9th NASCENT Moot Court Competition, 2019

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF YINDEMOI

CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. ____/2018

IN THE MATTER OF

NORATU UZAMIKU
NANAHAN
…….PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA …....RESPONDENT

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

UNDER ARTICLE 136(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. 4
INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................................................................... 8
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................................................................... 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................. 10
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .............................................................................................................. 13
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ...................................................................................................... 14
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .......................................................................................................... 15
ISSUE[I].WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD BE GRANTED BY THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO THE PRESENT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136
OF THE CONSTITUTION?................................................................................................ 15
[I.A] THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS. ............................. 15
[I.A.1] THAT IT IS THE NATURE OF EXTRAORDINARY POWER
CONFERRED ON THE SUPREME COURT BY ARTICLE I36 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. .................................................................................... 15
[I.A.2] THAT THE ALTERNATE REMEDY HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTD YET.
...................................................................................................................................... 17
[I.B] THAT THERE EXIST NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR ALLOWING THIS SPECIAL LEAVE
PETITION. .......................................................................................................................... 18
ISSUE [II].WHETHER SRIPAKSHI SHOULD BE CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 302
OR 304 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?......................................................................... 20
[II.A] THE ACT OF THE APPELLANT LEAD TO THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. ................... 20
[II.A.1] THERE WAS A VOLUNTARY ACT BY THE APPELLANT. ................... 20
[II.A.2] THERE IS A NEXUS BETWEEN THE ACT OF THE APPELLANT AND
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. .............................................................................. 20
[II.A.2.a]SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE ......................................................................... 21
[II.A.2.b]OPERATING CAUSE ............................................................................. 21
[II.A.2.c] THERE WAS NO ‘NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS’. ..................... 22
[II.B] THE APPELLANT COMMITTED MURDER WITH FULL INTENTION AND KNOWLEDGE
UNDER SECTION 300(3) OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. .................................................... 22
[II.B.1] THERE WAS PREPARATION. .................................................................... 23
[II.B.2] THERE WAS ‘MENS REA’. ......................................................................... 24
[II.B.2.a] INTENTION TO KILL. ......................................................................... 24
[II.B.2.b] THERE WAS KNOWLEDGE................................................................ 25
[II.B.3] THE INJURIES WERE SUFFICIENT IN ORDINARY COURSE OF
NATURE. .................................................................................................................... 25

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 [II.C] GRAVE PROVOCATION CAN NOT BE USED AS A DEFENCE. ................................... 26
[II.C.1] THE PROVOACATION MUST BE GRAVE................................................ 27
[II.C.2] THE PROVOCATION MUST BE SUDDEN. .............................................. 28
(II.C.2.a) Reasonable time had elapsed. ................................................................ 28
(II.C.2.b) Instrument with which the homicide Was affected. .............................. 28
[II.C.3] THE PROVOCATION MUST DEPRIVE THE OFFENDER OF SELF-
CONTROL. .................................................................................................................. 29
PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 30

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

List of Books
AIYAR, P RAMANATHA, THE LAW LEXICON 49 (2nd eds. 2006). .............................................. 21
BRENDA MIDSON, TEACHING CAUSATION IN CRIMINAL LAW: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE
POLICY ANALYSTS 112 (2010) ............................................................................................. 22
DUNHAM BETH WALSTON, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 52 (6th eds. 2011). ................................... 21
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 5756 (eds. 8th 2009). ..... 16
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW TEXTS CASES AND MATERIAL 87 (eds. 6th 2014). .......... 21
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW TEXTS CASES AND MATERIAL 88 (eds. 6th 2014). .... 22, 25
K.D. GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 728 (eds. 2th 2013). ........................ 26
K.D. GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 771 (eds. 2th 2013) ......................... 29
K.D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW: COSTS AND MATERIALS 367-370 (2009) ................................... 28
MP JAIN & SN JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1980 (Dr. Shakil Ahmed Khan)
eds. 7th ed. 2011 ................................................................................................................... 16
MP JAIN & SN JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2006 (Dr. Shakil Ahmed Khan eds.
7th ed. 2011) ......................................................................................................................... 18
List of Cases
A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1906 (India). .............................. 18
Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1698 (India). ...................................... 24
Aher Raja Khima v. Dharkoli, AIR 1956 SC 217 (India). ...................................................... 17
Anvaruddin v. Shakoor, AIR 1990 SC 1242 (India) ............................................................... 19
Arjun v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 2507 (India) ......................................................... 17
Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Setharathnam, AIR 1979 SC 1284 (India) ......................................... 17
Ashok Nagar Welfare association v. R.K. Sharma, AIR 2002 SC 335 (India) ....................... 17
Augustine Saldana v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC (India)........................................... 25
Balak Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 2165 (India) ........................................... 19
Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2009] 5 SCR 242 (India) ............................................ 21
Basudev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 (India) ............................................................. 26
Benjamin v. State, (2008) 3 SCC 745 (India). ......................................................................... 24
Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1321 (India) ............................................... 19
Chacko v. State of Kerala, (2012) 12 SCC 269 (India). .......................................................... 25
Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574 (India) ................................................ 24
Cheshire [1991] 3 All Er 670 (CA).......................................................................................... 22
Chikkarangaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 497 (India). ....................................... 20
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, AIR 1989 SC 1972 (India) ... 17
Deputy of Chief Controller v. Kosalram, AIR 1971 SC 1283 (India) ..................................... 19
Dulichand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 1960 (India) ............................................. 19
Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, (2010) 9 SCC 73 (India) .......................................................... 17
Engineering A. Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874 (India). ................... 16
enu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors v. Sri Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 195
(India) ................................................................................................................................... 18
Food Corporation of India v. Makhan Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1406 (India) .............................. 17
Gajula Surya Prakasarao v. State of A.P., (2010) 1 SCC 88 ................................................... 19
Gauri Shankar Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 709 (India) .......................... 20
Gokul v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 209 (India) ........................................................... 17
Hari Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2002 SC 478 (India) ........................................... 27
Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1956 SC 757 (India) .......................................... 17

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Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1946 AC 588 (598)............................................. 30
Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda (2007) 13 SCC 803
(India) ................................................................................................................................... 17
Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1998 SC 1074 (India) .................................................. 19
Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustee, Port of Mumbai, AIR 2004 SC 1815 (India) 17
Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199 ........................................... 20
Jayaraj v. State of TN, AIR 1976 SC 1519 (India) .................................................................. 26
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (India) ......................................... 28
Karu Masik v. State of Bihar, 2001 Cri LJ 2615 (India). ........................................................ 25
Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 (CA). ........................................................................................... 22
Kodavandi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 467 (India) ........................................................ 19
Krishna Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1252 (India) .................................................. 17
Kuldeep Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2001) 4 SCC 589 (India). ............................. 25
L.M. Navakhare v. K.E. Tapar, AIR 1993 SC 2596 (India) .................................................... 17
Lal Mandi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 2265 (India) ............................................. 19
Lala Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1185 (India) ............................................. 19
Magan Bhai Ishwar Bhai Patel v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., AIR 1969 SC 784 (India) 16
Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) v. G.V Srinava Murthy, AIR 2004 SC 4289 (India). ............ 16
Mahesh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1991 SC 1108 (India) ............................................................. 17
Mahmood v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 All 538 (India) ............................................................. 27
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 713 (India). .................................................. 24
Mathura Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1992 SC 49 (India)................................... 19
Milind Bhagwanrao Godse v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 699 (India). .................... 19
Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 79 (India) ................................................. 17
Mulk Raj v. New Kenilwoth Hotels Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1917 (India) .................................... 18
Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008 SC 1....................................................................... 28
Nain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 2 SCC 43 (India) .............................................. 19
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 (India) ........................... 17
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 (India). .......................... 16
Nathusingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2783 (India) ..................................... 19
Nayudu Srihari v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 393 (India) ................................ 19
Nirma Ltd. v. Lurgi Lentjes Energietechnik Gmbh & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 520 (India) ......... 18
Pathip Selvan S/o Sugumaran v. Public Prosecutor, (2012) SGCA 44 (India). ...................... 27
Prabhu v. State of M.P., (1991) Cr LJ 1373 (SC) (India). ....................................................... 24
Pran Dutt v. State of U.P., (2006) 4 SCC 425 (India).............................................................. 24
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169 (India); See: Sadhu Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR
1954 SC 271(India) .............................................................................................................. 17
Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Kerwal Singh Dhillon, (2008) 10 SCC 128 (India)
.............................................................................................................................................. 18
Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1993 Supp-1 SCC 499 (India) ................... 20
R v. Benge (1865) 4 F&F 504. ................................................................................................ 21
R v. Hallett [1969] SASR 141. ................................................................................................ 23
R v. Smith [1959] 2 All Er 193 ................................................................................................ 22
Rafiq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 96 (India) ........................................................ 19
Rajesh Kumar v. Dharamvir, (1997) 4 SCC 496 (India) ......................................................... 19
Ram Jag v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 606 (India) ................................................. 17
Ram Jolaha v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Pat 406 (India) ................................................................. 26
Ram Sanjiwan Singh v. State of Bihar, (1996) 8 SCC 552 (India) ......................................... 19
Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 1 SCC 359 (India) ........................... 19
Ramsaran v. CTO, AIR 1962 SC 1326 (India). ....................................................................... 18

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Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1995 SC 1219 (India) ................................................... 19
Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1097 (India) ................................................. 18
Rex v. Lesbini, (1914) 3 KB 1116. .......................................................................................... 29
Richhpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi, AIR 2014 SC 3595 (India) .................................................. 21
S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2184 (India) ............................... 19
Sabhu Das v. State of Assam, (2010) 10 SCC 374 (India) ...................................................... 19
Sachidanand Banerjee v. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR 1966 SC 1955 (India). .............................. 26
Salim and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 CrLJ 1419 (Raj) (India). ..................................... 23
Satbir v. Surat Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1160 (India).................................................................... 19
Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar of Co-operative Society, AIR 1974 SC 1896 (India). ............ 17
Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877 (India) ........................................... 17
Shyam Sunder Agrawal & Co. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 132 (India) ......................... 18
State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi, (2006) 13 SCC 147 (India) .................................................. 17
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 (India) ......................... 21
State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277 (India) ..................................... 17
State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2009) 11 SCC 330 (India) ............................................................. 20
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Goloo Raikwar and Ors., AIR 2016 SC 1182 (India) ................. 21
State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722 (India) ................................ 19
State of Punjab v. Atma Singh (2009) 15 SCC 45 (India) ....................................................... 20
State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 234 (India) ..................................................... 19
State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kailash, AIR 2016 SC 634 (India) ................................................ 21
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar, (1979) 3 SCC 1 (India) .......................................................... 19
State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 (India) ................................................................... 19
State of U.P. v. Boota Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 31 (India). .......................................................... 20
State of U.P. v. Gopi, 1980 Supp. SCC 160 (India) ................................................................ 19
State of U.P. v. Guru Charan (2010) 3 SCC 721 (India) ......................................................... 19
State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, AIR 1983 SC 1081 (India) ............................................................ 19
State of U.P. v. Harihar Bux Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 167 (India) ............................................... 19
State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 (India) .................................................... 18
State of U.P. v. Jashoda Nandan Singh, AIR 1974 SC 753 (India) ......................................... 20
State of U.P. v. Ram Sanjivan, (2010) 1 SCC 529 (India) ...................................................... 19
State of U.P. v. Sheo Ram, AIR 1974 SC 2267 (India) ........................................................... 19
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Abdul, AIR 1997 SC 2512 (India) ................................................... 19
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anil Singh, AIR 1998 SC 1998 (India). .......................................... 17
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ballabh Das, AIR 1985 SC 1384 (India) ......................................... 17
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dan Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1654 (India) ............................................ 19
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pheeru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205 (India) ....................................... 17
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Swarup, AIR 1988 SC 1028 (India) ........................................ 17
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sahai, AIR 1981 SC 1442 (India) .................................................... 19
Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 327 (India)................................................ 19
Surendra Pal v. State of U.P., (2010) 9 SCC 399 (India). ....................................................... 19
Suresh Chandra Babri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420 (India) ...................................... 17
Sushil Ansal and Ors. v. State of Delhi and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 451 (India) .......................... 22
tate of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babjan, (2009) 14 SCC 267 (India) ............................ 19
TI Ltd. v. Seimens Public Communication, (2002) 5 SCC 510 (India) ................................... 18
Union of India v. Harbans Singh Tuli and Sons Builders Private Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 520
(India). .................................................................................................................................. 18
Vijaya Rao v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 7 SCC 69 (India) .................................................... 20
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 (India) ...................................................... 21
Yallawwa v. Shantavva, AIR 1997 SC 35 (India) ................................................................... 17

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List of Statutes
§ 8, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. ............................................................................................... 24
Indian Penal Code, 1860. ......................................................................................................... 21

7|Page
 INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
§/S. Section
¶ Paragraph
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
AIR All India Reporter
All. Allahabad
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Cal. Calcutta
Co. Company
Corpn. Corporation
CrimLJ Criminal Law Journal
Del. Delhi
DLT Delhi Law Times
ed./eds. Edition(s)
Eng. England
Govt. Government
H.P. Himachal Pradesh
Hon’ble Honourable
ILR Indian Law review
Ker. Kerala
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
Ors. Others
p. Page Number
Retd. Retired
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Supdt. Superintendent
Supp. Supplementary

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U.P. Uttar Pradesh
UOI Union of India
v. Versus
Vol. Volume

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

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The Respondent has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Article 136(1) of
the Constitution of India.

“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.”

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

All of which is most respectfully submitted

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND

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Both, Mrs. Virupakshi and Sripakshi have been childhood friends. They have been living in
the same locality and studied in the same school. Having such a bond, Mrs. Sripakshi shared
her problem of financial crisis which she was facing along with her husband, Mr. Viresh
Patel, a businessman and the fact that she was depressed because of it with Mrs. Virupakshi.

Mrs. Sripakshi asked Virupakshi if she could help her as she was married to a wealthy
businessman, Mr. Naresh Patel but in vain as Virupakshi stated that she had no say or control
over the financial matters of her family. To lift the spirit of Sripakshi, Virupakshi suggested
the idea of going to a nearby resort. They went to the “Ajanta Paradise Amusement Park &
Resort”. Virupakshi took care of all the bills and on her way back dropped Sripakshi at 5:00
p.m.

THE ACT
After returning to her house, Mrs. Virupakshi checked her purse and realised that her
Diamond ring and her Gold Bangles were missing. She suspected that Mrs. Sripakshi had
stolen them as she had them in her bags when they went to the resort. Virupakshi called
Sripakshi to inquired about the jewellery and she firmly believed that Sripakshi stole it and
invited her to her house. This distrust of Virupakshi on her friend was heart breaking for
Sripakshi.

Sripakshi reached at Virupakshi’s house at 7:00 p.m. She was greeted by Mr. Naresh Patel
who told her that his wife is at the balcony. Upon her arrival, Virupakshi again questioned
about the jewellery and told Sripakshi, if not returned she would call the police. On hearing
this Sripakshi took out a sharp knife which was kept in the out pocket of her purse and gave a
single blow at Virupakshi’s neck after lurching at her. This was startling for Virupakshi and
to avoid another knife blow she stepped backwards due to which she lost her balance and fell
down from the balcony.

DEATH OF VIRUPAKSHI

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On hearing the commotion, Naresh Patel came running upstairs and saw Sripakshi running
towards the exit. He realised that Virupakshi was missing, so he followed Sripakshi and
asked her where his wife was. Sripakshi said “I was just threatening her, I didn’t mean to kill
her”, while weeping. After saying that she bolted the main door and ran away, because of
which prompt first aid could not be provided to Virupaskhi.

Virupakshi was taken to the hospital by her husband. She was in the hospital for one day but
her life could not be saved. The Port Mortem stated that the reason of her death was excessive
bleeding from the head because of the fall and the injury on the neck was not serious in
nature.

RESULTED LITIGATION
Sripakshi was tried at the Session’s Court and was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 for the offence of murdering Virupakshi and was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Sripakshi appealed before the High Court and the Court set aside the
conviction for murder, and convicted her under section 304-II and sentenced her to ten years
of rigorous imprisonment.

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

Thus, in light of above stated facts and circumstances, the petition has been filed by Sripakshi
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court for exemption and the State has filed special leave petition
for convicting Sripakshi under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

* Both the parties are filing appeals before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, but for the sake of
representation in the format of the competition, Sripakshi will be addressed as Appellant and
State will be addressed as Respondent.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

[ISSUE I]. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD BE GRANTED BY

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO THE PRESENT PETITION UNDER
ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

[ISSUE II]. WHETHER SRIPAKSHI SHOULD BE CONVICTED UNDER

SECTION 302 OR 304 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THE SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO
THE PRESENT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

The argument was in negative as firstly, the Supreme Court has self-imposed restrictions and
the special leave should not be granted because the alternate remedies, have not been
exhausted yet. Further, there are no sufficient grounds for allowing this special leave petition.
The Apex court would not entertain the matter which is filed as an abuse of process of court
and intent to harass the opposite party.

2: SRIPAKSHI SHOULD BE CONVICTED UNDER SECTION 302 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.

Sripakshi should be convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence her to
life imprisonment since her act fulfils the clauses of Section 300 which defines murder. The
act of Sripakshi was a voluntary act. Further, there was a reasonable nexus between her act
and the cause of the victim’s death proving her requisite mens rea through the existence of
knowledge and preparation.

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE[I].WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE SHOULD BE GRANTED BY

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO THE PRESENT PETITION UNDER
ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

1. It is humbly submitted that Art. 136 of Constitution of India vests in the Supreme
Court a plenary Jurisdiction1 and has set self-imposed limits i.e. not to permit
invocation of this power except in exceptional circumstances.2 The present special
leave petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under article 136 of the Constitution
should not be allowed as firstly, [A] the Supreme Court has self-imposed restrictions
and Secondly, [B]there are no sufficient grounds for allowing this special leave
petition.

[I.A] THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS.

2. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the remedy as contemplated
under Art. 136 must be exercised in exceptional situations,3it is an exceptional power
to be exercised sparingly, with caution and care and to remedy extra ordinary situation
occasioning gross failure of justice.4 It is further submitted that it’s in the nature of the
Extraordinary power conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 136 [A.1]. That the
Alternate Remedy has not been exhausted yet [A.2].

[I.A.1]THATIT
ISTHENATUREOFEXTRAORDINARYPOWERCONFERRED
ONTHESUPREMECOURTBYARTICLEI36OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

3. It is the humble submission before the Hon’ble Court that the Supreme Court has very
wide power under article 136 of the Constitution and it invests Supreme Court with a

1
Mahendra Saree Emporium (2) v. G.V Srinava Murthy, AIR 2004 SC 4289 (India).
2
DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 5756 (eds. 8th 2009).
3
Magan Bhai Ishwar Bhai Patel v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr., AIR 1969 SC 784 (India).
4
Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 (India).

15 | P a g e
 plenary Jurisdiction.5The Supreme Court does not grant leave to appeal in the
criminal matters liberally.6 It does so only when exceptional and special
circumstances exist, substantial and grave injustice has been done, and the case in
question present features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision
appealed against, or there has been a departure from legal procedure such as vitiates
the whole trial or if the finding of fact “were such as were shocking” to the judicial
conscience of the Court7. Furthermore, The Apex Court doesn’t allow facts to be
reopened or act as a court to review evidence.8
4. It is a well-established law that Article 136 neither confers on anyone the right to
invoke the jurisdiction nor inhibits anyone from invoking the court’s jurisdiction, it
only confers a discretionary power of widest amplitude on this court to be exercised
for satisfying the demand of justice.9 The Exercise of the power of the Supreme Court
is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may invoke it.10
5. Therefore, in the present matter the petition is neither based on abovementioned
grounds on which the extraordinary jurisdiction of the apex court should be invoked
nor it contains any question of law of general public importance as Hon’ble High
Court has convicted the appellant under Section 304(II) of Indian Penal Code (herein
after “IPC”) and the appellant is praying before the Hon’ble Supreme Court for
acquittal which is solely based on the question of facts which cannot be a sole ground

5
Engineering A. Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 874 (India).
6
MP JAIN & SN JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1980 (Dr. Shakil Ahmed Khan) eds. 7th ed. 2011.
7
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169 (India); See: Sadhu Singh v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 271(India);
Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1956 SC 757 (India); Ram Jag v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974
SC 606 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ballabh Das, AIR 1985 SC 1384 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram
Swarup, AIR 1988 SC 1028 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Pheeru Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1205 (India); Mahesh
v. State of Delhi, AIR 1991 SC 1108 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anil Singh, AIR 1998 SC 1998 (India).
8
Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 79 (India); Gokul v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1972 SC 209
(India); Krishna Lal v. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1252 (India); Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, AIR
1987 SC 877 (India); Suresh Chandra Babri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420 (India); Arjun v. State of
Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 2507 (India).
9
Ashok Nagar Welfare association v. R.K. Sharma, AIR 2002 SC 335 (India); See: L.M. Navakhare v. K.E.
Tapar, AIR 1993 SC 2596 (India); Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustee, Port of Mumbai, AIR 2004
SC 1815 (India); Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda (2007) 13 SCC 803
(India); Durga Shankar v. Raghu Raj, (2010) 9 SCC 73 (India).
10
Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Setharathnam, AIR 1979 SC 1284 (India); See: Food Corporation of India v. Makhan
Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1406 (India); Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, (2002) 4 SCC 666 (India);
State of A.P. v. Prameela Modi, (2006) 13 SCC 147 (India).

16 | P a g e
 11
to grant the special leave and the substantial justice has been done by the High
Court.12 There is no need of invoking the extraordinary power of the Apex Court.
[I.A.2] THAT THE ALTERNATE REMEDY HAS NOT BEEN
EXHAUSTD YET.

6. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the power of Supreme Court to
hear appeals under Article 136 is plenary and there is nothing imposing restriction or
qualification on this jurisdiction, yet the very extensiveness of its power has led the
court to set some limits in itself subject to which it exercises its appellate power.13
The Supreme Court will not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction unless the appellant
has exhausted all other remedies open to him.14 The Court has imposed this restriction
because of the heavy rush of cases flowing to it.15 The Special Leave may be refused
where the petition is intended to bypass the jurisdiction of High Court.16
7. It is humbly submitted that in the present matter there is existence of alternate
remedies in the form of letter patent appeal i.e. appeal to the larger bench but the
appellant has directly approached the Apex Court under article 136 and it has been
reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Alternative remedy is a bar unless there
was complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to act impugned,17 Letters
Patent Appeal can be sought by the Appellant against the order of the High Court. It
was held that normally, Special Leave against an order will not be granted unless the
remedy of Letters Patent Appeal has not been availed.18
8. It is a well-established law that Supreme Court would refuse to entertain appeal under
article 136 where efficacious alternate remedy is available to the petitioner by way of

11
Aher Raja Khima v. Dharkoli, AIR 1956 SC 217 (India).
12
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, AIR 1989 SC 1972 (India); See: State of H.P. v.
Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277 (India); Yallawwa v. Shantavva, AIR 1997 SC 35 (India);
Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar of Co-operative Society, AIR 1974 SC 1896 (India).
13
MP JAIN & SN JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2006 (Dr. Shakil Ahmed Khan eds. 7th ed. 2011).
14
Punjab Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Kerwal Singh Dhillon, (2008) 10 SCC 128 (India); See: Union of
India v. Harbans Singh Tuli and Sons Builders Private Limited, (2008) 12 SCC 520 (India).
15
Supra note 13.
16
State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra, (1996) 9 SCC 309 (India); See: Mulk Raj v. New Kenilwoth Hotels Ltd.,
AIR 2000 SC 1917 (India).
17
A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1906 (India).
18
Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1097 (India); See: Penu Balakrishna Iyer & Ors v. Sri Ariya
M. Ramaswami Iyer & Ors., A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 195 (India).

17 | P a g e
 filing a revision in the High Court19 and where the litigation has not availed himself of
the ordinary remedies available to him at law.20In the present matter appellant has the
alternate remedy to invoke the jurisdiction of Hon’ble high Court under article 227 of
the Constitution of India as revisional jurisdiction.
9. Therefore, the special Leave should not be granted to the present special leave petition
because the alternate remedy has not been exhausted yet and as per the
abovementioned law the appellant has efficacious alternate remedy as revisional
jurisdiction under article 227 or Letter Patent appeal which the appellant has
overlooked and directly approached the Hon’ble Apex Court.

[I.B] THAT THERE EXIST NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR ALLOWING THIS SPECIAL
LEAVE PETITION.
10. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Supreme Court has laid various
principles on which only it will be justifiable for the apex court to interfere in the
criminal matters decided by the Hon’ble High Courts.21 Moreover, the Court does not
interfere with concurrent findings “unless the findings are vitiated by errors of law or
the conclusion reached by the courts are so patently opposed to well-established
principles as to amount to miscarriage of justice”.22
11. It is a well-established law that court interferes where question of law involved and
the conclusion is perverse23 or where the interest of justice so requires.24The Apex

19
Nirma Ltd. v. Lurgi Lentjes Energietechnik Gmbh & Anr., (2002) 5 SCC 520 (India); See: Shyam Sunder
Agrawal & Co. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 132 (India); ITI Ltd. v. Seimens Public Communication, (2002)
5 SCC 510 (India).
20
Ramsaran v. CTO, AIR 1962 SC 1326 (India).
21
State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 (India); See: State of U.P. v. Ram Sanjivan, (2010) 1 SCC 529
(India); State of U.P. v. Guru Charan (2010) 3 SCC 721 (India); State of U.P. v. Harihar Bux Singh, (1975) 3
SCC 167 (India); State of U.P. v. Gopi, 1980 Supp. SCC 160 (India); State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar, (1979) 3
SCC 1 (India).
22
Supra note 13.
23
Sabhu Das v. State of Assam, (2010) 10 SCC 374 (India); See: Mathura Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR 1992 SC 49 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Dan Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1654 (India); Ramanbhai
Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 1 SCC 359 (India); Milind Bhagwanrao Godse v. State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 3 SCC 699 (India).
24
Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1321 (India); See: State of U.P. v. Sheo Ram, AIR 1974 SC
2267 (India); Dulichand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1975 SC 1960 (India); Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor,
AIR 1998 SC 1074 (India); Rafiq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 96 (India); Balak Ram v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 2165 (India); Lala Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 1185 (India); Nain
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 2 SCC 43 (India); Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1995 SC 1219
(India); Lal Mandi v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1995 SC 2265 (India); Ram Sanjiwan Singh v. State of Bihar,
(1996) 8 SCC 552 (India); S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2184 (India); Nayudu
Srihari v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 10 SCC 393 (India); State of Punjab v. Jugraj Singh, (2002) 3 SCC
234 (India); Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 3 SCC 327 (India); State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed

18 | P a g e
 Court will not look upon when the sentence passed by the lower courts unless there is
an illegality or it is harsh or unjust in findings of facts and circumstances or where the
High Court does not exercise its discretion judicially on the question of sentence,25 or
it is vitiated by some glaring infirmity in the appraisal of evidence 26 or is perverse in
the sense that no reasonable person would have come to that conclusion.27
Furthermore, the fact that another view could also have been taken of the evidence on
record would not justify interference with the judgement of High Court.28
12. Furthermore, The Apex court would not entertain an application for special leave
where the appellant did not move the High Court for certificate under article
134(1)(c).29The Supreme Court will not look into the matter where from the admitted
facts, it is clear that the complaint is filed as an abuse of process of court with the
intent to harass the person needlessly without any prima facie case, the complaint will
be quashed as “frivolous”.30
13. Therefore, from the abovementioned principles established by the Supreme Court in
various judgement from time to time of Special Leave Petition in the criminal matters
and the substantive justice done by the Hon’ble High Court of Maharashtra which
neither violated any aforementioned principle nor shocks the conscience of the
Supreme Court in its findings the present special leave petition filed by the appellant
for the exemption from Section. 304(II) of IPC should not be granted the special leave
by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Shaikh Babjan, (2009) 14 SCC 267 (India); Gajula Surya Prakasarao v. State of A.P., (2010) 1 SCC 88;
Surendra Pal v. State of U.P., (2010) 9 SCC 399 (India).
25
State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722 (India); See: Nathusingh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2783 (India); Kodavandi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 467 (India).
26
Deputy of Chief Controller v. Kosalram, AIR 1971 SC 1283 (India); See: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sahai, AIR
1981 SC 1442 (India); State of U.P. v. Hari Ram, AIR 1983 SC 1081 (India); Rajesh Kumar v. Dharamvir,
(1997) 4 SCC 496 (India); Satbir v. Surat Singh, AIR 1997 SC 1160 (India); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Abdul,
AIR 1997 SC 2512 (India); Anvaruddin v. Shakoor, AIR 1990 SC 1242 (India); Gauri Shankar Sharma v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1990 SC 709 (India); Jayabalan v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (2010) 1 SCC 199;
Chikkarangaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 17 SCC 497 (India).
27
State of M.P. v. Ramesh, (2009) 11 SCC 330 (India); See: State of Punjab v. Atma Singh (2009) 15 SCC 45
(India).
28
State of U.P. v. Jashoda Nandan Singh, AIR 1974 SC 753 (India).
29
State of U.P. v. Boota Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 31 (India).
30
Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad Sinha, 1993 Supp-1 SCC 499 (India); See: Vijaya Rao v. State of
Rajasthan, (2005) 7 SCC 69 (India).

19 | P a g e
ISSUE[II].WHETHER SRIPAKSHI SHOULD BE CONVICTED UNDER
SECTION 302 OR 304 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE?

[II.A] THE ACT OF THE APPELLANT LEAD TO THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM.
14. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the act of the appellant lead to
the death of the victim. The same can be substantiated by two-fold argument. Firstly,
[A.1]there was a voluntary act by the Appellant Secondly, [A.2] there is a nexus
between the act of the appellant and the death of the victim

[II.A.1] THERE WAS A VOLUNTARY ACT BY THE APPELLANT.

15. It is contended that, to decide whether case is of murder or culpable homicide not
amounting to murder firstly it has to be proved that the accused has done an act by
doing which he caused the death of another.31 Secondly, it must be established that a
bodily injury is present.32 In the present case, the respondents contend that the
appellant threw a knife blow on the victim’s neck33 voluntarily, as the victim stated
that she will call the police, if the jewellery is not returned.34
16. This voluntary act of lurching at the victim and giving a knife blow on the neck by the
appellant lead to a bodily injury of the victim. This fulfils one of the elements of a
culpable homicide as mentioned in the Section 29935 i.e. actus reuswhich means any
wrongful act,36 which would amount to the physical conduct of the accused.37

[II.A.2]THERE IS A NEXUS BETWEEN THE ACT OF THE

APPELLANT AND THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM.
17. It is humbly submitted to Hon’ble Supreme Court that the bodily injury of the victim
caused by the knife blow on the neck contributed to death of the victim. ‘But for’ or

31
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 (India); See also, State of Rajasthan v.
Ram Kailash, AIR 2016 SC 634 (India); State of Madhya Pradesh v. Goloo Raikwar and Ors., AIR 2016 SC
1182 (India).
32
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 (India); See also: Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand
[2009] 5 SCR 242 (India); Richhpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi, AIR 2014 SC 3595 (India).
33
Moot Problem for the Preliminary Round, ¶3.
34
Moot Problem for the Preliminary Round, ¶2.
35
Indian Penal Code, 1860.
36
AIYAR, P RAMANATHA, THE LAW LEXICON 49 (2ndeds. 2006).
37
DUNHAM BETH WALSTON, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 52 (6theds. 2011).

20 | P a g e
 factual aspect is an important aspect of criminal law i.e. sine qua non causation and
from the factual causes the law selects the one or ones which are the legal cause 38 It is
humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the key test for legal causation are –
[II.A.2.a] the accused’s act must be a substantial cause. Secondly, [A.2.b] the
accused’s act must be an operating cause of the result39 and [A.2.c] there should be no
novus actus interveniensi.e. a free voluntary act of a third party which renders the
original act no longer a substantial and operating cause of the result.

[II.A.2.a]SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE
18. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the accused’s act must be a
substantial cause of the result. It must contribute to the end result to a significant
extent40, and not be a ‘slight or trifling link.’41 In the given case the respondents
contend that, the act of blowing the knife on the victim’s neck was the sole reason of
victim stepping backward and falling down from the balcony which resulted in her
death.
19. Furthermore, in R v. Nette,42 it was suggested that it was sufficient if the accused’s
act had been a more than negligible contribution. In the present case the act of bolting
the main door and running away after injuring the victim by the appellant was
substantial enough to cause the victim’s death.

[II.A.2.b]OPERATING CAUSE
20. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the accused’s act must be
an operating cause of the result.43 The substantial cause test for causation asks
whether the act of the accused is substantial and operating cause of death. If at the
time of death, the original wound is still an operating cause, then the death can
properly be said to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is
also operating.44

38
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW TEXTS CASES AND MATERIAL 87(eds. 6th 2014).
39
R v. Benge (1865) 4 F&F 504.
40
Cheshire [1991] 3 All Er 670 (CA).
41
Kimsey [1996] Crim LR 35 (CA).
42
2001 SCC 788 (India).
43
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW TEXTS CASES AND MATERIAL 88(eds. 6th 2014).
44
BRENDA MIDSON, TEACHING CAUSATION IN CRIMINAL LAW: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE POLICY ANALYSTS112
(2010); See: R v. Smith [1959] 2 All Er 193; Sushil Ansal and Ors. v. State of Delhi and Ors., AIR 1998 SC
451 (India).

21 | P a g e
 21. The respondents contend that the post mortem reveals that the injury on the neck was
not serious but the victim died because of excessive bleeding from both the injuries45
therefore, it can be said that death of the victim was caused due to the injury on the
neck, it being the operating cause.

[II.A.2.c] THERE WAS NO ‘NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS’.

22. It is humbly submitted that, to amount to a novus actus interveniens the act of a third
party must have rendered the accused’s original act no longer operating and
substantial cause. In the present case the appellant might contend that the act of the
victim lead to the breaking of chain for which the Court of Appeal suggested that the
court should consider whether the victim’s response ‘might have been expected’ as a
result of the defendant’s act and if it was then it was caused by the defendant. In the
present case the act of stepping backward after the knife blow46 was a natural reaction
to a situation like that, and therefore the fall of the victim from the balcony was
caused due to the accused’s act.
23. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal and Ors. v. State of Delhi
and Ors.47 cited that the question to be asked is whether an act or a series of acts by
the accused is or are so connected with the event that it or they must be regarded as
having a sufficiently substantial casual effect which subsisted up to the happening of
the event, without being spent or without being in the eyes of the law sufficiently
interrupted by some other act or event.48
24. The respondents are of the opinion that apart from the victim and the accused there
was no other party present during the incident in dispute, therefore there was no
possibility of the event being disrupted by someone which could shift the blame away
from the accused.

[II.B] THE APPELLANT COMMITTED MURDER WITH FULL INTENTION AND

KNOWLEDGE UNDER SECTION 300(3) OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE.
25. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that all four conditions
enumerated under the said section may not necessarily co-exist, so as to prove an

45
Moot Problem for the Preliminary Round, ¶4.
46
Supra note 33.
47
AIR 1998 SC 254 (India).
48
R v. Hallett [1969] SASR 141.

22 | P a g e
 offence of murder. It would be sufficient for the prosecution to establish any one of
the conditions enumerated under the section against an offender, for punishing him
for an offence of murder.49
26. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the appellant had full
intention and knowledge of the consequences of her actions, and therefore has
committed the offence of murder under §30050. This can be asserted through three-
folded arguments. Firstly, [II.B.1] there was preparation, secondly [II.B.2] there was
mens rea and the consequences were foreseeable, and thirdly [II.B.3] the injuries
were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death.

[II.B.1] THERE WAS PREPARATION.

27. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the preparation consists in
devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of
offence.51 A culprit first intends to commit the offence, then makes preparation for
committing it and thereafter attempts to commit the offence. 52 In the present case the
convict had kept a sharp knife in the out pocket of her purse53 to be used as an
instrument to commit the offence, which shows that there was a preparation. The
actus reuswas completed when the same instrument was used for injuring the victim.
28. Since the law gives a lot of importance proving the intent of the accused, there have
been some tests to determine it by checking the preparation taken.54 Moreover, an act
done with the intent to commit that crime, and forming part of a series of acts which
would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted. The point at which
such a series of acts begins cannot be defined, but depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case.55 Intention to kill a person must be determined having regard to
the factual scenario involved in each case.56Any fact is relevant which shows or
constitutes a motive or preparation for any relevant fact.57According to the

49
Salim and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, 1999 CrLJ 1419 (Raj) (India).
50
Supra note 35.
51
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 713 (India).
52
Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1698 (India).
53
Supra note 33.
54
Pran Dutt v. State of U.P., (2006) 4 SCC 425 (India).
55
Supra note 51.
56
Benjamin v. State, (2008) 3 SCC 745 (India).
57
§ 8, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

23 | P a g e
 circumstances of the case at hand the act of keeping the instrument in the purse which
was used to commit the offence would determine the beginning of the preparation.
[II.B.2] THERE WAS ‘MENS REA’.
29. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in several cases intention to
kill was held to be evident from the facts. When injuries inflicted on vital parts of the
body with sharp edged instruments, the intention to kill was held to be proved. 58 In
the present an attack on the neck of the victim was made, which is a vital part of the
body,59 which indicates intention.
30. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that now that it has been established that
neck is a vital part of the body, the ‘mens rea’ of the convict will be substantiated
through a three-fold argument, which are – [II.B.2.a] the convict had intention to kill,
and [II.B.2.b] there was knowledge of the consequences.

[II.B.2.a] INTENTION TO KILL.

31. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that criminal liability should be
determined by looking inside the mind of the defendant and considering his or her
intention or foresight.60 The safest way of approach to the interpretation and
application of ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ is to keep
in focus the key words used in various clauses of Ss. 29961 and 300.62
32. It is further submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the manner of causing
injuries, the nature of the injuries, the part of the body where they were inflicted, the
weapon used and the conduct of the accused are relevant factors in determining
whether the offence committed is one of murder or culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.63 In the present case a sharp knife was used to injure a vital part of the
victim64, which led to the victim falling down from the balcony,65 after which the
convict bolted the main door and ran away due to which first-aid could not be

58
Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1972 SC 2574 (India); See also: Prabhu v. State of M.P., (1991) Cr LJ
1373 (SC) (India).
59
Kuldeep Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2001) 4 SCC 589 (India).
60
JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW TEXTS CASES AND MATERIAL 88(eds. 6th 2014).
61
Supra note 35.
62
Ibid.
63
Karu Masik v. State of Bihar, 2001 Cri LJ 2615 (India).
64
Supra note 59.
65
Supra note 33.

24 | P a g e
 provided to the victim.66 This action of the convict portrays that the convict intended
the end result.
Furthermore, the difference between §29967 and clause 3 of §30068 is one of degree of
probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly,
it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide
is of the gravest, medium, or the lowest degree.69 In the present case the convict chose
to attack the victim at the upstairs balcony70 as she knew that there was a high degree
of probability for victim to fall down during the attack is which shows her intention to
kill.
[II.B.2.b] THERE WAS KNOWLEDGE.
33. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that knowledge is an awareness
of the consequences of an act.71 The demarcating line between knowledge and
intention is thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things.72
Knowledge is a strong word and imports a certainty and not merely probability.73
34. Furthermore, as a general rule, every sane man is ‘presumed to intend’ the necessary
or natural and probable consequences of his acts.74 In the given case there might nor
be a full probability of the victim falling down but the grave consequences of using a
sharp instrument to give a blow on the neck were foreseeable, therefore there is no
scope of assuming that the convict could not foresee the consequences of her actions.

[II.B.3] THE INJURIES WERE SUFFICIENT IN ORDINARY

COURSE OF NATURE.
35. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the view has been
expressed in interpreting the third clause of § 300,75 that not only should the injury be
intentionally inflicted but that the accused should have further intended that it should

66
Ibid.
67
Supra note 35.
68
Ibid.
69
Augustine Saldana v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC (India); See also: Chacko v. State of Kerala, (2012)
12 SCC 269 (India).
70
Supra note 33.
71
Jayaraj v. State of TN, AIR 1976 SC 1519 (India); See also: Sachidanand Banerjee v. Sita Ram Agarwal, AIR
1966 SC 1955 (India).
72
Basudev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 (India).
73
Ram Jolaha v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Pat 406 (India).
74
K.D. GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 728 (eds. 2th 2013).
75
Supra note 35.

25 | P a g e
 be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause to death. 76 Furthermore, It is
culpable homicide if the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is likely to cause death,
it is murder, if such injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Therefore, it has to be proved as to why the circumstances in the present case ore
‘ordinary course of nature.’
36. Even a single injury might be under the circumstances sufficient to cause death
depending upon the nature of injury and weapon used. The court said it cannot be held
as a general rule that every case of single injury would show absence of intention to
kill. 77 In the present case the weapon used was sharp in nature and lead to two
injuries on the victim body. One of them was intentionally inflicted and the other
being caused due to the infliction of the first injury. Furthermore, in Brij Bhukhan v.
State of Uttar Pradesh78, there was no injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. It was, however, pointed out that it was open to the Court to look
into the nature of the injuries and if they were cumulatively sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, clause 3rdly of Section 300 was applicable.
37. The expression "bodily injury" in Clause 3rdly includes also its plural, so that the
clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused
are cumulatively sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of nature, even if
none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency. 79 In the present
case the injuries caused excessive bleeding and even after medical care the victim
could not be saved, therefore cumulatively both the injuries cause death of the victim
and hence it can be said that they were sufficient in ordinary course of nature.

[II.C] GRAVE PROVOCATION CAN NOT BE USED AS A DEFENCE.

38. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the authors of the Code80
have summarized the object and purpose of the exception in the Code and justification
for a lenient punishment in case of murder committed on grave and sudden
provocation.81 The Code has listed under Exception 1 to section 30082, the

76
Supra note 32.
77
Hari Prasad vs State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2002 SC 478 (India).
78
AIR 2015 SC 987 (India).
79
Supra note 31.
80
Supra note 35.
81
Supra note 74.
82
Supra note 35.

26 | P a g e
 circumstances under which the offence of murder will be reduced to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.
39. Before proving the degree of the gravity of the provocation the accused person
claiming the benefit of this exception must prove that he received provocation.83 In
India, words and gestures may also under certain circumstances cause grave and
sudden provocation so as to bring his act within the First Exception. The act of the
victim of suspecting the victim and asking her to return the jewelry twice84 can
amount to provocation.
40. However, the respondent humbly submits to the Hon’ble Court that the appellant still
cannot use the defence of grave and sudden provocation given under the Exception 1
of §300. This will be substantiated by disproving the fulfillment of the following
elements of the defence: Firstly, [C.1] the provocation must be grave85, secondly
[C.2] the provocation must be sudden86, and thirdly [C.3] the offender, by reason of
the said provocation, should have been deprived of his power of self-control.87

[II.C.1] THE PROVOACATION MUST BE GRAVE.

41. Relying on the judgment of Mahmood v. State of U.P.88, in which V.G. Oak, J stated
that: “…A good test for deciding whether a certain provocation was grave or not is
this: ‘Is a reasonable man likely to self-control as a result of such provocation?’ if the
answer is in the affirmative, the provocation will be classed as grave. If the answer is
in the negative, the provocation is not grave…” It is contended that, in the present
case there were only two conversations about the stolen jewellery between the victim
and the convict89, therefore contention like constant harassment may lead to
deprivation of the power of self-control amounting to grave provocation90 cannot be
raised.
42. Furthermore, what a reasonable man will do in certain circumstance depends upon the
customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc. in short, the cultural, social and

83
Mahmood v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 All 538 (India); See: Pathip Selvan S/o Sugumaran v. Public
Prosecutor, (2012) SGCA 44 (India).
84
Supra note 34.
85
Supra note 74.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Supra note 83.
89
Supra note 34.
90
Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008 SC 1.

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 emotional background of the society to which an accused belongs.91 The respondents
are of the opinion that, since both the victim and the convict were childhood friends92
and therefore were accustomed to each other’s manners and emotional background.
Hence, the victim’s words and action cannot be said to be grave provocation to the
extent that there was a reason for the convict to lose her self-control.

[II.C.2] THE PROVOCATION MUST BE SUDDEN.

43. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the word ‘sudden’ involves
two elements. Firstly, the provocation must be unexpected. Secondly, the interval
between the provocation and the homicide be brief.93
44. The test of the effect of provocation on a reasonable man, so that an unusually
excitable or pugnacious individual is not entitled to rely on provocation which would
not have led an ordinary person to act as he did94 has to be applied. The test considers
two factors: (C.2.a) Whether a sufficient interval has passed to cool down, and (C.2.b)
take into the account the instrument with which the homicide was affected.

(II.C.2.a) Reasonable time had elapsed.

45. It is of particular importance to consider whether a sufficient interval has elapsed
since the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to cool. 95 It is asserted that the
victim made the phone call to the convict around 5:00 P.M. and invited her to the
house at 7:00 P.M. The convict had two hours of time to cool down which is
sufficient for any reasonable man to cool down, therefore it can be said that the
provocation was not sudden.

(II.C.2.b) Instrument withwhich thehomicide Was affected.

46. It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that, to retort, in the heat of passion
induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use

91
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 (India); See: K.D. GAUR, CRIMINAL LAW: COSTS
AND MATERIALS 367-370 (2009).
92
Moot Problem for the Preliminary Round , ¶1.
93
Supra note 91.
94
Rex v. Lesbini, (1914) 3 KB 1116.
95
Ibid; See also: K.D. GAUR, COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 771(eds. 2th 2013).

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 of a deadly instrument. In short, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable
relationship to the provocation, if the offence is to be reduced to manslaughter.96
47. In the present case the convict had reasonable time to cool down but she still chose to
carry a sharp knife in the out pocket of her purse97 which gave her easy access, which
indicated preparation and intention, therefore the crime cannot be reduced to
manslaughter.

[II.C.3] THE PROVOCATION MUST DEPRIVE THE OFFENDER

OF SELF-CONTROL.
48. It is humbly submitted to Hon’ble Supreme Court that, the whole doctrine relating to
provocation depends on the fact that it causes, or may cause, a sudden and temporary
loss of self-control, whereby malice, which is the formation of an intention to kill or
to inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived.98
49. Secondly, the act which caused death should have been done during the continuance
of the state of mind to temporary loss of self-control caused by the provocation, and
before there was time for passion to cool and for reason regain dominion over the
mind.99 Furthermore, the question of loss of self-control comes up indirectly in
deciding whether a particular provocation was grave or not, so if it is proved that the
accused did receive grave and sudden provocation, the Court is to assume that
homicide was committed while the accused was deprived of the power of self-
control.100
50. In the present case the provocation was neither grave nor sudden, therefore there was
no scope of the convict losing her power of self-control, therefore the Hon’ble Court
cannot assume that the homicide was committed without any intention and knowledge

96
Ibid.
97
Supra note 33.
98
Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1946 AC 588 (598).
99
Supra note 93.
100
Supra note 74.

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 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, reasons given and
authorities cited, this hon’ble court may be pleased to:

1. Dismiss the present special leave petition, along with exemplary cost on account of lack of
material substance.
2. Convict Sripakshi under section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sentence her to life
imprisonment.
3. Set aside the impugned judgement of the Hon’ble High Court under article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

And/ or any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant in the interest of
justice, equity and good conscience.

And for this act of kindness the petitioner shall forever be duty bound.

Date: **

Place: New Delhi

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 Sd/-
Counsel on behalf of Respondent(s)

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