1. [A.C. No. 5624.

January 20, 2004]

NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C. FLORIDO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his
eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting
and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]

In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two
children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of
whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is
another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.

Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros
Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant
a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for
temporary child custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received
any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.

Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but
respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two
dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their
children to respondent.

In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning Center in
Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the
custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he
claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.

Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen
subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the
police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the
NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take
them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito
Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.

In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at the hotel where
respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took
the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.

On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the
alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and
obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.

At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently, the
petition was dismissed.

Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath by
manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law.
Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the country.

After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will result in his
disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation
of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and
attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and
presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed
Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ
of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to
recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution,
he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.

Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could
not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is
expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the
truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and
her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate
and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital
prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the
sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh
a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense
committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
of the country.

SO ORDERED.

2. [G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA
and JOSE SEELIN, respondents.

DECISION

MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:

This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing the
execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case
No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised in this second petition
for review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues which have already attained finality. We now write
finis to this controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years, for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge,
RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City:[1]

x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration
of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for
constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any attempt to prolong it. Public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and
irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.

The facts:

The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a
complaint against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for
declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942) issued in the name of said corporation,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.

On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment,[2] the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null and void.

Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement as to costs."

The aforesaid decision was affirmed[3] by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on June 25, 1991 and
eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No. L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final on March 5,
1992.[4]

The RTC decision, having become final and executory, private respondents moved for execution which was granted
by the lower court. Accordingly, a writ of execution of the decision was issued.

Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order. The motion was opposed by herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court; that it is completely unaware of
the suit between private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and registered owner of the lot having
bought the same from Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August 18, 1992 by
the trial court holding that the judgment was binding on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which read:

We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no compelling reason to disturb the same.

Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation,
defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.

Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee[5]

The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993.[6]

On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993.[7] Upon finality of said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment
dated October 21, 1993.[8]

Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial
court which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.

Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a reconsideration. Petitioners motion was initially granted[9] on August 29,
1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the said order was
reconsidered on December 19, 1994[10] by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero. Forthwith,
alias writs of execution were issued.

Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for the second time, filed a petition for certiorari[11] with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be
executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No. C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case
never mandatedCentral Dyeing to deliver possession of the property to the private respondents; that certain facts
and circumstances which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render the execution highly unjust, illegal
and inequitable; that the issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot buyers freedom of religion and
worship; and that private respondents title is being questioned in another case.

On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered judgment[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
ground that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final and executory. It ruled, thus:

"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and possession could have been
implemented a long time ago if not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal Gardens. x x x x Petitioner
Eternal Gardens cannot anymore stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues which actually have been
ruled upon by this Court in its earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind, the instant petition is a
mere continuation of petitioner's dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party, will not benefit at all
from a final judgment in their favor. Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory warranting the
assessment of double costs of this suit against petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).

Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, the instant petition has already become
moot and academic as the property in question was already turned over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and
the writs of execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully, putting the legal battle of this case to rest."
(Emphasis ours.)

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on January 30, 1996.[13]

Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in
their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.

It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to any matter related to the controversy litigated come
to an end.

Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to
surrender and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the ground that they were never parties to the
case between private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 28797 when it ruled:

Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation,
defendant in Civil Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered therein by respondent Judge.

Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit may be continued for or against
the original party or the transferor and still be binding on the transferee.[14]

The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993.
There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue here.

Further, petitioners contention that a determination of the issue of possession should first be resolved before the
issuance of a writ of possession is untenable.

Placing private respondents in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence
of the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. As correctly argued by
the private respondents, they do not have to institute another action for the purpose of taking possession of the
subject realty.

Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil Case
No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil
Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that
the pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification why execution of the aforesaid judgment and
delivery of possession of the subject property should be permanently stayed or at least held in abeyance until after
the final resolution of the case.

We do not agree.

The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will
not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the
petitioners title which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was already annulled in the judgment sought
to be executed, and which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if,
in the remote possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private respondents title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as
argued by petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT No. 205942 and make petitioner the
rightful owner of the subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely to delay the execution of the
judgment.

Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the
judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to the
execution of the judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners have been taken into account by the
trial court when it took steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be amply protected. In its Order
dated February 13, 1995, the trial court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:

"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely without recourse or remedy because they can still go
after the original party-defendant or transferor of the property in question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing
Corporation pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And should it be difficult or nay impossible for
plaintiff-respondents to be placed in possession of the subject property, due to defendant-petitioners' arguments
that the same have already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be incumbent for the defendant-petitioners
to negotiate with the plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property subject of their complaint to avoid
demolition or desecration since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots."[15]

In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following directive was given, to wit:

"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are
given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that they can have access to the property. But as to the
demolition of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant with the former owner so that cash
payment or cash settlement be made."[16]

Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following limitation
on the writ of execution, as follows:

"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many
persons who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the
interest of justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of possession and break open order should be applied
only to the gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side nearest to the parcel of land in question where
the factory of the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over the graves
spread over the parcels of land within the said memorial park."[17]

From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been
properly addressed.

Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias
Writ of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already
been implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs Return,[18] dated March 31, 1995, with the attached Turn
Over Premises[19]indicating therein that private respondents took possession of the subject property.

A note of caution. This case has again delayed the execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the
prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the
disputed lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is finally terminated, the whole lot shall have
already been filled with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the real owners of the property. This is
a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to
defeat the ends of justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.[20] In Banogan et. al. vs. Cerna, et. al.,[21] we ruled:

"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case such as
this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the
attention of the courts."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 3. G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the
classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his
client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-
at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence,
we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge
itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious
that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against
his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of
the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion
for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed
no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on
May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,
1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to
the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of
promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the
Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the
point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue
sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which
is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in
issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the
insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from
him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that
this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September
28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this
Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in
person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what
measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and
then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the Court;
that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of
a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of
our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to
inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS?
Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is
this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is current, though
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not
the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment
against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is
impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We have
added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has
ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not
one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe
the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must
end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members
of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to
state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful
thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours
meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The
rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been
generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court,
as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari,
it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations
preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the
control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed
of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give
reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from
the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through
the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice
Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to
be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither
controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so
far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law
and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have
known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not
only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time
and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety &
Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly
Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the
Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v.
Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs.
Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on
his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of
right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made
sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the
liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it
is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such
right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's
actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme
Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on
them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their
official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who
Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer
of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like
the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the
bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the
doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am.
Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing
and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only
act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood,
by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider
it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny
into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing
the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of
justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the
judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should
not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-
22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in
the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and
criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public
confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the
direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As
a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is
also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it
into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by
the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte
Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the respondent
here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of
practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their
criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the
dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and
perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and
the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and
said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest
and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people.
Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are
officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in
their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the
write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized
any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose members it
was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right,
and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state,
in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only
when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his
liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an
affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted
and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and
integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice
and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this
court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is
vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation
of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties
devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and
the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising
the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the
officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of
justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of
professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to
look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make
out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is
under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days,
saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of
such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the
profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our system
and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private
citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that members of the
bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the
thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of
the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action
using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates,"
"colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was
ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems
like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the
widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds
of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will
gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the
letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other
justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its
only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It
would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by
passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can
resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however
abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this
letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen
were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded
and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley
v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for
like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act
constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction
made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While
the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the
judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by
tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the
law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter
case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in
which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been
robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should
be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance,
with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything
but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The
accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of
mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a
cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby
breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of
this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351;
Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose
such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a
letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the
judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his
general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect
for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial
actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and
legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity
and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain
a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason
for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties,
and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty
and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session
of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt,
despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does not
merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by
this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and
reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo
case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision
of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided
during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair
to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might
be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken
as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication
to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel
charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications there
are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to
rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of
the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court
is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to
the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and some
former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not
now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of
a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made
only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime,
this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking
thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed.
Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication
which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any
way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand
of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose
their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now
under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much
be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post
litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we
have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to
a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is
without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys
to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound
judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the
public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers,
and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and
exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior
and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or
not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and
dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the
Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the
public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed
no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate
hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in
them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one
in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by
the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether
or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise
the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly
of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by
personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence
of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we
are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the
compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen
to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.

4. [G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners, vs. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent
Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt
and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by
which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently
titled in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who
later was replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition
of respondent judge from the consideration of the case.[1] The motion alleged in pertinent part:

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three
(3) successive postponements for the presentation for cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10
August 1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing,
the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS
Enterprises, Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty.
Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council,
against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;

4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs
to prove their case, since this will be the last case to recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor
inhibit himself and set this case for re-raffle;

5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the
partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should immediately move for his inhibition.

The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.

Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both counsel
and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt of court.[2]

In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff
Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his
views because he merely signed the motion in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly
Wicker, who said in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised him to have the
case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge both failed to come for a
hearing, because their absence was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may be and when he would
appear. Wickers sense of disquiet increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos
and the latters witness, Mrs. Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present.[3]

Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held them
guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order
of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7,
1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.

In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he
does not thereby become guilty of contempt.

In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not
because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty.
Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on
October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to
pick out the young man who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition;
that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution of his order dated
December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding petitioners in
contempt, he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that Atty.
Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his
(Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his client; and that by tendering
their profuse apologies in their motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged
the falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken inconsistent positions as to who
should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the
case be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November 29, 1993, which they
filed with the Office of Court Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing
the case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.

In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the case,
it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for
the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.

What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are pending,
as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same within the
meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct contempt.[6]

It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may
be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may be summarily adjudged in
contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt
only judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.[7]

Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are
right about the nature of the case against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no
ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held guilty of contempt. What is
important to determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioners liable for direct contempt.

We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail.[8] The contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose
of merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the
court.[9]

Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangels
finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition,
particularly the following paragraphs thereof:

2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting
Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises,
Inc. who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels were
present;

3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited from the south by Atty.
Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council,
against whom plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos relief;

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty.
Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated
easing out the former judge to make room for such transfer.

These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted
criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and
Capulong were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an
efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record
which could have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he deliberated for two months whether
or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of
whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the allegations in the
motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was his client who verified the same.

To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had been told by an unidentified young man,
whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the
replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the same days the new judge failed to
come. It would, therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been
personally recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been eased out were Atty. Rayos
and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.

Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while
he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not
overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the
motion for inhibition as his client.

Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins
him to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by
others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have materiality to the case.[13]

After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he would let
them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant
petition which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be REVERTED to his former station. He simply
cannot do in the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If nothing else, this
personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence
first evident in petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.

Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:[14]

Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit
themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants punished
for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among those
provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in
contempt of court.

It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.

Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be
exercised for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater
reason for doing so considering that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear
to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in
failing health (suffering from angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the
recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who was the source of the same. At least
he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge
Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners
description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex
cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one
of the most outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a
1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.

In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt, the
Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial
court for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion, considering the background of this
occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard
[of] preservation of the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the authority he is
entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to
P500.00.

The same justification also holds true in this case.

WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5)
days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

5. Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC

entitled Restoring Integrity: A
June 7, 2011
Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the following:

(a) the Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondent University of the Philippines (UP)
law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and

(b) the Manifestation[2] dated April 1, 2011 filed by respondents Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore
O. Te.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, Professors Catindig and Laforteza relied on the following grounds:

GROUNDS

A. THIS PROCEEDING, WHILE OSTENSIBLY DOCKETED AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER, IS PREMISED ON A

FINDING OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT. ACCORDINGLY, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS BREACHED THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT OBSERVANCE OF THE DUE
PROCESS SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED IN AN INDIRECT CONTEMPT PROCEEDING.

B. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT (1) THE PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES IN THE VINUYA CASE AND IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC HAVE NO RELATION TO
THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT AND THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION, AND THEREFORE (2) THE
RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ACCESS AND ADDRESS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN A.M. NO. 10-7-17-SC, TO
PRESENT THEIR OWN EVIDENCE IN RESPECT OF THE PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION ISSUES, AND TO
SUPPORT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SHOW CAUSE RESOLUTION WITH SUCH EVIDENCE.

C. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE IN
BREACH OF THEIR ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HAVING ISSUED THE RESTORING INTEGRITY STATEMENT.[3]

In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondents pray that (a) the Courts Decision dated March 8, 2011 be
reconsidered and set aside and the respondents Compliance dated November 18, 2010 be deemed satisfactory, and
(b) the Court expunge the reference in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC to the respondents (i.e., joined by some faculty
members of the University of the Philippines school of law) effectively finding them guilty of making false charges
against Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo). In the alternative, they pray that they be
afforded their full rights to due process and provided the full opportunity to present evidence on the matters subject
of the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010.[4]

Anent the first ground, Professors Catindig and Laforteza insist that, notwithstanding the docketing of this matter as
an administrative case, there was purportedly a findingthat respondents were guilty of indirect contempt in view of
(1) the mention made in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 of In re Kelly,[5] a case involving a
contempt charge; and (2) the references to respondents contumacious language or contumacious speech and
conduct and to several authorities which dealt with contempt proceedings in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

The shallowness of such argument is all too easily revealed. It is true that contumacious speech and conduct directed
against the courts done by any person, whether or not a member of the Bar, may be considered as indirect
contempt under Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice.

A charge of indirect contempt, if proven in due proceedings, carry with it penal sanctions such as imprisonment or a
fine or both.[6]

The very same contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a
member of the Bar, may likewise subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts.[7] In such disciplinary
cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition.

Contrary to Professors Catindig and Lafortezas theory, what established jurisprudence tells us is that the same
incident of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court on the part of a lawyer may be
punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.

In Salcedo v. Hernandez,[8] for the same act of filing in court a pleading with intemperate and offensive statements,
the concerned lawyer was found guilty of contempt andliable administratively. For this reason, two
separate penalties were imposed upon him, a fine (for the contempt charge) and reprimand (for his failure to
observe his lawyerly duty to give due respect to the Court).

The full case title[9] of In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen[10] and the sanction imposed indubitably show that the
proceeding involved therein was disciplinary. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court in Almacen adverted to a few
principles and authorities involving contempt proceedings aside from jurisprudence on ethical responsibilities of
lawyers, Atty. Almacen was only meted out an administrative sanction (indefinite suspension from the practice of
law) and no penal sanction was imposed upon him. Indeed, in Almacen,the Court explicitly stated that whether or
not respondent lawyer could be held liable for contempt for his utterances and actuations was immaterial as the
sole issue in his disciplinary case concerns his professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of the Court.[11]

Conversely, In re Vicente Sotto[12] was purely a contempt proceeding. Nonetheless, the Court in that case saw fit to
remind Atty. Sotto that:

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.[13]

Atty. Sotto was expressly found liable only for contempt and accordingly fined the amount of P1,000.00 payable
within 15 days from promulgation of judgment. The unmistakable reference to Atty. Sottos failure to observe his
ethical duties as a lawyer did not convert the action against him into a disciplinary proceeding. In fact, part of the
disposition of the case was to require Atty. Sotto to show cause, within the same period given for the payment of the
fine, why he should not be disbarred for his contemptuous statements against the Court published in a newspaper.

Similar to Salcedo, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan[14] involved both contempt and disciplinary proceedings for the lawyers
act of making public statements to the media that were offensive and disrespectful of the Court and its members
relating to matters that were sub judice. This was evident in the May 2, 1988 Resolution of the Court which required
respondent lawyer to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be punished for
contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions.[15] In Zaldivar, however, although the Court found
that respondents act constituted both contempt and gross misconduct as a member of the Bar, he was only
administratively sanctioned with an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The lesson imparted by the foregoing authorities is that, when the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers for intemperate and discourteous language and behavior directed at the
courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the
administration of justice. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Court to cite authorities on bar discipline (involving
the duty to give due respect to the courts) in contempt cases against lawyers and vice versa.

Thus, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation or
discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does
not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Respondents contrary position in their
motion for reconsideration is bereft of any rational merit. Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of
court, which is punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Clearly, the Court did not opt to do so. We cannot see why respondents would
stubbornly cling to the notion that they were being cited for indirect contempt under the Show Cause Resolution
when there is no basis for such belief other than their own apparent misreading of the same.

With respect to the second ground offered for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011, respondents
continue to insist on their theory, previously expounded in their Compliance, that the evidence and proceedings in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was relevant to their own administrative case and thus, it was necessary for them to be granted
access to the evidence and records of that case in order to prove their own defenses in the present case. The
Decision already debunked at length the theory that if respondents are able to prove the bases for their well
founded concerns regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, then they would be exonerated of the
administrative charges against them. It bears repeating here that what respondents have been required to explain
was their contumacious, intemperate and irresponsible language and/or conduct in the issuance of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, which most certainly cannot be justified by a belief, well-founded or not, that Justice Del Castillo
and/or his legal researcher committed plagiarism.

To dispel respondents misconception once and for all, it should be stressed that this Court did not call the attention
of respondents for having an opinion contrary to that of the Court in the plagiarism case against Justice Del
Castillo. Notably, even their co-respondent Prof. Raul T. Vasquez stood fast on his opinion regarding the plagiarism
issue. Still, he was able to simply relate to this Court how he came to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement and
candidly conceded that he may have failed to assess the effect of the language of the Statement. This
straightforward and honest explanation was found satisfactory despite the lack of reference to the evidence in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC or the holding of any formal trial-type evidentiary hearing, which respondents know fully well was
not mandatory in administrative proceedings. This circumstance belied respondents justification for seeking access
to the evidence and records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC and their assertion that they have in any way been denied their
due process rights. For the same reason that A.M. 10-7-17-SC and the present case are independent of each other, a
passing mention of respondent law professors in the Resolution dated February 8, 2011 in A.M. 10-7-17-SC is not
proof that this Court has found respondents guilty of falsely accusing Justice Del Castillo of plagiarism nor is it any
prejudgment of the present case. For if so, no one would be exonerated or none of the compliances would be found
satisfactory in this administrative case. Again, the case of Prof. Vasquez confirms that this Court duly considered
respondents submissions in this case before coming to a decision.

To buttress their third ground for reconsideration, respondents mainly contend that the Court erred in taking the
emphatic language in the Statement in isolation from the other statements evidencing the good intentions of
respondents and calling for constructive action. Again, these arguments have been substantially addressed in the
Decision dated March 8, 2011 and there is no need to belabor these points here. Suffice it to say that respondents
avowed noble motives have been given due weight and factored in the determination of the action taken with
respect to submissions of respondents.

In all, the Court finds that respondent Professors Catindig and Laforteza have offered no substantial arguments to
warrant a reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in
their motion.

As for the Manifestation dated April 1, 2011, Dean Leonen and Professor Te alleged that they support the Motion
for Reconsideration which was filed by Respondents Professors Tristan Catindig and Caren Laforteza on April 1,
2011. The rest of the assertions therein are mere restatements of arguments previously proffered in respondents
compliances and have been extensively taken up in the Decision dated March 8, 2011.

Since the Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Lafortezas motion for
reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to merely note
the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby RESOLVES to (a) DENY the Motion for Reconsideration dated
April 1, 2011 filed by respondent Professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza; and (b) NOTE the
Manifestation dated April 1, 2011 filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Professor Theodore O. Te.

SO ORDERED.

6. [A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]

SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ROMULO
RICAFORT, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of
grave misconduct.

From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10
percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainants repeated
demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent
and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present ex-
parte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex C of the Complaint) ordering
respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs
of suit.

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed for
failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex
B of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800
thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was
closed (Annexes D and E of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus
forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (Annexes F, G, H and I of the Complaint).

In the Joint Affidavit of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent
admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good
faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the
checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his three
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March
2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for
extension of time to submit the comment smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the
bar and a law dean.

In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the
filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San
Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to honor the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-
15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which said
checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends that
respondent be declared guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant and be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.

In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.

We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors
of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.

There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused
the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds
of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the
recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite
his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of
what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been
validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were
drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact
that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.

All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all
checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other
checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622
[2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the
legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).

Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by
the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite
demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes,
which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity
of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his
comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother
to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To
the Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful
disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty.
Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).

Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.

The penalty of suspension for at least one (1) year imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague and
inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this
case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his
palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver penalty. That
graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the
practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days from
notice of this resolution.

This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of
Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all
lower courts with copies of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
7. A.C. No. 6252

JONAR SANTIAGO, Complainant,

Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,Respondent. October 5, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with
public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial
Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance
thereof.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with
deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138[2] of the Rules of Court; and
violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant
in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents
on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax
certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and
execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of
the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as
evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain
date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting
the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD,Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He
admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He
believed, however, that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits
was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public
and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He
pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to
indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom
were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have
entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the
certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to
the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their
clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant
charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when
the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their
case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City
Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident
and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted Certifications from the Cabanatuan
City Police and the Joint Affidavit of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the
counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP
against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered
mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared.Respondent was unable to do so,
apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at
two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters
Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to
dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through
Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days
from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting
the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on
the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the
affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It
modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with
a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and
12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption
from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.[21] They are
also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to
give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in
[their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure
to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]
 These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed
to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod
methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost
care in the performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public
interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by
failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of
the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative
to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in
Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is
patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or
exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because
others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the
law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case
No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These
documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied
that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the subject
Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule
of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to
obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere
to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be
decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe
that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating
the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall
avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in certain cases
pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their
clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one
of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism
and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as
disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers
client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his
own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so,
to withdraw from active management of the case.

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we
cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit
of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental
right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest
all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if they are
convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no
effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means --
every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived
of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the
fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly
committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements
of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the
trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely
inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes
of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and
public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the
State from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be
followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any
matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the
canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported
by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not
the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters
allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City
Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

8. A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992

CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L.
Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and
corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then
pending before the Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente
Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas.

Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject
the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time
the regular judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases
were, in due course, declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a
letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:

Butuan City
23 April 1974

Atty. Ireneo Bunye

928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila

Dear Atty. Bunye:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic) on the 3 defaulted cases he
said he has no objection in fact he is happy and recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me
to be delivered to him.

xxx xxx xxx

I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.

My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas and all.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) CESAR L LANTORIA

Major Inf PC (ret)
Executive Director 5

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:

June 1, 1974

Dear Major Lantoria,

At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters received, which is about the
preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied
with my cases and other professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs.
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been reminding me but I always find
myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates
for the next hearing of the remaining cases over there.

Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted defendants. I am not sure if
they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once. However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind
mediation, that if the preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and willing to
accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better. And to this effect, kindly relay at once
what he is going to say or thinks if he signs them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.

xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our cases there. Regards to you and
family and prayer for your more vigor and success.

Brotherly yours,

(SGD.) IRINEO L. BUNYI 6

Counsel

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the
contents of which read as follows:
928 Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila
March 4, 1974

Dear Major Lantoria,

This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C.
Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver
the envelope to him as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless, of
course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is a need to wait from his words
about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite
receiving those copies for our hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No.
345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan City.

Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.

Truly yours,

(SGD.) L. BUNYI 7

Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case against
respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June,
1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who
unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.

By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the
existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the same
was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that
the decisions in question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation as a big help to
him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and
the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the
benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer inconsiderable delay.
But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it
came from the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage.
Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is
without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions
as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared
in default for failure to file their answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first
paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in fact, the letter mentioned
subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);

d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in sending the same to the
Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)

In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report to the Court, with the
following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12, September 29, and December 18, 1978,
but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both
respondent and complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following
development —
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to before the investigating Solicitor,
praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn, dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could
hardly substantiate" his charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint against him. At the same time,
he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has
in his possession the original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared to prove
his charges. 10 (emphasis supplied)

In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March
and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed prepared the draft of the
decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to
Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that respondent had previous
communications with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant
to the effect that he had lost the original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at
bar are of no moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that
he prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.

Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary
and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial determination of a litigation in which he is
counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year. He filed with the Court the corresponding complaint against respondent.

In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future he would be
more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.

On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until
further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the
case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6)
months when be expected to return from the United States of America where he would visit his children and at the
same time have a medical check-up.

On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General
appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on
16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that although he prepared the draft of the
decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing
him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may
have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.

We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant case
should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the respondent himself
having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the Court, for
whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.

With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative complaint is
based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action,
deserves suspension from the practice of law.

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing
in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or
consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the
Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:

3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court

Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of
the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer
should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke
and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A self-
respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and
respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between
bench and bar.

In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in
Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges.

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. 17

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court
Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.

SO ORDERED.

9. [G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [SPECIAL DIVISION],
HON. MINITA CHICO-NAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL, HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in the above-numbered case; it read:

The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan,
et al. The Petition prays

1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of the members of the Honorable Court disqualify themselves from hearing
and deciding this petition;

2. That the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside; and

3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905 pending before the Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.

Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court
from hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges
from participating in any partisan political activity which proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by
attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the
Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that the justices have thereby prejudged a case
that would assail the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v.
Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.

Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before
the Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de officio (sic) be declared functus officio and that,
being the now counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565
and No. 26905 pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the foregoing criminal cases against his client
be dismissed.

During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003, petitioner presented to the court several portions of the
book, entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice Artemio Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the
defense. On 9 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other things, that

a) x x x President Estrada be granted the opportunity to prove the truth of the statements contained in Justice
Artemio Panganibans book, REFORMING THE JUDICIARY, in relation to the prejudgment committed by the Supreme
Court justices against President Estrada in the subject case/s of Estrada v. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108;
and,

b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum be issued to Justice Artemio Panganiban, Justice Antonio Carpio,
Justice Renato Corona, Secretary Angelo Reyes of the Department of National Defense, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. for them to testify and bring
whatever supporting documents they may have in relation to their direct and indirect participation in the
proclamation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as cited in the book of Justice
Panganiban, including the material events that led to that proclamation and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs.
Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)

The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims
should have been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief
Justice Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

a) going to EDSA 2;

b) authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent disability even
without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g., written declaration by either the
President or majority of his cabinet; and

c) actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.

It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include these material facts which are obviously undeniable.
Besides, it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, pp. 13-14.)

On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss,
filed by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to
Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of the
Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred,
Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted
out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the
motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.)
remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the
alleged bias and partial attitude of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for
their disqualification. On 31 July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e., the resolution
(Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6 July 2003; viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph Ejercito Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na
tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6, 2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)
and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July 2003, denying petitioners motion for disqualification of
14 July 2003; viz:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court, for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for
Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)

The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for
utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion, an indispensable requirement to
warrant a recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal
and, on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it to challenge the two resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. He denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice and due process. Attorney Pagula
went on to state that-

The act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the public office. But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL,
is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court.
But the act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in
ESTRADA vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act
of the Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in
the name of the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]). Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow
the Justices to use the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)

Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision
of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and contribute to the
correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)

The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of
the ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to breathe life into the carcass of a long dead
issue.

Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients case within the judicial forum; indeed, he
has repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits a member of the bar from making such public statements on any pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia may have stoked the fires of public
dissension and posed a potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.

It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter,
dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he
has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on matters pending
before the Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia,
on pain of disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court
or to its Members. But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the Court, Attorney Paguia appears to
persist on end.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan Paguia,
counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he should
not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page pleading,
Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance, repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the
members of the Court.

Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty. Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of
validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its members, provides -
Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political activities.

Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term partisan political activities; the law states:

The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context, relates to acts designed to
cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a
public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The assailed presence of other
justices of the Court at such an event could be no different from their appearance in such other official functions as
attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative
Department.

The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if
well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of
the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.

The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from making such public statements on a case that may tend to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts well-
meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -

What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of law? It renders the decision
in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair
play since it appears that when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had
already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting to be formalized after
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had authorized the
proclamation of GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own
act?

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts of the land through the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.