Third Exam Persons Digest PDF

[PERSONS
AND FAMILY RELATIONS THIRD EXAM DIGESTED CASES BY KMEP] 1

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS cautioned them against buying the subject property
3RD EXAM CASE COMPILATION until the cases are closed and terminated.
Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
Article 88-‐ 104 December 29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject
property to petitioner without Shirley's consent in
NOBLEZA VS NUEGA 2015 the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand
FACTS: Pesos (P380,000.00), including petitioner's
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married undertaking to assume the existing mortgage on
to Rogelio A. Nuega (Rogelio) on September 1, the property with the National Home Mortgage
1990. Sometime in 1988 when the parties were still Finance Corporation and to pay the real property
engaged, Shirley was working as a domestic helper taxes due thereon.
in Israel. Upon the request of Rogelio, Shirley sent
him money for the purchase of a residential lot in The RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70, granted the
petition for legal separation and ordered the
Marikina where they had planned to eventually
dissolution and liquidation of the regime of
build their home. Rogelio was then also working
absolute community of property between Shirley
abroad as a seaman. The following year, or on and Rogelio. Rogelio appealed the above-‐quoted
September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject ruling before the CA which denied due course and
house and lot for One Hundred Two Thousand dismissed the petition. It became final and
Pesos (P102,000.00) from Rodeanna Realty executory and a writ of execution was issued in
Corporation. Shirley claims that upon her arrival in August 1995.
the Philippines sometime in 1989, she settled the
balance for the equity over the subject property Shirley instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Sale
with the developer through SSS8 financing. On and Recoveiy of Property against petitioner and
October 19, 1989, TCT No. 1719639 over the Rogelio before the RTC of Marikina City. The trial
subject property was issued by the Registry of court rendered its decision that the Deed of
Deeds of Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 insofar as
the 55.05 square meters representing the one half
Rogelio.
(1/2) portion of plaintiff Shirley Nuega is concerned,
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got is hereby ordered rescinded, the same being null
married and lived in the subject property. The and void. The appellate court affirmed with
following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work. modification the trial court's ruling that the Deed of
While overseas, she received information that Absolute Sale dated 29 December 1992 is hereby
Rogelio had brought home another woman, Monica declared null and void in its entirety. Hence this
Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, petition.
and was able to confirm upon her return to the
Philippines in May 1992, that Rogelio had been Petitioner argues, among others, that since she has
introducing Escobar as his wife. In June 1992, examined the TCT over the subject property and
Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for found the property to have been registered under
Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent
Office of Rizal, and another for Legal Separation and purchaser for value and "she is not required to go
Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City. beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of
the subject property at the time of the
In between the filing of these cases, Shirley learned consummation of the sale and at the date of the
that Rogelio had the intention of selling the subject sale."
property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers
-‐ one of whom was their neighbor and petitioner ISSUE:
Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) -‐ of the existence of 1. Whether is a buyer in good faith.
the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and 2. Whether the sale is void in its entirety.
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[PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS THIRD EXAM DIGESTED CASES BY KMEP] 2

seller was not stated, while petitioner as buyer was
HELD: indicated as "single”.
FIRST ISSUE: NO. PETITIONER IS NOT A BUYER IN
GOOD FAITH SECOND ISSUE: YES. THE SALE IS THE VOID IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser
for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller The nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not
while ignoring all the other surrounding premised on proof of respondent's financial
circumstances relevant to the sale. The TCT of the contribution in the purchase of the subject
subject property states that its sole owner is the property. Actual contribution is not relevant in
seller Rogelio himself who was therein also determining whether a piece of property is
described as "single". However, as in the cases of community property for the law itself defines what
Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are constitutes community property. Article 91 of the
circumstances critical to the case at bar which Family Code thus provides:
convince us to affirm the ruling of both the
appellate and lower courts that herein petitioner is Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter
not a buyer in good faith. or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by
First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and Shirley's marriage or acquired thereafter.
house -‐ the subject property -‐ in Ladislao Diwa
Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner been more The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1)
prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if those excluded from the absolute community by
Rogelio had the capacity to dispose of the subject the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she marriage settlement. Since the subject property
could have inquired with such facility -‐ considering does not fall under any of the exclusions provided
that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute
Village where the property is located -‐ if there was community property of Shirley and Rogelio.
any person other than Rogelio who had any right or Regardless of their respective contribution to its
interest in the subject property. To be sure, acquisition before their marriage, and despite the
respondent even testified that she had warned fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT as
their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village -‐ including owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses
petitioner's sister -‐ not to engage in any deal with Shirley and Rogelio.
Rogelio relative to the purchase of the subject
property because of the cases she had filed against Respondent and Rogelio were married on
Rogelio. September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and
without the consent of herein respondent as his
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed of
Deed of Absolute Sale also pose question on the Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 -‐ or during
claim of petitioner that she is a buyer in good faith. the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage.
As correctly observed by both courts a quo, the Under Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209,
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on otherwise known as The Family Code of the
December 29, 1992. However, the Community Tax Philippines, the said disposition of a communal
Certificates of the witnesses therein were dated property is void, viz.:
January 2 and 20, 1993.
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
Lastly, in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated community property shall belong to both spouses
December 29, 1992, the civil status of Rogelio as jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
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court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must x x x." As correctly stated by the appellate court,
be availed of within five years from the date of the there being no evidence on record that the amount
contract implementing such decision. received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the
family, respondent cannot be made to reimburse
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or any amount to petitioner.
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other Article 105-‐133
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of MUNOZ VS CARLOS 2010
disposition or encumbrance without the authority FACTS:
of the court or the written consent of the other Subject of the present case is a seventy-‐seven (77)-‐
spouse. In the absence of such authority or square meter residential house and lot registered in
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be the name of the petitioner. The residential lot in
void. However, the transaction shall be construed the subject property was previously covered by TCT
as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected to Eliseo Carlos respondents. Eliseo, a Bureau of
as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No.
other spouse or authorization by the court before 1427, with Erlindas consent, to the Government
the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a
P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of
Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the subject P1,687.66.[8] The respondents then constructed a
property without the written consent of thirty-‐six (36)-‐square meter, two-‐story residential
respondent or the authority of the court. Without house on the lot.
such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. As
correctly explained by the appellate court. The On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property
subject property forms part of Rogelio and Shirley's was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a
absolute community of property. Thus, the trial Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-‐in-‐
void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of
representing the one-‐half (1/2) portion of plaintiff-‐ P602,000.00.[9]
appellee Shirley. In absolute community of
property, if the husband, without knowledge and On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a
consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the
is void. deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no
sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the
AS FOR REIMBURSEMENT: documents transferring the title to the petitioners
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely name were falsified.
entered into the contract of sale with petitioner
and acknowledged receiving the entire The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the
consideration of the contract under the Deed of petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be
Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to
her payment for the purchase of the subject cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a
property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the document purporting to be the mortgage contract;
absolute community of property shall only be the petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00
"liable for x x x debts and obligations contracted by balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with
either spouse without the consent of the other to the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an
the extent that the family may have been benefited affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all
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his rights to the subject property; with the property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or
P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS mortgaged without Eliseos consent, pursuant to
P176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT Article 124 of the Family Code. Hence this petition.
No. 1427; in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the
petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned ISSUE:
Eliseos affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseos affidavit (1) Whether the subject property is paraphernal or
was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the conjugal; and,
P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, (2) Whether the contract between the parties was a
and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 sale or an equitable mortgage.
advance; since Erlinda could not return the
P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to HELD:
pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and FIRST ISSUE: PARAPHERNAL NOT CONJUGAL
in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had As a general rule, all property acquired during the
been issued in the petitioners name, cancelling TCT marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
No.1427 in their name. been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
The petitioner countered that there was a valid unless the contrary is proved. In the present case,
contract of sale. During the pendency of the RTC clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential
case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC decided the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this
ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to
vacate the subject property, to surrender its Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties
possession to the petitioner, and to pay the acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during
overdue rentals. the marriage, shall be excluded from the
community property and be the exclusive property
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is
of the scientific examination conducted by the Erlindas exclusive paraphernal property.
National Bureau of Investigation of Eliseos
purported signatures in the Special Power of The CA, however, held that the residential lot
Attorney dated April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of became conjugal when the house was built thereon
waiver of rights dated April 29, 1992, showing that through conjugal funds, applying the second
they were forgeries. The petitioner, on the other paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and
hand, introduced evidence on the paraphernal Calimlim-‐Canullas. Under the second paragraph of
nature of the subject property since it was Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally
registered in Erlindas name; the residential lot was belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon
part of a large parcel of land owned by Pedro the construction of improvements thereon at the
Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlindas parents. expense of the partnership.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the We cannot subscribe to the CAs misplaced reliance
subject property was Erlindas exclusive paraphernal on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-‐
property that was inherited from her father. It also Canullas.
upheld the sale to the petitioner, even without
Eliseos consent as the deed of absolute sale bore As the respondents were married during the
the genuine signatures of Erlinda and the petitioner effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on
as vendor and vendee, respectively. The CA held conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189)
that the subject property, originally Erlindas should have governed their property relations.
exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal However, with the enactment of the Family Code
property when it was used as collateral for a on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on
housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158,
Eliseos monthly salary deductions; the subject
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have been superseded by those found in the Family the realty taxes were declared has a valid and
Code (Articles 105 to 133). rightful claim over the land.

In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the
portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly principal debt owed to the petitioner with the
salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, subject property.
1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire
amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since AYALA INVESTMENTS VS CA 1998
the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by FACTS:
Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992. Considering Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as
the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, PBM) obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from
it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
the residential lot is considerably more than the Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As
P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly added security for the credit line extended to PBM,
salary deductions. respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President
of PBM, executed security agreements on
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making
paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
contracted with the petitioner; the written consent indebtedness to AIDC.
of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The
NBI finding that Eliseos signatures in the special PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981,
power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
immaterial. respondent-‐husband Alfredo Ching with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the court
SECOND ISSUE: EQUITABLE MORTGAGE rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-‐
Contract is an equitable mortgage husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with
In the present case, there are four (4) telling interests.
circumstances pointing to the existence of an
equitable mortgage. Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No.
42228, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued
First, the respondents remained in possession as a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDCs
lessees of the subject property; the parties, in fact, putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of
executed a one-‐year contract of lease, effective execution dated May 12, 1982 was issued.
May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr.,
Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil
Second, the petitioner retained part of the Case No. 42228, caused the issuance and service
purchase price, the petitioner gave a P200,000.00 upon respondents-‐spouses of a notice of sheriff
advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused sale dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their
to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda failed conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then
to submit Eliseos signed affidavit of waiver of rights. scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.

Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of
July 8, 1993, despite the alleged sale on April 30, injunction against petitioners with the then Court of
1992; payment of real property taxes is a usual First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin
burden attaching to ownership and when, as here, the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot
such payment is coupled with continuous enforce the judgment against the conjugal
possession of the property, it constitutes evidence partnership levied on the ground that, among
of great weight that the person under whose name others, the subject loan did not redound to the
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benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon husband or the wife before or during the marriage
application of private respondents, the lower court shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the the family. As can be seen, the terms are used
enforcement of the writ of execution and with the interchangeably.
sale of the said properties at public auction.
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
of Appeals, questioning the order of the lower court
enjoining the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on June 25, the contract, i.e., he directly received the money
1982, enjoining the lower court from enforcing its and services to be used in or for his own business or
Order of June 14, 1982, thus paving the way for the his own profession, that contract falls within the
scheduled auction sale of respondents-‐spouses term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal properties. On June 25, 1982, the auction conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may
sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder, was be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo. family is apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of
The trial court promulgated its decision declaring loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the sale on execution null and void. The CA affirmed the loan facility or services to be rendered to the
the descision of the RTC . it held that the loan business or profession of the husband. It is
procured from respondent-‐appellant AIDC was for immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
the advancement and benefit of Philippine fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
conjugal partnership of petitioners-‐appellees. family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
Hence this petition. that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner contends that the respondent court
erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are
private respondents is not liable for the obligation given to another person or entity, and the husband
by the respondent-‐husband. Petitioners in their acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
appeal point out that there is no need to prove that cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the within the context of obligations for the benefit of
partnership; all that is necessary, they say, is that the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
the transaction was entered into for the benefit of services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
the conjugal partnership. debtor and not for the surety or his family. No
presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
ISSUE: Whether the conjugal partnership is liable? enters into a contract of surety or accommodation
agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
HELD: NO partnership. Proof must be presented to establish
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
difference between the terms redounded to the
benefit of or benefited from on the one hand; and The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that
for the benefit of on the other. They mean one and co-‐respondent Alfredo Ching signed as surety for
the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly Petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove
worded, i.e., both use the term for the benefit of. that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to
On the other hand, Article 122 of the Family Code the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The reason
provides that The payment of personal debts by the
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for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent
court: However, these are not the benefits contemplated
by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The benefits must
The loan procured from respondent-‐appellant AIDC be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine merely be a by-‐product or a spin-‐off of the loan
Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the itself.
conjugal partnership of petitioners-‐appellees.
Philippine Blooming Mills has a personality distinct In all our decisions involving accommodation
and separate from the family of petitioners-‐ contracts of the husband, we underscored the
appellees -‐ this despite the fact that the members requirement that: there must be the requisite
of the said family happened to be stockholders of showing x x x of some advantage which clearly
said corporate entity. accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to
his family or that such obligations are productive of
x x x x x x x x x some benefit to the family. Unfortunately, the
petition did not present any proof to show: (a)
x x x. The burden of proof that the debt was Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal was prolonged and for how many months or years;
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-‐party and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by
litigant claiming as such. In the case at bar, the loan and its shares of stock appreciated, if so,
respondent-‐appellant AIDC failed to prove that the how much and how substantial was the holdings of
debt was contracted by appellee-‐husband, for the the Ching family.
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is
apparent from the facts of the case is that the Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and
judgment debt was contracted by or in the name of probable increase in the value of stocks) might have
the Corporation Philippine Blooming Mills and been already apparent or could be anticipated at
appellee-‐husband only signed as surety thereof. the time the accommodation agreement was
The debt is clearly a corporate debt and entered into. But would those benefits qualify the
respondent-‐appellants right of recourse against transaction as one of the obligations x x x for the
appellee-‐husband as surety is only to the extent of benefit of the conjugal partnership?
his corporate stockholdings. It does not extend to
the conjugal partnership of gains of the family of Respondents-‐appellants insist that the corporate
petitioners-‐appellees. x x x x x x. debt in question falls under the exception laid down
in said Article 122 (par. one). We do not agree. The
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the loan procured from respondent-‐appellant AIDC was
benefits the respondent family would reasonably for the sole advancement and benefit of Philippine
anticipate were the following: Blooming Mills and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of petitioners-‐appellees.
(a) The employment of co-‐respondent Alfredo
Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled We agree with the respondent court. Indeed,
to his monthly salary of P20,000.00 for an extended considering the odds involved in guaranteeing a
length of time because of the loan he guaranteed; large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the
probable prolongation of employment in PBM and
(b) The shares of stock of the members of his family increase in value of its stocks, would be too small to
would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated qualify the transaction as one for the benefit of the
through the loan obtained; suretys family. Verily, no one could say, with a
degree of certainty, that the said contract is even
(c) His prestige in the corporation would be productive of some benefits to the conjugal
enhanced and his career would be boosted should partnership. We likewise agree with the respondent
PBM survive because of the loan. court (and this view is not contested by the
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petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code ₱13,000,000.00. The PBMCI defaulted in the
is applicable in this case. payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981,
the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
advances the view that acting as surety is part of the PBMCI to collect the ₱12,612,972.88 exclusive
the business or profession of the respondent-‐ of interests, penalties and other bank charges.
husband. Impleaded as co-‐defendants in the complaint were
Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI.
industry or profession. The fact that on several
occasions the lending institutions did not require The trial court granted the ABC’s application for a
the signature of the wife and the husband signed writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of
alone does not mean that being a surety became ₱12,700,000. The deputy sheriff of the trial court
part of his profession. Neither could he be levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares
presumed to have acted for the conjugal of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
partnership.
Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy
emphatic that the payment of personal debts on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the
contracted by the husband or the wife before or 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff
during the marriage shall not be charged to the were acquired by her and her husband during their
conjugal partnership except to the extent that they marriage out of conjugal funds after the Citycorp
redounded to the benefit of the family. Investment Philippines was established in 1974.
Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the
Here, the property in dispute also involves the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship
family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for
personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an the account of PBMCI did not redound to the
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of benefit of the conjugal partnership. She, likewise,
administration for the benefit of the family. alleged that being the wife of Alfredo Ching, she
was a third-‐party claimant entitled to file a motion
CHING VS CA 2004 for the release of the properties.32 She attached
FACTS: therewith a copy of her marriage contract with
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Alfredo Ching.
Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of
₱9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation The trial court issued on December 15, 1993 an
(ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Order37 lifting the writ of preliminary attachment
Executive Vice-‐President Alfredo Ching, executed a on the shares of stocks and ordering the sheriff to
promissory note for the said amount promising to return the said stocks to the petitioners. The
pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of petitioner bank forthwith filed a petition for
14% per annum.5 As added security for the said certiorari with the CA, for the nullification of the
loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, said order of the court. The CA sustained the
together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, contention of the private respondent and set aside
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC the assailed orders. According to the CA, the RTC
binding themselves to jointly and severally deprived the private respondent of its right to file a
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations bond under Section 14, Rule 57 of the Rules of
owing the ABC to the extent of ₱38,000,000.00. Court. The petitioner Encarnacion T. Ching was not
a party in the trial court; hence, she had no right of
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended action to have the levy annulled with a motion for
another loan to the PBMCI in the amount of that purpose. HENCE THIS PETITION.
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petitioner-‐husband acquired the stocks with his
ISSUE: exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares
(a) Whether the petitioner-‐wife has the right to of stocks were registered in the corporate books of
file the motion to quash the levy on Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name
attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks of the petitioner-‐husband does not constitute proof
in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; that the petitioner-‐husband, not the conjugal
(b) Whether or not the RTC committed a grave partnership, owned the same.
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed In this case, the private respondent claimed that
orders. the petitioner-‐husband acquired the shares of
HELD: stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in
FIRST ISSUE: YES his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus,
On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners the burden of the private respondent to prove that
that the petitioner-‐wife had the right to file the said the source of the money utilized in the acquisition
motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-‐
No. 142729. In this case, the petitioner-‐wife filed husband alone. As held by the trial court, the
her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of private respondent failed to adduce evidence to
the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of prove this assertion.
petitioner-‐husband claiming that the said shares of
stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for
the account of her husband under his continuing The CA, likewise, erred in holding that by executing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
PBMCI. The petitioner-‐wife had the right to file the with the private respondent for the payment of the
motion for said relief. PBMCI loans, the petitioner-‐husband was in the
exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate
SECOND ISSUE: NO business. The appellate court erred in concluding
On the second issue, we find and so hold that the that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said
CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of account of PBMCI under Article 161(1) of the New
the RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in Civil Code.
the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC
committed a grave abuse of its discretion Article 161(1) of the New Civil Code (now Article
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Article 121[2 and 3]60 of the Family Code of the
160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the Philippines) provides:
properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to for:
the husband, or to the wife.
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the
In this case, the evidence adduced by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
issued to and registered in its corporate books in the partnership.
the name of the petitioner-‐husband when the said
corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. The petitioner-‐husband signed the continuing
This was done during the subsistence of the guaranty and suretyship agreement as security for
marriage of the petitioner-‐spouses. The shares of the payment of the loan obtained by the PBMCI
stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal from the private respondent in the amount of
partnership property of the petitioners. The private ₱38,000,000. In Ayala Investment and Development
respondent failed to adduce evidence that the Corp. v. Court of Appeals,61 this Court ruled "that
9

the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of herein set forth their obligations, rights and
an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a responsibilities on matters relating to their
business. children's support, custody, visitation, as well as to
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove gains as follows:
that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-‐husband’s act of (a) Title and ownership of the conjugal property
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala
agreement with the private respondent for and in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be
behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between transferred by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for and Ceamantha, as co-‐owners, when they reach
the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-‐
husband entered into an accommodation The property subject of the Compromise
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal Agreement is a house and lot covered by Transfer
partnership would thereby be benefited. The Certificate of Title No. 167907 in the name of
private respondent was burdened to establish that Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U.
such benefit redounded to the conjugal Francisco. Meanwhile, in a case for Unlawful
partnership. Detainer with Preliminary Attachment filed by
spouses Jorge C. Gonzales and Purificacion W.
It could be argued that the petitioner-‐husband was Gonzales (respondents) against George Zoltan
a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and Matrai (Matrai) and Michele, the Metropolitan Trial
was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that Court (MeTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80,
the shares of stocks of the petitioner-‐husband and rendered a Decision dated May 10, 2001, ordering
his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be Matrai and Michele to vacate the premises leased
rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the to them located in 264 Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang
petitioner-‐husband’s career would be enhanced Village, Muntinlupa City, and to pay back rentals,
should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of unpaid telephone bills and attorney's fees.
fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits
contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the
The benefits must be those directly resulting from sheriff covering the real property under Transfer
the loan. They cannot merely be a by-‐product or a Certificate of Title No. T-‐167907 in the name of
spin-‐off of the loan itself. Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U.
Francisco. When petitioners' grandmother learned
FRANCISCO VS GONZALES 2008 of the scheduled auction, she, as guardian-‐in-‐fact of
FACTS: petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third
Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco and Ceamantha U. Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale
Francisco are the minor children of Cleodualdo M. by Execution but this was denied
Francisco (Cleodualdo) and Michele Uriarte
Francisco (Michele). In a Partial Decision dated Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with
November 29, 2000 rendered by the RTC of Makati, the CA. Hence this petition. Petitioners argue that:
Branch 144, in Civil Case No. 93-‐2289 for (1) they are the rightful owners of the property as
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the Compromise the Partial Decision issued by the RTC of Makati in
Agreement entered into by the estranged couple Civil Case No. 93-‐2289 had already become final; (2)
was approved. The Compromise Agreement their parents already waived in their favor their
contained in part the following provisions: rights over the property; (3) the adjudged
7. In their desire to manifest their genuine concern obligation of Michele in the ejectment case did not
for their children, Cleodia and Ceamantha, redound to the benefit of the family; (4) Michele's
Cleodualdo and Michelle have voluntarily agreed to
10

obligation is a joint obligation between her and
Matrai, not joint and solidary. While the trial court has the competence to identify
and to secure properties and interest therein held
The Court finds that it was grave error for the RTC by the judgment debtor for the satisfaction of a
to proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the money judgment rendered against him, such
subject property. The power of the court in exercise of its authority is premised on one
executing judgments extends only to properties important fact: that the properties levied upon, or
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor sought to be levied upon, are properties
alone, in the present case to those belonging to unquestionably owned by the judgment debtor and
Michele and Matrai. One man's goods shall not be are not exempt by law from execution. Also, a
sold for another man's debts. To begin with, the sheriff is not authorized to attach or levy on
RTC should not have ignored that TCT No. 167907 is property not belonging to the judgment debtor,
in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to and even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon
Michele U. Francisco. On its face, the title shows the property of a third person. A sheriff has no
that the registered owner of the property is not authority to attach the property of any person
Matrai and Michele but Cleodualdo, married to under execution except that of the judgment
Michele. This describes the civil status of debtor.
Cleodualdo at the time the property was acquired.
It should be noted that the judgment debt for
Records show that Cleodualdo and Michele were which the subject property was being made to
married on June 12, 1986, prior to the effectivity of answer was incurred by Michele and her partner,
the Family Code on August 3, 1988. As such, their Matrai. Respondents allege that the lease of the
property relations are governed by the Civil Code property in Lanka Drive redounded to the benefit of
on conjugal partnership of gains. The CA the family. By no stretch of one's imagination can it
acknowledged that ownership of the subject be concluded that said debt/obligation was
property is conjugal in nature; however, it ruled incurred for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
that since Michele's obligation was not proven to or that some advantage accrued to the welfare of
be a personal debt, it must be inferred that it is the family.
conjugal and redounded to the benefit of the
family, and hence, the property may be held In the present case, the obligation which the
answerable for it. petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal
property managed by the private respondent Lily
The Court does not agree. Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo
for his own benefit because at the time he incurred
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when the obligation he had already abandoned his family
she purchases things necessary for the support of and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made
the family, or when she borrows money for that it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in
purpose upon her husband's failure to deliver the behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan
needed sum; when administration of the conjugal from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts Industries liable now for the said loan would be
or by the husband; or when the wife gives unjust and contrary to the express provision of the
moderate donations for charity. Failure to establish Civil Code.
any of these circumstances means that the conjugal
asset may not be bound to answer for the wife's Respondents bare allegation that petitioners lived
personal obligation.[20] Considering that the with Michele on the leased property is not
foregoing circumstances are evidently not present sufficient to support the conclusion that the
in this case as the liability incurred by Michele arose judgment debt against Michele and Matrai in the
from a judgment rendered in an unlawful detainer ejectment suit redounded to the benefit of the
case against her and her partner Matrai. family of Michele and Cleodualdo and petitioners.
11

To hold the property in Taal St. liable for the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent
obligations of Michele and Matrai would be going averred that there was no proper publication and
against the spirit and avowed objective of the Civil posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore,
Code to give the utmost concern for the solidarity respondent claimed that his property which was
and well-‐being of the family as a unit. valued at ₱500,000.00 was only sold at a "very low
price" of ₱51,685.00, whereas the judgment
In justifying the levy against the property, the RTC obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only ₱40,000.00.
went over the Compromise Agreement as
embodied in the Partial Decision dated November The RTC dismissed respondent’s complaint. On
29, 2000. Base from the compromise agreement, it appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
is clear that both Michele and Cleodualdo have and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on
waived their title to and ownership of the house the complaint filed by appellant. Hence, the instant
and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners. The petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the
property should not have been levied and sold at part of the Court of Appeals.
execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
Petitioners insist that respondent, who is the
BUADO VS NICOL 2009 husband of the judgment debtor, is not the "third
FACTS: party" contemplated in Section 17 (now Section
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus 16), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, hence a separate
Buado (petitioners) filed a complaint for damages action need not be filed. Furthermore, petitioners
against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda). Said action assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to
originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising the benefit of the conjugal partnership and cited
from the criminal offense of slander filed against authorities to the effect that the husband is liable
her by petitioners. for the tort committed by his wife.

On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ISSUE:
ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was 1. Is the husband, who was not a party to the
affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and suit but whose conjugal property is being
this Court. It became final and executory on 5 executed on account of the other spouse
March 1992. On 14 October 1992, the trial court being the judgment obligor, considered a
issued a writ of execution. "stranger?"
2. Whether the conjugal partnership of gains is
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties liable for the civil liabilities of the wife.
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy
Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on HELD:
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of FIRST ISSUE: YES
Cavite. A notice of sheriff’s sale was issued. The A third-‐party claim must be filed a person other
auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-‐
favor of petitioners. party claim.

Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo In Mariano v. Court of Appeals,11 which was later
Nicol (respondent), the husband of Erlinda Nicol, adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals,12
filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale this Court held that the husband of the judgment
and damages with preliminary injunction against debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to the case
petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an
plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the
petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and conjugal partnership.On the other hand, in Naguit
execute his real property without exhausting the v. Court of Appeals and Sy v. Discaya, the Court
12

stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana
action wherein the writ of execution was issued and (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder
is therefore justified in bringing an independent before the. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao
action to vindicate her right of ownership over his City. The RTC rendered a consolidated decision2
exclusive or paraphernal property. acquitting Efren of the charge for insufficiency of
evidence but finding Melecia and another person
In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car guilty as charged and sentenced them to the
which was claimed by the third party complainant penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found
to be conjugal property was being levied upon to guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly
enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
person, the third-‐party claim of the wife is proper P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
since the obligation which is personal to the P150,000.00 actual damages.
husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property
but on his separate property. On appeal to this Court, it affirmed on May 24,
2001 the conviction of both accused but modified
Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to
is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested. the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the
award of civil indemnity and moral damages.
SECOND ISSUE: NO
There is no dispute that contested property is Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code16 deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered the
explicitly provides that payment of personal debts issuance of the writ,5 resulting in the levy of real
contracted by the husband or the wife before or properties registered in the names of Efren and
during the marriage shall not be charged to the Melecia.6 Subsequently, a notice of levy7 and a
conjugal partnership except insofar as they notice of sale on execution8 were issued.
redounded to the benefit of the family.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife
Unlike in the system of absolute community where Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a execution, claiming that the levied properties were
crime or quasi-‐delict is chargeable to the absolute conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the ISSUE:
debtor-‐spouse, the same advantage is not accorded Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the
in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia
conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make can be levied and executed upon for the
advance payments for the liability of the debtor-‐ satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder
spouse. case.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it HELD: NO BUT ALL THE LIABILITIES MENTIONED IN
be concluded that the civil obligation arising from ART. 121 MUST BE SATISFIED FIRST.
the crime of slander committed by Erlinda Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot given that they were married prior to the
be held liable for the personal obligation contracted enactment of the Family Code and that they did not
by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is execute any prenuptial agreement.14 Although the
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership. heirs of the deceased victims do not dispute that it
was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which
PANA VS HEIRS OF JUANITE 2012 governed the marriage, they insist that it was the
FACTS:
13

system of absolute community of property that
applied to Efren and Melecia. This means that they continue under such property
regime to enjoy rights of ownership over their
While it is true that the personal stakes of each separate properties. Consequently, to automatically
spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or change the marriage settlements of couples who
unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal got married under the Civil Code into absolute
partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them community of property in 1988 when the Family
can be said to have acquired vested rights in Code took effect would be to impair their acquired
specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the or vested rights to such separate properties.
Family Code does not intend to reach back and
automatically convert into absolute community of The RTC cannot take advantage of the spouses’
property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains loose admission that absolute community of
that existed before 1988 excepting only those with property governed their property relation since the
prenuptial agreements. The Family Code itself record shows that they had been insistent that their
provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements property regime is one of conjugal partnership of
cannot be modified except prior to marriage. gains.22 No evidence of a prenuptial agreement
between them has been presented.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the
marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s finding that
before the celebration of the marriage, subject to Melecia has no exclusive property of her own,24
the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. the above applies. The civil indemnity that the
decision in the murder case imposed on her may be
Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains enforced against their conjugal assets after the
that governed the marriage between Efren and responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be Family Code have been covered.
modified except before the celebration of that
marriage. Contrary to Efren’s contention, Article 121 above
allows payment of the criminal indemnities
Post-‐marriage modification of such settlements can imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the
take place only where: (a) the absolute community partnership assets even before these are liquidated.
or conjugal partnership was dissolved and Indeed, it states that such indemnities "may be
liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the enforced against the partnership assets after the
spouses who were legally separated reconciled and responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article
agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) have been covered." No prior liquidation of those
judicial separation of property had been had on the assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since
ground that a spouse abandons the other without Article 122 states that "at the time of liquidation of
just cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the partnership, such offending spouse shall be
the family; (d) there was judicial separation of charged for what has been paid for the purposes
property under Article 135; (e) the spouses jointly above-‐mentioned."
filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their
absolute community or conjugal partnership of BA FINANCE VS CA 1988
gains. None of these circumstances exists in the FACTS:
case of Efren and Melecia. On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo
secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he
gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, signed in his own behalf and as representative of
the husband and the wife place only the fruits of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an
their separate property and incomes from their alleged special power of attorney executed by his
work or industry in the common fund. wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L
14

Industries and under whose name the said business court's decision except for the exemplary damages.
is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo HENCE THIS PETITION.
to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
About two months prior to the loan, however, Petitioner is that while it is true that A & L
Augusto Yulo had already left Lily Yulo and their Industries is a single proprietorship and the
children and had abandoned their conjugal home. registered owner thereof is private respondent Lily
When the obligation became due and demandable, Yulo, the said proprietorship was established during
Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same. the marriage and its assets were also acquired
during the same. Therefore, it is presumed that this
On October 7, 1975, the petitioner filed its property forms part of the conjugal partnership of
amended complaint against the spouses Augusto the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo and thus, could
and Lily Yulo on the basis of the promissory note. It be held liable for the obligations contracted by
also prayed for the issuance of a writ of Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
attatchment alleging that the said spouses were
guilty of fraud in contracting the debt. ISSUE:
1. Whether the signature of Lily was forged?
The trial court issued the writ of attachment prayed 2. Whether the conjugal partnership is liable
for thereby enabling the petitioner to attach the for the obligations contracted by Augusto
properties of A & L Industries. Apparently not Yulo.
contented with the order, the petitioner filed
another motion for the examination of attachment HELD:
debtor, alleging that the properties attached by the FIRST ISSUE: YES
sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction We cannot find any error on the part of the trial
of any judgment that may be recovered by it in the judge in using the above documents as standards
case. and also in giving credence to the expert witness
presented by the private respondent whose
Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with testimony the petitioner failed to rebut and whose
counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta Yulo credibility it likewise failed to impeach. But more
and she are husband and wife, the former had important is the fact that the unrebutted
abandoned her and their children five (5) months handwriting expert's testimony noted twelve (12)
before the filing of the complaint; that they were glaring and material differences in the alleged
already separated when the promissory note was signature of the private respondent in the Special
executed; that her signature in the special power of Power of Attorney as compared with the specimen
attorney was forged because she had never signatures, something which the appellate court
authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact also took into account.
any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries,
which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that SECOND ISSUE: NO
she never got a single centavo from the proceeds of There is no dispute that A & L Industries was
the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily
that as a result of the illegal attachment of her Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal
properties, which constituted the assets of the A & and the fact that it was registered in the name of
L Industries, the latter closed its business and was only one of the spouses does not destroy its
taken over by the new owner. conjugal nature. However, for the said property to
be held liable, the obligation contracted by the
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment husband must have redounded to the benefit of the
dismissing the petitioner's complaint against the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the Civil
private respondent Lily Yulo and A & L Industries Code. In the present case, the obligation which the
and ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal
Lily Yulo. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial property managed by the private respondent Lily
15

Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo
for his own benefit because at the time he incurred After Rafael Ayustes death on October 13, 1989,
the obligation he had already abandoned his family Christina Ayuste discovered, in the course of an
and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made inventory of their properties, that the title to the
it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in land in Lucena was missing. She searched for it in
behalf of A & L Industries, to procure such loan the office of her husband in Lucena City and it was
from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L then that she learned from her employees about
Industries liable now for the said loan would be the sale of the house and lot by her husband to
unjust and contrary to the express provision of the private respondent.
Civil Code.
On March 2, 1990, Christina Ayuste filed a
We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo City for the annulment of the sale, cancellation of
against his conjugal properties with respondent Lily the title issued in the name of private respondent
Yulo. Thus, it follows that the writ of attachment and for the payment of moral, exemplary and
cannot issue against the said properties. actual damages. In her complaint Christina Ayuste
alleges that her signature on the deed of sale was
HEIRS OF AYUSTE VS CA 1999 forged and that her husband Rafael Ayuste sold the
FACTS: property without her knowledge and consent.
Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on
September 24, 1961. Although the couple resided The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision
in Manila, they operated a machine shop in Declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Barangay Iyam, Lucena City, which was managed by House and Lot. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Rafael Ayuste. In order to serve as a temporary trial courts ruling by holding that Christina Ayustes
residence for Rafael Ayuste while in Lucena, the right to bring an action for the annulment of the
couple purchased on August 26, 1982 a parcel of sale is barred by laches because of her failure to file
land with an area of 180 square meters on which a it during the existence of the marriage in
residential house was built situated at Yale Street, accordance with article 173 of the Civil Code. Also,
University Village, Barrio Ibabang Dupay, Lucena it found private respondent to be entitled to the
City from spouses Pedro and Aida David. A deed of protection of a buyer in good faith and for value.
sale[4] was executed and signed by the parties and
filed with the Register of Deeds of Lucena City. On Petitioners claim that since the law expressly
October 23, 1983, the Register of Deeds of Lucena prohibits the husband from alienating real property
City issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-‐42972 belonging to the conjugal partnership without his
in the name of RAFAEL T. AYUSTE, married to wifes consent, the contract of sale in question is a
Christina Ayuste. nullity pursuant to article 1409 of the Civil Code
which provides that contracts expressly prohibited
On February 27, 1987, a deed of absolute sale was by law are inexistent and void from the beginning.
executed by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private It is further averred by petitioners that the present
respondent whereby the former sold the action is not barred because the action to declare
abovementioned parcel of land to the latter for the nullity of a contract does not prescribe.
P40,000, which amount Rafael Ayuste acknowledge Futhermore, Christina Ayuste cannot be faulted for
having received in the deed. On page 2 of this deed having brought the action only after the death of
appears the signature of Christina Ayuste below the her husband, despite the periods stated in article
phrase With my conformity. The deed of sale was 173 of the Civil Code, since she had no knowledge
registered with the Register of deeds of Lucena City of the sale during his lifetime as he concealed the
on March 5, 1987 and Transfer Certificate of Title same from her. Finally, it is contended that article
No. T-‐50046 was issued in the name of private 166 is the relevant provision, not article 173.
respondent.
16

ISSUE: Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had
Whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment been separated de facto since 1974.[9] Sometime in
of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983,
Ayuste without the consent of Christina Ayuste. Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 to respondent
spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for
HELD: NO P40,000.00. She likewise found out that Vicente
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten filed a petition for administration and appointment
years from the transaction questioned, ask the of guardian with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
courts for the annulment of any contract of the Quezon City, Branch XXI. Vicente misrepresented
husband entered into without her consent, when therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22,
such consent is required, or any act or contract of 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her only heirs. On September 29, 1983, the court
her interest in the conjugal partnership property. appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her children. Subsequently, in its Order dated October
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may 14, 1983, the court authorized Vicente to sell the
demand the value of property fraudulently estate of Ignacia.
alienated by the husband.
On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel,
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the
on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on return of her share in the lot. Failing to settle the
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2, matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a
1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with complaint for annulment of sale against respondent
the lower court asking for the annulment of the spouses. The complaint was thereafter amended to
sale. Although the action was filed within ten years include Vicente Reyes as one of the defendants.
from the questioned transaction, it was not brought
during the existence of the marriage which was In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that
dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale
1989.[17] Clearly, the action for annulment filed by was valid because it was duly approved by the
Christina Ayuste was barred for having been filed court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended
out of time. that what he sold to the spouses was only his share
in Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2, excluding the share of his wife,
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the and that he never represented that the latter was
sale after the death of her husband is not material. already dead. He likewise testified that respondent
We affirm public respondents ruling that spouses, through the counsel they provided him,
registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition
constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the for the issuance of letters of administration and
deed of sale was registered on March 5, 1987, appointment of guardian without his knowledge.
Christina Ayuste is presumed to have constructive
notice of the sale from such date. The court a quo rendered a decision declaring the
sale of Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 void with respect to the
HEIRS OF REYES VS MIJARES 2003 share of Ignacia. Ignacia filed a motion for
FACTS: modification of the decision praying that the sale be
The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot declared void in its entirety and that the
No. 4349-‐B-‐2 registered in the name of Spouses respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the
Vicente Reyes and Ignacia Aguilar-‐Reyes. Said lot rentals they collected on the apartments built on
and the apartments built thereon were part of the Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 computed from March 1, 1983.
spouses conjugal properties having been purchased
using conjugal funds from their garments business. On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its
decision by declaring the sale void in its entirety
17

and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
respondent spouses the purchase price of or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
P110,000. property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
Both Ignacia Aguilar-‐Reyes and respondent spouses marriage, may demand the value of property
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. fraudulently alienated by the husband.
Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was
substituted by her compulsory heirs. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No.
4349-‐B-‐2, is a conjugal property having been
Petitioners contended that they are entitled to purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses
reimbursement of the rentals collected on the during the subsistence of their marriage. It is
apartment built on Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2, while beyond cavil therefore that the sale of said lot to
respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in respondent spouses without the knowledge and
good faith. On January 26, 2000, the Court of consent of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul
Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4,
trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10
absence of Ignacias consent to the sale, the same year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the
must be held valid in favor of respondents because Civil Code. Even if we reckon the period from
they were innocent purchasers for value. November 25, 1978 which was the date when
Vicente and the respondent spouses entered into a
ISSUE: contract concerning Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2, Ignacias
(1) What is the status of the sale of Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐ action would still be within the prescribed period.
2 to respondent spouses?
(2) Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be SECOND ISSUE: IT SHOULD BE ANNULLED IN ITS
annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the ENTIRETY
share of Ignacia? Anent the second issue, the trial court correctly
(3) Are respondent spouses purchasers in good annulled the voidable sale of Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 in its
faith? entirety.

HELD: The plain meaning attached to the plain language of
FIRST ISSUE: CONJUGAL PROPERTIES the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the by the husband without the wife's consent, may be
governing laws at the time the assailed sale was annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to
contracted, provide: limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
prejudice the wife, such limitation should have
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non been spelled out in the statute.
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the THIRD ISSUE: RESPONDENTS ARE PURCHASERS IN
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real BAD FAITH
property of the conjugal partnership without the In the instant case, there existed circumstances that
wifes consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give should have placed respondent spouses on guard.
her consent, the court may compel her to grant the The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died
same on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate,
however, reveals that (1) it was issued by the Office
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March
within ten years from the transaction questioned, 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on
the husband entered into without her consent, March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation
when such consent is required, or any act or would be on March 8, 1982.
18

Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first
court approval of the sale. Note that the Order and second pages of the deed but she refused,
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court, appointing hence, he instituted on August 8, 1991 the instant
Vicente as guardian of his 5 minor children, as well complaint for specific performance against her and
as the Order authorizing him to sell the estate of her husband Pelayo (defendants). The defendants
Ignacia were issued only on September 29, 1983 moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
and October 14, 1983, respectively. On the other it stated no cause of action.
hand, the sale of the entire Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 to
respondent spouses appears to have been made The questioned deed having been executed on
not on March 1, 1983, but even as early as January 10, 1988, the defendants claimed that
November 25, 1978. Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988 within
which to register the same, but as they failed to, it
Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that is not valid and, therefore, unenforceable.
at the time of the sale in 1978, Vicente was married
to Ignacia and that the latter did not give her The trial court thus dismissed the complaint. On
conformity to the sale. This is so because the 1978 appeal to this Court, the dismissal was set aside and
Agreement described Vicente as married but the the case was remanded to the lower court for
conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear in further proceedings.
the deed. Obviously, the execution of another deed
of sale in 1983 over the same Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2, The trial court there was no marital consent to nor
after the alleged death of Ignacia on March 22, actual consideration for the deed, held that the
1982, as well as the institution of the special deed was null and void and accordingly rendered
proceedings were, intended to correct the absence judgment. The CA then promulgated its Decision on
of Ignacias consent to the sale. April 20, 1999 whereby it ruled that by Lorenzas
signing as witness to the execution of the deed, she
The fact that the 5 minor children of Vicente had knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to
represented by the latter, signed the March 1, 1983 have given her consent to the same; that herein
deed of sale of Lot No. 4349-‐B-‐2 will not estop petitioners failed to adduce sufficient proof to
them from assailing the validity thereof. Not only overthrow the presumption that there was
were they too young at that time to understand the consideration for the deed, and that petitioner
repercussions of the sale, they likewise had no right David Pelayo, being a lawyer, is presumed to have
to sell the property of their mother who, when they acted with due care and to have signed the deed
signed the deed, was very much alive. with full knowledge of its contents and import.
HENCE THIS PETITION.
PELAYO VS PEREZ 2005
FACTS: ISSUE:
David Pelayo (Pelayo),by a Deed of Absolute Sale Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void
executed on January 11, 1988, conveyed to Melki for lack of marital consent.
Perez (Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the
lots). HELD: NO
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner
Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of
one whose signature is illegible witnessed the Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is
execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only deemed to have given her implied consent to the
on the third page in the space provided for contract of sale.
witnesses on account of which Perez application for
registration of the deed with the Office of the Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by
Register of Deeds in Tagum, Davao was denied. mere consent, which may either be express or
19

implied. A wifes consent to the husbands Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken
disposition of conjugal property does not always thereunder against PNB. Plaintiff-‐appellee Joe A.
have to be explicit or set forth in any particular Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB Laoag
document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the
that such consent or approval was indeed given. In loan, plaintiff-‐appellee Ros executed a real estate
the present case, although it appears on the face of mortgage involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161.
the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an
instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
execution of said document point to the fact that result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
property and consented to the sale. extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the highest bidder.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article After the lapse of one (1) year without the property
166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in being redeemed, the property was consolidated
effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in and registered in the name of PNB.
question was executed, the lack of marital consent
to the disposition of conjugal property does not Claiming that she (plaintiff-‐appellee Estrella Aguete)
make the contract void ab initio but merely has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her
voidable. husband nor she consented to the mortgage
instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the
until the court annuls the same and only upon an mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property
action brought by the wife whose consent was not interposing the defense that her signatures affixed
obtained. In the present case, despite respondents on the documents were forged and that the loan
repeated demands for Lorenza to affix her did not redound to the benefit of the family.
signature on all the pages of the deed of sale,
showing respondents insistence on enforcing said In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the
contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists
annulment of the deed of sale. It was only when that it was plaintiffs-‐appellees own acts of
respondent filed a complaint for specific omission/connivance that bar them from
performance on August 8, 1991 when petitioners recovering the subject property on the ground of
brought up Lorenzas alleged lack of consent as an estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription.
affirmative defense. Thus, if the transaction was
indeed entered into without Lorenzas consent, we The trial court rendered its Decision5 in favor of
find it quite puzzling why for more than three and a petitioners. The appellate court rendered its
half years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek Decision and granted PNBs appeal. The appellate
the nullification of the assailed contract. court reversed the trial courts decision, and
dismissed petitioners complaint. HENCE THIS
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to PETITION.
believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of the
transaction between respondent and her husband; ISSUE:
and, by affixing her signature on the deed of sale, 1. Whether the real estate mortgage valid.
she, in effect, signified her consent to the 2. Whether the loan contracted by husband
disposition of their conjugal property. Joe A. Ros with respondent Philippine
National Bank Laoag redounded to the
AGUETE VS PNB 2011 benefit of his family.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a HELD:
complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate FIRST ISSUE: VOIDABLE
20

The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of
the mortgage. The subject property is thus A notarized document carries the evidentiary
considered part of the conjugal partnership of weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
gains. execution, and it has in its favor the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence
There is no doubt that the subject property was so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all
acquired during Ros and Aguetes marriage. Ros and controversy as to the falsity of the certificate.
Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the Absent such, the presumption must be upheld.
subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is
also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no
property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on one can come before the courts with unclean
23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that hands. In their memorandum before the trial court,
Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged
to Ros mortgage to PNB of the subject property. On Aguetes signatures.
the other hand, Aguete denies ever having
consented to the loan and also denies affixing her SECOND ISSUE: YES. IT REDOUNDED TO THE
signature to the mortgage and loan documents. BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
The application for loan shows that the loan would
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any be used exclusively for additional working capital of
conjugal real property without the consent, express buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco. In her
or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in
then the contract is voidable. Article 173 of the Civil such business, but claimed to be unaware whether
Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance it prospered. Aguete was also aware of loans
of the subject property. However, the same article contracted by Ros, but did not know where he
does not guarantee that the courts will declare the wasted the money. Debts contracted by the
annulment of the contract. Annulment will be husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
declared only upon a finding that the wife did not profession by which he contributes to the support
give her consent. In the present case, we follow the of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
conclusion of the appellate court and rule that and private debts.
Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of
the subject property. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the
contract, i.e., he directly received the money and
The documents disavowed by Aguete are services to be used in or for his own business or his
acknowledged before a notary public, hence they own profession, that contract falls within the term x
are public documents. Every instrument duly x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
acknowledged and certified as provided by law may partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
be presented in evidence without further proof, the It is enough that the benefit to the family is
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie apparent at the signing of the contract. From the
evidence of the execution of the instrument or very nature of the contract of loan or services, the
document involved. The execution of a document family stands to benefit from the loan facility or
that has been ratified before a notary public cannot services to be rendered to the business or
be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the
signer. PNB was correct when it stated that end, his business or profession fails or does not
petitioners omission to present other positive succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was contracts obligations on behalf of the family
fatal to petitioners cause.20 Petitioners did not business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
present any corroborating witness, such as a such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
handwriting expert, who could authoritatively conjugal partnership.
declare that Aguetes signatures were really forged.
21

For this reason, we rule that Ros loan from PNB payments due on the property were religiously paid
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal (until 1955) by the [petitioners] as evidenced by
partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the receipts under the [petitioners] name.
conjugal partnership.
Hernandez, Sr. died intestate in April 1983 and it
HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ VS MINGOA 2009 was only after his burial that his heirs found out
FACTS: that TCT No. 107534 was already cancelled a year
A complaint was filed with the RTC of Quezon City before (in 1982), and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
by herein petitioners, heirs of Domingo Hernandez, 290121 was issued to the [respondents]. Upon
Sr., namely, spouse Sergia Hernandez and their diligent inquiry, [petitioners] came to know that the
surviving children Domingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora cancellation of TCT (No. 107534) in favor of the
Wilma, against the respondents herein. [respondents] xxx TCT (No. 290121) was based
upon three sets of documents, namely, (1)
In their complaint, the petitioners asked for (a) the Irrevocable Power of Attorney; (2) Irrevocable
annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT No. Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Deed of Absolute
290121 including all its derivative titles, the Sale.
Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated
February 14, 1963 in favor of Dolores Camisura, the Petitioners also allege that because of financial
SPA dated May 9, 1964 in favor of Plaridel Mingoa, difficulties, they were only able to file a complaint
Sr., and the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate on February 11, 1995 after consulting with several
dated July 9, 1978 executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. lawyers.
in favor of Melanie Mingoa for being products of
forgery and falsification; and (b) the reconveyance Respondents on the other hand do not deny that
and/or issuance to them (petitioners) by the Hernandez, Sr. was indeed awarded a piece of real
Quezon City Register of Deeds of the certificate of property by the PHHC. According to the
title covering the subject property. respondents, Hernandez, Sr. was awarded by the
PHHC the Right to Purchase the property in
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the question; however, the late Hernandez, Sr. failed to
complaint interposing the following grounds: the pay all the installments due on the said property.
claim or demand has been paid, waived, abandoned Thus, afraid that he would forfeit his right to
or otherwise extinguished; lack of cause of action; purchase the property awarded to him, Hernandez,
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the Sr. sold to Dolores Camisura his rights for the sum
defendants or over the subject or nature of the suit; of P6,500.00 on February 14, 1963, through a deed
and prescription. of transfer of rights, seemingly a printed form from
the PHHC. Simultaneous to this, Hernandez, Sr. and
In the early part of 1958, Domingo Hernandez, Sr. his spouse executed an irrevocable special power of
(who was then a Central Bank employee) and his attorney, appointing Dolores Camisura as their
spouse Sergia V. Hernandez were awarded a piece attorney-‐in-‐fact with express power to sign,
of real property by the Philippine Homesite and execute and acknowledge any contract of
Housing Corporation (PHHC) by way of salary disposition, alienation and conveyance of her right
deduction. On October 18, 1963, the [petitioners] over the aforesaid parcel of land.
then having paid in full the entire amount of
P6,888.96, a Deed of Absolute Sale of the property Apparently, this special power of attorney was
was executed by the PHHC in their favor. TCT No. executed for the purpose of securing her right to
107534, covering the property was issued to the transfer the property to a third person considering
[petitioners] on May 23, 1966. It bears an that there was a prohibition to dispose of the
annotation of the retention period of the property property by the original purchaser within one (1)
by the awardee (i.e., restriction of any unauthorized year from full payment. Else wise stated, the
sale to third persons within a certain period). Tax irrevocable power of attorney was necessary in
22

order to enable the buyer, Dolores Camisura, to sell ordinary person. Having compared the questioned
the lot to another, Plaridel Mingoa, without the signature on the SPA with those of the documents
need of requiring Hernandez, to sign a deed of bearing the sample standard signature of Sergia
conveyance. Hernandez, we affirm both lower courts' findings
regarding the forgery.
On May 9, 1964, Dolores Camisura sold her right
over the said property to Plaridel Mingoa for However, Sergias lack of consent to the sale did not
P7,000.00. Camisura then executed a similar render the transfer of her share invalid. In
irrevocable power of attorney and a deed of sale of succeeding cases, we held that alienation and/or
right in a residential land and improvements encumbrance of conjugal property by the husband
therein in favor of Plaridel Mingoa. Upon such without the wifes consent is not null and void but
payment and on the strength of the said irrevocable merely voidable.
power of attorney, Plaridel Mingoa took possession
of the said property and began paying all the SECOND ISSUE: YES
installments due on the property to PHHC. Plaridel Here, the husbands first act of disposition of the
Mingoa further secured TCT No. 107534 (issued in subject property occurred in 1963 when he
the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr.) on May, executed the SPA and the Deed of Transfer of
1966. On July 9, 1978, Plaridel Mingoa sold to his Rights in favor of Dolores Camisura. Thus, the right
eldest child, Melanie Mingoa, the property in of action of the petitioners accrued in 1963, as
question for P18,000.00. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the wife
may file for annulment of a contract entered into by
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the the husband without her consent within ten (10)
petitioners. CA, in its herein assailed Decision years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners
reversed and set aside the appealed decision, filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Even if
thereby dismissing the complaint filed by the we were to consider that their right of action arose
petitioners. Hence this petition. when they learned of the cancellation of TCT No.
107534 and the issuance of TCT No. 290121 in
ISSUE: Melanie Mingoas name in 1993, still, twelve (12)
(1) Whether the alienation involving the subject years have lapsed since such discovery, and they
property is void; and filed the petition beyond the period allowed by law.
(2) Whether the action impugning the validity of Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together with
such alienation has prescribed and/or was barred her children, filed the action for reconveyance, the
by laches. conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez,
Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the
HELD: latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore,
FIRST ISSUE: NO. It’s VOIDABLE petitioners action has prescribed.
To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following elements: Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with
(1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent. the courts an action for annulment of the contract
during the marriage and within ten (10) years from
The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the the transaction necessarily barred her from
contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his share in questioning the sale of the subject property to third
the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the persons. More than having merely prescribed,
consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale petitioners action has likewise become stale, as it is
involving their conjugal property, the trial court barred by laches.
found that it was lacking because said wifes
signature on the SPA was falsified. Notably, even GUIANG VS CA 1998
the CA observed that the forgery was so blatant as FACTS:
to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an
23

Over the objection of private respondent and while the original registered owner from whom the
she was in Manila seeking employment, her couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the
husband sold to the petitioners-‐spouses one half of lot.
their conjugal property, consisting of their
residence and the lot on which it stood. Plaintiff Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned
Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally home. She found her children staying with other
married spouses. They were married on December households. For staying in their house sold by her
24, 1968. husband, plaintiff was complained against by
defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of
and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-‐wife Gilda Corpuz as Barangay General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1),
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot from Manuel Koronadal, South Cotabato, for trespassing. On
Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. document known as amicable settlement.

Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Defendant-‐spouses Guiang followed thru the
Judie Corpuz sold one-‐half portion of their Lot No. amicable settlement with a motion for the
9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-‐165409 to the defendants-‐ execution of the amicable settlement, filing the
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Plaintiff same with the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal,
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. South Cotabato.
She was trying to look for work abroad, in the
Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of Respondent Court found no reversible error in the
an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able trial courts ruling that any alienation or
to go abroad. encumbrance by the husband of the conjugal
property without the consent of his wife is null and
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned void as provided under Article 124 of the Family
that her father intended to sell the remaining one-‐ Code. It also rejected petitioners contention that
half portion including their house, of their homelot the amicable settlement ratified said sale, citing
to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars
mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied ratification of the contracts specified therein,
that she was objecting to the sale. particularly those prohibited or declared void by
law. HENCE THIS PETITION.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz,
defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of Petitioners-‐spouses contend that (1) the contract of
the remaining one-‐half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely
(LRC) Psd-‐165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document private respondent when she entered into an
known as Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) the amicable settlement with them.
remaining one-‐half portion of their lot and the
house standing thereon for a total consideration of ISSUES:
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in 1. Whether the contract of sale (Deed of
June , 1990. Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and
2. Whether such contract was ratified by
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5, private respondent when she entered into
1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in an amicable settlement with them.
defendant Judie Corpuzs title over the lot HELD:
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as FIRST ISSUE: NO. IT IS A VOID CONTRACT
vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of
this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the
24

parties-‐litigants in good faith and for valuable void. However, the transaction shall be construed
consideration. The absence of private respondents as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under spouse and the third person, and may be perfected
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides: as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or authorization by the court before
ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties: Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and
the intimidation referred to by petitioners were
x x x x x x x x x perpetrated in the execution of the document
embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, alleged during trial that barangay authorities made
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. her sign said document through misrepresentation
and coercion.[13] In any event, its execution does
These contracts are binding, unless they are not alter the void character of the deed of sale
annulled by a proper action in court. They are between the husband and the petitioners-‐spouses,
susceptible of ratification. as will be discussed later. The fact remains that
such contract was entered into without the wifes
The error in petitioners contention is evident. consent.
Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by
vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is
into by a person whose consent was obtained and premised on the absence of private respondents
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil
undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private Code requires the concurrence of the following
respondents consent to the contract of sale of their elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. last element being indubitably absent in the case at
bar.
This being the case, said contract properly falls
within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, SECOND ISSUE: NO. THE AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
which was correctly applied by the two lower DID NOT RATIFY THE CONTRACT.
courts: Insisting that the contract of sale was merely
voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the the contending parties through the amicable
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both settlement they executed on March 16, 1990 in
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the Barangay Case No. 38.
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which The position is not well taken. The trial and the
must be availed of within five years from the date appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of
of the contract implementing such decision. the private respondent. The trial court correctly
held:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the Moreover, it cannot be denied that the amicable
administration of the conjugal properties, the other settlement entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. and defendant spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a
These powers do not include the powers of direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By
disposition or encumbrance which must have the express provision of law, such a contract is also
authority of the court or the written consent of the void.
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
25

Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, on April
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent. 15, 1992.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
This agreement was handwritten by petitioner and
In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out
of Rights and the amicable settlement are null and the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto
void. assured her of his wifes conformity and consent to
the sale. The following day, petitioner, the real
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered estate broker and Edilberto met in the latters office
a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts
by the parties, following the last sentence of Article to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts,
124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after petitioner delivered to him two checks. The
the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal
trespassing against private respondent, after which affixing of his wifes signature.
the barangay authorities secured an amicable
settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a When petitioner met again with respondent
motion for its execution. The settlement, however, spouses and the real estate broker at Edilbertos
does not mention a continuing offer to sell the office for the formal affixing of Normas signature,
property or an acceptance of such a continuing she was surprised when respondent spouses
offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private informed her that they were backing out of the
respondent would vacate the property. By no agreement because they needed spot cash for the
stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret full amount of the consideration.[13] Petitioner
this document as the acceptance mentioned in reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to
Article 124. sell had already been duly perfected and Normas
refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice
MANALO VS CAMAISA 2002 petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts
FACTS: prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific
Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-‐Manalo allegedly came performance and damages against respondent
across an advertisement placed by respondents, spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
the Spouses Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Branch 136 on April 29, 1992, to compel
Edilberto Camaisa, for the sale of their ten-‐door respondent Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. sell.

As narrated by petitioner in her complaint filed with The trial court rendered a summary judgment
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, dismissing the complaint on the ground that under
she was interested in buying the two properties so Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot
she negotiated for the purchase through a real intervene to authorize the transaction in the
estate broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized by absence of the consent of the wife since said wife
respondent spouses. Thereafter, petitioner met who refused to give consent had not been shown to
with the vendors who turned out to be respondent be incapacitated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
spouses. She made a definite offer to buy the dismissal by the trial court. HENCE THIS PETITION.
properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with
the knowledge and conformity of his wife, ISSUE:
respondent Norma Camaisa in the presence of the Whether or not the contracts to sell between
real estate broker.[3] After some bargaining, petitioner and respondent spouses were already
petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase perfected such that the latter could no longer back
price of P1,500,000.00 for the Taytay property and out of the agreement.
P2,100,000.00 for the Makati property[4] to be paid
on installment basis with downpayments of HELD: NO
26

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property
property by the husband as administrator in was declared for tax assessment purposes under
appropriate cases requires the written consent of Assessment of Real Property No. 94-‐051-‐2802. The
the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. This is Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only
pursuant to Art. 124 of the Family Code. in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee
thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case
were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed
effective, the consent of both husband and wife a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
must concur. Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain
a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos
her written consent to the sale. Even granting that house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the
respondent Norma actively participated in SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor,
which she denied, her written consent to the sale is Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate
required by law for its validity. Significantly, Mortgage constituted on the subject property in
petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to favor of petitioner. The abovementioned
sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may transactions, including the execution of the SPA in
have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of favor of Gesmundo, took place without the
their conjugal properties. However, being merely knowledge and consent of respondent.
aware of a transaction is not consent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
Finally, petitioner argues that since respondent result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
Norma unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
contracts to sell, court authorization under Article extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
124 of the Family Code is warranted. issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder.

The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on
correct insofar as she alleges that if the written December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the
consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or subject property, respondent learned that
is being withheld, the matter may be brought to petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan
court which will give such authority if the same is Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford
warranted by the circumstances. However, it sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to
should be stressed that court authorization under play with fire within the premises.
Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the
spouse who does not give consent is Claiming that she had no knowledge of the
incapacitated.[26] In this case, petitioner failed to mortgage constituted on the subject property,
allege and prove that respondent Norma was which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted
incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo
In the absence of such showing of the wifes City, Civil Case No. SP-‐2222 (97) for Nullity of Real
incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought. Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK VS DAILO 2005 Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary
FACTS: Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot ground that the property in question was the
situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
27

correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate
The trial court rendered a Decision declaring the mortgage on the subject property for lack of
Deed of real estate mortgage as null and void. The respondents consent.
appellate court affirmed the trial courts finding that
the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the SECOND ISSUE: NO
absence of clear and convincing evidence to rebut The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
the presumption that the subject property acquired for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains
during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to lies with the creditor-‐party litigant claiming as such.
their conjugal partnership. The appellate court Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he
declared as void the mortgage on the subject who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
property because it was constituted without the Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan
knowledge and consent of respondent, in obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance
accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code. the construction of housing units without a doubt
HENCE THIS PETITION. redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Petitioner takes issue with the legal provision Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there
applicable to the factual milieu of this case. It is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late
be construed in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the
Code family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable for the payment of the
ISSUE: principal obligation.
1. Whether the real estate mortgage is void for
lack of consent of the wife. In addition, a perusal of the records of the case
reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously
2. Whether the conjugal partnership shall be asserted that the subject property was the
held liable for the payment of the late exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Marcelino Dailo Jr. to the extent that it Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was
redounded to the benefit of the family. it alleged that the proceeds of the loan redounded
to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal,
HELD: petitioner never claimed that the family benefited
FIRST ISSUE: YES from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts
The basic and established fact is that during his a certain theory in the court below, he will not be
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to
wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the
mortgage on the subject property, which formed other party but it would also be offensive to the
part of their conjugal partnership. By express basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. A
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the party may change his legal theory on appeal only
absence of (court) authority or written consent of when the factual bases thereof would not require
the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance presentation of any further evidence by the adverse
of the conjugal property shall be void. party in order to enable it to properly meet the
issue raised in the new theory.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the FUENTES VS ROCA 2010
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner FACTS:
that the rule on co-‐ownership under Article 493 of Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-‐square meter lot
the Civil Code does. Where the law does not in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982
distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano)
both the trial court and the appellate court are under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not
28

for the meantime have the registered title document in Zamboanga City four months later on
transferred to his name. January 11, 1989. All the same, the Fuentes spouses
pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides,
lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the the four-‐year prescriptive period for nullifying the
Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked
to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed The RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It
an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared ruled that the action had already prescribed since
dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale,
stated that it was to take effect in six months. forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article
1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty.
Plagata who then worked on the other On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, RTC decision. The CA found sufficient evidence of
he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagatas
and had her sign an affidavit of consent. As soon as testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in
Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata Quezon City. HENCE THIS PETITION.
notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On
January 11, 1989 Tarciano executed a deed of ISSUES:
absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They 1. Whether Rosarios signature on the
then paid him the additional P140,000.00 document of consent had been forged.
mentioned in their agreement. A new title was 2. What law governs in this case: Civil Code or
issued in the name of the spouses who immediately Family Code?
constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 3. Whether the heirs may bring an action to
1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife declare void Rosario’s husband’s sale of
Rosario who died nine months afterwards. conjugal land.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano HELD:
and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G. Roca, FIRST ISSUE: YES
Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, The Court agrees with the CAs observation that
together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit appears
represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen
(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters R
against the Fuentes spouses before the Regional and s were written is also remarkably different. The
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the
spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the
not give her consent to it. Her signature on the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat declared
affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in
prayed that the property be reconveyed to them Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty.
upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about
spouses paid Tarciano. four months earlier at her residence in Paco, Manila
on September 15, 1988. While a defective
The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They notarization will merely strip the document of its
presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he public character and reduce it to a private
personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with
residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such
He admitted, however, that he notarized the document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale
29

of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly consent during the marriage within 10 years from
relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios the transaction. Consequently, the action that the
consent does not matter. The sale is still void Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10
without an authentic consent. years of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet
prescribe.
SECOND ISSUE: FAMILY CODE
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC
law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not nullified the sale to them based on fraud and that,
the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal be that which applies to fraudulent transactions,
property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice
1989, a few months after the Family Code took of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when
effect on August 3, 1988. it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989,
their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign
law that governed the disposal of that lot was the document of consent upon a false
already the Family Code. representation that the property would go to their
children, not to strangers, and it turned out that
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article this was not the case, then she would have four
124 of the Family Code does not provide a period years from the time she discovered the fraud within
within which the wife who gave no consent may which to file an action to declare the sale void. But
assail her husbands sale of the real property. It that is not the case here. Rosario was not a victim
simply provides that without the other spouses of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was
written consent or a court order allowing the sale, simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since
the same would be void. the sale without her written consent was void.
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not
But, although a void contract has no legal effects forgery but the lack of written consent of their
even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence
of its terms have been performed, an action to of lack of consent.
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. This THIRD ISSUE: YES. THE HEIRS may.
action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code As stated above, that sale was void from the
does not prescribe. Thus: beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale.
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration When the two died, they passed on the ownership
of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. of the property to their heirs, namely, the
Rocas.[23] As lawful owners, the Rocas had the
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude
spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano
sold without their mothers (his wifes) written In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they
consent. The passage of time did not erode the should be entitled, among other things, to recover
right to bring such an action. from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the P200,000.00
that they paid him, with legal interest until fully
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that paid, chargeable against his estate.
applies to the transaction as the CA held, Article
173 provides that the wife may bring an action for FERRER VS FERRER 2006
annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal FACTS:
30

In her Complaint for payment of conjugal For their part, respondents filed a Motion to
improvements, sum of money, and accounting with Dismiss, contending that petitioner had no cause of
prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner action against them, and that the cause of action
alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer was barred by prior judgment.
(Alfredo), a half-‐brother of respondents Manuel M.
Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael). On 16 December 2002, the RTC rendered an Order,
Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Court of
a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition.
Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the It held that petitioners Complaint failed to state a
Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements cause of action. HENCE THIS PETITION.
thereon, including a residential house and a two-‐
door apartment building. However, it was during According to petitioner, while the RTC in Civil Case
their marriage that payment of the loan was made No. 61327 recognized that the improvements
using the couples conjugal funds. From their constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as
conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed Alfredos exclusive and capital property, the court
a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner also held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has
averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door the right to claim reimbursement from the estate of
of the apartment building, as well as the Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her husband
warehouse; however, in September 1991, he had no other property, and his only property had
stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he been sold to the respondents; hence, she has the
had acquired ownership over the property by virtue legal right to claim for reimbursement from the
of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents who are now the owners of the lot and
respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. the improvements thereon. In fine, petitioner
TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed
was issued and registered in the names of on the ground of failure to state a cause of action
respondents. because the respondents have the correlative
obligation to pay the value of the improvements.
It is petitioners contention that on 2 October 1989,
when her husband was already bedridden, ISSUE:
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign Whether petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has the
a document, purported to be his last will and right to claim reimbursement from the estate of
testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Alfredo.
Sale covering Alfredos lot and the improvements
thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed HELD: NO
with the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment of Petitioner was not able to show that there is an
the said sale against respondents, docketed as Civil obligation on the part of the respondents to respect
Case No. 61327. On 22 June 1993, the RTC or not to violate her right. While we could concede
dismissed the same. The dismissal was affirmed by that Civil Case No. 61327 made a reference to the
the Court of Appeals. right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120
of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows the improvements, the obligation to reimburse
that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal entire property is vested. There is no obligation on
partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the part of the purchaser of the property, in case
the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. She the property is sold by the owner-‐spouse.
alleged that the cost of the improvements
amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-‐half thereof The subject property was precisely declared as the
should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
they are now the registered owners of Alfredos lot. 120 of the Family Code.
31

community of property between the petitioner and
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, respondent. It also decreed the separation of
despite the allegations contained in the Complaint properties between them and ordered the equal
that they are the buyers of the subject premises, partition of personal properties located within the
are not petitioners spouse nor can they ever be country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous
deemed as the owner-‐spouse upon whom the title during the marriage. With regard to the
obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs Antipolo property, the court held that it was
rested. It is the owner-‐spouse who has the acquired using paraphernal funds of the
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the cannot recover his funds because the property was
case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
have the obligation to respect petitioners right to Constitution.
be reimbursed.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
Corollary thereto, neither can it be said that their which rendered the assailed decision modifying the
refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of trial court’s Decision. It held that respondent
petitioners rights. As has been shown in the merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase
foregoing, no obligation by the respondents under of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or
the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
a cause of action against the respondents, and for petitioner’s ownership over the property in trust for
this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in error in the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
dismissing the same. Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from
MULLER VS MULLER 2006 acquiring the same. HENCE THIS PETITION.
FACTS:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and Petitioner contends that respondent, being an
respondent Helmut Muller were married in alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The Philippines; that respondent was aware of the
couple resided in Germany at a house owned by constitutional prohibition but circumvented the
respondent’s parents but decided to move and same; and that respondent’s purpose for filing an
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By action for separation of property is to obtain
this time, respondent had inherited the house in exclusive possession, control and disposition of the
Germany from his parents which he sold and used Antipolo property.
the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the Respondent claims that he is not praying for
construction of a house amounting to transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him
registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer for the said property were in consideration of his
Certificate of Title No. 219438. marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to
petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that
Due to incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged respondent should be reimbursed of his personal
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the funds.
spouses eventually separated. On September 26,
1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of ISSUE:
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement
Quezon City. of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo
property.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision which terminated the regime of absolute HELD: NO
32

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. property despite the constitutional prohibition.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are Further, the distinction made between transfer of
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from futile exercise on respondent’s part. To allow
acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of reimbursement would in effect permit respondent
the constitutional provision is the conservation of to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
the national patrimony. allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by
law.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge Article 130
thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had
the Antipolo property titled in the name of GO, SR. VS SERVACIO 2011
petitioner because of the said prohibition. 12 His FACTS:
attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two
right on the said property cannot be sustained. parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square
meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go,
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years later, or on
implied trust was created and resulted by operation March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit
of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to of Renunciation and Waiver,[1] whereby he
respondent. Save for the exception provided in affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio
cases of hereditary succession, respondent’s Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased
disqualification from owning lands in the the two parcels of land (the property).
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in
trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She
made in violation of an existing statute and in was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the
evasion of its express provision, no trust can result petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr.
in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B.
hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of
constitutional prohibition. 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio)
for ₱5,686,768.00. On March 2, 2001, the
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a petitioners demanded the return of the property,
court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute,
follow the law and will not permit that to be done they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the
done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, annulment of the sale of the property.
and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s
which is also expressed in the principle that he who renunciation, the property became conjugal
has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies property; and that the sale of the property to
that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
equity on the ground that his conduct has been community property between Protacio, Sr. and
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or Marta was null and void.
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
33

Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership
exclusively owned the property because he had property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
purchased it with his own money.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent
On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the marriage without compliance with the foregoing
property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, separation of property shall govern the property
Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the relations of the subsequent marriage.
sale of the property, holding that: xxx As long as the
portion sold, alienated or encumbered will not be Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property
allotted to the other heirs in the final partition of after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise,
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate the disposition is void.
(sic) of other heirs, it is valid. HENCE THIS PETITION.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time
Code is the applicable law; and that the sale by of the effectivity of the Family Code. There being no
Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married
made without prior liquidation. prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, their property relation was properly
In contrast, although they have filed separate characterized as one of conjugal partnership
comments, Servacio and Rito both argue that governed by the Civil Code. Upon Martas death in
Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an
not render the sale invalid, because the sale was implied ordinary co-‐ownership ensued among
valid to the extent of the portion that was finally Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with
allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal
sale did not also prejudice any rights of the partnership pending a liquidation following its
petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-‐
disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil
property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs. Code, to wit:

ISSUE: Article 493. Each co-‐owner shall have the full
Whether the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
was void for being made without prior liquidation. pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
HELD: NO. NOT NECESSARILY person in its enjoyment, except when personal
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be or the mortgage, with respect to the co-‐owners,
liquidated in the same proceeding for the shall be limited to the portion which may be
settlement of the estate of the deceased. allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-‐ownership.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted,
the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-‐owner with
partnership property either judicially or extra-‐ his children in respect of Martas share in the
judicially within one year from the death of the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month title to any specific portion of Martas share without
period no liquidation is made, any disposition or an actual partition of the property being first done
either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until
34

then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it
in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-‐owner could sell turns out that there really would be, after
his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole
right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that
interest, but not the interest of his co-‐owners. half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal
co-‐owners without the consent of the other co-‐ partnership, and half should go to the estate of the
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of wife, then that corresponding to the husband is
the selling co-‐owners were thereby effectively valid, and that corresponding to the other is not.
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-‐ Since all these can be determined only at the time
owner of Martas share. the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a
disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly ab initio.
provides that the applicability of the rules on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without DOMINGO VS MOLINA 2016
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in FACTS:
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This In June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora
provision gives another reason not to declare the Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac,
sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration consisting of a one-‐half undivided portion over an
prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already 18, 164 square meter parcel of land.
acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the
property subject of the sale. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money
from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena
In their separate comments, the respondents aver Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978
that each of the heirs had already received a certain or 10 years after Flora’s death4, Anastacio sold his
allotted portion at the time of the sale, and that interest over the land to the spouses Molina to
Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the portions answer for his debts. The sale to the spouses
adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject
did not present any public document on the property. In 1986, Anastacio died.
allocation among her heirs, including themselves, of
specific shares in Martas estate. Neither did they In May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio’s interest
aver that the conjugal properties had already been was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title
liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a (TCT) No. 272967[[7 ]]and transferred the entire
partition among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of one-‐half undivided portion of the land to the
the sale, and whether the extent of the property spouses Molina.
sold adversely affected the interests of the
petitioners might not yet be properly decided with Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio and Flora,
finality. The appropriate recourse to bring that learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for
about is to commence an action for judicial Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership
partition. (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17,
1999.
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-‐heirs of her vendors in respect Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject
of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. property to the spouses Molina to serve as
The following observations of Justice Paras are collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed.
explanatory of this result, viz: Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest
over the subject property without Flora’s consent,
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.
mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the
35

Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have effectivity on August 3, 1988 and their property
falsified the document transferring Anastacio and relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal
Flora’s one-‐half undivided interest over the land. partnership of Anastacio and Flora was dissolved
Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to Article 175 (1)
subject property from the time of Anastacio’s death of the Civil Code22 (now Article 126 (1) of the
up to the time he filed the Complaint. Family Code).

The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio Article 130 of the Family Code requires the
surrendered the title to the subject property to liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death
answer for his debts and told the spouses Molina of a spouse and prohibits any disposition or
that they already own half of the land. The spouses encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the
Molina have been in possession of the subject conjugal partnership liquidation.
property before the title was registered under their
names and have religiously paid the property’s real While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that
estate taxes. any disposition involving the conjugal property
without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed15 the case void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of
because Melecio failed to establish his claim that the Family Code shall be "without prejudice to
Anastacio did not sell the property to the spouses vested rights already acquired in accordance with
Molina. The RTC also held that Anastacio could the Civil Code or other laws.
dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s
consent since the sale was necessary to answer for An implied co-‐ownership among Flora’s heirs
conjugal liabilities. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling governed the conjugal properties pending
in toto. HENCE THIS PETITION. liquidation and partition.

Melecio principally argues that the sale of land An implied ordinary co-‐ownership ensued among
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with
wife’s consent is invalid. Melecio also claims that respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal partnership
fraud attended the conveyance of the subject until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on
property and the absence of any document the other hand, owns one-‐half of the original
evidencing the alleged sale made the transfer null conjugal partnership properties as his share, but
and void. Finally, Melecio claims that the action has this is an undivided interest.
not yet prescribed.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-‐ownership
ISSUE: provides:
(1) Whether the sale of a conjugal property to the
spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and Article 493. Each co-‐owner shall have the full
legal; and ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
(2) Whether fraud attended the transfer of the pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
subject property to the spouses Molina. assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
HELD: rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
FIRST ISSUE: NO. NOT NECESSARILY or the mortgage, with respect to the co-‐owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be
Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal partnership was allotted to him in the division upon the termination
dissolved upon Flora’s death. of the co-‐ownership.

There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Thus, Anastacio, as co-‐owner, cannot claim title to
Domingo married before the Family Code’s any specific portion of the conjugal properties
36

without an actual partition being first done either Furthermore, Melecio's belief that Anastacio could
by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, not have sold the property without his knowledge
Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate
his undivided interest in the subject property. the spouses Molina's registered title over the
subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-‐owners of the
subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s Article 134-‐ 141
interest.
MAQUILAN VS MAQUILAN 2007
At the time of the sale, Anastacio’s undivided FACTS:
interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are
one-‐half of the entire conjugal properties; and (2) spouses who once had a blissful married life and
his share as Flora’s heir on the conjugal properties. out of which were blessed to have a son. However,
their once sugar coated romance turned bitter
Anastacio, as a co-‐owner, had the right to freely sell when petitioner discovered that private respondent
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour,
interest of his co-‐owners. Consequently, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case
Anastactio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the of adultery against private respondent and the
consent of the other co-‐owners was not totally latters paramour. Consequently, both the private
void, for Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof respondent and her paramour were convicted of
were thereby effectively transferred, making the the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an
spouses Molina a co-‐owner of the subject property imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8)
to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This result months, minimum of prision correccional as
conforms with the well-‐established principle that minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6) months
the binding force of a contract must be recognized and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision
as far as it is legally possible to do so. correccional as maximum penalty.

The spouses Molina would be a trustee for the Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel,
benefit of the co-‐heirs of Anastacio in respect of filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
any portion that might belong to the co-‐heirs after Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
liquidation and partition. Melecio’s recourse as a Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001
co-‐owner of the conjugal properties, including the with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
subject property, is an action for partition under Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil
Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on
the part of the petitioner.
SECOND ISSUE: NO
The sale of the subject property to the spouses During the pre-‐trial of the said case, petitioner and
Molina was not attended with fraud. private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT. The said Compromise Agreement was
The CA and RTC conclusion that there is no fraud in given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge
the sale is supported by the evidence on record. in the assailed Judgment On Compromise
Agreement, which was erroneously dated January
Melecio' s argument that no document was 2, 2002.
executed for the sale is negated by the CA finding
that there was a notarized deed of conveyance However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated
executed between Anastacio and the spouses January 15, 2002, praying for the repudiation of the
Molina, as annotated on the OCT of the disputed Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of
property. the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous
37

lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise 2. Whether the absence of the participation of
him of the consequential effects of the Compromise the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the
Agreement. voluntary separation made during the
pendency of the case is also void.
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated 3. Whether the conviction of adultery carries
January 21, 2002, denied the aforementioned the accessory of civil interdiction.
Omnibus Motion. Displeased, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, HELD:
but the same was denied in the assailed Order FIRST ISSUE: YES
dated February 7, 2002. The petitioner filed a The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA to the instant case. Article 43 of the Family Code
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that refers to Article 42.
the RTC committed grave error and abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of where a subsequent marriage is terminated
jurisdiction (1) in upholding the validity of the because of the reappearance of an absent spouse;
Compromise Agreement. while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of
legal separation. The present case involves a
The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is
CA held that the conviction of the respondent of sought to be declared under the ground of
the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify psychological capacity.
her from sharing in the conjugal property,
especially considering that she had only been Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly
sentenced with the penalty of prision correccional, inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially
a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty divided the properties of the conjugal partnership
of civil interdiction which deprives the person of of gains between the parties and does not deal with
the rights to manage her property and to dispose of the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is
such property inter vivos. Hence this petition. not among those that are expressly prohibited by
Article 2035.
The petitioner contends that the Compromise
Agreement is void because it circumvents the law Moreover, the contention that the Compromise
that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the
of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in
the conjugal property. Since the respondent was the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law
convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her and jurisprudence do not impose such
share should be forfeited in favor of the common disqualification.
child under Articles 43(2)[6] and 63[7] of the Family
Code. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
property may be effected voluntarily or for
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
Civil Code and argues that since adultery is a questioned Compromise Agreement which was
ground for legal separation, the Compromise judicially approved is exactly such a separation of
Agreement is therefore void. property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the
ISSUE: declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
1. Whether the partial voluntary separation of However, the Court must stress that this voluntary
property made by the spouses pending the separation of property is subject to the rights of all
petition for declaration of nullity of creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and
marriage is valid. other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to
Article 136 of the Family Code.
38

Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
SECOND ISSUE: NO USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24
The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29
Agreement involved the conjugal properties of the June 2005. The California court granted to Leticia
spouses. The settlement had no relation to the the custody of her two children, as well as all the
questions surrounding the validity of their couple’s properties in the USA. On 8 August 2005,
marriage. Nor did the settlement amount to a
Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
collusion between the parties.
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.

Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the She relied on the Joint Affidavit and David’s failure
Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to to comply with his obligation under the same. In his
ensure that the interest of the State is represented Answer, David stated that a judgment for the
and protected in proceedings for annulment and dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing June 2005 by the Superior Court of California,
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
suppression of evidence. While the appearances of conjugal partnership properties, which also include
the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor the USA properties, be liquidated and that all
are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of
their appearance does not per se nullify the both parties be charged against the conjugal
Compromise Agreement.
partnership.

THIRD ISSUE: NO RTC rendered judgment dissolving the absolute
The conviction of adultery does not carry the community of property of the parties. Also, the net
accessory of civil interdiction. It is clear, therefore, assets of the absolute community of property of
and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of the parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only,
civil interdiction which deprives the person of the
with the properties in the United States of America
rights to manage her property and to dispose of
remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner
such property inter vivos.
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to
NOVERAS VS NOVERAS the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
FACTS: California, County of San Mateo, United States of
America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras June 24, 2005. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
(Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, equal division of the Philippine properties between
United States of America (USA) where they the spouses.
eventually acquired American citizenship. They
then begot two children. Due to business reverses, In the present petition, David insists that the Court
David left the USA and returned to the Philippines of Appeals should have recognized the California
in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to him because said judgment was part of the
to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2 Million. pleading presented and offered in evidence before
According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to
David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
Martinez in Aurora province. unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering
that the latter was already granted all US properties
Upon learning that David had an extra-‐marital by the California court.
affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
39

ISSUE:
Whether the judicial separation of property should In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the
be granted should be granted. respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even
HELD: YES went several times to visit him there after the
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has
settlements must be made before the celebration been going back to the USA to visit her and their
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed children until the relations between them
provided that the modification isjudicially approved worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18 the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of
marriage with the California court. Such turn for the
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for worse of their relationship and the filing of the
judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes
6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit: for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial court’s decision because, the trial court
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of
abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or the absolute community of properties.
her obligations to the family as provided for in
Article 101; The records of this case are replete with evidence
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
have been separated in fact for at least one year more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
and reconciliation is highly improbable. improbable. First, while actual abandonment had
not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and had been living separately since 2003 when David
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of friends that David has been cohabiting with
property. (Emphasis supplied). Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in
The trial court had categorically ruled that there the hospital where David was once confined,
was no abandonment in this case to necessitate testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed
ratiocinated: for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the
Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid Having established that Leticia and David had
cause and the spouse is deemed to have actually separated for at least one year, the petition
abandoned the other when he/she has left the for judicial separation of absolute community of
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. property should be granted.
The intention of not returning is prima facie
presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse
failed to give any information as to his or her Article 147
whereabouts within the period of three months
from such abandonment. VALDES VS RTC BRANCH 102
40

FACTS: "In the liquidation and partition of the properties
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant,
on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage the provisions on co-‐ownership found in the Civil
were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June Code shall apply."
1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the "Considering that this Court has already declared
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code the marriage between petitioner and respondent as
(docketed Civil Case No. Q-‐92-‐12539, Regional Trial null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the
Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing property regime of petitioner and respondent shall
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial be governed by the rules on co-‐ownership.
court,[1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition; viz: "The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code finds no application since Article 102
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the
follows: conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers
to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and community of property." In his recourse to this
respondent Consuelo Gomez-‐Valdes is hereby Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52
declared null and void under Article 36 of the of the Family Code should be held controlling.
Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their ISSUE:
essential marital obligations; Whether Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXX should be held controlling.

"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to HELD: NO. IT’S ART. 147 THAT IS APPLICABLE.
start proceedings on the liquidation of their The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of property relations of the parties during the period
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that
portion of the decision directing compliance with Under Art. 147, this peculiar kind of co-‐ownership
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She applies when a man and a woman, suffering no
asserted that the Family Code contained no legal impediment to marry each other, so
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of exclusively live together as husband and wife under
common property in "unions without marriage." a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
The trial court made the following clarification: paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
Family Code explicitly provides that the property under any of the impediments mentioned in
acquired by both parties during their union, in the Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the When the common-‐law spouses suffer from a legal
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, impediment to marry or when they do not live
plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' exclusively with each other (as husband and wife
and all their other properties for that matter in ),only the property acquired by both of them
equal shares. through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and
41

in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of promulgated a Decision Declaring and decreeing
any party who is married to another shall accrue to the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh
the case may be, if so existing under a valid Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is initio; Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the
not validly married to another, his or her share shall conjugal partnership property particularly the
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received
expressed. from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company, by
ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%)
Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or
petitioner and private respondent own the "family P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per
home" and all their common property in equal annum from the date of this decision and one-‐half
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila
liquidation and partition of the property owned in Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies.
common by them, the provisions on co-‐ownership
under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in Thhe appellate court promulgated a Decision
relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and
should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the affirming in toto the trial courts decision. Petitioner
liquidation of either the absolute community or the filed a motion for reconsideration which was
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on
latter case until the contract is annulled ),are Certiorari.
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-‐ownership
that exists between common-‐law spouses. The first ISSUE:
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying Whether the CA erred when it ordered plaintiff-‐
paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, relates appellant noel to pay defendant-‐appellee one-‐half
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages or p1,837,667.89 out of his retirement benefits
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article received from the far east bank and trust co., with
40[14] of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of 12% interest thereon from the date of its decision,
a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a notwithstanding that said retirement benefits are
prior void marriage before the latter is judicially gratuitous and exclusive property of noel, and also
declared void. to deliver to defendant-‐appellee one-‐half of his
shares of stock with the manila memorial park and
BUENAVENTURA VS CA 2005 the provident group of companies, although said
FACTS: shares of stock were acquired by noel before his
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of marriage to respondent isabel and are, therefore,
nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner again his exclusive properties;
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground
of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, HELD: NO
Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. Since the present case does not involve the
After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions
leave of court, amended his petition by stating that of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of
both he and his wife were psychologically the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
incapacitated to comply with the essential absolute community or conjugal partnership of
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
filed an amended answer denying the allegation general rule applies, which is that in case a
that she was psychologically incapacitated. marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
42

regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned have been included or involved in said distribution.
and distributed is that of equal co-‐ownership. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on the sustained, but on the basis of co-‐ownership and not
consequences of a void marriage on the property of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law: ABING VS WAEYAN 2006
FACTS:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the Waeyan (Juliet, for short) met and fell in love with
property relations of the parties during the period each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together,
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, the couple bought a 2-‐storey residential house from
of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of one Benjamin Macua which was erected on a lot
Article 144 of the Civil Code. owned by a certain Alejandro Diño on Aurora
Street, Mankayan, Benguet. Consequent to the
This peculiar kind of co-‐ownership applies when a purchase, the tax declaration of the 2-‐storey house
man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment was transferred in the name of Juliet.
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without On December 2, 1991, Juliet left for overseas
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in employment in Korea. She would send money to
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) John who deposited the same in their joint bank
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract account.
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the In 1992, the original 2-‐storey residential house
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new
the Code. structure which housed a sari-‐sari store. This new
structure and the sari-‐sari store thereat are the
Under this property regime, property acquired by properties involved in this case.
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-‐ownership. In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and continued
Any property acquired during the union is prima to live with John. She managed the sari-‐sari store
facie presumed to have been obtained through while John worked as a mine employee of the
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in Lepanto Consolidated Mining, Inc.
the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if In 1995, the relationship between the two turned
said party's "efforts consisted in the care and from bad to worse. Hence, they decided to partition
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the their properties. For the purpose, they executed on
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement.
couple's separate property are not included in the Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by
co-‐ownership. the parties although signed by the witnesses
thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by shall leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet paying
the court a quo were found, both by the trial court him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John's
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired share in all their properties. On the same date –
during the union of the parties, the same would be October 7, 1995 – Juliet paid John the sum of
covered by the co-‐ownership. No fruits of a P232,397.66 by way of partial payment of his share,
separate property of one of the parties appear to with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet
43

in twelve monthly installment beginning November HELD: NO
1995. First and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties
hereto lived together as husband and wife from
Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance. 1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage.
On account thereof, John demanded of her to Neither is it disputed that sometime in December
vacate the annex structure housing the sari-‐sari 1991, Juliet left for Korea and worked thereat,
store. Juliet refused, prompting John to file an sending money to John which the latter deposited
ejectment suit against her before the MTC. in their joint account. In fact, Juliet was still in Korea
when the annex structure was constructed in 1992.
In his complaint, John alleged that he alone spent
for the construction of the annex structure with his Other than John's bare allegation that he alone,
own funds and thru money he borrowed from his thru his own funds and money he borrowed from
relatives. In fact, he added that the tax declaration his relatives, spent for the construction of the
for the structure was under his name. On this annex structure, evidence is wanting to support
premise, John claimed exclusive ownership of the such naked claim. For sure, John even failed to
subject structure, which thereby gave him the right reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he
to eject Juliet therefrom upon the latter's failure to divulge the names of the alleged relatives from
pay the agreed balance due him under the whom he made his borrowings, let alone the
aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement. amount of money he borrowed from them. All that
petitioner could offer by way of reinforcing his
In her answer, Juliet countered that their original claim of spending his own funds and borrowed
house was renovated thru their common funds and money in putting up the subject structure was the
that the subject structure annexed thereto was affidavit executed by a certain Manuel Macaraeg to
merely an attachment or an extension of their the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00
original residential house, hence the same from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his
pertained to the two of them in common. affidavit that it was sometime in 1990 when John
borrowed said amount from him. With the
In a decision dated March 15, 1997, the MTC, on its petitioner's own admission that the subject
finding that the money used in the construction of structure was constructed only in 1992, or two
the structure in question solely came from John, years after he borrowed P30,000.00 from
ruled that the same exclusively pertained to the Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the amount
latter, and accordingly ordered Juliet's eviction he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the
therefrom, including the sari-‐sari store thereat. The construction of the structure in dispute. More, it is
RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. The CA noted that while petitioner was able to present in
reversed the decision of the RTC. To the CA, John's evidence the Macaraeg affidavit, he failed to
evidence failed to establish that he alone spent for introduce similar affidavits, if any, of his close
the construction of the annex structure. Hence, the relatives from whom he claimed to have made
same pertained to both, and being a co-‐owner similar borrowings.
herself, Juliet cannot be evicted therefrom, adding
that if ever, John's cause of action should have Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax declaration
been for a sum of money "because he claims that covering the subject structure. We have, however,
Juliet still owes him the payment for the extension." ruled time and again that tax declarations do not
HENCE THIS PETITION. prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of
ownership.5 Payment of taxes is not proof of
ISSUE: ownership, any more than indicating possession in
Whether or not the property subject of the suit the concept of an owner.
pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner,
John. In this connection, Article 147 of the Family Code is
instructive. The law is clear. In the absence, as here,
44

of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired by real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties,
common-‐law spouses during their period of including one involving the lot covered by TCT No.
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted
thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283,
equal shares. Their property relationship is a photocopy of the marriage-‐nullifying RTC
governed by the rules on co-‐ownership. And under decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver"
this regime, they owned their properties in that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9,
common "in equal shares." Being herself a co-‐ 1995. The waiver, made in favor of Florencia,
owner of the structure in question, Juliet, as covered the conjugal properties of the ex-‐spouses
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected listed therein, but did not incidentally include the
therefrom. lot in question.

True it is that under Article 4878 of the Civil Code, a Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses
co-‐owner may bring an action for ejectment against Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell
a co-‐owner who takes exclusive possession and due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated
asserts exclusive ownership of a common property. foreclosure proceedings.
It bears stressing, however, that in this case,
evidence is totally wanting to establish John's or Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings,
Juliet's exclusive ownership of the property in Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in
question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of
thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, the mortgage of the disputed property, docketed as
or thru intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As Civil Case No. 00-‐789 and eventually raffled to
borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that
subject structure and the sari-‐sari store thereat by the property, which is still conjugal property, was
virtue of her being a co-‐owner thereof. As such, she mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank, in its
is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-‐Claim, alleged
ownership as John. that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia’s
name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted
METROBANK VS PASCUAL 2008 having approved the mortgage in good faith.
FACTS:
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of RTC rendered a decision declaring the real estate
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family mortgage on the property. The CA affirmed with
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-‐95-‐23533. After modification the decision of the RTC. Like the RTC
trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to
Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a overthrow the presumption established in Art. 116
Decision,2 declaring the marriage of Nicholson and of the Family Code. Thus, Metrobank filed this
Florencia null and void on the ground of Petition for Review on Certiorari.
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In
the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the ISSUE:
dissolution and liquidation of the ex-‐spouses’ 1. Whether the disputed property is conjugal.
conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events 2. Whether termination of Conjugal Property
saw the couple going their separate ways without Regime ipso facto End the Nature of
liquidating their conjugal partnership. Conjugal Ownership.
3.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 HELD:
million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and FIRST ISSUE: YES
Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, It is Metrobank’s threshold posture that Art. 160 of
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll property of the
45

marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains nullity of marriage, without more, does not
exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. automatically result in a regime of complete
Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption separation when it is shown that there was no
of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be liquidation of the conjugal assets.
adduced to prove that not only was the property
acquired during the marriage but that conjugal We again find for Nicholson.
funds were used for the acquisition, a burden
Nicholson allegedly failed to discharge. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson
and Florencia severed their marital bond and
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation11 and Wong the properties acquired before such declaration
v. IAC, contends that Metrobank failed to overcome continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and
the legal presumption that the disputed property is after the liquidation and partition of the
conjugal. He asserts that Metrobank’s arguments partnership. For, the relevant provisions of both
on the matter of presumption are misleading as Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal
only one postulate needs to be shown for the properties before a regime of separation of
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, property reigns.
that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage
In this pre-‐liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. Code shall govern the property relationship
160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family between the former spouses.
Code, is the applicable legal provision since the
property was acquired prior to the enactment of In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the
the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a
conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, little less than two years after the dissolution of the
there must be a showing that the property was conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before
acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may,
what governed the property relations of the former
Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof spouses when the mortgage was given is the
of acquisition during the marriage is needed to aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the
raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. right to mortgage or even sell her one-‐half (1/2)
Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is still undivided interest in the disputed property even
required as a necessary condition before the without the consent of Nicholson. However, the
presumption can arise, then the legal presumption rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only
set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned.
Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it
SECOND ISSUE: NO. Termination of Conjugal covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the
Property Regime does lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented
not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal to the mortgage of his undivided half.
Ownership
The conclusion would have, however, been
Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share
Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the
of the conjugal property regime, vested on Florencia courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver
full ownership of all the properties acquired during allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior
the marriage. to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal
partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his
forged signature, not to mention that of the
46

notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation,
not transfer any right at all, albeit it may become partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent under Article 147 of the Family Code. Hence this
buyer for value. petition.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner
ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration
belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does
for the partition of the lot and its property rights not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
"shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the ISSUE:
termination of the co-‐ownership." Whether the trial court erred when it ordered that
a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
DINO VS DINO 2011 be issued after liquidation, partition, and
FACTS: distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño 147 of the Family Code.
(respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 HELD: YES
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
petitioner and respondent decided to live together following elements must be present:
again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. 1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to
marry each other;
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband
respondent, citing psychological incapacity under and wife; and
Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
granted the petition on the ground that respondent 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the their marriage is void.9
essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Also, it declared that A All these elements are present in this case and
DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 Code applies to the property relations between
and 51 of the Family Code. petitioner and respondent.

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred
questioning the dissolution of the absolute in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
community of property and the ruling that the marriage shall be issued only after liquidation,
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has
Code. no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not
apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148
The trial court partially granted the motion and of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
modified its 18 October 2006 Decision. It also provides:
declared that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF
47

Sec. 19. Decision. -‐ (1) If the court renders a liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
decision granting the petition, it shall declare proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree SALAS VS AGUILA 2013
of annulment shall be issued by the court only after FACTS:
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. (Salas) and
Code as implemented under the Rule on respondent Eden Villena Aguila (Aguila) were
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. married. On 7 June 1986, Aguila gave birth to their
daughter, Joan Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
does not apply to marriages which are declared psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, Family Code. The petition states that they "have no
which should be declared void without waiting for conjugal properties whatsoever."
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
The RTC rendered a Decision7 declaring the nullity
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the of the marriage of Salas and Aguila (RTC Decision).
marriages are governed either by absolute The RTC Decision further provides for the
community of property13 or conjugal partnership "dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, if
of gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete any."8
separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the On 10 September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation
property relations of the parties is governed by and Motion9 stating that she discovered: (a) two
absolute community of property or conjugal 200-‐square-‐meter parcels of land with
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, improvements located in San Bartolome, Quezon
partition and distribute the properties before a City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not No. N-‐259299-‐A and TCT No. N-‐255497; and (b) a
the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 108-‐square-‐meter parcel of land with improvement
of the Family Code because the marriage is located in Tondo, Manila, covered by TCT No.
governed by the ordinary rules on co-‐ownership. 243373 (collectively, "Discovered Properties"). The
registered owner of the Discovered Properties is
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent "Juan S.Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas." The
was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family manifestation was set for hearing on 21 September
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what 2007. However, Salas’ notice of hearing was
governs the liquidation of properties owned in returned unserved with the remark, "RTS Refused
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules To Receive."
on co-‐ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage Aguila testified that on 17 April 2007 someone
during the period of cohabitation is governed either informed her of the existence of the Discovered
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16 Properties. Thereafter, she verified the information
The rules on co-‐ownership apply and the properties and secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered
of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila testified
with the Civil Code provisions on co-‐ownership. that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas’ common-‐law
Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may wife.11
be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition to the
Manifestation12 alleging that there is no conjugal
48

property to be partitioned based on Aguila’s Registry of Deeds are also declared in the
petition. According to Salas, Aguila’s statement was Assessment Roll for taxation purposes.22
a judicial admission and was not made through
palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila waived On the other hand, Aguila proved that the
her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas
likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived during their marriage.1âwphi1 Both the RTC and
in favor of Aguila. Thus, Salas contended that the the CA agreed that the Discovered Properties
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. registered in Salas’ name were acquired during his
marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The petitioner and Properties were entered on 2 July 1999 and 29
the respondent are hereby directed to partition September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and
between themselves by proper instruments of Aguila’s marriage.
conveyance, the following properties, without
prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate child, On both Salas and Rubina’s contention that Rubina
Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas. The CA affirmed the order owns the Discovered Properties, we likewise find
of the RTC. Hence this petition. the contention unmeritorious. The TCTs state that
"Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas" is the
Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila’s petition registered owner of the Discovered Properties. A
stating that they had no conjugal property, they Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of
actually acquired the Waived Properties during the ownership of the land referred to, because
their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA there is a strong presumption that it is valid and
affirmed, that Salas failed to prove the existence regularly issued.25 The phrase "married to" is
and acquisition of the Waived Properties during merely descriptive of the civil status of the
their marriage: registered owner.

ISSUE: In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147 of the
Whether Aguila had waive the two discovered Family Code applies to the union of parties who are
properties. legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
HELD: NO marriage is nonetheless declared void under Article
A perusal of the record shows that the documents 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
submitted by [Salas] as the properties allegedly
registered in the name of Aguila are merely Under this property regime, property acquired
photocopies and not certified true copies, hence, during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
this Court cannot admit the same as part of the have been obtained through the couple’s joint
records of this case. efforts and governed by the rules on co-‐
ownership.29 In the present case, Salas did not
Moreover, Aguila submitted original copy of rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the
Certification issued by Ms. Erlinda A. Dasal, ground for nullity of marriage was also
Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, Batangas, certifying psychological incapacity, we held that the
that Aguila has no real property (land and properties acquired during the union of the parties,
improvement) listed in the Assessment Roll for as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be
taxation purposes, as of September 17, 2008. governed by co-‐ownership.30 Accordingly, the
partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by
Suffice it to say that such real properties are the RTC and the CA should be sustained, but on the
existing and registered in the name of [Aguila], basis of co-‐ownership and not on the regime of
certified true copies thereof should have been the conjugal partnership of gains.
ones submitted to this Court. Moreover, there is
also a presumption that properties registered in the VENTURAN VS ABUDA 2013
49

FACTS: properties was fraudulent because Esteban’s
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
(Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Respondents, on the other hand, argued that
Socorro and Esteban never had common children, because of Socorro’s prior marriage to Crispin, her
both of them had children from prior marriages: subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void.
Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline Abuda Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any
(Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the right or interest over the properties purchased by
father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the Esteban and respondents.
petitioner in this case.
The RTC-‐Manila ruled that the marriage between
Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning.
marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she According to the RTC-‐Manila, the Vitas and Delpan
married Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 properties are not conjugal, and are governed by
April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. The CA
Crispin was alive at the time of Socorro’s marriage sustained the decision of the RTC-‐Manila. The CA
to Esteban. sustained the decision of the RTC-‐Manila. The CA
ruled, however, that the RTC-‐Manila should have
Esteban’s prior marriage, on the other hand, was applied Article 148 of the Family Code, and not
dissolved by virtue of his wife’s death in 1960. Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code. Article 148 of
According to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban the Family Code states that in unions between a
purchased a portion of a lot (VITAS PROPERTY). The man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry
Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate each other. Hence this petition.
of Title No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980,
issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering
married to Socorro Torres." the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is
co-‐owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the
Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11
Evangeline and Esteban operated small business December 1980, or several months after the parties
establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property). "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres."
On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and
Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, ISSUE:
Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According to Edilberto: Whether Vitas property is co-‐owned by Esteban and
Socorro.
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer
sometime in 1993, he decided to sell the Delpan HELD: NO
and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man
continued paying the amortizations on the two (2) and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
properties situated in Delpan Street. other, the ownership over the properties acquired
during the subsistence of that relationship shall be
Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while based on the actual contribution of the parties. This
Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999. is pursuant to Art. 148 of the Family Code.

Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the Applying ART. 148, the Vitas and Delpan properties
mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, can be considered common property if: (1) these
Edilberto, represented by Leonora, filed a Petition were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban
for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-‐ and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
Manila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the properties were acquired through the parties’
50

actual joint contribution of money, property, or property would be owned by and registered under
industry. the name of Esteban.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts
the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is evidencing payments of the amortizations for the
co-‐owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 failed to show any evidence showing Socorro s
December 1980, or several months after the parties alleged monetary contributions.
were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro BEUMER VS BEUMER 2012
Torres." FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several
owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32,
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil declared the nullity of their marriage in the
status, and does not show that Socorro co-‐owned Decision5 dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of
the property.27 The evidence on record also shows the former’s psychological incapacity as
that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
property prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if
the certificate of title was issued after the Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for
celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership6 dated
Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of
vest title. the following described properties claimed to have
been acquired during the subsistence of their
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution marriage.
to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered In defense, respondent averred that, with the
some of the amortizations.28 Thus, the law exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots
presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any
contributed to the acquisition of the Del pan conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth
property. being that she used her own personal money to
purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the RTC-‐ personal funds and Lots 2055-‐A and 2055-‐I by way
Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit
was acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact
Socorro.29 Furthermore, even if payment of the that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements
purchase price of the Delpan property was made by thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly,
Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for
her father. Article 123 of the Civil Code provides: dissolution as well as payment for attorney’s fees
and litigation expenses.
Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who
does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1,
deemed to be a donation, which requires the 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case respondent, these properties were acquired with
valid as to the creditor who has accepted it. the money he received from the Dutch government
as his disability benefit12 since respondent did not
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.
her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan
51

For her part, respondent maintained that the prohibition"25 and even asseverated that, because
money used for the purchase of the lots came of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, the subject properties in the latter’s name.26
her earnings from selling jewelry as well as Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable
products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.14 intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the
She further asserted that after she filed for basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason
annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner why it should not apply the Muller ruling and
transferred to their second house and brought accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for
along with him certain personal properties, reimbursement.
consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders,
clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and As also explained in Muller, the time-‐honored
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00. principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come
The RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has
Decision, dissolving the parties’ conjugal done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a
partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on
respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
and equipment in favor of petitioner as his unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing
on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-‐owned by the parties. The In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the
CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the real source of the funds used to purchase the
judgment rendered by the RTC. subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his
claims: While admitting to have previously
ISSUE: executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s
Whether Beumer is entitled for reimbursement. personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he
likewise claimed that his personal disability funds
HELD: NO were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-‐Elena inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court petitioner has come before the Court with unclean
had already denied a claim for reimbursement of hands, he is now precluded from seeking any
the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land equitable refuge.
instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his
former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. In any event, the Court cannot, even on the
It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is petitioner given that he acquired no right
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of
property despite the prohibition against foreign its unconstitutional purchase. Under Article 1412 of
ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine properties deeded to him or allow him to recover
Constitution which reads: the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed it finds them.
except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for
domain. reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment.33 As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
well aware of the above-‐cited constitutional reimbursement for money spent on purchase of
52

Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment which will govern the property relations between
does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Deogracio and Virginia even if they were married
Constitution. before the effectivity of the Family Code.

Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates
injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which partnerships established before the Family Code
demarcates the rights of citizens and non-‐citizens in without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
owning Philippine land. To be sure, the under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to Family Code, if the properties are acquired during
ownership of Philippine land and not to the the marriage, the presumption is that they are
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) conjugal. Hence, the burden of proof is on the party
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were claiming that they are not conjugal.
properly declared to be co-‐owned by the parties
subject to partition. The Court held that in a void marriage, as in those
declared void under Article 3610 of the Family
OCAMPO VS OCAMPO 2015 Code, the property relations of the parties during
FACTS: the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Petitioner Virginia Sy Ocampo (Virginia) filed a Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.11
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of her Marriage Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
with Deogracio Ocampo (Deogracio) before parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on the ground by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
of psychological incapacity. The trial court rendered marriage is nonetheless void, as in this case.
a Decision4 declaring the marriage between
Virginia and Deogracio as null and void. For Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
As to the couple's property relations, their conjugal other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
partnership of gains shall necessarily be dissolved husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the
and liquidated but since the petitioner has not benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in
submitted any detailed and formal listing or the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first
inventory of such property, the court cannot act paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
now on the liquidation aspect. The parties are given capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any
thirty (30) days to submit an inventory of their impediment to marry has not been shown to have
conjugal partnership for the purpose of liquidation. existed on the part of either Virginia or Deogracio.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband
The trial court rendered the assailed Order stating and wife. However, their marriage was found to be
that the properties declared by the parties belong void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
to each one of them on a 50-‐50 sharing. Deogracio ground of psychological incapacity.
filed a MFR but RTC denied it. Virginia also filed an
appeal but CA denied it. Hence this petition. From the foregoing, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry should,
ISSUE: therefore, be governed by the rules on equal co-‐
Whether respondent should be deprived of his ownership. Any property acquired during the union
share in the conjugal partnership of gains by reason is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
of bad faith and psychological perversity. through their joint efforts. A party who did not
HELD: NO participate in the acquisition of the property shall
While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot be considered as having contributed to the same
on January 16, 1978, it is still the Family Code jointly if said party's efforts consisted in the care
provisions on conjugal partnerships, however, and maintenance of the family household. Efforts
53

in the care and maintenance of the family and name of one of the spouses only. Article 116
household are regarded as contributions to the expressly provides that the presumption remains
acquisition of common property by one who has no even if the property is "registered in the name of
salary or income or work or industry. one or both of the spouses." Thus, the failure of
Virginia to rebut this presumption, said properties
Thus, the trial court and the appellate court were obtained by the spouses' joint efforts, work or
correctly held that the parties will share on equal industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in
shares considering that Virginia failed to prove that equal shares. Accordingly, the partition of the
the properties were acquired solely on her own former spouses' properties on the basis of co-‐
efforts. ownership, as ordered by the RTC and the appellate
court, should be affirmed, and not on the regime of
While it may be true that management of the conjugal partnership of gains.
businesses referred to herein may have been
actively undertaken by the petitioner, it cannot be Article 148
gainsaid that petitioner was able to do so without
the invaluable help of respondent. AGAPAY VS PALANG 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner's claim that the seed money in that Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July
business was provided by her mother and that, had 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina
it not been for that reason, the properties now (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio
subject of controversy could not have been Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few
acquired. That may be true but the Court is not months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left
prone to believe so because of insufficient evidence to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlinas only child,
to prove such contention but petitioner's self-‐ Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
serving allegations. Of course, attempts to establish
respondent as an irresponsible and unfaithful On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-‐three-‐year-‐old
husband, as well as family man were made but the Miguel contracted his second marriage with
testimonies adduced towards that end, failed to nineteen-‐year-‐old Erlinda Agapay, herein
fully convince the Court that respondent should be petitioner. Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973,
punished by depriving him of his share of the Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of
conjugal property because of his indiscretion. Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with
In the instant case, both the trial and appellate an area of 10,080 square meters. Consequently,
courts agreed that the subject properties were in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering
fact acquired during the marriage of Virginia and said rice land was issued in their names.
Deogracio.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was
Likewise, we note that the former spouses both likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
substantially agree that they acquired the subject allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No.
properties during the subsistence of their 143120 covering said property was later issued in
marriage.17 The certificates of titles and tax her name.
declarations are not sufficient proof to overcome
the presumption under Article 116 of the Family On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang
Code. All properties acquired by the spouses during executed a Deed of Donation as a form of
the marriage, regardless in whose name the compromise agreement to settle and end a case
properties are registered, are presumed conjugal filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
unless proved otherwise. The presumption is not donate their conjugal property consisting of six
rebutted by the mere fact that the certificate of parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
title of the property or the tax declaration is in the
54

Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made
Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and
later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel died. a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted
respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently
for recovery of ownership and possession with void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
damages against petitioner before the Regional Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the
Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Private latters de facto separation.
respondents sought to get back the riceland and
the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by
Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during both of the parties through their actual joint
his cohabitation with petitioner. contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that respective contributions. It must be stressed that
while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is actual contribution is required by this provision, in
registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in
had already given her half of the property to their the care and maintenance of the family and
son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house household, are regarded as contributions to the
and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole acquisition of common property by one who has no
property, having bought the same with her own salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
money. Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded contribution of the party is not proved, there will
from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter be no co-‐ownership and no presumption of equal
had already donated their conjugal estate to shares.
Herminia.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her
The lower court rendered its decision on June 30, testimony that she is engaged in the business of
1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that buy and sell and had a sari-‐sari store[10] but failed
there was little evidence to prove that the subject to persuade us that she actually contributed money
properties pertained to the conjugal property of to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact
Carlina and Miguel Palang. CA reversed the decision that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973,
of the RTC Declaring plaintiffs-‐appellants the petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
owners of the properties in question. Hence this Miguel Palang was already sixty-‐four and a
petition. pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute purchase price of subject property,[11] there being
sale covering the riceland and the house and lot, no proof of the same.
the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda
Agapay and the second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought
alone. two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually
cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said
ISSUE: added assertion was intended to exclude their case
Who owned the 2 pieces of property subject to this from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
action. Code. Proof of the precise date when they
HELD: CARLINA commenced their adulterous cohabitation not
55

having been adduced, we cannot state definitively concubinage at the time of the donation, under
that the riceland was purchased even before they Article 739 of the Civil Code.
started living together. In any case, even assuming MALLILIN VS CASTILLO 2000
that the subject property was bought before FACTS:
cohabitation, the rules of co-‐ownership would still On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin,
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition and/or Payment
essential. of Co-‐Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages"
against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-‐656 at the
money to the purchase price of the riceland in Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that
Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify petitioner and respondent, both married and with
her co-‐ownership with Miguel over the same. children, but separated from their respective
Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime
by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal in 1979 while their respective marriages still
partnership property of the deceased Miguel and subsisted. During their union, they set up the
private respondent Carlina Palang. Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with
petitioner as president and chairman of the board
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and of directors, and respondent as vice-‐president and
Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner
property in favor of their daughter Herminia in and respondent acquired real and personal
1975. The trial court erred in holding that the properties which were registered solely in
decision adopting their compromise agreement in respondents name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable
effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation differences, the couple separated. Petitioner
of the separation of property between spouses and demanded from respondent his share in the subject
the termination of the conjugal partnership.[12] properties, but respondent refused alleging that
Separation of property between spouses during the said properties had been registered solely in her
marriage shall not take place except by judicial name.
order or without judicial conferment when there is
an express stipulation in the marriage In her Amended Answer, respondent admitted that
settlements.[13] The judgment which resulted from she engaged in the customs brokerage business
the parties compromise was not specifically and with petitioner but alleged that the Superfreight
expressly for separation of property and should not Customs Brokerage Corporation was organized with
be so inferred. other individuals and duly registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1987. She
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, wife because the fact was that they were still legally
1975 when she was only 22 years old. The married to their respective spouses. She claimed to
testimony of the notary public who prepared the be the exclusive owner of all real and personal
deed of conveyance for the property reveals the properties involved in petitioners action for
falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun partition on the ground that they were acquired
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for entirely out of her own money and registered solely
the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name in her name.
alone be placed as the vendee.
ISSUE:
The transaction was properly a donation made by Whether co-‐ownership exist between the parties.
Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void Whether petitioners action amounted to a
and inexistent by express provision of law because collateral attack on the certificates of title involved.
it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
HELD:
56

FIRST ISSUE:YES ownership is a form of trust and every co-‐owner is a
Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a trustee for the other.
limited co-‐ownership in cases where the parties in SECOND ISSUE: NO
union are incapacitated to marry each other. When is an action an attack on a title? It is when
the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify
It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant
the parties in this case were not capacitated to to which the title was decreed.
marry each other at the time that they were alleged
to have been living together, they could not have In his complaint for partition, consistent with our
owned properties in common. The Family Code, in ruling in Roque regarding the nature of an action
addition to providing that a co-‐ownership exists for partition, petitioner seeks first, a declaration
between a man and a woman who live together as that he is a co-‐owner of the subject properties; and
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. He
likewise provides that, if the parties are does not attack respondents titles. Petitioner
incapacitated to marry each other, properties alleges no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity
acquired by them through their joint contribution that would justify a review of the registration
of money, property or industry shall be owned by decree in respondents favor. His theory is that
them in common in proportion to their although the subject properties were registered
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the solely in respondents name, but since by
contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-‐ agreement between them as well as under the
ownership eventhough the couple are not Family Code, he is co-‐owner of these properties and
capacitated to marry each other. as such is entitled to the conveyance of his shares.
On the premise that he is a co-‐owner, he can validly
In this case, there may be a co-‐ownership between seek the partition of the properties in co-‐ownership
the parties herein. Consequently, whether and the conveyance to him of his share.
petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether
the properties involved in the case are part of the SAGUID VS CA 2003
alleged co-‐ownership are genuine and material. All FACTS:
but one of the properties involved were alleged to Seventeen-‐year old Gina S. Rey was married, but
have been acquired after the Family Code took separated de facto from her husband, when she
effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque,
property acquired before the Family Code took sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, the
effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a
the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. Their
excluded. cohabitation was not blessed with any children.
Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing
On the basis of this, he contends that an implied vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other hand,
trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an
which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her
to purchase property and by common consent the relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her
legal title is taken in the name of one of them for periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the
the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the
in favor of the others in proportion to the interest couple decided to separate and end up their 9-‐year
of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal cohabitation.
relation of the parties is already specifically covered
by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a
properties acquired by the parties out of their complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
actual joint contributions of money, property or Property with Receivership against the petitioner
industry shall constitute a co-‐ownership. Co-‐ with the Regional Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque.
57

She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a
month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their upon the party who, as determined by the
unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able to affirmative issue. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
furniture and household effects, with a total value is not evidence.
of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared
the sole owner of these personal properties and In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the
that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her house and personal properties of the parties.
contribution to the construction of their house, be Private respondent alleged in her complaint that
reimbursed to her. she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of
their house. However, nowhere in her testimony
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner claimed did she specify the extent of her contribution. What
that the expenses for the construction of their appears in the record are receipts in her name for
house were defrayed solely from his income as a the purchase of construction materials on
captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that November 17, 1995 and December 23, 1995, in the
private respondents meager income as fish dealer total amount of P11,413.00.
rendered her unable to contribute in the
construction of said house. Besides, selling fish was On the other hand, both parties claim that the
a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented money used to purchase the disputed personal
with the small quantity of fish allotted to her from properties came partly from their joint account
his fishing trips. with First Allied Development Bank. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their
A decision was rendered in favor of private joint account deposit, there is, however, no
respondent. Said decision was affirmed by the sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
Court of Appeals. HENCE THIS PETITION respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of
the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent
ISSUE: of the parties respective contribution, their share
Whether private respondent should be reimbursed shall be presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed
for the 70, 000 for the completion of their house. personal properties were valued at P111,375.00,
the existence and value of which were not
HELD: NO questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not therein is equivalent to one-‐half, i.e., P55,687.50
capacitated to marry each other because the each.
former was validly married to another man at the
time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their ATIENZA VS DE CASTRO 2006
property regime therefore is governed by Article FACTS:
148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in the President and General Manager of Enrico
a state of concubinage, relationships where both Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime
man and woman are married to other persons, and Corporation, hired the services of respondent
multiple alliances of the same married man. Under Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two
this regime, only the properties acquired by both of corporations.
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by In the course of time, the relationship between
them in common in proportion to their respective Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo
contributions ... Proof of actual contribution is being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually
required. lived together in consortium beginning the later
58

part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were prove who actually bought it, and refuted the
born. However, after the birth of their second child, findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos
their relationship turned sour until they parted assertions casting doubt as to her financial capacity
ways. to acquire the disputed property.

On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate
City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial court, in its decision of April 29, 2005, reversed and
partition between them of a parcel of land with set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the
improvements located in Bel-‐Air Subdivision, litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda.
Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively
Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the
City. In his complaint, docketed in said court as Civil provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis-‐-‐vis
Case No. 92-‐1423, Lupo alleged that the subject the evidence on record and attending
property was acquired during his union with circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole ownership is
Yolanda as common-‐law husband and wife, hence meritorious, as it has been substantiated by
the property is co-‐owned by them. competent evidence. HENCE THIS PETITION.

Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse
property in question was acquired by Yolanda arguing that pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil
sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he
the title thereto was transferred by the seller in contributed to the acquisition of the subject
Yolandas name without his knowledge and consent. property because with or without the contribution
He did not interpose any objection thereto because by either partner, he is deemed a co-‐owner thereof,
at the time, their affair was still thriving. It was only adding that under Article 484 of Civil Code.
after their separation and his receipt of information
that Yolanda allowed her new live-‐in partner to live ISSUE:
in the disputed property, when he demanded his Whether disputed property is exclusively owned by
share thereat as a co-‐owner. Yolanda.

In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. HELD: YES.
According to her, she acquired the same property It is not disputed that the parties herein were not
for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos capacitated to marry each other because petitioner
(P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman
insisted having bought it thru her own savings and at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent.
earnings as a businesswoman. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to
In a decision dated December 11, 2000, the trial bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the relationships in a state of concubinage,
contested property as owned in common by him relationships where both man and woman are
and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
two in equal shares. the same married man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went their actual joint contribution of money, property,
on appeal to the CA in CA-‐G.R. CV No. 69797, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
therein arguing that the evidence on record proportion to their respective contributions ...Proof
preponderate that she purchased the disputed of actual contribution is required.
property in her own name with her own money.
She maintained that the documents appertaining to Co-‐ownership will only be up to the extent of the
her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to proven actual contribution of money, property or
59

industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In
contributions and corresponding shares shall be contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his
presumed to be equal. cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership.
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the There can clearly be no co-‐ownership when, as
parties commenced in 1983, or way before the here, the respondent sufficiently established that
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, she derived the funds used to purchase the
Article 148 thereof applies because this provision property from her earnings, not only as an
was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged
144 of the Civil Code.[12] Before Article 148 of the in foreign currency trading, money lending and
Family Code was enacted, there was no provision jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the
governing property relations of couples living in a promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with
state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the her clients. She also presented her bank account
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property statements and bank transactions, which reflect
occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article that she had the financial capacity to pay the
148 governs. purchase price of the subject property.

Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of BORROMEO VS DESCALLAR 2009
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.[15] FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
having no financial capacity to acquire the property employer, Simmering-‐Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian
in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984,
accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II
amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for Project of the National Power Corporation. There,
petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-‐Descallar, a
that his claim to the property contradicts duly separated mother of two boys who was working as
written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended
March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of dire need of additional income to support her
Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by children, respondent agreed. The tutorials were
and between the respondent and the vendor of held in Antonietta’s residence at a squatters’ area
said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. in Gorordo Avenue.

He presented documents pertaining to the ins and Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to
outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to prove his Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own
actual contribution in the purchase of the said house and lots at Agro-‐Macro Subdivision,
property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a limited Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell
access to the funds of the said corporations and dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862
had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent
accounts for their behalf do not prove that the were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute
money she used in buying the disputed property, or Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued
any property for that matter, came from said in their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute
withdrawals. Sale was presented for registration before the
Register of Deeds, registration was refused on the
Petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not
insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial courts acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
finding that the disputed property falls under the Consequently, Jambrich’s name was erased from
60

the document. But it could be noted that his
signature remained on the left hand margin of page In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation
1, beside respondent’s signature as buyer on page that she did not pay a single centavo of the
3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that
page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, she "solely and exclusively used her own personal
24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of
in respondent’s name alone. Jambrich also formally the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich,
adopted respondent’s two sons. being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own
real property in the Philippines.
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By
then, respondent found a new boyfriend while At the trial, respondent presented evidence
Jambrich began to live with another woman in showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the
Danao City. Jambrich supported respondent’s sons disputed property with money from a supposed
for only two months after the break up. copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented
Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich
sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the received while still employed by the Austrian
real estate business. He also built and repaired company, Simmering-‐Graz Panker A.G.
speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich
purchased an engine and some accessories for his RTC rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and
boat from petitioner, for which he became against the defendant Antoniet and declaring
indebted to the latter for about ₱150,000.00. To plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the
pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in residential house of strong materials and three
the Agro-‐Macro properties to petitioner for parcels of land. The Appellate court reversed the
₱250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that in the
Sale/Assignment."6 On July 26, 1991, when case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in
petitioner sought to register the deed of the name of Jambrich but in the name of
assignment, he discovered that titles to the three defendant-‐appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have
lots have been transferred in the name of transferred a property he has no title thereto.
respondent, and that the subject property has Hence this petition.
already been mortgaged.
ISSUE:
On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint 1. Who purchased the subject properties?
against respondent for recovery of real property 2. What now is the effect of registration of the
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. properties in the name of respondent?
Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the HELD:
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 FIRST ISSUE: JAMBRICH
over the properties which identified both Jambrich The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the
and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
agreement of the parties since respondent did not possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition
not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who of the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was
paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; gainfully employed at Simmering-‐Graz Panker A.G.,
that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated
the properties; and, that petitioner acquired monthly salary of ₱50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was
absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 monthly salary was approximately ₱90,000.00.
which Jambrich executed in his favor.
61

On the other hand, respondent was employed as a
waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary Further, the fact that the disputed properties were
of not more than ₱1,000.00. In 1986, when the acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does
parcels of land were acquired, she was not help respondent. The rule that co-‐ownership
unemployed, as admitted by her during the pre-‐trial applies to a man and a woman living exclusively
conference. Her allegations of income from a copra with each other as husband and wife without the
business were unsubstantiated. The supposed benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated
copra business was actually the business of her to marry each other, does not apply.19 In the
mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has instant case, respondent was still legally married to
no license to sell copra, and had not filed any another when she and Jambrich lived together. In
income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her such an adulterous relationship, no co-‐ownership
mother were lost to fire, and the last one left exists between the parties. It is necessary for each
standing was already scrap. of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to Presumptions of co-‐ownership and equal
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct contribution do not apply.
the house thereon:
SECOND ISSUE: NOTHING
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under It is settled that registration is not a mode of
oath, during her re-‐direct examination and during acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of
the proceedings for the adoption of her minor confirming the fact of its existence with notice to
children, that Jambrich was the owner of the the world at large.
properties in question, but that his name was
deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from
legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section
remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
buyer.
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of from Agro-‐Macro Development Corporation to
land in installments was in postdated checks issued Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been
by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
account with any bank. Receipts of the installment conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a
payments were also in the name of Jambrich and Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World
respondent. Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the
consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land
(3) In 1986-‐1987, respondent lived in Syria with is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
Jambrich and her two children for ten months, becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
where she was completely under the support of Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
Jambrich. considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament,
where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject As the property in dispute is already in the hands of
properties to respondent. a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be
no more public policy to be protected. The
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his objective of the constitutional provision to keep our
rights, interests and participation over the subject lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
62

LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF LUNA sisnce it was purchased upon the sole industry of
FACTS: Atty. Luna. On appeal, the CA ruled that EUGENIA,
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY.
partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The
Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA
that time when he was living with his first wife, inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his
herein intervenor-‐appellant Eugenia, whom he prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
initially married in a civil ceremony. After almost divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized
two decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA in our jurisdiction. Thus the share of Atty. Luna was
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in adjudged to respondents.
February 1966 and agreed to separation of
property. On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA THE FAMILY
ARTICLES 149-‐151
obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with

EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber
GUERRERO VS HERNANDO
of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also FACTS:
in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1
date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
against private respondent, this case assumed
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
another dimension when it was dismissed by
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
respondent Judge on the ground that the
together as husband and wife until 1987.
parties being brother-‐in-‐law the complaint should
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new have alleged that earnest efforts were first
law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and exerted towards a compromise. Admittedly, the
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the complaint does not allege that the parties
managing partner. On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON exerted earnest towards a compromise and that
through ATTY. LUNA purchased condominium unit. the same failed. However, private respondent
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this
partners partitioned the condominium unit. The alleged defect since he did not file any motion
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA to dismiss nor attack the complaint on this
over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ground in his answer. It was only on 7
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the December 1992, at the pre-‐trial conference, that
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio
furniture and equipment found therein were taken Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted
over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they
first marriage. being married to half-‐sisters hence are brothers-‐
in-‐law, and on the basis thereof respondent
SOLEDAD filed a complaint against the heirs of
Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City. The
motion and amended complaint" to allege that
complaint alleged that the subject properties were
the parties were very close relatives, their
acquired during the existence of the marriage
respective wives being sisters, and that the
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their
complaint to be maintained should allege that
joint efforts that since they had no children,
earnest efforts towards a compromise were
SOLEDAD became co-‐owner of the said properties
exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge
upon the death of ATTY. LUNA. RTC ruled that
considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
Soledad has no right over the condominium unit
63

Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December family does not comprehend "sisters-‐in-‐law". In
1992 Order claiming that since brothers by that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion
affinity are not members of the same family, he emphasized that "sisters-‐inlaw" (hence, also
was not required to exert efforts towards a "brothers-‐in-‐law") are not listed under Art. 217
compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that of the New Civil Code as members of the same
Hernando was precluded from raising this issue family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor repeats essentially the same enumeration of
assert the same as an affirmative defense in his "members of the family", we find no reason to
answer. alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling
On December 1992, respondent Judge denied
that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-‐in-‐law
the motion for reconsideration holding that
of private respondent Hernando, was required to
"[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards
exert earnest efforts towards a compromise
a compromise is jurisdictional such that for
before f iling the present suit.
failure to allege same the court would be
deprived of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of SECOND ISSUE: NO
the case." He warned that unless the complaint
O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, citing Mendoza v. Court
was amended within five (5) days the case
of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise as
would be dismissed. On 29 January 1993, the 5-‐
well as the inability to succeed is a condition
day period having expired without Guerrero
precedent to the filing of a suit between
amending his complaint, respondent Judge
members of the same family, the absence of
dismissed the case, declaring the dismissal
such allegation in the complaint being assailable
however to be without prejudice.Hence this
at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal,
petition.
for lack of cause of action. It is not therefore
ISSUES: correct, as petitioner contends, that private
respondent may be deemed to have waived the
(a) Whether brothers by affinity are
aforesaid defect in failing to move or dismiss or
considered members of the same family
raise the same in the Answer.
contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and
Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well
as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the
HIYAS SAVINGS BANK VS ACUNA
Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts
towards a compromise before a suit FACTS:
between them may be instituted and
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private
maintained; and,
respondent) filed with the RTC of Caloocan City
(b) Whether the absence of an allegation in
a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan
the complaint that earnest efforts
Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the
towards a compromise were exerted,
spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register
which efforts failed, is a ground for
of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
mortgage contending that he did not secure any
HELD:
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute
FIRST ISSUE: NO any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his
wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled
spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited
in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of
from the loan, made it appear that he signed
"brothers and sisters" as members of the same
64

the contract of mortgage; that he could not to make it imperative that such efforts to
have executed the said contract because he was compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-‐
then working abroad. requisite for the maintenance of an action
whenever a stranger to the family is a party
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to
thereto, whether as a necessary or
Dismiss on the ground that private respondent
indispensable one. It is not always that one who
failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family
is alien to the family would be willing to suffer
Code wherein it is provided that no suit
the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay
between members of the same family shall
and the complications that wranglings between
prosper unless it should appear from the
or among relatives more often than not entail.
verified complaint or petition that earnest
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the
efforts toward a compromise have been made,
determination of the rights of a stranger to the
but that the same have failed. Petitioner
family who just happened to have innocently
contends that since the complaint does not
acquired some kind of interest in any right or
contain any fact or averment that earnest
property disputed among its members should
efforts toward a compromise had been made
be made to depend on the way the latter
prior to its institution, then the complaint
would settle their differences among themselves.
should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
22 x x x.
Private respondent filed his Comment on the
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a
Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Strike Out
suit involving members of the same family, the
and to Declare Defendants in Default. He argues
law no longer makes it a condition precedent
that in cases where one of the parties is not a
that earnest efforts be made towards a
member of the same family as contemplated
compromise before the action can prosper. The
under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to
Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts
Magbaleta as well as in all of the
toward a compromise had been made by the
aforementioned cases should not equally apply
plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a
to suits involving husband and wife.
ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts
that since three of the party defendants are not Petitioner makes much of the fact that the
members of his family the ground relied upon present case involves a husband and his wife
by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable while Magbaleta is a case between brothers.
and unavailable. However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or
special circumstance that would make the ruling
ISSUE:
in Magbaleta as well as in the abovementioned
Whether earnest efforts towards compromise must cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband
be allege in the complaint in cases where one of the and his wife, as in the present case. In the first
parties is a stranger to the Family. place, Article 151 of the Family Code and Article
222 of the Civil Code are clear that the
HELD: NO
provisions therein apply to suits involving
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a "members of the same family" as contemplated
stranger to the family, the alleged owner of the under Article 150 of the Family Code.
subject property. The Court, taking into
Petitioner also contends that the trial court
consideration the explanation made by the Code
committed grave abuse of discretion when it
Commision in its report, ruled that: [T]hese
ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the
considerations do not, however, weigh enough
same family as respondent, may not invoke the
65

provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code. property, they were entitled to a reconveyance
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled of the same.
that the requirement under Article 151 of the
Respondent filed an unlawful detainer suit
Family Code is applicable only in cases which
against petitioners and her brothers Rafael and
are exclusively between or among members of
Ramon before the MeTC. Respondent in her
the same family, it necessarily follows that the
Complaint11 sought to evict her siblings from
same may be invoked only by a party who is a
the subject property on the claim that she is
member of that same family.
the owner of the same; that her siblings' stay
ROMERO VS SINGSON therein was merely tolerated; and that she now
needed the premises to serve as her daughters'
FACTS:
residence.
The parties herein -‐ petitioners Consolacion
As to the issue as to whether or not plaintiff
Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D. Domingo and
may validly eject the defendants, again this
respondent Engracia Domingo Singson -‐ are
Court answers in the affirmative, since the
siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad
plaintiff is a holder of a Torrens Title which is a
Domingo, own a 223-‐square meter piece of
right in rem. The RTC at first affirmed the decision
property. It appears that petitioners and other
of the MTC but later reversed its decision. At the
siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the
outset, it should be mentioned that the court a
actual occupants of the subject property, having
quo should have dismissed the complaint
stayed there with their parents since birth. On
outright for failure to comply with a condition
the other hand, respondent took up residence
precedent under Section 10, Rule 16 of the
in Mandaluyong City after getting married. On
Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties being
February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while
siblings and there being no allegations in the
Felicidad died on September 14, 1997.
complaint as regards efforts at compromise
On June 7, 2006, TCT 845-‐R was cancelled and having been exerted, a matter that was raised
a new certificate of title -‐Transfer Certificate of in the answer of defendants Consolation Romero
Title No. 12575-‐R7 or 125758 (TCT 12575) -‐ was and Rosario D. Domingo. The CA reversed and set
issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a aside the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale"9 ostensibly
ISSUE:
executed on June 6, 2006 by and between
Macario and Felicidad -‐ as sellers, and Whether the case must be dismissed for failure to
respondent -‐ as buyer. And this despite the fact allege that earnest efforts towards compromise
that Macario and Felicidad were then already were maid and the same have failed.
deceased. Soon thereafter, respondent sent
HELD: NO
letters to her siblings demanding that they
vacate the subject property, under pain of The procedural issue of lack of attempts at
litigation. Petitioners and their other siblings just compromise should be resolved in respondent's
as soon filed a Complaint10 against respondent favor. True, no suit between members of the same
and the Register of Deeds of San Juan City for family shall prosper unless it should appear from
annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the verified complaint or petition that earnest
the June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, efforts toward a compromise have been made.
and damages, on the claim that the deed of However, the failure of a party to comply with this
sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect. If
and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject
66

the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a defendant is not one of those enumerated under
motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived. Article 155 of the Family Code.
THE FAMILY HOME The trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and
ARTICLES 151-‐162
this was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the herein
MODEQUILLO VS BREVA petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged
that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its
FACTS:
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in
by the Court of Appeals in CA-‐G.R. CV No. denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of
09218 entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose the order dated August 26, 1988.
Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which
ISSUE:
read as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision under
appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and Is the family home of petitioner exempt from
set aside. Judgment is hereby rendered finding execution of the money judgment aforecited
the defendants-‐appellees Jose Modequillo and
HELD: NO.
Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs-‐appellants as hereinbelow set forth. In the present case, the residential house and lot of
Accordingly, defendants-‐appellees are ordered to petitioner was not constituted as a family home
pay jointly and severally to Plaintiffs-‐appellants, whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil
the Salinas spouses. Code. It became a family home by operation of law
only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
The said judgment having become final and
deemed constituted as a family home upon the
executory, a writ of execution was issued by
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy
the said judgment on the goods and chattels of The contention of petitioner that it should be
the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito considered a family home from the time it was
Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July 7, occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of well-‐ taken.
residential land.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family
Sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a residences at the time of the effectivity of the
parcel of agricultural land registered in the name of Family Code, are considered family homes and are
Jose Modequillo. prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2,
execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo
Title V have a retroactive effect.
alleging therein that the residential land located at
Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built The debt or liability which was the basis of the
since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the
or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
sought to be enforced against the family home of August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
67

exemptions from execution provided in the Family a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership of
Code. petitioners over said property.
TANEO JR. VS CA Private respondent refuted petitioners' contentions
alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject
FACTS:
properties described as Lot No. 5545, Cad. 237
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale
recovery of property) in favor of private on February 12, 1996. Said sale has become final as
respondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were no redemption was made within one year from the
levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale.
P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land and the other
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed
was the family home. The subject properties were
the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
private respondent as the highest bidder.
petition. Petitioners aver that the house which their
Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem
father constituted as family home is exempt from
the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed
execution. In a last ditch effort to save their
on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring,
property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded
and conveying said properties to the private
to the family home under the Family Code.
respondent.
ISSUE:
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an
action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case Whether Petitioner the family home of petitioner is
No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void exempt from execution.
and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a
HELD:NO
writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it
was alleged that petitioners are the children and Art. 243 reads:
heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be
died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984,
exempt from execution, forced sale or
respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject
attachment,except:
property covered by OCT No. P-‐12820 and Free
Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property (1) For nonpayment of taxes;
has been acquired through free patent, such
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was
property is therefore inalienable and not subject to
recorded in the Registry of Property;
any encumbrance for the payment of debt,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
Petitioners further alleged that they were in before or after such record of the declaration;
continuous, open and peaceful possession of the
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy
builders, material-‐men and others who have
Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs
rendered service or furnished material for the
Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private
construction of the building. 12
respondent over the subject property including
their family home which was extrajudicially The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo
constituted in accordance with law. As a result of Taneo constituted the house in question, erected
the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family
respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax home. The instrument constituting the family home
Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting was registered only on January 24, 1966. The
68

money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered however, when the Municipality of Molave
on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the relocated the townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a
"debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the
constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' government as a public road and as there were
alleged family home, as constituted by their father many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was
is not exempt as it falls under the exception of then discovered that defendant-‐appellees were
Article 243 (2). actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-‐appellants filed a
Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 92-‐20-‐127 for
constitution did not comply with the requirements Recovery of Property against defendant-‐appellees.
of the law. The trial court found that the house was
RTC rendered in favor of the defendants and
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned
against the plaintiff. CA reversed the decision of the
but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the
RTC. Hence this petition.
very definition of the law that the "family home is
the dwelling house where a person and his family Petitioners insist that the property subject of the
resides and the land on which it is situated," 13it is controversy is a duly constituted family home which
understood that the house should be constructed is not subject to execution, thus, they argue that
on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the
constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the judgment of the trial court.
instant case was merely an afterthought in order to
ISSUE:
escape execution of their property but to no avail.
Whether Petitioner the family home of petitioner is
CABANG VS BASA
exempt from execution.
FACTS:
HELD: NO
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of
As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, from
Lot No. 7777. However, Felix Odong and his heirs
the inception of Civil Case No. 99-‐20-‐127, it was
never occupied nor took possession of the lot.
already of judicial notice that the improvements
On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-‐appellants bought said introduced by petitioners on the litigated property
real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for are residential houses not family homes.
P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No. 0-‐2,768 was
The family home must be established on the
cancelled and in its stead, Transfer Certificate of
properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the
Title No. T-‐22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in
conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property
the name of plaintiff-‐appellants. The latter also did
of either spouse with the consent of the other. It
not occupy the said property.
cannot be established on property held in co-‐
Defendant-‐appellees, on the other hand, had been ownership with third persons. However, it can be
in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse established partly on community property, or
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up conjugal property and partly on the exclusive
to the present. They were the awardees in the property of either spouse with the consent of the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the latter.
Molave Townsite, Ts-‐222. During the said cadastral
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family,
proceedings, defendant-‐appellees claimed Lot No.
where there is no communal or conjugal property
7778 on the belief that the area they were actually
existing, it can be constituted only on his or her
occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out,
own property.
69

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of current market value of the property exceeded the
petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, statutory limit of 300,000 considering that it was
the stark and immutable fact is that the property on located in a commercial area, and that Spouses Bell
which their alleged family home stands is owned by had even sold it to them for 1million.7
respondents and the question of ownership had
The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for
been long laid to rest with the finality of the
hearing to determine the present value of the
appellate court’s judgment in CA-‐G.R. CV No.
family hoe of respondents. It also appointed a
55207. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on the
Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the
subject land is only by mere tolerance of
prevailing market value of their house and lot.
respondents.
The RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an
EULOGIO VS BELL, SR.
Order13 dispensing with the valuation report of the
FACTS: commissioners and directing the issuance of a writ
of execution. The CA found that the trial court
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and
execution sale of the subject family home after
Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the
finding its present value exceeded the statutory
unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno
limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home
C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-‐Bell (Spouses Bell). In
under Article 160, according to the appellate court,
1995, the Bell sibling lodged a Complaint for
is its actual value at the time of its constitution and
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting
not the market/present value; therefore, the trial
of title and damages against petitioner Enrico S.
court’s order was contrary to law. HENCE THIS
Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was
PETITION.
docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 84. The ISSUE:
complaint sought the annulment of the contract of
Whether respondents’ family home may be sold on
sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-‐
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
square-‐meter residential house and lot, as well the
as the cancellation of the title obtained by HELD: YES
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
About the allegation of the plaintiffs that the family
The RTC granted respondents’ prayers, but declared home which has been constituted on the house and
Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 lot in question is exempt from alienation and that
million plus 12% interest per annum. its value does not exceed 300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr.
testified that the two-‐storey house was built in
the RTC issued a Writ of Execution as a result of
1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks. He
which respondents’ property covered by the newly
inherited it in 1976 from his parents and has been
reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
living there with his family. In 1976, when an extra-‐
54208 [formerly RT-‐680 (5997)] was levied on
judicial settlement was made of the estate of his
execution. Upon motion by respondents, trial court,
parents, the fair market value of the house was
on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of
70,000.
the execution on the ground that the property was
a family home.6 City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and
presented Tax Declaration and others, (Exhibit "J",
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
Tax Declaration No. 005-‐047) beginning 1985
the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article
showing that the subject lot with an area of 329 sq.
160 of the Family Code, they posited that the
m. had a fair market value of 76,000.00 and the
70

residential house located thereon of 50,000.00, for During the execution proceedings, none of those
a total value of 126,000.00. She testified that during facts was alleged – much less proven – by
the prior years the assessed values were lower. This petitioners.1âwphi1 The sole evidence presented
shows that the limit of the value of 300,000.00 was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already
under Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not determined with finality that the contract was null,
been exceeded. The testimonies of the plaintiffs and that the actual transaction was an equitable
who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell, Sr. and mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses
Rogela Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in Bells executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price
that house together with their said parents. The stated therein was not the actual value of the
Court therefore concludes that the said house is a property in dispute.
family home under Chapter 2, Title 5 of the Family
PATRICIO VS DARIO III
Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses without the
written consent of the majority of the FACTS:
children/plaintiffs is null and void for being contrary
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived
to law and public policy as enunciated in Art. 158 of
by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their
the Family Code.
two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the
determined with finality that the property in properties he left was a parcel of land with a
dispute is a family home, and that its value at the residential house and a pre-‐school building built
time of its constitution was within the statutory thereon.
limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent,
the exemption of the property from execution.48 On
extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V.
the other hand, there is no question that the
Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-‐30731 (175992) was
money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under
cancelled and TCT No. R-‐213963 was issued in the
the ambit of Article 160.
names of petitioner, private respondent and
Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the Marcelino Marc.
trial court’s money judgment, however, they
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally
cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of
advised private respondent of their intention to
respondents’ rights over their family home. It is
partition the subject property and terminate the co-‐
axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition
exception from an exemption must bring
the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
themselves clearly within the terms of the
instituted an action for partition before the
exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for
Regional Trial Court.
its enforcement.49
The trial court ordered the partition of the subject
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’
property. The trial court also ordered the sale of the
family home under Article 160, petitioners needed
property by public auction wherein all parties
to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in
concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure,
its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
the subject property should be distributed
voluntary improvements on the property
accordingly in the aforestated manner.4
introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) Private respondent filed a motion for
the increased actual value exceeded the maximum reconsideration. In the now assailed Resolution, the
allowed under Article 157. Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for
partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for
71

lack of merit. It held that the family home should legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants"
continue despite the death of one or both spouses contemplates all descendants of the person or
as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The persons who constituted the family home without
heirs could not partition the property unless the distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the
court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. grandchildren and great grandchildren of the
The appellate court also held that the minor son of spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non
private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the
Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
minor beneficiary of the family home. Hence this Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who is also
instant petition. the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario
satisfies the first requisite.
Private respondent claims that the subject property
which is the family home duly constituted by As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must
spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be be actually living in the family home to avail of the
partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo
therein namely, his 12-‐year-‐old son, who is the R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
grandson of the decedent. He argues that as long as respondent and grandson of the decedent
the minor is living in the family home, the same Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family
continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death
age. of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite.
ISSUE:
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino
Whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from
son of private respondent, can be considered as a
his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
capable of supporting him. The liability for legal
HELD: NO support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three
private respondent who is the head of his
requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
immediate family. The law first imposes the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family
obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of
Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
the parents, especially the father, and only in their
are dependent for legal support upon the head of
default is the obligation imposed on the
the family.
grandparents.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal
that the family home shall continue despite the
support not from his grandmother, but from his
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
father.1âwphi1Thus, despite residing in the family
head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as
home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be
cannot partition the same unless the court finds
considered as beneficiary contemplated under
compelling reasons therefor.
Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the requisite of being dependent on his grandmother
family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an for legal support. It is his father whom he is
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and dependent on legal support, and who must now
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, establish his own family home separate and distinct
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be from that of his parents, being of legal age.
72

There is no showing that private respondent is Sometime in February 1995, Claudio leased the
without means to support his son; neither is there subject property to the petitioners and a certain
any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the Juanito Oliva (Juanito) for a monthly rent
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily of P5,500.00. However, the petitioners and Juanito
provide for her grandson’s legal support. On the defaulted in the payment of the rent and as of
contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of October 3, 1998, their total accountabilities to
Claudio amounted to P170,500.00.
the property which shows an intention to dissolve
the family home, since there is no more reason for
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1995, a Final Deed
its existence after the 10-‐year period ended in 4
of Sale over the subject property was issued to
1997. Claudio. Unable to collect the aforementioned
DE MESA VS ACERO JR. rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina Acero
(Rufina) (collectively referred to as Spouses Acero)
FACTS: filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan against
This involves a parcel of land registered the petitioners and Juanito. In their defense, the
under Arcelli’s name. A house was later constructed petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no
on the subject property, which the petitioners right over the subject property. The petitioners
thereafter occupied as their family home after they deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary,
got married sometime in January 1987. they are the lawful owners of the subject property
and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli
obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. (Claudio)
in the amount of P100,000.00, which was secured On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a
by a mortgage over the subject property. As Decision,6 giving due course to Spouses Acero’s
payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against complaint and ordering the petitioners and Juanito
China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. to vacate the subject property.
When the check was presented for In the interregnum, on October 29, 1999,
payment, it was dishonored as the account from the petitioners filed against the respondents a
which it was drawn had already been closed. The complaint10 to nullify TCT No. T-‐221755 (M) and
petitioners failed to heed Claudio’s subsequent other documents with damages with the RTC of
demand for payment. Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the petitioners asserted
that the subject property is a family home, which is
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with exempt from execution under the Family Code and,
the Prosecutor's Office of Malolos, Bulacan a thus, could not have been validly levied upon for
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of
(B.P. 22) against the petitioners. After preliminary execution.
investigation, an information for violation of B.P. 22
was filed against the petitioners with the Regional On September 3, 2002, the RTC rendered a
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Decision,11 which dismissed the petitioners’
complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the Family Code,
On October 21, 1992, the RTC rendered a the RTC ruled that even assuming that the subject
Decision3 acquitting the petitioners but ordering property is a family home, the exemption from
them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000.00 execution does not apply. A mortgage was
with legal interest from date of demand until fully constituted over the subject property to secure the
paid. loan Araceli obtained from Claudio and it was levied
upon as payment therefor. CA affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Hence this petition.
73

They insist that the execution sale that was by operation of law and was thus prospectively
conducted is a nullity considering that the subject exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus
property is a family home. The petitioners assert correct in asserting that the subject property was a
that, contrary to the disposition of the CA, a prior family home.
demonstration that the subject property is a family
home is not required before it can be exempted The family home’s exemption from execution
from execution. must be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction.
ISSUE:
Having failed to set up and prove to the
Whether the lower courts erred in refusing to sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject
cancel Claudio’s Torrens title TCT No. T-‐221755 (M) property before the sale thereof at public auction,
over the subject property. the petitioners now are barred from raising the
same. Failure to do so estop them from later
HELD: NO claiming the said exemption.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family In this case, it is undisputed that the
homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, petitioners allowed a considerable time to lapse
could be summarized as follows: before claiming that the subject property is a family
home and its exemption from execution and forced
First, family residences constructed before sale under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed
the effectivity of the Family Code or before August the subject property to be levied upon and the
3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either public sale to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the
judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the time the subject property was sold until a Final
provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later,
from execution; Araceli’s Torrens title was cancelled and a new one
issued under Claudio’s name, still, the petitioner
Second, family residences constructed after remained silent. In fact, it was only after the
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 respondents filed a complaint for unlawful
are automatically deemed to be family homes and detainer, or approximately four (4) years from the
thus exempt from execution from the time it was time of the auction sale, that the petitioners
constituted and lasts as long as any of its claimed that the subject property is a family home,
beneficiaries actually resides therein; thus, exempt from execution.
Third, family residences which were not

judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family
home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
but were existing thereafter, are considered as
family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family
residence sometime in January 1987. There was no
showing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family home
74

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