquet (Dr. Periquet) three times a week. On
October 31, 2001, Dr. Emmanuel C. Campana
(Dr. Campana) issued a Medical
Certificate5 stating that petitioner has been
under their medical care since August 13,
2001 and that after treatment and physical
therapy, petitioner was fit for work as of
October 21, 2001.
However, after almost two (2) months of
therapy, petitioner did not notice any
improvement. He informed Dr. Periquet that
when he was in Philadelphia, U.S.A., he was
advised to consult a neurologist and undergo
MRI. When Dr. Periquet ignored him, he
consulted another doctor. Thus, from October
23, 2001 to December 1, 2001, petitioner
underwent a series of treatment for his "frozen
shoulder of the right arm" from Dr. Johnny G.
Tan, Jr. (Dr. Tan) in his Chiropractic Clinic.6
On December 27, 2001, petitioner consulted
Dr. Cymbeline B. Perez- Santiago (Dr.
Santiago), a Neurologist at the Makati Medical
Center, and was subjected to neurologic
examinations. In her Neurologic
Summary7 dated February 28, 2002, Dr.
Santiago concluded that petitioner will no
longer be able to function as in his previous
disease-free state and that his condition would
hamper him from operating as chief officer of
a ship.
Meanwhile, petitioner was also examined by
Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo who, in a Medical
Certificate8 dated January 29, 2002,
diagnosed petitioner to be suffering from
Parkinson’s disease and a frozen right
shoulder (secondary), with an "Impediment
Grade VII (41.8%). He concluded that
petitioner is unfit to work as a seafarer.
On the basis of the findings of his doctors,
petitioner sought payment of his disability
benefits and medical allowance from
respondents, but was refused. Petitioner
therefore instituted the present
Complaint9 against the respondents docketed
as NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 02-03-0660-00.
On February 24, 2003, after the parties
submitted their respective pleadings, the
Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision10 in
favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to
pay the former his disability claims, sickness
allowance, and attorney’s fees. The
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgement (sic) is hereby rendered ordering
the respondents Maersk-Filipinas Crewing,
Inc./Elite Shipping A/S to jointly and severally
pay complainant Ramon D. (sic) Nazareno the
amount of TWENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN US
DOLLARS & 60/100 (US$27,957.60), or its
equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing
rate of exchange at the time of actual payment
representing his disability claims, sickness
allowance and attorney’s fees.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.11
The LA gave credence to the findings and
assessments of petitioner’s attending
physicians who took care and treated him,
instead of the conclusion of Dr. Campana that
petitioner was already fit for work as of
October 21, 2001. The LA held that the
medical certificate of Dr. Campana cannot
prevail over the findings of the physicians who
treated petitioner.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). On April 15, 2004, the NLRC, Third
Division, rendered a Decision12 affirming with
modification the decision of the LA. The
tribunal concurred with the findings of the LA
that petitioner was entitled to disability
benefits. It, however, deleted the grant of
sickness allowance, considering that petitioner
had already received the same. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of February 24, 2002 is hereby
MODIFIED by deleting the award of
US$4,516.00 for sick wages, the other awards
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.13
Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,14 but it was denied in the
Resolution15 dated May 31, 2004.
Respondents then sought recourse before the
CA alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the NLRC in ruling in favor of the
petitioner,16 which case was docketed as CA-
G. R. SP No. 84811.
On April 27, 2005, the CA rendered a
Decision17 granting the petition. The CA set
aside the decision and resolution of the NLRC
and dismissed petitioner’s complaint, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we
hereby GRANT the petition and
accordingly: SET ASIDE the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission for
being null and void; and DISMISS the private
respondent’s COMPLAINT for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.18
In ruling in favor of the respondents, the CA
opined that petitioner is covered by the 1996
POEA Standard Employment Contract
(POEA-SEC) and under Section 20 of the said
POEA-SEC, the disability of a seafarer can
only be assessed by the company-designated
physician and not by the seafarer’s own
doctor.
Hence, the petition assigning the lone error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
DECISIONS OF BOTH THE LABOR
ARBITER A QUO AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FINDING
PETITIONER ALREADY UNFIT TO WORK
AS A RESULT OF THE INJURY HE
SUSTAINED DURING THE ACCIDENT ON
BOARD THE RESPONDENT’S VESSEL AND
THEREFORE ENTITLED TO DISABILITY
BENEFITS.19
Petitioner argues that there is enough reason
to disregard the assessment of Dr. Campana,
the respondents’ company-designated
physician, that he is already fit for work as of
October 21, 2001. Petitioner maintains that
despite the said findings, he still found it
difficult to walk and move his upper right
extremities. Petitioner, thus, sought further
treatment from other doctors. The fact that he
continued to undergo further examinations
and treatments belie the declaration that he
was fit for work. Petitioner claims that both the
LA and the NLRC cannot be faulted for
disregarding the findings of respondents’
company-designated physician and in
upholding instead the assessment of his
independent doctors.
Moreover, petitioner contends that the records
of the case would clearly reveal that the
present complaint was filed on the basis of his
injured right shoulder that he suffered while
working on board respondents’ vessel and not
solely on the basis of his Parkinson’s disease,
which was diagnosed only at a later time.
Finally, petitioner insists that he is entitled to
the payment of attorney’s fees.
On their part, respondents argue that the CA
acted in accordance with the law when it set
aside and annulled the decision of the NLRC
and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack
of merit.
The petition is meritorious.
In the case at bar, the CA relied on the
provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 1996
POEA-SEC20 and the ruling of this Court
in German Marine Agencies, Inc. v NLRC,21 in
concluding that the disability of a seafarer can
only be determined by a company-designated
physician and not the seafarer’s own doctors.
Respecting the findings of the CA that it is the
1996 POEA-SEC which is applicable,
nonetheless the case of Abante v. KJGS Fleet
Management Manila22 is instructive and
worthy of note. In the said case, the CA
similarly held that the contract of the parties
therein was also governed by Memo Circular
No. 55, series of 1996.23 Thus, the CA ruled
that it is the assessment of the company-
designated physician which is deemed
controlling in the determination of a seafarer’s
entitlement to disability benefits and not the
opinion of another doctor. Nevertheless, that
conclusion of the CA was reversed by this
Court. Instead, the Court upheld the findings
of the independent physician as to the
claimant’s disability. The Court pronounced:
Respecting the appellate court's ruling that it
is POEA Memo Circular No. 55, series of
1996 which is applicable and not Memo
Circular No. 9, series of 2000, apropos is the
ruling in Seagull Maritime Corporation v.
Dee involving employment contract entered
into in 1999, before the promulgation of POEA
Memo Circular No. 9, series of 2000 or the
use of the new POEA Standard Employment
Contract, like that involved in the present
case. In said case, the Court applied the 2000
Circular in holding that while it is the
company-designated physician who must
declare that the seaman suffered permanent
disability during employment, it does not
deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a
second opinion which can then be used by the
labor tribunals in awarding disability claims.24
Verily, in the cited case of Seagull Maritime
Corporation v. Dee,25 this Court held that
nowhere in the case of German Marine
Agencies, Inc. v NLRC26 was it held that the
company-designated physician’s assessment
of the nature and extent of a seaman's
disability is final and conclusive on the
employer company and the seafarer-claimant.
While it is the company designated physician
who must declare that the seaman suffered a
permanent disability during employment, it
does not deprive the seafarer of his right to
seek a second opinion.27
The case of Maunlad Transport, Inc. v.
Manigo, Jr.28 is also worthy of note. In the said
case, the Court reiterated the prerogative of a
seafarer to request for a second opinion with
the qualification that the physician’s report
shall still be evaluated according to its
inherent merit for the Court’s consideration, to
wit:
All told, the rule is that under Section 20-B (3)
of the 1996 POEASEC, it is mandatory for a
claimant to be examined by a
companydesignated physician within three
days from his repatriation. The unexplained
omission of this requirement will bar the filing
of a claim for disability benefits. However, in
submitting himself to examination by the
company-designated physician, a claimant
does not automatically bind himself to the
medical report issued by the company-
designated physician; neither are the labor
tribunals and the courts bound by said
medical report. Its inherent merit will be
weighed and duly considered. Moreover, the
claimant may dispute the medical report
issued by the companydesignated physician
by seasonably consulting another physician.
The medical report issued by said physician
will also be evaluated by the labor tribunal and
the court based on its inherent merits.29
In the recent case of Daniel M. Ison v.
Crewserve, Inc., et al.,30 although ruling
against the claimant therein, the Court upheld
the abovecited view and evaluated the
findings of the seafarer’s doctors vis-à-vis the
findings of the company-designated physician.
A seafarer is, thus, not precluded from
consulting a physician of his choice.
Consequently, the findings of petitioner’s own
physician can be the basis in determining
whether he is entitled to his disability claims.
Verily, the courts should be vigilant in their
time-honored duty to protect labor, especially
in cases of disability or ailment. When applied
to Filipino seamen, the perilous nature of their
work is considered in determining the proper
benefits to be awarded. These benefits, at the
very least, should approximate the risks they
brave on board the vessel every single day.31
Accordingly, if serious doubt exists on the
company-designated physician's declaration
of the nature of a seaman's injury and its
corresponding impediment grade, resort to
prognosis of other competent medical
professionals should be made. In doing so, a
seaman should be given the opportunity to
assert his claim after proving the nature of his
injury. These pieces of evidence will in turn be
used to determine the benefits rightfully
accruing to him.32
It bears to note, at this juncture, that this Court
is aware of its ruling in Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc.33, wherein it sustained
the findings of the company-designated
physician vis-a-vis the contrary opinion of the
doctors consulted by the seafarer. This Court
so ruled on two basic grounds. First, the
seafarer failed to follow the procedure outlined
in the Standard Employment Contract he
signed, wherein it was provided that if a doctor
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the
assessment of the company-designated
physician, a third doctor may be agreed upon
jointly between the employer and the seafarer
and the third doctor's decision shall be final
and binding on both parties. This Court held
that, for failure of the seafarer to follow this
procedure, the company doctor's
determination should prevail, especially in
view of the fact that the company exerted real
effort to provide the seafarer with medical
assistance, through the company designated
physician, which eventually led to the
seafarer's full recovery. Second, the seafarer
never raised the issue of the company-
designated doctor's competence until he filed
a petition with this Court. On the contrary, he
accepted the company doctor's assessment of
his fitness and even executed a certification to
this effect.
The above factual circumstances, however,
are not on all fours with the facts obtaining in
the instant case.
1âwphi1
First, the procedure outlined above, which
was derived from Department Order No. 4,
Series of 2000, is not the same as the
procedure outlined in Memorandum Circular
No. 55, Series of 1996, which embodies the
Standard Employment Contract between
petitioner and respondent. Notably, there is
nothing in the said circular which provides that
in case of conflict between the findings of the
company-designated physician and the
seafarer's doctor of choice, the parties may
agree to consult a third doctor, whose opinion
shall bind both parties. The provision
authorizing the parties to ask the opinion of a
third doctor is an innovation which was added
in the subsequent Standard Employment
Contract provided for under Department Order
No. 4, Series of 2000. Thus, being governed
by the 1996 Standard Employment Contract, it
cannot be said that petitioner failed to follow
the procedure outlined under the 2000
Standard Employment Contract. Moreover,
in Vergara, the Court relied on the findings of
the companydesignated physician because
the medical attention given by the company to
the seafarer led to the seafarer's full recovery.
This is not so in the present case. Petitioner
remains unfit to perform his job as a ship's
chief officer.
Second, unlike in Vergara, petitioner timely
questioned the competence of the company-
designated physician by immediately
consulting two independent doctors. Neither
did he sign nor execute any document
agreeing with the findings of the company
physician that he is already fit for work.
Thus, the doctrine enunciated in Vergara is
not applicable in the instant case.
In any case, the bottomline is this: the
certification of the companydesignated
physician would defeat petitioner’s claim while
the opinion of the independent physicians
would uphold such claim. In such a situation,
the Court adopts the findings favorable to
petitioner. The law looks tenderly on the
laborer. Where the evidence may be
reasonably interpreted in two divergent ways,
one prejudicial and the other favorable to him,
the balance must be tilted in his favor
consistent with the principle of social justice.34
Anent the question of whether or not petitioner
is indeed entitled to disability benefits based
on the findings and conclusions, not only of
his personal doctors, but also on the findings
of the doctors whom he consulted abroad, the
Court rules in the affirmative.
From the documents presented by the parties,
it is apparent that in a Message35 to Elite, it
was established that petitioner was already
declared "not fit for duty" and was advised to
be confined and undergo MRI treatment.
Similarly, when petitioner was brought to the
Ulsan Hyundai Hospital, South Korea on
August 8, 2001 for his frozen right shoulder,
he was again declared not fit for duty and was
advised to be "signed off" for further physical
therapy. Indeed, petitioner was repatriated to
Manila and underwent physical therapy
session with Dr. Periquet. However, still not
feeling well, he underwent a series of
treatment with Dr. Tan for his frozen right
shoulder until December 1, 2001. Petitioner
then consulted Dr. Santiago for neurologic
evaluation on December 27, 2001. In Dr.
Santiago’s Neurologic Summary,36 it was
indicated that petitioner developed right
shoulder pains nine months before and that
despite repeated physical therapy, it only
provided petitioner temporary relief. Dr.
Santiago was also of the impression that
petitioner was afflicted with Parkinson’s
disease and concluded that petitioner will no
longer function as in his previous diseasefree
state.
From the findings and prognosis of the rest of
petitioner’s doctors who attended and treated
him, petitioner already established that he is
entitled to disability benefits. Indeed, the fact
remains that petitioner injured his right
shoulder while on board the vessel of Elite;
that he received treatment and was
repatriated due to the said injury; and was
declared unfit for duty several times by the
doctors who attended and treated petitioner
abroad and in Manila. Clearly, the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Campana cannot be
given much weight and consideration against
the overwhelming findings and diagnoses of
different doctors, here and abroad, that
petitioner was not fit for work and can no
longer perform his duties as a seafarer.
Also, contrary to the findings of the CA,
petitioner was claiming disability benefits
based on the injury he sustained while
employed by the respondents, the mere
inclusion of the findings that he has
Parkinson’s disease will not negate such fact
nor diminish his right to claim the said benefit
from the respondents.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as
affirmed by the NLRC, that petitioner is
entitled to disability benefits corresponding to
an Impediment Grade of 7 (equivalent to a
disability assessment of 41.8%) in the
Schedule of Disability Allowances under
Section 30-A of the 1996 Standard
Employment Contract. Under the said
Schedule, petitioner should be awarded the
amount of US$20,900.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine currency at the time of payment.
The Court also agrees with the ruling of the
labor arbiter that petitioner is entitled to
attorney's fees following Article 2208 of the
New Civil Code, which allows its recovery in
actions for recovery of wages of laborers and
actions for indemnity under the employer’s
liability laws. Pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to
attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the
monetary award.37
To recapitulate, it bears to reiterate the
general rule under Department Order No. 33,
Series of 1996 and Memorandum Circular No.
55, Series of 1996, that it is the company-
designated physician who determines the
fitness or disability of a seafarer who suffered
or is suffering from an injury or illness.
However, considering the unanimity of the
findings not only of petitioner's independent
physicians here in the Philippines, but also
those who were consulted abroad by
petitioner's employer, that petitioner is indeed
not fit for duty as a seafarer by reason of the
injury he sustained during his fall, the instant
case should be considered as an exception to
the general rule abovestated.
The Court has applied the Labor Code
concept of disability to Filipino seafarers in
keeping with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and full protection to labor,
it holding that the notion of disability is
intimately related to the worker’s capacity to
earn, what is compensated being not his injury
or illness but his inability to work resulting in
the impairment of his earning capacity, hence,
disability should be understood less on its
medical significance but more on the loss of
earning capacity.38
To be sure, the POEA-SEC for Seamen was
designed primarily for the protection and
benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
their employment on board ocean-going
vessels. Its provisions must be construed and
applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in their
favor. Only then can its beneficent provisions
be fully carried into effect.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 27, 2005 and June 28,
2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 84811
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondents MAERSK FILIPINAS
CREWING INC., and ELITE SHIPPING A/S
are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to
petitioner the amount of US$20,900.00,
representing his disability benefits, as well as
attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (1
0%) of the monetary award, both at its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 129472. April 12, 2005]
MARCELO LASOY and FELIX
BANISA, Petitioners, v. HON. MONINA A.
ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC,
BR. 76, QUEZON CITY, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
After an information has been filed and the
accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty
and were convicted and after they had
applied for probation, may the information
be amended and the accused arraigned
anew on the ground that the information
was allegedly altered/tampered
with?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In an Information filed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan-Querijero
dated 03 July 1996,1 accused Marcelo Lasoy
and Felix Banisa were charged as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, not having been authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully sell or offer for
sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in
violation of said law.
The case docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-
66788 was assigned and raffled to Branch
103 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, presided by Judge Jaime N.
Salazar, Jr.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded
guilty and were sentenced on 16 July 1996
in this wise:2
On arraignment accused MARCELO LASOY
and FELIX BANISA with the assistance of
[their] counsel Atty. Diosdado Savellano
entered a plea of GUILTY to the crime
charged against them in the information.
ACCORDINGLY, the court hereby find[s]
accused MARCELO LASOY and FELIX
BANISA, GUILTY of Violation of Section 4,
Republic Act 6425 and they are hereby
sentenced to suffer a jail term of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and the period
during which said accused are under
detention is hereby deducted pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act 5127.
The evidence in this case which is the
42.410 grams of dried marijuana fruiting
tops is hereby ordered confiscated in favor
of the government. The Property Custodian
is ordered to turn over said evidences to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition.
On the same date, both accused applied for
probation under Presidential Decree No.
968, as amended.3
On 28 August 1996, plaintiff People of the
Philippines, thru Assistant City Prosecutor
Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos, filed two
separate motions, first, to admit amended
Information,4 and second, to set aside the
arraignment of the accused, as well as the
decision of the trial court dated 16 July
1996.5 In plaintiff's motion to admit
amended information, it alleged:
1. That for some unknown reason both
accused herein were charged of (sic)
Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, R.P. 6425.
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, not having been authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully sell, or offer for
sale a total of 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in
violation of said law.
When in truth and in fact the said accused
should be charged for transportation and
delivery, with intent to sell and to gain, of
Forty-Five (45) pieces of dried marijuana
fruiting tops weighing 42.410 kilos from La
Trinidad to Metro Manila.
2. That it is imperative to file an amended
information in order to make it conformable
to the evidence on hand.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing it is
most respectfully prayed that the herewith
attached Amended Information against both
accused be admitted and subsequently set
for arraignment and trial.6 (Emphasis
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ
Resolving the motions, the trial court, in its
Order dated 03 September 1996,7 held:
The Motion to Admit Amended Information is
hereby DENIED, as this court has already
decided this case on the basis that the
accused was arrested in possession of
42.410 grams of marijuana and it is too late
at this stage to amend the information.
Another Order8 of the same date issued by
the trial court resolved the second motion in
the following manner:
The Motion to Set Aside the Arraignment of
the Accused as well as the Decision dated
July 16, 1996, filed by the Public Prosecutor
is hereby GRANTED, it appearing from the
published resolution of the Supreme Court
dated October 18, 1995, in G.R. No. 119131
Inaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares v.
Hon. FRANCISCO H. ESCANO, JR. in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial
Court, Leyte Branch 12, Ormoc City which
was dismissed by this court on August 20,
1996, the jurisdiction over drug of small
quantity as in the case at bar should be tried
by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although
under the statute of R.A. 7659 which took
effect on December 31, 1993 the penalty for
possession or use of prohibited or regulated
drugs is from prision [correccional]
to reclusion temporal which indeterminate
penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction
the court which has jurisdiction over a
criminal case is dependent on the maximum
penalty attached by the statute to the crime.
The amended Information reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1996,
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping
each other, not having been authorized by
law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any prohibited drug, did, then and
there, willfully unlawfully sell or offer for sale
a total of 42.410 kilos of dried marijuana
fruiting tops, a prohibited drug, in violation
of said law.9
This second information was assigned to
Branch 76 of the RTC of Quezon City
presided by Judge Monina A.
Zenarosa,10 docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-96-67572.
Both accused filed a Motion to Quash11 which
was opposed12 by the People in its
Comment/Opposition filed before the trial
court. Subsequently, while the motion to
quash before the RTC was as yet
unresolved, both accused filed before the
Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari13 which they later moved to
withdraw "to pave the way for Branch 76 of
the RTC of Quezon City to act judiciously on
their motion to quash. ''14 The Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 15 November
199615 noted the motion and considered the
petition withdrawn.
In its now assailed resolution dated 14
February 1997,16 the trial court denied
accused's motion to quash, and scheduled
the arraignment of the accused under the
amended information. Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration,17 duly opposed by the
prosecution,18 was denied by the trial court
in its Order dated 16 April 1997.19 Hence,
the instant Petition for Certiorari with prayer
for injunction and temporary restraining
order20 based on the following grounds:21
A) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THERE IS NO VALID INFORMATION
AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT
CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY; andcralawlibrary
B) WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT THE RTC, BRANCH 103, HAD
JURISDICTION OVER the case, docketed as
Criminal CASE NO. Q-96-66799.22
In this Court's resolution dated 23 July
1997,23 respondents were required to
comment on the Petition. They submitted
their Comment on 18 November
1998.24 Accused filed their Reply25 on 02
March 2000. In compliance with the Court's
resolution dated 29 March 2000,26 accused
and respondents submitted their
memoranda, respectively, on 26 May
200027 and 26 July 2000.28
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy,
the following requisites must be present: (1)
a valid complaint or information; (2) the
court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4)
he has been convicted or acquitted or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.29
The issues boil down to whether or not the
first information is valid and whether or not
the RTC, Branch 103, where the first
information was filed and under which
Criminal Case No. Q-96-66788 was tried,
had jurisdiction to try the case.
On the issue of validity of the information,
accused and respondents submitted
opposing views - - accused insisting on its
validity, whereas respondents asserted that
the accused were arraigned under an invalid
information. Alleging that there being an
alteration on the first information, hence it
failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs
caught in possession of the accused, the
prosecution insisted that the first
information under which accused were
arraigned is invalid.
In accord with the view of the prosecution,
the trial court denied the accused's motion
to quash, stating:30
. . . [I]n the instant case, it must be recalled
that the earlier information filed against the
accused appeared to be sufficient in form. It
was discovered, however, that an alteration
was made as to the weight of the marijuana
fruiting tops which was placed at only
42.410 grams when the correct amount
should have been in kilos. This fraudulent
alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of
the proceedings such that despite the plea
of guilt made by the accused it would not
bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct
offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the
plea of former jeopardy, the prior
proceedings must have been valid, and the
lack of any fundamental requisite which
would render void the judgment would also
make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on
such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A
verdict of acquittal procured by accused by
fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not
put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is
no bar to a second trial for the same
offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense
procured fraudulently or by collusion of the
offender, for the purpose of protecting
himself from further prosecution and
adequate punishment, is no bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same
offense, either on the ground that the
conviction is void because of the fraud
practiced, or that the state is not in any
sense a party to it and therefore not bound
by it. (22 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 244-
245)
It is impossible to believe that the accused
were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering
which led to the erasure of the true weight
of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in
the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact
amount of prohibited stuff for which they
were charged before the information was
tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they
participated in that charade when they
pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser
offense considering the decreased weight in
the now altered information which merited a
much lighter penalty was irregularly
obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered
as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in
court which was tainted with fraud.
The accused should not be allowed to make
a mockery of justice or to trifle with the
courts by participating in a grand deception
of pleading guilty to a lesser offense
knowing that they participated/acquiesced to
such tampering and then tell the court that
they would be placed in jeopardy for the
second time.
We do not agree with the trial court.
FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request
for appropriate inquest proceedings dated
03 July 1996 addressed to the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and received by
Prosecutor Querijero, stated that the
accused were apprehended "for conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with
each other in facilitating and effecting the
transportation and delivery . . . of forty five
pieces of dried marijuana leaves (already in
bricks) and weighing approximately forty-
five kilos. ''31
In the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer,
PO3 Ernesto Jimenez Viray, Jr., and
arresting officer SPOI Inadio U. Ibay, Jr., it
is stated that the accused were caught with
approximately 45 kilos of dried marijuana
fruiting tops.32 For some unknown reasons,
however, the Information filed against the
accused reflected a much lesser
quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
The question is whether this is sufficient to
consider the first Information under which
the accused were arraigned invalid.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information defined. - An
information is an accusation in writing
charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the
court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court
citing People v. Marquez affirmed:34
It should be observed that section 3 of Rule
110 defines an information as nothing more
than "an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court."
An information is valid as long as it distinctly
states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions
constitutive thereof.35
In other words, if the offense is stated in
such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter
according to law, the inevitable conclusion is
that the information is valid. It is not
necessary to follow the language of the
statute in the information. The information
will be sufficient if it describes the crime
defined by law.36
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable
conclusion is that the first information is
valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the
manner by which the crime was committed.
Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to
apprise the accused of the nature of the
charge against them, is reasonably complied
with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying
Rule 110,37 Section 6, shows on its face that
it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. - A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
SECOND, and with respect specifically to the
trial court's point of view that the accused
cannot claim their right against double
jeopardy because they
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering,"
we hold that while this may not be far-
fetched, there is actually no hard evidence
thereof.38 Worse, we cannot overlook the
fact that accused were arraigned, entered a
plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information. Granting that
alteration/tampering took place and the
accused had a hand in it, this does not
justify the setting aside of the decision dated
16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated
in by the accused may well be the subject of
another inquiry.
In Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v.
People,39 the Court affirming the finality of a
decision in a criminal case, citing Section 7,
Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, stated:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion
of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is
perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed a judgment [of conviction]
becomes final after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the
prosecution to have the information
amended defies procedural rules, the
decision having attained finality after the
accused applied for probation and the fact
that amendment is no longer allowed at that
stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. 'The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter
and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment
that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss
the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section
11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for
their appearance at the trial.
In Sanvicente v. People,40 this Court held
that given the far-reaching scope of an
accused's right against double jeopardy,
even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The
only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a
sham. Respondent People of the Philippines
argues, citing the case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan41 that the trial was a sham.
We do not agree with the respondent as the
trial in the Galman case was considered a
mock trial owing to the act of a then
authoritarian president who ordered the
therein respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure a
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and
total absolution of the respondents-accused
therein of all the charges.42
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III,
Section 21, mandates that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. In this case, it bears
repeating that the accused had been
arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were
already in the stage where they were
applying for probation. It is too late in the
day for the prosecution to ask for the
amendment of the information and seek to
try again accused for the same offense
without violating their rights guaranteed
under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the
amendment of an information by motion of
the prosecution and at the time when the
accused had already been convicted is
contrary to procedural rules and violative of
the rights of the accused.
FINALLY, on the issue of jurisdiction, the
case of Gulhoran and Bobares v. Escano,
Jr.,43 upon which both trial courts justified
their claim of jurisdiction, was actually based
on this Court's resolution dated 18 October
1995 where this Court held:
The criminal jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under Section
32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act
7691 has been increased to cover offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June
14, 1994). It appears that the imposable
penalties applicable to the subject cases are
within the range of prision correccional, a
penalty not exceeding six years, thus falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the MTC. It follows that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
charges against petitioners.
If we apply the resolution of this Court
quoted above, it would seem that the
Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case under the first Information.
Following that argument, the decision dated
16 July 1996 of the RTC Branch 103 was
rendered without jurisdiction, thus, accused
may not invoke the right against double
jeopardy.
Nonetheless, we cannot uphold this view
owing to the fact that a later resolution
superseding the resolution cited by the trial
courts, specifically Administrative Order No.
51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC
with jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No. Q-
96-67572. The resolution provides:
RE: SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING,
ROBBERY, DANGEROUS DRUGS,
CARNAPPING AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES
UNDER R.A. NO. 7659
Pursuant to Sec. 23 of Batas Pambansa Blg. AMENDED, regardless of the quantity of the
129, in the interest of speedy and efficient drugs involved.
administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following This issue is further settled by the
Regional Trial Court branches are hereby concurring opinion of Chief Justice Hilario G.
designated to exclusively try and decide Davide, Jr., in People v. Velasco:44
cases of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM,
ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY COMMITTED
. . . [A]ll drug-related cases, regardless of
AGAINST A BANKING OR FINANCIAL
the quantity involved and the penalty
INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF THE
imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659, as
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
applied/interpreted in People v. Simon (G.R.
AMENDED, AND VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-
No. 93028, 29 July 1994; 234 SCRA 555),
CARNAPPING ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED,
and of the provisions of R.A. No. 7691
AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES defined and
expanding the jurisdiction of the
penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal
committed within their respective territorial
Circuit Trial Courts, still fall within the
jurisdictions:
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts, in view of Section 39 of R.A.
... No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972). R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 7691
11. Branch 103, Quezon City, presided over have neither amended nor modified this
by RTC JUDGE JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR. Section.
Subsequently, A.M. No. 96-8-282-RTC dated Wherefore, premises considered, the
27 August 1996, Re: Clarification on the instant petition is Granted. The Orders dated
applicability of Supreme Court 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued
Administrative Order No. 51-96 in relation to by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No.
declared: Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed. Accused
Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith
ordered released from detention45 unless
. . . [T]he Court Resolved to AMEND the
prefatory paragraph in Administrative Order there may be valid reasons for their further
No. 5-96, to read: detention.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 23 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 in the interest of speedy
administration of justice and subject to the
guidelines hereinafter set forth, the following
Regional Trial Court branches are hereby
designated to exclusively try and decide
cases of KIDNAPPING AND/OR KIDNAPPING
FOR RANSOM, ROBBERY IN BAND, ROBBERY
COMMITTED AGAINST A BANKING OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION, VIOLATION OF
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO
GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS; S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS,
O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA
COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN,
FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW
GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA,
SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K.
MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA.
JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE
B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR.,
RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ,
EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP,
ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS
VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS,
VICENTE JAYME, **, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION
(represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran,
Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores
and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members),
JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ
(Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER,
MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG.
GEN. LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL.
ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B.
TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO,
CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT.
ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS
CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT.
ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS
FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT.
FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C.
DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO,
SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, SGT.
LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO,
SGT. ARMANDO DELA CRUZ, SGT.
PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO
MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO
ACUPIDO and HERMILO GOSUICO, ***
, respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for
petitioners.
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver
and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen.
Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H.
Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P.
Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A.
Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with
solemnity and for the first time in freedom the
third anniversary of the treacherous
assassination of foremost opposition leader
former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr.
imprisoned for almost eight years since the
imposition of martial law in September, 1972
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he
was sentenced to death by firing squad by a
military tribunal for common offenses alleged
to have been committed long before the
declaration of martial law and whose
jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to
trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the
military tribunals are admittedly not courts but
mere instruments and subject to the control of
the President as created by him under the
General Orders issued by him as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and that he had already been
publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the
President of the charges in a nationwide press
conference held on August 24, 1971 when he
declared the evidence against Ninoy "not only
strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed the Plaza
Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of
the opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971
elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of
the opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga
and many more were seriously injured), and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No.
889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed
to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the
then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the
civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter
allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to
undergo successful heart surgery. After three
years of exile and despite the regime's refusal
to give him a passport, he sought to return
home "to strive for a genuine national
reconciliation founded on justice." He was to
be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort
away by soldiers from his plane that had just
landed at the Manila International Airport on
that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His brain was
smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and
"from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that
the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to
be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando
Galman, although he was the personal friend of accused Col.
Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August 17,
1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-
enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and
continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live
on the spot. The then President instantly accepted the military
version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference
that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he
said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in
the killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was
not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience
of the entire nation and outraged the free
world. The large masses of people who joined
in the ten-day period of national mourning and
came out in millions in the largest and most
orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral
reflected their grief for his martyrdom and their
yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The then President was constrained to create
a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the treacherous
and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become a
national tragedy and national shame specially because of the
early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local
media 4 so that all right thinking and honest men desire to
ventilate the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate
investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two
false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22,
1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3,
1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los
Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses
recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of
their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23
and 24, 1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the
world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead
by the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received
congenially and cordially by the then President who treated the
report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report
of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for
final resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the
Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the
majority report of the four other members was submitted on the
following day to the then President who coldly received them and
could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report with
the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience
with what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority
reports were one in rejecting the military
version as propounded by the chief
investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that
Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin,
stating that "the evidence shows [to the
contrary] that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations." They were in
agreement that "only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot
him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was
"not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the
SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman
and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino
down the service stairs, deliberately and in
conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured
story to us regarding the alleged shooting by
Galman of Sen. Aquino and the mowing
down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short,
that Ninoy's assassination was the product of
a military conspiracy, not a communist plot
The only difference between the two reports is
that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents abovenamed in the title of
the case headed by then AFP Chief General
Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the
premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA
on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of
them and limit as plotters "the six persons
who were on the service stairs while Senator
Aquino was descending" and "General Luther
Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could
not have been planned and implemented
without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report
(somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue
to our work lies in what will transpire in
accordance with the action that the Office of
the President may thereafter direct to be
taken. "The four-member majority report (also
prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after
warning the forces who adhere to an alien and
intolerable political ideology against
unscrupulously using the report "to discredit
our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the
tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time
confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked
evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was
clear and unequivocal. This
task was not only to determine
the facts and circumstances
surrounding the death of the
late former Senator. Of greater
significance is the awesome
responsibility of the Board to
uphold righteousness over
evil, justice over injustice,
rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity.
The task was indeed a painful
test, the inevitable result of
which will restore our country's
honored place among the
sovereign nations of the free
world where peace, law and
order, freedom, and justice are
a way of life.
More than any other event in
contemporary Philippine
history, the killing of the late
former Senator Aquino has
brought into sharper focus, the
ills pervading Philippine
society. It was the
concretization of the horror
that has been haunting this
country for decades, routinely
manifested by the breakdown
of peace and order, economic
instability, subversion, graft
and corruption, and an
increasing number of abusive the resignation of the Chief of (for shooting
elements in what are the Armed Forces in a country Ninoy).
otherwise noble institutions in where public office is viewed
our country-the military and with highest esteem and MARCOS:
law enforcement agencies. We respect and where the moral Well, you are
are, however, convinced that, responsibilities of public of course
by and large, the great officials transcend all other wrong. What
majority of the officers and considerations. you have been
men of these institutions have reading are the
remained decent and It is equally the fact that the then President newspapers
honorable, dedicated to their through all his recorded public acts and and the
noble mission in the service of statements from the beginning disdained and newspaper
our country and people. rejected his own Board's above findings and reports have
insisted on the military version of Galman been biased.
The tragedy opened our eyes being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view The evidence
and for the first time confirmed that "there is no involvement of anyone in his still proves that
our worst fears of what government in the assassination," he told Galman was
unchecked evil would be David Briscoe (then AP Manila Bureau Chief the killer. The
capable of doing. As former in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 evidence also
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba that "I am convinced that if any member of my shows that
Eban observes. "Nobody who government were involved, I would have there were
has great authority can be known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I intelligence
trusted not to go beyond its would have known. I know how they think. I reports
proper limits." Social apathy, know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in connecting the
passivity and indifference and another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was communist
holding its hearings) the following:
neglect have spawned in party to the
secret a dark force that is bent killing. 8
on destroying the values held CBS: But
sacred by freedom-loving indeed there
has been In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General
people. Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of
recent
evidence that absence upon release of the Board's majority
To assert our proper place in seems to report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are
the civilized world, it is contradict even more aware, general, that the
imperative that public officials circumstances under which the board has
earlier reports,
should regard public service namely, the chosen to implicate you in its findings are
as a reflection of human Ideals recent fraught with doubt and great contradictions of
in which the highest sense of evidence opinion and testimony. And we are deeply
moral values and integrity are seems to disturbed that on the basis of so-called
strictly required. indicate that evidence, you have been so accused by some
some of the members of the Board," and extended "My
A tragedy like that which guards may very best wishes to you and your family for a
happened on August 21, 1983, have been speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he
announced that he would return the general to his position as
and the crisis that followed, responsible AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an
would have normally caused interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as
respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as
saying that "as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against
the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November
11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and
Reynaldo Galman, mother and son,
respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and
twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed
of three former Justices of this Court, five
incumbent and former university presidents, a
former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding
members of the Philippine Bar and solid
citizens of the community, filed the present
action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan
and Sandiganbayan committed serious
irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting
in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of
the constitutional rights of the petitioners and
the sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. They asserted that the
Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of
the people when he failed to exert genuine
and earnest efforts to present vital and
important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the
Sandiganbayan Justices were biased,
prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused,
and that their acts "clouded with the gravest
doubts the sincerity of government to find out
the truth about the Aquino assassination."
Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance
of a temporary restraining order restraining
the respondent Sandiganbayan from
rendering a decision on the merits in the
pending criminal cases which it had scheduled
on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be
rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and
ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of
petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent court
from rendering a decision in the two criminal
cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-
two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The
Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to
respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum
for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature
page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5
of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the
Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in
reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.13 The same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period
counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum
for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them
and which they alleged was "very material to the question of his
partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated
reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an
eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the
dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration, alleging that the
dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for
such action and urging that the case be set for
a full hearing on the merits because if the
charge of partiality and bias against the
respondents and suppression of vital evidence
by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners
would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The
People are entitled to due process which
requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased
prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and convict because
certain material evidence is suppressed by the
prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial,
then the entire proceedings would be null and
void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from
promulgating their decision as scheduled
anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining
order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as
scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued
its decision acquitting all the accused of the
crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. This
marked another unusual first in that
respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted
the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not
on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to
the very information and evidence submitted
by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's
verdict of acquittal, the instant case had
become moot and academic. On February 4,
1986, the same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad
Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their
motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust
of the second motion for reconsideration was
the startling and theretofore unknown
revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986
issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino
Trial a Sham," that the then President had
ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the
prosecution panel headed by Herrera to
whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion
to admit the second motion for reconsideration
and ordered the respondents to comment
thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on
April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold
office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when
he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate 2. MALACAÑANG
Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position comment, asserted that he passed no note to CONFERENCE PLANNED
in his comment on the petition, he added anyone; the note being bandied about is not in SCENARIO OF TRIAL
"relative to the reported alleged revelations of his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, herein writing of the note or of any note of any kind At 6:00 p.m. of said date
respondent never succumbed to any alleged intended for any lawyer of the defense or even (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E.
attempts to influence his actuations in the of the prosecution; and requested for an Marcos (the former President)
premises, having instead successfully resisted investigation by this Court to settle the note summoned to Malacañang
perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop passing issue once and for all. Justice Bernardo Fernandez
the case after preliminary investigation, and (the Tanodbayan),
actually ordered the filing and prosecution of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his Sandiganbayan Justice
the two (2) murder cases below against herein comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the Manuel Pamaran (the
private party respondents." He candidly allegations in the second motion for Presiding Justice) and an the
admitted also in his memorandum: "There is reconsideration that he revealed that the members of the Panel
not much that need be said about the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
existence of pressure. That there were prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to Also present at the meeting
pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. were Justice Manuel Lazaro
never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he He amplified his revelations, as follows: (the Coordinator) and Mrs.
vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect
complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly Imelda R. Marcos, who left
whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court find 1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF earlier, came back and left
sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases
below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong
ACQUITTAL! again. The former President
that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very had a copy of the panel's
least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be signed resolution (charging all
reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will Incidents during the
show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated his preliminary investigation accused as principals),
trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. showed ominous signs that evidently furnished him in
Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no
objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, the fate of the criminal case on advance, and with prepared
he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice the death of Ex-Senator notes on the contents thereof.
could take its course."
Benigno Aquino and Rolando
Galman on August 21, 1983 The former President started
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan was doomed to an ignominous by vehemently maintaining
First Division in their collective comment of end. Malacanang wanted that Galman shot Aquino at
April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the dismissal-to the extent that a the tarmac. Albeit initially the
criminal cases by them was valid and regular prepared resolution was sent undersigned argued against
and decided on the basis of evidence to the Investigating Panel the theory, to remain silent
presented and the law applicable, but (composed of the was the more discreet posture
manifested that "if it is true that the former undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto when the former President
Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Bernabe and Leonardo became emotional (he was
Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were Tamayo) for signature. This, of quite sick then).
pressured into suppressing vital evidence course, was resisted by the
which would probably alter the result of the panel, and a resolution During a good part of the
trial, Answering Respondents would not charging all the respondents conference, the former
interpose any objection to the reopening of as principals was forwarded to President talked about Aquino
those cases, if only to allow justice to take its the Tanodbayan on January and the communists,
course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice 10, 1985. lambasting the Agrava Board,
specially the Legal Panel.
Shifting to the military he
rumbled on such statements
as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen.
Ramos, though close to me, is
getting ambitious and poor
Johnny does not know what to
do". . . 'our understanding with
Gen. Ramos is that his stint is
only temporary, but he is
becoming ambitious "the boys
were frantic when they heard
that they will be charged in
court, and wig be detained at
city jail."
From outright dismissal, the
sentiment veered towards a
more pragmatic approach. The
former President more or less
conceded that for political and
legal reasons all the
respondents should be
charged in court, Politically, as
it will become evident that the
government was serious in
pursuing the case towards its
logical conclusion, and thereby
ease public demonstrations;
on the other hand, legally, it
was perceived that after (not
IF) they are acquitted, double
jeopardy would inure. The
former President ordered then
that the resolution be revised
by categorizing the
participation of each
respondent.
In the matter of custody of the
accused pendente lite the
Coordinator was ordered to
get in touch with Gen. Narciso
Cabrera, Gen. Vicente
Eduardo and Director Jolly
Bugarin to put on record that
they had no place in their
respective institutions. The
existence of PD No. 1950
(giving custody to
commanding officers of
members of AFP charged in
court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the
presiding justice (First
Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance
was made by him that it would
be finished in four to six
months, pointing out that, with
the recent effectivity of the
New Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the trial could be
expedited.
Towards the end of the two-
hour meeting and after the
script had been tacitly mapped
out, the former President
uttered: "Mag moro-moro na
lang kayo."
The parting words of the
former President were: "Thank
you for your cooperation. I
know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace
grounds on the way out, the
undersigned manifested his
desire to the Tanodbayan to
resign from the panel, or even
the office. This, as well as
other moves to this effect, had
always been refused. Hoping
that with sufficient evidence
sincerely and efficiently
presented by the prosecution,
all involves in the trial would
be conscience-pricked and
realize the futility and injustice
of proceeding in accordance
with the script, the
undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the
"implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18
minutes of the filing of the Informations with
the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23,
1985, while there were no members of the
media; the installation of TV monitors directly
beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a
"war room" occupied by the military; attempts
to direct and stifle witnesses for the
prosecution; the suppression of the evidence
that could be given by U.S. Airforce men
about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the
suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias
and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its
cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should
not decide these cases on the merits without
first making a final ruling on the Motion for
Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill
with the declaration that "the Court finds all
accused innocent of the crimes charged in the
two informations, and accordingly, they incur
neither criminal nor civil liability," adding that
"in the almost twenty years that the
undersigned has been the prosecutor in the
sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only
occasion where civil liability is pronounced in
a decision of acquittal. " He "associated
himself with the motion for reconsideration
and likewise prayed that the proceedings in
the Sandiganbayan and its decision be
declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez'
comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a
declaration of mistrial will depend on the
veracity of the evidence supportive of
petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence
and collusion. He submitted that this would
require reception of evidence by a Court-
appointed or designated commissioner or
body of commissioners (as was done in G.R.
No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No.
61016, Morales case; and G.R. No.
70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if
petitioners' claim were substantiated, a
reopening of the double murder case is proper
to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the
verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid
basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second
motion for reconsideration and prayed for its
denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the
proper step for the government was to file a
direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal
and at a regular trial present its evidence of
collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised
the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that
the issues had become moot and academic
because of the rendition of the
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all
respondents- accused on December 2, 1985,
with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas,
as well as Olivas, further arguing that
assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void
for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to
annul the judgment where the burden of proof
falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear,
competent and convincing evidence the cause
of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated
reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of
June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member
commission composed of retired Supreme
Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman,
and retired Intermediate Appellate Court
Justices Milagros German and Eduardo
Caguioa as members, to hear and receive
evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the
charges of collusion and pressures and
relevant matters, upon prior notice to all
parties, and to submit their findings to this
Court for proper disposition. The Commission
conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on
June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16, 1986,
On the said last day, respondents announced
in open hearing that they decided to forego
the taking of the projected deposition of
former President Marcos, as his testimony
would be merely corroborative of the
testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran
and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31,
1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page
Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it
and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as
follows:
1. The Office of the
Tanodbayan, particularly
Justice Fernandez and the
Special Investigating Panel
composed of Justice Herrera,
Fiscal Bernabe and Special
Prosecutor Tamayo, was
originally of the view that all of
the twenty-six (26)
respondents named in the
Agrava Board majority report
should all be charged as
principals of the crime of
double murder for the death of
Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned
of the impending filing of the
said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special
Investigating Panel having
already prepared a draft
Resolution recommending
such course of action,
President Marcos summoned
Justice Fernandez, the tree
members of the Special
Investigating Panel, and
justice Pamaran to a
conference in Malacanang in
the early evening of January
10, 1985.
3. In said conference,
President Marcos initially
expressed his disagreement
with the recommendation of
the Special Investigating Panel
and disputed the findings of
the Agrava Board that it was
not Galman who shot Benigno
Aquino.
4. Later in the conference,
however, President Marcos
was convinced of the
advisability of filing the murder
charge in court so that, after
being acquitted as planned,
the accused may no longer be
prosecuted in view of the
doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be
assured that not all of the
accused would be denied bail
during the trial, considering
that they would be charged
with capital offenses,
President Marcos directed that
the several accused be
"categorized" so that some of
them would merely be charged
as accomplices and
accessories.
6. In addition to said directive,
President Marcos ordered that
the case be handled
personally by Justice Pamaran
who should dispose of it in the
earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the
Malacanang conference were
followed to the letter; and
compliance therewith
manifested itself in several
specific instances in the
course of the proceedings,
such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special
investigating panel, the filing of
the case with the
Sandiganbayan and its
assignment to Justice
Pamaran, suppression of
some vital evidence,
harassment of witnesses,
recantation of witneses who
gave adverse testimony before
the Agrava Board, coaching of
defense counsels, the hasty
trial, monitoring of
proceedings, and even in the
very decision rendered in the
case.
8. That that expression of
President Marcos' desire as to
how he wanted the Aquino-
Galman case to be handled
and disposed of constituted
sufficient pressure on those
involved in said task to comply
with the same in the
subsequent course of the
proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran
and Justice Fernandez
manifested no revulsion
against complying with the
Malacañang directive, justice
Herrera played his role with
manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has
been ventilated to show a
scripted and pre-determined
manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-
Galman murder case, as
stage-managed from
Malacañang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as
well as by recalcitrant ones
whipped into line by the
omnipresent influence of an
authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following
recommendation.
Considering the existence of
adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution
in the Aquino-Galman case
and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under
the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be
beyond their capacity to resist,
and which not only prevented
the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to
offer all the evidences which it
could have otherwise
presented, but also
predetermined the final
outcome of the case, the
Commission is of the
considered thinking and belief,
subject to the better opinion
and judgment of this
Honorable Court that the
proceedings in the said case
have been vitiated by lack of
due process, and hereby
respectfully recommends that
the prayer in the petition for a
declaration of a mistrial in
Sandiganbayan Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011
entitled "People vs. Luther
Custodia et al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986
furnished all the parties with copies of the
Report and required them to submit their
objections thereto. It thereafter heard the
parties and their objections at the hearing of
August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report
and its findings and holds on the basis thereof
and of the evidence received and appreciated
by the Commission and duly supported by the
facts of public record and knowledge set forth
above and hereinafter, that the then President
(code named Olympus) had stage-managed
in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted
and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder
case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino
Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion
of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist', and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences which it
could have otherwise presented, but also pre-
determined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents
accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's
Report (incorporated herein by reference) and
findings and conclusions are duly
substantiated by the evidence and facts of
public record. Composed of distinguished
members of proven integrity with a combined
total of 141 years of experience in the practice
of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and
judicial services (86 years in the trial and
appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff
from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the
evidences presented and denials made by public respondents,
thus:
The desire of President
Marcos to have the Aquino-
Galman case disposed of in a
manner suitable to his
purposes was quite
understandable and was but to
be expected. The case had
stirred unprecedented public
outcry and wide international
attention. Not invariably, the
finger of suspicion pointed to
those then in power who
supposedly had the means
and the most compelling
motive to eliminate Senator
Aquino. A day or so after the
assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public
statement aired over television
that Senator Aquino was killed
not by his military escorts, but
by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos
would want the case disposed
of in a manner consistent with
his announced theory thereof
which, at the same time, would
clear his name and his
administration of any
suspected guilty participation
in the assassination.
The calling of the conference
was undoubtedly to
accomplish this purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no
bones to conceal his purpose
for calling them. From the
start, he expressed irritation
and displeasure at the
recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge
all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder.
He insisted that it was Galman
who shot Senator Aquino, and
that the findings of the Agrava
Board were not supported by
evidence that could stand in
court. He discussed and
argued with Justice Herrera on
this point. Midway in the
course of the discussion,
mention was made that the
filing of the charge in court
would at least mollify public
demands and possibly prevent
further street demonstrations.
It was further pointed out that
such a procedure would be a
better arrangement because, if
the accused are charged in
court and subsequently
acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of
double jeopardy and thereby
avoid another prosecution if
some other witnesses shall
appear when President
Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was
reached as to filing the case,
instead of dismissing it, but
with some of the accused to
be charged merely as
accomplices or accessories,
and the question of preventive
custody of the accused having
thereby received satisfactory
solution, President Marcos
took up the matter of who
would try the case and how
long it would take to be
finished.
According to Justice Herrera,
President Marcos told Justice
Pamaran 'point blank' to
personally handle the case.
This was denied by Justice
Pamaran. No similar denial
was voiced by Justice
Fernandez in the entire course
of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran
explained that such order
could not have been given
inasmuch as it was not yet
certain then that the
Sandiganbayan would try the
case and, besides, cases
therein are assigned by raffle
to a division and not to a
particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect
Justice Pamaran to admit
having received such
presidential directive. His
denial, however, falls to pieces
in the light of the fact that the
case was indeed handled by
him after being assigned to the
division headed by him. A
supposition of mere
coincidence is at once
dispelled by the circumstance
that he was the only one from
the Sandiganbayan called to
the Malacanang conference
wherein the said directive was
given. . . .
The giving of such directive to
Justice Pamaran may also be
inferred from his admission
that he gave President Marcos
the possible time frame when
asked as to how long it would
take him to finish the case.
The testimony of Justice
Herrera that, during the
conference, and after an
agreement was reached on
filing the case and
subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos
told them "Okay, mag moro-
moro na lamang kayo;" and
that on their way out of the
room President Marcos
expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered "I know how
to reciprocate," did not receive
any denial or contradiction
either on the part of justice
Fernandez or justice Pamaran.
(No other person present in
the conference was presented
by the respondents. Despite
an earlier manifestation by the
respondents of their
intention to present Fiscal
Bernabe and Prosecutor
Tamayo, such move was
abandoned without any reason
having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are
all supported by the evidence
on record. In the mind of the
Commission, the only
conclusion that may be drawn
therefrom is that pressure from
Malacanang had indeed been
made to bear on both the court
and the prosecution in the
handling and disposition of the
Aquino-Galman case. The
intensity of this pressure is
readily deductible from the
personality of the one who
exerted it, his moral and
official ascendancy over those
to whom his instructions were
directed, the motivation behind
such instructions, and the
nature of the government
prevailing at that time which
enabled, the then head of
state to exercise authoritarian
powers. That the conference
called to script or stage-
manage the prosecution and
trial of the Aquino-Galman
case was considered as
something anomalous that
should be kept away from the
public eye is shown by the
effort to assure its
secrecy. None but those
directly involved were caned to
attend. The meeting was held
in an inner room of the Palace.
Only the First Lady and
Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the
President. The conferees were
told to take the back door in
going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably
to escape notice by the visitors
in the reception hall waiting to
see the President. Actually, no
public mention alas ever made
of this conference until Justice
Herrera made his expose
some fifteen (15) months later
when the former president was
no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly
realized the importance of the
matter he wanted to take up
with the officials he asked to
be summoned. He had to do it
personally, and not merely
through trusted assistants.
The lack of will or
determination on the part of
Justice Fernandez and Justice
Pamaran to resist the
presidential summons despite
their realization of its
unwholesome implications on
their handling of the
celebrated murder case may
be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience
thereto. No effort to resist was
made, despite the existence of
a most valid reason to beg off,
on the lame excuses that they
went there out of "curiosity," or
"out of respect to the Office of
the President," or that it would
be 'unbecoming to refuse a
summons from the President.'
Such frame of mind only
reveals their susceptibility to
presidential pressure and lack
of capacity to resist the
same. The very acts of being
 summoned to Malacanang
and their ready acquiescence
thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining,
are in themselves pressure
dramatized and
exemplified Their abject
deference to President Marcos
may likewise be inferred from
the admitted fact that, not
having been given
seats during the two-hour
conference (Justice
Fernandez said it was not that
long, but did not say how long)
in which President Marcos did
the talking most of the time,
they listened to him on their
feet. Verily, it can be said
that any avowal of
independent action or
resistance to presidential
pressure became illusory from
the very moment they stepped
inside Malacanang Palace on
January 10, 1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual
issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on
whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of
the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such
pressure, as may be gauged by their
subsequent actuations in their respective
handling of the case." It duly concluded that
"the pressure exerted by President Marcos in
the conference held on January 10,
1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the
Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as
manifested in several specific incidents and
instances it enumerated in the Report under
the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure
and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel
draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six
accused as principals by conspiracy by
categorizing and charging 17 as principals,
Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as
accessories and the civilian as accomplice,
and recommending bail for the latter two
categories: "The categorization may not be
completely justified by saying that, in the mind
of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient
evidence to justify that all of the accused be
charged as principals. The majority of the
Agrava Board found the existence of
conspiracy and recommended that all of the
accused be charged accordingly. Without
going into the merit of such finding, it may
hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and
in accordance with the standard practice of
the prosecution to charge accused with the
most serious possible offense or in the highest
category so as to prevent an incurable
injustice in the event that the evidence
presented in the trial will show his guilt of the
graver charge, the most logical and practical
course of action should have been, as
originally recommended by the Herrera panel,
to charge all the accused as principals. As it
turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted
for categorization which, not surprisingly, was
in consonance with the Malacañang
instruction." It is too much to attribute to
coincidence that such unusual categorization
came only after the then President's
instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's
counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been asking the
same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since
November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez
himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the
Malacanang conference on January 10,
1985], his own view was in conformity with
that of the Special Investigating Panel to
charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents
as principals of the crime of double
murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice
Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the
draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all
26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a
press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go
through due to the summons for them to go to Malacanang in the
early evening of said date."20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and
harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no
doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the
evidence it can present, unmistakable and
persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the
accused to weaken the case of the
prosecution and thereby assure and justify
[the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal.
Unfavorable evidences were sought to be
suppressed, and some were indeed prevented
from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses
were harassed, cajoled, perjured or
threatened either to refrain from testifying or to
testify in a manner favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the
prosecution witnesses:21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who
recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and
had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Rañas who also testified before the Board
"disappeared all of a sudden and could not be located by the
police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi
Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful
flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if
crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was
not even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to
participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but was
deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next
plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear
Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in
accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the
Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as
prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave
"although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from
the original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival
at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to
testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was
seen running away by media men who sought to protect
Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was
forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday
(August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay
until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the
case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission
reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the
considerable significance of
her proposed testimony and its
unfavorable effect on the
cause of the defense, the
efforts exerted to suppress the
same was as much as, if not
more than those in the case of
Wakamiya. ... She recounted
that she was in constant fear
of her life, having been hunted
by armed men; that their
house in Tabaco, Albay was
ransacked, her family
harassed by the foreclosure of
the mortgage on their house
by the local Rural Bank, and
ejected therefrom when she
ignored the request of its
manager to talk with her about
her proposed testimony; that a
certain William Fariñas offered
her plane tickets for a trip
abroad; that Mayor Rudy
Fariñas of Laoag City kept on
calling her sister in the United
States to warn her not to
testify; that, later, Rudy and
William Fariñas offered her
two million pesos supposedly
coming from Bongbong
Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her
estafa case in Hongkong, and
the punishment of the persons
responsible for the death of
her father, if she would refrain
from testifying.
It is a matter of record,
however, that despite such
cajolery and harassments, or
perhaps because of them, Ms.
Quijano eventually testified
before the Sandiganbayan.
Justice Herrera was told by
justice Fernandez of the
displeasure expressed by
Olympus at justice Herrera's
going out of his way to make
Ms. Quijano to testify, and for
his refusal to honor the
invitation to attend the birthday
party of the First Lady on May
1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms.
Quijano's testimony on May 2,
1985. The insiduous attempts
to tamper with her testimony,
however, did not end with her
taking the witness stand. In
the course of her testimony
several notes were passed to
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the
defense counsel who cross-
examined her, one of which
suggested that she be asked
more questions about Dean
Narvasa who was suspected
of having coached her as to
what to declare (Exhibit "D");
and on another occasion, at a
crucial point in her testimony,
a power brownout occurred;
which lasted for about twenty
minutes, throwing the
courtroom into darkness, and
making most of those present
to scamper for safety, and Ms.
Quijano to pass over the
railing of the rostrum so as to
be able to leave the
courtroom. It was verified that
the brownout was limited to
the building housing the
Sandiganbayan, it not having
affected the nearby Manila
City Hall and the Finance
Building. Justice Herrera
declared that the main
switchboard of the
Sandiganbayan electrical
system was located beside the
room occupied by Malacañang
people who were keeping
track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further
made of record at that August 26th hearing
that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine
(hospitality girls) disappeared on September
4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's
assassination. And the informant, by the name
of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted
down the number of the car that took them
away, also disappeared. On January 29,
1984, during the proceedings of the Board,
Lina Galman, the common-law wife of
Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together
with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They
have been missing since then, despite his
attempts to find any of them. According to
him, "nobody was looking for these five
persons because they said Marcos was in
Power [despite his appeal to the Minister of
National Defense to locate them]. Today, still
no one is looking for these people." And he
appealed to the new leadership for its
assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by
U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S.
airmen's proposed testimonies would show an
attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the
plane to Basa Airfield or some other place,
such showing would not necessarily
contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor
the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed
at the Manila International Airport. Justice
Herrera had accurately pointed out that such
attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane
merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,'
it being possibly just one of two or three other
plans designed to accomplish the same
purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any
event, even assuming that the said piece of
evidence could go either way, it may not be
successfully contended that it was prudent or
wise on the part of the prosecution to totally
discard the said piece of evidence. Despite
minor inconsistencies contained therein, its
introduction could have helped the cause of
the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it
would even favor the defense, as averred by
Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to
suppress the same would have been totally
uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not
presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies
against adverse developments: "When the
Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice
Fernandez [against the exclusion of the
testimonies given by the military respondents
headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding
Board], the latter almost immediately
announced to media that he was not filing a
motion for the reconsideration of said denial
for the reason that it would be futile to do so
and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on
the same. ... His posture ... is, in the least,
indicative that he was living up to the
instruction of finishing the trial of the case as
soon as possible, if not of something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding
Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice
Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The
pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such
instruction crumbles under the actuality of
such directive having been complied with to
the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim
that he was ordered by President Marcos to
handle the case personally by explaining that
cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by
raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a
division thereof. The evidence before the
Comission on how the case happened to be
assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong
indication that such assignment was not done
fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the
assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular
raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of
Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an
announcement that Justice Escareal would be
presented by the respondents to testify on the
contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such
was not done. No reason was given why
Justice Escarel could not, or would not like to
testify. Neither was any one of the officials or
employees of the Sandiganbayan who,
according to Justice Pamaran, were present
during the supposed raffle, presented to
corroborate the claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two
Informations in the double murder case were
filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985,
at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle
Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m.
or only 18 minutes after the filing of the two
Informations. Such speed in the actual
assignment of the case can truly be
categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be
included in the raffle, there is need for a
certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements
were done in this case within the limited time
available therefor, the charge that the raffle
was rushed to avoid the presence of media
people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that
although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of
the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not
receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who
wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one
of the two other members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a
civilian jail: "When the question of custody
came up after the case was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order
directing the confinement of the accused in
the City Jail of Manila. This order was not
carried out in view of the information given by
the Warden of the City Jail that there was no
space for the twenty-six accused in said jail.
The same information was given when the
custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to
the National Bureau of Investigation. At that
point, the defense came up with Presidential
Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the
custody of the accused military personnel with
their respective Commanding Officers. Justice
Herrera claimed that the said Presidential
Decree was not known even to the
Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to
call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito
Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and
was given such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and
developments from Malacañang and by
Malacañang personnel: "There is
an uncontradicted evidence that the progress
of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as
well as the developments of the case outside
the Court had been monitored by Malacañang
presumably for it to know what was happening
and to take remedial measures as may be
necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly
carrying the label of 'Office of the President of
the Philippines' " were installed in the
courtroom for that purpose. There was a room
in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned
'war room', wherein military and Malacañang
personnel stayed to keep track of the
proceedings." the close monitoring by
Malacañang showed its results on several
occasions specified in the
Report. Malacañang was immediately aware
of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's
presence injustice Herrera's office on August
21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his
testimony by having the Japanese Embassy
advise Wakamiya to leave the country at
once. Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego,
Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly
appeared at the National Bureau of
Investigation office when the "crying
lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by
NBI agents for interrogation and therein
sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise
an undisputed fact," the Commission noted
"that several military personnel pretended to
be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and
attended the trials thereof in the prescribed
deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's
inescapable finding. " It is abundantly clear
that President Marcos did not only give
instructions as to how the case should be
handled He saw to it that he would know if his
instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its
decision: "That President Marcos had wanted
all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted
may not be denied. The disposal of the case
in said manner is an integral part of the
scenario which was cleverly designed to
accomplish two principal objectives,
seemingly conflicting in themselves, but
favorable both to then administration and to
the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the
public clamor for the suspected killers of
Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2]
the foreclosure of any possibility that they may
again be prosecuted for the same offense in
the event that President Marcos shall no
longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan
overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the
accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally
ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed
not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-
six accused on the standard ground that their
guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, as was the most logical and
appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in
the case, there not being a total absence of
evidence that could show guilt on the part of
the accused. The decision had to pronounce
them 'innocent of the crime charged on the
two informations, and accordingly, they incur
neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare
phenomenon to see a person accused of a
crime to be favored with such total absolution.
...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision
entertained by one of the two justices who
concurred with the majority decision penned
by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice
Herrera who testified that in October,
1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that
he was of the view that some of the accused
should be convicted he having found difficulty
in acquitting all of them; however, he confided
to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made
it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that
Malacañang had instructions to acquit all of
the twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986,
p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice
Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice
Herrera's comment to the Second Motion for
Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June
19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice
Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis
supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from
beginning to end, the then President used, or
more precisely, misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his
authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a
mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-
Galman murder cases. As graphically
depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out
by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur22) since the
resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's
dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it
would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at
any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel,
the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the
rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would
accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the
public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and
of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double
jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at
which the authoritarian President called
together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez
and the entire prosecution panel headed by
Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them
how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial
and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined
ignominious final outcome are without parallel
and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from
Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his
petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-
man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes
"any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or
business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of
justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to
several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the
findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he
himself appointed to investigate the "national
tragedy and national shame" of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination of
Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate
investigation by prestigious and free
investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her
minority report one day ahead of the four
majority members and instantly referred it to
respondents "for final resolution through the
legal system" as if it were the majority and
controlling report; and rebuked the four
majority members when they presented to him
the next day their report calling for the
indictment of all 26 respondents headed by
Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser
seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino
assassination to the dictated verdict of
acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's
majority and minority findings of fact and
publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy"
Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy
Aquino and sought futilely to justify the
soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence
to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to
their alacrity in gunning down the alleged
assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran,
J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando
Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding
that he was not on trial but the victim
according to the very information filed, and
evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite
reservations expressed by Justice Amores
who wanted to convict some of the accused)
granted all 26 accused total absolution and
pronounced them "innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor
civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on
the basis of which the Fact Finding Board had
unanimously declared the soldiers' version of
Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story,
given deliberately and in conspiracy with one
another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference
of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian
President discussed with the Presiding Justice
of the Sandiganbayan and the entire
prosecution panel the matter of the imminent
filing of the criminal charges against all the
twenty-six accused (as admitted by
respondent Justice Fernandez to have been
confirmed by him to the then President's
"Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding
day) is not denied. It is without precedent.
This was illegal under our penal
laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the
very beginning all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the
Commission noted: "The very acts of being
summoned to Malacañang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the
circumstances then obtaining, are in
themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to
presidential pressure became illusory from the
very moment they stepped inside Malacanang
Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has
received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree
(disclosed only at the hearing of oral
arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition
challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman
murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial,
as mandatory required by the known P.D.
1850 at the time providing for exclusive
jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal
offenses committed by military men 26-a) made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an
impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law.
As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be
determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means
of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This
criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases
by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for
now the extensive arguments of respondents accused,
particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as
accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness
suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of
Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of
the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of
the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed.
There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments
and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a
sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under
its aegis are courts of
law and justice and equity. They would have
no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
used as mere tools of injustice, deception and
duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,
instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render
impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear
or favor and removed from the pressures of
politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at
bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of
our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an
accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had
pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was
entitled to due process of law and trial in the
regular civil courts before an impartial court
with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy,
as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and
sovereign people as the aggrieved parties
plead once more for due process of law and a
retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained
to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-
trial of the century-and that the pre-
determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful
and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine
that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial
courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the
1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is
deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its
case its right to due process is
thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is
that where there is a violation
of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation
of the State's right to due
process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon
vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA
420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which
cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the
denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction (Aducayen vs.
Flores, L-30370 [May 25,
1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]).
Any judgment or decision
rendered notwithstanding such
violation may be regarded as a
"lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head" (Aducayen
vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal
order dated July 7, 1967 being
null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not
constitute a proper basis for a
claim of double jeopardy
(Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b)
before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the
accused (People vs. Ylagan,
58 Phil. 851). The lower court
was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when
it violated the right of the
prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was
never terminated, and the
remand of the criminal case
for further hearing and/or trial
before the lower courts
amounts merely to a
continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose
the accused to a second
jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of
double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar
where as we have held, the sham trial was but
a mock trial where the authoritarian president
ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure
the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal
and total absolution as innocent of an the
respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the
laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw
him near the end "deactivating" himself from
the case, as it was his belief that its eventual
resolution was already a foregone conclusion,
they could not cope with the misuse and
abuse of the overwhelming powers of the
authoritarian President to weaken the case of
the prosecution, to suppress its evidence,
harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses,
secure their recantation or prevent them from
testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's
difficulties in locating witnesses and
overcoming their natural fear and reluctance
to appear and testify, respondent
Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying
tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
intention to terminate the proceedings in about
6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to
the scripted scenario. The prosecution
complained of "the Presiding Justice's
seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and
their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
and contempt proceedings as compared to
the nil situation for the defense. Herrera "Private respondent invoke 'justice for the important thing
likewise complained of being "cajoled into innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales here is, shall
producing witnesses and pressed on making must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the we say, the
assurances that if given a certain period, they accused alone. The interests of the society, decision of the
will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera which they have wronged must also be case.
pleaded for "a reasonable period of equally considered. A judgment of conviction
preparation of its evidence" and cited other is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict J. HERRERA
pending cases before respondent court that of acquittal neither necessarily spells a
were pending trial for a much longer time triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to I think more
where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" the society offended, it could also mean important than
were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital the decision of
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process role. They render justice where justice is due.30
of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the the case, Your
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the Honor, is the
authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his 2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal capacity of the
such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors justices to sit in
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars had filed a motion to disqualify and for judgment. That
anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to
inhibition of respondents Justices of the is more
the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias important than
authoritarian head of the government becomes the law-breaker, and partiality to the defense and arising from
he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become anything
a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. else.(p. 13
Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had TSN, June 25,
Respondents-accused's contention that the been passing coaching notes to defense 1985)
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the (Emphasis
case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, supplied by
without being put in double jeopardy was 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum Herrera). 31
forcefully disposed of by the Court in People that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not
vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable decide the case on the merits without first But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside
here, as follows: "That is the general rule and making a final ruling on the Motion for Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him,
presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange in the decision, for supposedly not having
pointed out, however, respondent Courts' between him and the Presiding Justice to joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the
Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment show the latter's "following the script of facts above-stated, as follows:
for having been issued without jurisdiction. No Malacanang.
double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void ... the motion for inhibition
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all PJ PAMARAN above referred to related
By it no rights are divested. Through it, no exclusively for the contempt
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all Well the court proceeding. Too, it must be
proceedings founded upon it are equally believes that remembered that the
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All we should prosecution neither joined that
acts performed under it and all claims flowing proceed with petition, nor did it at any time
out of it are void. the trial and manifest a desire to file a
then deal later similar motion prior to the
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx on with submission of these cases for
that. After all, decision. To do it now is not
the most alone out of season but is also
 a confession of official
insouciance (Page 22,
Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the
Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the
procedure recognized by the Court in the
1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an
adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of
acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor
appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the
overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out
a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged
failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete
evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their
petition and lifting of the temporary restraining
order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no
restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have
precipitately issued its decision of total
absolution of all the accused pending the final
action of this Court. This is the teaching
of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in setting
aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that
(respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very
least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision
pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to
imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by
deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action].
All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of
discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other
related objections of respondents' counsels
must be rejected in the face of the Court's
declaration that the trial was a mock trial and
that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to
a direct action to annul the judgment, instead
of the present action which was timely filed
initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the
rendition of the void judgment. And after the
hasty rendition of such judgment for the
declaration of its nullity, following the
presentation of competent proof heard by the
Commission and the Court's findings
therefrom that the proceedings were from the
beginning vitiated not only by lack of due
process but also by the collusion between the
public respondents (court and Tanodbayan)
for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of
acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-
accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a
case of mere irregularities in the conduct of
the proceedings or errors of judgment which
do not affect the integrity or validity of the
judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel
that the State and the sovereign people are
not entitled to due process is clearly
erroneous and contrary to the basic principles
and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that
they had not exerted the pressure applied by
the authoritarian president on public
respondents and that no evidence was
suppressed against them must be held to be
untenable in the wake of the evil plot now
exposed for their preordained wholesale
exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's
opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer
therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme
Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's
membership for review of his lost case once more, since public
policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end
and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating
the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six
(6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion
for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked,
because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration
was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under
date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and
the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April 3,
1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing
after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties
who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second
motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material
ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the
petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the
secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came
to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed
beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings)
the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had
dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal.
Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new
appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for
reconsideration.37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the
proceedings, the cases must now be tried
before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor.-There has been the long dark
night of authoritarian regime, since the fake
ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted
by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the
imposition of martial law and authoritarian
one-man rule, with the padlocking of
Congress and the abolition of the office of the
Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente
Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the
new members of the Bar last May, "In the past
few years, the judiciary was under heavy
attack by an extremely powerful executive.
During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both
in and outside the judiciary perceptively
surrendered to the animus of technicality. In
the end, morality was overwhelmed by
technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly
and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme
Court faces the task of restoring public faith
and confidence in the courts. The Supreme
Court enjoys neither the power of the sword
nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in
public confidence, based on the truth and
moral force of its judgments. This has been
built on its cherished traditions of objectivity
and impartiallity integrity and fairness and
unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the
rule of law which compels acceptance as well
by the leadership as by the people. The lower
courts draw their bearings from the Supreme
Court. With this Court's judgment today
declaring the nullity of the questioned
judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial,
there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as
vigorously as we rejected becoming its
victims. The end of one form of injustice
should not become simply the beginning of
another. This simply means that the
respondents accused must now face trial for
the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor
with all due process. What the past regime
had denied the people and the aggrieved
parties in the sham trial must now be assured
as much to the accused as to the aggrieved
parties. The people will assuredly have a way
of knowing when justice has prevailed as well
as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime
that those appointed to public office owe their
primary allegiance to the appointing authority
and are accountable to him alone and not to
the people or the Constitution must be
discarded. The function of the appointing
authority with the mandate of the people,
under our system of government, is to fill the
public posts. While the appointee may
acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity
thus given of rendering public service, the
appointing authority becomes functus
officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed
must be rendered to the Constitution and the
sovereign people in accordance with his
sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States
Supreme Court, the Justices and judges must
ever realize that they have no constituency,
serve no majority nor minority but serve only
the public interest as they see it in accordance
with their oath of office, guided only, the
Constitution and their own conscience and
honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court
expresses its appreciation with thanks for the
invaluable services rendered by the
Commission composed of retired Supreme
Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman,
and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros
German and Eduardo Caguioa as members.
In the pure spirit of public service, they
rendered selflessly and without remuneration
thorough competent and dedicated service in
discharging their tasks of hearing and
receiving the evidence, evaluating the same
and submitting their Report and findings to the
Court within the scheduled period and greatly
easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion
for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions
of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition
and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration are hereby set
aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby
rendered nullifying the proceedings in
respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment
of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-
trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with
careful regard for the requirements of due
process, so that the truth may be finally known
and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took
no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the
need to establish the truth behind the vicious
assassination of the late Senator Benigno
Aquino, as expressed in my dissenting opinion
in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA 294, 379
[1985]), and so that justice may be done, I
vote for the re-trial prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital
evidence had been suppressed by the
prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as
immaterial or irrelevant, evidence which, if
presented, could affect the outcome of the
case. As it is, the prosecution failed to fully
ventilate its position and to lay out before
respondent Court all the pertinent facts which
could have helped that Court in arriving at a
just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
A public prosecutor is 'the
representative not of an
ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as
 compelling as its obligation to
govern at all and whose
interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that
it shag win a case but that
justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and every
definite sense the servant of
the law, the two-fold aim of
which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence
suffer. [Emphasis supplied]
(Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil.
556 [1940])
He owes the state, the court
and the accused the duty to
lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal
with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up
gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the
court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, the
innocent may not suffer, and
the guilty may not escape
unpunished (People vs.
Esquivel, 82 PhiL 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the
accused from beginning to end, from the raffle
of the subject cases to the promulgation of
judgment, which absolved the accused, en
masse, from any and an liability, is equally
culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due
process of law, which "requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal"
and the right of every litigant to "nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge"
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961];
Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was
violated.
The proceedings below, having been vitiated
by lack of due process, to the detriment of the
State and the People, were invalid and the
judgment rendered null and void ab initio.
There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no
judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy
may be based. "To entitle the accused to the
plea of former jeopardy the proceedings must
have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W.,
757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack
of any fundamental requisite which would
render void the judgment would make
ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such
proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).
The accused, however, argue that double
jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without
conceding, that pressure and collusion did
take place, they were not a party to the same;
and, for those who were charged only either
as accomplices or accessories, they contend
that their alleged offense involved only a
cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so
that, whatever pressure was exerted could
only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to
put them twice in jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a
party to the fraud, a conviction secured
fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be
avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So.
459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that
exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar
where both the prosecution and the Trial
Court itself were parties to the fraud and
collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused
were not a part thereof. The agreement to file
the murder charge in Court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused could no
longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of
double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the
accused into principals, accomplices and
accessories so that not all of them would be
denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently
conceived for their benefit and for the purpose
of protecting them from subsequent
prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs.
Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d.
682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and
does not put him in jeopardy; and
consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for
the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110,
65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA.
498).
The proceedings below having been fatally
flawed by pressure, fraud and collusion, with
the legal consequence that there was no trial
and judgment to speak of, and under the
circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I
v•te for a re-trial in the interest of truth and
the ends of public justice. As in all criminal
proceedings, however, the accused must be
guaranteed a fair, speedy, and impartial re-
trial before an unbiased Tribunal and
prosecutor and, I might add, safeguarded
against trial by publicity.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
Considering that certain significant facts and
circumstances not previously disclosed to the
Court were found by the Commission
constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire
and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be
duly established by sufficient evidence and
are indicative of "a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing
of the Aquino-Galman murder case ...;" and
that there exists "adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion
of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences it could
have otherwise presented, but also pre-
determined the outcome of the case; ..." I join
in granting petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration.
In my considered view, the ends of Justice will
be best served by allowing the trial anew of
the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain
a judgment that will be removed from any
suspicion of attendant irregularities. With the
greatest significance being given by our
people to the said cases, which are evidently
of historical importance, I am readily
persuaded that it is to our national interest that
all relevant evidence that may be now
available be provided an opportunity to be
received and made known so that whatever is
the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained. I,
therefore, vote for a declaration of mistrial and
for nullifying the proceedings of the referred
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before
the Sandiganbayan and the ordering of are
trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring:
On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary
Restraining Order earlier granted. We are now
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition,
I issued a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately
dismissing the petition, we were denying the
petitioners every reasonable opportunity to
prove their allegations of non-independent
and biased conduct of both the prosecution
and the trial court. I stated that the issues of
miscarriage of justice and due process arising
from that conduct should be allowed more
extended treatment. With then Associate
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente
Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented from the
Court's resolution denying the petitioners'
motions to continue presenting their case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had
decided to resolve the petition on its merits
and the findings of the Vasquez Commission
were still for the future, I concurred in the
result of this Court's action on two grounds-(1)
the right of the accused to speedy trial and (2)
the presumption in law that judicial acts are
regularly performed and that public officers
have discharged their duties in accordance
with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now
confirm my initial misgivings and more than
overcome the presumption of regular
performance of official duty upon which I
based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now
given substance by the investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In
this petition neither the accused nor the
prosecution saw anything wrong in the
proceedings. We had the unusual
phenomenon of the relatives of one victim,
prominent lawyers and law professors, and
retired Justices assuming the uncommon role
of alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan
but also a Tanodbayan holding back its own
evidence. Instead of allowing the heated
passions and emotions generated by the
Aquino assassination to cool off or die down,
the accused insisted on the immediate
rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and
respectful in its relations with the Supreme
Court. I, therefore, found it strange and
unfortunate why, in its Comment, the
Sandiganbayan should question our authority
to look into the exercise of its jurisdiction.
There was the further matter of television
cameras during trial, their effect on the
witnesses and the judges, and other
mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Comission now
shows that there was more to these
misgivings and suspicions than appeared in
the records at that time. The Court's opinion
penned by the Chief Justice states in detail
why the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial
tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an unbiased
prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended
to protect against repeated litigations and
continuous harassment of a person who has
already undergone the agony of prosecution
and trial for one and the same offense. It
certainly was never intended to cover a
situation where the prosecution suppresses
some of its own evidence, where the accused
correctly and eagerly anticipate a judgment of
acquittal, and where the court appears to have
made up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the
Vasquez Commission, there was a failure of
trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-
moro" could not possibly result in a just or
valid decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this
separate opinion to emphasize a concern of
this Court and of an Filipinos who want
genuine justice to be realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the
pressures and partiality which led to the
judgment of acquittal we must insure that
absolutely no indication of bias, pre-judgment,
or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this
case. The fairly strong language used by the
Court in its main opinion underscores the
gravity with which it views the travesties of
justice in this "trial of the century." At the same
time, nothing expressed in our opinion should
be interpreted as the Supreme Court's making
a factual finding, one way or another, about
the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman
killing. Any statements about the
circumstances of the assassination or about
the military version of the killings are intended
solely for one issue whether or not the
Sandiganbayan acquittals should be set aside
and a retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the
stature of the persons involved, pakikisama,
utang na loob for an appointment or
reappointment, or any other extraneous
matters should color or influence the future
course of this case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past,
may have formally expressed opinions about
the innocence or guilt of the accused should
be neither a prosecutor or judge in any
forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future
proceedings to be fair they should be above
any suspicion of partiality, bias, rancor, or
vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in
the conduct of further proceedings in this
case, erroneous impressions may arise that a
prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or
innocence of any accused. Having just
declared a mistrial, we should not again
declare the retrial as another mistrial, ad
infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the
decision of the Court to grant the petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration.
Feliciano, J., concurs in his statements in the
last three paragraphs (prior to the dispositive
paragraph) of his Separate Concurring
Opinion.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Consistent with what I had perceived as the
need to establish the truth behind the vicious
assassination of the late Senator Benigno
Aquino, as expressed in my dissenting opinion
in Galman vs. Pamaran (138 SCRA 294, 379
[1985]), and so that justice may be done, I
vote for the re-trial prayed for by petitioners.
There is reason to believe that some vital
evidence had been suppressed by the
prosecution, or that it had disregarded, as
immaterial or irrelevant, evidence which, if
presented, could affect the outcome of the
case. As it is, the prosecution failed to fully
ventilate its position and to lay out before
respondent Court all the pertinent facts which
could have helped that Court in arriving at a
just decision. It had, thus, failed in its task.
A public prosecutor is 'the
representative not of an
ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to
govern at all and whose
interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that
it shag win a case but that
justice shall be done. As such,
he is in a peculiar and every
definite sense the servant of
the law, the two-fold aim of
which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence
suffer. [Emphasis supplied]
(Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil.
556 [1940])
He owes the state, the court
and the accused the duty to
lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal
with methodical and
meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up
gaps and loopholes in his
evidence to the end that the
court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, the
innocent may not suffer, and
the guilty may not escape
unpunished (People vs.
Esquivel, 82 PhiL 453 [1948]).
Respondent Court, in showing partiality for the
accused from beginning to end, from the raffle
of the subject cases to the promulgation of
judgment, which absolved the accused, en
masse, from any and an liability, is equally
culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due
process of law, which "requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal"
and the right of every litigant to "nothing less
than the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge"
(Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961];
Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was
violated.
The proceedings below, having been vitiated
by lack of due process, to the detriment of the
State and the People, were invalid and the
judgment rendered null and void ab initio.
There having been no trial at all in
contemplation of law, there is likewise no
judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy
may be based. "To entitle the accused to the
plea of former jeopardy the proceedings must
have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W.,
757; State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack
of any fundamental requisite which would
render void the judgment would make
ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such
proceedings (Steen vs. State, 242 S.W.
1047).
The accused, however, argue that double
jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without
conceding, that pressure and collusion did
take place, they were not a party to the same;
and, for those who were charged only either
as accomplices or accessories, they contend
that their alleged offense involved only a
cover-up in the investigation of the crimes so
that, whatever pressure was exerted could
only have benefited the principals,
consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to
put them twice in jeopardy.
It is true that where an accused was not a
party to the fraud, a conviction secured
fraudulently by the State's officer cannot be
avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So.
459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that
exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar
where both the prosecution and the Trial
Court itself were parties to the fraud and
collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused
were not a part thereof. The agreement to file
the murder charge in Court so that, after being
acquitted as planned, the accused could no
longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of
double jeopardy; the "categorization" of the
accused into principals, accomplices and
accessories so that not all of them would be
denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently
conceived for their benefit and for the purpose
of protecting them from subsequent
prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs.
Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d.
682). "A verdict of acquittal procured by the
accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and
does not put him in jeopardy; and
consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for
the same offense (State vs. Lee, 30A. 1110,
65 Conn. 265,48 Am. S.R. 202,27 L. RA.
498).
The proceedings below having been fatally
flawed by pressure, fraud and collusion, with
the legal consequence that there was no trial
and judgment to speak of, and under the
circumstances peculiar only to these cases, I
vote for a re-trial in the interest of truth and the
ends of public justice. As in all criminal
proceedings, however, the accused must be
guaranteed a fair, speedy, and impartial re-
trial before an unbiased Tribunal and
prosecutor and, I might add, safeguarded
against trial by publicity.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
Considering that certain significant facts and
circumstances not previously disclosed to the
Court were found by the Commission
constituted by this Court, purposely to inquire
and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be
duly established by sufficient evidence and
are indicative of "a scripted and pre-
determined manner of handling and disposing
of the Aquino-Galman murder case ...;" and
that there exists "adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion
of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist and which not only
prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position and to offer all the evidences it could
have otherwise presented, but also pre-
determined the outcome of the case; ..." I join
in granting petitioners' second motion for
reconsideration.
In my considered view, the ends of Justice will
be best served by allowing the trial anew of
the subject cases in order to ultimately obtain
a judgment that will be removed from any
suspicion of attendant irregularities. With the
greatest significance being given by our
people to the said cases, which are evidently
of historical importance, I am readily
persuaded that it is to our national interest that
all relevant evidence that may be now
available be provided an opportunity to be
received and made known so that whatever is
the actual truth can be rightfully ascertained. I,
therefore, vote for a declaration of mistrial and
for nullifying the proceedings of the referred
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 before
the Sandiganbayan and the ordering of are
trial.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J. concurring::
On November 28, 1985, this Court dismissed
the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and lifted a Temporary
Restraining Order earlier granted. We are now
acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners.
When the Court initially dismissed the petition,
I issued a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion. The issues before us were novel and
momentous. I felt that in immediately
dismissing the petition, we were denying the
petitioners every reasonable opportunity to
prove their allegations of non-independent
and biased conduct of both the prosecution
and the trial court. I stated that the issues of
miscarriage of justice and due process arising
from that conduct should be allowed more
extended treatment. With then Associate
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Vicente
Abad Santos, I, therefore, dissented from the
Court's resolution denying the petitioners'
motions to continue presenting their case.
Since the majority of the Court, however, had
decided to resolve the petition on its merits
and the findings of the Vasquez Commission
were still for the future, I concurred in the
result of this Court's action on two grounds-(1)
the right of the accused to speedy trial and (2)
the presumption in law that judicial acts are
regularly performed and that public officers
have discharged their duties in accordance
with law.
The findings of the Vasquez Commission now
confirm my initial misgivings and more than
overcome the presumption of regular
performance of official duty upon which I
based my concurrence.
What were some of these misgivings now
given substance by the investigation?
Mistrial is usually raised by the accused. In
this petition neither the accused nor the
prosecution saw anything wrong in the
proceedings. We had the unusual
phenomenon of the relatives of one victim,
prominent lawyers and law professors, and
retired Justices assuming the uncommon role
of alleging not only a biased Sandiganbayan
but also a Tanodbayan holding back its own
evidence. Instead of allowing the heated
passions and emotions generated by the
Aquino assassination to cool off or die down,
the accused insisted on the immediate
rendition of a decision.
The Sandiganbayan is usually sober and
respectful in its relations with the Supreme
Court. I, therefore, found it strange and
unfortunate why, in its Comment, the
Sandiganbayan should question our authority
to look into the exercise of its jurisdiction.
There was the further matter of television
cameras during trial, their effect on the
witnesses and the judges, and other
mischievous potentialities.
The report of the Vasquez Comission now
shows that there was more to these
misgivings and suspicions than appeared in
the records at that time. The Court's opinion
penned by the Chief Justice states in detail
why the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial
tribunal and the Tanodbayan not an unbiased
prosecutor.
The right against double jeopardy is intended
to protect against repeated litigations and
continuous harassment of a person who has
already undergone the agony of prosecution
and trial for one and the same offense. It
certainly was never intended to cover a
situation where the prosecution suppresses
some of its own evidence, where the accused
correctly and eagerly anticipate a judgment of
acquittal, and where the court appears to have
made up its mind even before trial has started.
Under the circumstances found by the
Vasquez Commission, there was a failure of
trial tantamount to no trial at all. A "moro-
moro" could not possibly result in a just or
valid decision.
I am, however, constrained to write this
separate opinion to emphasize a concern of
this Court and of an Filipinos who want
genuine justice to be realized in this case.
In the same way that we deplore the
pressures and partiality which led to the
judgment of acquittal we must insure that
absolutely no indication of bias, pre-judgment,
or vindictiveness shall taint the retrial of this
case. The fairly strong language used by the
Court in its main opinion underscores the
gravity with which it views the travesties of
justice in this "trial of the century." At the same
time, nothing expressed in our opinion should
be interpreted as the Supreme Court's making
a factual finding, one way or another, about
the perpetrators of the Aquino or the Galman
killing. Any statements about the
circumstances of the assassination or about
the military version of the killings are intended
solely for one issue whether or not the
Sandiganbayan acquittals should be set aside
and a retrial ordered.
Neither our final resolution of this petition, the
stature of the persons involved, pakikisama,
utang na loob for an appointment or
reappointment, or any other extraneous
matters should color or influence the future
course of this case.
Needless to say, any person who, in the past,
may have formally expressed opinions about
the innocence or guilt of the accused should
be neither a prosecutor or judge in any
forthcoming trial. It is not enough for the future
proceedings to be fair they should be above
any suspicion of partiality, bias, rancor, or
vindictiveness. It would be unfortunate if, in
the conduct of further proceedings in this
case, erroneous impressions may arise that a
prosecutor or judge has prejudged the guilt or
innocence of any accused. Having just
declared a mistrial, we should not again
declare the retrial as another mistrial, ad
infinitum.
For the reasons abovestated, I concur in the
decision of the Court to grant the petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration.
G.R. No. L-59180 January 29, 1987
CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and
RESOLUTION L. RUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS
MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative
of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973
Constitution, is Batas Pambansa Blg. 56,
enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan
del Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56
read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai,
Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez,
Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa Maria, San
Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan
Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the
Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan
del Sur, are hereby separated from said
municipality to form and constitute an
independent Municipality of Sibagat without
affecting in any manner the legal existence of
the mother Municipality of Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new
Municipality of Sibagat will be: Beginning at
the point of intersection of the Cabadbaran-
Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries;
thence in a southernly direction following the
Old Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan
and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las
Nieves boundaries, until it reaches the point of
intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and
the Municipality of Las Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly
created municipality shall be in Barangay
Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all
provisions of laws, now or hereafter applicable
to regular municipalities shall be applicable to
the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted in
the area or areas affected within a period of
ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act,
the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint
the Mayor and other Officials of the new
Municipality of Sibagat.
Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of
Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino
Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent
municipal officers are the local public officials
of the new Municipality.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution,
said to have been infringed, is reproduced
hereunder:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or
barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code,
and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected.
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that
under the aforequoted provision, the Local
Government Code must first be enacted to
determine the criteria for the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
the boundary of any province, city,
municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local
Government Code had as yet been enacted
as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute
could not have possibly complied with any
criteria when respondent Municipality was
created, hence, it is null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code
came into being only on 10 February 1983 so
that when BP 56 was enacted, the code was
not yet in existence. The evidence likewise
discloses that a plebiscite had been
conducted among the people of the unit/units
affected by the creation of the new
Municipality, who expressed approval thereof;
and that officials of the newly created
Municipality had been appointed and had
assumed their respective positions as such.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The
absence of the Local Government Code at the
time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it
intended to cripple legislative competence to
create municipal corporations. Section 3,
Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not
proscribe nor prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the
enactment of the Local Government Code. It
contains no requirement that the Local
Government Code is a condition sine qua
non for the creation of a municipality, in much
the same way that the creation of a new
municipality does not preclude the enactment
of a Local Government Code. What the
Constitutional provision means is that once
said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government
units should conform with the criteria thus laid
down. In the interregnum before the
enactment of such Code, the legislative power
remains plenary except that the creation of the
new local government unit should be
approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of
Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A
plebiscite was conducted and the people of
the unit/units affected endorsed and approved
the creation of the new local government unit
(parag. 5, Petition; p. 7, Memorandum). In
lwphl@itç
fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not
questioned herein. The officials of the new
Municipality have effectively taken their oaths
of office and are performing their functions.
A dejure entity has thus been created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power
to create a municipal corporation is essentially
legislative in nature. In the absence of any
constitutional limitations a legislative body
may Create any corporation it deems
essential for the more efficient administration
of government (I McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd ed., 509). The creation of
the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid
exercise of legislative power then vested by
the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa.
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs.
COMELEC (142 SCRA 727 [1986]), striking
down as unconstitutional BP Blg. 885 creating
a new province in the Island of Negros known
as the Province of Negros del Norte, and
declaring the plebiscite held in connection
therewith as illegal There are significant
differences, however, in the two cases among
which may be mentioned the following. in
the Tan case, the Local Government Code
already existed at the time that the challenged
statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not
so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885 in
the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the
"proposed new province" to the exclusion of
the voters in the remaining areas, in
contravention of the Constitutional mandate
and of the Local Government Code that the
plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units
affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically
provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas
affected." In fact, as previously stated, no
question is raised herein as to the legality of
the plebiscite conducted. Thirdly, in
the Tan case, even the requisite area for the
creation of a new province was not complied
with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the
creation of the new municipality has been
raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste"
attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and
the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in
the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56
creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was
enacted in the normal course of legislation,
and the plebiscite was held within the period
specified in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa,
Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required
plebiscite, although not questioned here,
nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section
3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held
"in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in
the proposed municipality but also in the
mother municipality, in line with Tan v.
Commission on Elections (142 SCRA 727),
reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary
(128 SCRA 6) and Lopez v. Metro Manila
Commission (136 SCRA 633) insofar as these
cases held that the plebiscite could be
confined only to the political unit proposed to
be created.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required
plebiscite, although not questioned here,
nevertheless complied with Article XI, Section
3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held
"in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in
the proposed municipality but also in the
mother municipality, in line with Tan v.
Commission on Elections (142 SCRA 727),
reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary
(128 SCRA 6) and Lopez v. Metro Manila
Commission (136 SCRA 633) insofar as these
cases held that the plebiscite could be
confined only to the political unit proposed to
be created.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132603. September 18,
2000.]
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE
LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION
P. DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON,
JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA,
CARMENCITA A. SALVA, DIONISIO B.
DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA,
GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS
TOO NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A
CLASS SUIT, Petitioners, v. HON.
ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI,
Balayan, Batangas; HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANGLALA WIGAN OF
BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN, CALACA,
BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Order dated February 25,
1998, 1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, 2 in Civil
Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
holding the plebiscite scheduled on
February 28, 1998, on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 23, 1998, Petitioners, as
officials and residents of barangay San
Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit
against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of
Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987, series of 199S, with
prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order.
Ordinance No. 05 3 declared the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger
with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of
Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the
required plebiscite as provided under
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991. 4 On the other
hand, Resolution No. 345 5 affirmed the
effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby
overriding the veto 6 exercised by the
governor of Batangas. 7 Ordinance No. 05
was vetoed by the governor of Batangas
for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was
not shown that the essential requirements
under Section 9, in relation to Section 7,
of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the
attestations or certifications of the
Department of Finance (DOF), National
Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the
foregoing ordinance and resolution, on
February 10, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998, to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger
with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca,
Batangas. 8 Simultaneous with the filing
of the action before the trial court,
petitioners also filed an ex parte motion
for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents
from enforcing Ordinance No. 05,
Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the
trial court denied the ex parte motion for
the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction for
lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial
court, the temporary restraining
order/injunction sought by petitioners is
directed only to COMELEC Resolution No.
2987. The trial court ruled that any
petition or action questioning an act,
resolution or decision of the COMELEC
must be brought before the Supreme
Court. 9
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed
the instant petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, without filing
a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s Order dated February 25, 1998,
claiming the urgency or immediate
necessity to enjoin the conduct of the
plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998. 10
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the
Court directed the parties to maintain the
status quo prevailing at the time of the
filing of the petition. 11
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General
filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, declaring that he concurs with
petitioners’ cause and recommending that
the instant petition be given due course.
12 Consequently, the Court further
resolved on September 29, 1998 to
require the COMELEC and the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas
to submit their own Comment on the
petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the
Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and require the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. 13
In their Memorandum filed on October 26,
1999, petitioners submitted the following
issue for the resolution of this
Court:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN
THE COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS
RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998,
WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY
28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION
OF BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS
MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO,
CALACA, BATANGAS, PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO.
3442 FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO.
345 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO.
2987." 14
First, petitioners contend that the assailed
Order dated February 25, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of
suit[s] and splitting a single cause of
action," contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of
the Rules of Court. 15 Petitioners maintain
that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
was only issued pursuant to Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas,
the propriety of the issuance of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon
the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345. 16 And considering
that the jurisdiction of the trial court to
hear and determine the validity of
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345
is not disputed, the assailed Order dated
February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to
seek the preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before this
Court, advances multiplicity of suits and
splitting a single cause of action.
Second, petitioners assert that when the
COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial
functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881),
its acts are subject to the exclusive review
by this Court; but when the COMELEC
performs a purely ministerial but, such act
is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial
Court, 17 citing Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop v. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25
[1985]), thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers
vested by the Constitution and the law on
the Commission on Elections may either
be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or
those which are inherently administrative
and sometimes ministerial in character." ‘
18chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that"
[t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345,
is not adjudicatory [or quasi judicial] in
nature but simply ministerial or
administrative in nature [and only] in
obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and
Resolution," citing Garces v. Court of
Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996),
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . To rule otherwise would surely
burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best
ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial
Court], a court which the law vests with
the power to exercise original jurisdiction
over ‘all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions’." 19
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the
plebiscite sought to be enjoined has
already been conducted on February 28,
1998, the instant petition is far from being
moot and academic, claiming that the
actual holding of the said plebiscite could
not validate an otherwise invalid
ordinance and resolution; 20 that there
are still substantial matters to be
resolved; 21 assuming arguendo that this
petition has become moot and academic,."
. . courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is ‘capable of
repetition, yet evading review" ‘; 22 and
finally, petitioners maintain that this Court
has resolved to require the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the
time of the filing of the petition, that is, a
day before the plebiscite was scheduled to
be conducted. 23
Concurring with petitioners’ arguments,
the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum
filed on September 7, 1999, asserts that."
. . [I]t is already settled in this jurisdiction
that what is contemplated by the terms
‘any decision, order or ruling’ of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari to this
Honorable Court, as provided under
Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987]
Constitution, are those that relate to the
COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial powers involving elective
regional, provincial and city officials."
(Citations omitted.) 24 The Solicitor
General further argues that the issuance
of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative functions,
hence, it is submitted that the aforecited
constitutional provision is
inapplicable.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand,
submits that the power to review or
reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
solely belongs to this Court, citing the
earlier cases of Zaldivar v. Estenzo (23
SCRA 533, 540-541[1968]); Luison v.
Garcia (L-10916, May 20, 1957); Macud
v. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and
Aratuc v. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272
[1979]); 25 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . For even without the express
constitutional prescription that only this
Court may review the decisions, orders
and rulings of the Commission on
Elections, it is easy to understand why no
interference whatsoever with the
performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed
unless emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not
precisely in point, indicates the proper
approach. Thus: ‘It is easy to realize the
chaos that would ensue if the Court of
First Instance of each and every province
were to arrogate unto itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any
order of the Commission on Elections;
that constitutional body would be speedily
reduced to impotence." 26
The COMELEC further argues that." . . if a
Regional Trial Court does not have
jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory
agencies of government like the ones
cited above [referring to the former Court
of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent
Office, Public Service Commission, Social
Security Commission, National
Electrification Administration and
Presidential Commission on Good
Government], a fortiori it can not have
any such jurisdiction over the Commission
on Elections, a constitutional independent
body expressly clothed by the 1987
Constitution with, among others, quasi-
judicial functions and tasked with one of
the most paramount aspects of a
democratic government. . . ." 27 Finally,
the COMELEC contends that the
temporary restraining order sought by
petitioners has been rendered moot and
academic by the actual holding of the
plebiscite sought to be enjoined. 28
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution provides in part
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within this days from
receipt of a copy thereof." chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In Garces v. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA
99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop v. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25
[1985]), we found occasion to interpret
the foregoing provision in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . What is contemplated by the term
‘final orders, rulings and decisions’ of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers." 29
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that
powers vested by the Constitution and the
law on the Commission on Elections may
either be classified as those pertaining to
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions,
or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial
in character. 30
As aptly explained by the Solicitor
General, in the instant case, after the
COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the
ordinance and resolution declaring the
abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for
a plebiscite to be held in the affected
barangays, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. We
agree with the Solicitor General that." . . .
[t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution
No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is
part and parcel of its administrative
functions. It involves no exercise of
discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial power to hear and resolve
controversies defining the rights and
duties of party-litigants, relative to the
conduct of elections of public officers and
the enforcement of the election laws."
(Citation omitted.) 31 Briefly, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 which provides for
the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not
issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-
judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of plebiscites,
thus, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order" reviewable
by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution
may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Even the cases cited by the public
respondent in support of its contention —
that the power to review or reverse
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely
belongs to this Court are simply not in
point. Zaldivar v. Estenzo 32 speaks of
the power of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections to the exclusion of the
judiciary. In the present case, petitioners
are not contesting the exclusive authority
of the COMELEC to enforce and administer
election laws. Luison v. Garcia 33 refers to
this Court’s power to review
"administrative decisions," particularly
referring to a COMELEC resolution with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No.
declaring a certain certificate of candidacy 3442. The execution of the result of the
null and void, based on Article X, Section plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall
2 of the 1935 Constitution. In Macud v. be deferred depending on the outcome of
COMELEC, 34 we reiterated that when a Civil Case No. 3442.cralaw : red
board of canvassers rejects an election
return on the ground that it is spurious or SO ORDERED
has been tampered with, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to the
COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the
COMELEC sustains the action of the board,
the aggrieved party may appeal to this
Court. In both Luison and Macud, the
assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within
the purview of "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public

respondent’s other contentions deserve
scant consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is

hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order
dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
The Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed