Australian Journal of International Affairs

ISSN: 1035-7718 (Print) 1465-332X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20

West Papua, Indonesia and the Melanesian

Spearhead Group: competing logics in regional
and international politics

Stephanie Lawson

To cite this article: Stephanie Lawson (2016) West Papua, Indonesia and the Melanesian
Spearhead Group: competing logics in regional and international politics, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 70:5, 506-524, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2015.1119231

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1119231

Published online: 08 Feb 2016.

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AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2016
VOL. 70, NO. 5, 506–524
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2015.1119231

West Papua, Indonesia and the Melanesian Spearhead Group:

competing logics in regional and international politics
Stephanie Lawson
Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The idea of a shared Melanesian identity has been consolidated over identity politics; Indonesia;
the last three decades or so through the most important Melanesia; Pacific Islands;
subregional organisation in the South-West Pacific—the regionalism; West Papua
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The solidarity of this group
has been strained over various issues from time to time, but none
is as fraught as the Indonesian occupation of what is commonly
known as West Papua, whose indigenous Papuan people are
ethnically Melanesian. In addition to recounting the Indonesian
takeover of West Papua in the context of the dynamics of
decolonisation, the Cold War and early regional development, the
article examines the emergence of Melanesian identity and the
MSG, before considering more recent developments. These focus
on a recent bid by West Papuans for MSG membership, key
aspects of Indonesia’s role in the Melanesian subregion, and the
extent to which these developments highlight competing logics
in regional and international politics.

Introduction
Identity politics is a common facet of regional politics, and nowhere is this more clearly
evident than in the South-West Pacific. Defined in geographic terms, this region encom-
passes the island countries of Melanesia and Western Polynesia, as well as Australia and
New Zealand. While the latter belong geographically, they are usually seen as essentially
‘European’ or ‘Western’, and therefore outside the cultural sphere of the island states—
New Zealand’s substantial indigenous Polynesian population notwithstanding. The Mel-
anesian states have also been differentiated from those of Polynesia, partly on ethnic/cul-
tural grounds, but also along certain political lines. These modes of differentiation have
been expressed through the idea of a Melanesian Way and a Melanesian ‘brotherhood’,
thereby underpinning a certain sense of ethno-political solidarity across the Melanesian
subregion. Melanesian identity and solidarity have been further consolidated through
the South-West Pacific’s most important subregional organisation—the Melanesian
Spearhead Group (MSG).

CONTACT Stephanie Lawson stephanie.lawson@mq.edu.au

Stephanie Lawson is Professor of Politics and International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, and Senior
Research Associate, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Her latest book is Theories of Inter-
national Relations: Contending Approaches to World Politics (Polity Press, 2015).
© 2016 Australian Institute of International Affairs
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 507

From the beginning, the MSG evinced a strong anti-colonial stance, which added to the
sense of differentiation from the more politically conservative Polynesian countries, as well
as from Australia and New Zealand. The latter are former colonial powers, albeit by
default, in that they were not original colonising agents but, rather, assumed responsibility
for several of the colonial states in the region as a result of the World Wars of the twentieth
century. In the longer term, however, the mission of Australia and New Zealand became
one of preparing their Pacific Island colonies for independence. This occurred in the post-
World War II era of decolonisation, although the ‘winds of change’ generally reached the
Pacific much later than in other parts of the former colonial world.
Indonesia’s emergence as an independent nation, largely on the foundations of the
combined colonies of the Netherlands East Indies and the incorporation of what is com-
monly called West Papua within the Indonesian state, is a very different story.1 The former
Netherlands New Guinea was claimed as a legitimate and integral part of the new inde-
pendent state of Indonesia. This was despite the resistance of the Papuan people them-
selves—resistance which continues to this day.
As part of the quest for international recognition in the contemporary period, a conso-
lidated group of pro-independence organisations, operating under the banner of the
United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), petitioned the MSG for mem-
bership, which was duly considered at the MSG’s biennial summit meeting in Honiara in
June 2015. Given that the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), the
principal Kanak organisation of New Caledonia, was granted membership in 1991 pre-
cisely on the basis that it represented the legitimate aspirations for independence of a colo-
nised Melanesian people, and accords with the MSG’s founding principles of anti-
colonialism and the Melanesian brotherhood, consistency of logic and principle appears
to have been on the side of the West Papuans.
The ULMWP’s application to the MSG was, not surprisingly, opposed by Indonesia.
Indonesia’s position now rests on the standard claim in international law of the right to
non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state—a right that has been asserted
dogmatically by most post-colonial states since the era of decolonisation. This right,
however, clearly clashes with the right to self-determination implicit in the moral case
for decolonisation, which provides the normative basis for West Papuan claims against
what is seen as Indonesia’s illegal occupation of West Papua, amounting to simply
another form of oppressive and violent colonialism. These claims have been enhanced
by Indonesia’s own sorry record in West Papua over the last half century, including egre-
gious human rights abuses, which also brings into play the more recent emphasis on state
sovereignty as entailing the ‘responsibility to protect’ and not merely the right of states, or
rather their governments, to do as they please within their borders without interference or
even criticism from any external source.
This article looks first at the Indonesian takeover of West Papua in the 1960s in the
context of the historical dynamics of the decolonisation movement, the Cold War and
regional development in the South-West Pacific. It then examines the emergence of
pan-Melanesianist ideas and the rise of the MSG as a subregional organisation based on
notions of Melanesian solidarity, as well as a strong anti-colonial ideology. The discussion
of more recent developments focuses on the West Papuan bid for MSG membership and
the decision of the MSG at its June 2015 summit, which resulted in limited recognition for
West Papuans through the granting of observer status to the ULMWP, but on the basis
508 S. LAWSON

that the organisation only represents West Papuans resident outside Indonesia. At the
same time, Indonesia’s status was elevated to associate membership of the MSG, although
representation will be through the governors of Melanesian provinces (MSG 2015a). The
question is whether the overall result means that the logic of realpolitik, entailing a per-
ception that their interests are better served by a closer relationship with Indonesia, has
won out over that of the MSG’s own foundational principles of Melanesian solidarity
and ant-colonialism.

Regional organisation in the South-West Pacific

Regional organisation in the Pacific, as elsewhere, is a predominantly post-World War II
phenomenon. The Pacific colonial powers in the immediate post-war period—the USA,
UK, France and the Netherlands, together with Australia and New Zealand—recognised
the necessity for coordinating certain of their activities while stabilising post-war order
in the region in an emergent Cold War context. The Canberra Agreement of 1947 estab-
lished the region’s first formal organisation in the shape of the South Pacific Commission
(SPC), and also the first political definition of the territorial scope of the region’s colonial
sphere as comprising ‘all those non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Ocean …
administered by the participating Governments and which lie wholly or in part south
of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea’ (Australian Govern-
ment 1947, 1).2 The latter territory was not part of negotiations over Indonesian indepen-
dence in 1949, with the Dutch having argued that the people were both ethnically very
different and had, in any case, been administered separately from Netherlands East
Indies, and so should not be incorporated within the new state. The few educated
Papuans of the time, and others who were aware of these developments, reportedly also
opposed incorporation in Indonesia (Van Der Eng 2004, 664).
The Dutch had first occupied the territory in 1828, but had done little to initiate devel-
opment, which meant that most Papuans had been left largely to their own devices. Some
developmental efforts were made from the early 1950s, no doubt spurred by the pressure
from Indonesia and, perhaps, by participation in the SPC, which was very much focused
on development among indigenous populations in the region. Indonesian reports from
this period refer, correctly, to the thoroughgoing neglect of education, housing, health
and development in the territory generally, with one report noting that the accrued
benefit of many decades of Dutch rule was a literacy rate of only 7 percent of the popu-
lation (Republic of Indonesia 1954, 3).
In 1961, Sukarno delivered his Trikora (‘Three Commands’) speech, threatening to
deploy the entire armed forces of Indonesia to ‘liberate West Irian from the strangle-
hold of Dutch imperialism’ (Sukarno 1961). This was somewhat reminiscent of Japanese
claims about ‘liberating’ Asia from Western colonial powers through militarism (see
Mimura 2011). Invoking both moral cause and classic power politics, Sukarno had also
previously asserted that:
Although our claim is just, West Irian will never come under our control if our claim is not
substantiated with power … Our struggle must be based on the build-up of our power and
the application of power so as to impose our will on the enemy … if the Dutch and the
United Nations will not meet our just demand let us apply that power! (quoted in Republic
of Indonesia c. 1957b, 31).
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 509

Indonesia’s leadership also portrayed its actions in West Papua as liberating the
Papuans from the Stone Age. Although quite definitely ‘Indonesian’—for they could scar-
cely be regarded as otherwise in the logic of Indonesia’s claims—the Papuans were
regarded as uncivilised, an attitude that added to resentment and alienation among
Papuans (see Slama and Munro 2015). As Indonesian transmigration grew after 1963,
the sense of difference sharpened on both sides (Chauvel 2008, 154; Chauvel and
Bhakti 2004, 5). Discrimination continued in the decades that followed, exemplified by
lower rates of pay for Papuans for the same work (Dibley 1998). This kind of treatment
was exactly what Indonesia had complained about on behalf of the population of West
Papua when the Dutch controlled the territory (see Republic of Indonesia 1957a, 3).
Derogatory attitudes towards Melanesians, however, were scarcely confined to Indone-
sians, and it is as well to remember that identical beliefs had long been promulgated by
various European colonial powers involved in the Pacific Islands and their supporters.
The Pacific Islands Monthly—founded in 1930 and published in Australia—is replete
with references to the backwardness of Melanesians in the post-war period (and also
strongly supportive of the Dutch, while absolutely scathing about the Indonesians). In
June 1946, in the context of Indonesian nationalist demands, the editorial opined that:
‘The Melanesians of the South-West Pacific are far too backward to understand all this
“liberty” talk’ (Pacific Islands Monthly 1946, 8). It was perhaps because of such attitudes
that support for Papuans as people with rights barely registered in the international
sphere.
Meanwhile, a militarily strong Indonesia under President Sukarno, supplied in part by
the USSR, had been pressing its claims more aggressively. Actions included a military
intrusion into West Papua in 1962, prompting concerns about the possibility of large-
scale conflict. The United Nations (UN), now heavily influenced by proponents of the
decolonisation movement—most of whom apparently did not see Indonesia as an agent
of colonisation itself—also pressured the Netherlands and, in August 1962, the
New York Agreement, signed by both Indonesia and the Netherlands, officially transferred
the administration of the territory to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority,
but with provision for the phased transfer of full administrative responsibility to Indone-
sia. Further provision was made for an Act of Free Choice for the Papuan people, to be
conducted by the Indonesian authorities but observed by the UN 1962. In 1965–66,
Suharto usurped power in Indonesia—under circumstances which entailed the slaughter
of some 500,000 of his fellow Indonesians. But Suharto’s ascent to power changed nothing
in Indonesia’s approach to the territory. Indeed, an early act of his presidency was to sell a
30-year licence to the US mining company Freeport in 1967 to exploit West Papua’s gold
and copper resources. It has since emerged that Indonesia’s new foreign investment laws
were drafted by the Suharto regime with the assistance of the USA’s Central Intelligence
Agency specifically to enable Freeport’s access (Stott 2011).
The Act of Free Choice, which took place in 1969, is widely considered to have been a
complete farce. It was conducted by the Indonesian authorities under extraordinarily con-
strained conditions, and consisted of assembling 1026 hand-picked Papuans in front of
UN observers, but under the watchful eye of the Indonesian military, who then voted
unanimously for incorporation into Indonesia. Following the vote, the Indonesian govern-
ment declared that: ‘The choice of the people of West Irian is absolute. It can not be made
void by whomsoever and under whatever pretext’ (Republic of Indonesia 1972, 12).
510 S. LAWSON

The vote had been preceded by protests by Papuan people against Indonesian rule, both
peaceful and violent. Indeed, in 1961, while still under Dutch administration, a semi-
representative body called the New Guinea Council had been established and a date in
1970 set for independence. In the same year, West Papuans had raised the Morning
Star flag as a symbol of their independence. Any expression of a desire for independence,
however, was violently repressed by Indonesian security forces. One report estimates that,
in the period between 1962 and 1969, around 30,000 Papuans were killed by the Indone-
sian police and military (Robinson 2012). Even the Secretary General’s report to the UN
on the process surrounding the Act of Free Choice—popularly known among West
Papuans and their supporters as the ‘Act of No Choice’—raised serious doubts about its
integrity. Nonetheless, in the UN’s twenty-fifth year, which celebrated the theme of
‘Peace, Justice and Progress’, the General Assembly endorsed the process—opposed
only by a few African states sympathetic to the West Papuan claims—thereby formally
recognising Indonesian sovereignty over what was now called West Irian (UN 1969).
Support for Indonesia’s claims to West Papua at the UN was influenced both by the
conditions of the Cold War and concerns about Soviet involvement in the region, on
the one hand, and by the ideology of the decolonisation movement, on the other. The
US A, supported by Australia (although Australia had previously supported the Dutch),
was concerned to placate Indonesia for fear that it would turn to the communist bloc.
To this day, both the USA and Australia continue to support Indonesia for strategic
reasons, endorsing the standard mantra that issues concerning West Papua come strictly
within the ambit of Indonesia’s domestic politics (Heidbüchel 2007, 39, 61). Human rights
concerns are raised from time to time, but have had little effect.
One analyst notes that, from a contemporary perspective, it seems rather bizarre that
the most vociferous opponents of colonialism at the UN failed to support the plans for
the territory’s full independence set in train by the Netherlands from the 1950s. The Indo-
nesian case rested primarily on the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which holds that the
territorial boundaries of post-colonial states should follow those of the former colonial
state, the ostensible purpose of which was to minimise territorial disputes (Saltford
2003, 8). Sukarno applied this to Netherlands New Guinea. But he also staked a claim
to non-Dutch possessions in Indonesia’s region, including Portuguese Timor and
British colonies on Borneo and the Malay Peninsular. At the same time, Sukarno
opposed the formation of Malaysia on the basis of the former status of its component
parts as British possessions (Khilam 2007, 8). Thus, Sukarno applied the doctrine very
selectively. More generally, it appears that the basic principle of self-determination under-
pinning the entire post-World War II decolonisation movement was ultimately compro-
mised by a doctrine which only served to perpetuate some of the injustices of colonialism
and, in cases such as West Papua, to create new forms of the phenomenon.
Over the next four decades or so, the number of Papuans killed by the Indonesian
security forces—which have continued to act with virtual impunity to this day—is esti-
mated to have reached around half a million (Harvey 2014). However, there is no way
of verifying the numbers, and a more considered source suggests it is probably much
lower. But the same source also highlights well-documented atrocities committed by the
Indonesian security forces, including rape, torture, forced cannibalism and sexual mutila-
tion, designed to terrorise the Papuan population (Braithwaite et al. 2010, 61–63). Another
detailed study also provides irrefutable evidence of extensive practices of state-sponsored
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 511

torture, which, together with surveillance, arbitrary arrest and detention, disappearances
and murder, has come to constitute ‘a mode of governance’ (Hernawan 2015a, 197).
Together with policies of transmigration, especially of Javanese, who now constitute the
largest single ethnic group in West Papua (see Ananta et al. 2015, 115), the killings are
frequently said to amount to genocide. If the aim was to reduce the Papuan population
to a minority, one estimate indicates that this was achieved by the time of the 2010
Indonesian census, when the non-Papuan population of the territory reached just over
50 percent. A projection to the year 2020 predicts that Papuans will number just under
30 percent (Elmslie 2010). However, another view of the demographic issue suggests
that inter-island migration has become so common in Indonesia that the West Papuan
statistics are quite normal in this wider context (see Chauvel 2009). None of this
appears to have dampened West Papuan nationalist sentiments, with a new generation
of activists continuing the demand for self-determination (Elmslie, Webb-Gannon, and
King 2011, 2).

Regional development in the post-colonial Pacific

With Indonesia’s annexation of the former Netherlands New Guinea, the definition of the
South Pacific region was to change. The Canberra Agreement was amended in 1965 to
adjust the region’s eastern boundary, effectively giving West Papua to South-East Asia
(SPC 1965). There had been some speculation that Indonesia would attempt to join the
SPC in the place of the departing Dutch, but the redefinition of the region via this amend-
ment precluded this (Inder 1964, 10). However, it scarcely altered the fact that the indi-
genous people of West Papua remained ethnically Melanesian and identified strongly as
not Indonesian.
The advent of independence in the Pacific Islands added a significant dynamic to
regional politics and formal organisations. Western Samoa was the first to gain indepen-
dence in 1962, with most other Polynesian states following suit over the next decade,
although the Cook Islands and Niue remain technically self-governing, while Tokelau is
non-self-governing. However, to the extent that these are entirely voluntary arrangements,
they satisfy the requirements of self-determination in a way that the Act of Free Choice for
West Papuans did not.
Independence for the Melanesian states came later still—Papua New Guinea (PNG) in
1975, Solomon Islands in 1978 and Vanuatu in 1980—and for the Micronesian states even
later. French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna remain overseas territories
of Europe’s most reluctant decoloniser—France. French Polynesia was relisted in 2013 by
the UN as a non-self-governing territory, while New Caledonia, which France awarded
special status as an ‘overseas collectivity’, was relisted in 1986. Increasing power has
been devolved to New Caledonia over the last two decades, pending a possible referendum
on its final status by 2019. Like West Papua, however, it has undergone significant demo-
graphic change due to transmigration policies, resulting in a much larger local sector
favouring the political status quo. But the contrast between the status of the French terri-
tories and West Papua at the UN is significant, especially in view of the relative treatment
of the local populations, including rights to free political expression and organisation. It is
precisely because the indigenous populations of the French territories now enjoy relative
political freedom that they have been able to lobby effectively at the international level. But
512 S. LAWSON

it may also have something to do with the fact that France, being European/Western, is
regarded as a colonising power, whereas Indonesia, being non-Western, is not.
The South Pacific Commission is now, formally, the Pacific Community (although it
retains the acronym SPC in designating the Secretariat of the Pacific Community).
Once the principal institution of colonial regional coordination, the SPC now includes
in its membership 22 Pacific Island states and territories, as well as four of the original
colonial powers—the USA, France, Australia and New Zealand. The original purposes
of the SPC focused squarely on technical developmental issues and very deliberately pre-
cluded political issues, especially those that might have interfered with the rights of the
colonial powers in the region. The independent states of the Pacific are now just as
ready to invoke the doctrine of non-intervention when it comes to political issues
within their own borders, but it was, in fact, frustration with the preclusion of political
matters on the SPC agenda that led island leaders to propose the formation of the
Pacific Islands Forum (formerly the South Pacific Forum, and hereafter ‘the Forum’).
Established in 1970, the Forum embraced all independent and self-governing Pacific
Island states. Although initiated by island leaders—primarily from Fiji, Western Samoa
and the Cook Islands—it was agreed that membership would also be extended to
include Australia and New Zealand, at least partly because the new organisation would
rely on them for funding, and also perhaps to boost the Forum’s standing as a new inter-
national organisation. No Melanesian country had achieved independence at the time of
the Forum’s formation and none were involved in its early development, although all
joined as they achieved independence. The exception here was Fiji, which is often classified
as ethnically Melanesian, but stands at the intersection of Polynesia and Melanesia in geo-
graphic, ethnic and cultural terms. Fiji’s leading figures at independence were from the
eastern regions of the Fiji group, where patterns of Polynesian sociopolitical hierarchy pre-
dominated. It followed that they were also more attuned to, and aligned with, the western
Polynesian subregion at that time.
The advent of independence and the emergence of a major regional organisation on the
initiative of island leaders were accompanied by the assertion of a pan-Pacific regional
identity, expressed in the ‘Pacific Way’. As with the ‘ASEAN Way’ in neighbouring
South-East Asia, the Pacific Way acquired certain anti-colonial overtones, although this
was a later development rather than implicit in its original formulation by Ratu Sir Kamis-
ese Mara, Fiji’s first prime minister, who first articulated it during a speech to the UN in
1970 (see Lawson 2010). Mara highlighted Fiji’s peaceful transition to independence,
noting that similar ‘calm and orderly moves to independence’ had taken place in
Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga. Without elaborating further, he
simply stated that: ‘We like to think that this is the Pacific Way, both geographically
and ideologically’ (Mara 1997, 238).
As a pan-regional island identity, the Pacific Way has retained a certain currency, albeit
a rather clichéd one. But in the later stages of the decolonisation period, as PNG, Vanuatu
and Solomon Islands gained independence, a more specific subregional identity, revolving
around the idea of a ‘Melanesian Way’, emerged. This differentiated Melanesians from
both European colonisers (including Australia and New Zealand, whose dominant popu-
lations are obviously of European descent) and from the Polynesians. The latter, influen-
tial in the early development of the Forum, tended to be more politically conservative than
the new Melanesian members, more inclined to align with Australia and New Zealand,
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 513

and softer on issues such as nuclear testing in the Pacific—one of the major issues of the
1970s and 1980s—as well as decolonisation (MacQueen 1993, 145). Here it is also worth
noting that, despite the highly problematic nature of the Polynesia/Melanesia/ Micronesia
divide in ethnographic terms, not to mention its origins in European racist thought, these
categories have been invested with considerable cultural significance by those to whom
they apply (see Lawson 2013).

The Melanesian Way

The principal source of ideas about a Melanesian Way first came from the pen of a Papua
New Guinean intellectual, Bernard Narokobi, who published a series of articles in the PNG
Post-Courier in the mid-1970s, just after PNG gained independence. These articles,
together with critical commentaries by a few other contributors, were subsequently pub-
lished as The Melanesian Way (Narokobi 1983). Narokobi identified Melanesia as consist-
ing of both West Papua and PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and
distinguished the Melanesian people from Asians, Europeans, Africans and Polynesians
(Narokobi 1983, 4). Narokobi was deliberately non-specific about the substance of the
Melanesian Way, stating only that it amounted to ‘a total cosmic vision of life’ (8). But
the primary purpose of asserting a Melanesian Way was in little doubt:
Over the centuries, Melanesians have come to see themselves as they are understood and
written up by foreigners … Unless we succeed in establishing a philosophical base,
founded on our ancient virtues, we stand to perish as a people of unique quality, character
and dynamism (9).

At much the same time, Kanak leader and, later, first president of the FLNKS, Jean-
Marie Tjibaou, organised a major festival of indigenous art in New Caledonia in 1975
to celebrate Kanak cultural achievements, which had been too often ignored or denigrated
under French colonial rule. Perhaps taking its cue from Narokobi, the English translation
of a book published to mark the festival was also called The Melanesian Way (Tjibaou
1978). The festival marked the first time that a collective nationalist sentiment had been
expressed by Kanaks, and it continued to grow from this point (Bensa and Wittersheim
1997, 374). But both Narokobi’s and Tjibaou’s national versions resonated with broader
ideas about both Pacific and Melanesian Ways current at the time, and held much poten-
tial for application in the context of Melanesian subregional cooperation once other Mel-
anesian countries achieved independence and became politically active on the regional
stage in their own right (see Bensa and Wittersheim 1997, 374; Otto 1997, 61).
Elsewhere in the Melanesian subregion, the period preceding independence in Vanuatu
(then the New Hebrides) and Solomon Islands had seen the emergence of local kastom
discourses. In both places, the value of local customs and practices—previously denigrated
under colonial regimes as primitive, as well as by missionaries concerned to eliminate
‘heathen’ practices—came to be celebrated with increasing pride, along with the assertion
of a Melanesian self worthy of full recognition, and certainly of political rights (see, gen-
erally, Keesing 1982; Lindstrom 2008). Although, again, occurring mainly in the context of
national politics and the quest for independence, these kastom discourses also held the
potential for broader regional application. Tonkinson (1982, 302) noted that the idea of
kastom operated in the service of a shared Melanesian identity ‘that owes nothing to
514 S. LAWSON

alien cultural forms and now forms the way for a pan-regional “Melanesian Way”, vaguely
defined but clearly different from, and in some respects opposed to, modern Western
culture. The idea of an overarching Melanesian wantok—literally ‘one talk’ and originally
used to denote a single language group and its mutually supportive social dynamics—has
also been used to emphasise Melanesian solidarity and brotherhood (see Kabutaulaka
2015, 131).
Against this background of Melanesian identity formulation, the developing regional
sphere of politics also provided an opportunity for the expression of a collective subregio-
nal identity distinct from Polynesians, as well as from Australia and New Zealand. This
was to find institutional expression in the form of the Melanesian Spearhead Group,
which began as an informal grouping within the Forum and became consolidated as a
caucus by 1986, when the heads of government of PNG, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands,
and an FLNKS representative met in Goroka. This meeting agreed on the importance
of solidarity ‘in spearheading regional issues of common interest, including the FLNKS
cause for political independence in New Caledonia’ (MSG 2015b). In 1988, its
members, then consisting of PNG, Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, signed a set of
Agreed Principles of Co-operation among Independent States of Melanesia. The FLNKS
was admitted to formal membership in 1989. Fiji did not join the MSG until 1996, prob-
ably due to its earlier orientation to the Polynesian subregion. It took until 2007 for the
agreement under which the MSG now operates as a formal entity in international law
to be adopted (May 2011, 1). In the same year, a permanent secretariat was established
in Vanuatu with initial funding from China. The MSG is now the most important of
the subregional associations built on the foundations of the geocultural division of the
Pacific established by Europeans in the early nineteenth century—namely, Polynesia, Mel-
anesia and Micronesia. The other associations are the Micronesian Chief Executives’
Summit, founded in 2003, and the Polynesian Leaders Group, first convened in 2011
(see Lawson 2015).
While full membership of the Forum was restricted to independent countries, the
MSG’s inclusion of the FLNKS, which enjoys all the rights and privileges of the state enti-
ties, signalled a different approach. It is this precedent that establishes the basis for the
ULMWP’s aspirations to full membership of the MSG. Although developments along
these lines would accord with all the sentiments of Melanesian solidarity expressed over
the years by MSG members, as well as the anti-colonial credentials of the organisation
and the broader Melanesian Way discourse in which these are embedded, recent develop-
ments highlight a weakening of support for the West Papuans as a direct result of Indo-
nesian pressure.

The MSG and West Papua

In the MSG’s earlier years, the issue of West Papua scarcely registered on the organis-
ation’s agenda, with its members being much more concerned with issues on the Pacific
side, especially that of Kanak independence, which the Melanesian states saw as being neg-
lected by the Forum. Indeed, May (2011, 5) reports that only Vanuatu showed sympathy
for the West Papuan cause in the early years. But the profile of West Papuan issues has
grown significantly over the last decade or so, as it has among the Pacific Islands more
generally and beyond. This has been helped, at least in part, by the growth of social
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 515

media, which has made more extensive communication from within West Papua possible
following years of Indonesian media suppression (Blades 2014, 24). According to Usman
Hamid, an Indonesian human rights campaigner, social media has also been an important
factor in raising issues about West Papuan human rights abuses in other parts of Indonesia
where there has previously been very little awareness (ABC 2015c). Social media has also
become a factor in raising awareness among people around the Pacific Islands and beyond,
resulting in solidarity marches in Fiji and Solomon Islands (see Titifanue et al. 2015)—pre-
viously places where the West Papua cause had a relatively low public profile.
Even before the rise of social media, however, West Papua’s regional and international
profile had been boosted by various developments. At the September 2000 UN Millen-
nium Summit in New York, leaders from Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu declared support
for West Papuan independence. This was the first time any countries had voiced such
support at the UN since Indonesia’s takeover. A month later, four West Papuans were
included in the Nauru delegation to the 31st Pacific Islands Forum Summit in Kiribati,
resulting in the Forum issuing ‘an unprecedented statement calling for peaceful dialogue
on the future of the country, and an end to human rights abuses’ (Oxfam Community Aid
Abroad 2002, 26). While continuing to acknowledge Indonesian sovereignty over West
Papua, subsequent Forum communiqués have included expressions of concern about
human rights. By 2007, however, the communiqués included just one reference to the
PNG prime minister’s intention ‘to convey the Forum discussions on Papua to the Presi-
dent of Indonesia’ (Pacific Islands Forum 2007, 7). Between 2007 and 2015, Forum com-
muniqués failed to include any mention of West Papua. This was almost certainly due to
Indonesian influence among Forum members, which of course includes MSG members
(West Papua Action Auckland 2015). But at the Forum meeting in September 2015,
issues concerning human rights in West Papua were once again raised, as we will see
shortly.
Here it is worth noting that Indonesia has been a regular Post Forum Dialogue Partner
since 1989. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares on its website that the
Forum’s importance to Indonesia reflects its efforts to reposition Indonesia’s foreign
policy towards a ‘look east’ policy , and to establish closer ties with Pacific Island states,
‘especially in order to maintain the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia’ and,
more generally, ‘to improve the image of Indonesia in the international [sic] as well as
to garner support for Indonesia in international fora’ (Republic of Indonesia, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs c. 2010).3
Indonesia has also been a keen participant in the new Pacific Islands Development
Forum, established by Fiji’s prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, in the wake of Fiji’s sus-
pension from the regular Forum in 2009, which, in turn, followed the military coup of
2006. Indeed, in June 2014, the then Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
(2014), was invited to deliver the keynote address at the Pacific Islands Development
Forum’s second summit in Fiji, in which he declared Indonesia’s intention to enhance
its economic, political and security linkages in the Pacific Islands region, noting that Indo-
nesia had established diplomatic relations with almost all Pacific Island countries, built on
‘the basis of equality, mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, independence and ter-
ritorial integrity. Fiji is especially susceptible to Indonesian pressure, since the Bainimar-
ama regime has adopted a ‘look anywhere but at Australia and New Zealand’ policy since
516 S. LAWSON

2009, and is therefore very much concerned to strengthen ties with other important actors
in the vicinity of the region.
For their part, West Papuan activists have continued lobbying wherever and whenever
they can, attracting sympathisers from around the world, including academics, parliamen-
tarians and non-governmental organisations concerned with human rights. There is the
group International Parliamentarians for West Papua, whose membership is composed
substantially of Members of Parliament from the UK , Australia and New Zealand, but
includes small numbers from other European countries and one from the USA and, in
the Pacific, from Samoa, PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (IPWP 2015). Another
group, International Lawyers for West Papua, was launched in the Netherlands in late
2014. An earlier umbrella group—the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation—
was established in Vanuatu in 2008 and was the group that originally petitioned the
MSG for membership. ‘Free West Papua’ (or ‘Free Papua’) offices also operate in
Oxford in the UK (since 2013) and Perth, Western Australia (since 2015). Indonesia
has consistently opposed these groups, attempting to pressure the countries that have
allowed them to operate offices to close them down.
While only one parliamentarian is formally listed as a member of the International Parlia-
mentarians for West Papua at the time of writing, a number of Solomon Islands politicians
have publicly expressed support for the West Papuan cause in recent years. In early 2013,
the Solomon Islands government announced that it would support a West Papuan bid for
MSG membership at the summit later that year in New Caledonia (Scoop Media 2013),
although this did not eventuate. In the lead-up to the Honiara summit in June 2015, both
local and visiting activists were busy raising public awareness by ensuring that the local
news media carried reports on the issue on an almost daily basis, and lobbying Solomon
Islands politicians to support the West Papuan cause. One local newspaper applied the
wantok concept as a symbol of solidarity in declaring that ‘Melanesians must not lose sight
of the continued struggle and suffering our wantoks in West Papua are going through and
their aspiration for regional and global recognition’ (Solomon Star 2015a).
Within the Pacific Islands region, and within the MSG itself, the West Papuan cause
had previously found its strongest support in Vanuatu. It was here that the independence
leader and first prime minister, Walter Lini, enunciated the oft-quoted phrase: ‘Vanuatu
will not be fully free until all Melanesians are free’ (quoted in Cullwicj 2013). This
phrase (or variations on it) has been repeated in discourses relating to both the Kanak
and West Papuan causes ever since. One commentator, writing in 2011, suggested that
Vanuatu had, in fact, been the only Melanesian country to show sympathy for the West
Papuan cause up to that time. He noted that, in 2005, West Papuan spokesman (and
Vanuatu resident) John Otto Ondawame had been included as a member of the
Vanuatu delegation to an MSG meeting in PNG, although he was asked by the PNG
prime minister, Michael Somare, to leave. West Papuan activists were also refused per-
mission to present a petition at that meeting. At much the same time, Indonesia’s ambas-
sador to Vanuatu reportedly suggested that Indonesia, given that it contained a larger
Melanesian population than all the MSG countries combined, should become a
member of the MSG (May 2011, 5).
In June 2010, in a unanimous vote, Vanuatu’s national parliament passed the Wantok
Bilong Yumi Bill in support of West Papuan independence and committing Vanuatu to
push for observer status for West Papua in both the MSG and the Forum, and to advocate
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 517

for West Papuans at the UN. In June 2014, Vanuatu’s prime minister, Moana Carcasses,
addressed the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, calling for international action.
Appealing directly to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Carcasses noted the ongoing
human rights violations committed by the Indonesian security forces since 1969 and
accused the international community of ‘blatant negligence’ in its refusal to confront
the issue. He further called for the establishment of a UN country mandate to investigate
human rights issues in the province, and for the UN to promote the issue on its own
agenda (Carcasses 2014). The West Papuan cause was also championed by the former
prime minister Joe Natuman, who was toppled by pro-Indonesia Sato Kilman just days
before the June 2015 MSG meeting. Although Carcasses became foreign minister in the
new government, Vanuatu’s previous strong support for full West Papuan membership
of the MSG evaporated almost overnight under Kilman’s leadership. Another former
prime minister of Vanuatu, Edward Natapei, suspects an Indonesian hand in the vote
of no confidence that saw Kilman’s return to the top post, and therefore as the voting
head of government at the MSG summit (ABC 2015a).
Support for the West Papuan cause from PNG, as well as Fiji, has been compromised
due to both a fear of Indonesia (especially on the part of PNG with its long shared border)
and a desire to further develop relations. Both countries have significant vested interests in
their respective relations with Indonesia in terms of investment and military and trade
links. As one commentator puts it, both face the potential of ‘diplomatic and commercial
blowback’ as the price for any support they may give for West Papuans in the MSG
(Andrews 2015). Indonesia is, after all, the largest country in terms of population in the
vicinity of the Melanesian subregion and an important player in the politics of what is
increasingly called the Indo-Pacific region (which, in geostrategic terms, links Indian
Ocean powers with those of the Pacific, from India to China and the USA). PNG has
observer status at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, but aspires to full member-
ship. It can hardly fulfil this ambition if it does not support Indonesia in its own sphere of
regional politics. PNG also has its own issues with separatism, especially in Bougainville,
making it difficult to be seen supporting separatist movements elsewhere.
Both PNG’s and Fiji’s current prime ministers, Peter O’Neill and Frank Bainimarama,
respectively, declared unequivocal support for Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua in
the lead-up to the MSG meeting in Honiara. They had previously pushed for granting
Indonesia observer status in the organisation in 2011. In early 2015, however, O’Neill
spoke out against ‘the oppression of our people’ (that is, fellow Melanesians) in West
Papua, and said that PNG, as a ‘regional leader’, had a ‘moral obligation to speak for
those who are not allowed to talk’ (quoted in Garrett 2015). This was a rare statement
from a Papua New Guinean prime minister. But he subsequently stated that West
Papuans should be represented in the MSG, not by the pro-independence groups,
which were not ‘legitimate’ representatives, but by the governors of the West Papuan pro-
vinces (ABC 2015b). It is difficult to say whether this idea originated with O’Neill, but, as
we will see later, it was to carry much weight at the 2015 Honiara summit.
The remaining MSG member, the FLNKS, which chaired the organisation from 2013 to
2015, has stood more firmly behind the West Papuan cause. It would be difficult to do
otherwise, given its own status. In declaring its support for full membership for the
ULMWP, and opposition to the enhancement of Indonesia’s status, just the day before
the final leaders’ retreat in Honiara when the decision was to be made, the leader of the
518 S. LAWSON

FLNKS, Victor Tutugoro said that, as a Melanesian political movement dedicated to pro-
moting solidarity with other colonised people, he was also opposed to Indonesia, which
was not a Melanesian country, becoming part of the organisation (quoted in Maclellan
2015).
At the 2013 summit in New Caledonia, West Papuans submitted an application for
observer status through the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, supported
by the FLNKS as host. Ahead of the meeting, however, Indonesia invited MSG
members to undertake a ‘fact-finding’ mission in West Papua. Vanuatu, with pro-West
Papua Carcasses as prime minister and Natapei as foreign minster, boycotted the del-
egation after it was discovered that the program arranged by Indonesia precluded
meeting with non-governmental organisations or church groups, let alone pro-indepen-
dence leaders or anyone who was likely to be critical of Indonesia. An ABC (2014)
news report noted that, as it turns out, they were correct in their assumptions, as the Indo-
nesian authorities in fact arrested several West Papuan activists who attempted to contact
the MSG delegates. Following the mission, the MSG and Indonesia issued a joint state-
ment, which merely reiterated the mantra of inviolate state sovereignty, declaring that
they ‘supported [the] respective sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and the prin-
ciple of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, consistent with the Charter of
the United Nations’ (Parlina and Aritonang 2014).
The West Papua National Coalition for Liberation subsequently failed in its bid to at
least achieve observer status within the MSG. The reason given was that its claim to rep-
resent 2.5 million West Papuans could not be substantiated—a line of argument that had
apparently been promoted by Indonesia, which had ‘pressured members to refuse West
Papua a place unless dissident groups were represented by a single entity and voice’
(Rika 2015). But this at least gave West Papuan activists a clear criterion to meet. A
second application was subsequently submitted by a new, larger and more representative
umbrella coalition—the ULMWP—led by the well-known Oxford-based spokesperson
Benny Wenda. It was this application that went before the official 20th MSG Leaders’
Summit in Honiara in June 2015. It is noteworthy that it was accompanied by a petition
signed by around 55,000 residents of West Papua, who had risked reprisals from Indonesia
in putting their names to it (Free West Papua Campaign 2015).
As noted earlier, the MSG’s Honiara decision concerning Indonesia’s status, on the one
hand, and West Papua’s, on the other, resulted in limited recognition for the ULMWP,
since it is on the basis that the organisation only represents West Papuans who are resident
outside of Indonesia. The notion that it would represent West Papuans within Indonesia
would clearly compromise recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, which the MSG appears
determined not to do. At the same time, Indonesia’s status was elevated to associate mem-
bership of the MSG. However, representation at MSG meetings is to be through the gov-
ernors of Indonesia’s Melanesian provinces, as foreshadowed by O’Neill earlier in 2015.
Although there are only two West Papuan provinces, the provision is for five governors
(see MSG 2015a). The communiqué itself did not spell out who these five will represent,
but another source names, in addition to the provinces of Papua and West Papua, those of
Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara, all of which contain some Melanesian
people (Hernawan 2015b). Overall, the inclusion of Indonesia in this way is a face-
saving measure that appears to satisfy the expectation that the MSG represents Melane-
sians only (not Asians), but, again, does not compromise Indonesian sovereignty and
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 519

also gives Indonesia a superior status within the MSG vis-à-vis the ULMWP. There is little
doubt that the governors representing Indonesia via the Melanesian provinces will follow
official Indonesian policy at all times, while the ULMWP will offer a very different view,
albeit from a weaker position.
Reaction to the MSG’s decision on Indonesia and West Papua has been mixed, with
some seeing it as a sell-out to Indonesia, while others view it as a positive step forward
in gaining some form of international recognition for West Papuans. Various items in
the Jakarta Post restricted reporting simply to stating the facts, but one opinion piece pro-
moted the view that recognition by the MSG of the Melanesian groups opened up new
opportunities for dialogue both within Indonesia and between Indonesia and the Melane-
sian groups as a whole to advance recognition of Melanesian cultural distinctiveness and
human rights issues (Hernawan 2015b). A New Zealand news source depicted it as Mel-
anesian nations having ‘taken the lead in trying to broker a peaceful future for Indonesia’s
contested West Papuan provinces’ (Armbruster 2015). The ULMWP’s Secretary General,
Octovianus Mote, was reported as putting ‘a positive spin on the development, saying the
diplomatic recognition would help them to focus international attention on human rights
abuses in the province’ (quoted in Fox 2015). But another source reported criticisms of the
process by Mote, which highlighted the fact that, while the ULMWP faced difficult con-
ditions for its bid, including providing proof of its unity and representativeness, no
such conditions were placed on Indonesia’s membership bid. He also rejected claims by
prime ministers O’Neill and Bainimarama that the ULMWP’s case was different to that
of the FLNKS because it was located outside of its home country (Solomon Star 2015b).
But given Indonesia’s record of violent response to any voicing of dissent within West
Papua, it was remarkable that even 55,000 signatures from people within West Papua
had been gathered. Thus, West Papuans as represented by the ULMWP, while achieving
some gains, remain in the shadow of Indonesia’s power and influence in the region.
Even so, the profile of the West Papuan cause has become much more prominent
among the Pacific Islands, not just in the MSG, but also within the broader Forum. A
2015 Forum communiqué, issued following the Forum’s meeting in Port Moresby in Sep-
tember, recalled the leaders’
decisions and concerns expressed at their meeting in 2006 about reports of violence in Papua,
in which they also called on all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all residents
in Papua and to work to address the root causes of such conflicts by peaceful means.

It went on to state that although the MSG leaders recognised Indonesian sovereignty over
the Papuan provinces, they also expressed ‘concerns about the human rights situation,
calling on all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all residents in Papua’,
while requesting ‘the Forum Chair to convey the views of the Forum to the Indonesian Gov-
ernment, and to consult on a fact finding mission to discuss the situation in Papua with the
parties involved’ (Pacific Islands Forum 2015). This communiqué was one of the most
strongly worded to date, and one which cannot be easily ignored by Indonesia.

Conclusion
The MSG meeting in Honiara was a real test of claims about the Melanesian brotherhood.
MSG support for the Kanak cause, as represented by the FLNKS, has been consistent over
520 S. LAWSON

the years and is clearly underpinned by the logic of anti-colonialism, on the one hand, and
the principle of Melanesian solidarity, on the other. To fail to apply the same logic to the
West Papuan situation, and to grant the ULMWP mere observer status and allow it to rep-
resent only West Papuans resident outside Indonesia, may therefore seem to be an act of
hypocrisy, as well as weakness in the face of Indonesian pressure and/or a perception that
its interests may be better served by establishing closer relations with Indonesia—an
increasingly important actor in regional and international politics—than by acting more
in solidarity with its fellow Melanesians in West Papua, who have little to offer in
terms of power and influence, let alone aid or other such benefits. The MSG’s decision
may also be seen as a failure to recognise Indonesia’s record in West Papua as tantamount
to a violent and repressive form of colonialism, which compares very poorly indeed with
the French record in New Caledonia. This further entails a ‘forgetting’ that Indonesia’s
claim to West Papua rests on suspect historical/legal premises. Taken together, these
factors undermine Indonesia’s ‘just’ claims to sovereign rights. As noted earlier, it is
increasingly recognised that sovereignty entails more than simply the ‘right’ to exercise
exclusive power within certain territorial boundaries, and to expect complete non-interfer-
ence. In the final analysis, the underlying purpose of the sovereign power of the modern
state, and what underpins its legitimacy, is to protect citizens from harm—not to expose
them to preventable harm, let alone torture, abuse and murder in the name of the state.
This is the logic underlying the (re)definition of state sovereignty as the ‘responsibility
to protect’, which has achieved increasing currency in the UN precisely because of atro-
cities committed by states against minority groups, of which Indonesia’s behaviour in
West Papua over the years is a prime example. When states fail in this most basic of
duties, it falls to the international community to assume some responsibility (see, gener-
ally, Bellamy 2002). In the worst cases, this may take the form of humanitarian interven-
tion, although no one has suggested active intervention in West Papua, which would
almost certainly be counterproductive. At the very least, however, the case of West
Papua involves recognising the problem and bringing considerable diplomatic pressure
to bear on Indonesia. Yet the international community—consisting of both the UN and
other bodies such as regional organisations, the MSG included—has also largely failed
the West Papuans to date. It remains to be seen whether future developments bear out
the claims of Melanesian leaders—including those of PNG and Fiji in particular, who
have bent over backwards to accommodate Indonesia—that the MSG will be used to
enhance human rights protection in West Papua, especially from the very forces that
are meant to protect civilians—namely, the Indonesian security forces. So far, however,
it seems that the logic of realpolitik—that, in the final analysis, one’s own perceived
state interests override any other considerations—has trumped the foundational logic of
the MSG in terms of both its anti-colonialism and its ideology of Melanesian solidarity.

Notes
1. Technically, the western part of the island of New Guinea as a whole now consists of two Indo-
nesian provinces—Papua and West Papua—but the latter term is still commonly used to refer to
both. This territory generally has had more names applied to it than almost any other entity in
the Pacific region. These include Netherlands (or Dutch) New Guinea, West New Guinea, Irian
Barat, Irian Jaya Barat, Irian Jaya, Papua Barat and West Papua. In addition to the two separate
 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 521

administrative provinces of Papua and West Papua that exist now, there are plans for the latter
province to be further split to create a third province—South-West Papua.
2. This changed with Indonesia’s annexation of the territory, and so the Canberra Agreement was
amended in 1965 to state that its eastern boundary stopped at ‘the Australian territory of Papua
and the Trust Territory of New Guinea’ (SPC 1965, 2).
3. It is not important enough, however, to keep the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website up to date
on the topic. Since it refers to a forthcoming meeting in 2011, one can only assume that it has not
been updated since 2010. However, there is nothing to indicate that anything much has changed
in Indonesia’s position since then, except perhaps an intensified determination to garner
support from the Pacific Island countries for its policies.

Acknolwedgements
I would like to thank the University of the South Pacific Solomon Islands Campus in Honiara for
providing the opportunity to give a public lecture on the topic of this article in May 2015. I would
also like to thank Peter King and Denise Fisher for valuable critical feedback on an earlier draft.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
Funding was provided by the Australian Research Council [DP140101227].

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