Torres v.
Court of Appeals extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence,
G.R. No. L-37420|July 31, 1984|Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera
Doctrine: Having been amended, the original complaint lost
its character as a judicial admission, which would have
required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial
admission, the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its
formal offer.
Facts: The subject property was leased by the government to
Margarita Torres, who was the actual occupant of the lot.
Subsequently, the Director of Lands issued to Margarita a sale
certificate over the said lot P428.80, payable in 20 annual
installments of P20.00 each. However, it was Leon Arbole, the
second spouse of Margarita, who paid the installments out of
his earnings as a water tender. Leon then sold his interest to the
one-half portion of the said lot to their (Margarita and Leon)
daughter, petitioner Macaria Torres. Subsequently, private
respondent Vicente Santillan, Margarita's son to his first spouse,
claimed possession of the subject lot and asked for the issuance
of title in his name before the Bureau of Lands. The RD issued a
TCT in the name of the heirs of Margarita.
Vicente then filed a complaint against petitioner for forcible
entry, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of the
subject lot without their consent and constructed a house. For
her part, petitioner claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in
question, being one of the daughters (albeit legitimated) of
Margarita Torres. The ejectment case was decided against the
petitioner, but the latter appealed to the CFI. Thereafter,
petitioner instituted an action for partition before the CFI,
alleging that said lot was conjugal property of the spouses
Margarita and Leon and that she is their legitimated child.
Private respondents filed an answer alleging that the lot
belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres and that they are her
only heirs.
The ejectment case and the partition case were jointly tried and
decided. The CFI ruled that the lot in question is the
paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to
private respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal
shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. It also ruled
that Macaria is the legitimated daughter of Margarita and Leon,
since there was no impediment between the two when they
got married. This was reversed by the CA.
Before the SC, petitioner claims that the original complaint in
the ejectment case filed by Vicente stated that "the plaintiffs
and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and
nearest of kins of Margarita Torres . . ." which is an admission of
her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her
participation in the disputed property.
Pertinent provision/s: Rule 129
Issue: Whether private respondents’ admission estops them
from questioning the legitimated status of the petitioner?
Ruling: NO. In the Amended Complaint filed by private
respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined
portion was deleted so that the statement simply read, "[t]hat
the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of
Margarita[.]" In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes
the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned
and ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The
original complaint no longer forms part of the record.
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she
should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the
original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission,
which would have required no proof, and became merely an
required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission,
therefore there can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission
made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence.
Separate Opinion (J. Teehankee): Such admission did not
cease to be a judicial admission simply because respondents
subsequently deleted the same in their amended complaint.
The original complaint, although replaced by an amended
complaint, does not cease to be a part of the judicial record, not
having been expunged therefrom.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the
now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and depending
on its outcome, said Court shall also resolve the respective
participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of
the estate of the deceased Vicente Santillan. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154|July 15, 2003|Ponente: J. Corona
Doctrine:
Facts: Petitioner Republic filed a forfeiture case against Marcos
for the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds
were previously held by five account groups. Private
respondents filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and
the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos
children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The said
agreement sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of
and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings. Private respondents
opposed the motion. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan,
but reversed the same after petitioner contended that after the
pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting
a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Pertinent provision/s:
Issue: Whether the stipulation of facts in the agreement
amounts to a judicial admission on the part of the private
respondents as to the ownership of the Swiss bank accounts?
Ruling: YES. Judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the
pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.
Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at
bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents,
respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or
subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with
such admissions.
Here, respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their
ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer,
the General/Supplemental Agreements, and the other
pleadings they filed. In their answer, aside from admitting the
existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted
ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer
stated, "[r]espondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23
insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being
false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties
were lawfully acquired." By qualifying their acquisition of the
Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly
admitted their ownership thereof. Respondent Mrs. Marcos also
admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain
actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the
petition.
Further, the stipulations set forth in the General and
Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest
intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with
petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an
amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their
ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no
person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge
dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.
Lastly, the testimony of Bongbong during the hearing on the
motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement shows
that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine
government in the hope of finally putting an end to the
problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss
accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of
ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the
witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial
admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a
fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred
to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National
Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60
as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor
of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 108028|July 30, 1996|Ponente: J. Francisco
Doctrine: A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution
and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically
reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of
the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in
the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view
of the fact that an attorney has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation,
which, unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive.
Facts: Accused Cristina Hernandez, introducing herself as the
general manager of the Philippine-Thai, Inc., asked private
complainants if they wanted to work as factory workers in
Taipei, since her company recruited workers for placement
abroad. Enticed, private complainants applied. Appellant
required private complainants to pay placement and passport
fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant.
After having received the entire amount from the witnesses,
appellant assured them that they would be able to leave for
Taipei. However, complainants-witnesses were unable to leave
for abroad. They demanded for the return of their money but to
no avail. An information was then filed against accused
Hernandez for the crime of illegal recruitment committed in
large scale.
On trial, accused denied the charges against her. However,
when questioned further, accused admitted being the
president of Philippine-Thai but only in a nominal capacity, and
claimed that as nominee-president, she did not participate in
any of its transactions. Accused likewise insisted that
Philippine-Thai was engaged solely in the barong tagalog
business.
Pertinent provision/s:
Issue: Whether an admission during trial in a criminal case
should be put in writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel?
Ruling: NO. A stipulation of facts entered into by the
prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official
transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of
the accused in the form of his signature affixed thereto is
unnecessary in view of the fact that an attorney has prima facie
authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, which, unless allowed to be withdrawn are
conclusive.
Here, Atty. Ulep, appellant's counsel in the lower court, agreed
to the stipulation of facts proposed by the prosecution (that
accused was not licensed to recruit OFWS) not out of mistake
nor inadvertence, but obviously because the said stipulation of
facts was also in conformity of defense's theory of the case.
Throughout the entire duration of the trial, appellant staunchly
denied ever having engaged in the recruitment business either
in her personal capacity or through Philippine-Thai. Therefore,
it was but logical to admit that the POEA records show that
neither she nor Philippine-Thai was licensed or authorized to
recruit workers.
The stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution
and admitted by defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial
admission by the appellant of the facts stipulated on.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, appellant's conviction of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby AFFIRMED, and
the penalty imposed MODIFIED as follows: the court sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; to
return and pay to BENITO L. BERNABE the amount of TWENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P28,500.00) PESOS; to
ROBERT P. VELASQUEZ the amount of TWENTY TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to GREGORIO
P. MENDOZA the amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P22,500.00) PESOS; to ARNEL MENDOZA the
amount of TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P22,000.00) PESOS also without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.