DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY OR STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

1. For resolution is the Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO and Preliminary Injunction
2. Petitioner pleads that the petition for certiorari must first be resolved as a continuation of
the civil case by public respondent might be rendered unnecessary in the event that its
petition before this court is resolved in its favor
3. Mere elevation of an interlocutory matter through this court does not merit a suspension of the
proceedings before a public respondent, unless a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the respondent
4. The petitioner is burdened to show a meritorious ground for the issuance of TRO or PI, which the
latter failed to do so
5. The general rule is that the pendency of a special civil action commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a PI or TRO
6. There are exceptions to which, even if there is no PI or TRO, it would be proper for a lower
court to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy
7. The rule on judicial courtesy applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before
a higher court would be rendered moot and moribound as a result of the continuation of the
proceedings in the lower court.
Motion for issuance of TRO or PI is DENIED.

PACIFIC FINANCE VS. EIJI YANAGISAWAA

1. Eiji, a Japanese national filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of bigamy.
He also filed a motion for issuance of a TRO and PI asking Evelyn to be enjoined from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.
2. His applications were held moot since Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily undertook not to dispose
of the properties.
3. Hence, Makati RTC annotated on the title of the Parañaque townhouse unit.
4. Due to Evelyn’s loan of Php500,000 from PAFIN, she executed a real estate mortgage in favor of
PAFIN over the Paranaque townhouse unit.
5. Makati RTC dissolved their marriage and ordered the liquidation of their properties. The Makati
RTC didn’t lift its order on Evelyn’s commitment
6. Eiji filed a complaint against PAFIN and Evelyn for its annulment as it is in violation of the RTC
Makati order.
7. Paranaque RTC ruled against Eiji for the reason that he is a foreign national who cannot possibly
own the mortgaged property.
8. Eiji appealed the RTC’s decision emphasizing that Evelyn made a commitment to him and to the
Makati RTC and such commitment incapacitates her from entering into the REM contract. This was
favored by the CA by annulling the REM executed by Evelyn and PAFIN.
9. They then filed separate motions for reconsideration but were denied. PAFIN filed this petition for
Review.

Issue:
WON the Paranaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue was already
ruled upon by the Makati rtc AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE ca
Ruling:
1. Cojuangco v. Villegas. The various branches of the RTCs having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and
are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their order of judgments
2. Doctrine of judicial stability/non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates an insurmountable barrier
 3. The PRTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the
possibility of conflicting decisions.
4. Jurisprudence holds that all acts done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable. The
party in whose favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of the
offending actions.
5. Order by the Makati RTC is akin to an injunction against the disposition or encumbrance of the
property.
Petition is DENIED.

CONRADO NICART (Prov Gov of Eastern Sama) vs. MA. JOSEFINA C. TITONG AND JOSELITO
ABRUGAR
1. Petition for Review seeking the issuance of a TRO
2. Prior to the end of his term, then Gov. Evardone issued 93 appointments including respondents
Titong and Abrugar which were later confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Appointees
immediately assumed their respective positions.
3. Upon submission of the appointments to the CSCRO, all 93 appoinments were disapproved for
being violative of CSC Memo. Circular no. 16
4. Evardone appealed for the disapproval but was dismissed.
5. Titong and Abrugar requested the assistance of the CSC with their claim for payment of their first
salary which was denied by COA.
6. CSC rendered decision granting the petition, modifying the CSCRO’s ruling and declaring the
appointment of respondents valid on the ground that they are qualified for the positions.
7. The Provincial Government is directed to pay the respondents’ salaries from the time that they
have assumed their respective positions.
8. Petitioner filed before the CA for review and argued that the appointments were violative of CSC
MC 16
9. In view of petitioner’s continued refusal to pay for their salaries despite the service of their writ of
execution, respondents filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus
10. CA rendered a decision granting the petition and ruling that respondents’ appointments are not
valid for having been issued in violation of CSC rules
11. CA consequently held that respondents can no longer claim entitlement to the payment of their
salaries from the government
12. According to the RTC, the non-issuance by the CA of a restraining order or injunction results in the
continued effectivity of the CSC decision in respondents’ favor
Issue:
WON the respondent violated the Doctrine of Judicial Stability
Ruling:
1. Ordinarily, the non-issuance by the CA of an injunction or restraining order would make the CSC
resolution executory pending appeal
2. What the RTC failed to take into account is the fact that the propriety of the very directives is
reliant on the CA’s resolution and that judicial courtesy dictates that it suspend its
proceedings and await the CA’s resolution
3. When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well aware of the pendency in the CA.
nevertheless, the trial court implied that the petition for review pending before the CA will not
affect or be affected by the petition for mandamus.
4. Further held that it is an accepted principle that “quasi-judicial bodies like CSC are better
equipped in handling cases like this
5. The trial court incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without
erroneously disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy
 6. Enforcement of the CSC resolution is no longer proper and necessary, affirming the CA’s
ruling that the appointments were not valid, making the issue of enforcing the CSC reso
pending appeal, moot and academic.
a. One that ceases to prevent a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical value
Petition is hereby GRANTED.

SARA LEE PH VS. EMILINDA MACATLANG

1. Controversy stemmed when Aris filed a Notice of Permanent Closure before the DOLE and caused
the displacement of 5,984 employees.
2. Thereafter, FAPI was incorporated. This prompted the former Aris employees to file a case for
illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris. FAPI, SLC, SLP
impleaded as defendants.
3. LA held that the employees were illegally dismissed and awarded them monetary benefits
amounting to 3.4b, composed of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages
4. The corporations filed their appeal with motion to reduce appeal bond to NLRC. They posted a 4.5
million bond to which the NLRC granted and issued an order directing to post an additional 4.5m
amounting to the total posted bond of 9million.
5. Former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang filed a petition for review before the
CA insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to the failure of the Corporations to post the
correct amount of the bond.
6. While the case was still pending before the CA, the NLRC prematurely issued an order
setting aside the LA’s decision and remanding the case to the forum of origin.
7. CA proceeded to reverse and set aside the NLRC Resolution and ordered the Corporations to post
an additional appeal bond of 1billino.
8. SC modified CA’s decision directing the Corporations to post 725m within 10 days from the receipt
of the decision, nullifying the NLRC resolution
9. Hence, this is a motion for reconsideration with urgent petition with the contention that there was
no legal impediment for the NLRC to issue its resolution
Issue:
WON NLRC’s Resolution vacating the LA’s decision would render moot the appeal filed before CA
Ruling:
1. Yes.
2. Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club “the principle of judicial courtesy to justify the
suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even without an injunctive writ or order
from the higher court. We pronounced that due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and
ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot
exactly what was before this court.
3. We held that the principle of judicial courtesy applies only if there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribound as a result of the
continuation of the proceedings in the lower court
4. ITCAB, the ruling of the NLRC would moot the appeal filed before the higher courts because the
issue involves the appeal bond which is an indispensable requirement to the perfection of the
appeal before the NLRC. Unless the issue is resolved, the NLRC should be precluded form
ruling on the merits on the case. This is the essence of judicial courtesy.
Motion for Reconsideration denied.

LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

HEIRS OF FELICIANO TIMBOL VS. PNB
1. Karrich Holdings based in Hong Kong and owned by Felino Timbol Jr., applied with PNB
International Finance Limited for credit facilities.
2. KAE, a sole proprietorship based in the Philippines and also owned by Timbol acted as co-
borrower. The credit facilities were granted in the total amount of USD 850,000 or Php 22.7m
3. Timbol executed real estate mortgages over 9 different parcels of real estate. He discovered that
the amounts annotated as mortgaged added up to Php100m.
4. Timbol signed several Promissory notes attesting to availments.
5. PNB sent a demand letter advising them about their total outstanding obligation which totaled
P38M
6. Timbol thus requested for additional time to settle the obligation.
7. PNB caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties claiming that it violated the terms of the
real estate mortgages. As of the date of the foreclosure, the obligation amounted to P42M
8. PNB was allegedly the highest bidder at the public auction sale with a bid price of P35m.
9. Timbol filed suit against PNB for annulment of the real estate mortgage, foreclosure and auction
sale. Prayed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against PNB
10. RTC granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and denied PNB’s motion for
reconsideration
11. PNB elevated the RTC’s order all the way to the Supreme Court which would ultimately nullify and
set aside the same.
12. The RTC declared null and void the foreclosure of mortgage made by the defendant bank.
13. PNB elevated the case to the CA who reversed RTC’s decision. Timbol died and was substituted by
his heirs, herein petitioners.
14. In the same decision, the court upheld PNB’s argument that Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3 does not apply, the extrajudicial foreclosure was proper.
15. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence this petition for review.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in applying the Decision of the Court in PNB v. Timbol
Ruling:
1. No. Petition denied for lack of merit.
2. The CA correctly applied the law of the case doctrine. In PNB v. Timbol, PNB brought a petition for
certiorari to set aside the order that issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The court struck down
this order holding that the order was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
3. The Court found that Spouses Timbol acknowledged that they had an outstanding obligation with
PNB and simply requested more time to pay.
4. The Court also held that the EJF of the mortgage was proper, since it was done in accordance with
the terms of the REM.
5. This court is bound by its earlier pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol
6. Law of the case means whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or
decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal
of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong.
7. The doctrine applies when:
a. A question is passed upon by an appellate court
b. The appellate court remands the case to the lower court
8. The doctrine of the law of the case is necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same cause upon any and every subsequent appeal.
9. Thus, questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regard as the law
of the case on a subsequent appeal.
DBP vs. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP
1. Respondent Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from petitioner DBP.
2. Petitioner required respondent to put up a cash equity of P1.4m for the construction of the
buildings and other improvements on the resort complex.
3. The loan was released in several installments which respondent used to cover the additional
improvements.
4. Petitioner found that Guarina had not completed the construction works and demanded that
respondent expedite the completion and warned that it would initiate foreclosure proceedings
should they not comply.
5. The non-action and objection of respondent led DBP to initiate extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, which gave its clients and patrons the impression that business operation had
slowed down and that the resort had closed.
6. Guarina sued DBP in the RTC to stop the mortgage foreclosure. While DBP moved for its dismissal,
stating that the mortgaged properties had already been sold to satisfy respondent’s obligation.
7. Respondent amended the complaint to seek the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and
cancellation of certificate of sale.
8. DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was granted. Guarina assailed RTC’s
decision to CA on certiorari, which was dismissed.
9. DBP sought the implementation of the order for the issuance of the writ of possession, which was
granted by the RTC on June 1982.
10. On January 6, 1998, RTC ruled in respondent’s favor – rendered the extrajudicial sale as null and
void.
Issue:
WON the CA adhered to the usual course of judicial proceedings in deciding the case in accordance with
the law of the case doctrine
Ruling:
1. No, law of the case did not apply.
2. LOTC is the opinion delivered on a former appeal and means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the LOTC, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
3. ITCAB, the proceeding on DBP’s application for issuance of the writ of possession was entirely
independent from the judicial demand for specific performance.
4. The former case, being an interlocutory appeal, was not at all intertwined with any legal issue
5. The ruling in the case of possession did not settle any question of law involved because this case
for specific performance was not a continuation of the main case.
6. The court affirms the decision of the CA.

PCI JIMMY M. FORTALEZA AND SPO2 FREDDIE NATIVIDAD VS. RAUL M. GONZALES & ELIZABETH
OROLA DESABLAS
1. Lomoljo, Suganob and Salabas were kidnapped in Bacolod and their dead bodies where found in
different places in Negros Oriental.
2. Of the 3 criminal complaints filed, only one was heard. Elmaco found probable cause against
Dongail and Estanislao and 15 others for the death of Salabas. However, Elmaco discharged
Dongail from the criminal complaint.
3. An information for kidnapping with murder was thereafter filed against Estanislao and 15 others
was filed in the RTC of Guihulngan.
4. Justice Sec. Gonzalez modified the resolution of Negros Oriental PRO which found probable cause
against Dongail and Estanislao only.
5. Dongail appealed the resolution before the office of the president which was denied.
 6. Fortaleza and Natividad filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
7. CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. The appellate court held that the
Secretary of Justice has the power of supervision and control over prosecutors and there for can
take cognizance of a case pending before or resolved by the PRO.
Issue:
1. WON public respondents acted with GAD in proceeding with the appeal after the RTC had
acquired jurisdiction over the case, an act which was clearly and unmistakably outside their
powers as it constitute an encroachment upon judicial power
2. WON respondents acted with GAD in disregarding the decision of the CA upholding the power and
authority of the Sec. of Justice in issuing his resolution
Ruling:
1. No, the court does not lose control of the proceedings by reason of a reinvestigation or review
conducted by either the DOJ or office of the pres.
2. Yes, the determination by the CA on the question of the validity of the SOJ resolution should be
considered the law of the case and should remain established in all other steps of the prosecution
process.
3. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal and means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case.
4. Decision of the office of the pres is set aside and case is remanded to SOJ

DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
BENJAMIN TING V. CARMEN VELEZ-TING
1. After being married for more than 18 years to petitioner, respondent filed a petition before the
RTC of Cebu, praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the FC.
She claimed that the petitioner suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage which only became manifest thereafter.
2. She alleged that her husband was an excessive drinker, compulsive gambler, violent, immature
and irresponsible for failing to provide financial support to their family. Petitioner denied being
psychologically incapacitated.
3. During the trial, the respondent presented their former nanny Susan Wasawas and a psychiatrist,
Dr. Oñate who confirmed the respondent’s claims of her husband’s psychological incapacity. For
his part, petitioner presented Dr. Obra, as his expert witness.
4. The lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
null and void under Art. 36
5. Petitioner appealed to the CA and reversed the RTC’s ruling. It stated that no proof was adduced to
support the conclusion that he was psychologically incapacitated since the conclusion was based
only on theories, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals & RPH v. CA &
Molina
6. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be
applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated 5 years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC. She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively
as it would counter to the principle of stare decisis.
7. CA denied the motion for having been filed beyond the prescribed period.
8. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with this court which granted the petition and directed
CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.
9. On review, CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling, thus, issued an amended decision
reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.
Issues:
WON the rule on stare decisis was violated by the CA when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases
Ruling:
1. Yes, the principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established
by the Court in its final decisions. Once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. The principle is entrenched in Art. 8 of the CC
2. Lambino vs. COMELEC, the doctrine of stare decisis was elucidated. The doctrine has 2 strains;
vertical & horizontal. The former deals with the duty of the lower courts to apply decisions of the
higher courts to cases involving same facts. Whereas the latter requires that the high courts must
follow its own precedents.
3. Courts follow the stare decisis rule bc:
a. It legitimizes judicial institutions
b. Promotes judicial economy
c. Allows for predictability
4. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where
a. Its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings
b. It cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings
c. Leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress
d. Activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare
decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
5. Leading case is Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which established a 4-pronged test. The court
should:
a. Determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability
b. Consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation
c. Determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule
no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine
d. Find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or justification
6. The interpretation or construction of a law constitutes a part of the law as of the date the
statute is enacted. Only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively.
7. Thus, petition for review on certiorari is granted.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD INC V. COMELEC

1. PGBI filed to nullify COMELEC resolutions where it delisted PGBI from the registered coalitions
under the party-list system because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and did not
participate in 2007.
2. PGBI sought for accreditation in which the COMELEC denied.
3. PGBI came to this court in its petition for certiorari and was dismissed in light of MINERO v.
COMELEC
4. In MINERO v. COMELEC, applying Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941 the court disqualified MINERO since
petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all
in the 2004 elections. It failed to get at least 2% of the votes cast in the two preceding elections.
COMELEC, therefore is not duty bound to certify it.
5. PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider asserting that it Sec. 6(8) does not apply to its situation,
as it failed to participate and failed to secure the required percentage in only 1 preceding election.
6. Court granted the motion
Issue:
WON the doctrine of stare decisis is applicable in this case pursuant to MINERO v. COMELEC
Ruling:
1. Petition partly impressed with merit.
 2. Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Sec. 6(8) of RA 7941. Hence it cannot sustain PGBIs
delisting from the roster of registered coalitions.
3. The law is clear that the COMELEC upon verified complaint remove or cancel if it:
a. Fails to participate in at least 2 preceding elections
b. Fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in 2 preceding
elections
4. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.
5. The Court grants the petition and accordingly annuls COMELEC reso.

CARMELO F. LAZATIN, MARINO MORALES, TEODORO DAVID & ANGELITA PELAYO VS. HON ANIANO
DISIERTO AS OMBUDSMAN AND SANDIGANBAYAN
1. Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint-affidavit
against petitioners with illegal use of Public Funds
2. In the preliminary investigation, EPIB recommended the filing of 14 counts of each of
Malversation of Public Funds, approved by the Ombudsman; hence 28 information were filed
against the petitioners before the SB.
3. Petitioners recommended to the Ombudsman the dismissal of the case for lack of evidence.
However, Ombudsman rendered the Office of the Legal Affairs to review the OSP resolution.
4. OLA recommended the disapproval of OSP’s resolution and to proved with the trial. This was
adopted by the Ombudsman.
Issue:
WON Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction in
adopting OLA’s recommendation
Ombudsman has no authority to overturn the OSP’s resolution (bc it’s a violation of art 9 sec 13)
Ruling:
1. Acop vs. Office of the Ombudsman
a. The Constitution provides that Ombudsman shall “exercise such other functions or duties
as may be provided by law”
b. OSP is merely a component of the OO and may only act under the supervision and control,
and upon authority of the O.
2. Stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle thigns which are
established) is embodied in Art. 8, NCC
3. The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the SC thereof.
4. The court ruled that abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling
reasons
5. ITCAB, petitioners haven’t shown any strong and compelling reasons not to apply the doctrine
of stare decisis. They have not successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse
of discretion for the Ombudsman
PLDT COMPANY VS. ABIGARIL RAZON ALVAREZ & VERNON RAZON
1. PLDT’s Alternative Calling Patterns Detection Division regularly visits foreign countries to conduct
market research
2. ACPDD bought The Number One prepaid card-marketed to Filipinos in UK for calls in the PH to
make test calls using two telephone lines
3. During the test call, the receiving phone reflected a local telephone number. Upon verification, the
subscriber of the number is Abigail Razon Alvarez from Paranaque City. Further lines are installed
at this address with Abigail and Razon
 4. In its validation test, several telephone numbers were registered in the name of Experto
Phils/Experto Enterprises as calling numbers supposedly from UK.
5. Narciso of the PLDT’s Quality Control Division with the operatives of the PNP conducted an ocular
inspection to the two places in PC and discovered that PLDT telephone lines were connected to
several pieces of equipment.
6. PS Cruz filed an application for a search warrant before the RTC for the crimes of theft and
violation of PD 401. As per PLDT, respondents are engaged in a form of network fraud known as
International Simple Resale, which amounts to theft under RPC.
7. PLDT and PNP filed with the DOJ a joint complaint-affidavit for theft
8. Respondents filed with RTC to quash the search warrants, which was denied. They petitioned for
certiorari with the CA.
9. CA quashed SW A-1 & SW A-2 on the ground that they were issued for “non-existent crimes”
10. CA ruled that the respondents could not have possibly committed the crime of theft because
PLDT’s business (telecommunication services) is not personal properties contemplated
under Art. 308 of the RPC
11. CA denied PLDT’s motion for reconsideration.
12. CA relied on Laurel
Issue:
WON CA erred in relying on Laurel case in deciding the case
Ruling:
Yes
1. Laurel moved to quash the information asserting that ISR activities do not constitute a
crime under PH law. He argued that ISR activity cannot entail taking personal property
because international long distance telephone calls using PLDT telephone lines belong to
the caller himself
2. Business, like services, although are properties, are not proper subjects of theft under RPC
because the same cannot be taken or occupied.
3. Art. 8 NCC states that the decision of the Court form part of the country’s legal system. They
evidence the law’s meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the
laws themselves.
4. Article embodies principle stare decisis that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents embodied in
the decision of the SC.
5. A case is not decided if the court’s decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
6. ITCAB, CA allegedly erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a non-
final ruling.
7. Petition is partially granted.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY vs. NOEL B, PILI

1. LRTA, a government owned and controlled corporation, entered into a 10-year agreement with
Meralco transit Organization.
2. LRTA purchased all the shares of stock of MTOI and renamed it Metro Transit Org.
3. Employees of Metro staged a strike over a bargaining deadlock
4. Respondent Noel B. Pili alleged that he was illegally dismissed
5. LRTA argues that NLRC cannot exercise jurisdiction over it as it is a government-owned and
controlled corporation, supposedly under the authority of CSC.
6. LA ruled in favor of Pili & others
7. LRTA appealed to NLRC and found that there was no illegal dismissal
8. LRTA filed certiorari to the CA which set side the resolution of NLRC and reinstated the decision of
the LA.
Issue:
WON the LA and NLRC have jurisdiction on the case
Ruling:
1. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil cannot be applied. Pili cannot claim to be employed by
LRTA.
2. LRTA is a government-owned and controlled corporation – any allegation of illegal dismissal
against it by tis employees should have been brought to the CSC.
3. LRTA still cannot avoid liability. It is liable as an indirect employer under the law for the
respondents’ separation pay.
4. Accordingly, we find that the application of the doctrine of stare decisis is in order.
5. The basic facts in this petition are the same as those in the case of LRTA v. Mendoza. Thus we
find that LRTA is solidarity liable for the monetary claims of respondents. It is the duty of the
Court to apply the previous ruling in LRTA v. Mendoza in accordance with the doctrine of stare
decisis. Once a case has been decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at
issue, as in the present case, should be decided in the same manner.

EMMANUEL QUINTANAR V. COCA COLA

1. Complainants allege that they are former employees on different dates. Their duties consist of
distributing bottled Coca-cola products to the stores but were transferred as agency workers.
2. DOLE held the complainants regular employees entitled to additional claims. As soon as the
complainants learned this, they were immediately dismissed.
3. Complainants filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA ruled in their favor, ordered Coca-Cola
to reinstate them and to pay their full backwages.
4. NLRC rendered its decision and upheld the LA’s ruling. Also found that the relationship between
the parties in the controversy bore a striking similarity with the facts in the cases of Coca-cola vs.
National Organization of Workingmen
5. Upon appeal, CA reversed the LA and NLRC’s rulings and held that the petitioners were not
employees of coca cola.
Issue:
WON following the doctrine of stare decisis, the petitioners, as route helpers, can still be conserved as
respondent’s employees although they were already working for interserve.
Ruling:
1. Yes. It cannot be said that petitioners no longer enjoy the employee-employer relationship they
had with Coca-Cola since they became employees of interserve.
2. A pattern emerges by which coca-cola consistently resorts to various methods in order to deny its
route-helpers the benefits of regular employment. Adopts the rulings made in Pacquing that
Interserve was a labor-only contractor and that Coca-cola should be held liable pursuant to the
principle of stare decisis.
3. Art. 8 of the CC, the doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the court has ruled
that the abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons.
4. ITCAB, Coca-cola has not shown any strong and compelling reason to convince the court that the
doctrine of stare decisis should be applied.
5. Petition is granted.